Ethical Relativism
2002 Copyright Donald Hubin
Revised by Makoto Suzuki
Aims for Day 2
Distinguishing Descriptive theories and Normative theories
Understanding an argument for Descriptive Ethical Relativism
(DER) and its Weaknesses
Understanding an argument for Normative Ethical Relativism
(NER) and its Weaknesses
Understanding the implications of NER
Descriptive vs. Normative Ethics
Descriptive ethics is an enterprise that seeks to describe and
explain people’s moral attitudes and the moral practices of
societies. It is concerned with what is believed to be good, right or
virtuous and with what practices societies do have.
Moral psychology, sociology and anthropology on mores engage in
descriptive ethics.
Normative ethics is concerned with the determination of what is
good, right or virtuous and of what practices society ought to have.
Moral philosophy primarily engages in normative ethics.
Relativism and Universalism
People often define Ethical (or Moral) Relativism as the view that there
are no universal ethical standards—every ethical standard is relative
to a society (this is an aspect of ”Cultural Relativism”) or to an
individual.
They define Ethical (or Moral) Universalism as the view that at least
some ethical judgments are universal.
But these definitions are ambiguous: they do not distinguish
normative from descriptive theories.
It is important to distinguish different senses of ethical relativism. As
Rachels says, “some of them might be false even if others are true.”
(p.19)
Descriptive Ethical Relativism (DER)
Even at the most fundamental level, there are no
ethical judgments that are universally shared, and
no moral practices that are universally adopted (or
accepted).
Descriptive Ethical Universalism (DEU)
At least at the most fundamental level, there are
some (at least one) ethical judgments that are
universally shared or some (at least one) ethical
practices that are universally adopted.
This is the denial of DER.
Normative Ethical Relativism (NER)
There are no universally correct ethical judgments
and there are no practices that it would be correct to
adopt universally.
(This seems to be the thesis five on Rachels, p.19.)
Normative Ethical Universalism (NEU)
There are some (at least one) universally correct
ethical judgments and there are some (at least one)
practices that it would be correct to adopt
universally.
This is the denial of NER.
Descriptive vs. Normative
Remember:
Descriptive theories concern what moral views or practices are
ACTUALLT APPLIED or ADOPTED (i.e., what things people
BELIEVE to be good, right or virtuous, or what practices they
DO have).
Normative theories concern what moral views or practices are
CORRECT (i.e., what things are REALLY good, right or
virtuous).
The Positions
(Relativism and Universalism in the same level are mutually
exclusive.)
Philosophical Questions About Ethical
Relativism/Universalism
We will focus on DER and NER. Then, the philosophical questions
are:
Do the established facts support DER? (Rachels, 2.5, .6 and pp.
27-8)
Does DER support NER? (Rachels, 2.3)
What are the implications of NER?
(Rachels, 2.4)
Evaluating the Evidence for DER
The Evidence
There are cultural (and/or individual) variations in
people’s ethical judgments. (Rachels 2.3)
The Argument
“Inference to the Best Explanation”
The variation is best explained by DER. Generally
speaking, the best account is probable. So, DER is
probably true.
Argument for DER:
Criticism: Alternative Explanations (Rachels 2.5 and
p. 28):
Rachels’ point: ethical judgments might differ from culture to culture
NOT because people’s fundamental beliefs differ, but because people’s
(1) circumstances or (2) factual beliefs are different. (This is the answer
to Q4.)
(1) Circumstantial variation
Many ethical judgments are different from culture to culture because
their circumstances are different.
The fundamental ethical principles are shared, but the circumstances
are different, so (only) derived ethical judgments are different.
Circumstantial Variation: Example
As Rachels suggests on p. 28, people might share the fundamental
principle that one should adopt the practice that promotes the
welfare of people whose lives are affected by the practice.
Notice that different judgments are derived from this fundamental
principle, depending on the circumstances people live.
If Eskimo’s environment is tough as Rachels suggests, then the
fundamental principle might permit Eskimo to take possibly even
infanticide; though it does not permit us, those living in less harsh
environment, to take the actions.
Alternative Explanation 2:
Difference in Factual Beliefs
Many ethical judgments are different from culture to culture not
because people’s fundamental principles are different, but
because their factual beliefs are different.
The fundamental ethical principles are shared, but their factual
beliefs are different, so (only) derived ethical judgments are
different.
Alternative Explanation 2:
Difference in Factual Beliefs: Example
Rachel’s example of the people who do not eat cows (p.23)
What is the different belief the people have?
The belief that after death the souls of humans inhabit the bodies of animals,
especially cows.
Then, this difference in factual belief explains why we and they have
different derivative ethical judgments. If they share our ethical judgment
that it is wrong to kill and eat humans, given their belief, they will conclude
that it is wrong to kill and eat cows.
Criticism of the Argument for DER: Alternative
Explanations
So?
Different circumstances and/or different factual beliefs might better explain
the variations in people’s ethical judgments than DER does.
Then, DER is perhaps not the best account of the variations of people’s
ethical judgments.
Thus, the argument for DER fails to show DER is true.
Caution: This only means that one argument for DER fails. DER might still
be true. (Consider the relationship between the following argument and its
conclusion: “All bats are animals; some animals fly; therefore, all bats fly.”
This type of argument fails to support the conclusion, but the conclusion
might still be true.)
Philosophical Questions About Ethical
Relativism/Absolutism
Do the established facts support DER?
Does DER support NER?
What are the implications of NER?
From DER to NER ???
Normative Ethical Relativism (NER) does not follow
automatically from Descriptive Ethical Relativism (DER).
Confusing the different meanings of “Ethical Relativism” leads
some to think it does.
This point is made by Rachels on pp. 20-1.
From DER to NER (cont’d.)
In general, the fact that people have different beliefs (about the truth of a
judgment) does NOT show that there is no objective truth or that the truth is
relative to different people.
This is the point Rachels uses the example in geography to illustrate. (So the
above is the answer to Q1.)
People’s different beliefs about the shape of the earth, and the existence of
the objective truth (p. 20)
Other examples: people’s different beliefs about causes (of diseases, fire etc.),
about past events, and the elements of the universe, and so on.
From DEU to NEU ???
To be fair to Normative Ethical Relativists:
for the very same reason that Normative Ethical Relativism (NER)
doesn’t follow automatically from Descriptive Ethical Relativism
(DER), neither does Normative Ethical Universalism (NEU) follow
automatically from Descriptive Ethical Universalism (DEU).
From DER to NER: A Better Route
Perhaps Rachels is too quick to conclude that NER rests on a bad
argument. (p. 29)
Even if DER does not imply NER, it might be used to support NER.
Best Explanation Argument
The best explanation for why DER is true is NER.
That is, if, even at the most fundamental level, there are no
ethical judgments that are universally shared, this is best
explained by the hypothesis that there are no universally
correct ethical judgments.
Generally speaking, the best account is probable. So, NER is
probably true.
Does the Best Explanation Argument from DER to
NER Succeed?
To get the argument off the ground, one must show that NER is the
best explanation: i.e., that other explanations for why people have
fundamentally different ethical judgments are less adequate.
This has not been shown yet.
Can you hit upon alternative explanations?
Here is one. There are non-relative ethical truths, but they are hard
to know. Consequently, people have fundamentally different
ethical judgments.
Is this explanation of DER less adequate than the explanation of
DER by NER?