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					Briankle G. Chang: Deconstructing communication.
Representation, subject, and economics of exchange
The impossibility of       Clearly with parallels to Peters‟ book. Doubts the
communication              possibility of communication.
Communication              Communicare. Communality. Focus on sharing, social
                           intercourse, mutual exchange.
                           > A romantic view on communication. Symptomatic for
                           communication theory.
”Ideology of the           Conceptualization of communication as transcendence of
communicative”             difference is naïve. Reflects an implicit subjectivist
                           > Advocates an inverted image of communication as the
                           occurrence of Babel-like.
DECONSTRUCTION             Jacques Derrida: Deconstruction must execute two
                           related operations: mimesis and castration.
                           Always an asymmetry between explicit statement and its
                           implicit ”gesture”
Presupposes two things          The host text mut be (or thought to be) coherent,
                                   unified and meaningful.
                                The text, despite its own claim, is not coherent
                                   and unified.
                           This non-correspondece opens the text to deconstruction.
Desire for reason, logos        For presence and the consequent constructions of
                                   philosophical hierarchies based on transparency,
                                   identity and totality. Desire for primitive
                                Contrary desire coming from the far side of
                                   reason. Desire for deconstruction. Nietzsche,
                                   Heidegger, Derrida. Antimetaphysical desire.
                                   > An economy of nonfinality and undecidability.
First part of book         Traces the formation of the transcentental economy.
                           This modern theorizing of communication bears on
                           Husserlian phenomenology: ”radical Cartesianism” that
                           articulates this desire. Traces the formation of the
                           transcendental-hermeneutic foundation of modern
                           communication theories.
The second part of the     Seeks to undermine the transcendental-hermeneutic
book                       communication theories. Show how and why
                           communication theories fail.
Solution?                  A vision of the future enabled by post-phenomenological
                           thinking, especially deconstructivism.

Part 1: The transcendental economy
1. Phenomenology and after
Beginning anew           Symptomatic for Plato, for Descartes and finally for
                         philosophy generally: turning away from tradition in
                         order to inagurate a new beginning.
Descartes‟s Meditations  The discovery of the one indubitable fact: cogito. An
                         achoring point for all future knowledge. The essence of
                         human being as dependent of that person. The absolute
                         certainty of the ego, the distinctive subjecctum.
Cogito > new metaphysics A new relation between thinking and being. A
                         rationalized philosophy. The age of reason.
Crisis                   Recurring because of the philosophical need to do
                         everything all over again.
Husserl‟s phenomenology Wishes to reconstruct philosophy as a rigorous, precise
- the objective of       science in a time of crises-ridden European philosophical
transcendental           scene. Rearticulating a First Philosophy (as the
phenomenology            beginning of all sciences).
Being for consciousness  Unfolds in the form of a science of transcendental
                         subjectivity. “Transcendental phenomenology is
                         concerned with the “region” of absolute beings, “since
                         everything we can in general speak of as „being‟
                         (Seiendem) is being (Sein) for sconsciousness and must
                         permit the justification for its beings posited as being to
                         the exhibited consciousness.” (7)
Move beyond positivism   Transcendental phenomenology as a truly universal
                         ontology with a comprehensive analysis of beings and
Where does               From naïve cognition of reality to the reality of
phenomenology begin?     congnition.
                         Phenomenology begins by performing reduction: by
                         abstracting whatever is reducible in experience. I.e.
                         whatever is transcendent to consciousness.
The intentionality of    Understood in strict relation to consciousness.
consciousness            Intentionality: The intentionality of consciousness.
                         Consciousness as invariably a consciousness of…
                         Consciousness inescapably transcends itself toward the
                         world, something other than itself.
Transcendence and        Not every instance of being is mind-dependent.
consciousness            Phenomena that are outwardly beyond conscious
                         processes. Instances of in-itself that hold their opacity in
                         opposition to any intending act. Instances of being that
                         are transcendent to the immanent stream of
                         consciousness. Resist any arbitrary appropriation by the
                         reductive consciousness.
Immanence                The intending consciousness – by its nature bipolar and

                            reflexive. Immanence as the totality of reflexive mental
                            processes: constructing the intellectual constellation of
                            recursively intended objects of consciousness in and by
                            consciousness itself.
Don‟t get it yet?           “‟Immanence‟ refers to consciousness‟s own interior
                            plenitude, while „transcendence‟ indicates the possibility
                            of exteriority as the very „irreducibility of what is meant
                            to the particular act or acts in which it is meant‟” (9).
Reduction in two steps      First step is to let objects the chance to show themselves
                            as they truly are. Descriptive phase, a means to an end.
                            “Critical” as in moving beyond mere assumptions.
    Approaching objects as f.ex. approaching a tree as a noema (what is meant by
                    nomeas object, phenomena). From a tree in nature to an object in
                            consciousness. “reduction purifies the perceptual object
                            by neutralizing the prejudgments that under normal
                            practical circumstances would consume it” (10). Brings
                            us closer to the reality of the object.
          Step two: Eidetic Uncovering the essence of the object. An eidetic
                  reduction analyses of what the descriptive step discovers.
                            > into a kind of essentialism.
                            Essence as the structure that governs a range of actual
                            and possible objects. What makes objects objects of the
                            same type.
     Imagination necessary Free variation in fantasy through three steps: exemplary
                            intuition, imaginative repetition, synthesis.
                            Towards an overreaching act of identification, an act of
                            synthetic abstraction. Identifying the core, the
                            indisputable identitical.
A radical phenomenology Beyond its Cartesian point of departure. Evolves into a
                            theory of essence (in relation to essentialism?). “I think”
                            tells only half the story.
                            Exceeds Descartes‟s doubt, and revives the Platonic
                            illumination of the true being of things.
The primacy of the ego      As a consequence of the reduction process. A self-
                            identical ego as a functinoal center of the transcendent.
                            World perceived as dependent on ego. Being for me. The
                            ego becomes a singular constitutive agent of the world.
The pure ego                Once the reduction has been performed thoroughly. The
                            reductive process must be continued up to the
                            transcendental ego – the only irreducible foundation.
> transcendental ego        insofar as it constitutes itself while motivating objective
                            or transcendent beings through its own intentional life.
                            Functions as the kern central from which the world
Solipsism?                  From radical empirism to an idealism of the ego. A
                            subjectivist idealist position.
Phenomenonology             The total triumph of interiority over exteriority and of

egologized                the immanent over the transcendent.
Two Husserlian                - A philosophy of “constitution”, of the productoin
phenomenologies                   of meaning and the constituted objects.
                              - A philosophy of givenness, of intuitive contact,
                                  the in-person presence of the things themselves
This dual incompatible    > phenomenological reduction forced to play two
demand                    different inconcruent roles:
                              1. As a descriptive endeavor, phenomenology is
                              2. A post-Cartesian theory of subject that
                                  modernizes the moment of certainty.
Towards transcendental    How can the otherness of other be justified? The
solipsism                 problem other egos and other subjects, of the plurality of
                          subjects and the reality of the social.
The problem of            Other egos are intentional subjects too.
intersubjectivity         An intrinsic difficulty of the transcendental problematic
                          betrayed in an asymmetry or nonreciprocity between the
                          I and others.
Asymmetry and lack of     How to account for what is other than I.
“Sphere of my ownness”    The initial reduction: the reduction to sphere of ownness.
                          A transference from me to others > Recognized as
                          something “alien”, an alter ego. Enables the other ego to
                          take shape in a mirro image of me. First constitute a
                          sense ego, the transport the sense “alter ego” to the
                          * But how move from the sense “alter ego” to the other
                          as a genuine and legitimate ego-subject.
Analogical apprehension   The other has to be apprehended through the experience
                          ego has of itself.
                          We perceive the other by the appearance of the other‟s
                          body. Inferential movement, but we do not disclose its
Pairing                   > passive genesis (origin): one understands something
                          new by analogy with something familiar. Pairing
From paired body to       The other body must be verified.
another ego-subject       Two-fold verification:
                              - bodily expressions as indicative signs. (Dis)
                                  confirmation of what the other body expresses
                              - These indicative signs must exhibit “a
                                  [continuous] unitary transcending experience”.
                                  The anthropological principle of concordant
                          Alters the status of the paired being, elevating it into an
                          intentional being, an ego-monad.
Overcoming solipsism?     Chang means not.
                          Egology + intersubjective phenomenology: intermonadic
                          community and forms of social communalization, each
                          possessing the character of personalities of a higher

                          order. Chang however does not mean the transfer from
                          egological phenomenology to intersubjective
                          phenomenology is that smooth.
             Two problems     1. The plausibility of analogizing apprehension: can
                                  one attribute equal validity to presentation and
                                  appresentation, “so that (…) one can move from
                                  what is given originally and immediately
                                  (presented) to what originally lies outside the
                                  sphere of ownness (appresented)” (26).
                              2. analogizing apprehension depend on a minimal
                                  level of similarity between the two bodies being
                                  paired. However, I do not find Chang‟s argument
                                  very convincing at this point.
                          Perception defined by a relation of visibility in the living
                          presence; apperception claims knowledge beyond
                          perceptual visibility.
Husserl‟s failure         The other ego has to be more than a sense, more than a
                          being-for-me. Still in the final analysis the other is no
                          more than a moment in the constitutive productivity of
                          the ego. It is still the I who gives sense to the that other
                          ego. Essentially an asymmetrical I-other relationship.
                          The problem of solipsism has not been dissolved.
The sovereignity of the   The ego constitutes the world and the truth, it constitutes
subject                   everything but itself.
No remaining reality      No residual reality. The transcendental subject reigns
                          without challenge.
Philosophical modernism The sovereign subject representes the break with the
                          classic tradition.

2 / Communication before deconstruction
Husserl‟s impact      Husserl‟s vission of a First Philosophy has been
                      prominent within the twentieth-century theoretical
                      Phenomenological elements into the humanities and the
                      social sciences.
Phenomenologically    Describe, the everyday life-world, insider‟s point of
inspired ideas and    view, reduction, presence, transcendence, the subject,
concepts              life-world, temporality, transcendental consciousness,
Communication studies Emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s? Influences
                      from phenomenology are visible.
Chapter outline            1. How this phenomenological consciousness
                              makes possible the clear articulation of a subject-
                              based problematic.
                           2. How and why these theories necessarily fail to
                              answer the question of mediation <-- idealist
                              vision of the subject

Althusser: the problematic  Looking beneath theories to uncover their foundation.
                            Performing a “symptomatic reading” the available
                            theories --> reconstruct the system behind the words.
Epistemological field       Constitutes “a problematic”. Functions as the latent
                            thought-structure enabling the production of theories.
                            The prolematic gives order to the pretheoretical chaos
                            and determines what counts as a legitimate scientific
The central challenge       How is individuality transcended? How is sharing
                            meaning/understanding achieved? Concerns questioning
                            what is usually taken for granted.
                            Ricoeur: (…) Because [it]… appears as a way of
                            transcending or overcoming the fundamental solitude of
                            each human being.” (39).
Central mystery             Communication seems to be a necessary fact. Yet
                            communication appears to be enigmatic, a person‟s
                            individuality as a difference that sets a person apart from
                            all others. Can both be possible? The possibility of
                            transcending individuality.
Presuppes a conception of In short noncommunication. Overcoming the dilemma of
subjectivity as essentially understanding the individual, the egocentric subject as
solitary                    bot monadlike and coexisting.
Modernized                  Inagurated by Husserl‟s transcendental subject. This
transcendentalism           constitutes the background for thematizing the solitary
                            subject of communication. Both existing with and
                            necessarily distanced from other subject and the social
The solitary subject        The primitive of the problematic of communication.
                                 1. It is a necessary constituent of the problematic.
                                 2. The nature of the solitary subject is determined
                                    before its participation in the problematic. Before
                                    the theory.
Problem of mediation        The challenge of communication translated into a
                            challenge of privacy. The problem of communication
                            rewritten as a problem of mediaton. How can solitary
                            subjects share understandings. Closing the gap between
                            the islandlike monads.
                            Communication represents the embodiment of an
                            interplay between self and other.
From individual to          The telos of communication as a dialectical becoming.
commonality                 The I becomes a member of the We.
Communication as            The delivery of messages. The specific adressing
transmission                according to receiver. Communicatio as delivery.
The postal principle        - the more general principle governing the dialectic of
                            mediation. The postal principle as the medium of
                            communication rather than the reverse. The presupposed

                          identity of both the addresser and the addressee, and the
                          identity of the message.
Why postal principle      Unifies the concepts of communication, exchange, and
                          mediation under one rule – its own rationality as
                          universal mediation. This postal ideology explains why
                          the concept of communication so easily translates into
                          the concept of mediation. Really?
Potential problems with   It seems to me that Chang works with at least two
Chang                     somewhat dubious premisses: that communication
                          effortlessly translates into mediation; and that in creating
                          and sending messages, receiving is already inscribed in
                          the sending, that the addressee must be known prior to
                          the sending.
Metaphors to explain      Metaphors easily step over their function and stand in
communication             place of the concept they are supposed to illustrate. A
                          trespassing of the abstrac by the concrete, a reversal of
                          the signifier and the signified.
The danger of             Raises questions regarding the validity of explanatory
overreliance of metaphors discourses in which the usurpation takes place. Are
                          communication theories nothing but postal constructs?
Derrida on metaphors in   The founding concepts of philosophy are metaphorical
philosophy                and philosophy is as such not rational altough appearing
                          to be. A heliotropic system of metaphors. Philosophy is
                          necessarily a culture-specific tropology. Has become
                          powerlessto control the tropology that has empowered it.
Towards “hermeneutics of Sceptisism toward the foundatio of communication
suspicion” towards the    theory inspired by Derrida‟ scepticism.
origin of communication   Theories of communication, relying on metaphors, as not
theory                    different from fictional artifacts?
Resisit parrotry when     Staying within the problematic of communication, yet
rereading                 remaining indifferent to its suggestions.
How?                      How is the problematic of communication as an active
                          structure of determination itself determined?
                          How does the postal government of communication
                          itself display the same kind of metaphorical
                          displacement that is displayed in the postal construction
                          of communication?
Dialogical nature         “I give myself verbal shape from another‟s point of
                          view” (56). Verbal (only?) communication requires a
                          minimal level of reciprocity. Perspective taking.
                          Parallels to G. H. Mead (and hence symbolic
Language/code             Communication, communality, co-operation. Language
                          makes this possible in the first place. More precisly the
                          code. Establishes the possibility of commonality in a
                          world of differences and the basis for co-ordination.
Code/intersubjectivity    The code is essentially intersubjective. Intersubjectivity
                          as the key term in explaining how individuality is

                             Codes translates what is subjective into something
                             objective or accessible.
Intersubjectivity thus the   Answers the question of communication: how
mediating term               individuality is transcended. The conflict between the
                             natural certainty (we communicate) and the reflective
                             puzzle (solipsism).
First: definition            Explaining the unknown by means of the more
The problematic of           Fundamentally at triadic structure of subject, mediation,
communication                intersubjectivity. Chained together by the postal
The problem of the           Generated from within the problematic in response to the
concept of                   problematic‟s initial move of postulating a solitary
intersubjectivity            subject. This way the concept and meaning of
                             intersubjectivity blocks any further exploration of the
                             relation between privacy and mediation without really
                             explaining anything.
“The logic of “deferral”     Parallel to the concepts of “social role” and “interaction”
(suspension)                 in sociology. Tautologically defined: one is defined or
                             clarified in relation to the other. Radically compromises
                             the explanatory utility of the concepts.
                             The same can be said about the postal play taking place
                             between mediation and intersubjectivity in
                             communication theories.
            Trades away the      1. Intersubjectivity functions as a transcendental
       explanatory integrity         signifier. It accounts for mediation but is itself
                                     unaccounted for.
                                 2. As a signifier immune to reflexive critique,
                                     intersubjectivity designates the problematic‟s
                                     own blind spot.
                             The theoretical challenge of solipsism is silenced.
Tautologically understood Communication and intersubjectivity can only be
                             tautologically understood. The lack of a terminal referent
                             whose meaning does not presuppose prior understanding
                             of the terms within the problematic.

3 / The inaugural relation:
toward an ontology of communication
DeMan: no natural            Reality constituted as such by linguistic signs according
unrhetorical language        to their own reason. Establishes the world as present.
Rhetorical turn              Rhetoric as epistemic and ontological.
Communication theories       Captives of their metaphors, their rhetoric.
                             How then can theorizing about communication find a
                             way out of the metaphorical mess and still respond to the
                             initial existential eigma that brings that theorizing into
                             being (the fact of communication taking place +

Chang‟s aim                 Conduct a Heideggerian critique of the “textual
                            prehistory” of communication theories. An archeological
                            reading of the movement between the two signifiers
                            communication and intersubjectivity to uncover the
                            staging of elements that supports the double play of the
                            metaphorical couple of mediation and intersubjectivity.
                            --> a nontranscendental regrounding of communication
Husserl‟s post-Cartesian    Not a simple or innocent point of departure although
self                        Husserl seems to believe so. Identity “actualizes itself as
                            a grasping of itself by the unity that I am in myself”
                            (Nancy in Chang: 74). “Cogito” presupposes a self-
                            constituted ego.
The question of self-       “if the foundation of philosophy is to be found in the I
foundation                  think, could the thinking of an I be a good judge of the
                            validity of its own thinking?” (75).
                            The problem of self-reflection because of the problem of
                            infinite regress.
Self-reflection             Cannot provide anything beyond the empty truism that
                            the reflecting self is capable of self-reflection. With a
                            starting point in the self, reflection can never close the
                            gap between that which reflects and that which is
                            reflected upon.
Husserl‟s shift to          A response to the problem of infinite regress. A need to
transcendental              install a “firstness of the ego” to halt the reduction. A
phenomenology               moment of aboslute knowledge above and beyond the
                            sphere of infinite regress. The stopping point of the
                            transcendental consciousness. Necessary to avoid
                            scepticism and relativism.
Difficulties with Husserl‟s Especially concerning the question of intersubjectivity.
transcendentalism           The chasm between the self and other seems decisive
                            and too wide to cross. There is no escape from solipsism
                            (although reduction promises exactly that).
Existential turn            By Husskerl‟s followers. Reverting to the mundane
                            world of everyday life. Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger,
                            Sartre. Looking at the surrounding worl: individuals act
                            and react before they reflect. Intersubjectivitiy is
                            declassified and becomes an intramundane problem. The
                            everyday world is already a world with others.
Already                     Changes its meaning from temporarily prior to logically
                            following. Takes on additional meaning of
                            “metaphysical priority.” States a relation between
                            concepts. Intersubjectivity gets metaphysical priority
                            over the subject. Hence, no problem of solipsism.
The “alreadyness” of the    The ego lives and interacts with others before it becomes
life-world                  aware of its solitude (clearly there are parallels here to
                            Lacan‟s emancipating-from-mother theories?). The

                              social nature of the world is a definitive fact. The world
                              is intersubjective. Intersubjectivity precedes
How is a common world         How does it come about? The formation of the
possible?                     intersubjective lifeworld.
                              Cannot be answered at the level of descriptive
                              phenomenology (descr. ph. the same as exist. ph.?)
The metaphysical problem      Pushes phenomenology into a social ontology.
of fundamental-grounding      An impossible project? <-- every attempt leads to a
                              situation with three unacceptable alternatives.
Trilemma:                     (1) infinite regress. (2) a logical circle: one is forced to
                              resort to statements that have already shown themselves
                              to be in need of grounding. (3) a stopping of the process
                              at one point > arbitrary suspension.
                              Intersubjective phenomenology faces this trilemma
                              because it cannot eschew the question of how it is
Crucial task                  To identify at which moment cessation takes place and
                              determine the implications for the conceptual system.
Post-Husserlian               The rejection of the transcendental pov.; and the
phenomenologies               opposition to the reduction ti the sphere of ownness.
reactions                     Focus is rather on the everyday world.
                              Radical redefinition of the phenomenological enterprise.
--> Schutz and Luckmann       The everyday life-world is man‟s fundamental and
                              paramount reality. That part of reality which we take for
                              granted as common sense.
                              - Entails as such an ontological commitment. Responds
                              to the problem of fundamental-grounding.
The everyday life             Where social life begins and where intersubjective
                              phenomenology marks its reflexive point of
Taken for granted             > the irreducibility of a naïve trust in reality.
                              > the permanence of that faith: there is always some part
                              of reality that is accepted as valid or unproblematic.
The concept of the life-      In the post-Husserlian phenomenology of
world signals the moment      intersubjectivity. Now the search for intersubjectivity
of cessation                  can be laid to rest. Descriptive phenomenology reaches
                              its borderline, social ontology takes over.
Intersubjectivity             From the transcendental subject to the taken-for-granted
reanchored                    intersubjective life-world. The intersubjective life-world
                              begins as a descriptive concept, but ends as an
                              ontological postulate.
Ontologizing the life-        The only way to terminate the infinite regress of
world                         searching for ground.
But bypasses the question     The strategy of ontologizing is a strategy of
of the relation between the   prioritization.
subject and the world         The transcendence of subjectivity remains a problem.
What is still missing         A fundamental ontology as a crtique of subjectivity.
                              --> Heideggeria turn: give way to a fundamental
                              ontology that responds to the hermeneutic complexity of

                           Juxtaposing being and communication.
Heidegger‟s fundamental    Launched against representational metaphysics
ontology                   (epistemology is really metaphysical).
The question of Being      Diachronic thinking of the nature of Being.
                           A return to metaphysics focusing on the sources of
                           intelligibility implicit in our everyday existence.
Rupture with               Critical of Husserl‟s prejudgement, depends on a
Husserlianism              postulated distinciton between subject and object;
                           between consciousness and its object.
A hermeneutic inquiry of   Preliminary to a illuminating of Being as such.
Dasein – being there       Returning to where man already and always is: being-in-
                           the-world. A world of cultural and historical meanings.
Heidegger‟s reading of     Metaphysics becomes problematic again. The critique of
Kant                       pure reason. Inherits from Descartes the idea that the
                           basic condition of knowledge is the ego as “I think.” The
                           ego exists as a permanent principle of thinking and
                           cannot be a representation or a represented object.
                           Functions as the fundamental ontological foundation of
                           being. All things that are not the I, are something that
But what is the difference stand as something else in relation to a subject. The
between Kant and           Being of all things are determined by their relation to the
Husserl?                   subject.
The search for Being       Directed toward the subjective roots of the
                           transcendental consciousness.
The problem with Kant‟s    Fails to grasp the transcendental I as factical and an
representionism            essentially temporal existence. Fails to recognize that “I
                           (am)” us always and already somewhere and at some
                           point in time.
                           Kant is trapped by the transcendental illusion.
Kant‟s transcendental      ”an inquiry into the ultimate conditions a priori in terms
critique of knowledge      of which there is knowledge. This meant that it had to be
                           an inquiry into thinking per se as productive of
                           knowledge, into the structure of thinking, and thus into
                           the ultimate unconditioned grounds and sources of
Heidegger critique of Kant Kant‟s critical idealims subordinates object to subject
                           leading to a high degree of ontological indeterminacy.
Fundamental ontology       Heidegger‟s proposal. Traditional ontology does not
                           problematize the nature of Being. This must be the
                           starting point for ontology.
                           ” Heidegger hopes to recover a more original sense of
                           things by setting aside reality as seen from theorizing
                           and focusing on the way things show up in the flux of
                           every pre-reflective activities

                             Heidegger begins by asking the question of traditional

                              ontology, “What is the being of entities?” But Heidegger
                              quickly asks “What is the meaning of being?” or else
                              ontology will remain naïve and opaque

                             Since what things are [their being] is accessible only if
                             intelligible to us, “fundamental ontology” will clarify the
                             meaning [that is, the conditions of intelligibility] of
                             things in general” (Anil Mitra: Heidegger on Being)
A two-ponged task:               1. The question of the topos of being: where is this
fundamental ontology is a             internal possibility of understanding of Being to
hermeneutic topology of               be found?
Being                            2. The question of interpreting that understanding
                                      once that topos is located.
Starts from a                The meaning of Being available as an always already
preontological               vague, avergae understanding of Being. Preunderstood
understanding of Being       as ”that which determines beings as being. From this the
                             ontological clarification of Being must proceed.
Where to start               No guarantee that one is able to enter the hermeneutical
                             circle of this preunderstaning of Being in a manner
                             adequate to the task,
The questioning              The ontological must be sought in the ontic [refering to
                             existing reality; concerned with the facts of entities], but
                             how can the former be canvassed in adequate clarity on
                             the basis of the latter?
                             The question of Being is immediately reflexive. To the
                             questioning of Being one has to add a questioning of the
                             questioning and of the questioner.
Fundamental ontology         A topology of Being and a reflexive hermeneutic
                             converge as one in fundamental ontology.
Dasein                       ”this being, which we ourselves are and which has
                             questioning as one of its possibilities of Being.”
                             ” By using the expression Dasein, Heidegger called
                             attention to the fact that a human being cannot be taken
                             into account except as being an existent in the middle of
                             a world amongst other things (Warnock 1970), that
                             Dasein is „to be there‟ and „there‟ is the world. To be
                             human is to be fixed, embedded and immersed in the
                             physical, literal, tangible day to day world”
       Essentially reflexive being both the subject and object of reflection,
                             ”Dasein constitutes an existential opening in the form of
                             a temporal, historical and mortal organization where
                             being first becomes apparent and approachable”. (98).
Exposure as in making        Of Dasein‟s need of being and the hidden meaning of
manifest or laying bare      this needfulness.
                             To expose metaphysics as representationism. Setting the
                             limits of metaphysics. Starting point: no longer in the I‟s
                             a priori structures of objective knowledge but in our
                             being‟s involvement with things and with others.
Being-in-the-world           The originary basis of metaphysics.

The mutation of             From Husserl to Heidegger: has to do with the role of
transcendentalism           man: the condition of our knowledge is sought in our
                            relation to the being of entities in their totality.
Husserl‟s eidetic-noetic    Eidetic: precise, detailed, photographic memory
phenomenology               Noetic: referring to the mind or intellect, or to
                            understanding gained through human rational processes.
                            - Subject/ego understands world through a precise
                            intellectual (transcendental) process?
Dasein                      Critical extension of Husserl‟s understanding of what
                            constitutes phenomenological evidence. I.e. evidence of
                            reality, of entities in the life-world?
Husserl‟s phenomenology Omits questioning the phenomena themselves.
comes to short              Overconfidence in transcendental optics: --> blurs the
                            distinction between the given and its appearance.
                            Hermeneutic shortcoming.
Radicalizing the            Cannot be understood solely as immanent/located inside
conception of               the subject. ”I can see a natural thing in its bodily
transcendence               presence only on the basis of this being-in-the-world”
                            (Heidegger in Chang: 101). Dasein: the constitutive
                            antecedence of the subject‟s relfective possibilities.
Dasein destroys the         And destroys the dualist economy that priviliges te
representational            subject over the object.
metaphysics                 Man and world: distinct yet essentially related. Must be
                            considered to be mutually constitutive.
Dasein as a way of being    Whose essence is its relation with the world and its
                            possibilities thereof.
Let go of Husserl‟s         Dasein is always outside, alongside entities. Hence the
constructionist theory of   knower cannot be substantialized as the origin of the
knowledge                   known.
                            Antisubstantial, antidualist understanding of Dasein <--
Openness/disclosure         Phainomena as something that of themselves show
                            themselves or appear. Appears as something meaningful
                            (with a function?). Most entities simply occupy space
                            and persist through time [but this seems to be related to
                            physical entities alone – what about transcendental
                            concepts?] Dasein however, stands ahead of itself, open
                            to its own possibilities as transcendence [aka beyond the
                            limits of experience?]
Dasein has no essence       As in fixed qualities. Dasein cannot be anything but its
Dasein is openness          Being-in as in being-alongside: being open for.
Situated disclosure         Points to the mutual presence of Dasein and the world.
                            The coming into presence of the average everyday world
Significance-world          as a structure of significance: specific situation, place in
                            the world and its moment in history.
Hermeneutic turn to         The truth is as much a matter of producing as it is of
phenomenology               proving.
Dasein rejects the centered Because Dasein and world are equiprimordial (equally

and centralizing subject?     basic (primordial) and mutually interdependent. They
                              pick out different aspects within a unified, integrally
                              connected whole, and one cannot exist without the
The meaning of Dasein         Consist in the radical inseparability of man and the
                              world. An essential and internal relation.
                              Man and world are ontologically the same though
                              ontically distinct. Ek-sistence as an intertext of man and
Relational ontology           Dasein is a structrual whole. Being as ek-sistence is a
                              relational totality a priori of any ontic difference.
Being as presence             A thing is no-thing apart from its internal relation to
                              difference. It‟s identity depends on a reference-to-other.
Difference                    Entitites are co-relative, otherness hence ceases to be
                              merely other. Difference from other is at the same time
                              relation to other.
                              This difference implies a relation to other thing, implies
                              the cessation of its being-for-itself.
Being as interrelatedness     Both multiple and singular. Being is streched out
                              between interraled beings.
Establishes the possibility   Because of the relational structure of Being at the
of communication              ontological level. Yet subjects are different at the ontic
                              Ontologically communication has always and already
                              occurred. Precedes existence.
Communication                 I.e. subject is the effect of communication.
constitutes the wordly        Communication is the ontological foundation from
individual as subject         which intersubjective exchanges receive the possibility
                              of expressing their spatial and temporal multiplicity.
                              Because communication always and already exists,
                              questioning the possibility of intersubjectivity becomes


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