Briankle G. Chang: Deconstructing communication.
Representation, subject, and economics of exchange
The impossibility of Clearly with parallels to Peters‟ book. Doubts the
communication possibility of communication.
Communication Communicare. Communality. Focus on sharing, social
intercourse, mutual exchange.
> A romantic view on communication. Symptomatic for
”Ideology of the Conceptualization of communication as transcendence of
communicative” difference is naïve. Reflects an implicit subjectivist
> Advocates an inverted image of communication as the
occurrence of Babel-like.
DECONSTRUCTION Jacques Derrida: Deconstruction must execute two
related operations: mimesis and castration.
Always an asymmetry between explicit statement and its
Presupposes two things The host text mut be (or thought to be) coherent,
unified and meaningful.
The text, despite its own claim, is not coherent
This non-correspondece opens the text to deconstruction.
Desire for reason, logos For presence and the consequent constructions of
philosophical hierarchies based on transparency,
identity and totality. Desire for primitive
Contrary desire coming from the far side of
reason. Desire for deconstruction. Nietzsche,
Heidegger, Derrida. Antimetaphysical desire.
> An economy of nonfinality and undecidability.
First part of book Traces the formation of the transcentental economy.
This modern theorizing of communication bears on
Husserlian phenomenology: ”radical Cartesianism” that
articulates this desire. Traces the formation of the
transcendental-hermeneutic foundation of modern
The second part of the Seeks to undermine the transcendental-hermeneutic
book communication theories. Show how and why
communication theories fail.
Solution? A vision of the future enabled by post-phenomenological
thinking, especially deconstructivism.
Part 1: The transcendental economy
1. Phenomenology and after
Beginning anew Symptomatic for Plato, for Descartes and finally for
philosophy generally: turning away from tradition in
order to inagurate a new beginning.
Descartes‟s Meditations The discovery of the one indubitable fact: cogito. An
achoring point for all future knowledge. The essence of
human being as dependent of that person. The absolute
certainty of the ego, the distinctive subjecctum.
Cogito > new metaphysics A new relation between thinking and being. A
rationalized philosophy. The age of reason.
Crisis Recurring because of the philosophical need to do
everything all over again.
CRISIS AND BEYOND: THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL WAY
Husserl‟s phenomenology Wishes to reconstruct philosophy as a rigorous, precise
- the objective of science in a time of crises-ridden European philosophical
transcendental scene. Rearticulating a First Philosophy (as the
phenomenology beginning of all sciences).
Being for consciousness Unfolds in the form of a science of transcendental
subjectivity. “Transcendental phenomenology is
concerned with the “region” of absolute beings, “since
everything we can in general speak of as „being‟
(Seiendem) is being (Sein) for sconsciousness and must
permit the justification for its beings posited as being to
the exhibited consciousness.” (7)
Move beyond positivism Transcendental phenomenology as a truly universal
ontology with a comprehensive analysis of beings and
Where does From naïve cognition of reality to the reality of
phenomenology begin? congnition.
Phenomenology begins by performing reduction: by
abstracting whatever is reducible in experience. I.e.
whatever is transcendent to consciousness.
The intentionality of Understood in strict relation to consciousness.
consciousness Intentionality: The intentionality of consciousness.
Consciousness as invariably a consciousness of…
Consciousness inescapably transcends itself toward the
world, something other than itself.
Transcendence and Not every instance of being is mind-dependent.
consciousness Phenomena that are outwardly beyond conscious
processes. Instances of in-itself that hold their opacity in
opposition to any intending act. Instances of being that
are transcendent to the immanent stream of
consciousness. Resist any arbitrary appropriation by the
Immanence The intending consciousness – by its nature bipolar and
reflexive. Immanence as the totality of reflexive mental
processes: constructing the intellectual constellation of
recursively intended objects of consciousness in and by
Don‟t get it yet? “‟Immanence‟ refers to consciousness‟s own interior
plenitude, while „transcendence‟ indicates the possibility
of exteriority as the very „irreducibility of what is meant
to the particular act or acts in which it is meant‟” (9).
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION: FROM PHENOMENON TO EIDOS
Reduction in two steps First step is to let objects the chance to show themselves
as they truly are. Descriptive phase, a means to an end.
“Critical” as in moving beyond mere assumptions.
Approaching objects as f.ex. approaching a tree as a noema (what is meant by
nomeas object, phenomena). From a tree in nature to an object in
consciousness. “reduction purifies the perceptual object
by neutralizing the prejudgments that under normal
practical circumstances would consume it” (10). Brings
us closer to the reality of the object.
Step two: Eidetic Uncovering the essence of the object. An eidetic
reduction analyses of what the descriptive step discovers.
> into a kind of essentialism.
Essence as the structure that governs a range of actual
and possible objects. What makes objects objects of the
Imagination necessary Free variation in fantasy through three steps: exemplary
intuition, imaginative repetition, synthesis.
Towards an overreaching act of identification, an act of
synthetic abstraction. Identifying the core, the
A radical phenomenology Beyond its Cartesian point of departure. Evolves into a
theory of essence (in relation to essentialism?). “I think”
tells only half the story.
Exceeds Descartes‟s doubt, and revives the Platonic
illumination of the true being of things.
PHENOMENOLOGY AS TRANSCENDENTAL EGOLOGY
The primacy of the ego As a consequence of the reduction process. A self-
identical ego as a functinoal center of the transcendent.
World perceived as dependent on ego. Being for me. The
ego becomes a singular constitutive agent of the world.
The pure ego Once the reduction has been performed thoroughly. The
reductive process must be continued up to the
transcendental ego – the only irreducible foundation.
> transcendental ego insofar as it constitutes itself while motivating objective
or transcendent beings through its own intentional life.
Functions as the kern central from which the world
Solipsism? From radical empirism to an idealism of the ego. A
subjectivist idealist position.
I AND OTHERS: THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Phenomenonology The total triumph of interiority over exteriority and of
egologized the immanent over the transcendent.
Two Husserlian - A philosophy of “constitution”, of the productoin
phenomenologies of meaning and the constituted objects.
- A philosophy of givenness, of intuitive contact,
the in-person presence of the things themselves
This dual incompatible > phenomenological reduction forced to play two
demand different inconcruent roles:
1. As a descriptive endeavor, phenomenology is
2. A post-Cartesian theory of subject that
modernizes the moment of certainty.
Towards transcendental How can the otherness of other be justified? The
solipsism problem other egos and other subjects, of the plurality of
subjects and the reality of the social.
The problem of Other egos are intentional subjects too.
intersubjectivity An intrinsic difficulty of the transcendental problematic
betrayed in an asymmetry or nonreciprocity between the
I and others.
Asymmetry and lack of How to account for what is other than I.
“Sphere of my ownness” The initial reduction: the reduction to sphere of ownness.
A transference from me to others > Recognized as
something “alien”, an alter ego. Enables the other ego to
take shape in a mirro image of me. First constitute a
sense ego, the transport the sense “alter ego” to the
* But how move from the sense “alter ego” to the other
as a genuine and legitimate ego-subject.
Analogical apprehension The other has to be apprehended through the experience
ego has of itself.
We perceive the other by the appearance of the other‟s
body. Inferential movement, but we do not disclose its
Pairing > passive genesis (origin): one understands something
new by analogy with something familiar. Pairing
From paired body to The other body must be verified.
another ego-subject Two-fold verification:
- bodily expressions as indicative signs. (Dis)
confirmation of what the other body expresses
- These indicative signs must exhibit “a
[continuous] unitary transcending experience”.
The anthropological principle of concordant
Alters the status of the paired being, elevating it into an
intentional being, an ego-monad.
Overcoming solipsism? Chang means not.
Egology + intersubjective phenomenology: intermonadic
community and forms of social communalization, each
possessing the character of personalities of a higher
order. Chang however does not mean the transfer from
egological phenomenology to intersubjective
phenomenology is that smooth.
Two problems 1. The plausibility of analogizing apprehension: can
one attribute equal validity to presentation and
appresentation, “so that (…) one can move from
what is given originally and immediately
(presented) to what originally lies outside the
sphere of ownness (appresented)” (26).
2. analogizing apprehension depend on a minimal
level of similarity between the two bodies being
paired. However, I do not find Chang‟s argument
very convincing at this point.
Perception defined by a relation of visibility in the living
presence; apperception claims knowledge beyond
Husserl‟s failure The other ego has to be more than a sense, more than a
being-for-me. Still in the final analysis the other is no
more than a moment in the constitutive productivity of
the ego. It is still the I who gives sense to the that other
ego. Essentially an asymmetrical I-other relationship.
The problem of solipsism has not been dissolved.
PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHICAL MODERNISM
The sovereignity of the The ego constitutes the world and the truth, it constitutes
subject everything but itself.
No remaining reality No residual reality. The transcendental subject reigns
Philosophical modernism The sovereign subject representes the break with the
2 / Communication before deconstruction
Husserl‟s impact Husserl‟s vission of a First Philosophy has been
prominent within the twentieth-century theoretical
Phenomenological elements into the humanities and the
Phenomenologically Describe, the everyday life-world, insider‟s point of
inspired ideas and view, reduction, presence, transcendence, the subject,
concepts life-world, temporality, transcendental consciousness,
Communication studies Emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s? Influences
from phenomenology are visible.
Chapter outline 1. How this phenomenological consciousness
makes possible the clear articulation of a subject-
2. How and why these theories necessarily fail to
answer the question of mediation <-- idealist
vision of the subject
A NOTE ON THE PROBLEMATIC
Althusser: the problematic Looking beneath theories to uncover their foundation.
Performing a “symptomatic reading” the available
theories --> reconstruct the system behind the words.
Epistemological field Constitutes “a problematic”. Functions as the latent
thought-structure enabling the production of theories.
The prolematic gives order to the pretheoretical chaos
and determines what counts as a legitimate scientific
THE QUESTION THEN…: COMMUNICATION AND THE COMMUNICATIVE
The central challenge How is individuality transcended? How is sharing
meaning/understanding achieved? Concerns questioning
what is usually taken for granted.
Ricoeur: (…) Because [it]… appears as a way of
transcending or overcoming the fundamental solitude of
each human being.” (39).
Central mystery Communication seems to be a necessary fact. Yet
communication appears to be enigmatic, a person‟s
individuality as a difference that sets a person apart from
all others. Can both be possible? The possibility of
Presuppes a conception of In short noncommunication. Overcoming the dilemma of
subjectivity as essentially understanding the individual, the egocentric subject as
solitary bot monadlike and coexisting.
Modernized Inagurated by Husserl‟s transcendental subject. This
transcendentalism constitutes the background for thematizing the solitary
subject of communication. Both existing with and
necessarily distanced from other subject and the social
COMMUNICATION AS MEDIATION: THE POSTAL PRINCIPLE
The solitary subject The primitive of the problematic of communication.
1. It is a necessary constituent of the problematic.
2. The nature of the solitary subject is determined
before its participation in the problematic. Before
Problem of mediation The challenge of communication translated into a
challenge of privacy. The problem of communication
rewritten as a problem of mediaton. How can solitary
subjects share understandings. Closing the gap between
the islandlike monads.
Communication represents the embodiment of an
interplay between self and other.
From individual to The telos of communication as a dialectical becoming.
commonality The I becomes a member of the We.
Communication as The delivery of messages. The specific adressing
transmission according to receiver. Communicatio as delivery.
The postal principle - the more general principle governing the dialectic of
mediation. The postal principle as the medium of
communication rather than the reverse. The presupposed
identity of both the addresser and the addressee, and the
identity of the message.
Why postal principle Unifies the concepts of communication, exchange, and
mediation under one rule – its own rationality as
universal mediation. This postal ideology explains why
the concept of communication so easily translates into
the concept of mediation. Really?
Potential problems with It seems to me that Chang works with at least two
Chang somewhat dubious premisses: that communication
effortlessly translates into mediation; and that in creating
and sending messages, receiving is already inscribed in
the sending, that the addressee must be known prior to
METAPHORS AT LARGE IN COMMUNICATION
Metaphors to explain Metaphors easily step over their function and stand in
communication place of the concept they are supposed to illustrate. A
trespassing of the abstrac by the concrete, a reversal of
the signifier and the signified.
The danger of Raises questions regarding the validity of explanatory
overreliance of metaphors discourses in which the usurpation takes place. Are
communication theories nothing but postal constructs?
Derrida on metaphors in The founding concepts of philosophy are metaphorical
philosophy and philosophy is as such not rational altough appearing
to be. A heliotropic system of metaphors. Philosophy is
necessarily a culture-specific tropology. Has become
powerlessto control the tropology that has empowered it.
Towards “hermeneutics of Sceptisism toward the foundatio of communication
suspicion” towards the theory inspired by Derrida‟ scepticism.
origin of communication Theories of communication, relying on metaphors, as not
theory different from fictional artifacts?
REREADING THE PROBLEMATIC OF COMMUNICATION
Resisit parrotry when Staying within the problematic of communication, yet
rereading remaining indifferent to its suggestions.
How? How is the problematic of communication as an active
structure of determination itself determined?
How does the postal government of communication
itself display the same kind of metaphorical
displacement that is displayed in the postal construction
Dialogical nature “I give myself verbal shape from another‟s point of
view” (56). Verbal (only?) communication requires a
minimal level of reciprocity. Perspective taking.
Parallels to G. H. Mead (and hence symbolic
Language/code Communication, communality, co-operation. Language
makes this possible in the first place. More precisly the
code. Establishes the possibility of commonality in a
world of differences and the basis for co-ordination.
Code/intersubjectivity The code is essentially intersubjective. Intersubjectivity
as the key term in explaining how individuality is
Codes translates what is subjective into something
objective or accessible.
Intersubjectivity thus the Answers the question of communication: how
mediating term individuality is transcended. The conflict between the
natural certainty (we communicate) and the reflective
IGNOTUM PER IGNOTIUS; OR, THEORETICAL VENTRILOQUISM
First: definition Explaining the unknown by means of the more
The problematic of Fundamentally at triadic structure of subject, mediation,
communication intersubjectivity. Chained together by the postal
The problem of the Generated from within the problematic in response to the
concept of problematic‟s initial move of postulating a solitary
intersubjectivity subject. This way the concept and meaning of
intersubjectivity blocks any further exploration of the
relation between privacy and mediation without really
“The logic of “deferral” Parallel to the concepts of “social role” and “interaction”
(suspension) in sociology. Tautologically defined: one is defined or
clarified in relation to the other. Radically compromises
the explanatory utility of the concepts.
The same can be said about the postal play taking place
between mediation and intersubjectivity in
Trades away the 1. Intersubjectivity functions as a transcendental
explanatory integrity signifier. It accounts for mediation but is itself
2. As a signifier immune to reflexive critique,
intersubjectivity designates the problematic‟s
own blind spot.
The theoretical challenge of solipsism is silenced.
Tautologically understood Communication and intersubjectivity can only be
tautologically understood. The lack of a terminal referent
whose meaning does not presuppose prior understanding
of the terms within the problematic.
3 / The inaugural relation:
toward an ontology of communication
DeMan: no natural Reality constituted as such by linguistic signs according
unrhetorical language to their own reason. Establishes the world as present.
Rhetorical turn Rhetoric as epistemic and ontological.
Communication theories Captives of their metaphors, their rhetoric.
How then can theorizing about communication find a
way out of the metaphorical mess and still respond to the
initial existential eigma that brings that theorizing into
being (the fact of communication taking place +
READING THE CIRCLE AND THE HERMENEUTIC RETURN
Chang‟s aim Conduct a Heideggerian critique of the “textual
prehistory” of communication theories. An archeological
reading of the movement between the two signifiers
communication and intersubjectivity to uncover the
staging of elements that supports the double play of the
metaphorical couple of mediation and intersubjectivity.
--> a nontranscendental regrounding of communication
YOU MUST TAKE FOR GRANTED THE TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED
Husserl‟s post-Cartesian Not a simple or innocent point of departure although
self Husserl seems to believe so. Identity “actualizes itself as
a grasping of itself by the unity that I am in myself”
(Nancy in Chang: 74). “Cogito” presupposes a self-
The question of self- “if the foundation of philosophy is to be found in the I
foundation think, could the thinking of an I be a good judge of the
validity of its own thinking?” (75).
The problem of self-reflection because of the problem of
Self-reflection Cannot provide anything beyond the empty truism that
the reflecting self is capable of self-reflection. With a
starting point in the self, reflection can never close the
gap between that which reflects and that which is
Husserl‟s shift to A response to the problem of infinite regress. A need to
transcendental install a “firstness of the ego” to halt the reduction. A
phenomenology moment of aboslute knowledge above and beyond the
sphere of infinite regress. The stopping point of the
transcendental consciousness. Necessary to avoid
scepticism and relativism.
Difficulties with Husserl‟s Especially concerning the question of intersubjectivity.
transcendentalism The chasm between the self and other seems decisive
and too wide to cross. There is no escape from solipsism
(although reduction promises exactly that).
Existential turn By Husskerl‟s followers. Reverting to the mundane
world of everyday life. Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger,
Sartre. Looking at the surrounding worl: individuals act
and react before they reflect. Intersubjectivitiy is
declassified and becomes an intramundane problem. The
everyday world is already a world with others.
Already Changes its meaning from temporarily prior to logically
following. Takes on additional meaning of
“metaphysical priority.” States a relation between
concepts. Intersubjectivity gets metaphysical priority
over the subject. Hence, no problem of solipsism.
GROUNDING THE LIFE-WORLD: SOCIAL ONTOLOGY
The “alreadyness” of the The ego lives and interacts with others before it becomes
life-world aware of its solitude (clearly there are parallels here to
Lacan‟s emancipating-from-mother theories?). The
social nature of the world is a definitive fact. The world
is intersubjective. Intersubjectivity precedes
How is a common world How does it come about? The formation of the
possible? intersubjective lifeworld.
Cannot be answered at the level of descriptive
phenomenology (descr. ph. the same as exist. ph.?)
The metaphysical problem Pushes phenomenology into a social ontology.
of fundamental-grounding An impossible project? <-- every attempt leads to a
situation with three unacceptable alternatives.
Trilemma: (1) infinite regress. (2) a logical circle: one is forced to
resort to statements that have already shown themselves
to be in need of grounding. (3) a stopping of the process
at one point > arbitrary suspension.
Intersubjective phenomenology faces this trilemma
because it cannot eschew the question of how it is
Crucial task To identify at which moment cessation takes place and
determine the implications for the conceptual system.
Post-Husserlian The rejection of the transcendental pov.; and the
phenomenologies opposition to the reduction ti the sphere of ownness.
reactions Focus is rather on the everyday world.
Radical redefinition of the phenomenological enterprise.
--> Schutz and Luckmann The everyday life-world is man‟s fundamental and
paramount reality. That part of reality which we take for
granted as common sense.
- Entails as such an ontological commitment. Responds
to the problem of fundamental-grounding.
The everyday life Where social life begins and where intersubjective
phenomenology marks its reflexive point of
Taken for granted > the irreducibility of a naïve trust in reality.
> the permanence of that faith: there is always some part
of reality that is accepted as valid or unproblematic.
The concept of the life- In the post-Husserlian phenomenology of
world signals the moment intersubjectivity. Now the search for intersubjectivity
of cessation can be laid to rest. Descriptive phenomenology reaches
its borderline, social ontology takes over.
Intersubjectivity From the transcendental subject to the taken-for-granted
reanchored intersubjective life-world. The intersubjective life-world
begins as a descriptive concept, but ends as an
Ontologizing the life- The only way to terminate the infinite regress of
world searching for ground.
But bypasses the question The strategy of ontologizing is a strategy of
of the relation between the prioritization.
subject and the world The transcendence of subjectivity remains a problem.
What is still missing A fundamental ontology as a crtique of subjectivity.
--> Heideggeria turn: give way to a fundamental
ontology that responds to the hermeneutic complexity of
Juxtaposing being and communication.
FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY: QUO VADIS
Heidegger‟s fundamental Launched against representational metaphysics
ontology (epistemology is really metaphysical).
The question of Being Diachronic thinking of the nature of Being.
A return to metaphysics focusing on the sources of
intelligibility implicit in our everyday existence.
Rupture with Critical of Husserl‟s prejudgement, depends on a
Husserlianism postulated distinciton between subject and object;
between consciousness and its object.
A hermeneutic inquiry of Preliminary to a illuminating of Being as such.
Dasein – being there Returning to where man already and always is: being-in-
the-world. A world of cultural and historical meanings.
Heidegger‟s reading of Metaphysics becomes problematic again. The critique of
Kant pure reason. Inherits from Descartes the idea that the
basic condition of knowledge is the ego as “I think.” The
ego exists as a permanent principle of thinking and
cannot be a representation or a represented object.
Functions as the fundamental ontological foundation of
being. All things that are not the I, are something that
But what is the difference stand as something else in relation to a subject. The
between Kant and Being of all things are determined by their relation to the
The search for Being Directed toward the subjective roots of the
The problem with Kant‟s Fails to grasp the transcendental I as factical and an
representionism essentially temporal existence. Fails to recognize that “I
(am)” us always and already somewhere and at some
point in time.
Kant is trapped by the transcendental illusion.
THE THERE OF BEING
Kant‟s transcendental ”an inquiry into the ultimate conditions a priori in terms
critique of knowledge of which there is knowledge. This meant that it had to be
an inquiry into thinking per se as productive of
knowledge, into the structure of thinking, and thus into
the ultimate unconditioned grounds and sources of
Heidegger critique of Kant Kant‟s critical idealims subordinates object to subject
leading to a high degree of ontological indeterminacy.
Fundamental ontology Heidegger‟s proposal. Traditional ontology does not
problematize the nature of Being. This must be the
starting point for ontology.
” Heidegger hopes to recover a more original sense of
things by setting aside reality as seen from theorizing
and focusing on the way things show up in the flux of
every pre-reflective activities
Heidegger begins by asking the question of traditional
ontology, “What is the being of entities?” But Heidegger
quickly asks “What is the meaning of being?” or else
ontology will remain naïve and opaque
Since what things are [their being] is accessible only if
intelligible to us, “fundamental ontology” will clarify the
meaning [that is, the conditions of intelligibility] of
things in general” (Anil Mitra: Heidegger on Being)
A two-ponged task: 1. The question of the topos of being: where is this
fundamental ontology is a internal possibility of understanding of Being to
hermeneutic topology of be found?
Being 2. The question of interpreting that understanding
once that topos is located.
Starts from a The meaning of Being available as an always already
preontological vague, avergae understanding of Being. Preunderstood
understanding of Being as ”that which determines beings as being. From this the
ontological clarification of Being must proceed.
Where to start No guarantee that one is able to enter the hermeneutical
circle of this preunderstaning of Being in a manner
adequate to the task,
The questioning The ontological must be sought in the ontic [refering to
existing reality; concerned with the facts of entities], but
how can the former be canvassed in adequate clarity on
the basis of the latter?
The question of Being is immediately reflexive. To the
questioning of Being one has to add a questioning of the
questioning and of the questioner.
Fundamental ontology A topology of Being and a reflexive hermeneutic
converge as one in fundamental ontology.
Dasein ”this being, which we ourselves are and which has
questioning as one of its possibilities of Being.”
” By using the expression Dasein, Heidegger called
attention to the fact that a human being cannot be taken
into account except as being an existent in the middle of
a world amongst other things (Warnock 1970), that
Dasein is „to be there‟ and „there‟ is the world. To be
human is to be fixed, embedded and immersed in the
physical, literal, tangible day to day world”
Essentially reflexive being both the subject and object of reflection,
”Dasein constitutes an existential opening in the form of
a temporal, historical and mortal organization where
being first becomes apparent and approachable”. (98).
Exposure as in making Of Dasein‟s need of being and the hidden meaning of
manifest or laying bare this needfulness.
To expose metaphysics as representationism. Setting the
limits of metaphysics. Starting point: no longer in the I‟s
a priori structures of objective knowledge but in our
being‟s involvement with things and with others.
Being-in-the-world The originary basis of metaphysics.
The mutation of From Husserl to Heidegger: has to do with the role of
transcendentalism man: the condition of our knowledge is sought in our
relation to the being of entities in their totality.
BEING AS RELATIONAL TOTALITY
Husserl‟s eidetic-noetic Eidetic: precise, detailed, photographic memory
phenomenology Noetic: referring to the mind or intellect, or to
understanding gained through human rational processes.
- Subject/ego understands world through a precise
intellectual (transcendental) process?
Dasein Critical extension of Husserl‟s understanding of what
constitutes phenomenological evidence. I.e. evidence of
reality, of entities in the life-world?
Husserl‟s phenomenology Omits questioning the phenomena themselves.
comes to short Overconfidence in transcendental optics: --> blurs the
distinction between the given and its appearance.
Radicalizing the Cannot be understood solely as immanent/located inside
conception of the subject. ”I can see a natural thing in its bodily
transcendence presence only on the basis of this being-in-the-world”
(Heidegger in Chang: 101). Dasein: the constitutive
antecedence of the subject‟s relfective possibilities.
Dasein destroys the And destroys the dualist economy that priviliges te
representational subject over the object.
metaphysics Man and world: distinct yet essentially related. Must be
considered to be mutually constitutive.
Dasein as a way of being Whose essence is its relation with the world and its
Let go of Husserl‟s Dasein is always outside, alongside entities. Hence the
constructionist theory of knower cannot be substantialized as the origin of the
Antisubstantial, antidualist understanding of Dasein <--
Openness/disclosure Phainomena as something that of themselves show
themselves or appear. Appears as something meaningful
(with a function?). Most entities simply occupy space
and persist through time [but this seems to be related to
physical entities alone – what about transcendental
concepts?] Dasein however, stands ahead of itself, open
to its own possibilities as transcendence [aka beyond the
limits of experience?]
Dasein has no essence As in fixed qualities. Dasein cannot be anything but its
Dasein is openness Being-in as in being-alongside: being open for.
Situated disclosure Points to the mutual presence of Dasein and the world.
The coming into presence of the average everyday world
Significance-world as a structure of significance: specific situation, place in
the world and its moment in history.
Hermeneutic turn to The truth is as much a matter of producing as it is of
TOWARDS AN ONTOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION
Dasein rejects the centered Because Dasein and world are equiprimordial (equally
and centralizing subject? basic (primordial) and mutually interdependent. They
pick out different aspects within a unified, integrally
connected whole, and one cannot exist without the
The meaning of Dasein Consist in the radical inseparability of man and the
world. An essential and internal relation.
Man and world are ontologically the same though
ontically distinct. Ek-sistence as an intertext of man and
Relational ontology Dasein is a structrual whole. Being as ek-sistence is a
relational totality a priori of any ontic difference.
Being as presence A thing is no-thing apart from its internal relation to
difference. It‟s identity depends on a reference-to-other.
Difference Entitites are co-relative, otherness hence ceases to be
merely other. Difference from other is at the same time
relation to other.
This difference implies a relation to other thing, implies
the cessation of its being-for-itself.
Being as interrelatedness Both multiple and singular. Being is streched out
between interraled beings.
Establishes the possibility Because of the relational structure of Being at the
of communication ontological level. Yet subjects are different at the ontic
Ontologically communication has always and already
occurred. Precedes existence.
Communication I.e. subject is the effect of communication.
constitutes the wordly Communication is the ontological foundation from
individual as subject which intersubjective exchanges receive the possibility
of expressing their spatial and temporal multiplicity.
Because communication always and already exists,
questioning the possibility of intersubjectivity becomes