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					COEN 350

      Mobile Security
Wireless Security
   Wireless offers additional challenges:
       Physical media can easily be sniffed.
       War Driving
            Legal?
                  U.S. federal computer crime statute, Title 18 U.S.C. 1030,
                      Crime to knowingly access a computer used in interstate or

                        foreign communication "without authorization" and obtain
                        any information from the computer.
                      Crime to access a computer without authorization with

                        "intent to defraud" to obtain "anything of value."
                      But not if "the object of the fraud and the thing obtained

                        consists only of the use of the computer and the value of
                        such use is not more than $ 5,000 in any 1-year period."
Wireless Security
   Wireless offers additional challenges:
       Physical media can easily be sniffed.
       Mobile computing needs to preserve
        battery power.
            Calculations cost more on a mobile platform.
            Especially important for sensor networks
Wireless Security:
Attackers Perspective
   Knowing the Threat
       Targets of opportunity
            Goal is
                 Internet access.
                 Easy pickings.
       Targeted attacks
            Targets assets valuable enough.
       Internal attackers
            Most Dangerous
            Can open an unintentional security hole
IEEE 802.11
   Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
    Protocol
       Based on a shared secret k.
            Distributed out of band.
       Uses CRC for internal integrity protection.
       Uses RC4 to encrypt network traffic.
WEP Protocol
WEP Protocol
   Confidentiality
       Original packet is first check-summed.
       Checksum and data form the payload.
       Transmitting device creates a 24-bit
        random initialization vector IV.
       IV and shared key are used to encrypt with
        RC4
WEP Protocol
   RC4
       Generates a pseudo-random stream of
        bytes (keystream)
            Based on a secret internal state
                 Permutation S of all 256 possible bytes
                 Two index pointers
       Plaintext is XORed with keystream
WEP Protocol
   RC4
       Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA)
            Initializes S based on a key

        for i from 0 to 255
                  S[i] := i
        j := 0
        for i from 0 to 255
                  j := (j + S[i] + key[i mod keylength]) mod 256
                  swap(S[i],S[j])
WEP Protocol
   RC4
       Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm
        (PRGA)
            Generates pseudo-random byte stream

        i := 0
        j := 0
        while GeneratingOutput:
            i := (i + 1) mod 256
            j := (j + S[i]) mod 256
            swap(S[i],S[j])
            output S[(S[i] + S[j]) mod 256]
WEP Protocol
   RC4
       Known weaknesses
           Keystream slightly biased
                Fluhrer & McGrew attack can distinguish keystream
                 from random stream given a GB of input.
                Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir: statistics for output of the
                 first few bytes of output keystream are non-random,
                 leaking information about key.
WEP Protocol
   Authentication
       Station associating with access point needs
        to authenticate itself.
       Both exchange the type of authentication
        that is accepted.
            Open: Just identification between station and
             AP
            Shared Secret: Participants send nonces to
             each other, encrypt the nonce using WEP (and
             the shared secret key), and verify the other’s
             response.
WEP has no key management
   Everyone allowed to have access to a
    wireless network has the same key.
   Anyone with the key can read ALL
    traffic.
WEP: RC4
   RC4 uses the key and the IV to produce
    a stream of pseudo-random bytes.
   Calculates cipher text from plaintext by
    XORing the pseudo-random stream with
    the plain-text.
WEP: RC4
WEP: Attacks on RC4
   Dictionary Attack
            Build database:
            224 different IVs
            Build a database of 224 streams of MTU bytes
             (2,312 B) for each different IV.
            Takes < 40 GB storage.
       XOR two entries with the same IV.
            Result are the two plaintexts XORed.
            Natural language text has enough redundancy
             to decrypt the XOR of two text streams.
WEP: Attacks on RC4
   Dictionary Attack
       Many packages can be completely or
        partially guessed.
       XORing guessed plaintext and captured
        cipher gives pseudo-random byte stream
        for a given IV.
   Some implementations reset IVs poorly.
       This simplifies dictionary attacks.
WEP: Attacks on RC4
   Injection Attack
       Attacker creates packets on the wireless
        connection.
       Attacker XORs plaintext and cipher.
            Builds Pseudo-Random Stream database
             indexed by IV.
RC4
Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir Attack
   First few bits of several thousand
    messages reveals key.

       Based on an analysis of the RC4 code.
            Originally kept secret, but later leaked on the
             internet.
RC4
Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir Attack
   Key Scheduling Algorithm
       Sets up RC4 state array S
       S is a permutation of 0, 1, … 255
       Output generator uses S to create a
        pseudo-random sequence.
       First byte of output is given by
        S[S[1]+S[S[1]]].
            First byte depends on
                 {S[1], S[S[1], S[S[1]+S[S[1]]}
RC4
Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir Attack
   Key Scheduling Algorithm
       First byte of plain text package is part of the SNAP header
            0xAA for IP and ARP packages
            0xFF or 0xE0 for IPX
          Guessing the first byte is trivial
       Some IVs are vulnerable: “resolved”
            (KeyByte+3, 0xFF, *)
            Plus some more
       Easy to test whether an IV is vulnerable.
       Search for vulnerable IVs.
       They leak key bytes probabilistically.
       Large number of packets does it.
RC4
Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir Attack
   Optimization needs about 5,000,000 to
    1,000,000 packages.
   Counter-measures:
       Change key frequently.
       Change IV counters to avoid bad IVs.
WEP Message Modification
   WEP uses CRC code to ascertain integrity of
    messages.
   CRC code is linear:
       CRC(x  y) = CRC(x)  CRC(y).
   Attacker knows plaintext M and desired modification
     for target plaintext M’ = M  .
   Attacker want to substitute X = P(M,CRC(M)) for
    P(M’,CRC(M’)).
   Attacker sends
        X(,CRC())    = P(M,CRC(M)) (,CRC())
                        = P(M’,CRC(M’))
Wireless Insecurity Problems
   WiFi card software allows users to
    change the MAC address.
Wireless Security
   Casual user, low yield traffic
       WEP is good enough.
   Enterprise, Commercial
       Combine WEP with higher order security
            SSH
            VPN
            IPSec
WPA
   Created by WiFi Alliance
       Certification started April 2003
       Uses 802.1X authentication server
            Distributed different keys to each user.
       Can also be used in “pre-shared key” (PSK)
        mode
            Every user uses the same passphrase.
            Called WPA Personal
     IEEE 802.1X
   Standard for port-
    based authentication.
       Uses a third-party
        authentication server
        such as Radius




                                http://www.linux.com/howtos/8021X-HOWTO/index.shtml
WPA
   Protocol changes over WEP
       CRC is replaced by “Michael” MIC.
            MIC now includes a frame counter, preventing replay
             attacks.
            Payload bit flipping is now impossible.
       Data encryption still uses RC4, but now
            Prevents key recovery attacks on WEP by using
                 128b Key
                 48b Initialization vector
                 Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) changes key
                  dynamically.
TKIP
   Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
       Ensures that every data packet has its own
        encryption key.
802.11i
   Uses AES instead of RC4.
   Subset published as WPA2
   Uses 802.1X authentication
Protocol Layers
   WEP
       Privacy only.
       Very elementary security.
   WPA
       Temporal Key Exchange Protocol
             Fixes WEP that scrambles keys between packages and adds a secure
              message check.
   AES: Advanced Encryption Standard
       802.11i
       Military grade encryption, replaces DES
   802.1X
       General purpose and extensible framework for authentication users
        and generating / distributing keys.
   Simple Secure Network (SSN)
       Recipe for authentication based on 802.1X

				
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posted:11/30/2011
language:English
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