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					Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                                                                                      DDI 2011
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                                                            Space Weapons Generic – DDI 2011
Space Weapons Generic – DDI 2011......................................................................................................................................................... 1
***Uniqueness – No Weapons Now***.................................................................................................................................................... 3
Conflict Not Inevitable .............................................................................................................................................................................. 4
AT: Space Weapons Inevitable .................................................................................................................................................................. 5
AT – Human Nature................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
AT – Historical Analogies ......................................................................................................................................................................... 9
AT – Sea Power Analogy ........................................................................................................................................................................ 10
AT – Air Power Analogy ......................................................................................................................................................................... 11
AT – Economic Vulnerability .................................................................................................................................................................. 12
Not inevitable – China ............................................................................................................................................................................. 13
No weapons - China ................................................................................................................................................................................. 15
Not inevitable – Russia ............................................................................................................................................................................ 17
No weapons – Russia ............................................................................................................................................................................... 18
No weapons – Russia – Economy ............................................................................................................................................................ 19
Inevitability is Irrelevant .......................................................................................................................................................................... 20
***Uniqueness – Yes Space Weapons*** .............................................................................................................................................. 21
Yes Space War - Generic ......................................................................................................................................................................... 22
Yes Arms Race ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 23
Conflict Inevitable ................................................................................................................................................................................... 24
Yes China Conflict ................................................................................................................................................................................... 26
Weapons Inevitable .................................................................................................................................................................................. 27
Uniqueness – Yes Russia Weapons ......................................................................................................................................................... 28
Yes Russia Weapons – AT: Econ ............................................................................................................................................................ 29
Yes Russia Threat .................................................................................................................................................................................... 30
Uniqueness – Yes US Weapons – China ................................................................................................................................................. 32
Uniqueness – Yes Chinese Weapons ....................................................................................................................................................... 33
Yes Chinese Weapons- ASBM ................................................................................................................................................................ 39
Yes Chinese Weapons- Intentions ........................................................................................................................................................... 40
Yes Chinese Weapons – US Competition ................................................................................................................................................ 41
Yes Chinese Weapons - Catch up ............................................................................................................................................................ 42
Yes Chinese Weapons - Long Term ........................................................................................................................................................ 43
Yes China Threat ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 44
Uniqueness – Yes Indonesian Weapons .................................................................................................................................................. 46
Uniqueness – Yes Iran Weapons ............................................................................................................................................................. 47
Yes Iran Threat ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 49
***Space Weapons Good*** .................................................................................................................................................................. 50
Space Weapons Good – China ................................................................................................................................................................. 51
Space Weapons Good – China ................................................................................................................................................................. 52
Space Weapons Good – Hegemony ......................................................................................................................................................... 53
Space Weapons Good – AT: No Challengers .......................................................................................................................................... 57
Space Weapons Good – Miscalculation ................................................................................................................................................... 58
Space Weapons Good – Readiness .......................................................................................................................................................... 60
Space Weapons Good – Satellites ............................................................................................................................................................ 61
Space Weapons Good – Satellites ............................................................................................................................................................ 62
Space Weapons Good – Space Power ...................................................................................................................................................... 63
Space Weapons Good – Terrorism .......................................................................................................................................................... 64
Space Weapons Good – Terror ................................................................................................................................................................ 65
AT: Space Weapons Bad – Arms Race.................................................................................................................................................... 66
AT: Space Weapons Bad – Arms Race.................................................................................................................................................... 68
AT: Space Weapons Bad – Arms Race.................................................................................................................................................... 69
AT: Arms Race – Nonunique................................................................................................................................................................... 70
AT: Arms Race – Inevitable .................................................................................................................................................................... 71
AT: Space Weapons Bad - Econ .............................................................................................................................................................. 72
AT: Space Weapons Bad – International Backlash ................................................................................................................................. 74



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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                                                                                  DDI 2011
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AT: Space Weapons Bad – International Backlash ................................................................................................................................. 75
AT: International Backlash – US Posture Solves..................................................................................................................................... 77
AT: International Backlash – International Support Checks .................................................................................................................... 78
AT: Space Weapons Bad – Invites Attack ............................................................................................................................................... 79
AT: Space Weapons Bad – Miscalc ......................................................................................................................................................... 80
AT: Space Weapons Bad – Prolif – Weapons Solve ............................................................................................................................... 82
AT: Proliferation – Turn: Prolif Good ..................................................................................................................................................... 84
AT: Proliferation – Turn: Prolif Good – AT: Rogue States ..................................................................................................................... 86
AT: Proliferation – Turn: Prolif Good – AT: Terrorism .......................................................................................................................... 87
AT: Proliferation – Turn: Prolif Good – AT: Arms Race ........................................................................................................................ 88
AT: Space Weapons Vulnerable .............................................................................................................................................................. 89
AT: Space Weapons Bad – Space Debris ................................................................................................................................................ 90
AT: Debris – Ground-Based Laser Solves ............................................................................................................................................... 91
AT: Debris – Inevitable ........................................................................................................................................................................... 92
Weapons Feasible - Lasers....................................................................................................................................................................... 94
Weapons Feasible – Rail Guns ................................................................................................................................................................ 95
***Space Weapons Bad*** ..................................................................................................................................................................... 97
Space Weapons Bad – Arms Races ......................................................................................................................................................... 98
Space Weapons Bad – China ................................................................................................................................................................. 103
Space Weapons Bad – China ................................................................................................................................................................. 104
Space Weapons Bad – China ................................................................................................................................................................. 105
Space Weapons Bad – China – High Probability ................................................................................................................................... 109
Space Weapons Bad – China – ASATs Impact ..................................................................................................................................... 110
Space Weapons Bad – Colonization ...................................................................................................................................................... 111
Space Weapons Bad – Economy ........................................................................................................................................................... 112
Space Weapons Bad – First Strike ......................................................................................................................................................... 113
Space Weapons Bad – Hegemony ......................................................................................................................................................... 115
Space Weapons Bad – India/Pakistan .................................................................................................................................................... 116
Space Weapons Bad – Miscalculation ................................................................................................................................................... 117
Space Weapons Bad – Multilateralism .................................................................................................................................................. 118
Space Weapons Bad – Multilateralism .................................................................................................................................................. 119
Space Weapons Bad – Prolif.................................................................................................................................................................. 120
Space Weapons Bad – Russia ................................................................................................................................................................ 121
Space Weapons Bad – Russia ................................................................................................................................................................ 122
Space Weapons Bad – Soft Power ......................................................................................................................................................... 125
Space Weapons Bad – Space Debris...................................................................................................................................................... 127
Space Weapons Bad – Terrorism ........................................................................................................................................................... 128
AT: Space Weapons Good – China ....................................................................................................................................................... 129
AT: Space Weapons Good – Deterrence ............................................................................................................................................... 130
AT: Space Weapons Good – Satellite Defense ...................................................................................................................................... 131
AT: Space Weapons Good – Space Power ............................................................................................................................................ 132
Space Weapons Fail – Technical ........................................................................................................................................................... 133
Space Weapons Fail – Countermeasures ............................................................................................................................................... 134




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Space Weapons Generic                                                    DDI 2011
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                                     ***Uniqueness – No Weapons Now***




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                        DDI 2011
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                                                  Conflict Not Inevitable
Space conflict not inevitable – nationalism doesn‟t mean wishes for dominance.
Moore 06 (Mike Moore, Senior Consultant at Sapient Government Services, Winter 2006, ―A Debate About Weapons in Space:
Against A New Cold War?‖ SAIS Review, Volume 26, Number 1, pg.179)

      National righteousness is not uncommon. It characterizes the elites of any number of states beginning with France, a nation
      whose chief exports seem to be wine, cheese, and moral smugness. But Britain and Germany are powerfully righteous
      states, too, as are Norway and Sweden, Russia and India, Saudi Arabia and Israel, China and Japan. None of these states,
      however, aspires to develop and maintain the capability to exercise ―full spectrum dominance‖—a favored Defense
      Department phrase6—anywhere in the world at any time; none of these states contemplates developing and deploying a
      space-control capability; none of these states is attempting to design space-based weapons.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
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                                             AT: Space Weapons Inevitable
Space weapons not inevitable – banned chemical and biological weapons prove.

Hardesty 05 (David C Hardesty, Captain in the US Navy, faculty of the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy
Departmentfaculty of the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Department, Spring 2005, ―SPACE-BASED WEAPONS Long-
Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives,‖ Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 2)
    The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization reported five major
    findings. One of these concerned the inevitability of weaponizing space: Every medium of transport—air, land, sea—has
    seen conflict. Space will be no different. . . . As with national capabilities in the air, on land, and at sea, the United States
    must have the capabilities to defend its space assets against hostile acts and to negate the hostile use of space against
    American interests. Explicit national security guidance and defense policy [are] needed to direct development of doctrine
    and concepts of operations for space capabilities, including weapons systems that operate in space and that can defend
    assets in orbit and augment current air, land, and sea forces. This requires a deterrence strategy for space, which in turn
    must be supported by a greater range of space capabilities.33 The report cites no background analysis supporting this rather
    dramatic chain of logic. The argument seems to be, first, one of historical determinism— that other mediums having seen
    conflict, space will as well. That inevitability requires not only defense of assets in space but negation in advance of the
    hostile use of space. The final leap is to the idea that these offensive and defensive requirements can be met only by
    ―weapons systems that operate in space.‖No potential disadvantages or possible alternatives are noted. As for the
    inevitability argument, Dr. Karl P. Mueller concludes that arguments based on human nature or historical analogies to the
    air and sea are ―thought-provoking but ultimately weak.‖34 They do not account for the fact that though some nations
    continue to possess banned chemical and biological weapons, there is no clamor in the United States to deploy such
    weapons in such large numbers on the ground that their further spread is inevitable. ―Perhaps most strikingly of all, even
    among space weapons advocates one does not find voices arguing that the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit is
    inevitable based on the rule that weapons always spread.‖35 The analogy to the medium of air also has significant holes.
    Less than fifteen years after the first powered flight, military aircraft were carrying out reconnaissance, offensive and
    defensive counterair, and strategic and tactical bombing missions. In contrast, over forty-five years after Sputnik, space-
    based counterspace and terrestrial bombardment is not being conducted, long after the technical capability emerged. ―In
    fact, both superpowers did develop anti-satellite interceptors, but then abandoned their ASAT programs, something utterly
    without precedent in the history of air power that casts further doubt on the soundness of the analogy.‖36




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                                                   Weapons not inevitable
Space weapons not inevitable – multiple warrants.
Mueller 02 (Karl P. Mueller, Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A. in political science, University of Chicago, senior
political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 3/27/2002, ―Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?,‖ International Studies
Association Annual Convention)
    Far and away the best argument that space weaponization is inevitable, and the only such argument that can plausibly stand
    on its own, is that the military utility of space weapons for the United States and/or its enemies will soon be so great that
    the imperative of protecting national security will make space weaponization impossible for rational statesmen to resist.
    Exactly what these weapons would do, and how, varies from one weaponization vision to another, but the standard
    expectation is that space weapons would eventually defend friendly satellites against enemy attack, attack enemy space
    weapons and other satellites that perform important military functions, shoot down long-range ballistic missiles, and
    conduct attacks against enemy air and surface forces and other terrestrial targets.[33] Some weaponization advocates
    anticipate that space weapons will ultimately supplant many, or even most, types of terrestrial military forces; others have
    more modest expectations, but all predict that space weapons will be the best, and in some cases the only, systems available
    to fulfill at least some key military roles. The core of this inevitability argument is that even (or especially) if the United
    States chooses not to build space weapons, other countries will certainly do so, in large part because of the great and still
    growing degree to which U.S. military operations depend upon what has traditionally been known as ―space force
    enhancement‖: the use of satellites to provide a vast array of services including communications, reconnaissance,
    navigation, and missile launch warning, without which American military power would be crippled. This parallels the
    argument that the importance of satellites to the U.S. economy will make them an irresistible target, except that military
    satellites are far more indispensable, and successful attacks against a relatively small number of them could have a
    considerable military impact, for example by concealing preparations for an invasion or by disrupting U.S. operations at a
    critical juncture.[34] Rivals of the United States might also find space-to-earth weapons to be a very attractive way to
    counter U.S. advantages in military power projection. These are all reasonable arguments, but to conclude from them that
    space weaponization is inevitable, rather than merely possible or even likely, is unwarranted, for several reasons. There is
    no question that space systems are a key center of gravity (or perhaps several) for U.S. military capabilities. An enemy that
    attacked them might be able to impair U.S. military operations very seriously, and this ranks high among threats that
    concern U.S. strategists. It need not follow from this that the enemies of the United States will do so, or invest in the
    weapons required to do so, however. The U.S. armed forces possess many important vulnerabilities that adversaries have
    often, even consistently, opted not to attack in past conflicts. To cite but one widely-discussed example, during Operation
    Allied Force in 1999, Serbia apparently did not attempt to mount special forces attacks against key NATO airbases in Italy
    or to use manportable missiles to shoot down aircraft operating from them during take-off or landing, although such an
    action could have profoundly disrupted the Alliance‘s bombing campaign.[35] Moreover, it is quite possible that if a
    potential enemy did want to develop the ability to attack U.S. space systems, it would choose to do so in ways—such as
    investing in ground-based ASAT lasers or computer network attack capabilities—that would not involve weaponizing
    space, and against which the logical defensive countermeasures would not involve placing U.S. weapons in orbit either.
    For military as well as commercial satellites, ―bodyguard‖ weapons in space would offer protection only from certain sorts
    of attacks, while the terrestrial links in satellite systems would remain inviting targets. Again it is the transition to larger
    networks of smaller satellites that will do the most to reduce vulnerability, perhaps together with supplementing satellite
    platforms for some military functions with new types of terrestrial systems, such as high endurance unmanned aerial
    vehicles (UAVs),[36] and improving terrestrial weapons with which to attack ground-based ASATs and satellite launch and
    control facilities. Conversely, if the United States decides that it must have the ability to deny an enemy the use of its
    satellites, it is quite possible that the most attractive means for doing this will prove to involve non-space weapons and, to
    an even greater extent, tools that are not weapons in the conventional sense at all. Space-to-earth weapons are likely to
    prove to be less attractive than ASATs for the United States, which already possesses considerable ability to project
    military force around the world on short notice. Because orbital weapons offer only limited advantages over their terrestrial
    counterparts under most circumstances,[37] it is not difficult to imagine the U.S. Government deciding not to deploy them,
    and instead choosing to invest in terrestrial systems for rapidly attacking distant and well-protected targets, such as
    conventionally armed ICBMs and hypersonic stand-off missiles. For their part, potential enemies of the United States may
    see space weapons as one of the few ways in which they could threaten to mount a substantial non-nuclear military attack
    against targets in the U.S. homeland, and yet still not opt to build them, since effective STEW will not be inexpensive, and
    as years of experience have shown, states at war with the United States have usually been inclined to pursue victory by
    means other than directly attacking North America. Boost-phase long-range ballistic missile defense against large enemy
    states is the single existing military mission for which space-based weapons present the only viable option. However, in
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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                          DDI 2011
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      spite of current U.S. enthusiasm for BMD, this is a mission in which the United States can afford not to invest for a variety
      or reasons[38] (and if it isn‘t, to say that space weaponization is inevitable because we are determined to build space
      weapons would be an intolerably circular argument). Rivals of the United States seem unlikely to build space-based BMD
      systems to protect themselves from missile attack either by the United States or regional adversaries in light of the
      alternatives.




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                                                      AT – Human Nature
Space weapons not inevitable – the human nature theory doesn‟t predict policies.
Mueller 02 (Karl P. Mueller, Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A. in political science, University of Chicago, senior
political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 3/27/20 02, ―Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?,‖ International Studies
Association Annual Convention)
    The simplest inevitability argument is that warfare and armaments are intrinsically uncontrollable because people are
    warlike and states ultimately will do whatever they believe to be in their self-interest.[12] In short, weapons and warfare
    abhor a vacuum, and will spread wherever humanity goes.[13] In some cases, adherence to this belief is based upon
    skepticism about, or even deep visceral revulsion for, negotiated arms control.[14] The premise that states are selfish
    rational actors in an anarchic world actually predicts little about what their specific policies will be in the absence of
    additional information or assumptions. In fact, warfare and states‘ preparations for war are often limited by a wide variety
    of rational considerations, most of which have little to do with formal arms control negotiations. Deploying space weapons
    would involve a variety of potential political costs and benefits, both domestic and international, and is far from
    unreasonable to think that states might shy away from such a course even if it promised to increase their absolute military
    capabilities, depending on the complete set of incentives and disincentives facing them. As the space weapons debate itself
    proves, the norm of space as an unweaponized sanctuary that has evolved during the past forty-five years is far from
    politically insignificant. Of course, the more important a military innovation appears to be to a state‘s security, the more
    likely it is to be adopted, even if the price for doing so is fairly high, while it is relatively easy to give up military
    opportunities of limited value. For example, the longstanding success of the multilateral 1957 treaty prohibiting military
    bases in Antarctica, often cited as an example of an effective sanctuary regime, would be more impressive if the signatory
    powers had strong incentives to establish bases on that continent. Yet even so it flies in the face of the idea that
    weaponization will follow wherever people go; the argument that space weapons in particular will have military utility too
    great to resist is a different proposition from the contention that weapons always spread everywhere, and will be later in this
    essay. A variety of weapons have fallen into disrepute over the last century, While they have not yet disappeared, chemical
    and biological weapons have been shunned by all but renegade states. Anti-personnel land mines are following in their
    wake. Many states that could easily have developed nuclear weapons have opted not to do so, in some cases in spite of
    apparently very good military reasons to go nuclear.[15] Perhaps most strikingly of all, even among space weapons
    advocates one does not find voices arguing that the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit is inevitable based on the rule
    that weapons always spread. The fact that this has not happened is due to many factors other than the Outer Space Treaty‘s
    prohibition on such weaponization, but if some weapons do not necessarily follow wherever people go, the idea that a law
    of human nature requires that others will do so should not be taken very seriously.

Space weapons not inevitable – human nature theory is flawed – more warrants.
Mueller 03 (Karl P. Mueller, Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A. in political science, University of Chicago, senior
political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 20 03, ―Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate‖)
      The simplest inevitability argument is that warfare and armaments are intrinsically uncontrollable because people are
      warlike: weapons and warfare abhor a vacuum, and will spread wherever humanity goes.' This assertion is often
      accompanied by arguments that arms control never works, although it is possible to argue more narrowly that only space
      arms control is infeasible." This generalization is not far from the truth, yet it is far enough from truth that it can and should
      be considered invalid. For example, although the longstanding success of the 1957 Antarctic Treaty's proscription of
      military bases in Antarctica, often cited as an example of an effective sanctuary regime, would be far more impressive if the
      signatory powers actually had strong incentives to establish bases on that continent, it still flies in the face of the idea that
      weaponization must always follow wherever people go (the argument that space weapons in particular will have military
      utility too great to resist is a different proposition from the contention that weapons always spread everywhere). Similarly,
      some types of weapons have fallen into disrepute over the last century While they have not yet disappeared, it could be
      argued that chemical and biological weapons have been shunned by all but renegade states and terrorists, and anti-personnel
      land mines are following in their wake. Many states that could easily have developed nuclear weapons have opted not to do
      so, in some cases in spite of apparently very good military reasons to go nuclear.' Perhaps most strikingly of all, even
      among space weapons advocates one does not find voices arguing that the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit is
      inevitable based on the rule that weapons always spread. The fact that this has not happened is due to many factors other
      than the 1967 Outer Space Treaty's prohibition on such weaponization, but if some weapons do not necessarily follow
      wherever people go, the idea that a law of human nature requires that others will do so should not be seriously embraced as
      a basis for national policy




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                            DDI 2011
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                                                  AT – Historical Analogies
Space weapons not inevitable – submarine power proves historical analogies wrong.
Mueller 03 (Karl P. Mueller, Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A. in political science, University of Chicago, senior
political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 2003, ―Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate‖)
      Space weaponization advocates rarely mention the third new environment into which human activity has expanded: the
      undersea world. In this case, although there are many similarities between submarine and space operations, the two
      weaponization histories have little in common. Warfare was the sole purpose of the first generations of subsurface vessels,
      joined only much later and on a vastly more limited scale by scientific research, while submarines have so far been of
      virtually no commercial significance. This says little about what the future of spacepower will look like, but it provides
      one more reason to be skeptical about the proposition that weapons spread into new environments according to a
      consistent and deterministic pattern. It is also worth noting that one of the most striking commonalities among the three
      historical precedents is rarely if ever predicted to hold true for space as well. Nuclear weapons were deployed in each of
      these environments by all the major nuclear powers more or less as soon as each was capable of doing so. Yet not only has
      this failed to happen in space, but those who make analogical arguments for the inevitability of space weaponization
      conspicuously fail to claim that the nuclearization of space will occur in the future, raising doubts about the extent to which
      even its supporters actually believe in these assertions.

Space weapons not inevitable – historical analogies flawed – more warrants.
Mueller 03 (Karl P. Mueller, Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A. in political science, University of Chicago, senior
political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 20 03, ―Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate‖)
      The second argument that space must inevitably be weaponized is that the evolution of sea and airpower reveal a striking
      historical pattern leading inexorably in this direction, which the exploitation of space is also following. According to an
      influential recent commander of US Space Command, for example, If we examine the evolutionary development of the
      aircraft, we see uncanny parallels to the current evolution of spacecraft ... The potential of aircraft was not recognized
      immediately Their initial use was confined to observation ... Until one day the full advantage of applying force from the air
      was realized and the rest is history. So too with the business of space ... [Military] space operations, like the land, sea, and
      air operations that evolved before them, will expand [into] the budding new missions already included in the charter of U.S.
      Space Command of space control and force application as they become more and more critical to our national security
      interests.' The parallels between the early days of space flight and, especially, the early development of aerial flight are
      indeed striking, at least at first glance. Yet upon closer examination, it is clear that the spread of weapons into the three
      previous environments into which human activity has expanded — the seas, the air, and the undersea world — has been far
      from identical, raising serious doubts about the soundness of drawing such deterministic analogies when predicting the
      future of military space exploitation."




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                                                 AT – Sea Power Analogy
Space weapons not inevitable – sea power analogy flawed.
Mueller 03 (Karl P. Mueller, Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A. in political science, University of Chicago, senior
political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 20 03, ―Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate‖)
      The first new realm into which human enterprise expanded was the surface of the oceans and other bodies of water, initially
      along the coasts and later onto the high seas. Maritime transport offered many advantages over land-bound alternatives,
      especially prior to the invention of the railroad, and armed conflict followed commerce onto the seas. Navies soon
      developed to protect merchant vessels from pirates and other enemies, to prey on enemy shipping and to attack or defend
      coastlines and sea lanes. In spite of the intuitive similarities between seafaring and spacefaring, however, there is one
      fundamental difference between them which makes the sea—space analogy very weak: ships primarily transport goods and
      people, while spacecraft (with only minor exceptions) are built to collect, relay or transmit information. This means that
      space piracy is not a problem, so space navies are not required to suppress it, while 'commerce raiding' threats to space
      systems can be ameliorated by building redundant, distributed systems of satellites; for merchant shipping this is obviously
      not an option. It also means that whatever threats may be posed by enemy space systems, invasion is very low on the list. In
      short, satellites have more in common with lighthouses than with oceangoing ships, and space commerce resembles
      telegraphy or terrestrial radio more than it does maritime trade.39 This does not mean that nothing we know about sea
      power can be applied to space, or that space strategists should not study the works of Julian Corbett and Alfred Thayer
      Mahan. However, there is little reason to conclude from the evolution of naval forces either that the weaponization of space
      is inevitable, or that it is not.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                          DDI 2011
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                                                  AT – Air Power Analogy
Space weapons not inevitable – air power analogy flawed.
Mueller 03 (Karl P. Mueller, Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A. in political science, University of Chicago, senior
political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 20 03, ―Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate‖)
      The parallels between military use of the air and of space are far more impressive. Both balloons and airplanes were used
      for military observation soon after they were first invented, and because aerial observation was so powerful in the First
      World War, armed aircraft were soon employed as interceptors and then as escorts. Airplanes and airships were also used
      for bombing even before the dawn of air-to-air combat, and by 1918 virtually every modern military air mission had been
      undertaken or proposed." Serious commercial exploitation of the air came only later. In space, strategic reconnaissance was
      the purpose of most early satellites, and intelligence collection remains the most well-known military space application;41
      it was the value of being able to destroy enemy surveillance satellites that drove the ASAT programs in both the Unites
      States and the Soviet Union." However, the evolution of air and space power has not been as similar as space weapon
      advocates' analogies often suggest. For example, less than a decade elapsed between the Wright brothers' first flight and the
      first aerial combat missions, while in the fifth decade after Sputnik space remains unweaponized. Of course, the occurrence
      of a major war in the 1910s had much to do with the rapid evolution of airpower, and spacepower might look very different
      today if the Third World War had broken out in the 1960s, but with no major wars now on the horizon, this caveat hardly
      makes the parallel between the two cases look like a strong basis for space policy in the early twenty-first century. In fact,
      both superpowers did develop anti-satellite interceptors, but then abandoned their ASAT programs, something utterly
      without precedent in the history of airpower that casts further doubt on the soundness of the air—space analogy Naturally,
      it would be foolish to conclude from the history of the last fifty years that space will definitely not be weaponized during
      the next fifty but it would also be reckless to deduce the opposite from the history of flight between 1903 and 1915.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
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                                               AT – Economic Vulnerability
Space weapons not inevitable – economic vulnerability theory is flawed.
Mueller 03 (Karl P. Mueller, Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A. in political science, University of Chicago, senior
political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 20 03, ―Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate‖)
      The third inevitability argument is that as space systems become more and more economically important to the United
      States, these assets will naturally become attractive targets of attack for rival states, terrorists and other enemies, and
      therefore it will be necessary to place weapons in space in order to protect them." American industry, commerce and civil
      society do indeed depend heavily and increasingly on space systems for communications, navigation, weather prediction
      and many other functions. However, it is far from clear that attacking US commercial space assets would automatically
      appear worthwhile to an enemy seeking ways to hurt the United States, or that protecting them would necessarily require
      weapons in space. In the abstract, it is apparent that an enemy wishing to harm or to intimidate the United States might
      want to attack important satellites, potentially causing disruption of the services they provide, destroying expensive pieces
      of American infrastructure, and possibly even causing significant damage to the US economy. If however, an enemy that
      wanted to achieve such a result against the United States could do so far more easily by attacking something other than
      satellites in orbit, and unlike satellites, most of these targets can be attacked without first developing or acquiring
      specialized weapons for one exotic target set." Attacking satellites is certainly possible, but crippling or destroying a small
      object hundreds of miles overhead moving at 17,000 miles per hour (to say nothing of satellites at far higher altitudes,
      where most communications and navigation satellites reside) is considerably more challenging than doing comparable
      damage to targets such as ships, airliners, bridges, dams, pipelines, computer networks, office buildings — the list could go
      on almost indefinitely." That such targets are not attacked on a regular basis is due mainly to the relatively small numbers
      and limited capabilities of serious terrorist enemies, not to any great degree of protection for these assets. Increased
      defensive measure since 11 September 2001 have done little to alter the relative difficulties of attacking space and
      terrestrial targets. Moreover, if an enemy did want to disrupt the use of American satellites, attacking their ground control
      stations and launch facilities might well be more effective than striking satellites in orbit, as well as much easier. If an
      adversary did wish to attack US satellites rather than something else in order to hurt the United States,' space-based lasers
      or kinetic energy weapons would be useful for defense against direct ascent ASATs or 'space mines' that were detected
      before attacking, but they would provide no protection against attacks by ground-based lasers or covert mines already
      positioned near their targets, against electronic jamming or against attacks on the infrastructure that supports satellites.'
      Instead, the greatest improvements in the security of valuable US space assets might be achieved by making satellites less
      vulnerable to attack and, especially, by making them individually le'ss valuable through the construction of satellite systems
      that are more distributed and redundant, with more smaller satellites doing the same jobs as fewer large, expensive ones.'
      The ultimate goal would be for the communications and other satellite infrastructures to become like the US interstate
      highway system: economically vital, but not worth attacking because its resilience means that none of its individual
      components is critical.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                             DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                           1
                                                     Not inevitable – China
Space conflict with China not inevitable – multiple warrants
Moore 06 (Mike Moore, Senior Consultant at Sapient Government Services, Winter 2006, ―A Debate About Weapons in Space:
Against A New Cold War?‖ SAIS Review, Volume 26, Number 1, pg.180-181)

      On the surface, such threat estimates are not unreasonable. Even a casual look at the literature of the People‘s Liberation
      Army since Gulf War I in 1991 suggests an obsessive pursuit of ways to counter U.S. high-tech military power, including
      U.S. assets in space. The American ―revolution in military affairs‖ and its new way of precision war haunts the leaders of
      the PLA, a force that had long relied on sheer numbers of troops to prevail in a military conflict. Now the PLA is
      attempting to modernize by cutting back manpower and making the ―informationalization‖ of its forces—its version of the
      revolution in military affairs—the highest priority. Hardliners in the Chinese government and the PLA assume that a
      military confrontation short of all-out war with the United States is virtually inevitable. Similarly, U.S. hardliners believe
      that a future military showdown of some sort with China is likely. Are China‘s hardliners winning the battle to shape
      China‘s official policy toward the United States? That‘s an uncertainty that bedevils analysts in Washington and perhaps
      even in Beijing. Before President Nixon began to mend U.S. relations with China in 1972, the Middle Kingdom spoke
      incessantly of U.S. ―hegemonism‖ in starkly lurid terms. But in the post- Nixon years, China greatly moderated its official
      rhetoric, partly because the Chinese government came to realize that communism simply was not working as an economic
      system. During Mao‘s Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and early ‗60s, as many as 30 million people may have died
      amid the Great Famine.8 Mao‘s Cultural Revolution, launched in 1966, did not lead to mass death, but it did produce a
      near-total breakdown of society. By the early 1970s, China was effectively bankrupt and the machinery of the Communist
      Party had been shredded. After much inner turmoil at the highest levels during the 1970s, Beijing initiated a policy of free
      enterprise with ―Chinese characteristics‖— or as Deng Xiaoping tirelessly put it, ―To get rich is glorious!‖ The result has
      been sustained economic growth. While hundreds of millions of peasants in rural areas barely make it from day to day, the
      economic boom in the coastal cities as well as in many inland cities is staggering. The Chinese government may be corrupt
      and repressive, but it is not collectively stupid. China learned a vital lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union: In a
      direct arms competition with the United States, the United States wins. The Soviet Union sought to create an alternate
      universe, a socialist paradise with Muscovite characteristics. It failed. China has chosen, albeit cautiously, to join the global
      community, and it expects the payback will be a modest degree of national prosperity. Does China actively seek to initiate a
      cold war-style competition with the United States? Several factors would suggest it does not. Manufacturing consumer
      goods for export to the West drives China‘s boom and provides employment for tens of millions in a nation in which
      unemployment is still dangerously high. A cold war-style confrontation would sap China‘s economic vitality by diverting
      huge amounts of capital away from the making of consumer goods (mainly for export) into China‘s arms industries, thus
      threatening China‘s main business: the Wal-Marting of America. That Red China and capitalist America are now joined at
      the hip in the economic sphere is a fact that few politicians care to acknowledge fully. The overriding fact is that China
      needs U.S. consumers, the biggest single market for its made-in-China products, and American consumers seem
      comfortable with that. ―The China price,‖ which denotes the lowest possible price for manufactured goods, is now part of
      the American lexicon. The downward competition among American manufacturers to meet the China price means that
      American consumers buy manufactured goods far more cheaply at discount stores than they could have bought comparable
      American-made goods. A quid pro quo relationship has developed between Washington and Beijing. Washington generally
      accepts that China will continue to supply inexpensive products to U.S. consumers; in turn, China continues to help finance
      the growing U.S. national debt by buying hundreds of billions of dollars of low-interest Treasury bonds that private
      investors in the United States and elsewhere no longer covet.9




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                         DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                       1
                                                   Not inevitable – China
Space conflict with China not inevitable – China pays for our military and champions weapons bans.
Moore 06 (Mike Moore, Senior Consultant at Sapient Government Services, Winter 2006, ―A Debate About Weapons in Space:
Against A New Cold War?‖ SAIS Review, Volume 26, Number 1, pg.184-185)

      Nevertheless, space warriors continue to wring their hands about the potential military-space capabilities of China. The
      penultimate paragraph of an article published in the Winter 2005 issue of High Frontier, a quarterly produced by Air Force
      Space Command, distilled the conventional wisdom regarding the Middle Kingdom: ―China possesses both the intent and a
      growing capability to threaten U.S. space systems in the event of a future clash between the two countries.‖15 Yet this
      analysis overstates the threat posed by China and misses the real threat. Consider a few ironies. China persists in
      underwriting America‘s instant-gratification lifestyle by exporting cheap consumer goods to the United States while
      financing a substantial part of the U.S. national debt by buying hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S. Treasury notes. On
      the other hand, China is regularly portrayed by U.S. hardliners as the next great threat. In its continuing enthusiasm for
      buying Treasury notes, China underwrites the further development of America‘s new high-tech way of war. This is
      distinctly odd behavior for a nation that is presumed to be preparing for a High Noon confrontation with the United States.
      China is intent on integrating itself into the global economic system— strange behavior indeed for a nation that is regularly
      depicted as a military threat to the United States and, by extension, the West. A final irony is that China has long been the
      lead player in the global effort to negotiate a ban on all space-oriented weapons. This inconvenient fact is seldom
      mentioned in the United States by Air Force Space Command, by the Pentagon, by the White House, by hard-line think
      tanks, by cable-news pundits, by America-first newspaper editorialists, or by the assortment of triumphalists and
      neoconservatives determined to eliminate evil empires everywhere.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                     DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                  1
                                                   No weapons - China
China committed to banning space weapons- PPWT treaty proves
Information Office of the State Council- The People's Republic of China, March 2011, ―China's National Defense
in 2010‖, Beijing, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm //ZY
     [t]he Chinese government has advocated from the outset the peaceful use of outer space, and opposes any weaponization of
     outer space and any arms race in outer space. China believes that the best way for the international community to prevent
     any weaponization of or arms race in outer space is to negotiate and conclude a relevant international legally-binding
     instrument. In February 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) a draft Treaty
     on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects
     (PPWT). In August 2009, China and Russia jointly submitted their working paper responding to the questions and
     comments raised by the CD members on the draft treaty. China is looking forward to starting negotiations on the draft
     treaty at the earliest possible date, in order to conclude a new outer space treaty.

China is developing systems to take down space weapons- not pursuing weaponizing space.
<we do not endorse abelist language>
Ignatius 11 (David Ignatius, Editor Washington post, written eight spy novels: ―Bloodmoney‖ (2011), ―The Increment‖ (2009),
―Body of Lies‖ (2007), ―The Sun King‖ (1999), ―A Firing Offense‖ (1997), ―The Bank of Fear‖ (1994), ―SIRO‖ (1991), and ―Agents
of Innocence‖ (1987), was executive editor of the International Herald Tribune in Paris Sunday, January 2, 2011,Transforming U.S.
military might into 21st-century weapons //ZY)
      Shen, who teaches at Fudan University, was countering the view of some Chinese analysts that Beijing should embrace the
      gospel of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the 19th-century American missionary for sea power. Mahan is outdated, he said: With a
      laser weapon fired from space, "any ship will be burned." China's future isn't in competing to build aircraft-carrier battle
      groups, argues Shen, but in advanced weapons "to make other command systems fail to work." I come back to Shen, the
      Chinese analyst. He says that he's grateful that the United States is willing to spend so many billions of dollars to protect
      the sea lanes on which China depends for its global commerce. But instead of competing to build ships and tanks, he says,
      China will focus on the weapons that can cripple them. Somehow, we need to stop being the suckers when it comes to
      defense.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                             DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                          1
                                                       No weapons - China
China will not militarize – strongly opposed
Chen 11 [Chen Peijie, Head of the Chinese delegation at the 50th Session of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS, March 28,
2011 ―General Statement‖, http://www.chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/xw/t814138.htm]
      China has all along advocated the idea of harmony in outer space, abided by the basic principles of the 5 space treaties and
      dedicated itself to peace, development, cooperation and rule of law in outer space. China hopes that the international
      community will further optimize the space law regime and provide a legal basis for the orderly conduct of space activities.
      China is firmly opposed to space militarization and space arms race. There are gaps within existing space law
      instruments in this regard that give rise to the increasing escalation of the risks of space militarization and space arms race.
      Such a situation poses a grave threat to peaceful human space activities and serves no country's interests. Humanity has
      been tortured by wars throughout its history and we should not let such a menace extend to outer space. China always
      believes that the best option for maintaining long lasting peace and security in outer space still is to conclude a treaty to
      prevent space militarization and to tighten the monitoring of implementation of existing treaties.

China will not militarize – white paper and joint treaty
Mo 11 [Mo Honge, writer for Centre for Research on Globalisation, an independent research and media organization, March 31,
2011―China Opposes Arms Race in Outer Space: White Paper‖, http://www.gov.cn/english/2011-03/31/content_1835476.htm]
      The Chinese government advocates the peaceful use of outer space, and opposes any weaponization of outer space and any
      arms race in outer space, says a white paper on the country's national defense. "China believes that the best way for the
      international community to prevent any weaponization of or arms race in outer space is to negotiate and conclude a relevant
      international legally-binding instrument," says the white paper, issued by the Information Office of the State Council
      Thursday. According to the document, in February 2008, China and Russia jointly submitted to the Conference on
      Disarmament (CD) a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of
      Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). In August 2009, China and Russia jointly submitted their working paper
      responding to the questions and comments raised by the CD members on the draft treaty. China is looking forward to
      starting negotiations on the draft treaty at the earliest possible date, in order to conclude a new outer space treaty, says the
      white paper.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                        1
                                                   Not inevitable – Russia
Russia will not militarize – joint treaty
KNSA 11 [Korea News Service Agency, state news agency of North Korea, March 5, 2011, ―Russia FM Rejects Space
Militarization‖, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201103/news05/20110305-10ee.html]
     Pyongyang, March 5 (KCNA) -- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, addressing the UN Disarmament Conference on
     Tuesday, clarified Russia's stand against the militarization of space. There has already been built in the world the potentials
     to deploy arms on the orbit around the earth and spoil spacecraft, he said, warning of the danger of militarization in space
     around the earth. He stressed the need to discuss unconditionally a draft treaty on ban to arms deployment in outer space
     jointly submitted by Russia and China in 2008.




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                                                                                                                                       17
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                          DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                        1
                                                    No weapons – Russia
Russias not weaponizing- they are committed to preventing an arms race
Decan Herald, 2011-03-02, ―Russia reiterates danger of outer space militarization Geneva,‖ March 2 (Itar-Tass)
http://article.wn.com/view/2011/03/02/Russia_reiterates_danger_of_outer_space_militarization/ //ZY
      Russia has again warned the international community about the danger of militarization of outer space. At the conference
      on disarmament in Geneva, it called for an urgent review of the Russian-Chinese draft international treaty to prevent the
      deployment of weapons in space. The world has already accumulated the potential enabling it to deploy weapons in near
      Earth orbits and put spacecraft out of order. "A build-up of this potential will be increasing its destabilizing influence,"
      Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned on yesterday.It is the wish to prevent the worst scenario that guided Russia
      and China as they brought forward in February 2008 a draft treaty on preventing the deployment of weapons in outer
      space."We assume that such a treaty should fix the legal commitments on parity basis, without dividing the countries into
      those that "can" have weapons in space and those that "cannot," he said."We're hoping for the soonest beginning of
      substantive work on the Russian-Chinese project," Lavrov underlined, "if we do not get down to it without delay, we may
      lose time. We are confident that preventing the appearance of weapons in space is extremely necessary for the predictability
      of the strategic situation on the Earth."Let's not forget that the chimera of the nuclear monopoly led to the arms race, whose
      inertia we're only beginning to overcome," the Russian diplomat said. He noted that the approval by the UN General
      Assembly of the resolution -- which Russia co-authored with a group of states -- on measures of transparency and
      confidence-building in outer space was an indicator of the growing awareness in many countries of the significance of the
      problem."We'll be seeking further consolidation of the international community's efforts in this crucial issue," Lavrov
      underlined.

Russia does not want militarization – wants to prevent destabilization
Itar-Tass 11 [Information Telegraph Agency of Russia, major news agency of Russia, March 2, ―Russia reiterates danger of outer
space militarization‖, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/142355/russia-reiterates-danger-outer-space.html]
     Russia has again warned the international community about the danger of militarization of outer space. At the conference
     on disarmament in Geneva, it called for an urgent review of the Russian-Chinese draft international treaty to prevent the
     deployment of weapons in space. The world has already accumulated the potential enabling it to deploy weapons in near
     Earth orbits and put spacecraft out of order. "A build-up of this potential will be increasing its destabilizing influence,"
     Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned on yesterday.

Russia won‟t weaponize space- Russian federation confirms
Loshchinin 11 (STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR VALERY LOSHCHININ, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, 8 FEBRUARY 2011 ―PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE
(PAROS)‖, GENEVA, http://www.geneva.mid.ru/disarm/34.html //ZY)
    Mr. President, Prevention of an arms race in outer space is a matter of absolute priority for this delegation at the
    Conference. Russia considers that the introduction of the draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
    Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) (CD/1839 of 29 February 2008) jointly with
    China represents an attempt to adopt preventive measures against the emergence of new high-tech destabilizing types of
    weapons and new areas of confrontation. Placement of weapons in outer space could trigger unpredictable consequences for
    the international community – similar to those at the advent of the nuclear era. Moreover, weapons deployment in outer
    space by one state will inevitably result in a chain reaction. And this, in turn, is fraught with a new spiral of the arms race
    both in outer space and on Earth. All States have equal and inalienable right to access to outer space, its research and use.
    And it is natural that space security should be our common goal and we should join our efforts to find a solution that would
    consolidate international security and stability. Undoubtedly, PPWT is an effective and practical way to reach this goal. We
    stand ready to closely work with all CD Member States on this issue.




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                                                                                                                                       18
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                         DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                        1
                                           No weapons – Russia – Economy
Russian economy downturn prevents ant developments in space
Arbatov 11 (Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee of the Russian Federation, senior scholar
and chair of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center and head of the Center for International Security, Jun 6,
2011 ―Toward a theory of space power‖ Chapter 23-―Russian Perspectives on Spacepower‖,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/spacepower.html /ZY)
      Achievements in space exploration and utilization are that part of its Soviet heritage that the Russian Federation views with
      great pride and satisfaction. In 1957, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was the first nation in the history of
      the world to put a satellite in space, and in 1961 it followed with the first manned space flight. During the Cold War, Soviet
      spacepower was second to none—in some respects behind and in others ahead of that of the United States. Since the
      collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, due to a protracted economic decline and depression, Russian space potential and
      activities have suffered greatly. The end of the Cold War added to this decline since during the decades of arms race and
      confrontation, Soviet space activities had been closely associated with military purposes and requirements. (In fact, the first
      Sputnik was a byproduct of the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs], which were needed to negate
      U.S. strategic nuclear superiority stemming from its geographic remoteness and forward-based aircraft and missile
      deployments in Europe and Asia.) After 1991, the sharp decline of the defense and space budgets and disintegration of
      scientific centers and industrial cooperation, exacerbated by the loss of assets of other former Soviet republics that were
      newly independent (the foremost being Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan), led to a virtual collapse of Soviet
      spacepower. The only exception was the commercial space launching program, which largely utilized Soviet/Russian
      converted ICBMs retired from service (such as START–1, Dnepr, Zenit, and Rokot). This program provided at least some
      revenue that saved Russian spacepower from total demise during the 1990s. Nonetheless, by the beginning of the current
      decade, Russian space activities were badly undercut. Overall Russian space assets decreased 150 percent during the 1990s
      and in 2004 consisted of 96 satellites (70 percent military and dual-purpose), of which 65 percent were beyond service
      lifetime (33 military and 29 civilian and dual-purpose). The American space constellation consisted of 415 military and
      civilian satellites. The U.S. space budget ($16.4 billion) was 20 times bigger than Russia's ($0.8 billion). In contrast to the
      12 or 13 U.S. radioelectronic and electronic-optical reconnaissance satellites, Russia had only 1 in orbit at any given time.1
      Obsolete naval communication satellites Molniya-1T, Molniya-3, and Parus could not be replaced by the new Meridian-
      type craft due to shortage of funding. Out of eight needed missile attack early warning satellites (71X6 and 73D6), only
      three were in orbit. The Russian global navigation satellite system (GLONASS) consisted of only 14 instead of 24
      satellites, which were not enough even for the permanent coverage of Russian territory. Hence, Russian combat aircraft,
      including strategic bombers, had to rely on the U.S. analogous global positioning (NAVSTAR) space system. Likewise, the
      Russian Northern Fleet had to receive ice condition information from Canadian Radarsat-1 spacecraft.2




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                                                                                                                                    19
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                         1
                                                  Inevitability is Irrelevant
Inevitability is irrelevant – whoever wins the impact debate wins the flow, either way, heg is not
guaranteed.
Hardesty 05 (David C Hardesty, Captain in the US Navy, faculty of the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy
Departmentfaculty of the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Department, Spring 20 05, ―SPACE-BASED WEAPONS Long-
Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives,‖ Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 2)
    If a decision to space-base weapons should not rest solely on arguments of historical inevitability, it is possible to argue that
    weaponization of space will occur at some time in the future. When humans ultimately explore deep space, they may indeed
    carry weapons for protection. A powerful weapons system may ultimately be deployed to protect the earth from asteroids.
    ―Ultimately‖ is a long time. However, it is not long-term predictive accuracy that is important but the almost complete
    irrelevance of ―inevitability‖ to current efforts. Things that are inevitable can be either good or bad. If something is good
    and inevitable, it is logical to pursue acquisition now in order to obtain the benefits as early as possible; if something
    is inevitable and bad, it is logical to delay it as long as possible. Thus, our current decisions with regard to space-basing
    weapons must be dictated not by its inevitability but by whether it is good or bad—by whether weaponization and its
    consequences will improve or degrade the national security environment. If analysis points to overall degradation,U.S.
    policy should be to delay the introduction of space-based weapons: ―Even if weaponization of space is ultimately
    inevitable, like our own deaths, why should we rush to embrace it?‖37 There is, nonetheless, an inevitability-based
    argument that is more strongly supported by history—that once a nation deploys weapons that provide an advantage, other
    nations will build similar weapons or find asymmetric ways to avoid their effect. Britain‘s introduction of the dreadnought
    battleship at the beginning of the last century, with its combination of heavy guns, armor, and speed, caused in Germany
    ―something close to panic.‖38 However, this revolution in warship effectiveness did not forever solidify Britain‘s hold on
    the seas. Only four years later, in 1909, it was the British who were in a panic, over the rapid buildup of dreadnoughts by
    Germany;39 the new concept, by making previous ships almost irrelevant, was allowing Germany to overtake British naval
    power much more quickly than would otherwise have been possible. History is filled with other examples: chemical
    weapons, atomic bombs, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, etc.; it is difficult to think of a single
    counterexample, even when the original innovator had the clear capability to maintain a numerical lead. Worse, space-
    based weapons differ in important ways from the dreadnoughts of the early 1900s. First, as we have seen, space-based
    weapons are not individually robust under attack, nor can they be hidden in port; instead, they are fragile and always
    exposed to attack. Additionally, in the 1900s a nation needed almost as many expensive dreadnoughts as the enemy fleet
    had to have a chance of wresting from it control of the sea. In the twenty-first century, high-technology space-based lasers
    and mirrors may be able to destroy many satellites before the attack is even detected. Even low-technology space mines and
    global-strike weapons can destroy high-technology satellites and ground facilities if employed first. Finally, because of
    these less expensive alternatives, American technical and industrial capacity advantages will not ensure the security in
    space that it would have at sea a century ago. Even if the United States deploys spacebased weapons first, its supremacy in
    space would not be “inevitable.”




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                                                                                                                                        20
Space Weapons Generic                                                       DDI 2011
                                                                                  1
                                     ***Uniqueness – Yes Space Weapons***




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                                                                                21
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                     DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                   1
                                                Yes Space War - Generic
Space war is inevitable – US must weaponize to avoid a space Pearl Harbor
Blazejewski 8
(Kenneth S. Blazejewski is a JD/MPA joint degree student at NYU School of Law and the Woodrow Wilson School. Over the course
of his graduate education, he has worked at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, and
the Democratic staff of the House Ways and Means Committee. Kenneth also served as the President of Law Students for Human
Rights (LSHR) at NYU from 2004-2005. His interests include international law, human rights, foreign policy and constitutional law,
and Latin American affairs. He is currently working on a paper analyzing the international institutional response to the financing of
terrorism 2008. ―Space Weaponization and US-China Relations‖ http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf LShen)
      Recent US actions and other internal statements, however, paint a much more aggressive picture of US plans for the
      weaponization of outer space. In 2001, a high-level commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld and charged with examining
      the future of US space security concluded that to avoid a ―Space Pearl Harbor‖ the ―U.S. government should vigorously
      pursue the capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the President will have the option to deploy
      weapons in space to deter threats to, and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.‖ 9 In addition, the
      commission stated that since space warfare is a “virtual certainty,‖ the ―U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to
      defend against hostile acts in and from space.‖10 The commission called for improvements in ―defense in space‖ and
      ―power projection in, from and through space.‖11 Before the commission concluded its work, Donald Rumsfeld assumed
      the post of secretary of defense. In 2006, President Bush issued a new US National Space Policy that emphasized the US
      determination to remain free of restraint in outer space. ―The United States will oppose the development of new legal
      regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space.




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                                                                                                                                22
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                            DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                          1
                                                         Yes Arms Race
Arms Race already happening
Rozoff 09 (Rick Rozoff, manages the Stop NATO e-mail list and writes on the threat of international militarization, especially on
the globalization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 20 09, ―Militarization Of Space: Threat Of Nuclear War On Earth,‖
http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/31/militarization-of-space-threat-of-nuclear-war-on-earth/)
      NATO‘s unswerving fidelity to Pentagon initiatives and diktat doesn‘t require substantiation, but if it did this statement by
      its Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on March 11 would further underscore the fact: ―Given the vital role that space
      and satellites now play within our cyber networks, should we not also start to follow activities in space more closely and
      consider the implications for our security?‖ [19] Plans for the expansion of military hardware, both surveillance and kinetic
      weapons (missiles), into outer space are not distinct from but inextricably connected with parallel American and NATO
      global interceptor missile systems. So-called missile shield facilities already in place or in the process of being stationed in
      Poland, the Czech Republic, Norway and Britain and their counterparts in Alaska, Japan, Australia and South Korea in the
      east are to be integrated with space components so that both NATO and what has come to be called Asian NATO will
      provide radar and ground-based interceptor missile sites, as will Azerbaijan and Georgia in the South Caucasus and Israel in
      the Middle East in the future. Many of the above-named nations also possess and will base sea-launched missile killing
      interceptors on Aegis class destroyers and can host new generation US stealth warplanes designed to penetrate deep into the
      interior of nations like China and Russia to destroy strategic targets, including silo-based long-range missiles and mobile
      missile launchers. This past April Japan announced that its ―first strategic space policy will focus on improving missile
      launch detection abilities‖ after the passage and implementation of a Basic Space Law last August and that ―As many as 34
      satellites – twice the current number – will be launched between fiscal 2009 and 2013….‖ [20] Last month Australia
      revealed that not only was it planning to build and launch its own space satellites but that it also ―wants to create a new
      cadre of military space experts inside the Australian Defence Forces,‖ citing Japan as ―a good example of the learning
      process that a new 21st century military space power has to go through.‖ [21] Recently the Pentagon has also activated new
      equipment to facilitate the interaction between spaced-based surveillance and earth-based interceptor missile systems. In
      April the US Defense Department launched a new-generation military satellite, the Wideband Global Satellite
      Communication satellite, into space. A US military website said of the new acquisition that ―These satellites are designed to
      provide high-capacity communications to U.S. military forces. It will augment and eventually replace the Defense Satellite
      Communication System.‖ [22] The missile used to launch the satellite into orbit, an Atlas V rocket, is described in the same
      report: ―The Atlas V family of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles has achieved 100 percent mission success in launches
      from Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.‖ [23] The increasingly integrated – to the point of
      inseparability – work of the Defense Department in general, the US Missile Defense Agency and NASA [National
      Aeronautics and Space Administration] demonstrates the emphasis that Washington places on the militarization of space
      and the potential use of it for warfighting purposes. Eighteen days before Barack Obama was inaugurated the 44th president
      of the United States the Bloomberg news agency reported that the incoming chief executive would ―tear down long-
      standing barriers between the U.S.‘s civilian and military space programs‖ and that ―Obama‘s transition team is considering
      a collaboration between the Defense Department and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration….‖ [24] As
      further confirmation of this obscuring of the distinction between civilian and military uses of space, in May it was reported
      that ―A Delta II rocket managed by NASA‘s Launch Services Program lifted off from Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA.,
      Tuesday with a spacecraft for the United States Missile Defense Agency. ―The spacecraft is called the Space Tracking and
      Surveillance System Advanced Technology Risk Reduction mission, or STSS-ATRR.‖ [25] The Vandenberg Air Force
      Base is routinely employed for long-range interceptor missile tests in the Pacific Ocean in coordination with a 28-story sea-
      based X-Band radar periodically stationed in the Aleutian Islands near the coast of Russia. The Space Tracking and
      Surveillance System spacecraft is part of a Ballistic Missile Defense System space sensor layer which ―provide[s]
      combatant commanders with the ability to continuously track strategic and tactical ballistic missiles from launch through
      termination.‖ [26] Weeks earlier the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command,
      also in Huntsville, Alabama, received flight-ready nanosatellites from Ducommun Incorporated, which event marked ―the
      completion of the first U.S. Army satellite development program since the Courier 1B communications satellite in 1960.‖
      [27]




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                                                                                                                                         23
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                         DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                       1
                                                      Conflict Inevitable
Space conflict inevitable – every environment is inevitably militarized.
Corley 05 (Charles P Corley, Lieutenant Colonel in the USAF, 5/17/2005, ―Air Force Space Doctrine: Is It Ready for Weapons in
Space?‖)
    There are obvious military advantages to placing offensive weapons in space, but is the weaponization of space inevitable?
    The ―Space Commission‖ stated in 2001 that ―we know from history that every medium – air, land and sea – has seen
    conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different.‖16 Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations,
    lists four primary space missions: space control, force enhancement, space support, and force application. Space control
    deals with freedom of use and denial of space to adversaries. Force enhancement includes intelligence, surveillance,
    reconnaissance, and GPS assets. Space support involves lift and satellite capabilities. Force application involves space-
    based weapons. Although the mission area is clearly stated, the publication makes it clear that ―currently, there are no space
    force application assets operating in space.‖17 The ―Space Commission‖ and Joint Pub 3-14 set the stage for offensive
    weapons in space. The Air Force followed suit and unveiled its Transformation Flight Plan in 2003. In it, several
    transformational space weapons systems were addressed. In addition to antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities designed to jam
    enemy satellites to make them unusable, the document discusses future systems such as the Common Aerospace Vehicle,
    which will deliver conventional weapons from space anywhere on the planet in less than an hour. A space-based laser is
    also discussed not only as a defensive weapon, but one capable of penetrating the atmosphere to strike air and ground
    targets across the planet.18 If there are any doubts left that offensive weapons will go into space, they might be quelled with
    the following quotes by General Lance Lord, Commander of U.S. Air Force Space Command. In a speech to the Air Force
    Air War College, the general declared that ―We are putting offensive, first-strike weapons in space.‖ In addition, he made
    another telling comment during the same speech: ―Non-nuclear, prompt global strike from and through space can transform
    our ability to strike time-critical, emerging targets in the future.‖19

Space conflict inevitable – political will
Marshall et al 05 (William S Marshall et al, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, Chairman, Space
Generation Advisory Council, NASA/Ames Research Center, George Whitesides, former Chief of Staff of NASA, former Executive
Director of the National Space Society, Robert Schingler, Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief Technologist at NASA, Andre Nilsen, the
Chairman and Managing Director of the OCGG, Kevin Parkin, M.Phys. 1999, University of Leicester. M.S. 2001, Caltech. Ph.D.
2006, Caltech, member of the Carnegie Mellon Silicon Valley Research Staff, Deputy Director of the Mission Design Center at NASA
Ames, and project lead for the Microwave Thermal Rocket, 2005, ―Space weapons: the urgent debate,‖ ISYP Journal on Science and
World Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1)
     At the same time as the technological and legal constraints on deployment are abating, the incentives are mounting. The
     critical role that space has become to play, in both civil and military activity, has created the potential for future conflict.
     The US military is now dependent on space assets to wage its preferred style of war. Perhaps even more important, the
     economic benefits of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and other space-based technologies gives the US and other
     countries a substantial interest in maintaining, protecting, and augmenting those assets. Discord between peer competitors,
     such as the one surrounding Galileo, the European satellite navigation system, are seen by some as early seeds of greater
     conflict. Other conflicts have arisen due to differences of opinion over the distribution of reconnaissance data and in
     controversies over the use of radio spectra. The effect of all these developments is that space policy is being increasingly
     securitised and framed as a core national interest. Against the backdrop of waning constraints and rising incentives, it is no
     surprise that political will is emerging. There have recently been prominent voices within the US military (US Space
     Command Master Plan 2001 and Air Force 2025) and political (Commission to Assess United States National Security
     Space Management and Operations, Rumsfeld, 2000) leadership in favour of considering the acquisition of space weapons.
     In the US military document ‗Vision 2020‘, for instance, it is argued that the United States should seek capacity to operate
     freely within all technological domains of land, sea, air, space, and information. A decision on deployment could therefore
     be impending.




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                                                                                                                                      24
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                     DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                  1
                                                    Conflict Inevitable
Space conflict inevitable – US vulnerabilities attract attacks
Hyten 2K (John E Hyten, Director, Space Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Bachelor's
degree in engineering and applied sciences, Harvard University, Master of Business Administration degree, Auburn University,
Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, National Defense Fellow,
University of Illinois, 2K, "A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space," The Program in Arms
Control, Disarmament, and International Security Occasional Paper, University of Illinois)
     In fact, in spite of indications to the contrary, conflict in space is inevitable—and on a limited basis, has already occurred.
     Nations have already interfered with the space systems of other nations—through jamming and interference—solely for
     commercial advantage.4 All the nations of the world have learned from the Persian Gulf War how critically dependent the
     United States is on the use of space assets to successfully operate in a theater of war. No nation would dare to challenge the
     United States in conventional military operations without attempting to somewhat level the information dominant
     battlefield that the U.S. currently enjoys; and this dominance, in great part, comes from space.

Space conflict inevitable – pressures on military and commerce.
Hyten 2K (John E Hyten, Director, Space Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Bachelor's
degree in engineering and applied sciences, Harvard University, Master of Business Administration degree, Auburn University,
Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, National Defense Fellow,
University of Illinois, 2K, "A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space," The Program in Arms
Control, Disarmament, and International Security Occasional Paper, University of Illinois)
     The pressures on space are enormous—from both an economic and a military perspective. Looked at in isolation, each of
     these pressures is severe enough to create conflict. In combination, they create the risk that future space conflicts could
     result in war—either on earth, in space, or both. On the economic front, conflict has already occurred due to crowding in
     geostationary (GEO) orbits and through saturation of the available radio spectrum.12 On the military front, conflict has
     been avoided because the United States, in recent years, has retained an effective monopoly on the use of space during
     conflict. Conflicts involving the commercial use of space will continue to increase as crowding increases. There are limited
     unoccupied slots at GEO and limited spectrum remaining to be allocated. On the military side, one cannot imagine the
     United States allowing an enemy to either threaten U.S. space capabilities or use space systems to their advantage, putting
     Americans at risk. Conflict involving space systems could be a significant part of any future military conflict involving the
     United States.




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                                                                                                                                25
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                     DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                   1
                                                    Yes China Conflict
Chinese military strategy is rooted in patience and observation – China will always militarize against the
US – conflict is inevitable
Dolman 10
(Everett Dolman is the Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force‘s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
(SAASS). His focus is on international relations and theory, and he has been identified as Air University‘s first space theorist. Dr.
Dolman began his career as an intelligence analyst for the National Security Agency, and moved to the United States Space Command
in 1986. In 1991, he received the Director of Central Intelligence‘s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst award.
The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment Dr. Everett Carl Dolman Prepared for the APSA Annual Meeting,
September 2010 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676919 LShen)
     To the Eastern strategist, proper war-making is a matter of timing. Balance of force is a not a single calculation, but a
     continuing one. Power is a function of capabilities, position, and morale—just as it is in the West—but it is predicated on
     the interplay of numerous immutable and sometimes unknowable forces. Structure dominates agency. Rather than force a
     change through positive actions, the Eastern strategist bides time until the moment to strike is ripe. Indeed, the gardening
     analogy is a strong one in Chinese military writings. No matter how much effort one puts into growing a crop—in learning
     how to garden, preparing the soil, and tending the plants—there is no benefit in harvesting too early or too late. Patience is
     the preeminent military virtue. When Chinese generals are told that their advantage is in long-term planning, they are liable
     to chuckle. ―I do not know what will happen tomorrow,‖ he or she will respond, ―how can I know what will happen in years
     or decades?‖ What the Eastern strategist does is study, prepare, and wait. Through study and reflection, the strategist learns
     about the opponent‘s forces and one‘s own, as well as the terrain, technologies, and socio-political contexts that shift in
     time. Through preparation and training, military forces required by the strategist are available when needed. By awaiting
     the proper moment for action, success is guaranteed.


Competition is unavoidable – US and China will go to war over space
Dolman 10
(Everett Dolman is the Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force‘s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
(SAASS). His focus is on international relations and theory, and he has been identified as Air University‘s first space theorist. Dr.
Dolman began his career as an intelligence analyst for the National Security Agency, and moved to the United States Space Command
in 1986. In 1991, he received the Director of Central Intelligence‘s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst award.
The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment Dr. Everett Carl Dolman Prepared for the APSA Annual Meeting,
September 2010 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676919 LShen)
     The coming war with China will be fought for control of outer space. The stakes are high. The side that prevails will have a
     clear path to domination of the international system. Although its effects will be far-reaching, the conflict itself will not be
     visible to those looking up into the night sky. It will not be televised. Most will not even be aware that it is occurring. It
     may already have begun. And yet, this new kind of remotely-controlled proxy war will not be so different that it is
     unrecognizable. The principles of war and the logic of competition remain as they always have. Only the context has
     changed. When perceived through this mind-set, via the tenets of traditional realist and geopolitical theories that have
     survived millennia in their basic forms, the unavoidable conclusion is that the United States and the People‘s Republic of
     China are on a collision course for war.




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                                                                                                                                26
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                         DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                       1
                                                     Weapons Inevitable
The weaponization of space is inevitable, regardless of US policies
Lambakis 01 (Steven Lambakis, national security and international affairs analyst specializing in space power and policy studies,
member of the National Institute for Public Policy, author on American space power, writer for space Policy, Policy Review, Armed
Forces Journal International, Orbis, Strategic Review, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Defense News, Comparative Straegy, The
Claremont Review of Books, and the Washington Times, testified in front of the House Science Committee, Managing Editor of
Comparative Strategy, a leading international journal of global affairs and strategic studies, 2/1/01, ―Space Weapons: Refuting the
Critics,‖ Policy Review No. 105, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6612)
      Could we stop the historical progression of weaponry at the edge of earth? From the perspective of the strategist, a "line"
      between outer space and the atmosphere is strictly conceptual. Nothing in the world of tactics, operations, or strategy, and
      nothing in the logic of deterrence or the grammar of warfare, says there must be such a line. This leaves only the possibility
      of political decision to make it so. But the absence of universal political will means there is no practical way to enforce
      supporting treaties, laws, and proclamations. One may ask, just because the United States unilaterally refrains from
      developing antisatellite weapons or space-based lasers, why do we assume that other countries will pause right alongside
      Washington? After all, not all innovations in war stem from provocation. While weapons developed and deployed by rival
      states surely influence decision making, it is unlikely that states procure weapons systems primarily to achieve a balance in
      arsenals. Some states certainly may strive to have what we have, but they also will strive to acquire and master those
      weapons that meet their unique security requirements.

Space weapons inevitable – every environment inevitably is militarized.
Spacy 99 (William L. Spacy, BS, United States Air Force Academy [USAFA]; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology [AFIT],
graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, September 19 99 ―Does the United States Need Space-Based
Weapons?‖)
    Another line of argument in favor of space-based weapons, or at least an argument for why they are inevitable, devolves
    from the fact that every environment accessible to man has eventually become an arena for combat. This line of reasoning
    was noticeable in then-Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall‘s address to the National Security Forum in May 1997:
    ―You have, first off, a fundamental question of whether we will place weapons in space. We have a lot of history that tells
    us that warfare migrates where it can—that nations en - gaged in a conflict do what they can, wherever they must. At a very
    tender age, aviation went from a peaceful sport, to a supporting function, very analogous to what we do today in space—to
    a combat arm. Our space forces may well follow that same path.‖7 This argument holds that the evolution of warfare will
    inevitably require placing weapons in space in order to fulfill a multitude of military roles. These roles in - clude defending
    against ballistic missile attack, defending space-based assets (the space control mission), and attacking terrestrial targets
    (the force application mission).

Space weapons inevitable – protection of US assets.
Gildea 02 (Kerry Gildea, Boeing Communications, 2/28/2002, ―Air Force Space Officials Believe U.S. Use of Weapons In Space
Is Inevitable‖)
      Use of weapons in space is inevitable for preserving the U.S. military's current edge on future battlefields, Air Force Lt.
      Gen. Charles Wald, Air Force deputy chief of staff for air and space operations, said yesterday. Pointing to the success of
      U.S. operations in Afghanistan with the aid of space assets for surveillance, communication and precision guided munition
      targeting, Wald said protection of those assets in the future makes space control and potential use of weapons in space
      inevitable. There will be a continued need to assure space system survivability and replenishment, he said at the National
      Defense Industrial Association conference on military space in Falls Church, Va. Space control will involve denying future
      enemies access to space, whether that be jamming communications systems or reconnaissance and surveillance platforms
      from the ground. "We're going to have to go down that path eventually--like it or not," Wald said.




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                                                                                                                                      27
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                            DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                          1

                                           Uniqueness – Yes Russia Weapons
Russia will modernize regardless of US space policy – they only oppose US space weapons to buy time
Brown 09 (Trevor Brown, BA from Indiana University in international studies, author focused on political, economic, and military
strategy for the medium of space, 3/1/09, ―Soft Power and Space Weaponization,‖ Air & Space Power Journal,
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html)
      Some people speak as if they believe that a country can choose whether to pursue national security through arms or through
      arms control.10 But Russia‘s interest in banning space weapons is motivated by a desire to stunt the growth of US military
      space programs in order to buy time for covertly advancing its own space-weapons program and achieving technological
      parity.11 Russia bases its opposition to space weaponization not on a scrupulous set of principles but on strategic objectives.
      Two scholars contend that ―to understand whether Russia could indeed change its position on the weaponization of space,
      we need to go beyond official statements and discussion among Russian military experts. The course of the military space
      program in Russia will be determined primarily by the availability of the resources required to support the program and by
      the ability of the industry and the military to manage development projects for the military use of space.‖ 12

Russia is developing space weapons secretly
Interfax news May 26, 2006‖ Solomonov: Russia Developing Laser and Kinetic Space-Based Weapons‖
http://www.missilethreat.com/archives/id.481/detail.asp //ZY

Yuri Solomonov, chief designer of the Russian Topol-M (SS-27) and Bulava (SS-NX-30) missiles, hinted last week that Moscow has
a secret space-based weapons program, according to a report from Interfax. Speaking at the Russian Academy of Sciences on May 16,
Solomonov discussed new space-based x-ray lasers and kinetic weapons; mini-satellites that would deploy IT systems for monitoring
and reacting to operational situations; and high-resolution advanced Earth satellite sensors capable of showing objects as small as half
a meter in size from 400 to 500 km away in space. He added that Russia is developing these new space-based assets in order to
maintain state security.

Russia has ASATS

Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee of the Russian Federation, senior scholar and chair of the
Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center and head of the Center for International Security, Jun 6, 2011 ―Toward a
theory of space power‖ Chapter 23-―Russian Perspectives on Spacepower‖, http://www.ndu.edu/press/spacepower.html /ZY


There is some evidence that Russia experimented with a direct-access ASAT system similar to the American one and based on the
MiG–31 fighter-interceptor, and prepared to deploy some direct-access SS–19 (Ur-100UTTX)–based ASAT systems at Svobodniy
test range. But neither was ever tested or deployed. The Soviet first-generation A–35 Moscow BMD system, deployed in the 1970s,
had some collateral ASAT capabilities, as does the follow-on A–135 system presently deployed. However, both rely on nuclear
intercept; hence, their effect would be suicidal for Russia's own satellites. The history of negotiations on space (including antisatellite
weapons) in the 1980s proved the great difficulty of creating treaty-based limitations on space systems. Currently, for a number of
reasons, the political and international law environment (foremost, a collapse of the 1972 ABM Treaty after U.S. withdrawal in 2002)
for such negotiations and agreements is even less favorable, despite the end of the Cold War 15 years ago. In fact, the U.S. Ground
Based Interceptor (GBI)–type BMD system under deployment is already an effective ASAT system for destroying satellites at up to
1,500 kilometers altitude. The only thing missing is a global deployment to provide for fast interception at various orbits and testing
against a target satellite.




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                                                                                                                                        28
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                     DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                   1
                                          Yes Russia Weapons – AT: Econ
Despite economic downturn Russia is still funding it‟s space program- local competition

Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee of the Russian Federation, senior scholar and chair of the
Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center and head of the Center for International Security, Jun 6, 2011 ―Toward a
theory of space power‖ Chapter 23-―Russian Perspectives on Spacepower‖, http://www.ndu.edu/press/spacepower.html /ZY


During the last several years, Russian spacepower has been gradually recovering from the crisis. Presently there are 99 Russian
satellites in space (70 percent military and dual-purpose). New vintage satellites were placed in orbit (Meridian, new type early
warning, communication, and reconnaissance systems), and the number of GLONASS satellites was increased to 17. New space
launchers are under intensive development (Angara, START–1, Soyuz 2–1B). The Plesetsk space and missile launching range is
undergoing broad modernization (for Angara and Soyuz 2–1B vehicles). With the Angara launcher, Plesetsk for the first time will be
able to reach geostationary orbit and loft superheavy loads in space. Space Forces (a separate branch of the armed services) is
withdrawing from Baykonur range (in Kazakhstan) and curtailing its assets at Svobodniy range (in the Far East) to a minimal scale.
The personnel level presently is 50,000 military and 25,000 civilians and is not being reduced any further. 3 Altogether, Russia (by
joint efforts of Space Forces and Roskosmos) is conducting about 25 space launches annually for its own needs. A new space
command and control site was commissioned in Armavir to make up for the two sites left in Ukraine (Yevpatoria and Dunayevtzy).
Missile early warning radars of the Missile-Space Defense (part of Space Forces) were modernized in Pechora, Irkutsk, Balkhash
(Kazakhstan), and Lekhtusi (Belarus). A new rapid-deployment radar system was tested successfully near Saint Petersburg. In
addition to the electro-optical space monitoring station in Nurek (Tajikistan), a new site was commissioned in Karachaevo-Cherkessia
(North Caucasus).4




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                                                                                                                                29
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                        DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                      1
                                                      Yes Russia Threat
Russia has dangerous space weapon capabilities- expert agrees

pravda.ru, 07.02.2011, USA concerned about Russia's response to X-37B http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/07-02-
2011/116803-russia_usa_space-0/ //ZY

The Christian Science Monitor set out its concerns about Russia's efforts to create competition for the US Boeing X-37B unmanned
spacecraft. "Russia's reviving space industry might be working on its own version of the US Air Force's reusable unmanned space
plane. After all, Russian space experts seemed surprised, a little alarmed, and possibly in awe of the American X-37B when it was
successfully flight-tested from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station on April 22," the newspaper wrote. According to The Christian
Science Monitor, "the Kremlin nowadays identifies successful space projects as key to boosting Russia's international prestige and has
spent a lot more money on the once-moribund space industry." The Americans were intrigued by the "tantalizing hint" dropped by the
head of Russia's Space Forces, Lt. Gen. Oleg Ostapenko. "Something has been done along these lines, but as to whether we will use it,
only time will tell," the official said. Some foreign military experts said that Ostapenko's remarks were simply a PR stunt, because the
official had not demonstrated anything to prove his words. Pravda.Ru interviewed First Vice President of the Academy for
Geopolitical Problems, Konstantin Sivkov, about Russia's possible response to the American space threat. "What did the Americans
test under the guise of X-37B spacecraft? Was it a space element of the nation's missile defense system or was it an aircraft to destroy
space satellites?" "In spite of the fact that it is a top secret program, I can assume that it is most likely a multipurpose space
plane. I think that destroying satellites is just one of its other possible combat tasks. The Americans are perfectly aware of the
fact that if an enemy loses at least some of its navigation, intelligence, communication and other satellites, it can guarantee 50
percent of victory. Without satellites, enemies becomes blind, deaf and helpless.




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                                                                                                                                   30
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                        DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                      1
                                                      Yes Russia Threat
Russia is a military threat- Russia utilizes space weapons as a means of dangerous power projection-
proven by the Kuril Island dispute
Web News JAX, May 16, 2011, Secret Russian Weather Weapons Can Kill Millions, Warns Top Russian Politician
Russian Weather          Weapons‖,   http://www.webnewsjax.com/secret-russian-weather-weapons-can-kill-millions-warns-top-russian-
politican/ //ZY

Duma political leader caused shock waves in a recent television interview when he warned that Russia could deploy an arsenal of new
technology to ―destroy any part of the planet‖ and kill over a hundred million people using secret weather weapons if the United
States, the UN or Georgia tried to stop Russia‘s entry into the WTO. Vladimir Zhirinovsky is Vice-Chairman of the Russian State
Duma and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), the first officially sanctioned opposition party after the fall of
communism. The LDPR has deep links with the former KGB and Communist Party and has become a significant force in Russian
politics, despite Zhirinovsky himself being branded as a militant neo-fascist. According to a translation provided by a Russian speaker,
during the interview Zhirinovsky went off on a bizarre tangent after he was asked how Russia should treat countries like Georgia and
the United States who try and block Russia‘s entry into the World Trade Organization. After saying American government has no
future and will collapse Zhirinovsky made Threats including Russian Weather Weapons Saying that the American government in
Washington DC had ―no future‖ and would ―collapse,‖ Zhirinovsky cited Russia‟s supremacy in space and stated that the
country had, “Lots of money, resources, and new weapons that no one knows about.” ―With them we will destroy any part of the
planet within 15 minutes,‖ he sensationally warned. ―Not an explosion, not a ray burst, not some kind of laser, not lightning, but a
quiet and peaceful weapon,‖ added Zhirinovsky, warning that ―whole continents will be put to sleep forever‖ and that ―120 million
will die‖ if anyone interfered with Russia‘s claim on the Kuril Islands, which are the subject of a territorial dispute with Japan. Did
they (Russian‘s) already use Secret Russian Weather Weapons against Japan? The female presenter of the news program smirked as
he made the comments, but Zhirinovsky‘s manner on Secret Russian Weather Weapons was far from jovial. Zhirinovsky made
reference to the recent tsunami in Japan, suggesting that the ―new weapons‖ to which he refers are related to weather control
technology, which has been intensely studied by both the U.S. and Russia since the 1950′s and is commonly used today. Threatening
to annex Georgia completely, Zhirinovsky warned, ―And then there will be another tsunami, on the other side of the planet, in the
Caucasus. Zhirinovsky‘s reference to the Kuril Islands in connection with the devastating tsunami that hit Japan in March is a not so
subtle suggestion that Russia had something to do with causing the natural disaster that killed thousands, led to the Fukushima crisis
and threatened to derail Japan‘s economic recovery. Zhirinovsky also warned of a coming ―third world war‖ emerging from the
current turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa that would lead to the collapse of current global institutions like the EU and the
WTO and the rise of a new international order led by Russia. Moscow has routinely employed the weather control technology of
―cloud seeding‖ for decades to ensure sunny skies when military parades are taking place on national holidays, but turning the weather
into a devastating weapon to be used in warfare is a frightening new prospect. cientists at NASA have discovered ―A close link
between electrical disturbances on the edge of our atmosphere and impending quakes on the ground below,‖ which has led to claims
that earthquakes are being artificially induced as a form of modern warfare by HAARP. The technology to which Zhirinovsky refers is
rapidly moving out of the realms of science fiction and into scientific fact as we progress further into the 21st century. While
Zhirinovsky is a controversial character in Russia with an incendiary personality, he is nonetheless a major political player. Although
Zhirinovsky has been dismissed as a ―clown‖ and has made many offbeat comments in the past, it would be naive to dismiss him as
being on the fringe. As well as being Vice-Chairman of the Russian State Duma and leader of the LDPR, Zhirinovsky is a member of
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The deputy Duma speaker has announced his intention to run in the 2012
Russian presidential elections, where he is expected to finish third in the race.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                          DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                        1

                                       Uniqueness – Yes US Weapons – China
China ASATs spur US weaponization
Easton 9
(Ian Easton is a Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009 ―The Great Game in Space‖
http://www.project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf LShen)
      China is currently engaged in a large-scale ASAT weapons program that has profound implications for future U.S. military
      strategy in the Pacific. China successfully tested and has reportedly deployed enough direct-ascent ASAT missiles to
      threaten the destruction of vital U.S. satellites in LEO. China has also apparently tested and deployed at least one large,
      ground-based ASAT laser weapon for use on a number of targets in LEO, and is developing a submarine-based ASAT
      missile with which it could eventually target U.S. national security satellites in GEO. Developments in China‘s co-orbital
      ASAT systems also pose a future risk to U.S. satellites, as do China‘s development of cyber warfare units, radiofrequency
      jamming devices and ground-based microwave weapons. As a result, while China‘s expansive ASAT program continues to
      strengthen, the U.S. is developing its own counter-ASAT deterrent as well as its next generation space technology to meet
      the challenge, and this is leading to a ―great game‖ style competition in outer space. This competition is likely to intensify
      over the coming decades as both nations attempt to further exploit the military high-ground space represents, while seeking
      to deny their opponents access to this increasingly vital theater of operations




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                                                                                                                                       32
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                         1

                                          Uniqueness – Yes Chinese Weapons
China only opposes US space weapons to buy time – modernization begun and will continue
Brown 09 (Trevor Brown, BA from Indiana University in international studies, author focused on political, economic, and military
strategy for the medium of space, 3/1/09, ―Soft Power and Space Weaponization,‖ Air & Space Power Journal,
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html)
      Some people speak as if they believe that a country can choose whether to pursue national security through arms or through
      arms control.10 But Russia‘s interest in banning space weapons is motivated by a desire to stunt the growth of US military
      space programs in order to buy time for covertly advancing its own space-weapons program and achieving technological
      parity.11 Russia bases its opposition to space weaponization not on a scrupulous set of principles but on strategic objectives.
      Two scholars contend that ―to understand whether Russia could indeed change its position on the weaponization of space,
      we need to go beyond official statements and discussion among Russian military experts. The course of the military space
      program in Russia will be determined primarily by the availability of the resources required to support the program and by
      the ability of the industry and the military to manage development projects for the military use of space.‖ 12 Despite China‘s
      repeated calls for a ban on all space weapons, historical evidence suggests that little separates Chinese and Russian
      motivations for such bans. ―Because a broad interpretation of space weapons would rule out almost all U.S. missile defense
      systems, Chinese officials who want to limit U.S. missile defense deployments would advocate a ban that used this
      interpretation.‖13 Interestingly, after the Clinton administration scrapped the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1993, China
      redoubled its efforts in military space and gained ground on the United States. 14 By 1999 ―China‘s test of a spacecraft
      intended for manned flight demonstrated a low-thrust rocket propulsion system that could be used to make warheads
      maneuver to defeat a BMD [ballistic missile defense] system.‖15




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             1
                                                                                            Uniqueness – Yes Chinese Weapons
The space dominance gap is closing- China is rapidly rising to challenge the United States to create
international conflict
Bruce W. MacDonald, is a consultant in technology and national security management and is currently senior director to the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. From 1995 to 1999, he was assistant director for national
security at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy as well as senior director for science and technology on the
National Security Council staff. Earlier, MacDonald was a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee and
was national security adviser to Sen. Dale Bumpers (D-AR). He also worked for the State Department as a nuclear weapons expert in
the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, where he led the Interagency START Policy Working Group and served on the U.S. START
delegation in Geneva. MacDonald holds a BSE from Princeton in aerospace engineering and two master's degrees from Princeton—
one in aerospace engineering and a second in public and international affairs. May 11, 2011, Testimony before the US-China
Economic and Security Review commission on The Implications of China‘s Military and Civil Space Programs, United States
Institute of space //ZY
      The Chinese Challenge This hearing is timely, and one of rising urgency. In the more than four years since China destroyed
      an aging weather satellite, demonstrating not only an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability but the potential for strategic ballistic
      missile defense capability as well, it has proceeded to deploy more, and more advanced, military space capabilities as well.
      We should not be surprised by this, nor should we be stricken with fear. We would, however, be unwise to ignore both these developments, which are public knowledge, and other
      developments that are of a classified nature. The Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) appears to recognize what most thoughtful observers of national security also recognize, that
                                                                                             and unequaled global conventional
      U.S. space assets, coupled with our advances in brilliant weaponry, have provided the United States with unprecedented
      military capabilities. Both China and the United States are fortunate that neither country is the enemy of the other.
      However, China's growing economic and military power, coupled with friction points in the relationship, most notably over
      Taiwan, suggest that a future U.S.-China conflict, though unlikely, cannot be ruled out. The PLA and U.S. armed forces
      both would be derelict in their duties if they did not have contingency plans for such a conflict. As the current inferior military power, the PLA has every incentive
      to develop options for offensive operations against weak points in U.S. military posture, just as our military establishment should develop options against weak points in Chinese defenses. PLA officers have noted the great U.S. dependence upon space assets and capabilities and the way
      they multiply U.S. force effectiveness. Just recently, they saw how U.S. special forces, and the military and civilian leadership that commanded them, heavily depended upon satellite photographs, space-derived weather and electronic intelligence, GPS, other space-
      enabled information, and satellite communications in executing the strike against Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan. This brilliantly successful operation was built on a firm foundation of information in which space played a vital role in
      creating.. Is it any wonder that the PLA would want the capability to interrupt these rivers of information and services that our space assets provide? This information allows our military decision-making, our weapons, and especially our warfighters to be far more
      effective than in the past, vital advantages across the spectrum of potential conflict. These "space-enabled information services" lie at the heart of U.S. military superiority. The PLA certainly wants to be able to greatly weaken U.S. military power
      in wartime, and I believe the PLA could do so within a decade using its kinetic kill and other AS AT weapons if it chose to deploy them in large numbers, and thus pose a serious threat to U.S. space assets. China is also pursuing other programs that have

                                                       . This strategic space situation is troubling. Though absolute U.S.
      important ASAT implications, and other nations are interested in ASAT as well, such as India and Russia

      advantages in space should increase over time, the margin of U.S. advantage seems likely to diminish as China increases its
      space capabilities and space exploitation, and the PLA will reap both the military advantages and vulnerabilities of greater space capabilities. These PLA efforts are
      funded by a vigorous, quickly growing economy and supported by a government with full appreciation for the roles that space-enabled information and information warfare play in modern conflict. U.S. and Chinese strategic interests in East Asia are not

                                                                                                                                                                      . China seeks to be able
      foreordained to lead to conflict; each has much to lose if this happens, and each appreciates the other's military capabilities. In the face of this growing Chinese military space challenge, it is easy to assume the worst about Chinese intentions

      to prevail militarily at some point in the future should conflict come, but they see the United States as militarily superior to
      them and thus would be unlikely to consciously provoke any military conflict. While we should guard against a worst case,
      we should not treat it as a given. I do not believe China or the PLA is spoiling for a fight with the United States - China has come too far to want to placetheir substantial economicachievements at risk unless they
      faced an extraordinary threat to their national security. In addition, China faces serious demographic realities over the next couple of decades, where their ratio of workers to retirees will shrink substantially (the result of their one-child policy), which further underscores China's need

      for stability and continued economic growth for years to come.        China also has additional       needs, and vulnerabilities.




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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            34
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                        1
                                         Uniqueness – Yes Chinese Weapons
China is weaponizing- wiki leaks prove
Technology Review, Published by MIT, 02/03/2011 by Brittany Sauser, reporter and senior Web producer for Technology
Review. ―Wikileaks Hints at U.S. and China Space Weapon Showdown -Documents released today show that anti-satellite tests may
have been a show of military strength.‖, http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/deltav/26344// ZY

The Wikileaks website has obtained diplomatic cables, which have been released to the U.K.'s Daily Telegraph, that suggest that anti-
satellite tests conducted by China in 2007 and by the United States in 2008 were not merely "tests" but showcases of each country's
space weapon or military powers. This is not entirely surprising, but the documents put in writing the some of the realpolitik involved
with two competing super powers, i.e. my weapons are bigger and better than yours. The Chinese intentionally shot down an aging
weather satellite 530 miles above Earth in January 2007, which resulted in thousands of pieces of debris, exponentially compounding
the space debris problem. The strike down garnered criticism from nations around the world, including the United States. Then in
February 2008 the United States shot down a malfunctioning American spy satellite, a task it claimed it had to conduct because the
satellite was carrying toxic fuel that could pose health concerns. According to the Telegraph, One month before the strike, the US
criticised Beijing for launching its own "anti-satellite test", noting: "The United States has not conducted an anti-satellite test since
1985." In a formal diplomatic protest, officials working for Condoleezza Rice, the then secretary of state, told Beijing: "A Chinese
attack on a satellite using a weapon launched by a ballistic missile threatens to destroy space systems that the United States and other
nations use for commerce and national security. Destroying satellites endangers people." The warning continued: "Any purposeful
interference with US space systems will be interpreted by the United States as an infringement of its rights and considered an
escalation in a crisis or conflict. "The United States reserves the right, consistent with the UN Charter and international law, to defend
and protect its space systems with a wide range of options, from diplomatic to military." . . . In secret dispatches, US officials
indicated that the strike was, in fact, military in nature. Immediately after the US Navy missile destroyed the satellite, the American
Embassy in China received "direct confirmation of the results of the anti-satellite test" from the US military command in the Pacific,
according to a secret memo. The most recent cable in the collection was sent from the office of Mrs Clinton in January 2010. It
claimed that US intelligence detected that China had launched a fresh anti-satellite missile test. Crucially, Washington wanted to keep
secret its knowledge that the missile test was linked to China's previous space strikes. The cable, marked "secret" said the Chinese
army had sent an SC-19 missile that successfully destroyed a CSS-X-11 missile about 150 miles above the Earth.




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                                                                                                                                     35
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                             DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                           1
                                          Uniqueness – Yes Chinese Weapons
China is weaponizing space- leaked documents prove administrations concern
SPACE.com Staff, Date: 03 February 2011 Time: 01:35 PM ET,‖ WikiLeaks Cables Suggest U.S.-China Space Weapons Race‖
http://www.space.com/10756-united-states-china-space-missiles.html //ZY
The United States and China engaged in a show of military strength in space by testing anti-satellite weapons on their own satellites
on separate occasions, according to diplomatic cables leaked by WikiLeaks and published by the U.K.'s Daily Telegraph newspaper
today (Feb. 3). The memos include more than 500 leaked cables and detail the private fears of two superpowers as they clamber to
dominate the new military frontier in space, the Daily Telegraph reported. The documents disclose that following China's intentional
destruction of its own weather satellite in January 2007, the U.S. responded in February 2008 by blowing up one of its own defunct
satellites in a "test" strike. At the time, the U.S. insisted that the maneuver was not a military test. Pentagon officials told reporters in
the days before and after the test that it was necessary to destroy the American spy satellite — called USA-193 — just before it re-
entered Earth's atmosphere to prevent it from returning to Earth with a toxic fuel tank that would pose health concerns. But, the leaked
documents seem to suggest something else. "Teng Jianqun, Deputy Secretary General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament
Department described the shoot-down as unnecessary and simply an opportunity to test the U.S. missile defense system," the memo
stated. In the dispatched cable, Teng described the strike as "an ideal opportunity to voice their (the U.S.) objection" and proved "the
U.S. missile defense system is also an offensive system." In another secret cable sent after the U.S. Navy missile destroyed the
malfunctioning satellite, the American embassy in China received "direct confirmation of the results of the anti-satellite test" from the
U.S. military command in the Pacific, according to the Telegraph. The Chinese anti-satellite test of 2007 destroyed one of the
country's old weather satellites in orbit 530 miles (853 kilometers) above Earth, sparking widespread criticism and serving as a wake-
up call for the White House. Another leaked cable from January 2008 showed that officials working for then-Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice issued a warning to Beijing. "A Chinese attack on a satellite using a weapon launched by a ballistic missile
threatens to destroy space systems that the United States and other nations use for commerce and national security," the memo stated.
"Destroying satellites endangers people. Any purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be interpreted by the U.S. as an
infringement of its rights and considered an escalation in a crisis or conflict." A month after this diplomatic protest, in February 2008,
then-U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates authorized the U.S. Navy to fire a sophisticated rocket at the USA 193 spy satellite – the
U.S.'s first anti-satellite test since 1985. The strike provoked tense talks between the two nations, and the leaked cables reveal that
China claimed to be "neither allies nor adversaries" with the U.S. at a defense summit in 2008, the Daily Telegraph reported. The
Chinese assistant foreign minister also expressed concern that the U.S. missile defense program "includes lasers that attack a missile in
launch phase over the sovereign territory of the launching country." The latest secret memo obtained by WikiLeaks was sent from the
office of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in January 2010. It claimed that U.S. intelligence detected a successful anti-satellite
missile test launched by the Chinese army about 150 miles above Earth. The cable expressed the Obama administration's shared
concern with the former Bush administration over Chinese space weapons plans. In July 2010, the U.S. government told the United
Nations that the country's new space policy will now at least consider measures to control arms in space, similar to other arms control
agreements. The Obama administration is also set to release its Space Security Policy Plan this month.




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                                                                                                                                        36
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                             DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                           1

                                          Uniqueness – Yes Chinese Weapons
China is developing weapons and counter space activities
News 24 , US worry over China space weapons, 2011-02-05 18:30 http://www.news24.com/SciTech/News/US-worry-over-China-
space-weapons-20110205 //ZY

Washington - China is developing "counterspace" weapons that could shoot down satellites or jam signals, a Pentagon official said on
Friday as the US unveiled a 10-year strategy for security in space.
"The investment China is putting into counterspace capabilities is a matter of concern to us," deputy secretary of defence for space
policy Gregory Schulte told reporters as the defence and intelligence communities released their 10-year National Security Space
Strategy (NSSS).
The NSSS marks a huge shift from past practice, charting a 10-year path in space to make the US "more resilient" and able to defend
its assets in a dramatically more crowded, competitive, challenging and sometimes hostile environment, Schulte said.
"Space is no longer the preserve of the US and the Soviet Union, at the time in which we could operate with impunity," Schulte said.
"There are more competitors, more countries that are launching satellites... and we increasingly have to worry about countries
developing counterspace capabilities that can be used against the peaceful use of space.
"China is at the forefront of the development of those capabilities," he said.
In 2007, China shot down one of its own weather satellites using a medium-range ground missile, sparking international concern not
only about how China was "weaponising" space, but also about debris from the satellite.
Years later, Chinese space junk is still floating around in space. Last year, debris from the satellite passed so close to the International
Space Station that crew had to change orbit and take cover.
Shooting down the satellite not only focused the world's attention on the amount of junk in space but also on Chinese counterspace
capabilities, which go beyond shooting down spacecraft, said Schulte.
Among other counterspace activities, Beijing has jammed satellite signals and is developing directed energy weapons, which emit
energy toward a target without firing a projectile, said Schulte.
And China isn't the only country flexing its counterspace muscle. Iran and Ethiopia are, too, he said.

China is weaponizing- developing ballistic missile capabilities
Press Trust of India, Updated: August 17, 2010 17:27 IST , China building new nuke delivery system, space weapons: US
http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/china-building-new-nuke-delivery-system-space-weapons-us-45203 //ZY

Washington: China is pursuing a major military buildup in a "secretive manner" developing survivable nuclear delivery system, a
1,500 km range anti-ship missile to hit aircraft carriers and has the most active land based ballistic and cruise missile programme in
the                            world,                            Pentagon                               has                             said.
Beijing is acquiring 'capabilities' to strike from a distance, warned the US Defence department, saying these moves, "increases the
potential          of        misunderstanding"           and         military          conflict           with        other          nations.
In worrying new assessment, Pentagon said Beijing had developed missiles capable of striking targets in space and is also expanding
its      fleet      of    conventional        and     nuclear      submarines       to      give       it      forces      global     reach.
The annual Congressional-mandated report by the Pentagon expressed concern about the lack of transparency from China into the
force          projection       and         anti-access,       area        denial         capabilities          it      is        acquiring.
In 2009 alone, the Pentagon said China's military-related spending was US $150 billion. While some of the increasing Chinese
capabilities have been put to positive use, like humanitarian and anti-piracy efforts, the report says, China's continued effort to be able
to sustain military operations far from its shore was a cause of concern to the US military. According to the report, "China has the
most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. It is developing and testing several new classes of offensive
missiles, qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses," a Pentagon
official                                                          told                                                             reporters.
China's active ballistic and cruise missile development programme also extends over into the area of its nuclear force modernisation,
where China appears to be focusing on developing more survivable delivery systems, he said




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                                                                                                                                        37
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                         1
                                          Uniqueness – Yes Chinese Weapons
China is already pursuing space weapon modernization
Brown 09 (Trevor Brown, BA from Indiana University in international studies, author focused on political, economic, and military
strategy for the medium of space, 3/1/09, ―Soft Power and Space Weaponization,‖ Air & Space Power Journal,
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html)
      Perhaps there remains a belief in the US strategic community that ―the deployment of U.S. space weapons is likely to make
      space assets—including commercial communications and broadcast satellites—even more vulnerable, since no other
      country is pursuing, let alone deploying, space attack weapons.‖16 Such notions were shattered when China conducted its
      first successful ASAT test in January 2007, suggesting that it had spent many years developing ASAT capabilities. The
      United States—as well as the rest of the world, for that matter—should not allow itself to be duped. The record shows that
      although officials in the Chinese Communist Party rail against military space as a threat to peace and stability, the People‘s
      Liberation Army busies itself with the acquisition of space weapons.

China weaponizing now – ASATs lead to nuclear launch and shut down US communication
Easton 9 (Ian Easton is a Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009 ―The Great Game in Space‖
http://www.project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf LShen)
      China‘s direct-ascent ASATs pose a serious challenge to U.S. photographic intelligence (PHOTINT), electro-optical (EO),
      synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites that operate in low-earth orbit (LEO).
      According to Desmond Ball, a stockpile of around 20 direct-ascent ASATs would be needed to guarantee the destruction of
      the six or seven EO/SAR satellites that are thought to currently constitute the bulk of classified U.S. national security space
      imaging. A further 20 such weapons would be needed to guarantee the destruction of the four co-orbiting groups of three
      sub-satellite units (SSU) the U.S. Navy uses to locate enemy warships and ground-based air defense systems with which it
      can then target with its over-the-horizon, satellite-guided cruise missiles. The loss of these EO/SAR/ELINT platforms,
      which are probably the main targets of China‘s direct-ascent ASAT weapons, would be a very serious blow to the U.S. at
      the outset of any conflict. Aside from the direct-ascent KKV China has successfully tested, it is also possible that direct-
      ascent ASATs could be armed with the electro-magnetic pulse (nuclear or non-nuclear) warheads that the PLA is also
      developing for its anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) program, which is based upon similar technology as China‘s ASAT
      program. Such a weapons system would be serious (and rather indiscriminate) threat to a large number of civilian and
      military satellites in LEO, as well as those in highly elliptical orbits. China may feel that the use of such a device would be
      warranted in order to guarantee a survivable nuclear deterrent in the face of recent U.S. missile defense related infrared
      satellite deployments.

China is not being truthful, they will build Space Weapons
Kenneth Blazejewski, private practice in New York City, focusing primarily on international corporate and financial transactions,
JD from NYU Law, 2008. ―Space Weaponization and US China Relations,‖ http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf

      A third interpretation is that China‘s statements at the CD are noth- ing more than empty rhetoric and that its real intention
      is to develop the means to launch its own space weapons. China only seeks to pursue PAROS as a means of buying time to
      catch up to the United States in re- search and development of its space program. The Department of Defense views
      China‘s advances for negotiation with skepticism, noting ―the tra- ditional roles that stratagem and deception have played in
      Chinese state- craft.‖29 The Rumsfeld Commission noted that ―the Xinhua news agency reported that China‘s military is
      developing methods and strategies for defeating the U.S. military in a high-tech and space-based future war.‖

China weaponizing now
Easton 9 (Ian Easton is a Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009 ―The Great Game in Space‖
http://www.project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf LShen)
      According to a Chinese news website that focuses on military affairs, China has deployed up to 40 direct-ascent ASAT
      missiles. China has also imported 8 battalions of S-300PMU2 SAMs which have limited ballistic missile interception
      capability, and with some modification could make ASAT intercepts as well. Unconfirmed Chinese military reports
      indicate increasing interest in an integrated air and space defense system, with an emphasis on using SAMs for space
      control. Such a system could be similar to the U.S. SM-3 program, which Chinese ASAT engineers have studied in detail.




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                                                                                                                                        38
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                            DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                          1

                                              Yes Chinese Weapons- ASBM
China is developing powerful space weapons- ACBMS

By Craig Covault, written about 3,000 articles on space and aeronautics during a nearly 37 year career at Aviation Week & Space
Technology, where he was a Senior Editor when "riffed" in late 2008 because of cost cuts at that McGraw Hill publication, joined
astronauts many times for space shuttle launch and reentry simulations and is the only journalist to fly on board the Gulfstream II STA
Shuttle Training Aircraft, testified about planetary exploration before the White House National Commission on Space and has
lectured on Russian military space systems before at the National Defense University, earned numerous awards including two Neal
Awards, considered the equivalent a Pulitzer Prize for specialized writing. His first Neal was awarded in 1984 for his coverage of
commercial space and the second in 2003 for scoops on the Columbia space shuttle accident. He has twice won the top "Space Writing
Award" from the National Space Club in Washington and twice more won the Breaking News Award from the Royal Aeronautical
Establishment and Aero Club of Paris. He also won the 2004 Decade of Excellent Award presented by that British/French group at the
Farnborough Air Show near London, March 12, 2011, ―A warning about a military threat posed by China from space comes to us via
Space Ref. Craig Vovault reports:‖ http://rightdemocrat.blogspot.com/2011/03/china-space-weapons-pose-threat-to-us.html //ZY


China's surging military space program is poised to challenge U.S. aircraft carrier operations in the Pacific, as Chinese military
spacecraft already gather significant new radar, electrooptical imaging, and signal intelligence data globally.
During 2010, China more than doubled its military satellite launch rate to 12. This compares with three to five military missions
launched each year between 2006 and 2009. Since 2006, China has launched about 30 military related spacecraft. Its total of 15
launches in 2010 set a new record for China and for the first time equaled the U.S. flight rate for a given year.
Most U.S. public and media attention has focused on China's occasional manned flights and its maturing unmanned lunar
program. But China's military space surge reveals a program where more than half of its spacecraft are like 'wolves in
sheep's clothing,' posing a growing threat to U.S. Navy operations in the Pacific. India's navy is also concerned.
"This is a really big deal. These military spacecraft are being launched at a very rapid pace" says Andrew S. Erickson, a Naval
War College expert on China's naval and space forces. China is becoming a military space power within a global context." At
least three or four different Chinese military satellite systems are being networked to support China's 1,500 km+ range DF-21D
antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) program, say U.S. analysts. The DF-21D is being designed to force U.S. Navy aircraft carrier
battle groups and other large U.S. allied warships to operate hundreds of miles farther away from China or North Korea than they
do today.
The ASBM "has undergone repeated tests and has reached initial operational capability," Adm. Robert Willard, commander of
the U.S. Pacific Command said recently in Tokyo. The new Chinese space capabilities, combined with development of the DF-
21D, are already having an effect on the planning of future operations in the Pacific, says Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.
"I'm trying to get people to think about how do we use aircraft carriers in a world environment where other countries [China
specifically] will have the capability, between their missile and satellite capabilities, to knock out a carrier," Gates said recently
at Duke University. "How do you use carriers differently in the future than we've used them in the past?" he asked.
The full article appears in the March 2011 issue of Aerospace America published by the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA)




Last printed 11/28/2011 4:21:00 AM
                                                                                                                                         39
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                         DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                       1
                                           Yes Chinese Weapons- Intentions
China is developing space weapons- ideology ensures continuing on this path
Yoshihisa Goosen, Special Editor and international affairs expert, ― Chinas star wars program‖ May 20, 2011
http://weapons.technology.youngester.com/2011/05/chinas-star-war-program.html //ZY

China has successfully launched a number of pieces of satellite and independent development of the "Compass" navigation satellite
system. Various satellites, including launching satellites, resource exploration and environmental observation satellite satellites. In
addition, China is actively promoting the space-base weapons development. The U.S. experts pointed out that "For each country, the
use of space can be described as a variety of purposes. However, the biggest features of China's space program is a large sub-space
devices have GAO military function. China has not developed like other countries The 'civil space' plan, but by the People's Liberation
Army management, including satellite launching base, including related facilities. China's space strategy is the subject of great
concern to the United States. China in October 2003 successfully "Shenzhou V" manned spacecraft into orbit, after the United States
and the Soviet Union after the successful launch of manned spacecraft country. The expert from the Heritage Foundation since the
previous year as the principal investigator is responsible for China's problems, the technical evaluation in the U.S. Congress before the
Board and the Center for Naval Analyses space strategy and other agencies, including the high-end military technology, including
China, for nearly 20 years of research . Of course, the study of space technology to China should not be limited to the military angle.
For China, space technology can be applied in many areas including the military. A U.S. commission released its annual report on
China's space program has made the following statement: "the development of space technology will help improve China's technology
foundation for global commerce, communications, technology development, to contribute. From space to the surface The survey can
help predict floods, typhoons and earthquakes and other natural disasters. Of course, this is more conducive for China to achieve its
political strategic objectives. "




Last printed 11/28/2011 4:21:00 AM
                                                                                                                                    40
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                         1
                                      Yes Chinese Weapons – US Competition

US competition ensures China continues to weaponize
Yoshihisa Goosen, Special Editor and international affairs expert, ― Chinas star wars program‖ May 20, 2011
http://weapons.technology.youngester.com/2011/05/chinas-star-war-program.html //ZY

      Nevertheless, the general view that to promote China's space development technology to accelerate the development of the
      greatest opportunity lies in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq war, the U.S. military use of space technology has made a
      series of impressive results. The U.S. experts, said: "Rather, the field of space technology applications in the military is
      mainly to collect, transfer and use of military information. Satellite induction can improve the hit rate of the missile, space
      technology can direct the ground forces are in the desert along the right direction of attack, can also provide coordination
      between the various forces Xia convenient. Determination of the earth magnetic field satellite reconnaissance, so that the
      missile flying along the right track. the use of satellite information for weather by the obstacle has a vital role in military
      operations. can be said that the Chinese U.S. combat forces from high school to the effective use of satellite information. As
      a result, China's strategy from the previous term 'under the conditions of modern high-tech regional wars' into 'information
      technology local wars under conditions of'. " China in January 2007 to implement the anti-satellite weapons test proved
      this point. The U.S. expert said, "Clearly the purpose is to contain the United States. The test designed to prove that the
      United States and the occasion of the military conflict between the two countries, China is not only impede or damage the
      U.S. satellite, but is fully equipped with satellite to destroy each other capacity. 2010, China carried out in another form of
      proof of anti-satellite capability tests of the technology itself has been further enhanced. "




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                                                                                                                                        41
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                      DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                    1
                                          Yes Chinese Weapons - Catch up
China is developing space weaponizing capabilities- catching up with the US
Yoshihisa Goosen, Special Editor and international affairs expert, ― Chinas star wars program‖ May 20, 2011
http://weapons.technology.youngester.com/2011/05/chinas-star-war-program.html //ZY


About China's strategic space, another American expert said: "It is no exaggeration to say that China's space program is entirely
military space program. China to launch manned spacecraft development of the space program dominated the occasion, the first
consideration is How to be applied to future military. particularly since 2004, an increase in imprison the Air Force mission to
improve the content of the space combat capability, to ultra-high-speed aircraft through the atmosphere continue to be developed. "
The expert in the United States as a director of a private think tank researchers, familiar with the Chinese military movements, both
before the Commission in the U.S. Congress as a consultant, also served as Research Fellow Jamestown Foundation. He said: "China's
space strategic goals is to maintain asymmetrical combat capability across the stage, efforts to achieve operational advantage to the
United States. For example, the United States since 2004 and continuously push forward the development of X-43A hypersonic
aircraft, Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corporation began development of similar supersonic drone. Also in Chengdu, called 'Dragon'
plane has been successfully developed, the size of unmanned aircraft in the same U.S. X37A. 'Dragon' and one aircraft into UAVs
machine two, the rocket rose to low Earth orbit, after which further change the track to capture a specific target or observation. can
also      be    equipped       with     such      aircraft    or     space     weapons       to     attack   surface     targets.    "
According to the expert's explanation, the Chinese are catching up with the pace of U.S. space strategy, but because the United States
to stop development of future hypersonic aircraft towards the direction of development, China's "space combat" would be a real threat.
In other words, space is no longer a hypothetical war.




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                                                                                                                                 42
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                         DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                      1
                                         Yes Chinese Weapons - Long Term
Long term goals of weaponizing- expert agrees
Yoshihisa Goosen, Special Editor and international affairs expert, ― Chinas star wars program‖ May 20, 2011
http://weapons.technology.youngester.com/2011/05/chinas-star-war-program.html //ZY

The expert also emphasized the importance of China's lunar exploration program. China in October 2007 successfully launched the
"Chang'e I" lunar probe satellite. He said: "China's decision to use the past two years, two rockets spacecraft will weigh 130 tons into
low orbit, the manned lunar exploration program to prepare. The scheme is in fact similar to the U.S. 'Constellation'. U.S. President
Barack Obama was terminated in February last year, 'Constellation', while China is planning to carry small 2013 radar and laser range
finder device soft landing on the moon. These two instruments are a military function, may capture to the U.S. early warning satellites,
deep space place. " Therefore, the development of exploration technologies in China, it may be a military conflict with the United
States upset the occasion of the combat situation on the million. The expert also emphasized that China plans to launch in 2020
manned spacecraft to the moon to the moon by 2049 with the military functions of the base building. On the other hand, the United
States is prepared to abandon the lunar exploration program. The expert also emphasized that the Chinese have access to natural
resources of the moon's strategic intent. He said: "The Chinese want the moon tritium or helium 3, and helium-3 is the best fuel fusion
reactors, tritium is a very precious resource. China is promoting the development of fusion reactors, and attempt to achieve its
commercial applications. Nuclear Fusion energy has the military strategic significance, which reflect China's lunar exploration
program with a lot of military purposes. " To further prove this point, the expert example, saying that China North Industries
Corporation has recently announced the establishment of the Institute of lunar resources to investigate. He said: "China North
Industries Corporation is a corporate manufacturing guns and tanks, is also begun to study lunar resources and the development of the
lunar surface in a moving vehicle. Can be inferred that China will eventually build military bases on the moon." In other words, the
long-term objective of China's space strategy is the military use of the Moon and begin it own STAR WARS Program.




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                                                                                                                                   43
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                            DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                          1
                                                        Yes China Threat
Chinese ASATs ensure US-Sino conflict over Taiwan. Escalation will occur, US is vulnerable
Easton 9 (Ian Easton is a Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009 ―The Great Game in Space‖
http://www.project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf LShen)
      War games conducted as part of U.S. national security protocols, such as the Army-After-Next, Navy Global and Air Force
      Global Engagement series, Space Game 2 and Schriever 1 & 2, as well as the privately conducted ―DEADSATS‖ war
      games, conducted from the late 1990s and the early 2000s, confirm this view. According to some space experts who were
      intimately involved with the war games, the exercises exposed ―a critical national Achilles heel that politicians, economists
      and corporate CEOs have largely ignored…losses in space can quickly affect the economic, social, and national security
      fabric not only of the United States, but of the entire world.‖ These experts further speculate that ―large military powers,‖
      such as the United States, could ―be held hostage by the unknowns inherent in a new kind of war.‖ 36 These concerns are
      directly linked with China‘s ASAT weapons and their potential applicability in any future U.S.-Sino conflict. A more recent
      war game, ―Pacific Vision,‖ conducted by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) underscored the vulnerability of the unprotected
      commercial communication satellite channels on which the Air Force relies, as well as its cyber and radar vulnerabilities to
      Chinese attack. Any possible U.S. military contingency around the Taiwan Strait would require secure satellites as the U.S.
      becomes ever more reliant upon its space systems. Moreover, reconnaissance satellites are thought to limit the risk inherent
      in the build-up of forces that both the PRC and the U.S. could be expected to deploy to the region in the event of a crisis.
      However, if the U.S. was blinded as the result of a preemptive Chinese ASAT attack, the conflict could quickly escalate to
      a dangerous level. According to two experts on the subject, ―if there is a great-power war in the twenty-first century, our
      crystal ball says that it will be between the United States and China over Taiwan, with a very serious potential for a horrible
      escalatory process.‖ 38 This underscores the gravity of the topic as well as the negative impact the Chinese shift towards
      fielding ASAT weapons could have.

Chinese ASATs threaten space pearl harbor and conflict
Easton 9(Ian Easton is a Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009 ―The Great Game in Space‖
      http://www.project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf LShen)
      If there is a great power war in this century, it will not begin with the sound of explosions on the ground and in the sky, but
      rather with the bursting of kinetic energy and the flashing of laser light in the silence of outer space. China is engaged in an
      anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons drive that has profound implications for future U.S. military strategy in the Pacific. This
      Chinese ASAT build-up, notable for its assertive testing regime and unexpectedly rapid development as well as its broad
      scale, has already triggered a cascade of events in terms of U.S. strategic recalibration and weapons acquisition plans. The
      notion that the U.S. could be caught off-guard in a ―space Pearl Harbor‖ and quickly reduced from an information-age
      military juggernaut into a disadvantaged industrial-age power in any conflict with China is being taken very seriously by
      U.S. war planners. As a result, while China‘s already impressive ASAT program continues to mature and expand, the U.S.
      is evolving its own counter-ASAT deterrent as well as its next generation space technology to meet the challenge, and this
      is leading to a ―great game‖ style competition in outer space.




Last printed 11/28/2011 4:21:00 AM
                                                                                                                                         44
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                              DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                            1
                                                         Yes China Threat
China is developing increasingly threatening space capabilities
UPI Security Industry, Published: Feb. 8, 2011 at 3:27 PM U.S. wary of China space weaponsPublished: Feb. 8, 2011 at 3:27 PM
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/02/08/US-wary-of-China-space-weapons/UPI-
36951297196877/#ixzz1SYz2mPCG //ZY

U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Gregory Schulte said China's project was becoming a "matter of concern" for the
United States. Space, he told defense and intelligence officials while unveiling a 10-year strategy for security in space, "is no longer
the preserves of the United States and the Soviet Union, at the time in which we could operate with impunity." "There are more
competitors, more countries that are launching satellites ... and we increasingly have to worry about countries developing counter-
space capabilities that can be used against the peaceful use of space." In 2007, China shot an obsolete weather satellite with a ground
missile, creating so much space junk that crew members on the International Space Station had to change orbit to avert a collision last
year. Schulte said in his remarks that U.S. concerns had prompted U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to seek to include space in
stability talks being pursued with the Chinese. The official said China's capabilities were going beyond shooting at spacecraft.
Beijing's counter-space activities include jamming satellite signals. It is also in the process of developing directed energy weapons that
emit a disabling burst of energy toward a target rather than firing a projectile at it. Other countries believed to be developing counter-
space technology include Iran and Ethiopia. Diplomatic cables distributed by WikiLeaks and published by the British Daily Telegraph
newspaper said that the United States and China had engaged in a show of military strength in space by testing anti-satellite weapons
on their own satellites on separate occasions. The memos feature more than 500 leaked cables that detail the fears of the countries as
they race to gain supremacy in space. The documents revealed that following China's destruction of the weather satellite in 2007, the
United States responded a year later by blowing up a defunct satellite in a test strike. U.S. officials at the time, rebuffed reports that the
move was part of a military test, saying it was necessary to destroy the American spy satellite to avert a health and environmental
fallout as it re-entered the Earth's atmosphere laden with toxic fuel. Under the 10-year space strategy being formulated by the
Pentagon, Schulte said the United States was bent on proposing ways to protect U.S. space assets. Among the considerations: setting
up international partnerships along the lines of NATO, under which an attack on one member would constitute an attack on all and
thus jointly retaliate. Schulte said the United States also retained the option to "respond in self-defense to attacks in space."


Control is China‟s priority – failure of US to check Chinese space desires ensures tension over Taiwan
Dolman 10
(Everett Dolman is the Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force‘s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
(SAASS). His focus is on international relations and theory, and he has been identified as Air University‘s first space theorist. Dr.
Dolman began his career as an intelligence analyst for the National Security Agency, and moved to the United States Space Command
in 1986. In 1991, he received the Director of Central Intelligence‘s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst award.
The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment Dr. Everett Carl Dolman Prepared for the APSA Annual Meeting,
September 2010 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676919 LShen)
     China‘s ultimate goal appears to be to assert its regional supremacy and achieve co-equal (if not dominant) status as a
     global power. Control of space is a critical step in that direction. Without its eyes and ears in space to provide warning and
     real-time intelligence, the United States would be in a painfully awkward situation should the PRC put direct military
     pressure on Taiwan.




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                                                                                                                                         45
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                          DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                       1
                                       Uniqueness – Yes Indonesian Weapons
Indonesian is developing space capabilities via China‟s resources
China Military News Posted on 14 April 2011, China Helps Indonesia Develop Missile Weapons http://www.china-defense-
mashup.com/china-helps-indonesia-develop-missile-weapons.html //ZY
2011-04-14 (China Military News cited from strategypage.com) -- China has agreed to help Indonesia establish weapons development
and production capabilities. The initial project will develop and produce 1,000 122mm rockets for the navy. The Indonesian space
agency (LAPAN) will contribute some of its research. These R122 rockets are simple devices, with a range of 15 kilometers.
Eventually, Indonesia would like to add guidance systems. But meanwhile. what Indonesia is more interested in is advancing to the
production of more complex weapons like the Chinese C802A anti-ship missiles. Indonesia has been buying these from China for the
last three years. The C802A is a 6.8m (21 foot) long, 360mm, 682kg (1,500 pound) missile, with a 165kg (360 pound) warhead. The
C802 has a max range of 120 kilometers, and moves along at about 250 meters a second. The French Exocet missile is the same size
and performance, but costs twice as much (over a million dollars each, but the manufacturer is known to be flexible on pricing.) The
Indonesians see the Chinese missiles as a much better deal, especially since Indonesia is not looking to start a war anytime soon. So
why pay premium prices for a premium, battle proven, Exocet. The C802 is older technology, and Iran produces them in cooperation
with China. The Exocet has been around for over three decades, has been proven in combat and is known to be reliable. The C802 is
known to be less capable than the Exocet, but it looks similar. For a navy that never expects to get into a serious war, that, and a much
lower price, is enough to get the sale




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                                                                                                                                     46
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                             DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                         1
                                             Uniqueness – Yes Iran Weapons
Iran is developing space weapons- they are rising and dangerous

 CAROLINE B. GLICK , senior Middle East Fellow at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, DC and the deputy managing
editor of The Jerusalem Post, where her column appears. 06/17/2011 16:38, ―Column One: A do-or-die moment‖ //ZY

      Iran says it launched a satellite into orbit this week, renewing worries that it could soon be capable of firing long-range
      nuclear missiles. The Rasad-1 reconnaissance satellite, the second one Iran has sent into space, weighs only 100 pounds,
      which means the rocket that carried it still lacks the power and sophistication an intercontinental ballistic missile requires.
      Still, security experts are concerned; the apparently successful mission marks a significant step forward for Iran's space
      program, which next hopes to put a live monkey into orbit. How worried should we be? The danger from Iran is rising:
      Tehran's scientists are just a few steps away from enriching uranium to the point where it's suitable for a nuclear
      bomb, says Caroline B. Glick in The Jerusalem Post. And this launch indicates that Iran is also making huge strides
      toward developing intercontinental ballistic missiles. Iran is a distant enemy for Europe and the U.S. now, but once it has
      both nukes and the missiles to deliver them, Tehran will "constitute a clear and present danger."
      "A do-or-die moment"


China is assisting Iran- they can gain capabilities dangerously fast

Steven Aftergood, directs the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy and is the author of the Federation
newsletter Secrecy News, received the Electronic Frontier Foundation's Pioneer Award in 2010, February 6th, 2011,‖ CIA Views
Russian Concerns Over Iran‘s Space Program‖, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2011/02/russia_iran_space.html //ZY

Russian experts are persuaded that Iran‘s space program is serving to advance development of intercontinental ballistic missiles that
could be used against targets throughout the Middle East and Russia, according to a CIA review of open source reporting. ―Over the
past year Moscow appears to have become more worried about the security implications of assisting Tehran with the further
development of its space capability,‖ the November 2010 CIA report (pdf) said. The CIA document was first reported by Bloomberg
News (―Russian Scientists Worried Iran Uses Their Know-How for Missiles‖ by Roxana Tiron and Anthony Capaccio, February 3). A
copy was obtained by Secrecy News. See ―Russia: Security Concerns About Iran‘s Space Program Growing,‖ CIA Open Source
Works, November 16, 2010. On February 7, Iranian officials displayed four new prototype satellites that they said would be launched
in the near future.




Last printed 11/28/2011 4:21:00 AM
                                                                                                                                        47
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                         1
                                            Uniqueness – Yes Iran Weapons
Overwhelming expert consensus that Iran is prepared and willing to weaponize space
CIA-DI-10-04951, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, 16 November 2010 ―Russia:
Security Concerns About Iran‘s Space Program Growing (U//FOUO)‖, //ZY

      An OSW review of open source material indicates that there has been a consensus for several years among prominent
      Russian space experts that Iran is seeking to develop space launch technology to develop an ICBM capability but there is
      disagreement about how quickly that goal can be achieved. In contrast, most statements from Russian officials and
      legislators have tended to downplay both Iran‘s technical capabilities as well as its intentions to develop ICBMs, calling
      them ―groundless‖ in some cases. Nonetheless, over the past year Moscow appears to have become more worried about the
      security implications of assisting Tehran with the further development of its space capability. Iran‘s Ambassador to Russia,
      for example, complained publicly about a slowdown in space-related cooperation. (U//FOUO) Russian Experts Convinced
      Iran Making Progress ... (U) Most Russian military and scientific space experts judge that recent Iranian space launches
      demonstrate that Iran is moving forward in developing multistage separation and propulsion technology and is increasingly
      capable of developing a space launch vehicle with an advanced payload capacity            Viktor Mizin, deputy head of the
      Moscow State University of International Relations‘ Institute of International Studies, in September 2009 said that ―over
      the past five to seven years, Iran has mastered technology to develop both liquid-fueled and solid-propelled rocket engines,
                                                           Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, first vice president of the Russian Academy of
      Security, Defense and Law and a former Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Troops, in March 2009
      said that, in ―addition to work to develop rocket staging, the Iranians appear to have acquired a more sophisticated rocket
                                       Russian space expert Igor Lisov, commenting on Iran‘s successful launch of Omid satellite
      on a Safir-2 rocket last year, noted that ―It is quite extraordinary to use a two-stage rocket of such a small launch mass (up
      to 25 ton) for a spacecraft launch mission. In order for the upper stage to gain the required velocity to deliver even a small
      satellite int                                                          Vladimir Yevseev, a senior research fellow with the
      Moscow-based Center for International Security of the Russian Academy of Sciences‘ Institute of World Economy and
      International Relations, told the state-controlled RIA Novosti news agency in February 2009 that, since 2005, Iran has been
      developing space launch vehicles (SLVs) ―rumored to have an improved range of up to 10,000 km and featuring a three-
      stage design, with the first and second stages being propelled by liquid fuel, and the upper stage—by solid fuel.‖
      (U//FOUO)and Seeking ICBM Capability (U) A variety of Russian experts over the past few years have said that Tehran
      intends to use SLV technology to develop ICBM systems that could reach targets throughout most of the Middle East and

          RIA Novosti in July 2010 noted Iran‘s launching into orbit of the Rasad-1 satellite and reported that Iran may be
      developing a ballistic missile with a range of 4,000-5,000 km. In a February 2010 interview, the late Aleksandr Pikaev, then
      head of the Center for International Security of the Russian Academy of Sciences‘ Institute of World Economy and
      International Relations, said that Iran has been actively developing its space rocket technology and that their primary goal is
      to build ICBMs. •      Russian space analyst Andrei Kislyakov wrote in April 2009 that Iran‘s development of the solid- fuel
      ballistic missiles Shahab-5 and Shahab-6, with a range of between 3,000 km and 5,000 km respectively, means that Tehran
      is on the verge of creating ICBMs. • Mizin asserted in September 2009 that he expects Iran within the next 10 years to
      develop reliable medium-range missile systems with a range of about 3,000 km and to move to the testing phase for its first
      ICBM with a range of between 3,500 km to 5,000 km. (U//FOUO)




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                                                                                                                                        48
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                             DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                             1
                                                          Yes Iran Threat
Iran is space weapon threat- recent space developments prove
Clara Moskowitz, SPACE.com Senior Writer, 17 March 2011 Time: 12:45 PM ET, Iran Says It Launched New Rocket and
Capsule Into Orbit, http://www.space.com/11153-iran-launches-rocket-space-capsule.html //ZY


      Iran announced today (March 17) that it has launched a new rocket and space capsule designed to carry a monkey into
      orbit, according to the country's state-run news agency. According to Iran's official Islamic Republic News Agency, the
      country launched the capsule on a Kavoshgar-4 ("Explorer" in Farsi) rocket Tuesday (March 15). The IRNA report stated
       that "data and images" from the capsule were expected to be sent from orbit 120 kilometers (75 miles) above the Earth,
      Reuters reported. The launch marks a major step forward for Iran's fledgling space program, and a worrying sign for
      foreign nations fearing that Iran's space goals are aimed at developing space weapons. [Top 10 Space Weapons]
      Ultimately, Iran has said it aims to launch a human into space by 2020, and to put an astronaut on the moon by 2025. The
      Islamic republic denies military motives for its space program, but Western nations fear that Iran is moving toward
      developing a ballistic missile capable of deploying a nuclear warhead. Last year's launch of the Kavoshgar-3 rocket
      prompted the United States to call it a "provocative act." Analysts say Iran's space goals are probably both scientific and
      militaristic, and the program allows the nation to build prestige among friends and enemies alike. "They will clearly use
      dual-use technology for a military buildup, and as long as they at least dabble in human spaceflight, they get advantageous
      press coverage on that as well," Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College in
      Newport, R.I., told SPACE.com in November.

Iran is using space for military purposes- expert on proliferation agrees
CBS news, June 27, 2011 10:38 AM , U.S. space entrepreneur                                   accused   of                   helping       Iran,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/06/27/national/main20074667.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody //ZY

      The 2005 launch from Russia of the Sina-1 satellite came one day after newly elected Iranian President Mahmoud
      Ahmadinejad said Israel must be "wiped off the map." To many, the launch seemed to back up this threat. David Albright
      of the Institute for Science and International Security, an expert on nuclear proliferation, said Iran is focused on the military
      applications of space science. "One of the goals of the program, and it appears to be an ongoing program, is to develop a
      missile that can carry a nuclear warhead if Iran decides to build one," he said. Iranian officials insist that they are pursuing
      nuclear technology strictly for peaceful purposes. But their refusal to disclose all their nuclear activities has raised
      international suspicions, and has led to four rounds of United Nations sanctions since 2006. A recent International Atomic
      Energy Agency report said there was evidence Iranian scientists were studying ways to build nuclear warheads compact
      enough to be carried by a missile. Ahmadinejad recently announced Iran was expanding its uranium enrichment program,
      bringing the country another step closer to the capacity to build weapons. The White House under President George W.
      Bush never commented publicly on the launch. But the deputy director of Russia's Federal Security Service said months
      later that Moscow was cooperating in a U.S. investigation of allegations that Modanlo had tried to transfer missile and
      space-related technologies to Iran.




Last printed 11/28/2011 4:21:00 AM
                                                                                                                                          49
Space Weapons Generic                                           DDI 2011
                                                                      1
                                     ***Space Weapons Good***




Last printed 11/28/2011 4:21:00 AM
                                                                    50
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                                                        DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                                                   1
                                                       Space Weapons Good – China
A US/China war is inevitable – space weapons determine victory

Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2010. ―The Case for Weapons in Space: a Geopolitical Assessment,‖ p. SSRN
   The coming war with China will be fought for control of outer space. The stakes are high. The side that prevails will have a
   clear path to domination of the international system. Although its effects will be far-reaching, the conflict itself will not be visible to those looking
   up into the night sky. It will not be televised. Most will not even be aware that it is occurring. It may already have begun. And yet, this new kind of
   remotely-controlled proxy war will not be so different that it is unrecognizable. The principles of war and the logic of
   competition remain as they always have. Only the context has changed. When perceived through this mind-set, via the tenets of
   traditional realist and geopolitical theories that have survived millennia in their basic forms, the unavoidable conclusion is that
   the United States and the People‘s Republic of China are on a collision course for war.

Nuclear war

Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2010. ―The Case for Weapons in Space: a Geopolitical Assessment,‖ p. SSRN
    Almost 2,500 years ago, Thucydides foresaw the inevitability of a disastrous Peloponnesian war due to ―the rising power of Athens and the fear it caused in
    Sparta.‖ Indeed, wheneveran extant international order is challenged by a rising power, the dominant power in
    the system is obligated to respond. Such conditions are relatively rare in history, but when they occur, the resulting war is not for
    minor spoils or border modifications, but for leadership of a new world order. It is a great war, a hegemonic war.
    This is the context in which the world now exists. The relatively stable global hegemony of US
    dominance since 1945, punctuated by limited wars and shifting balances of opposition, has relied on technology-dominant global
    power projection. Today, that technology is wholly integrated and inextricable from space support, and no state
    relies more on space power for its economic and security well-being than the US. Any effort to deny space
    capabilities would be a direct challenge to its hegemonic power, and the United States must confront the
    usurper or abdicate its leadership position. To be sure, China‘s increasing space emphasis and its cultural
    antipathy to military transparency suggests that a serious attempt at seizing control of space is in the works.
    A lingering fear is the sudden introduction of an unknown capability (call it Technology X) that would allow a hostile state to place multiple weapons into
    orbit quickly and cheaply. The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any other state, and the
    concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to America‘s already-dependent military
    forces could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the United States
    dithers on its military responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit
    before America is able to respond.




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                                                                                                                                                                  51
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                                                         DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                                                        1
                                                        Space Weapons Good – China

Chinese ASATs can provoke escalation – US space weaponization key to check conflict and attacks

Lee and Teng 8
Huo Hsiung Lee, Chung Chian Teng, Military professors at National Chengchi University
NCCUR China's Militarization of Space: Motivations and Implications for U.S-Chinese Relations. Chapter Six: Space Militarization:
Implications for US-Chinese Relations 6.1 Offensive Realism Speaks: Troubling Future 2008
http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/34911/10/503910.pdf LShen
      Assuming they passed over or near the PRC, US spy satellites would indeed be vulnerable to China‘s ASAT weapons by
      2010, as 20 operational, direct-ascent ASAT missiles would presumably be easy enough to field by that time given that the
      PRC is already mass-producing well over a hundred similar missile platforms a year. All one would need to modify would
      e the warhead and guidance package, both of which have been already been proven and have been operational as of January
      11, 2007. The PLA can be expected to continue to develop its ASAT guidance package (which is reportedly radar based
      and therefore highly vulnerable to jamming) in order to overcome US defense satellites built-in counter-measures, which
      are thought to be quite technologically impressive. Therefore the PRC already has an operational ASAT capability, and one
      that is likely to grow in sophistication and capability. This will add to the US imperative to counter and deter the Chinese
      counter-space weapons, and further fuel the US-Sino cold war style build-up in space mentioned previously. In the near-term China
      is unlikely to be able to compete directly with the US, and therefore will continue its asymmetric efforts to exploit the US vulnerability in space. Looking
      more distantly, however, one can forecast a situation where China is competing with the US in space (and on terra firma) as more of a peer-competitor,
      whereby there is a relative balance of power and mutual reliance upon orbital space, one could foresee increased stability and something akin to the
      détente that characterized the later stages of the cold war and led to US-Soviet cooperation in outer space. However, as noted by a recent study, it will be a
      long time before the PRC can be considered a true peer competitor of the US in space. In the interim , there is a strong possibility that the
      relationship between the two powers will be unstable, with potential global repercussions. China‘s irresponsible actions in
      space only underscore that growing trend, and point to a disturbing strategic environment in the years ahead. That said, the
      likely US response to any ASAT attack on an American government satellite, which would be viewed much in the same
      way that an attack on US terrestrial forces would be (i.e. an act of war), probably rule it out barring a massive
      miscalculation on the part of the Chinese leadership or a Chinese decision to engage in a Pearl harbor style sneak attack.
      The danger lies in the fact that as the PRC‘s counter-space capabilities grow and become more subtle with the development
      of micro-satellites, nano-satellites and other less conspicuous ASAT platforms which could potentially interfere with US
      satellites without going so far as destroying them, the US-Sino relationship in space may become more unstable because the
      potential Chinese menu of options would be increasingly tempting, offering as it would ever more possibilities at a time
      when the US reliance upon satellites was ever greater. To offset this scenario, which would mix a dangerous brew of
      Chinese capabilities with US vulnerabilities in a situation that could escalate rapidly to general war, the US can be expected
      to not only diversify and strengthen its orbital assets, but also to develop better air-breathing reconnaissance platforms, such
      as smaller, stealthier Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAV) with longer dwell times in order to have the ability to rapidly restore
      lost satellite coverage in a crisis. This US diversification and multiplication of reconnaissance assets would thereby both
      strengthen the durability of its C4ISR network and force the PRC to plan for more targets, thus making it a less tempting
      option ad creating an environment for better deterrence, let us now conclude this chapter with a summation and a brief
      policy suggestions.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                                                                       DDI 2011
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                                                        Space Weapons Good – Hegemony
Space weapons key to hegemony
Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2005. ―US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,‖ http://www.e-
parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf

      Opponents of space weapons on technical or budgetary grounds are not advocating space weapons in the event their current
      assumptions or analyses are swept aside. Granted, just because a thing can be done does not mean it ought to be. But
      prescience is imperfect. New technologies will emerge unpredictably, and the foolish policymaker eschews adapting to
      them until their utility is beyond a doubt. Indeed, it is just this concern for the unanticipated arrival of technology X that
      initially motivates my own preference for the immediate deployment of space weapons. So long as America is the state
      most likely to acquire a breakthrough technology in this area, my concern is limited to the problem of letting technology
      take us where it will. But what if an enemy of democratic liberalism suddenly should acquire the means to place multiple
      weapons into orbit quickly and cheaply? The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to
      it as surely as to any liberal state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to our already-
      dependent military forces could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the United
      States dithers on its responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-Earth orbit before America is able
      to respond. In such circumstances, America certainly would respond eventually. Conversely, if America were to weaponize
      space today, it is unlikely that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to
      provide the necessary infrastructure is too high—hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment
      needed to achieve a minimal counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for
      the United States to entrench itself in space and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in
      time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter U.S. deployments in kind.
      They might oppose U.S. interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively America uses its new power,
      but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the United States deploy weapons there—at least for the
      next few years—is extremely remote. This reasoning does not dispute the fact that U.S. deployment of weapons in outer
      space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in extending the current period
      of American hegemony well into the future. Clearly this would be threatening, and America must expect severe
      condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than any other state
      doing so.

Nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND policy analyst, Spring 1995, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, ―Losing the
Moment?‖
    Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future.
                                                                                                                                      world in which the U nited S tates
    On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a
    exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy,
    free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world‘s major problems, such as
    nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile
    global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange.
    U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                            DDI 2011
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                                           Space Weapons Good – Hegemony
Space weapons key to space dominance
Lt Col Richard Earl Hanson, USAF, 1999. Air & Space Power Journal, ―Dominance on the High Seas of Space,‖
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/highseas.html

      Question: Could it possibly occur that the United States, presently one of the world's most powerful nations on the sea, on
      the land, in the air and currently masterful in space, would ever fail to strive for wartime dominance in space? The
      alternative---that is to fail to create and exercise US Air Force commanding forces in space, would in effect, be to abandon
      our commercial, communication, reconnaissance, transportation and military space assets to potential or even certain loss.
      By such a failure to act, would not the U.S. be engaging in surrender before the fact? Can we in the U.S. afford to turn our
      heads and permit a form of military laissez faire to be our guiding doctrine? No! Even any middle or compromise solution
      taken by the United States to protect our space assets can hardly be envisioned as approaching success against direct hostile
      interference. The medium of aerospace is the combat operating environment of our Air Force, just as surely as the ground-
      based forces belong to the Army and the sea-borne forces belong to the Navy. The Aerospace Environment is defined in Air
      Force Manual 1-1, March 1992, in this way: "Aerospace consists of the entire expanse above the earth's surface." I believe
      that the US Air Force should be charged promptly by the Congress and the Executive Branch with the mission of achieving
      and exercising wartime dominance on the high seas of space. Upon hostile foreign challenge of U.S. space assets to
      conclude otherwise, or to attempt to find some compromise in a lesser solution, would border on sheer capitulation. ROLE
      OF THE AIR FORCE IN SPACE: The considered policy of the United States, as laid out in the basic doctrine of the
      Department of Defense by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls for all our fighting forces to strive for supremacy in battle as a
      guiding premise. The U.S. Air Force has duly published such doctrine5 stressing that Air Supremacy must be achieved
      early in any conflict. Presently, Air Supremacy is often referred to by some flag officers as Air Dominance. Accomplishing
      that state of supremacy or dominance in a conflict is directed to serve as the cornerstone of success in any campaign---be it
      air, ground or sea. Because AFM1-1 considers that "The aerospace environment can be most fully exploited when
      considered as an indivisible whole," the term air dominance leads across the continuum to the expression Space
      Dominance. With the United States moving more comprehensively into space, such Air Force space-dominance, when
      achieved in a conflict, will show itself to be the critical turning point for our aerospace forces and surface forces to realize
      success. There may even exist the potential for the Air Force, solely with Air and Space Dominance, to accomplish early
      resolution of some limited conflicts to the beneficial advantage of the United States. Hostile nations, when encountering
      such manifest United States Air Force dominance, may realize that they face early defeat, because they have been denied
      the proven protection of that overarching, war-winning potential.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                             DDI 2011
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                                           Space Weapons Good – Hegemony
Space weapons key to hegemony – revolutionize the military
Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2005. ―US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,‖ http://www.e-
parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf

      Space weaponization is a critical and necessary component in the process of transformation well under way, a process that
      cannot be reversed. Now that America has demonstrated the capacity to strike precisely, it would not return to the kind of
      indiscriminant targeting and heavy collateral damage that characterized pre-space warfare unless it were engaged in a war
      of national survival. Moreover, any technological, economic or social benefits to be derived from developing and deploying
      weapons certainly would not come from increasing the stock of current systems. They would come, if at all, only from the
      development of innovative, highly complex and scientifically sophisticated space, stealth, precision, and information
      systems. As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position of having to
      make decisions for the good of all. On the issue of space weaponization, a single best option is elusive. No matter the
      choice, some parties will benefit and others will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and
      the worst choice is to do nothing. Fortunately, the United States has a great advantage — its people‘s moral ambiguity
      about the use of power. There is no question that corrupted power is dangerous, but perhaps only Americans are so
      concerned with the possibility that they themselves will be corrupted. They fear what they could become. No other state has
      such potential for self-restraint. It is this introspection, this self-angst that makes America the best choice to lead the world
      today and tomorrow. America is not perfect, but perhaps it is perfectible. Space weapons, along with the parallel
      development of information, precision, and stealth capabilities, represent a true revolution in military affairs. These
      technologies and capabilities will propel the world into an uncertain New Age. Only a spasm of nuclear nihilism could
      curtail this future. By moving forward against the fears of the many, and harnessing these new technologies to a forward-
      looking strategy of cooperative advantage for all, the United States has the potential to initiate mankind‘s first global
      golden age. The nature of international relations and the lessons of history dictate that such a course begin with the vision
      and will of a few acting in the benefit of all.

Space weapons key to heg – but tradeoff with ground troops avoids backlash
Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2005. ―US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,‖ http://www.e-
parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf
      There is reasonable historic support for the notion that the most peaceful and prosperous periods in modern history coincide
      with the appearance of a strong, liberal hegemon. America has been essentially unchallenged in its naval dominance over
      the last 60 years, and in global air supremacy for the last 15 or more. Today, there is more international commerce on the
      oceans and in the air than ever. Ships and aircraft of all nations worry more about running into bad weather than about
      being commandeered by a military vessel or set upon by pirates. Search and rescue is a far more common task than forced
      embargo, and the transfer of humanitarian aid is a regular mission. Lest one think this era of cooperation is predicated on
      intentions rather than military stability, recall that the policy of open skies advocated by every president since Eisenhower
      did not take effect until after the fall of the Soviet Union and the singular rise of American power to the fore of international
      politics. The legacy of American military domination of the sea and air has been positive, and the same should be expected
      for space. To be sure, America will maintain the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with
      military force if necessary. The operational deployment of space weapons would increase that capacity by providing for
      nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable and deadly. At the same time,
      the United States would forgo some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because the necessary budget tradeoffs
      would diminish its capacity to do so. Space weapons offer no advantage if the opponent is not dispersed broadly around the
      globe. Against massed and regionally concentrated forces, conventional weaponry is far more efficient. As such,
      transformation of the American military assures that the intentions of current and future leaders will have but a minor role
      to play in international affairs. The need to limit collateral damage, the requirement for precision to allay the low volume of
      fire, and the tremendous cost of space weapons will guarantee they are used only for high-value, time-sensitive targets. An
      opposing state‘s calculation of survival no longer would depend on interpreting whether or not the United States desires to
      be a good neighbor. Without sovereignty at risk, fear of a spacedominant American military will subside. The United States
      will maintain its position of hegemony as well as its security, and the world will not be threatened by the specter of a future
      American empire.



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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                    DDI 2011
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                                        Space Weapons Good - Hegemony
Space weapons key to US military superiority
Dinerman 05 (Taylor Dinerman, former writer for Berkshire Eagle, North Adams Transcript and Space Equity, former writer of a
weekly column for the Space Review, has on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the
magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere, Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute‘s New York office, an
author of the textbook Space Science for Students, and part time consultant for the US Defense Department, 9/19/05, ―Whose space
security?,‖ The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/456/1)
     Due to its heavy dependence on space assets, the US is vulnerable to a ―Space Pearl Harbor‖. Because of the Missile
     Defense Agency‘s slow progress with midcourse intercept systems, this nation badly needs space-based boost-phase kill
     vehicles if it is to be effectively defended against long-range ballistic missiles. With these and other space weapons
     America‘s global military superiority will be insured for at least another half century. For the overwhelming majority of
     Americans this is a self-evidently good thing, but internationally such an attitude is not universally shared. Those who wish
     to reduce American power now see international arms control treaties and what is termed ―lawfare‖ as a way to accomplish
     their goals.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                         DDI 2011
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                                     Space Weapons Good – AT: No Challengers
Other countries can challenge the US in space
Lt Col Richard Earl Hanson, USAF, 1999. Air & Space Power Journal, ―Dominance on the High Seas of Space,‖
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/highseas.html

      Dominance in the space regime in wartime can hardly be accomplished by a nation-state that does not have a visionary
      leadership, skilled technicians, a stable society and a monetarily-solid economy. The false conclusion must not be reached
      that the United States is the only nation that may find it prudent to aspire to wartime space dominance. We are not alone.
      Russia also is highly proficient in space technologies as well as manned and unmanned applications and could be
      competent. That country presently lacks a healthy financial basis due to its glacial transition to a market economy, but will
      recover. The Peoples Republic of China has a rapidly growing but occasionally stumbling space capability. It is difficult to
      imagine a third-world country capable of realizing even the most rudimentary elements of space power, let alone reaching
      dominance. Space dominance for those nations would certainly seldom be an objective and rarely achieved. On the other
      hand, many presently robust industrial nations have space-launch facilities with a base of manufacturing and a technical
      personnel pool. Those nations are capable of placing dangerous payloads in space to menace United States space-traveling
      assets, but only a few might be expected to do so. Hard-to-detect techniques such as placing of space-mines, use of
      electromagnetic-pulse devices, killer-laser or particle-beam weapons and others, are among the weapons that such hostile
      industrial nations could bring to bear. Many nations can be brought to mind that harbor malice for the United States and this
      animosity could be expressed by disruptive actions against our space assets. Present and real in the news are those countries
      cottoning to known terrorists. Their future actions could do irreparable damage to U.S. space resources. Among
      surreptitious deeds, terrorists could disrupt radio-transmission of directive commands to space-borne assets---even though
      encrypted, critically alter positioning of satellites, counter with jamming the transmission and reception of space-earth
      communication and television relays, obstruct geo-stationary-orbit positioning and faculties, as well as other disastrous
      procedures. For the United States to counter these, as a minimum even today, radio traffic to and from space must feature
      agile-frequency modes or innovative encryption techniques.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                                            DDI 2011
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                                            Space Weapons Good – Miscalculation
Miscalc likely now due to accidents and covert attacks – space weapons decrease vulnerability
Dinerman 09 (Taylor Dinerman, former writer for Berkshire Eagle, North Adams Transcript and Space Equity, former writer of a
weekly column for the Space Review, has on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the
magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere, Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute‘s New York office, an
author of the textbook Space Science for Students, and part time consultant for the US Defense Department, 2/25/09, ―Bad for
America: The Ban on Space Weapons,‖ Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson-ny.org/336/bad-for-america-the-ban-on-space-weapons)
     On February 11 2009 the collision between Cosmos 2251, an old Russian military satellite and a US Iridium
     communications satellite at approximately 500 miles over Siberia, produced at least two more debris clouds that will circle
     the Earth for years and possibly endanger other satellites. This proves in any case the ease with which any spacecraft can be
     turned into an ASAT weapon. Ultimately, this event may also show how easy it is to test or to use an ASAT weapon
     without having to admit that one has done so. The Russian satellite, launched in 1993, was ostensibly inactive, but there is
     really no way of knowing this. Some experts have long speculated that some older satellites have been turned into ‗space
     mines‘, that can be activated at will. No one has ever proven this, but in any case the suspicion is not going to go away.
     Indeed, since the DSP- 23 ceased to function there have been a number of unusual satellite accidents. In January a
     commercial communications satellite belonging to SES of Luxembourg, ‗Astra 5A, was working fine one moment and then
     went into emergency sun acquisition mode the next.‖ Launched in 1997, this satellite was, at the time of the incident, being
     used to expand broadcast services to Central and Eastern Europe. More recently, at least one other satellite, Eutelsat W2M,
     has failed in orbit. This could just be a coincidence, or it could be something else. So far, there is no way to reliably verify
     what has caused these outages. If they were the result of attacks carried out using so-called ―Counterspace Devices,‖ which
     are essentially high powered jamming systems, it would be a difficult case to prove. A ban on space weapons, either with a
     treaty or more likely with a so-called ―Rules of the Road‖ agreement, sometimes referred to as an International Code of
     Conduct on Outer Space Activities, would do nothing to stop these kinds of attacks. In fact, it would make them easier, as
     the US and other Western nations would be forbidden from putting active defensive systems on their spacecraft, as well as
     from developing their own ASAT weapons.

Accidental launch triggers a global nuclear war that kills billions.

PR Newswire, 98 (“NEJM Study Warns of Increasing Risk of Accidental Nuclear Attack; Over 6.8 Million Immediate U.S. Deaths Possible,” 4/29)
      Despite the end of the Cold War, Americanand Russian nuclear arsenals remain on high-alert. That, when combined with
      significant deterioration in Russian control systems, produces a growing likelihood of an "accidental" nuclear attack, in
      which more than six million American[s] men, women, and children could die, according to a study published in the April 30 New
      England Journal of Medicine. The authors, physicians, public health professionals, and nuclear experts, will hold press conferences on April
      29 in seven U.S. Cities, including Boston, beseeching the U.S. Government to seek a bilateral agreement with the Russians that would take
      all nuclear missiles off high-alert as an "urgent interim measure" toward the only permanent solution: the abolition of nuclear weapons
      worldwide. "It is politically and morally indefensible that American children are growing up with the threat of an accidental nuclear attack,"
      says Lachlan Forrow, MD, principal author of the NEJM article, "'Accidental' Nuclear War: A Post-Cold War Assessment," and internist at
      Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. His study cites numerous instances of 'broken arrows' -- major nuclear accidents that could have
      killed millions and exposed millions of others to potentially lethal radiation from fallout if disaster had not been averted. "Nuclear weapons do
      not make us safer, their existence jeopardizes everything we cherish." Forrow adds, "We are calling upon the mayors and citizens of all U.S.
      and Russian cities to join us in appealing to Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin to end this threat by taking all weapons off high-alert
      status immediately." A strike on Boston would likely target Logan Airport, Commonwealth Pier, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
      and Harvard University, resulting in 609,000 immediate fatalities, according to the researchers. Depending on wind patterns, says Dr.
      Forrow, hundreds of thousands of other Boston-area residents could be exposed to potentially lethal fallout. Launching nuclear missiles on
      false warning is the most plausible contemporary 'accident' scenario, according to the authors. More than mere conjecture, this scenario
      almost played out to horrifying results in 1995 when a U.S. scientific rocket launched from Norway led to activation of the nuclear suitcases
      carried by the top Russian command -- the first time ever in Soviet- Russian history. It took eight minutes for the Russian leadership to
      determine the rocket launch was not part of a surprise nuclear strike by Western nuclear submarines -- just four minutes before they might
      have ordered a nuclear response based on standard launch-on-warning protocols. An 'accidental' nuclear attack would create a
      public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles and speeches on the subject, cited by
      the authors and written by leading nuclear war experts, public health officials, international peace organizations, and legislators.
      Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forces under former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
      of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many "war games" it is plausible that such an attack could
      provoke a nuclear counterattack that could trigger full-scale nuclear war with billions of casualties worldwide .




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
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                                             Space Weapons Good - Miscalc
Space weapons would solve miscalc – shoot down accidental launches
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 09 (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis - independent, nonpartisan research
organization specializing in national security, foreign policy, and defense planning issues, helps senior government policy makers,
industry leaders, and officials in the public policy community make informed decisions in a dynamic and unpredictable global security
environment, staff is a mix of scholars, business professionals, retired military officers, and foreign policy specialists, associated with
 The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and has offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., 2/21/09 ―Missile
Defense, the Space Relationship, & the Twenty-First Century,‖ 2009 Report, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf)
     One of the more recent examples of unexplained reference to the immorality of missile defense comes from William Spacy.
     In his discussion on how missile defense might be decentralized, he accurately quotes Dr. Lowell Wood‘s description of
     Brilliant Pebbles as each having its self-contained ability to respond swiftly, so that it could perform its purely defensive
     mission with no external supervision or coaching. Spacy then goes on to say, ―Aside from the moral reluctance of many to
     give any weapon so much autonomy, a major problem with this concept is to devise a computer/software combination
     small, cheap and smart enough to do the job.‖ 37 Here, Spacy seems to have himself, or recognizes in others, a moral
     problem with a weapon ―smart enough‖ to respond to a hostile missile attack quickly enough to shoot it down to save lives
     – this without ―reporting‖ to anyone in advance before taking what in effect is a real-time defensive response. Further, he
     does not elaborate. He simply notes ―moral reluctance‖ as an aside, as a ―given‖ requiring no further explanation and moves
     on. Yet, this point is important to any serious discussion about missile defense. Near-real-time responses are critical if a
     layered system is to work; so that if there is a moral problem, then it should be examined in detail. And in this particular
     matter Spacy is comparing apples to oranges by applying a set of concerns about one kind of weapon to another kind of
     weapon with a different function and mission. First, nuclear weapons designers properly have long been concerned about
     how much of a ―hair trigger‖ should be incorporated into missile firing and command/control systems. Too much
     automation without fail-safe supervision could lead to accidental or unauthorized launches, where megaton-size nuclear
     missiles could be sent screaming down upon millions of people with little warning – a nuclear Armageddon. Hence, the
     use of complex firing codes and ―black boxes‖ and ―footballs‖ that most heads of nuclear-power nations (certainly the
     United States) always carry with them to guard against such an event. But these are offensive nuclear weapons, ones
     calculated to destroy lives and property. These are the apples. The oranges are different. They would be space-based
     interceptors, defensive weapons, designed to save lives and property. They would be small and compact defensive
     weapons, in this case Brilliant Pebbles (BP), that would use not explosives but their own body weight to provide kinetic
     energy. This would occur when the device (pebble) first ―sees‖ the hostile nuclear weapon as it is launched, and locks on to
     the ascending missile. The device, powered by a mini-rocket, then would streak down or out or up to strike the missile
     (like a large pebble) and knock it out of commission. Obviously, seconds count, because once the pebble ―sees‖ the missile
     firing, it must respond instantly or it is too late 37 Spacy, ―Assessing the Military Utility of Spaced-based Weapons,‖ 130.
     and the hostile missile is well on its way to its target. The problem of accidental activation, however, would be virtually
     eliminated, because the autonomous system – like cruise control on an automobile – would be designed to be switched off
     as the BPs pass over friendly or non-hostile territory and turned on again over potentially hostile territory and programmed
     to do so automatically. 38 A reasonable comparison is the average home security system, which must be real-time
     automated, to activate its alarms the second an unwanted intruder shows up, so that law enforcement can respond
     effectively. Obviously, a prudent owner will turn off the alarm when moving about the premises or when expecting guests,
     but otherwise the owner wants the system armed to be able to respond quickly when needed.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                                                       DDI 2011
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                                                    Space Weapons Good – Readiness
Space weapons are key to preserving military readiness
Dinerman 09 (Taylor Dinerman, former writer for Berkshire Eagle, North Adams Transcript and Space Equity, former writer of a
weekly column for the Space Review, has on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the
magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere, Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute‘s New York office, an
author of the textbook Space Science for Students, and part time consultant for the US Defense Department, 2/25/09, ―Bad for
America: The Ban on Space Weapons,‖ Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson-ny.org/336/bad-for-america-the-ban-on-space-weapons)
     Invariably in war, striking an undefended weak point, especially a critical communications link, is a great advantage to the
     attacker. America‘s satellites are the key to making our high technology war fighting systems work effectively; they are
     even more important in helping to avoid deaths from ‗friendly fire,‘ and to civilians from stray bombs and shells.
     Destroying them would be a high priority at the beginning of any major conflict. A ban on space weapons would insure that
     they would be totally vulnerable to attack; this is what has been called a ―Space Pearl Harbor.‖ Such an attack would be
     even worse than Pearl Harbor, as the targets would not just be a few old battleships, but would be the heart of America‘s
     intelligence, communications and navigation systems. After such an attack this country and its leaders would be effectively,
     blind deaf and dumb. Not only will a ban leave America‘s essential space assets defended by nothing more than an
     unenforceable international agreement, but it will rule out, at least for as long as it lasts, any work on a space based missile
     defense system. This of course is one of the main reasons why the space weapons ban is being pursued so vigorously by
     Arms Control advocates. Effective multi-layered missile defense, the kind that can truly defend against a large scale nuclear
     missile attack, needs to have a system that can shoot down lots of long range missiles in the ‗boost phase‘ as they are lifting
     off and spewing out unbelievable amounts of heat. The best tool for this purpose was the Brilliant Pebble program that was
     developed during the George H.W. Bush administration and canceled in the first year of the Clinton administration. When
     George W. Bush came into office and withdrew from the much violated ABM Treaty that forbade America from defending
     itself against ballistic missile attacks, he failed to revive the program and instead went for a slightly more robust version of
     the National Missile Defense system that the Clinton administration had embarked on under pressure from the GOP
     Congress. Space and Missile Defense are closely intertwined issues. If the Obama administration decides to join in an
     unwise and unverifiable ban on space weapons merely to make a few misguided ‗soft power‘ advocates feel good, then it
     will have to be fought tooth and nail by those who do not want to see America‘s real military strength weakened.

Readiness solves war
Spencer, 2000 (Jack, Research Fellow at Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, ―The Facts About Military
Readiness‖, Heritage Foundation, September 15 th, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/BG1394-The-Facts-About-
Military-Readiness)
     America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a
     given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would
     surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American
     military superiority over any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support
      America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining.
      The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives, 3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to
      deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4According to some of the
      military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former
      Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their
      respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy. 5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George
      Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness
      is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared
      to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and
      interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter
      potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.




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                                                    Space Weapons Good – Satellites
Space weapons check satellite vulnerability

Dinerman 9
(Taylor Dinerman is a well-known and respected space writer regarding military and civilian space activities since 1983Bad for
America: The Ban on Space Weapons by Taylor Dinerman February 25, 2009 at 6:30 am http://www.hudson-ny.org/336/bad-
for-america-the-ban-on-space-weapons LShen)
     The effort to impose some sort of international space traffic control on the US, which owns nearly half of the 900 satellites
     now in orbit, would not only negate the principal of freedom of space, which is the basis of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,
     by giving effective sovereignty to a UN controlled institution, but it would give such an institution control over where and
     when the US could fly its military satellites. The US does not need to ask permission to sail the high seas: neither should
     the US have to ask for permission to operate in space. Invariably in war, striking an undefended weak point, especially a
     critical communications link, is a great advantage to the attacker. America‘s satellites are the key to making our high
     technology war fighting systems work effectively; they are even more important in helping to avoid deaths from ‗friendly
     fire,‘ and to civilians from stray bombs and shells. Destroying them would be a high priority at the beginning of any major
     conflict. A ban on space weapons would insure that they would be totally vulnerable to attack; this is what has been
     called a “Space Pearl Harbor.” Such an attack would be even worse than Pearl Harbor, as the targets would not just
     be a few old battleships, but would be the heart of America‟s intelligence, communications and navigation systems.
     After such an attack this country and its leaders would be effectively, blind deaf and dumb. Not only will a ban leave
     America‟s essential space assets defended by nothing more than an unenforceable international agreement, but it
     will rule out, at least for as long as it lasts, any work on a space based missile defense system.


Chinese ASAT attacks will collapse the global economy and make military power useless

Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009. ―The Great Game in Space,‖
http://www.project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf
                                                                                       U.S. economy, and in turn, much of the world
    Many specialists also argue that aside from the U.S. military dependency on orbital space, the
    economy, is also rapidly becoming dependent on space-based systems. They posit that, in effect, the U.S. is now a
    ―spacefaring‖ nation whose very way of life is tied to the myriad capabilities provided by the orbital space medium. War games conducted as
    part of U.S. national security protocols, such as the Army-After-Next, Navy Global and Air Force Global Engagement series, Space Game 2 and Schriever 1 &
    2, as well as the privately conducted ―DEADSATS‖ war games, conducted from the late 1990s and the early 2000s, confirm this view. According to some
    space experts who were intimately involved with the war games, the exercises exposed ―a critical national Achilles heel that politicians,
    economists and corporate CEOs have largely ignored…losses in space can quickly affect the economic, social, and national
    security fabric not only of the United States, but of the entire world.‖ These experts further speculate that ―large military powers,‖ such
    as the United States, could ―be held hostage by the unknowns inherent in a new kind of war.‖ 36 These concerns are directly
    linked with China‘s ASAT weapons and their potential applicability in any future U.S.-Sino conflict. A more recent war game,
    ―Pacific Vision,‖ conducted by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) underscored the vulnerability of the unprotected commercial
    communication satellite channels on which the Air Force relies, as well as its cyber and radar vulnerabilities to Chinese attack.

Nuclear war

Walter Russell Mead, a great American citizen, 2/4/2009, Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, p.
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2
    None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help
    capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a
    normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of
    the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the
    two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed
    wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf
    Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow,
    Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back
    on track, we may still have to fight.


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                                          Space Weapons Good – Satellites
Space weapons key to protect satellites

William Marshall et al. ,Former Research Fellow from the International Security Program at the Belfer Centre for Science and
International Affairs 2004-2007 and Chairman, Space Generation Advisory Council, NASA/Ames Research Center, Moffett Field,
CA, George Whitesides, former Executive Director of the National Space Society, Robert Schingler, special assistant to NASA Ames
Research Center Director, Andre Nilsen, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Managing Director of the Oxford Council on
Good Governance, and Kevin Parkin, member of the Carnegie Mellon Silicon Valley Research Staff, Deputy Director of the Mission
Design Center at NASA Ames, and project lead for the Microwave Thermal Rocket, prof physics, 2005, ―Space weapons: the urgent
debate‖ http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/MarshallEtAl_Vol1.pdf
      The judgment of whether to deploy space weapons should be based on a detailed analysis of their effects on stability and
      welfare in the short, medium and long term. Only by considering all of these time frames it is possible to make an informed
      cost-benefit analysis of space weapons and their impact on security. The following analysis is an attempt to outline some of
      the key issues that need to be taken into consideration. The main purpose is an impartial list of the potential pros and cons
      of such weapons. We will begin by assessing some of the most immediate aspects. In a short-term perspective of less than a
      decade, several advantages of space weapons can be imagined: 1. A superior weapon: Space weapons are potentially a
      primary tool for information dominance, and thus may be a key to battlefield dominance in contemporary war. Space
      weapons enable an advantage in time and space over an adversary which enables a state to acquire and maintain the
      initiative. This would mean increased capability to halt potential aggressors more effectively, with less collateral damage
      and probably earlier, compared to conventional arms. [Table 3, Outcome 3] 2. First mover advantage: If the readiness for
      deployment of space weapons is low among other countries, the first state to deploy will enjoy a short-term advantage. 3.
      Protection of space assets: Assets in space are a critical part of modern communications, navigation and information
      gathering, vital to the economy, vital to security and in demand in everyday life. Damage to these assets could seriously
      cripple a nation. Thus the ability to prevent hostile attack, whether from the ground or from space, is desirable. 4. Image of
      technical supremacy: By bolstering the image of technological supremacy, space weapons could act as a deterrent to hostile
      action. 5. Other: Military and commercial industry can be bolstered by gains from long-term (>5 years) research and
      development projects.




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                                                Space Weapons Good – Space Power
Weapons key to space power

Major Stanford K. Kekauoha, USAF, this is his masters thesis, 2003, ―SPACE WEAPONS AND SPACEPOWER,‖
https://www.afresearch.org/skins/RIMS/home.aspx (go to this URL, search for the year and author – the direct link doesn‘t work)

      In somewhat of a surprise, the Space Commission concluded that the ―U.S. Government should vigorously pursue the
      capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the President will have the option to deploy weapons in
      space to deter threats.‖7 The path to space weaponization, though long and arduous, appears to be gaining momentum as
      confirmed by Undersecretary of the Air Force Peter Teets‘ comments at a recent conference; "the fact is that we‘re going to
      want to, if necessary, deny an adversary their use of space…offensive space capability is something I think we need to start
      to work on."8 It has been argued here that space weaponization is a necessary element for realizing the true potential of
      spacepower, because exerting influence is essentially coercive. Three basic elements frame the argument. Coercion first
      requires an objective; the behavior one wants the adversary to exhibit. The preferred pattern of behavior should be clearly
      communicated to the adversary, accompanied by a threat—either the consequences of non-compliance or the benefits of
      obedience. Finally, that warning should be backed up by a credible capacity to punish transgressions (or reward obedience).
      The legitimacy and probability of actually meting out the promised consequences or benefits is dependent on this
      perception. Spacepower, while powerfully supportive in its current state, does not achieve its full potential—and will not—
      until the threats can be backed by a credible lethal force in and from space. As coercion expert Thomas Schelling
      concludes, ―to be coercive, violence has to be anticipated. And it has to be avoidable by accommodation. The power to hurt
      is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.‖9 While American space assets today
      remain unchallenged, their capacity to influence is considerably limited. Spacepower, at a minimum, requires a lethal
      component to establish it as a credible threat on par with other means. As powerful as space weapons may one day become,
      the real power behind spacepower involves a combination of space weapons, multiple coercion methods, and the qualitative
      advantages inherent in space operations

Space leadership prevents war and makes combat less destructive
General Lance Lord, Commander U.S. Air Force Space Command, 2005. High Frontier, 2:2, p. 2.
   In the simplest terms, America needs Space for its National Security and the survival of our way of life . We need space just as we need
   land, air, and sea forces. Removing one of those components of our National Security would render us incapable of defending the
   Nation. Removing space from the equation not only cripples our land, air and sea forces but it would have catastrophic
   consequences to our entire economy. In 1998, we saw firsthand what the loss of a satellite could do to our economy and way of life. Galaxy IV lost its
    Earth orientation, wiping out pager traffic for 40 million pagers in the US, halting credit card transactions and ATM machines, and knocking TV and radio
    stations off the air. Space is beyond a joint warfighting catalyst; it is a universal necessity and must be protected as such. It is
    important though, to recognize there are many different perspectives on the relevance of space. Space makes us safer, makes warfare less likely,
    and less destructive. We have all witnessed the incredible images of a bomb going down an elevator shaft or bridge being
    destroyed with a single aircraft dropping multiple precision weapons. Those are vivid images of the awesome combat power of our armed forces.
    However, we should look beyond the combat effects for the true lesson in those images. The real story is about the destruction that didnʼt occur
    because we were so precise. The real story is about the troops on the ground that were not put in harmʼs way. The real story is also
    about the collateral damage that did not occur to civilian populations. The bottom line is our space capabilities save lives and
    minimize destruction, and for that reason we have a moral responsibility to maintain the worldʼs preeminent space and missile force.




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                                               Space Weapons Good – Terrorism
Space weapons solve terror

William Marshall et al. ,Former Research Fellow from the International Security Program at the Belfer Centre for Science and
International Affairs 2004-2007 and Chairman, Space Generation Advisory Council, NASA/Ames Research Center, Moffett Field,
CA, George Whitesides, former Executive Director of the National Space Society, Robert Schingler, special assistant to NASA Ames
Research Center Director, Andre Nilsen, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Managing Director of the Oxford Council on
Good Governance, and Kevin Parkin, member of the Carnegie Mellon Silicon Valley Research Staff, Deputy Director of the Mission
Design Center at NASA Ames, and project lead for the Microwave Thermal Rocket, prof physics, 2005, ―Space weapons: the urgent
debate‖ http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/MarshallEtAl_Vol1.pdf

      Second, also in a medium-term perspective, looking between ten and twenty years ahead in time, there are certain
      advantages of space weapons: 1. Stable domination: Cognisant of the arms-race arguments against unilateral moves in
      space (see below), some argue that restraint on the part of a nation such as the United States may not persuade other nations
      from moving ahead to their own advantage. Seizing the initiative, they argue, could enable the United States to stop an
      arms race before it starts by establishing a globally dominant, stabilising force in space. 2. Global stabilising effect on earth:
      The past half-decade has seen considerable instability and conflict throughout the world. The latest threat is global
      terrorism. Space offers not only the ability to detect threats globally on very short time scales, but some believe it may also
      offer the ability to counter those threats from space on similarly short time scales.

Exinction

Alexander „03
          (Yonah, Prof, Dir – Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, 8-28, Lexis)
      Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and
      unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have
      entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning
      national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective
      counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion
      is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social
      and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to
      achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will
      give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that
      the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental
      human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas,
      Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national
      grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly,
      Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and
      Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The
      second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training,
      weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts
      and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to
      prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further
      terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of
      force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's
      targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The
      assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide
      bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military
      operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized
      by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940:
      "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."




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                                            Space Weapons Good – Terror
Space based weapons solve terror
Tim Rinne, State Coordinator of Nebraskans for Peace, 2-10-2010, ―Space as the Ultimate Imperial
Base‖http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402650903539836

      After 9/11, Bush, Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld concluded that to combat a shadowy enemy like
      terrorism, a different military strategy was going to be required. To wage and win a ‗‗War on Terror,‘‘ the United States
      would need a new kind of warfighting weapon: one that featured a broad mission portfolio, centralized decision-making
      authority, and—capitalizing on the asymmetrical U.S. advantage in space technology—an emphasis on speed and agility.
      America‘s entire force structure (including its network of national and international military bases) would be at this new
      command‘s disposal. Equipped with such a global, integrated, spacebased weapon, the United States would not only be
      able to take the fight to terrorists anywhere in the world, it could exert its imperial will over Earth. President Bush‘s
      amendments to the Unified Command Plan effectively placed StratCom at the pinnacle of the organizational hierarchy for
      the Pentagon‘s ten unified commands, effectively ‗‗tying them all together,‘‘ as Jackie Cabasso of the Western States Legal
      Foundation has expressed. Five years earlier, the U.S. Space Command‘s ‗‗Vision for 2020‘‘ had forecasted just such a
      development. ‗‗The space AOR [Area of Responsibility] is global and requires a combatant commander with a global
      perspective to conduct military operations and support regional warfighting CINCs [commanders in chief].‘‘




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                                       AT: Space Weapons Bad – Arms Race
Space weapons don‟t lead to an arms race
Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2005. ―US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,‖ http://www.e-
parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf


      Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American
      hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the majority of states seem
      to regard it as at least tolerable. A continuation of the status quo is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working
      toward its demise. As long as the United States does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable
      initially and grudgingly accepted over time. On the other hand, an attempt by any other state to dominate space would be
      part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order, with
      the weaponizing state at the top. Such an action would challenge the status quo, rather than seek to perpetuate it. This
      would be disconcerting to nations that accept the current international order—including the venerable institutions of trade,
      finance and law that operate within it—and intolerable to the United States. As leader of the current system, the United
      States could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside. There is
      another, perhaps far more compelling reason that weaponizing space would in time be less threatening to the international
      system than the failure to do so. The weaponization of space would decrease the likelihood of an arms race by shifting
      spending away from conventional weapons systems. One of the more cacophonous refrains against weapons procurement
      of any kind is that the money needed to purchase them is better spent elsewhere. It is a simple cliché but a powerful one.
      Space weapons in particular will be very, very expensive. Are there not a thousand better ways to spend the money? But
      funding for weapons does not come directly from education, housing or transportation budgets. It comes from military
      budgets. Thus the question should be directed not at particular weapons, but at all weapons. The immediate budget impact
      of significant funding increases for space weapons would be to decrease funding for combat aircraft, the surface battle fleet,
      and ground forces. This may well set the proponents of space weaponization at odds with both proponents and opponents of
      increased defense spending. Space advocates must sell their ideas to fellow pro-weapons groups by making the case that the
      advantages they provide outweigh the capabilities forgone. This is a mighty task. The tens or even hundreds of billions of
      dollars needed to develop, test and deploy a minimal space weapons system with the capacity to engage a few targets
      around the world could displace a half-dozen or more aircraft carrier battle groups, entire aircraft procurement programs
      such as the F-22, and several heavy armored divisions. This is a tough sell for supporters of a strong military. It is an even
      more difficult dilemma for those who oppose weapons in general, and space weapons in particular. Ramifications for the
      most critical current function of the Army, Navy, and Marines—pacification, occupation, and control of foreign territory—
      are profound. With the downsizing of traditional weapons to accommodate heightened space expenditures, the U.S. ability
      to do all three would wane significantly. At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police
      foreign lands, in light U.S. Military Transformation and Weapons in Space 171 of the no-end-in-sight occupations of Iraq
      and Afghanistan, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will
      have no direct potential to do so. Hence, the argument that the unilateral deployment of space weapons will precipitate a
      disastrous arms race is further eroded. To be sure, space weapons are offensive by their very nature. They deter violence by
      the omnipresent threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation. But they offer no advantage in the mission of
      territorial occupation. As such, they are far less threatening to the international environment than any combination of
      conventional weapons employed in their stead. What would be more threatening to a state in opposition to American
      hegemony: a dozen lasers in space with pinpoint accuracy, or (for about the same price) 15 infantry divisions massed on the
      border? A state employing offensive deterrence through space weapons can punish a transgressor state, but it is in a poor
      position to challenge that state‘s sovereignty. A transgressor state is less likely to succumb to the security dilemma if it
      perceives that its national survival is not at risk. Moreover, the tremendous expense of space weapons would inhibit their
      indiscriminate use. Over time, the world of sovereign states would recognize that the United States could not and would not
      use space weapons to threaten another country‘s internal self-determination. The United States still would challenge any
      attempts to intervene militarily in the politics of others, and it would have severely restricted its own capacity to do the
      latter. Judicious and non-arbitrary use of a weaponized space eventually could be seen as a net positive, an effective global
      police force that punishes criminal acts but does not threaten to engage in aggressive behavior.




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                                        AT: Space Weapons Bad – Arms Race
Space weaponization prevents arms race
Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2006. ―Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,‖ http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/408.pdf

      Well, technology does drive policy; we know that is a fact and the states or policy-makers who ignore technology that
      appears suddenly and changes the landscape in which one makes decisions will be at a great disadvantage. However,
      ideally and in theory, pol-icy should determine or channel technology development. In this case the technology
      development I advocate has to go for control of this ultimate high ground of outer space, and this is where Karl and I have
      some tremendous arguments. Peter Teets, the former Deputy Secretary of the Air Force for Space, said that we have
      traditionally kept air superiority around the world because we have a very rigorous and aggressive doctrine of control of the
      air. The first thing we must do in conflict is gain mastery of the skies and deny the skies to the enemy. We must now, in this
      21st century, do so for space. In fact, space supremacy is an enabling condition for the kinds of operations or conflicts that
      we can imagine in a military that is undergoing something called transformation, and in fact has undergone transformation
      so far that it really cannot be reversed. We cannot go back, either easily or effectively, toward a Vietnam-era style mili-tary
      that is not reliant on outer space—that is not enabled by space. And we would not want to because the context of war has
      changed. After resolving whether space can be controlled, we then get into arguments about whether space should be
      controlled. Karl Mueller and Pete Hays and I have talked at great length, and it is this debate that we are fostering, that we
      are all very proud of – should it be done? The real question is not inevitability; nothing is inevitable, but I think that things
      are probable and Karl and I disagree on the probability. We should be planning or expecting or at least thinking about it.
      The real question is not whether the United States should be the first to weaponize space, as I advocate, but whether or not
      the United States can afford to be the second to weaponize space. It is at least theoreti-cally possible (and I think it is more
      than theoretically possible) that one state, with a given will, could seize low-earth orbit with enough weapons (or use other
      means available for control of space) and take control of that high ground, that low earth orbit, which is glob-ally high
      ground. It is not the trivial example of Mt. Everest, though I like that example, Karl, I‘m going to have to look closer at
      that. Space is a global high ground. Yes, it is visible; the high ground is always visible. Despite Mt. Everest`s
      disadvantages, the high ground has always been sought by military planners and military strategists and it has al- ways
      provided an advantage. lt does not guarantee victory; it provides an advantage and that is what is sought. lf a nation can
      seize low-earth orbit and prevent other states from getting there, and we have several arguments about how that might be
      possible, then it will have gained a tremendous advantage that may not be disruptable as space, at least in some senses, is
      unflankable. There are a number of analogies that are used in this process of weighing options; one of the most common is
      to hearken back to Eisenhower in the Cold War. But rou- tinely the analogy is rniscast. Eisenhower was operating in a
      context where the United States was spending a great deal of money on ICBMs and missile development; that would go
      into the 1960s engaged in a war in Vietnam and then in implementing the Great Society, a domestic program of tremendous
      spending. The Soviet Union, for its part, was spending a great deal of money, too. Neither side wanted to get into an arms
      race where it did not know who would prevail. The Soviet system was not as technically advanced, but it was very robust.
      So it was quite easy to decide bilaterally that weapons in space or any kind of militarization of space might be damaging to
      both sides. Nonetheless, we have a different system today and, as Karl has pointed out, it may be that if the United States
      were to unilaterally militarize space - and l am not advocating that necessarily, but it is an option - that it could in fact
      prevent an arms race. The tril- lions of dollars that would have to be spent to dislodge the United States from space, if it
      were to quickly seize control of the low-earth orbit, might be seen as not worthwhile to another state. However, if we wait
      fifteen or twenty years until a state is able to challenge the United States in space, then we will have a space race. By
      putting weapons in space to enhance its military capabilities the United States today is saying to the world that in this
      period of American hegemony, it is not going to wait for problems to develop over- seas until they bubble over into its area
      of interest, and then massively and forcefully fix that problem. No. The American way of war today, based on precision and
      on space capabilities, is to engage early using less force, using more precise force and more deadly force in a specific area,
      but with far less collateral damage. That is the new American way of war and we really cannot get out of it.




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                                       AT: Space Weapons Bad – Arms Race
US already has dominance – others would opt out rather than compete – too expensive and time-intensive
David 05 (Leonard David, Senior writer for Space.com, 6/17/05, ―Weapons In Space: Dawn of a New Era,‖ Space.com,
http://www.space.com/325-weapons-space-dawn-era.html)
      What if America weaponizes space? One would think such an action would kick-start a procession of other nations to
      follow suit. Dolman said he takes issues with that notion. "This argument comes from the mirror-image analogy that if
      another state were to weaponize space, well then, the U.S. would have to react. Of course it would! But this is an entirely
      different situation," Dolman responded. "The U.S. is the world's most powerful state. The international system looks to it
      for order. If the U.S. were to weaponize space, it would be perceived as an attempt to maintain or extend its position, in
      effect, the status quo," Dolman suggested. It is likely that most states--recognizing the vast expense and effort needed to
      hone their space skills to where America is today--would opt not to bother competing, he said.

US space weaponization won‟t be perceived as a threat – other countries won‟t compete and checks
China First Strike
Dolman 10
(Everett Dolman is the Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force‘s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
(SAASS). His focus is on international relations and theory, and he has been identified as Air University‘s first space theorist. Dr.
Dolman began his career as an intelligence analyst for the National Security Agency, and moved to the United States Space Command
in 1986. In 1991, he received the Director of Central Intelligence‘s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst award.
The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment Dr. Everett Carl Dolman Prepared for the APSA Annual Meeting,
September 2010 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676919 LShen)
     To be sure, China‘s increasing space emphasis and its cultural antipathy to military transparency suggests that a serious
     attempt at seizing control of space is in the works. A lingering fear is the sudden introduction of an unknown capability
     (call it Technology X) that would allow a hostile state to place multiple weapons into orbit quickly and cheaply. The
     advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any other state, and the
     concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to America‘s already-dependent military forces could cause the
     immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the United States dithers on its military responsibilities,
     the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America is able to respond. And in such
     circumstances, the US certainly would respond. Conversely, if America were to weaponize space, it is not at all sure
     that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the
     necessary infrastructure is still too high—hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment needed to
     achieve a comparable counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the
     United States to entrench itself in space and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time
     and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments directly. They
     might oppose American interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively it uses its new power, but the
     likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the United States deploy weapons first—at least for the next
     few years—is remote.

Weaponizing now avoids arms race – no peer competitors – waiting ensures dangerous competition
David 05 (Leonard David, Senior writer for Space.com, 6/17/05, ―Weapons In Space: Dawn of a New Era,‖ Space.com,
http://www.space.com/325-weapons-space-dawn-era.html)
      "The time to weaponize and administer space for the good of global commerce is now, when the United States could do so
      without fear of an arms race there." This is the view of Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military
      Studies in the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. No peer competitors are
      capable of challenging the United States, Dolman explained, as was the case in the Cold War, and so no "race" is possible.
      The longer the United States waits, however, the more opportunities for a peer competitor to show up on the scene. Dolman
      argues that, in ten or twenty years, America might be confronting an active space power that could weaponize space. And
      they might do so in a manner that prevents the United States from competing in the space arena. "The short answer is, if
      you want an arms race in space, do nothing now," Dolman said.




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                                       AT: Space Weapons Bad – Arms Race
Outer space dominance stabilizes the international system and checks space arms race – US is key
Dolman 10
(Everett Dolman is the Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force‘s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
(SAASS). His focus is on international relations and theory, and he has been identified as Air University‘s first space theorist. Dr.
Dolman began his career as an intelligence analyst for the National Security Agency, and moved to the United States Space Command
in 1986. In 1991, he received the Director of Central Intelligence‘s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst award.
The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment Dr. Everett Carl Dolman Prepared for the APSA Annual Meeting,
September 2010 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676919 LShen)
     A continuation of the status quo is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working toward its demise. As long as the
     United States does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over
     time. Mirror-imaging does not apply here. An attempt by China to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the
     land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order. Such an action would challenge
     the status quo, rather than seek to perpetuate it. This would be disconcerting to nations that accept, no matter how
     grudgingly, the current international order—including the venerable institutions of trade, finance, and law that operate
     within it—and intolerable to the United States. As leader of the current system, the United States could do no less than
     engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside and accept a diminished world status.
     Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the United States is dominant in space infrastructure,
     would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race in space. The enhanced ability to deny
     any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space and to readily engage and destroy terrestrial anti-satellite
     capacity would make the possibility of large-scale space war or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a
     state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the
     highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force
     to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the
     future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote.

Weaponization deters arms race

Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2003. ―Space Power and US Hegemony,‖ http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/Security_Space_Volume.Final.pdf
     Space has the unique capacity of being the ―unflankable‖ high ground. So tactically advantageous is the high ground
     position that has both line of site over and defensive domination of the battlefield that commanders have always sought it.
     Space control is not only tactically advantageous on the battlefield, it is strategically so in diplomacy. The entity in control
     of space has real-time presence and persistence over the globe.39 So strong is the fortified position at the top of the Earth‘s
     gravity well that should any nation seize it, it could effectively deny access to space to any other state that should attempt to
     put assets there. A simple argument could be made that the United States has an imperative to seize control of space on this
     point alone, to prevent a dangerous enemy from taking it, but such a case could be made for any state that desired
     domination over the world. My point is that not only is the United States the sole country with the capacity to seize space
     (currently), it is the only great power that has a history of benign intervention and overall disdain of empire that it is
     morally important it do so before any state bent on world domination and oppression can.

Arms race good – US will win, becoming a stabilizing hegemon in space – history proves

Dinerman 05 (Taylor Dinerman, former writer for Berkshire Eagle, North Adams Transcript and Space Equity, former writer of a
weekly column for the Space Review, has on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the
magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere, Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute‘s New York office, an
author of the textbook Space Science for Students, and part time consultant for the US Defense Department, 9/19/05, ―Whose space
security?,‖ The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/456/1)
     Those who claim that a US deployment of space weapons would set off an arms race tend to think that such races are, in
     and of themselves, bad things. The US success in using such a race to defeat the Soviet Union is discounted, as is the
     potential for the US to benignly use its space supremacy to permit the peaceful uses of outer space just as its sea and air
     supremacy allow for the global nonbelligerent use of those mediums today. This point was made by Everett Dolman of the
     Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base



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                                            AT: Arms Race – Nonunique

The space arms race began years ago – dismissing space weapons now just makes the US vulnerable

Dinerman 05 (Taylor Dinerman, former writer for Berkshire Eagle, North Adams Transcript and Space Equity, former writer of a
weekly column for the Space Review, has on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the
magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere, Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute‘s New York office, an
author of the textbook Space Science for Students, and part time consultant for the US Defense Department, 9/19/05, ―Whose space
security?,‖ The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/456/1)
     As in a real Congressional hearing, the parliamentarians from Europe, Latin America, Australia, Ghana, and Japan took
     turns to ask questions and to state their positions. With only a couple of exceptions, they tended to express not only their
     hostility to US space weapons and to the Bush Administration, but also to the American people who elected him. This was
     evidently implied in the way some of them mentioned the effects and implications of Hurricane Katrina.As some of them,
     and their supporters, explained, their principal goal was to prevent an ―arms race in space‖; in fact, since such a race
     already exists, any arms control agreements further restricting US military space efforts would have the effect of helping
     America‘s enemies and rivals to catch up. They may honestly believe that the best thing for world peace would be to make
     space a ―weapons-free zone‖. The faith they show in international treaties would be touching were it not for the potentially
     deadly consequences.




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                                              AT: Arms Race – Inevitable
Most countries won‟t engage in a space arms race, but those that will weaponize will do so independent of
US action
Lambakis 01 (Steven Lambakis, national security and international affairs analyst specializing in space power and policy studies,
member of the National Institute for Public Policy, author on American space power, writer for space Policy, Policy Review, Armed
Forces Journal International, Orbis, Strategic Review, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Defense News, Comparative Straegy, The
Claremont Review of Books, and the Washington Times, testified in front of the House Science Committee, Managing Editor of
Comparative Strategy, a leading international journal of global affairs and strategic studies, 2/1/01, ―Space Weapons: Refuting the
Critics,‖ Policy Review No. 105, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6612)
      One may ask, just because the United States unilaterally refrains from developing antisatellite weapons or space-based
      lasers, why do we assume that other countries will pause right alongside Washington? After all, not all innovations in war
      stem from provocation. While weapons developed and deployed by rival states surely influence decision making, it is
      unlikely that states procure weapons systems primarily to achieve a balance in arsenals. Some states certainly may strive to
      have what we have, but they also will strive to acquire and master those weapons that meet their unique security
      requirements. Washington‘s very reliance on satellites for security, moreover, would appear to be a more plausible
      motivation behind any hostile state‘s desire to acquire satellite countermeasures. While China might wish to integrate
      ASATs into its arsenal to offset Washington‘s deployment of ASATs as part of a deterrence strategy ("you hit one of mine,
      I‘ll hit one of yours"), Beijing is likely to be more inclined to acquire satellite countermeasures independently of what
      Washington does in order to degrade U.S. space advantages, which may be used to support Taiwan. To argue that states
      must follow Washington and deploy space weapons out of self-interest is to ignore the fact that self-interest has many faces.
      In the end, foreign officials must weigh personal, national, and party priorities and strategic requirements, understand
      political tradeoffs, and assess whether the national treasury and domestic resources could support plans to "match" U.S.
      weapons. Haiti‘s security needs will not match those of Serbia, Iran‘s will not match Canada‘s, and India‘s will not match
      those of the United States. Space control weapons, one must conclude, would not fit very well in the defense strategies of
      many nations. Foreign leaders, in other words, are not automatons. Between action and reaction always lies choice.


Space weapons arms race inevitable – incentives too great
Brown 09 (Trevor Brown, BA from Indiana University in international studies, author focused on political, economic, and military
strategy for the medium of space, 3/1/09, ―Soft Power and Space Weaponization,‖ Air & Space Power Journal,
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html)
      The notion that the United States can keep space from becoming a ―shooting gallery‖ by agreeing to a comprehensive ban
      on space weapons is naïve.17 The hard truth is that as long as US economic and military power depends on massive,
      complex, and expensive sets of vulnerable space assets, the incentive for any potential foe to develop ways of attacking
      them remains too great to be overcome by any international agreement. 18 If, however, such an agreement can constrain the
      United States from developing and deploying effective countermeasures, foes would have every reason to pressure
      Washington into limiting its own actions.19 As space technology spreads, the incentives for small and medium states to seek
      space-warfare capabilities increase, and the destruction of a major US satellite would represent both a substantive and
      symbolic victory over the United States.20 There is, therefore, no question of whether to proceed with space weapons—only
      a question of how to do so with the requisite political skill in order to retain soft power while expanding hard power.




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                                            AT: Space Weapons Bad - Econ
Weaponization key to econ
Lt Col Richard Earl Hanson, USAF, 1999. Air & Space Power Journal, ―Dominance on the High Seas of Space,‖
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/highseas.html

The United States and our Air Force would do well to accept that statement as a basic doctrinal verity in any conflict. Note that the
Gulf War played out to be an excellent, though partial, proving ground for that axiom. Our dominance there in passive space tools
helped to provide the US and friendly fighting forces with a commanding position over hostile terrestrial forces. After a period of
decisive air strikes and only one hundred hours of ground warfare, the stated United Nations' goals were achieved. Due in great part to
these superior United States advantages in space, victory in the conflict was celebrated. We must initiate the struggle for the creation
and operation by the Air Force of those aerospace forces capable in wartime of achieving a commanding presence on the high seas of
space. When realized, that commanding position would permit the protection of valuable U.S. space-traveling assets from electronic
tampering, predators, pirates, and hostile nations. "Spacefaring nations would prefer to see the international community adopt a Live-
and-Let-Live stance on the use of space, building on the proven Law of the Sea model. All nations can freely use the open seas, but
shipment of goods along sea lanes can be protected during conflicts."3 It is believed that the same philosophy should apply to space.
The world has reached the situation in which many nations and businesses have extensive commercial capabilities in space for
television and communications. Aggressive acts by unprincipled nations or terrorists will be a likely prospect. Industrial espionage on
space secrets of a competing firm or military spying on the automated or manned space stations of our nation could become common.
Our United States corporations will expect Air Force aerospace forces to provide security for all their peaceful space ventures. Such
expectations would parallel our ocean naval forces providing protection for our merchantmen, tankers and fishing fleets, or as the
cavalry in our early West escorted and defended the prairie schooners venturing into our unpopulated frontiers

Space weapons solve the economy
William Marshall et al. ,Former Research Fellow from the International Security Program at the Belfer Centre for Science and
International Affairs 2004-2007 and Chairman, Space Generation Advisory Council, NASA/Ames Research Center, Moffett Field,
CA, George Whitesides, former Executive Director of the National Space Society, Robert Schingler, special assistant to NASA Ames
Research Center Director, Andre Nilsen, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Managing Director of the Oxford Council on
Good Governance, and Kevin Parkin, member of the Carnegie Mellon Silicon Valley Research Staff, Deputy Director of the Mission
Design Center at NASA Ames, and project lead for the Microwave Thermal Rocket, prof physics, 2005, ―Space weapons: the urgent
debate‖ http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/MarshallEtAl_Vol1.pdf

      Third, some advantages of space weapons might only emerge in a long term perspective of at least twenty years:1. Basis of
      outer space ‗Naval‘ Paradigm: The existence of weaponry in global ‗common‘ areas can be a long-term positive and
      welcome influence. The standard analogy of outer space is to the world‘s oceans including the presence of global,
      weaponised navies dominated by a single power (in the 19th Century Great Britain and in the 20th the United States). This
      regime may be applicable to space and could result in security in space akin to the world‘s oceans, with all nations
      operating free from interference based on an internationally recognised ‗Law of the Sea‘. 2. Economic impetus to large-
      scale space exploitation: Today much of the developmental spending on space, perhaps the majority of it, is spent on
      security-related expenditures. Indeed, the US Apollo programme and associated ‗space race‘ was arguably based mostly on
      security-related competition. Some argue that large-scale military space spending, particularly on weapons and even with
      (and maybe in light of) an arms race, will ignite rapid development of space technologies at a pace not seen since Apollo.
      As with the opening of the American West, military pathfinders and operations might presage finance and enable large-
      scale civil and economic development of space assets.




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                                           AT: Space Weapons Bad – Econ
Weaponization solves the economy

Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2005. ―US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space,‖ http://www.e-
parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.pdf

      Moreover, if the United States were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of
      space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action would serve to
      discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. Should the United States use its advantage to police the
      heavens and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over
      time its control of low-Earth orbit could be viewed as a global asset and a public good. In much the same way the British
      maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights, the United
      States could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion




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                                     AT: Space Weapons Bad – International Backlash
Weaponization decreases imperial power – other countries are less threatened
Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2006. ―Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,‖ http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/408.pdf

      What we have to think about then is what would a space-weapons-heavy American military force structure look like? And
      here we get a number of issues. It would be very, very expensive. I would like to leave you with one thought here: what are
      the opportunity costs forgone? The money that will have to go into space is not going to come from school budgets or from
      transportation budgets; it is going to come from the DOD. It is going to be at the cost of other military things. It has been
      pointed out that space weaponization and military space operations are not going to do anything new. These things could be
      done by other cheaper and possibly less incendiary means. The billions it would cost for a proper recapitalization of all of
      the aging space support systems that we have and for potentially using space as an integral part of our ability to project
      violence abroad, which we will be doing - we are not going to give up the right to do that - means that we will have to
      atrophy some of our existing capabilities to go into other countries and stay there for a long time. Space-enabled force
      application for the United States, in the sense of going in and getting the job done, was amply demonstrated in Operation
      Iraqi Freedom. The conven- tional part of that war was a spectacular success. The occupation has been equivocal, to say the
      least. Now we could imagine, say, that for the price of what we are talking about for space weapons, we could get another
      five heavy divisions, three more carrier battle groups, and/or fund all of the weapons systems that the Air Force might want.
      Fine. What is more threatening to foreign states: the ability of the United States to apply a lim- ited amount of violence in a
      very precise way anywhere on the globe at almost any time, or five more heavy divisions, three more carrier battle groups,
      or whatever, giving the United States the capacity to occupy and control foreign states physically? I submit to you that
      space weaponization and military space is not an attempt by the United States to be- come an imperial power around the
      world, but to extend its current period of hegemony into the foreseeable future. This is the point that I was sidetracked on. I
      will plot an ex- ample: say ten or fifteen years from now, China sees taking space as a way of guarantee- ing its sovereignty
      and giving it advantages in the Taiwan straits or any place else it deems in its security interest. Seizing low-earth orbit
      would thus be an attempt to overthrow the existing international order (not continue it), and the United States would have to
      oppose such actions. On the other hand, the United States militarizing space aggressively, at least through an aggressive
      doctrine of space supremacy, would not be an attempt to over- throw the extant global system, but to extend it and it may
      not - it probably would not - be directly challenged in its efforts.




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                                     AT: Space Weapons Bad – International Backlash
International backlash doesn‟t have an effect on the US
Garrett M. Mills, student at American University. His professor, John Calabrese, uses his paper as a model for current students.
Spring 2005, ―Space-to-Earth Weapons The Case for U.S. Deployment‖
http://www.angelfire.com/dc2/cal_foreignpolicy/MillsResearchProject.pdf

      The U.S. is the most powerful nation in the world. Though many do not like it, this is the truth of the times. It is this very
      fact, though, that upsets many nations of the world. Just as no person likes to feel like he is not in control, so it is with any
      world power. When the U.S. does not heed the will of the international community (though Lambakis would assert that
      there is no such thing), the power of the rest is lost. Many nations, including a large number of U.S. allies, have made their
      opposition to the weaponization of space clear in their actions on the world stage, supporting various initiatives to see to the
      continued un-weaponized state of space.122 For the U.S. to go forward with a STEW program would be to emphasize to
      the others their lack of power relative to the U.S. The world is worried about U.S. space dominance and as such, the world
      can expect to face opposition.123 The next question would then be: what would be the ramifications of this international
      opposition? Were there no opposition, the U.S. would not really need to pay other nations any regard. But this is
      impossible. Nevertheless, the effects of the opposition are unlikely to be cataclysmic. While there would certainly be
      opposition on the international stage to a U.S. STEW program, it does not necessarily follow that the effects of this
      opposition would be terribly damaging to the U.S. A decision by the United States to use the space environment for
      protection will bring the acrimony of the entire world against Washington, asphyxiating U.S. national and economic
      security. This is not strategic thought—this is the worst-case, even unimaginable-case scenario played to the hilt.124 A far
      more likely reading of the result of a unilateral action on the part of the U.S. would be a greater difficulty in receiving
      international cooperation when it did desire to have it, just the same as it works in the domestic political sphere. There is
      certainly no risk of military retaliation and any sort of economic sanctions would be very unlikely. This being said, even
      though the matter is simply one of perception, life is more pleasant for all parties if there is cooperation. Further, the U.S.
      international diplomatic situation is already tarnished, whether that state is justified or not.




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                                     AT: International Backlash – Inevitable

Weaponization inevitable – perception of US ensures backlash and balancing regardless of policy
Dinerman 05 (Taylor Dinerman, former writer for Berkshire Eagle, North Adams Transcript and Space Equity, former writer of a
weekly column for the Space Review, has on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the
magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere, Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute‘s New York office, an
author of the textbook Space Science for Students, and part time consultant for the US Defense Department, 6/20/05, ―Space weapons:
the new debate,‖ The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/394/1)
     If built and deployed, these weapons would indeed constitute unilateral ―space weaponization.‖ The opposition believes
     that, like virginity, space would somehow lose its purity once orbital weapons of any sort were deployed. Officials in
     China, Russia, and France speak as if their national security depends on the continued defenselessness of America‘s
     military space infrastructure. The nature of space technology, and of space itself, as the ultimate high ground, means that
     there will be weapons, and future battles, outside Earth‘s atmosphere. No matter what actually happens, it is almost certain
     that some will find a way to blame America. Therefore, any decision regarding the building of any space warfare system
     should be made strictly on the basis of military utility. Since no argument or foreign threat will likely change the minds of
     those who are against space weaponization, any change in US space policy, no matter how mild or hedged with caveats,
     will be portrayed as opening the doors of hell. Rather, under current circumstances, President Bush should authorize the
     pursuit of more and better space assets, including weapons, and Donald Rumsfeld should be pushing the Air Force to
     radically improve the way it designs and builds all its space systems. After all, why not fight wars in space? There‘s lots of
     room there and not a lot of civilians to get in the way.




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                                     AT: International Backlash – US Posture Solves
US development of commercial interests in space alongside the military ensures minimal backlash
Brown 09 (Trevor Brown, BA from Indiana University in international studies, author focused on political, economic, and military
strategy for the medium of space, 3/1/09, ―Soft Power and Space Weaponization,‖ Air & Space Power Journal,
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html)
      But the United States does not necessarily have to choose between civilian and military space programs since much of the
      technology developed for space is dual use. The space industry provides a tremendous opportunity for militaries that desire
      more affordable access and space assets that can significantly augment terrestrial forces. As Alfred Thayer Mahan pointed
      out, ―Building up a great merchant shipping lays the broad base for the military shipping.‖36 The US military can maximize
      its resources, not only financially but also politically, by packaging as much military space activity as possible into
      commercial space activity. One example involves satellite communications. The arrangement the Pentagon has with
      Iridium Satellite LLC gives the military unlimited access to its network and allows users to place both secure and nonsecure
      calls or send and receive text messages almost anywhere in the world. 37 Another example involves space imagery. Even
      though the government must maintain sophisticated imaging capabilities for special situations, it could easily meet the vast
      majority of its routine requirements at lower cost by obtaining commercially available imagery. 38 The Air Force could also
      use space transportation, another emerging industry, to maximize its resources. Private ventures now under way are
      reducing the costs of space access considerably. It is possible that one enterprise could become an alternative to Russian
      Soyuz spacecraft for NASA‘s missions to the International Space Station. 39 Such enterprises could prove attractive, cost-
      effective options for delivering the Air Force‘s less-sensitive payloads to Earth orbit. Space tourism, a growing industry,
      could enable the Air Force to procure affordable capabilities to routinely operate 60 to 90 miles above Earth.40 Advances
      that entrepreneurs are making in suborbital space flight could eventually evolve to a point where the Air Force would find it
      far easier, politically as well as financially, to acquire platforms capable of delivering munitions from space. Conclusion A
      glance at the global strategic situation reveals many nations rushing to develop space capabilities. Ostensibly civilian, the
      capabilities in development around the world are largely dual use and will have profound effects on the balance of power.
      The United States, therefore, would be foolish to slow the pace of its own space development. The issue at hand is not
      whether to proceed with space weapons but how to proceed with these capabilities and effectively manage the security
      dilemmas that will inevitably arise. By assuming a posture which suggests that its intentions in space are competitive
      scientific and commercial pursuits—and which does not suggest the desire to barricade the medium in times of peace for
      the purpose of geopolitical leverage—the United States can proceed without causing undue angst in the international
      community. Once we have laid the foundation for commercial activities (i.e., ―merchant shipping‖), military capabilities—
      or ―military shipping‖—will follow in due course and with far less controversy. If US policy makers can showcase
      scientific and commercial space endeavors while avoiding the perception of orbital despotism, they can steadily build
      dominant military space capabilities and retain soft power.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                             DDI 2011
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                          AT: International Backlash – International Support Checks
When the US weaponizes, international levelheadedness and support will prevail – little backlash
Lambakis 01 (Steven Lambakis, national security and international affairs analyst specializing in space power and policy studies,
member of the National Institute for Public Policy, author on American space power, writer for space Policy, Policy Review, Armed
Forces Journal International, Orbis, Strategic Review, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Defense News, Comparative Straegy, The
Claremont Review of Books, and the Washington Times, testified in front of the House Science Committee, Managing Editor of
Comparative Strategy, a leading international journal of global affairs and strategic studies, 2/1/01, ―Space Weapons: Refuting the
Critics,‖ Policy Review No. 105, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6612)
      It is further assumed that deploying arms not possessed by other states in regions unexploited by other states would put the
      United States in a position to coerce, even terrify, other nations. One must note, however, that Washington already has the
      power to tyrannize and bully with its current arsenal — but it does not. The United States deploys unparalleled — even
      "uncustomary" — nuclear and conventional military forces and engages in peace and combat missions on a global basis.
      Yet the face of overwhelming American military might neither alarms allies nor incites aggression. The U.S. retreat from
      several forward bases and its positive global leadership, moreover, belie suspicions that, in this unipolar world, Washington
      harbors imperialist ambitions. Recent criticisms surrounding the MIRACL test and the U.S. National Missile Defense
      program were well orchestrated and vociferous, but numerically shallow when put up against the larger body of
      international opinion. In fact, voices will inevitably rise, from all corners of the globe, to condemn U.S. military decisions
      and actions. Political assault is the price the United States pays for having global interests and power. There will always be
      attempts by foreign leaders and vocal minorities to influence U.S. procurement decisions through arms control and public
      condemnation. It costs little, and the potential gains are great. Would a vigorous military space program alienate foreign
      governments to the point at which Washington could never again assemble a coalition similar to the one that defeated
      Saddam Hussein in 1991? This is doubtful. Leading up to the onset of war, the Iraqi leader‘s actions, not President Bush‘s
      initiatives, dominated foreign policy discussions abroad. Indeed, many Arab countries joined the coalition, despite
      America‘s stout support for the much-hated Israel. Any significant anti-American rhetoric was quickly overshadowed by
      the singular goal of turning back naked aggression. Similar international support may be expected in the future, even if the
      United States were to deploy space-based interceptors to slap down ballistic missiles aimed at New York or Los Angeles or
      antisatellite weapons to blind prying eyes in times of crisis or conflict. When the stakes are high and the United States must
      act militarily in self-defense or to protect its interests, allies and friends are likely to judge U.S. activities in space to affect
      politico-strategic conditions on Earth appropriately and in context.




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                                      AT: Space Weapons Bad – Invites Attack
Weaponization doesn‟t cause attacks

Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2003. ―Space Power and US Hegemony,‖ http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/Security_Space_Volume.Final.pdf

      The United States‘ reliance on military space support is greater than that for any other nation. Should it be denied access to
      space, the United States would be unable to conduct coordinated, large-scale offensive military operations abroad, and the
      security and economic well-being of the United States and its allies would be directly threatened.12 And the United States
      is vulnerable to a wide array of anti-space hostilities. These include anti-satellite attack, physical destruction of space
      support centers, electromagnetic attack (jamming) and vulnerable are its space systems that the authors of the Space
      Commission Report suggest a ‗Pearl Harbor‘ in space scenario is possible in the near future.13 This vulnerability has
      prompted several analysts to decry any attempt at weaponizing space.14 Doing so would signal weakness to potential
      enemies, and would encourage them to build anti-space capabilities.15 Restraint, they assert, would signal that no need to
      build such capabilities exists. Such arguments are stunningly feeble. They suggest that the best protection is no protection;
      the more damage that can be done by the loss of an asset, the more imperative it is not to protect it. This head-in-the-sand
      derivative of Cold War MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) logic is misplaced in the Space Age. Indeed, an active attempt
      to physically defend space assets will be a signal to others of their value to the United States. It also ratchets up the
      difficulty for a state attempting to deny that capability. Today, a single nuclear detonation in low-Earth orbit could cause
      massive long-term damage to spacecraft (to name only one of the more ubiquitous possible threats), and dozens of
      countries have the missile capacity to place such a device into orbit. The Cold War assumption that the anti-weaponization
      advocates make is that putting a device into orbit that could shoot down an attempt to place a nuclear warhead there would
      force potential adversaries to take precisely that action before the defensive device became operational. This is similar to
      the anti-Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or ‗Star Wars‘) logic that said development of an anti-missile shield would force
      the Soviet Union to attack the United States (with nuclear weapons) before it could be deployed. Of course, to do so would
      have been suicide. The American MAD policy guaranteed it. The balance of terror created by mutually defenseless nuclear
      powers was thought to deter the possibility of nuclear war. Thus a launch against the United States would have been by
      definition an irrational act. And there‘s the rub. One cannot deter an irrational act. One can only defend against it. Because
      of their value and importance, an attack on United States space assets will likely receive some retaliation whether there are
      weapons in space or not, and hence the deterrent – what there is – is already in place. But is it enough of a deterrent? We
      simply have no way of knowing for sure if deterrence works, or if it has ever worked. We can only know when it fails. If
      deterrence, no matter how credible or overawing it may seem, fails, then the deterrer must suffer the consequences or be
      prepared to defend against the transgression. This is precisely the point. It may be that no state would ever attempt to attack
      the United States‘ spacebased capabilities – but if some state (or nonstate group) does attack, it is presently unobstructed




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                          DDI 2011
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                                          AT: Space Weapons Bad – Miscalc
Sway of major powers, not isolated tactical events, cause war – space miscalc speculation is ungrounded
Lambakis 01 (Steven Lambakis, national security and international affairs analyst specializing in space power and policy studies,
member of the National Institute for Public Policy, author on American space power, writer for space Policy, Policy Review, Armed
Forces Journal International, Orbis, Strategic Review, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Defense News, Comparative Straegy, The
Claremont Review of Books, and the Washington Times, testified in front of the House Science Committee, Managing Editor of
Comparative Strategy, a leading international journal of global affairs and strategic studies, 2/1/01, ―Space Weapons: Refuting the
Critics,‖ Policy Review No. 105, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6612)
      The case against deploying weapons in space rests on a number of assumptions, often unstated. A careful look at the
      validity of these assumptions reveals serious problems — in many cases undermining the conclusions the critics draw. One
      such assumption is that military developments over the past 50 years have created a security environment in which certain
      tactical events or localized crises run an unacceptably high risk of triggering a general, possibly even nuclear, war. We are
      therefore more secure when we do nothing to upset the global military balance, especially in space — where we station key
      stabilizing assets. Yet we have little experience in reality to ground this freely wielded and rather academic assumption. By
      definition, anything that causes instability in armed relationships is to be avoided. But would "shots" in space, any more
      than shots on the ground, be that cause? When we look at what incites war, history instructs us that what matter most are
      the character and motivation of the states involved, along with the general balance of power (i.e., are we in the world of
      1914, 1945, or 2001?). Fluctuations in national arsenals, be they based on earth or in space, do not determine, but rather
      more accurately are a reflection of, the course of politics among nations. In other words, it matters not so much that there
      are nuclear weapons, but rather whether Saddam Hussein or Tony Blair controls them and in what security context. The
      same may be said for space weapons. The sway of major powers historically has regulated world stability. It follows that
      influential countries that support the rule of law and the right of all states to use orbits for nonaggressive purposes would
      help ensure stability in the age of satellites. The world is not more stable, in other words, if countries like the United States,
      a standard-bearer for such ideas, "do nothing." Washington‘s deterrence and engagement strategies would assume new
      dimensions with the added influence of space weapons, the presence of which could help bolster peacemaking diplomacy
      and prevent aggression on earth or in space. Insofar as we have no experience in space warfare, no cases exist to justify
      what is in essence a theoretically derived conclusion — that space combat must be destabilizing. We do know, however,
      that the causes of war are rarely so uncomplicated. Small events, by themselves, seldom ever explain large-scale events.
      When ardent Israeli nationalist Ariel Sharon visited this past fall the holy site around the Al Aksa Mosque at Jerusalem‘s
      Temple Mount, his arrival fired up a series of riots among impassioned Palestinians and so widened the scale of violence
      that it kicked up the embers of regional war yet again. Yet the visit itself would have been inconsequential were it not for
      the inveterate hostility underlying Israeli-Palestinian relations. Likewise, World War I may have symbolically begun with
      the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Yet a serious student of history would note that the alliances, the
      national goals and military plans, and the political, diplomatic, and military decisions of the major European powers during
      the preceding years and months were the true causes of the erosion in global strategic stability. By extension, if decisions to
      go to war are set on a hair-trigger, the reasons for the precarious circumstances extend far beyond whether a
      communications or imaging platform is destroyed in space rather than on earth.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
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                                          AT: Space Weapons Bad – Miscalc
Miscalc won‟t escalate in space – multiple historical examples prove
Lambakis 01 (Steven Lambakis, national security and international affairs analyst specializing in space power and policy studies,
member of the National Institute for Public Policy, author on American space power, writer for space Policy, Policy Review, Armed
Forces Journal International, Orbis, Strategic Review, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Defense News, Comparative Straegy, The
Claremont Review of Books, and the Washington Times, testified in front of the House Science Committee, Managing Editor of
Comparative Strategy, a leading international journal of global affairs and strategic studies, 2/1/01, ―Space Weapons: Refuting the
Critics,‖ Policy Review No. 105, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6612)
      Those who believe we run extraordinary risks stemming from clouded perceptions and misunderstandings in an age of
      computerized space warfare might want to take a look at some real-world situations of high volatility in which potentially
      provocative actions took place. Take, for example, the tragedies involving the USS Stark and USS Vincennes. In May
      1987, an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet fighter attacked the Stark on patrol to protect neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf, killing 37
      sailors. Iraq, a "near-ally" of the United States at the time, had never before attacked a U.S. ship. Analysts concluded that
      misperception and faulty assumptions led to Iraq‘s errant attack. The memory of the USS Stark no doubt preoccupied the
      crew of the USS Vincennes, which little over a year later, in July 1988, was also on patrol in hostile Persian Gulf waters.
      The Vincennes crew was involved in a "half war" against Iran, and at the time was fending off surface attacks from small
      Iranian gunboats. Operating sophisticated technical systems under high stress and rules of engagement that allowed for
      anticipatory self-defense, the advanced Aegis cruiser fired anti-aircraft missiles at what it believed to be an Iranian military
      aircraft set on an attack course. The aircraft turned out to be a commercial Iran Air flight, and 290 people perished owing to
      mistakes in identification and communications. To these examples we may add a long list of tactical blunders growing out
      of ambiguous circumstances and faulty intelligence, including the U.S. bombing in 1999 of the Chinese Embassy in
      Belgrade during Kosovo operations. Yet though these tragic actions occurred in near-war or tinderbox situations, they did
      not escalate or exacerbate local instability. The world also survived U.S.-Soviet "near encounters" during the 1948 Berlin
      crisis, the 1961 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Guarded diplomacy won the day in all cases.
      Why would disputes affecting space be any different? In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a
      communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the
      context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent
      communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special
      reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our
      ability to know what transpires in space is growing — so we are not always in the dark. The burden is on the critics,
      therefore, to present convincing analogical evidence to support the notion that, in wartime or peacetime, attempts by the
      United States to control space or exploit orbits for defensive or offensive purposes would increase significantly the chances
      for crisis instability or nuclear war. In Washington and other capitals, the historical pattern is to use every available means
      to clarify perceptions and to consider decisions that might lead to war or escalation with care, not dispatch.


Even after a deadly miscalculation in space, international protocol and safeguards ensure no escalation
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 09 (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis - independent, nonpartisan research
organization specializing in national security, foreign policy, and defense planning issues, helps senior government policy makers,
industry leaders, and officials in the public policy community make informed decisions in a dynamic and unpredictable global security
environment, staff is a mix of scholars, business professionals, retired military officers, and foreign policy specialists, associated with
 The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and has offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., 2/21/09 ―Missile
Defense, the Space Relationship, & the Twenty-First Century,‖ 2009 Report, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf)
     Further, even if a BP ―got away‖ to ―run wild,‖ it would quickly burn up in the atmosphere. And in the case of an
     accidental shoot-down involving the mistaken identity of someone‘s ―innocent‖ missile (such as one carrying a
     communications satellite), Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocols and international
     notification procedures that have long governed an unwarranted response by offensive nuclear weapons against another
     nation: when a country plans to launch a nonthreatening rocket – such as for a weather or communications satellite or to
     ferry astronauts and supplies to the international space station or the moon or to send robots to Mars or to orbit telescopes
     – those powers possessing offensive nuclear weapons are notified well in advance, so as to avoid a terrible
     misunderstanding that could trigger a massive retaliatory nuclear strike against the country of origin. Brilliant Pebbles and
     other SBIs would fall under the same protocol of advance notification and, of course, their automated systems would be
     switched off, even as offensive nuclear weapons would be taken off hair-trigger alert and ordered to ―stand down.‖



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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                           DDI 2011
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                                     AT: Space Weapons Bad – Prolif – Weapons Solve
Credible defensive measures deter proliferation – objections are based on emotional considerations
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 09 (The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis - independent, nonpartisan research
organization specializing in national security, foreign policy, and defense planning issues, helps senior government policy makers,
industry leaders, and officials in the public policy community make informed decisions in a dynamic and unpredictable global security
environment, staff is a mix of scholars, business professionals, retired military officers, and foreign policy specialists, associated with
 The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and has offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., 2/21/09 ―Missile
Defense, the Space Relationship, & the Twenty-First Century,‖ 2009 Report, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf)
     American missile defense will cause an arms race; will cause nuclear proliferation in such places as North Korea and Iran;
     will threaten the military ―integrity‖ of China and Russia and thereby challenge their places in the world, and will as a
     consequence be destabilizing to world peace. America must not be allowed to acquire missile defense. These are the
     screeds of a community of missile defense opponents that daily pepper the media and public policy worlds. They have
     been part of the nation‘s rhetorical landscape for over 40 years, and for thirty of those years these pronouncements were
     protected and made valid by the ABM Treaty‘s prohibition of missile defense. They have been repeated so often for so
     long that for some Americans these utterances have become conventional wisdom that carries the ring of truth to be
     accepted as a matter of course without challenge. Therefore, these arguments must be taken seriously. Until the U.S.
     withdrawal from the treaty, it had been a losing proposition to refute them, not because they are difficult to refute, but
     because any serious challenges to them have been irrelevant. What would be the point of challenging the ―evils‖ of missile
     defense when the ABM Treaty was in place to prevent missile defense? With the treaty gone, this changes. Refutation
     should be vigorously pursued. The flaw in these views is that they have little or no basis in fact. They are instead based on
     philosophy and emotion and for some political advantage, where fact itself is irrelevant. The fact that there is no real basis
     in fact is obvious and to deny this is clear evidence of the dogmatic nature of missile defense opponents who use these
     arguments. To begin with, arms races stem from competition for offensive weapons and while it is true that some arms
     races are designed in part to overcome someone‘s defenses, the converse that the absence of defenses breeds the absence
     of offensive weapons is without historical basis. Indeed, this proposition is supported by irrefutable evidence that the
     United States never has had missile defenses for its population, much less its military installations (save for selective use of
     limited ―point‖ defense, such as the Patriot). But that reality has not prevented either nuclear proliferation or nuclear arms
     buildups; it has in all probability been the reverse. The evidence also is clear that the past 40 years, most especially the last
     decade, have seen relentless buildups and bold moves to spread the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction,
     as witness evolving events in Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran (discussed elsewhere in this report). One of the few
     times there has been a significant slowing of momentum was in the brief period 1985-93, which was the height of missile
     defense development in the United States. In other words, if anything, a credible missile defense – even in development
     stage – is much more likely to help slow an arms race and discourage proliferation because it raises the costs and lowers
     the chances of success for aggressor nations or terrorist groups to try to find ways to overwhelm an effective missile
     defense system with their offensive weapons. In this sense it can become a deterrent and thus contribute to stability.
     Arguably, there is some evidence of this likelihood, in that at least some of the reasons for the Soviet Union‘s collapse
     was due to an inability to keep up with U.S. technological developments in this field. Even as the USSR was scaling itself
     down, it was engaging in ways to share missile defense technology and use – an effort that was discontinued by the U.S.
     government after 1993. 10 To close the loop in this logic train: if America has never had missile defense, why have the
     Soviet/Russian and Chinese nuclear arms buildups continued unabated over these many years, as has the growth of
     proliferation? According to the MAD culture, one would have thought arms races and proliferation would have long since
     slowed – thus making a case based on fact that America indeed should continue to forego missile defense. But there is no
     fact to substantiate such a claim. To the contrary, while certainly some arms control initiatives have proved useful –
     paradoxically because of U.S. arms buildups during the Cold War 11 – if history is any ex-ample, effective missile
     defense capabilities could actually help to strengthen and enhance responsible arms control efforts, rather than to foster
     arms races and proliferation, as opponents so vigorously maintain. 12 If there is one sliver of fact at all in these assertions,
     it probably protrudes from the notion that an effective global missile defense system will threaten the military ―integrity‖
     of such evolving powers as China and Russia, by challenging their places in the world and, hence, be ―destabilizing‖ to
     ―world peace‖ – but perhaps not in the way most people think about world peace. Instead, such a system could well be
     destabilizing to any expansionist ambitions these or other countries (or terrorist groups) might entertain but only if theirs
     were covetous ambitions toward other nations, such as the United States or its friends or allies. But short of that, why
     would any nation object to another nation wanting to defend itself? There is no rational answer, save one: it would be only
     if someone seeks an aggressive edge over someone else and hopes to achieve that edge ―peacefully.‖ At this point, the
     sliver of fact dissolves into missile defense objections that are based on philosophical, ideological, or political beliefs and



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      resulting emotions, where factual evidence is largely irrelevant. There is no known evidence even to suggest that an arms
      race or instability occurs simply because a nonbelligerent nation chooses to erect defenses against offensive weapons.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                        DDI 2011
                                                                                                                                         1
                                       AT: Proliferation – Turn: Prolif Good
Proliferation is stabilizing regardless of who acquires nukes – deterrence theory and years of historical
examples prove
Tepperman 09 (Jonathan Tepperman - Deputy Editor at Newsweek Magazine, helped launch and edit Newsweek's
InternationaList section, helpeds run Newsweek International's Europe, Middle East and Africa coverage and edit its annual Davos
Issue, writer for Newsweek International, former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, former writer for New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New Republic, The Jerusalem Post and The
Forward, Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities, 8/29/09, ―Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,‖ Newsweek,
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html)
      A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more
      dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and
      transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to
      entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy.
      Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents
      have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S.
      government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a
      nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of
      peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since
      1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a
      second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th
      century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts
      it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that
      substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are
      likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their
      leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away
      with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price.
      Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders
      often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons
      change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the
      ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the
      craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As
      Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and
      mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented
      stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight
      proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of
      full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end
      of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided
      direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at
      these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe
      conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United
      States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink
      when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the
      reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war,
      and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-
      armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and
      Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands
      on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior.
      Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-
      based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in
      1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit
      Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on
      both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war
      brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to
      avoid it.



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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                        DDI 2011
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                                       AT: Proliferation – Turn: Prolif Good
The rational choice is to accept the positive nature of proliferation – opposition arises from irrational
nuclear phobia
Tepperman 09 (Jonathan Tepperman - Deputy Editor at Newsweek Magazine, helped launch and edit Newsweek's
InternationaList section, helpeds run Newsweek International's Europe, Middle East and Africa coverage and edit its annual Davos
Issue, writer for Newsweek International, former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, former writer for New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New Republic, The Jerusalem Post and The
Forward, Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities, 8/29/09, ―Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,‖ Newsweek,
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html)
      Put this all together and nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening. So why have so few people in Washington
      recognized this? Most of us suffer from what Desch calls a nuclear phobia, an irrational fear that's grounded in good
      evidence—nuclear weapons are terrifying—but that keeps us from making clear, coldblooded calculations about just how
      dangerous possessing them actually is. The logic of nuclear peace rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that
      something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad—conventional war—
      won't happen. This may well be a rational bet to take, especially if that first risk is very small indeed. But it's a tough case
      to make to the public.




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                           AT: Proliferation – Turn: Prolif Good – AT: Rogue States
Rogue states today are no worse than those in the past – Mao and Stalin were deterred, so will Kim and
Ahmadinejad
Tepperman 09 (Jonathan Tepperman - Deputy Editor at Newsweek Magazine, helped launch and edit Newsweek's
InternationaList section, helpeds run Newsweek International's Europe, Middle East and Africa coverage and edit its annual Davos
Issue, writer for Newsweek International, former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, former writer for New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New Republic, The Jerusalem Post and The
Forward, Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities, 8/29/09, ―Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,‖ Newsweek,
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html)
      Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the
      future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust
      them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud
      Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected
      Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the
      ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and
      crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev,
      remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America
      wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and
      Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University
      of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some
      20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would
      today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always
      proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with
      both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't
      win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its
      overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later
      (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These
      countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.




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                             AT: Proliferation – Turn: Prolif Good – AT: Terrorism
Countries have no incentive to give weapons to terrorists and nuclear arsenals are very secure – even if
terrorists got nukes they couldn‟t use them
Tepperman 09 (Jonathan Tepperman - Deputy Editor at Newsweek Magazine, helped launch and edit Newsweek's
InternationaList section, helpeds run Newsweek International's Europe, Middle East and Africa coverage and edit its annual Davos
Issue, writer for Newsweek International, former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, former writer for New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New Republic, The Jerusalem Post and The
Forward, Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities, 8/29/09, ―Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,‖ Newsweek,
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html)
      Still, even if Iran or North Korea are deterrable, nuclear pessimists fear they'll give or sell their deadly toys to terrorists,
      who aren't—for it's hard to bomb a group with no return address. Yet look closely, and the risk of a WMD handoff starts to
      seem overblown. For one thing, assuming Iran is able to actually build a nuke, Desch explains that "it doesn't make sense
      that they'd then give something they regard as central to their survival to groups like Hizbullah, over which they have
      limited control. As for Al Qaeda, they don't even share common interests. Why would the mullahs give Osama bin Laden
      the crown jewels?" To do so would be fatal, for Washington has made it very clear that it would regard any terrorist use of
      a WMD as an attack by the country that supplied it—and would respond accordingly. A much greater threat is that a
      nuclear North Korea or Pakistan could collapse and lose control of its weapons entirely. Yet here again history offers some
      comfort. China acquired its first nuke in 1964, just two years before it descended into the mad chaos of the Cultural
      Revolution, when virtually every Chinese institution was threatened—except for its nuclear infrastructure, which remained
      secure. "It was nearly a coup," says Desch, "yet with all the unrest, nobody ever thought that there might be an
      unauthorized nuclear use." The Soviets' weapons were also kept largely safe (with U.S. help) during the breakup of their
      union in the early '90s. And in recent years Moscow has greatly upped its defense spending (by 20 to 30 percent a year),
      using some of the cash to modernize and protect its arsenal. As for Pakistan, it has taken numerous precautions to ensure
      that its own weapons are insulated from the country's chaos, installing complicated firing mechanisms to prevent a launch
      by lone radicals, for example, and instituting special training and screening for its nuclear personnel to ensure they're not
      infiltrated by extremists. Even if the Pakistani state did collapse entirely—the nightmare scenario—the chance of a Taliban
      bomb would still be remote. Desch argues that the idea that terrorists "could use these weapons radically underestimates the
      difficulty of actually operating a modern nuclear arsenal. These things need constant maintenance and they're very easy to
      disable. So the idea that these things could be stuffed into a gunnysack and smuggled across the Rio Grande is
      preposterous."




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                     DDI 2011
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                             AT: Proliferation – Turn: Prolif Good – AT: Arms Race
Arms races won‟t happen – multiple warrants. Even if they do, such proliferation decreases chance of
war – empirics
Tepperman 09 (Jonathan Tepperman - Deputy Editor at Newsweek Magazine, helped launch and edit Newsweek's
InternationaList section, helpeds run Newsweek International's Europe, Middle East and Africa coverage and edit its annual Davos
Issue, writer for Newsweek International, former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, former writer for New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New Republic, The Jerusalem Post and The
Forward, Fellow of the New York Institute of Humanities, 8/29/09, ―Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,‖ Newsweek,
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html)
      The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to
      dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12,"
      says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons
      are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the
      extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in
      the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one
      or more of Iran's neighbors—Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say—might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But
      the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United
      States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does
      complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so
      disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.




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                                            AT: Space Weapons Vulnerable
Space weapons aren‟t vulnerable
Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2003. ―Space Power and US Hegemony,‖ http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/Security_Space_Volume.Final.pdf

      The important factor here is that once a state has established weapons in space capable of shooting down rockets and launch
      vehicles in boost, no other state can put weapons there. Total domination of space is effected. Fears of an arms race in space
      are eliminated. Only in the situation where more than one side can place weapons into space is an arms race possible (e.g.
      the Cold War). This is because both sides will be attempting to fill and dominate the position before the other, taking
      advantage of orbital placement to acquire tactical superiority over the process. Where such an indeterminate outcome is
      possible, both sides have an incentive to create legal and international restraints that make it difficult for either side to
      engage in such an activity. If, as is the case today (though for how long is unknown), only the United States has the
      capacity to place weapons into space quickly enough to gain an insurmountable edge on its potential rivals, then a window
      of opportunity exists to seize this vital territory without significantly countering space opposition or competition. Once in
      place, the entry cost for an opponent to attempt to vie for space dominance is too high. The analogy is to a blockade of a
      small island, or perhaps a siege. The United States, due to its fortunate geographic position, can resupply, replace, and
      reinforce its space assets indefinitely. Moreover, and unlike a siege or blockade, there is no force outside the boundary that
      can break the siege. The rear and flanks of space are not vulnerable. The only kinetic attack on space assets so deployed
      must come from Earth, up the viciously steep gravity well and vulnerable to the very weapons they wish to engage. Laser
      or other directed energy antisatellite weapons could be destroyed before they come on line, as manufacture and assembly of
      such weapons would be observable from the high perch of low-Earth orbit, but even should these manage to come on line,
      the optical targeting effects of Earth to space are vastly more difficult than from space to Earth.




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                                       AT: Space Weapons Bad – Space Debris
Space weaponization avoids debris
Everett Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space
Studies, 2006. ―Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,‖ http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/408.pdf

      Question: This is a question for Dr. Dolman. You just mentioned previous hegemonies, but all of those hegemonies are no
      longer extant. What is the risk to the U.S. in pursuing this strategy, by taking all these resources up to space? What are the
      implications for U.S. hegemony if they are destroyed and space is filled with debris and there are no chances for
      exploration or no chances for going beyond? Dolman: Well, l think that some assumptions that you made are extremely
      problematic. You know, the Soviet Union launched twenty ASATS into space and those were the worst kind of ASAT you
      can imagine. They were essentially shotgun shells of hundreds of bits of debris smashing into other satellites. Did that
      cause a debris problem? No, because it is a planned orbital mechanics issue that the kinetic force of that engagement goes
      into the atmosphere and debris is burned up on reentry. There are thus ways to use weapons in space that don`t really cause
      a debris problem, and there are ways to use them that ac- tually clean up space in orbit. But also I agree with you. No
      hegemon, no empire, no state or business lasts forever. Does that mean that we should accelerate our own de- cline? No. lt
      is important to do things to extend it. The United States inevitably will lose its power relative to the rest of the world, so it
      needs to set up the conditions that are seen as beneficial around the world in such a way that whoever replaces the United
      States is going to be in the same sort of liberal mode that the United States had been, the same type of benevolent hegemon
      or follow-on power. What it cannot do is set up a situation where the next power is likely to be antithetical to those ideas.
      What I am talking about is extending the period of American hegemony into the foreseeable future, not creating a
      permanent empire in that sense, but continuing to have a situation where there is a power to create and enforce some sort of
      order.

ASATs can be produced to prevent debris creation
Dinerman 07 (Taylor Dinerman, former writer for Berkshire Eagle, North Adams Transcript and Space Equity, former writer of a
weekly column for the Space Review, has on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the
magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere, Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute‘s New York office, an
author of the textbook Space Science for Students, and part time consultant for the US Defense Department, 1/22/07, ―Sticky airbags
and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris,‖ The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/789/1)
     Fortunately, a few years ago a proposal was floated for as class of weapons that would destroy target spacecraft without
     directly creating any debris. This type of ―co-orbital‖ ASAT would approach its target and envelop it with an airbag
     covered in a type of sticky substance. It would then fire a thruster so that the conjoined satellites would burn up in the
     atmosphere. If it worked as designed, no debris would be created. In practice it would be no easy task to design, test, and
     operate such a weapon, but it is not beyond the state of the art and would not create any debris. Figuring out what kind of
     sticky material is right for such a system would, by itself, be a fascinating project. The substance might have applications in
     other military and perhaps civil space systems. If the sticky airbag solution proves too difficult, the same goals might be
     reached using an ASAT equipped with grappling arms that would grasp the target before pushing down towards the
     atmosphere. The challenges of such a system are evident, not the least of which would be the need for some sort of
     decision-making software that would choose the best places to seize the enemy satellite during the final moments before
     contact.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                            DDI 2011
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                                     AT: Debris – Ground-Based Laser Solves
Proposed NASA ground-based laser solves space debris collisions
Cartwright 11 (Jon Cartwright, Freelance journalist on science, politics & controversy, 3/15/11, ―Lasers could nudge space debris
aside,‖ naturenews, http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110315/full/news.2011.161.html)
Scientists in the United States have devised a new way to avoid collisions among space debris, and possibly even reduce the amount
of debris in orbit. The method uses a medium-powered, ground-based laser to nudge the debris off course — but some are concerned
that the laser could be used as a weapon. Debris orbiting Earth is a mounting problem. Two years ago, a satellite owned by the
communications provider Iridium, based in McLean, Virginia, smashed into a defunct Russian satellite at ten times the speed of a rifle
bullet, putting an end to the 'big sky' theory that assumed space was too vast for chance collisions. That incident alone created more
than 1,700 pieces of debris, raising the total amount by nearly 20%. Space analysts are particularly concerned about the possible onset
of Kessler syndrome, when enough debris is present to make collisions so likely there would be an avalanche effect that would leave
the Earth's orbit uninhabitable for satellites. Sweeping up the mess Scientists at NASA have considered using a ground-based laser to
mitigate debris collisions before. However, in their 'laser broom' concept, a powerful, megawatt-class laser would vaporize the surface
of a piece of debris that is heading for another, causing the debris to recoil out of harm's way. But critics argued that the laser could be
used as a weapon, as it could easily damage an enemy's active satellites. Indeed, both the United States and China have in the past 15
years been accused of testing the ability of ground-based lasers to 'dazzle' satellites and render them inoperable. Now, James Mason, a
NASA contractor at the Universities Space Research Association in Moffett Field, California, and his colleagues have come up with a
variation on the laser broom concept that they claim is unlikely to be useful as a weapon. In a paper uploaded to the arXiv preprint
server1, Mason and colleagues suggest using a medium-powered laser of 5–10 kilowatts to illuminate debris with light a few times
more intense than sunlight, imparting just enough momentum to nudge the debris off course. "We think this scheme is potentially one
of the least-threatening ways to solve a problem that has to be addressed," says Mason. In the researchers' proposal, a piece of debris
that has a high risk of collision would be tracked by another laser and a telescope. As the debris comes over the horizon, technicians
would switch on the main laser and illuminate the debris until it reaches its highest point. If the debris isn't nudged far enough to avoid
a collision the first time, the technicians would repeat the procedure for several days until the collision risk becomes negligible. Risk
reduction With just one laser facility, Mason's group says, the number of debris collisions could be almost halved. What's more, by
mitigating the number of collisions, the amount of debris would lessen as it slowly burns up in Earth's atmosphere. And that would
avoid the onset of Kessler syndrome, the researchers say. All the experts in space debris contacted by Naturesaid that the new proposal
is feasible, but still has problems. "It'll be ineffective against dense objects that are too heavy to move," says William Priedhorsky of
Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. "To use a medical analogy, they propose not to cure the disease, but to manage it."
And some are concerned that the laser could still be used to push enemy satellites out of orbit. Christophe Bonnal, a debris expert at
the French space agency CNES, doesn't buy the researchers' claim that the laser's power would be too low for anti-satellite uses. "Let's
be logical," he says. "If the power is low, you'll have no effect on the debris." But Hugh Lewis, an engineer at the Southampton
University, UK, "cautiously" welcomes the idea. "Any method that aims to address the growing debris problem should be taken
seriously, I think," he says.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                      DDI 2011
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                                                 AT: Debris – Inevitable

Space debris is inevitable – focus on debris makes the US vulnerable to attack
Dinerman 07 (Taylor Dinerman, former writer for Berkshire Eagle, North Adams Transcript and Space Equity, former writer of a
weekly column for the Space Review, has on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the
magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere, Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute‘s New York office, an
author of the textbook Space Science for Students, and part time consultant for the US Defense Department, 1/22/07, ―Sticky airbags
and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris,‖ The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/789/1)
     Whatever happens the US should be wary of making too big a deal out of the orbital debris issue. All man-made activity in
     space produces debris. If the US or its allies worry too much about this question instead of simply deciding to live with it,
     the enemy will find ways of using this concern against the US, like in the case of the ―collateral damage‖ question, where
     Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and others learned the lesson that when they kill civilians, they win, and when the US kills civilians,
     they win. If America‘s space warriors concentrate on their primary mission, which is to defeat the enemy, destroy his space
     assets, and protect our own, all will be well. If, on the other hand, we end up concentrating on limiting the creation of space
     debris while avoiding the primary mission, we will hand the enemy a tool they will use to frustrate our goals. War is a dirty,
     messy business and cannot be waged cleanly, not in Baghdad nor in outer space.


Problems from space debris are exaggerated and inevitable
Dinerman 07 (Taylor Dinerman, former writer for Berkshire Eagle, North Adams Transcript and Space Equity, former writer of a
weekly column for the Space Review, has on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the
magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere, Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute‘s New York office, an
author of the textbook Space Science for Students, and part time consultant for the US Defense Department, 1/22/07, ―Sticky airbags
and grapples: kinetic ASATs without the debris,‖ The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/789/1)
     Dangerous space debris is both man-made and natural, in the latter case in the form of micrometeoroids. Confusing the two
     is a great way to make the issue into more of a problem than it already is. The environment around Earth is certainly filled
     with space junk, but if this was as dangerous as has been claimed, spacecraft would be breaking up on an almost weekly
     basis. Space junk is a problem and always will be. The international agreements designed to mitigate the dangers have been
     useful, but cannot halt the creation of more debris any more than recycling laws halt the production of garbage. The trend
     has been moving in the right direction, at least until our Chinese friends decided to make a statement.




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                                                                                                                                92
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                        DDI 2011
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                                                 AT: Debris – Inevitable

War in space will occur, and when it does, it will be messy – debris from ASATs is inevitable
Dinerman 08 (Taylor Dinerman, former writer for Berkshire Eagle, North Adams Transcript and Space Equity, former writer of a
weekly column for the Space Review, has on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the
magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere, Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute‘s New York office, an
author of the textbook Space Science for Students, and part time consultant for the US Defense Department, 3/24/08, ―Messy
battlefields,‖ The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1089/1)
      War is a bloody, wasteful, expensive, and unpleasant business. Why anyone should expect space war to be clean and cheap
      is one of those mysteries that can only be answered by philosophers or mental health professionals. China‘s January 2007
      ASAT test produced more commentary about the debris it created than about Beijing‘s strategic reasons for developing and
      testing the technology. Maybe it‘s easier to discuss debris—which, after all, can be tracked—than to speculate about the
      policy thinking inside a notoriously closed regime. Any weapon, defensive or otherwise, will produce unexpected effects.
      It was predictable that in World War 2 fragments from exploding anti-aircraft artillery shells would fall back to Earth. In
      spite of this, many Londoners were killed by shrapnel from the barrage that was supposed to protect them. Minefields are
      another example of this problem: who could imagine that, more than sixty years after the end of the Second World War,
      parts of Egypt and elsewhere would still be no-go areas thanks to these weapons? Looking further back in time, the kings of
      England during the Hundred Years War might never have deployed their longbow-armed peasant warriors if they had
      realized how devastating these weapons would be to the feudal and monarchial order. When it happens, war in space is
      going to be a very messy business, especially in low Earth orbit (LEO), where most of the really lucrative targets are. Big
      high-performance spy satellites are especially important. They provide those nations that own and operate them with very
      high-resolution imagery across swaths of the electromagnetic spectrum. Knocking them out in the first moments of a
      conflict is going to be a priority. During the Cold War this was expected and planned for. The US expected to USSR to
      knock out its big Keyhole satellites as a prelude to an all-out nuclear attack. It was one of the reasons why some leaders in
      the US figured they could count on at least a small margin of early warning. Today, when the possibility of a major nuclear
      war has receded, space warfare may be fought without the cloud of atomic uncertainty hanging over every operation.
      According to one report in Aviation Week, the US is now building a pair of advanced Keyhole satellites at a cost of about
      $15 billion. The idea that the US will launch a defenseless military asset that costs $7.5 billion seems to defy logic, yet that
      is exactly what the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) seems to have in mind. As space technology spreads, the
      incentives for small and medium-sized states to seek space warfare capability increases. A dictator who does not want to
      end the way Saddam Hussein did may seek way to hurt US warfighting capability in such a way as to impose major costs
      and casualties on the US early on. The destruction of a major US satellite would be both a substantive and a symbolic
      victory over the US. Hitting a number of satellites would increase the effect. Such an attack would result in a major increase
      in the amount of debris orbiting the Earth. This would be the equivalent of a ―scorched earth‖ policy if enough deadly
      debris were created. One possibility that has not been publicly examined might be to build highly- or ultra-destructive
      ASAT weapons that would literally pulverize the target and leave nothing behind but bits of dust. Even small particles can
      do some damage, but paint flakes like those that sometimes hit space shuttles have not managed to destroy an orbiter.




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                                                 Weapons Feasible - Lasers
Lasers are feasible – high power, low cost
Garrett M. Mills, student at American University. His professor, John Calabrese, uses his paper as a model for current students.
Spring 2005, ―Space-to-Earth Weapons The Case for U.S. Deployment‖
http://www.angelfire.com/dc2/cal_foreignpolicy/MillsResearchProject.pdf

      Where progress in the field of chemical lasers has essentially ground to a halt, the field of diode-pumped solid-state lasers
      (SSL) has been burgeoning.37 Not only are SSLs advancing at a rapid pace in comparison to the chemical laser, their
      weapons potential is also far greater. Their first and perhaps primary advantage is that they have no ammunition per se.
      Where chemical lasers require their chemicals to provide their radiation, SSLs need only electricity. This fixes the cost of
      the laser system and also makes it more compact overall, making it a far more attractive system in the long run with regard
      to expense and logistical cost.38 The current weapon concept being tested at White Sands is the solid-state heat-capacity
      laser (SSHCL). In recent tests this laser ―burned a 1-centimeter-diameter hole straight through a 2- centimeter thick stack of
      steel samples in 6 seconds‖ and it did so with power from a standard wall socket and at the cost of 30 cents.39 The system
      is the first to appear to have the capability to be a fully mobile battlefield system—small enough (2x1 m) to be mounted on
      board a Humvee. At this time, the most powerful version of the SSHCL requires a power feed or 1 megawatt to create a 13-
      watt beam firing up to 10-second bursts. The goal for the project is to create a laser that has an output of up to 100 kilowatts
      on the same 1 megawatt of input while keeping it in a small package. Indicators are good as the team has already produced
      a 41 kW diode array and the 100 kW is in the works and all of the other components are coming along equally as well.40
      Even better, the mobile 100 kW variant is projected to be available by 2007.41 The greatest difficulty with the SSL at this
      point is making the beam effective at range. Currently the beam is neither very accurate nor able to maintain coherency
      over significant distances.42 In parallel with the production of the more powerful models of the SSHCL, an adaptive optics
      system is being designed that is likely to allow the beam to be effective at a range of 10 kilometers.43 Thus, overall, the
      SSHCL and SSLs in general appear to be very promising concepts in future weapons systems with definite applications in
      space-based systems. A final note of encouragement on laser technology comes from a team of personnel, military and
      civilian, associated with laser research; they claim that laser technology is about to experience a boom, claiming that the
      combination of the past progress of laser technology and the application of Moore‘s Law (which states that technological
      capabilities advance exponentially) leaves us on the ―elbow‖ of the graph of progress in the field. They claim that if interest
      persists, the theorized exponential growth of the technology will start to pay significant dividends.44




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                                              Weapons Feasible – Rail Guns
Rail guns are feasible in the near future
Garrett M. Mills, student at American University. His professor, John Calabrese, uses his paper as a model for current students.
Spring 2005, ―Space-to-Earth Weapons The Case for U.S. Deployment‖
http://www.angelfire.com/dc2/cal_foreignpolicy/MillsResearchProject.pdf

      EM ―Rail Guns‖. This weapons system, currently being researched by various divisions of the U.S. Armed Forces is
      probably going to be the heart of any STEW that might be developed in the near future. Rail guns show promise to be the
      replacement for conventional cannon in the coming decades. As the range and muzzle velocity of contemporary cannon
      reaches its theoretical maximum, its limited accuracy becomes more apparent, and its armor-piercing capability reaches the
      limits of available material compounded by the purported environmental hazard of depleted Uranium-tipped rounds. In
      theory, EM weaponry is supposed to overcome all of these shortfalls while presenting the U.S. military with an all-around
      more economical system (excluding R&D costs). The concept of rail guns is deceptively simple. A solid slug with a
      conducting base is placed between two conductive rails. When fired, the two rails are made into electromagnets that send
      current through the slug, and through a ―Lorentz Force‖ of opposing charge, rapidly catapulting the slug forward along the
      rails until it is discharged. The rail gun slugs themselves will have no explosives on board but rather will derive all of their
      destructive force from their kinetic energy. While the physics of the device are far more complex, this explanation will
      suffice. The Navy is seemingly at the forefront of the efforts to develop this system. In an effort to make their fleets more
      flexible, the Navy is seeking to integrate rail guns into their new ship designs [such as the DD(X) destroyer] as the primary
      deck guns and method of staging precision strikes. As with concept laser systems, there are some problems to work out on
      the practicability of rail guns; however, the current impression of rail guns is that they will be very usable as a weapon in
      the relatively near future. The Marine Corps will be running its development and demonstration phase from 2004-2008, and
      hopes to have a version that could be mounted on an Abrams tank between 2012 and 2015.45 As far as the technical
      capabilities of these rail guns are concerned, military experts expect field systems to be able to fire their projectiles at an
      unprecedented 2.5 to 6.0 km/s.46 Tests show that to match the kinetic energy delivered by a 155mm shell (the standard
      shell caliber for U.S. artillery pieces) a rail gun would have to fire a 1 kg slug at a velocity of 2 km/s. Designers have their
      eyes on more powerful systems though and have designed systems to fire rounds between 5 and 10 kilograms in mass at
      velocities up to 3 km/s. What does this translate to in more tangible effects? One test demonstrated that the release of the
      rail gun projectile‘s kinetic energy alone would create a 10-foot diameter crater, 10 feet deep in solid ground, and achieve
      projectile penetration to 40 feet. Hypervelocity projectiles provide deep penetration to destroy hardened targets that are
      extremely hard to kill by other methods … Lethality studies suggest that rail gun KE projectile concepts will be sufficiently
      lethal—three to five times more deadly than current gun systems.47 Such a system would be very well suited for the
      tactical and strategic world that the U.S. is in today. With more and more nations keeping their strategic assets underground
      and the concept of a nuclear bunker buster being highly contested, an orbital EM gun would rebalance the scales for the
      U.S. when it needs to strike hardened positions. Another consideration will be the size of the entire package—while gun
      barrel itself will be substantial at about 10-12 meters, the slugs will help save space as they are much smaller (and safer!)
      than standard projectiles as they lack propellant and explosive warheads.48 Before an EM weapon satellite can be
      deployed, there is a survivability issue that will need to be addressed. A problem that has plagued rail gun development is
      the maintenance of the rails. Up until more recent trials, there has been trouble of wearing out the rails over the course of a
      small number of firings. While the problem of the slugs gouging the rails in the course of firings has been solved by the use
      of more conductive rails, there is still some (though ―manageable‖) wear on the rails.49 Though no doubt there will need to
      be some future improvements on this, by the time a final design is ready, these problems will likely be brought to the level
      of insignificance.




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                                               Weapons Feasible – Generic
Space based weapons systems are technologically feasible
Garrett M. Mills, student at American University. His professor, John Calabrese, uses his paper as a model for current students.
Spring 2005, ―Space-to-Earth Weapons The Case for U.S. Deployment‖
http://www.angelfire.com/dc2/cal_foreignpolicy/MillsResearchProject.pdf

      Before the legal, political, and strategic aspects of the weaponization can be brought into discussion, the matter of whether
      or not STEW are even practical must first be considered. If they are not a practical concept, there is little point in carrying
      on any further on the subject. That they are something for consideration is something amazing in itself. They have been
      imagined for some time in films, books, and games dealing with the future or alternate universes. Now perhaps—as is so
      often said when new technologies are coming over the horizon—fiction is becoming fact. Technology is becoming
      available that can allow for fortresses in space capable of staging tactical strikes on Earth from orbit while perhaps even
      maintaining the ability to mount active defenses. This is not to say that STEW are a certainty in the near future—there are a
      lot of hurdles to be cleared before it is a viable weapons system concept. However, there is enough evidence to believe that
      such a system might be feasible and possibly even cost effective. At this time, it appears that such a weapon would not be
      the ―death ray‖ so often depicted in popular science fiction, but rather a bombardment system based around a kinetic energy
      weapon—an electromagnetic (EM) gun—more commonly know as a ―rail gun.‖ What follows is a brief review of the state
      of the art of relevant technologies involved in such a space weapon. No doubt, the matter is a difficult engineering concern,
      and there is little chance that this essay will have a chance of covering the full complexity of the problem.




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                                     ***Space Weapons Bad***




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                                                Space Weapons Bad – Arms Races
Space militarization causes arms races and nuclear war

Rick Rozoff, writer for Stop Nato, 2009. ―Militarization of Space: The Threat of Nuclear War on Earth,‖
http://dandelionsalad.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/militarization-of-space-threat-of-nuclear-war-on-earth-by-
rick-rozoff/
    That is, the militarization of space can result in a nuclear conflagration on earth not only by accident or the law of unintended
    consequences but fully by design. If the US plan is, by a combination of ground, sea and air delivery systems, to destroy any ability to
    retaliate after a devastating first blow, the Russian general warned of what in fact would ensue: ―The Americans will never manage to implement this
    scenario because Russian strategic nuclear forces, including the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, will be capable of delivering a retaliatory
    strike given any course of developments. ―After receiving authorization from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces it
    will not take our strategic missile force more than two-three minutes to carry out the task of launching missiles.‖ [38] What
    Solovtsov has described is the nightmare humanity has dreaded since the advent of the nuclear age: An exchange of nuclear-
    tipped intercontinental missiles. One that might result from an attack launched at least partially from space and in one manner
    or other in relation to space-based military assets. An analogous warning was issued last year by the then commander of Russia‘s Space Forces,
    General Vladimir Popovkin, who said, ―Space is one of the few places around not yet separated by borders, and any kind of military
    deployments there would upset the existing balance of forces on our planet. ‖ [39] This past March American space researcher Matt Hoey
    stated that an arms race in space would be ―increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear war while shortening the time for sanity
    and diplomacy to come into play to halt crises.‖ ―If these systems are deployed in space we will be tipping the nuclear balance between
    nations that has ensured the peace for decades.




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                                          Space Weapons Bad - Arms Races
Space weapons lead to arms race and hurt war fighting capabilities
Krepon 04 (Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, 20 04. Arms Control Association, ―Weapons in
the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon#krepon)
     If the United States leads the way in flight-testing and deploying new anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, other states will
     surely follow suit because they have too much to lose by allowing the Pentagon sole rights to space warfare. U.S. programs
     will cost more and be far more sophisticated than the ASAT weapons of potential adversaries, who will opt to kill satellites
     cheaply and crudely. The resulting competition would endanger U.S. troops that depend on satellites to an unprecedented
     degree for battlefield intelligence, communication, and targeting to win quickly and with a minimum of casualties.

Space weapons lead to global arms race
Hitchens 02 (Theresa Hitchens, Vice President of the Center for Defense Information, 2002. ―Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet
or Russian Roulette?‖ http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm)
     The United States already enjoys an overwhelming advantage in military use of space; space assets such as the Global
     Positioning System satellite network have proven invaluable in improving precision-targeting giving the U.S. military a
     decisive battlefield edge. There would be even a more formidable military advantage to possession of weapons in space —
     global power projection and the enormous difficulty in defending against space weapons aimed at terrestrial targets. "It is ...
     possible to project power through and from space in response to events anywhere in the world. Having this capability
     would give the United States a much stronger deterrent and, in a conflict, an extraordinary military advantage," notes the
     Space Commission report. Space weapons — even those primarily designed for defense of U.S. satellites — would have
     inherent offensive and first-strike capabilities, however, (whether aimed at space-based or earth-based targets) and would
     demand a military and political response from U.S. competitors. "To be sure, not deploying weapons in space is no
     guarantee that potentially hostile nations (such as China) will not develop and deploy ASATs. However, it is virtually
     certain that deploying U.S. weapons in space will lead to the development and deployment of ASATs to counter such
     weapons," notes a new policy brief by the Cato Institute.27 China and Russia long have been worried about possible U.S.
     breakout on space-based weaponry. Officials from both countries have expressed concern that the U.S. missile defense
     program is aimed not at what Moscow and Beijing see as a non-credible threat from rogue-nation ballistic missiles, but
     rather at launching a long-term U.S. effort to dominate space. Both Russia and China also are key proponents of
     negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament to expand the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to ban all types of weapons.
     The effort to start talks known as PAROS, for "prevention of an arms race in outer space," has been stalled due in large part
     to the objection of the United States. For example, in November 2000, the United States was one of three countries (the
     others were Israel and Micronesia) to refuse to vote for a UN resolution citing the need for steps to prevent the arming of
     space.28 It is inconceivable that either Russia or China would allow the United States to become the sole nation with space-
     based weapons. "Once a nation embarks down the road to gain a huge asymmetric advantage, the natural tendency of others
     is to close that gap. An arms race tends to develop an inertia of its own," writes Air Force Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, in a
     1998 article in Airpower Journal.29 Chinese moves to put weapons in space would trigger regional rival India to consider
     the same, in turn, spurring Pakistan to strive for parity with India. Even U.S. allies in Europe might feel pressure to "keep
     up with the Joneses." It is quite easy to imagine the course of a new arms race in space that would be nearly as destabilizing
     as the atomic weapons race proved to be.

Space weapons lead to global weaponization and arms race
Hitchens 05 (Theresa Hitchens, former director of CDI (center for defense information), Winter 20 05, ―Safeguarding Space:
Building Cooperative Norms to Dampen Negative Trends‖, The Acronym Institute, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd81/81th.htm)
     Meanwhile, China seems to be pursuing a classic "two-track" approach to space arms control: promoting a treaty while
     pursuing research and development into weaponry either to hedge against a US deployment or to use as a bargaining chip.
     Some analysts, particularly in the United States, argue that, conversely, China is pursuing space weapons for offensive
     purposes while seeking to inhibit acquisition of similar weapons by the United States and other nations via its political
     stance promoting a weapons ban treaty. What is certain is that there are voices within China's military promoting the
     development of ASATs as a counter to both US space and power-projection capabilities.[8] In addition, there have been
     media reports that at least two other space powers, India and Israel, may be considering pursuit of their own space arsenals.




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Non Space powers will respond to U.S. space militarization with an arms race
Hitchens 03 (Theresa Hitchens, Vice president Center for Defense Information, ―U.S. Weaponization of Space: Implications for
International Security, ―2003, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1745)
      Still, the basic physics of space mean that other nations seeking to challenge or degrade U.S. space capabilities do not
      necessarily have to seek a level playing field with U.S. space power, or even have a highly sophisticated space program.
      Reasonably low-tech methods to counter or attack on-orbit systems – such as detonation of a nuclear weapon in Low-Earth
      Orbit using a mid-range ballistic missile – already exist or are rapidly emerging. Further, especially if the United States
      were to move all the way to the deployment of space weapons against terrestrial targets, even non-space powers might feel
      threatened enough to seek other asymmetrical means of deterring the use of U.S. force against them, such as weapons of
      mass destruction, methods to damage ground-facilities or communications links used by U.S. space assets, or even the
      development of terrorist operations.

Space weaponization would be harmful to the security of US and trigger arms race.
Bethe et al 84 (Hans Albrecth Bethe, German-American nuclear physicist, and Nobel laureate in physics, Richard L Garwin,
Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Chicago, K Gottfried, Laboratory of Nuclear Studies, Cornell University, Henry W.
Kendall, former National Science Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow at MIT and at Brookhaven National Laboratory, Nobel Prize in
Phsyics winner, 10/1/1984, the abstract for ―Space-based ballistic-missile defense‖)
     This article, based on a forthcoming book by the Union for Concerned Scientists, focuses on the technical aspects of the
     issue of space-based ballistic-missile defense. After analysis, the authors conclude that the questionable performance of the
     proposed defense, the ease with which it could be overwhelmed or circumvented, and its potential as an antisatellite system
     would cause grievous damage to the security of the US if the Strategic Defense Initiative were to be pursued. The path
     toward greater security lies in quite another direction, they feel. Although research on ballistic-missile defense should
     continue at the traditional level of expenditure and within the constraints of the ABM Treaty, every effort should be made
     to negotiate a bilateral ban on the testing and use of space weapons. The authors think it is essential that such an agreement
     cover all altitudes, because a ban on high-altitude antisatellite weapons alone would not viable if directed energy weapons
     were developed for ballistic-missile defense. Further, the Star Wars program, unlikely ever to protect the entire nation
     against a nuclear attack, would nonetheless trigger a major expansion of the arms race.




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                                              Space Weapons Bad – Arms Races
Space weaponization will lead to arms race, immediate preventative action must be taken.
Li 05 (Li Daoyu, Ambassador, President of China Arms Control and Disarmament Association 2005, ―Safeguarding Space
Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space‖ http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-179-3-en.pdf)
     The prevention of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space has attracted the attention of the world for decades.
     With the growing ability of mankind to explore and use outer space, the danger of the weaponization of outer space has
     become increasingly imminent. As human civilization enters the twenty-first century, the development of science and
     technology has offered us an unprecedented opportunity to explore and use outer space. We have witnessed glorious
     achievements in the peaceful exploration and uses of outer space in recent years, such as the successful landings of the
     National Aeronautics and Space Administration Mars Exploration Rover ―Spirit‖ and ―Opportunity‖ on Mars, the European
     ―Huygens‖ probe on Titan, as well as China‘s historical success in its manned-spaceship programme. These triumphs have
     aroused mankind‘s aspirations of exploring outer space; and many countries are responding by establishing their own long-
     term space exploration plans. The peaceful uses of outer space have brought tremendous benefits to human development
     and social progress. More and more countries have gained the capability to explore and use outer space by purchasing or
     renting commercial satellites. According to recent statistics, countries worldwide have launched over 5,000 spacecraft,
     including about 600 satellites that are operating in different orbits in outer space. It is estimated that by 2010, there will be
     2,000 satellites orbiting the Earth. By then, every aspect of human life will benefit from the exploration and use of outer
     space. The well-being of mankind will be more than ever closely linked with the peace and tranquillity of outer space.
     Science and technology, however, is a double-edged sword. While it brings us benefits, it can also cause disaster. As we
     cheer for every success of peaceful exploration and use of outer space, we also hear the approaching bugling of war. Space
     military technology is advancing rapidly. New military and combat concepts and theories such as ―control of space‖ and
     ―occupation of space‖ are emerging. Research and development programmes of space weapons are being implemented. The
     danger of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is ever more imminent. Once an arms race occurs in outer
     space, it would inflict awesome catastrophe on mankind. Being aware of this danger for some time, the international
     community is striving to conclude international legal instruments to regulate human activities in outer space. The United
     Nations General Assembly included the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) on its agenda in the late
     1950s and since then, thanks to the concerted efforts by all countries, several international treaties related to outer space
     have been concluded, including the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Agreement, the Registration Convention, the Convention
     on International Liability for Damage Caused By Space Objects, and the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
     Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space. These treaties have contributed, to some extent,
     to the prevention of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. However, with the rapid development of science
     and technology, and with the change of security concepts, these treaties are far from adequate to prevent the weaponization
     of and an arms race in outer space. There are four, if not more, loopholes within these treaties. First, they cannot prevent
     testing, deployment and use of weapons other than those of mass destruction in outer space, especially in orbit around the
     Earth, other celestial bodies other than the Moon and outer space. Second, they do not deal with such issues as the threat or
     use of force from the Earth (including from land, sea or air) against outer space objects. Third, with the abolishment of the
     Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the international legal system has been weakened and undermined. And fourth, some of the
     existing legal instruments lack universality. For example, as of 1 January 2005, 11 states have ratified and an additional 5
     have signed the Moon Agreement. If we fail to take effective measures in coping with the danger of the weaponization of
     outer space to prevent the development and use of new destructive military technology and equipment before they emerge,
     history is likely to be repeated and new tragedies will occur, and our children will suffer heavily for our inaction. Therefore,
     what we need is action, not debate. The international community should immediately take effective measures to nip the
     danger in the bud. The international community has gained broad common understanding in preventing the weaponization
     of and an arms race in outer space. It is the view of the majority of countries that outer space is the common heritage of
     humankind. Every year since 1981, the General Assembly has adopted, supported by an overwhelming majority, the
     resolution of PAROS. This reflects the political will of the international community. The relevant General Assembly
     resolution of 1981 states that: … the Conference on Disarmament (CD), as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has
      the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer
      space in all its aspects Accordingly, the CD has included ―the prevention of an arms race in outer space‖ on its agenda as a
      standing topic since 1982. For 10 consecutive years between 1984 and 1995, an ad hoc committee was created to discuss
      the non-weaponization of outer space. Regrettably, due to a lack of consensus on the programme of work, the CD has not
      yet started to negotiate an international legal instrument. Given the growing possibility of the weaponization of and an arms
      race in outer space, all parties concerned should intensify their efforts to move forward. We are glad to see that, over the
      years, many countries, including China and the Russian Federation, have been devoted to the early negotiation and



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                                              <<CARD CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE>>
      conclusion of an international legal instrument on the prevention of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space.
      Other countries, intellectual communities and non-governmental organizations have als put forward many proposals that are
      conducive to maintaining peace and security in outer space. Our common desire is for peace and development. The
      emergence of nuclear weapons in the twentieth century has caused us to live in the shadow of nuclear warfare for decades.
      It is therefore my sincere hope that no effort should be spared to maintain a peaceful and safe outer space, so that our
      children will not live in another shadow of fear.




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                                             Space Weapons Bad – China
US space weaponization leads to Chinese miscalculation and space wars
Chase 3-25 (Michael S. Chase is an Associate Research Professor and Director of the Mahan Scholars Program at the U.S. Naval
War College in Newport, Rhode Island. ―Defense and Deterrence in China‘s Military Space Strategy‖ Publication: China Brief
Volume: 11 Issue: 5. 3-25-2011 2011 01:22
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37699&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=
e3f0fcd233f563e2364ad7bc49425244 LShen)
      A review of Chinese writings on military space operations indicates that Chinese strategists are concerned about a wide
      variety of perceived threats to Chinese space systems. In particular, Chinese analysts characterize U.S. space policy as
      inherently threatening to China‘s interests because of its emphasis on space dominance. As Zhang Hui of Harvard‘s Belfer
      Center for Science and International Affairs writes, "Many Chinese officials and security experts have great interest in U.S.
      military planning documents issued in recent years that explicitly envision the control of space through the use of weapons
      in, or from, space to establish global superiority" [7]. Similarly, according to Bao Shixiu, a senior fellow at the PLA‘s
      Academy of Military Science (AMS), "the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to
      monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others" [8]. Given that China must protect its
      own interests, Bao argues, "China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country." Consequently, he
      asserts that U.S. space policy "poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as
      obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes" [9]. Chinese writers also assert that
      U.S. space war exercises reflect the growing militarization of space. Yet Beijing‘s concerns are not limited to the realm of
      policy statements and war games. Indeed, some Chinese strategists appear to believe that other countries are actively
      developing counter-space capabilities that could threaten Chinese satellites. Some Chinese writers discussed what they
      characterize as a long history of ASAT research, development, and testing in the United States and Russia dating back to
      the Cold War [10]. Like their Western counterparts, Chinese writers divide these potential threats into two major categories:
      "soft kill" and "hard kill" [11]. Soft kill threats can cause temporary loss of the effectiveness of space systems, causing them
      to be unable to carry out operational functions. According to Chinese military researchers, the main methods of soft kill
      anti-satellite attack include electronic warfare and computer network attacks [12]. In contrast to soft kill threats such as
      jamming, hard kill capabilities are intended to cause permanent damage to spacecraft. Chinese writers identify kinetic
      energy weapons and directed energy weapons such as high-energy lasers as the main hard kill ASAT threats. Other Chinese
      writings offer more detailed discussions of perceived threats from a wide range of systems, such as kinetic energy
      interceptors, laser ASAT systems, nuclear ASAT systems, microwave weapons, and space planes that could be used to
      disable or destroy an adversary‘s satellites [13]. In addition, some Chinese authors assert that U.S. missile defense
      interceptors provide the United States with an inherent ASAT capability [14]. In all, according to Chinese analysts, as a
      result of the actions of the world‘s major space powers, space war is no longer the stuff of science fiction. Indeed, they
      argue that it is already more a reality than a myth. Consequently, they conclude that China must be prepared not only to
      degrade an adversary‘s ability to use space, but also to protect its own space capabilities. Chinese writings suggest that
      Beijing would consider doing so through a combination of defensive measures and deterrence.




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Nuclear war

STRAITS TIMES, June 25, 2000; Lexis
      THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If
      Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes
      unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the
      possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support
      to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser
      extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as
      opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to
      redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq.
      In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and
      dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth
      Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from
      military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US
      foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of
      nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of
      winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can
      destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was
      considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute
      for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided
      by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the
      country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of
      civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem
      inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the
      biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone
      believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which
      borders China and North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody
      were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.




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The more US develops Space Weapons, the More China prepares for War
Ritter 08 (Peter Ritter, reporter at Time Inc., Wednesday, Feb. 13, 2008, ―The New Space Race: China vs. US,‖ Time Magazine
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1712812,00.html)
      But there may be more at stake than national honor. Some analysts say that China's attempts to access American space
      technology are less about boosting its space program than upgrading its military. China is already focusing on space as a
      potential battlefield. A recent Pentagon estimate of China's military capabilities said that China is investing heavily in anti-
      satellite weaponry. In January 2007, China demonstrated that it was able to destroy orbiting satellites when it brought down
      one of its own weather satellites with a missile. China clearly recognizes the significance of this capability. In 2005, a
      Chinese military officer wrote in the book Joint Space War Campaigns, put out by the National Defense University, that a
      "shock and awe strike" on satellites "will shake the structure of the opponent's operations system of organization and will
      create huge psychological impact on the opponent's policymakers." Such a strike could hypothetically allow China to
      counterbalance technologically superior U.S. forces, which rely heavily on satellites for battlefield data. China is still
      decades away from challenging the U.S. in space. But U.S. officials worry espionage may be bringing China a little closer
      to doing so here on Earth.




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                                               Space Weapons Bad – China
US China conflict over space weapons issues lead to conflict escalation – leaked cables prove.
The Telegraph 2011 ―WikiLeaks: US vs China in battle of the anti-satellite space weapons‖
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8299491/WikiLeaks-US-vs-China-in-battle-of-the-anti-satellite-space-
weapons.html
      Led by the White House, the West reacted with outrage. Leaked US embassy files disclose that Clark Randt, the American
      ambassador in Beijing, delivered a strongly worded protest to He Yefei, the Chinese assistant foreign minister, on Jan 15,
      2007. The documents show that the scale of American concern over the test was far greater in private than was admitted
      publicly. By January 2008, Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, raised the prospect of “military” action to protect
      American space systems. In a “secret” complaint to the Chinese, she said: ―Any purposeful interference with US space
      systems will be interpreted by the United States as an infringement of its rights and considered an escalation in a crisis or
      conflict. The United States reserves the right, consistent with the UN Charter and international law, to defend and protect
      its space systems with a wide range of options, from diplomatic to military.‖ Washington was particularly concerned about
      the 2,500 pieces of debris – and 100,000 smaller fragments – from the destroyed Chinese craft. Some of the pieces would
      remain in orbit around the Earth for the next 100 years and pose a risk to the US Space Shuttle and the International Space
      Station, Miss Rice said. She also pointed out that America had not tested an anti-satellite weapon since 1985. Just a month
      later this had changed. In February 2008, Mr Gates – with the backing of Mr Bush – decided that diplomacy was not
      enough. The missile was fired. In public, the Bush administration denied that the strike, which cost an estimated
      $30 million, was anything except a safety measure. A broken US spy satellite was falling towards the Earth and posed a risk
      to human health from its toxic fuel tank, officials said. Destroying the craft in space was the safest option, they claimed.
      Most satellites are left to burn out as they re-enter the atmosphere. The leaked embassy cables disclose that Washington‘s
      decision to shoot down spy satellite USA 193 caused private “anger” and anxiety in Beijing. The Chinese ―repeatedly
      emphasised that the United States should provide information on the planned satellite interception prior to releasing the
      information to CNN‖, according to a secret memo sent from the Beijing Embassy on Feb 22, 2008.

US China conflict over Space weapons issues lead to tensions-Leaked Cables prove
The Telegraph ‟11 ―WikiLeaks: US vs China in battle of the anti-satellite space weapons‖
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8299491/WikiLeaks-US-vs-China-in-battle-of-the-anti-satellite-space-
weapons.html
      Led by the White House, the West reacted with outrage. Leaked US embassy files disclose that Clark Randt, the American
      ambassador in Beijing, delivered a strongly worded protest to He Yefei, the Chinese assistant foreign minister, on Jan 15,
      2007. The documents show that the scale of American concern over the test was far greater in private than was admitted
      publicly. By January 2008, Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, raised the prospect of ―military‖ action to protect
      American space systems. In a ―secret‖ complaint to the Chinese, she said: ―Any purposeful interference with US space
      systems will be interpreted by the United States as an infringement of its rights and considered an escalation in a crisis or
      conflict. The United States reserves the right, consistent with the UN Charter and international law, to defend and protect its
      space systems with a wide range of options, from diplomatic to military.‖ Washington was particularly concerned about the
      2,500 pieces of debris – and 100,000 smaller fragments – from the destroyed Chinese craft. Some of the pieces would
      remain in orbit around the Earth for the next 100 years and pose a risk to the US Space Shuttle and the International Space
      Station, Miss Rice said. She also pointed out that America had not tested an anti-satellite weapon since 1985. Just a month
      later this had changed. In February 2008, Mr Gates – with the backing of Mr Bush – decided that diplomacy was not
      enough. The missile was fired. In public, the Bush administration denied that the strike, which cost an estimated
      $30 million, was anything except a safety measure. A broken US spy satellite was falling towards the Earth and posed a risk
      to human health from its toxic fuel tank, officials said. Destroying the craft in space was the safest option, they claimed.
      Most satellites are left to burn out as they re-enter the atmosphere. The leaked embassy cables disclose that Washington‘s
      decision to shoot down spy satellite USA 193 caused private ―anger‖ and anxiety in Beijing. The Chinese ―repeatedly
      emphasised that the United States should provide information on the planned satellite interception prior to releasing the
      information to CNN‖, according to a secret memo sent from the Beijing Embassy on Feb 22, 2008.




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                                              Space Weapons Bad – China
China is playing catch up with US on Space Weaponization for protection
Blazejewski 08 (Kenneth Blazejewski, private practice in New York City, focusing primarily on international corporate and
financial transactions, JD from NYU Law, 2008. ―Space Weaponization and US China Relations,‖
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf)
      On this account, China‘s primary concern with US space weaponiza- tion is its contribution to a US multilayered missile
      defense shield. In- deed, China‘s campaign for PAROS negotiation at the CD seems to inten- sify after each new
      development in United States BMD plans.20 Although China could respond to a BMD shield with effective
      countermeasures,21 future technological developments may permit the BMD system to viti- ate China‘s nuclear
      deterrent.22 In the case of a conflict over Taiwan, for example, a US space-based BMD system could prove very valuable
      to the United States. According to this view, if the United States decides to advance with such a BMD program, China will
      respond so as to main- tain its nuclear deterrence. It will modernize its ICBM fleet (a program it has already initiated),
      develop further countermeasures to circumvent the BMD shield, and develop the means to launch multiple ASAT attacks.
      Ultimately, an arms race could ensue. This, however, would not be China‘s chosen outcome. Its development of space
      weapons is merely a counter- strategy to what it views as likely US space weaponization.23 China would much prefer that
      the United States negotiate a PAROS agreement not to build the BMD shield.24 If this were the case, China‘s January
      ASAT test would appear to be an attempt to get the United States to the negotiating table. By launching the ASAT, China
      sought to put the United States on notice that any attempt to weaponize outer space would lead to this mutu- ally
      undesirable path.

China Views America as a threat and sees no other option but to build weapons
Blair and Chen 08 (Bruce Blair, president of the World Security Institute (WSI) in Washington D.C, former project director at
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings
Institution, Analyst for China Security Journal, and Chen Yali, editor-in-chief of the Washington Observer Weekly, Program
Manager of Chen Shi China Research Group, former writer for China Daily, analyst for China Security Journal, 20 08, ―Editors‘
Notes: The Space Security Dilemma‖ http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=243)
      Hui at Harvard University contends in his article that examines threats from a Chinese perspective. Drawing on
      authoritative sources, he argues that the United States is unambiguously committed not only to exploiting space for military
      purposes, but also to controlling space by all necessary means including weapons deployed in space. The objective is not
      only to protect U.S. space assets, but to deny adversaries the use of space in wartime. In its most ambitious rendition,
      controlling space applies even to the transitory period of several minutes when an adversary‘s missiles are passing through
      space enroute to their wartime targets on enemy soil. This prospective role for U.S. space control weapons – shooting down
      an adversary‘s ballistic missiles – is the central concern of Zhang‘s analysis, as it represents the most serious threat to
      China‘s security. A space-based U.S. missile defense system, especially one designed to shoot down ballistic missiles
      during their several minutes of boosted flight after launch (boost-phase defenses), would pose the gravest potential threat by
      enabling the United States to neutralize China‘s strategic nuclear missile deterrent. In some respects Zhang and many U.S.
      analysts understate the degree of potential threat to China by stressing the huge cost of the thousands of space- based
      interceptors needed to maintain an around-the-clock vigil of Chinese missile launches, and by stressing the relative ease by
      which China‘s missiles could punch holes in this defensive constellation. The understatement derives from the fact that a
      far less extensive galaxy of U.S. space-based interceptors would be needed if the United States could choose the moment
      for initiating hostilities as part of a preemptive offensive strategy. Even a constellation of dozens of interceptors could be
      decisive if the United States enjoyed the luxury of setting the terms of the onset of conflict and the interceptors were
      optimally positioned at that moment. In Zhang‘s view, China could counter by deploying anti-space weapons designed to
      cripple the U.S. missile defense network, but such a step could ignite an arms race in space (and, we might add, create
      impulses to preemptively strike in space during a crisis). Alternatively, China could ramp up its arsenal of nuclear missiles
      and warheads to the point at which it would overwhelm the U.S. defense capability, but the downsides are numerous. A
      Chinese missile build-up could trigger nuclear reactions from India. If Pakistan follows suit, an arms race in South Asia
      could result. It could also require China to re-start its fissile materials production facilities and thereby unravel China‘s
      commitment to the multinational treaty calling for all countries to stop future production of such materials. From a Chinese
      perspective, according to Zhang, the prospect of an unregulated military space environment is decidedly bleak, and
      warrants renewed efforts to ban space weapons. He analyzes various approaches to banning their development or
      deployment, and concludes that a focused approach that bans the deployment of weapons in space would offer the best
      solution from the stand- point of feasibility and of China‘s overall security. Zhang does not adequately



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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                         DDI 2011
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                                              Space Weapons Bad – China
Chinese Space Weapons make Arms Race inevitable

Blazejewski 08 (Kenneth Blazejewski, private practice in New York City, focusing primarily on international corporate and
financial transactions, JD from NYU Law, 2008. ―Space Weaponization and US China Relations,‖
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf)
      Second, China has developed the means to attack some US satellites, and there is no guarantee that China does not
      ultimately seek to develop a robust space weapons program. China‘s ASAT test demonstrates that the Chinese have been
      working assiduously at developing their space weapons program. Although China made a decision in the early 1990s to
      focus its space resources on civilian programs, an annual official budget of $2.5 billion for space programs and a growing
      number of dual-use technol- ogy programs suggest that China‘s military space capacity is growing.42 For instance, China
      has long conducted research on the development of beam weapons that can be incorporated into ASAT weapons systems.43
      China is known to have tested high-power microwave weapons for jam- ming satellite communication.44 If China is indeed
      pursuing a full-blown space weapons program, a space arms race may be inevitable despite a US decision not to launch the
      first space weapons program.

US sends mixed messages about Space, causing Chinese armament
Carroll 03 (James Carroll, journalist, ―Bush‘s Battle to Dominate Space‖ The Boston Globe, October 28, 2003,
http://www.commondreams.org/scriptfiles/views03/1028-03.htm )
      If the Chinese were alarmed in 1998 by such "full-spectrum dominance," as US planners call it, imagine how much more
      threatened they feel now that Pentagon fantasies of preemption and permanent global supremacy have become official Bush
      policies. For decades, "deterrence" and "balance" were the main notes of Pentagon planning, but now "prevention" and
      "dominance" define the US posture. Such assertions can be made in Washington with only good intentions, but they fall on
      foreign ears as expressions of aggression. When it comes to space, the Chinese have good reason for thinking of themselves
      as the main object of such planning, which is why they are desperate for a set of rules governing military uses of space. (At
      the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a study of such rules is underway codirected by Steinbruner and the
      academy's Martin Malin). Two weeks ago China put a man in space, a signal of China's arrival -- and of the arrival of this
      grave question. Beijing has invested heavily in commercial development of space and will become a significant economic
      competitor in that sphere. But such peaceful competition presumes a framework of stability, and it is inconceivable that
      China can pursue a mainly nonmilitary space program while feeling vulnerable to American military dominance. China has
      constructed a minimal deterrent force with a few dozen nuclear-armed ICBMs, but US "global engagement" based on a
      missile defense, will quickly undercut the deterrence value of such a force. The Chinese nuclear arsenal will have to be
      hugely expanded.

US Space weaponization destabilizes the world because of China response
Zhang 08 (Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs at Harvard‘s Kennedy School of Government, 2008. ―Chinese Perspectives on Space Weapons‖)
      Zhang arrives at similar conclusions. He describes how U.S. plans will negatively affect peaceful uses of outer space,
      disrupting current civilian and commercial initiatives, but focuses on a much greater concern among Chinese officials—that
      actions by the United States in space will result in a loss of strategic nuclear parity. China‘s options for response, as
      detailed by Zhang, include building more ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against misPREFACE v sile defense,
      developing ASAT weapons, and reconsidering China‘s commit- ments on arms control. Thus introducing weapons into
      space would destabi- lize the already vulnerable international non-proliferation regime. Zhang concludes, ―U.S. space
      weaponization plans would have potentially disas- trous effects on international security and the peaceful use of outer
      space. This would not benefit any country‘s security interests.‖




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                               DDI 2011
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                                     Space Weapons Bad – China – High Probability
Chinese Satellite shows that probability of future problems is high
Potter 07 (Ned Potter, science and technology reporter for ABC, won the duPont-Columbia Award for excellence in broadcast
journalism, the Emmy Award, the Headliner Award, a Genesis Award and the CINE Golden Eagle Award, 2/1/20 07 ―China's Space-
Weapon Test Could Endanger Astronauts and Satellites,‖ http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=2841745&page=1)
    When the Chinese government destroyed one of its weather satellites in a military test last month, it sent a chill through the
    U.S. military. And engineers say it had a serious side effect -- it increased the amount of orbiting space junk by about 10
    percent. That could mean danger -- to other satellites, and even, possibly, to astronauts on the International Space Station
    and future space shuttle flights. "There's a lot of stuff up there in low-Earth orbit," said T.S. Kelso, a veteran space-
    surveillance analyst who is now at the Center for Space Standards and Innovation in Colorado Springs, Colo. "While we
    can't tell them that 'five months from now, you're at risk for being hit,' it's not unreasonable to expect that it's going to affect
    a lot of stuff in orbit." 500 Pieces of Debris, Possibly Thousands More The Chinese test, carried out on Jan. 11, was at once
    complex and very simple. An old weather satellite, passing 537 miles overhead, was targeted by a missile launched from a
    Chinese military base. The missile hit the satellite with deadly precision. The missile carried no bomb because it didn't need
    one. The satellite was pulverized by the impact. But what followed was chaos in space. As of today, Kelso reports that
    American radar is tracking at least 525 pieces of debris from the collision -- each at least the size of a baseball. There are
    probably hundreds, if not thousands, of smaller ones. The pieces are gradually spreading out in a ring around the Earth,
    creating a vast area where spacecraft face increased danger of being hit. "We've already seen in the range of 500 to 600
    events where some piece of debris from this one event was coming within 5 kilometers [about 3 miles] of some payload,"
    said Kelso. Space 'Pollution' It's a growing problem. The U.S. Air Force was already tracking almost 14,000 objects in
    orbit. Three times in the last 15 years, U.S. satellites have reportedly been disabled or damaged by collisions with space
    junk. NASA is worried enough about the problem that each shuttle crew now spends the entire day before landing taking
    pictures of its ship's heat shield tiles, just in case there's been a small but potentially fatal impact. If a shuttle crew ever does
    find damage, the astronauts would have to seek safe haven on the International Space Station, and wait for a second shuttle
    to get them. Such an accident, NASA's administator, Michael Griffin, has said, would probably mean the end of the shuttle
    program. The Chinese weather satellite, designated Fen Yung-IC, was in an orbit that took it over the North and South
    poles. It's an orbit that's popular for weather, reconnaissance and Earth-science satellites because it allows daily pictures of
    virtually every part of the planet below. "There are about 125 or 130 satellites in that same orbit," said Theresa Hitchens,
    head of the Center for Defense Information, a Washington-based group that provides information on national defense and
    aerospace isues. "It's a highly used orbit, and it's an orbit that's already fairly polluted." Shuttles travel in a very different
    path; all but one of the remaining 13 missions is scheduled for assembly of the space station, about 220 miles high. But the
    ring of debris from the Chinese debris has already spread out enough that the station passes through it twice on every 90-
    minute orbit of the earth. How great is the danger? They don't call it "space" for nothing; there is a lot of empty void in the
    realm where most spacecraft orbit. NASA has said it's not worried. But the debris from the Chinese test has added to the
    small chance of a big catastrophe. "We can't see it, we can't track it," said Hitchens, "and something as small as a marble
    can shatter a satellite."




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                        DDI 2011
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                                     Space Weapons Bad – China – ASATs Impact
China developing ASATs because of US provocation
Saunders 07 (Phillip C. Saunders: He has been a Senior Research Professor at the National Defense University's Institute for
National Strategic Studies since January 2004 and Charles D. Lutes: He ―China‘s ASAT Test Motivation and implications‖ 20 07
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA517485&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf LShen)
      Another approach is to try to dissuade China from developing ASAT capabilities and to deter it from using them in a
      conflict. Successful dissuasion would require the United States and other countries to impose costs on China if it continues
      efforts to develop and deploy ASAT weapons. A space expert noted that the lack of U.S. response to earlier tests may have
      led China to underestimate the costs of pursuing ASAT weapons. A China expert noted that U.S. complaints about earlier
      tests might have helped overcome the compartmentalized Chinese system and forced Chinese leaders to consider the full
      costs and benefits of the ASAT program. A strong response from the international community would reinforce dissuasion
      efforts, but most felt that China was currently paying relatively low costs for its ASAT test and program. Dissuading
      Beijing from deploying ASAT capabilities would require greater efforts to raise the costs of deployment and to assure
      China that it can meet its security needs without deployment. The possibility of conflict over Taiwan greatly complicates
      this effort. Most participants believe China will probably continue developing ASAT weapons, although it might not test
      the direct-ascent ASAT system again (or might do so only in a suborbital mode that would limit debris). Most felt the
      strategic value of ASAT weapons was high enough that China would likely deploy them. A few space experts argued that
      China prefers a treaty banning space weapons, although such an agreement would be inherently difficult to negotiate and
      verify (especially because some PRC experts consider space-based surveillance assets to be space weapons). Most of the
      group dismissed the argument that Beijing tested its ASAT weapon to encourage Washington to negotiate about space
      weapons. Most felt China‟s primary motive in testing was to demonstrate a military capability that could increase the
      costs and risks of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict. One participant suggested that although China would continue
      to champion a treaty banning space weapons, it might well support a code of conduct as an interim measure. Others noted
      that a code of conduct might address space debris but would do little to address the vulnerability of U.S. space assets.
      Deterring the use of ASAT weapons also poses difficult challenges. China experts noted that China does not share the U.S.-
      Soviet experience with arms control, deterrence, mutual satellite reconnaissance, or dealing with incidents at sea. The U.S.
      military has internalized these norms into its doctrine and operations, but China does not necessarily accept them. While
      U.S. thinking about deterrence has traditionally focused on conventional and nuclear aggression, deterrence might work
      differently in the space and cyber domains. The different context may complicate attribution and require rethinking
      thresholds for response.

China builds ASATS in response to US Space Weapons
Hagt 07 (Eric Hagt, director of the China Program at the World Security Institute, in Washington, D.C. and Beijing. His research
interests include Sino-U.S. relations in the field of space, energy and a range of non-traditional security issues. 2007, ―China‘s ASAT
Test: Strategic Response,‖ http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_3.pdf)

      As U.S. military space developments have evolved, China‘s observations and subsequent conclusions have engendered a
      fundamental response: we cannot accept this state of affairs. For reasons of defense of national sovereignty as well as
      China‘s broader interests in space – civilian, commercial and military – America‘s pursuit of space control and dominance
      and its pursuit to develop ASATs and space weapons pose an intolerable risk to China‘s national security.9 China‘s own
      ASAT test embodied this message. Attempting to redress what China perceives as a critically imbalanced strategic
      environment that increasingly endangers its interests, China demonstrated a deterrent to defend against that threat. Its
      willingness to risk international opprobrium through such a test conveys China‘s grim resolve to send that message.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                  DDI 2011
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                                       Space Weapons Bad – Colonization
Space warfare prevents colonization
Hitchens 05 (Theresa Hitchens, former director of CDI (center for defense information), Winter 20 05, ―Safeguarding Space:
Building Cooperative Norms to Dampen Negative Trends‖, The Acronym Institute, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd81/81th.htm)
     Because space is a global commons and most satellites are dedicated to civil and commercial functions, warfare in space
     could likely debilitate its use for near- and mid-term economic and social development here on Earth. The spectre of
     warfare could undercut the positive trend toward cooperative exploration of the universe - exploration that could lead to
     scientific developments of major benefit to future generations and, perhaps, even help make possible humankind's
     migration beyond the Earth's solar system some time in the future.




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                       DDI 2011
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                                           Space Weapons Bad – Economy
Space warfare destroys the economy and modern life
Krepon 04 (Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, 20 04. Arms Control Association, ―Weapons in
the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon#krepon)
     Space warfare would have far-reaching adverse effects for global commerce, especially commercial transactions and
     telecommunication services that use satellites. Worldwide space industry revenues now total almost $110 billion a year,
     $40 billion of which go to U.S. companies.[4] These numbers do not begin to illuminate how much disruption would occur
     in the event of space warfare. For a glimpse of what could transpire, the failure of a Galaxy IV satellite in May 1998 is
     instructive. Eighty-nine percent of all U.S. pagers used by 45 million customers became inoperative, and direct broadcast
     transmissions, financial transactions, and gas station pumps were also affected.[5]

Nuclear war

Walter Russell Mead, a great American citizen, 2/4/2009, Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, p.
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2
    None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help
    capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a
    normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of
    the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the
    two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed
    wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf
    Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow,
    Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back
    on track, we may still have to fight.




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                                                                                                                                112
Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                        DDI 2011
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                                          Space Weapons Bad – First Strike
Space weapons cause first striking and nuclear war
Krepon 04 (Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, 20 04. Arms Control Association, ―Weapons in
the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon#krepon)
     To prevent adversaries from shooting back, the United States would need to know exactly where all threatening space
     objects are located, to neutralize them without producing debris that can damage U.S. or allied space objects, and to target
     and defeat all ground-based military activities that could join the fight in space. In other words, successful space warfare
     mandates pre-emptive strikes and a preventive war in space as well as on the ground. War plans and execution often go
     awry here on Earth. It takes enormous hubris to believe that space warfare would be any different. If ASAT and space-
     based, ground-attack weapons are flight-tested and deployed, space warriors will have succeeded in the dubious
     achievement of replicating the hair-trigger nuclear postures that plagued humankind during the Cold War. Armageddon
     nuclear postures continue to this day, with thousands of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons ready to be launched in minutes
     to incinerate opposing forces, command and control nodes, and other targets, some of which happen to be located within
     large metropolitan areas. If the heavens were weaponized, these nuclear postures would be reinforced and elevated into
     space. U.S. space warriors now have a doctrine and plans for counterspace operations, but they do not have a credible plan
     to stop inadvertent or uncontrolled escalation once the shooting starts. Like U.S. war-fighting scenarios, there is a huge
     chasm between plans and consequences, in which requirements for escalation dominance make uncontrolled escalation far
     more likely. A pre-emptive strike in space on a nation that possesses nuclear weapons would invite the gravest possible
     consequences. Attacks on satellites that provide early warning and other critical military support functions would most
     likely be viewed either as a surrogate or as a prelude to attacks on nuclear forces.


Space Weapons lead to an enemy first-strike
DeBlois 03 (Bruce DeBlois, Director of Systems Integration at BAE SYSTEMS, 10/29/03, ―US Space Posture and the Role of
Space Weapons to Outer Space and International Security: Options for the Future Conference Elliot School of International Affairs‖
http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/DeBlois.pdf)
      And we found the posturing of weapons in space will extend and expose our space-based military force enhancement
      Center of Gravity. My years in the space intelligence community have only reinforced this notion of vulnerability: space
      weapons equate to more static / vulnerable targets, posing a larger threat from space, and no doubt voiding existent
      diplomatic protection of National Technical Means. From a weakened and more vulnerable position, we would
      simultaneously posture space forces that invite pre-emption and escalation as evidenced in one wargame after another. And
      this in regionally and globally more diplomatically unstable environments created by the posturing of space weapons in the
      first place. Furthermore, adversaries will be encouraged to focus effort on lesser expensive asymmetric approaches against
      a Space Superpower. Simply put, we would posture ourselves as a target in a volatile context that we create, and weaken
      ourselves at the same




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Space Weapons Generic                                                                                                                                                       DDI 2011
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                                                          Space Weapons Bad – Hegemony
Space weapons lead to arms races and loss of hegemony

Hitchens 02 (Theresa Hitchens, Vice President of the Center for Defense Information, 2002. ―Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet
or Russian Roulette?‖ http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm)
     Such a strategic-level space race could have negative consequences for U.S. security in the long run that would outweigh
     the obvious (and tremendous) short-term advantage of being the first with space-based weapons. There would be direct
     economic costs to sustaining orbital weapon systems and keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching U.S. space-
     weapon capabilities — raising the proverbial question of whether we would be starting a game we might not be able to win.
     (It should be remembered that the attacker will always have an advantage in space warfare, in that space assets are
     inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, have inherent vulnerabilities.) Again, the
     price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial — with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs
     commercial firms between $300 million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years,
     according to Ed Cornet, vice president of Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm.30 Many experts also argue there
     would be costs, both economic and strategic, stemming from the need to counter other asymmetric challenges from those
     who could not afford to be participants in the race itself. Threatened nations or non-state actors might well look to terrorism
     using chemical or biological agents as one alternative. Karl Mueller, now at RAND, in an analysis for the School of
     Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, wrote, "The United States would not be able to maintain
     unchallenged hegemony in the weaponization of space, and while a space-weapons race would threaten international
     stability, it would be even more dangerous to U.S. security and relative power projection capability, due to other states'
     significant ability and probably inclination to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against ascendant U.S. power."31
     Spurring other nations to acquire space-based weapons of their own, especially weapons aimed at terrestrial targets, would
     certainly undercut the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the ground on a worldwide basis — negating what today is
     a unique advantage of being a military superpower.32 U.S. commercial satellites would also become targets, as well as
     military assets (especially considering the fact that the U.S. military is heavily reliant on commercial providers, particularly
     in communications). Depending on how widespread such weapons became, it also could even put U.S. cities at a greater
     risk than they face today from ballistic missiles.

Nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND policy analyst, Spring 1995, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, ―Losing the
Moment?‖
    Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future.
                                                                                                                                      world in which the U nited S tates
    On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a
    exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy,
    free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world‘s major problems, such as
    nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile
    global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange.
    U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system .




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                                          Space Weapons Bad – Hegemony
Space weapons lead to arms race and hurt war-fighting capabilities

Krepon 04 (Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, 20 04. Arms Control Association, ―Weapons in
the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon#krepon)
     If the United States leads the way in flight-testing and deploying new anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, other states will
     surely follow suit because they have too much to lose by allowing the Pentagon sole rights to space warfare. U.S. programs
     will cost more and be far more sophisticated than the ASAT weapons of potential adversaries, who will opt to kill satellites
     cheaply and crudely. The resulting competition would endanger U.S. troops that depend on satellites to an unprecedented
     degree for battlefield intelligence, communication, and targeting to win quickly and with a minimum of casualties.




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                                                Space Weapons Bad – India/Pakistan
Space weapons cause Indo-Pak conflict

Hitchens 02 (Theresa Hitchens, Vice President Center for Defense Information, ―US Space Policy: Time to Stop and Think ,‖
2002, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 67, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd67/67op2.htm)
      An arms race in space would threaten international stability. Space weapons have inherent first-strike capabilities and,
      much like nuclear weapons, a dangerous "use or lose" nature, making them destabilising factors in any military
      competition. Consider, for example, the high probability that bitter, nuclear-armed enemies India and Pakistan would enter
      any space arms race. If constructed in the next few years, an international arms control regime would still have a real
      chance of preventing the outbreak of an arms race in space, by any country. In addition, by limiting other nations' pursuit of
      space weapons and/or counterspace weapons, the United States might be able to maintain its current military edge for a
      longer period of time.

Extinction

Fai „01(Ghulam Nabi, Executive Director, Kashmiri American Council, Washington Times, 7-8)
    The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto
    power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally
    occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged
    South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The
    United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department,
    and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear
    arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the
    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention. The
    boiling witches' brew in Kashmir should propel the United States to assertive facilitation or mediation of Kashmir negotiations. The impending July 14-16 summit
    in New Delhi between President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee featuring Kashmir on the agenda does not justify complacency.




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                                                Space Weapons Bad – Miscalculation
Space weapons make nuclear war inevitable – eliminates decision time

Marko Beljac, a Foreign Policy In Focus contributor, teaches at the University of Melbourne, 2008. ―Arms
Race in Space,‖ http://www.fpif.org/articles/arms_race_in_space
      Space weaponization may well have cataclysmic consequences given the link between space weapons and nuclear weapons
      strategy. This is because Russia, and the United States, to a certain extent rely on satellites for early warning of nuclear attack. As
      other space nations with nuclear weapons develop their space capacity it is expected that they will follow suit. The
      deployment of space weapons means that the first shot in a nuclear war would be fired against these early warning
      satellites. Currently strategic planners in Moscow have about 10 minutes between warning of an attack and the decision to
      launch nuclear weapons in response before they impact. Weapons in space would lower this in certain scenarios down to seconds. This
      would also apply for weapons placed in space that would be considered to be defensive such as say a space based BMD interceptor or a ―counter-ASAT‖
      weapon. On occasion, ground warning radars falsely show that a nuclear attack has been launched . In the 1990s a false alarm went
      all the way up to President Boris Yeltsin and was terminated after approximately eight minutes. We are still here, noted analysts believe, because warning
      satellites would have given Moscow real time information showing the alarm to be false. Should such a false alarm coincide with an accident
      involving an early warning satellite when space weapons are known to exist, an accidental nuclear exchange could result. The risk
      would increase if the false alarm occurred during a crisis. Space weapons could lead to itchy fingers on nuclear triggers.
      They would therefore significantly increase the importance nuclear weapon states place upon nuclear deterrence .

Space weapons cause extinction through accidents and miscalculation

Mitchell, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, Ayotte
and Helwich, Teaching Fellows in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 2001 (Dr.
Gordon R., Kevin J., David Cram, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, ―Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic
Diplomacy at a Crossroads‖, No. 6 July, http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html)
    A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the
                                                                                                            33
    presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'. This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact
                                                                                                                                                          34
    elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'. The
    interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc
    Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same
                                             35
    capability to target something on land'.    To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such
    interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of
    space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks
    creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance
    survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands
    and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict . Yale
    sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated
    components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the
    different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics,
    multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority
    to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems
    to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny
    projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than
                                                                       37
    would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst
                                                                                                                                                           38
    David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.
    Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with
    maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer
    glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.




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                                                Space Weapons Bad – Multilateralism
Space weapons collapse multilateralism – extinction

Alexey Arbatov, professor of the Academy of Defense, Security and Police and Head of the Center for
International Security Center of the Institute for International Economy and International Relationships of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, 2009. ―Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats, and Arms Control
Opportunities,‖ http://www.icnnd.org/Documents/Arbatov_Space_Weapons.pdf?noredirect=1
   Currently, the economic and technological superiority of the USA in space is obvious and indisputable. However, if a space arms race is initiated, it
    will inevitably be joined by other countries, above all China, Russia, India, Brazil, Japan, and later possibly Iran, Pakistan, and
    others. As a result, the USA, despite its superiority in space, may lose more than all the rest because, in their military and civilian
    activities, they more than anyone else depend on the security of space vehicles. Historically, this is what happened with nuclear
    weapons and missile technology, where the USA initially had a monopoly or superiority, but now they see the proliferation of
    such weapons as the main threat to their own security. In the long term, the growing threat of an arms race and, even more so,
    space conflicts, will inevitably lead to the ―vertical‖ and ―horizontal‖ proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons, and to the
    irreversible crisis of the whole nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Additionally, outer space (which does not have natural
    borders and natural shelters) through its saturation by weapons, will present a grave threat from the point of view of accidents,
    incidents, false alarms, and navigational system failures. Having entered the era of globalisation, the world is confronting ever new
    security problems that cannot be resolved on a unilateral basis, and even less through the use of military force. In order to
    resolve these tasks, it is absolutely necessary that leading powers and all responsible states in the world are engaged in concerted
    action, including cooperation in the use of outer space to fight proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, control of international
    terrorism, the fostering of multilateral peacekeeping operations, verification of radical disarmament steps, promotion of
    effective measures in relation to climate and ecology as a whole, and the provision of a secure supply of energy and food. For this
    to happen, it is imperative to develop international agreements without delay, to prevent the arming of outer space. As Napoleon I said, ―Great
    politics are only common sense applied to great things‖. The first step on this path can be the urgent adoption of outer space code of conduct, in which states
    shall voluntary adhere to general principles of the peaceful and co-operative use of outer space. A Draft for such a Code was proposed at the end of 2008 by
    the Council of the European Union under the title ―Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities‖. One of its provisions proclaims ―the freedom of access
    to, exploration and use of outer space24 and exploitation of space objects for peaceful purposes without interference, fully respecting the security, safety and
    integrity of space objects in orbit‖.




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                                       Space Weapons Bad – Multilateralism
Space weapons destroy cooperation. Key to stop proliferation and arms races

Krepon 04 (Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, 20 04. Arms Control Association, ―Weapons in
the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon#krepon)
     Weaponizing space would poison relations with China and Russia, whose help is essential to stop and reverse proliferation.
     ASAT weapon tests and deployments would surely reinforce Russia‘s hair-trigger nuclear posture, and China would likely
     feel compelled to alter its relaxed nuclear posture, which would then have negative repercussions on India and Pakistan.
     The Bush administration‘s plans would also further alienate America‘s friends and allies, which, with the possible
     exception of Israel, strongly oppose the weaponization of space. The fabric of international controls over weapons of mass
     destruction, which is being severely challenged by Iran‘s and North Korea‘s nuclear ambitions, could rip apart if the Bush
     administration‘s interest in testing space and nuclear weapons is realized.

Space weapons destroy multilateralism
Krepon 03 (Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, ―Space Assurance or Space Dominance?
THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE‖, The Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-
pdfs/spacebook.pdf)
     U.S. initiatives to ―seize‖ the high ground of space are likely to be countered by asymmetric and unconventional warfare
     strategies carried out by far weaker states—in space and to a greater extent on Earth. In addition, U.S. initiatives associated
     with space dominance would likely alienate longstanding allies, as well as China and Russia, whose assistance is required
     to effectively counter terrorism and proliferation, the two most pressing national security concerns of this decade. No U.S.
     ally has expressed support for space warfare initiatives. To the contrary, U.S. initiatives to weaponize space would likely
     corrode bilateral relations and coalition-building efforts. Instead, the initiation of preemptive or preventive warfare in space
     by the United States based on assertions of an imminent threat—or a threat that cannot be ameliorated in other ways—is
     likely to be met with deep and widespread skepticism abroad.

Nuclear war, debris, miscalculation, first strikes and loss of multilateralism (Awesome impact card)
Johnson 07 (Rebecca Johnson, PhD negotiated arms withdrawal, 10/8/07, ―Space without Weapons‖, The Acronym Institute,
http://www.acronym.org.uk/space/congo.htm)
      The pursuit of missile defences could increase nuclear threats by creating an escalating offence-defence spiral, not only in
      production of weaponry, but also in operational situations, which could be particularly destabilising and dangerous in times
      of crisis. The use of space for targeting conventional forces may already provoke asymmetric threats, particularly through
      hacking, jamming or attacks to disable ground stations. A number of adverse security consequences are foreseeable if space
      were to be weaponised. It could exacerbate the threats from space debris and EMP and provoke other space-faring nations
      to deploy weapons for use in, to or from space. In computer wargame trials conducted by the Pentagon a few years ago, the
      use of weapons in space (including anti-satellite weapons) led inexorably to the use of nuclear weapons and therefore to
      nuclear war on the ground. Losing one's space-based 'eyes and ears' appeared to cause miscalculations that led to rushed,
      panicky 'use them or lose them' decisions being made, with devastating consequences. Even if weaponising space did not
      lead directly to nuclear war - with the inevitable catastrophic consequences for humankind - it would create a situation of
      widespread distrust. It could also impede international cooperation in areas related to space technology and developments,
      including commercial enterprises and space exploration.




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                                                                 Space Weapons Bad – Prolif
Space weapon collapses the non-proliferation regime

Krepon and Hyman 05 (Michael Krepon, Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the author or editor of thirteen
books and over 350 articles. And Michael Katz Hyman, author for Arms Comtrol Work, 2005, ―Space Weapons and
Proliferation,‖ http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2555.pdf)
      Will flight testing or deploying space weapons prompt arms races? 2 This assertion figures prominently in the writings of
      both critics and boosters of space warfare initiatives.3 We contend that the arms race argument is weak and beside the
      point, since arms racing is not needed to negate the space weapons of a potential adversary. Advanced space-faring nations
      such as China and the Russian Federation could compete in making low- Earth orbit inhospitable to satellites with modest
      investments and unsophisticated techniques. Any nation that possesses medium-range ballistic missiles, space tracking
      capabilities and the means to precisely insert a satellite into orbit also has the ability to destroy a satellite. Rather
      than engaging in an expensive arms race, states threatened by US space warfare initiatives are likely to respond in cos
      effective ways to counter US weapons. The fundamental problem associated with space weapons is not their expense or
      their propensity to generate arms races. Instead, the fundamental problem associated with space weapons is how easily they
      can pollute space, and how much long-term and costly damage could result from relatively inexpensive investments. We
      argue that additional proliferation of nuclear weapons, rather than new arms races, is the most likely outcome in the event
      of renewed interest in space warfare. Proliferation will be a natural consequence of more nations feeling less secure as a
      result of space weapons. Furthermore, in the absence of united fronts against proliferation by major powers and by US
      friends and allies, international efforts to strengthen non-proliferation and disarmament norms are likely to fail, and hedging
      strategies against a more worrisome future are likely to multiply. The US Air Force‘s Counterspace Operations doctrine,
      released in August 2004, embraces power projection in and through space by means of what the Pentagon calls ―offensive
      counter-space‖ capabilities.4 The implications of US initiatives to pursue offensive counterspace capabilities for the non-
      proliferation regime—constructed during an era of bi-polar, Cold War competition—have not been carefully analysed.
      Military dominance confers many advantages. Paradoxically, success in preventing proliferation is not one of them. Instead,
      the dominance of one state could prompt others to seek insurance or deterrence in the form of proliferation.
      Successful non-proliferation policies are usually based on collective, not unilateral action, since collective action is usually
      more dissuasive and effective than unilateral enforcement. A dominant state may have difficulty in generating collective
      action if other states view the dominant power with concern, or if they view proliferation as less of a threat to them than to
      the dominant state. The problems of shaping a collective response are exacerbated if the dominant state pursues initiatives
      that are widely perceived as unwise. Our analysis suggests that the negative impacts of US military dominance on
      proliferation will be accentuated in the event that Washington also seeks dominant military capabilities in space. This
      pursuit will be widely viewed as unwise and dangerous, not only by potential adversaries, but also by most of Washington‘s
      allies and friends. Consequently, US initiatives to flight-test and deploy space weapons are likely to hasten efforts to seek
      insurance or deterrence against US might. We view the advocacy of US space dominance as a useful prism to analyse why
      proliferation concerns are growing, and why efforts to strengthen nonproliferation and disarmament norms have
      encountered such great difficulty in recent years.

Nuclear war

Utgoff 2 [Victor, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense
Analysis, "Proliferation, Missile Defense, and American Ambitions," Survival, Summer, p. 87-90]
    In sum, widespread      proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial
    probability of escalating  to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are
    headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‗six-
    shooters‘ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies
    of dead cities or even whole nations. This kind of world is in no nation‘s interest. The means for preventing it must be pursued vigorously. And, as argued above, a most
    powerful way to prevent it or slow its emergence is to encourage the more capable states to provide reliable protection to others against aggression, even when that aggression could
    be backed with nuclear weapons. In other words, the world needs at least one state, preferably several, willing and able to play the role of sheriff, or to be members of a sheriff‘s
    posse, even in the face of nuclear threats.




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                                                        Space Weapons Bad – Russia
Space mil disrupts US/Russian strategic stability

Victor Mizin, formerly a Diplomat in Residence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey,
California and now the Leading Research Fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences‘ Institute of World
Economics and International Relations, 2007. ―Russian Perspectives on Space Security,‖
http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/Collective%20Security%20in%20Space%20-
%20European%20Perspectives.pdf
    Russian military officials are worried that Washington could eventually obtain the capability to launch a surprise attack in
    which space would be used both for striking Russian targets and blinding its command, control, communications, and
    reconnaissance networks. Retired Ministry of Defense officials, military officers, and representatives of the former Soviet
    military industrial complex speak of dire strategic consequences for Russian security if U.S. nationwide missile defenses are fully deployed and
    predict a new frenzied arms race with general destabilization of the global strategic environment. They do not discount the possibility of a
    disarming ―bolt-from-the-blue‖ U.S. strike from space as Washington seeks undisputed, unilateral military advantages. Indeed,
    any type of space-based weapons could, in the Russian view, have disastrous consequences for strategic stability, particularly
    as they affect the strategic forces and information systems of other side.

Extinction

Nick Bostrom, professor of philosophy - Oxford University, March, 2002, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction
Scenarios and Related Hazards, Journal of Evolution and Technology, p. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html
    A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a
    possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify
    as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear
    Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the
    US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is
    also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and
    Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind‘s potential permanently. Such
    a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or
    asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.




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                                                        Space Weapons Bad – Russia
Space weapons cause war with Russia

New York Times 2007. ―Russia Issues Warning on Space Based Weapons,‖
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/world/europe/27iht-russia.4.7662417.html
    The chief of  Russia's space forces said Thursday that the nation would have to retaliate if others deployed weapons in space - a
    stern warning to the United States. While Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin did not name any specific country, he was clearly referring to U.S.
    plans for space-based weapons, which the Kremlin has vociferously opposed. "We don't want to wage a war in space, we don't want to gain
    dominance in space, but we won't allow any other nation to dominate space," Popovkin said in televised remarks. "If any country deploys
    weapons in space then the laws of warfare are such that retaliatory weapons are certain to appear ." President Vladimir Putin has criticized
    U.S. plans for space-based weapons, saying they could trigger a new arms race. When China tested an anti-satellite missile in January, Putin said that the move
    was a response to U.S. plans for space-based weapons. Russia and China have strongly pushed for an international agreement banning space weapons, but their
    proposals have been stymied by the United States. "It's necessary to legalize the game rules in space," Popovkin said. He warned that the
    complexity of space weapons could trigger a war .




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                                                         Satellite Dfense
Satellite assets are easily countered
Hitchens 02 (Theresa Hitchens, Vice President of the Center for Defense Information, 2002. ―Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet
or Russian Roulette?‖ http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm)
     For example, a September 2001 report by the U.S. Department of Transportation, "Vulnerability Assessment of the
     Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System," highlights the fact that the GPS network is easily
     disrupted in part due to its low power signals and because its characteristics are well known due to its civil uses.25 The
     Space Commission noted that there already are available Russian-made, handheld jamming devices that can block GPS
     receivers for up to 120 miles. In addition, like other satellite networks, the 24 GPS satellites have stable and predictable
     orbits. However, vulnerabilities do not necessarily result in threats. In order to threaten U.S. space assets, military or
     commercial, a potential adversary must have both technological capabilities and intent to use them in a hostile manner.
     There is little hard evidence that any other country or hostile non-state actor possesses either the technology or the intention
     to seriously threaten U.S. military or commercial operations in space — nor is there much evidence of serious pursuit of
     space-based weapons by potentially hostile actors. Currently, the simplest ways to attack satellites and satellite-based
     systems involve ground-based operations against ground facilities, and disruption of computerized downlinks. Hacking and
     jamming also are the least expensive options for anyone interested in disrupting space-based networks, because they do not
     require putting anything into orbit. The high cost of space launch (ranging between $5,000 and $10,000 per pound) is not a
     trivial matter, even for space-faring nations such as Russia and China, much less for 'rogue' states such as North Korea or
     non-state actors. Indeed, the Space Commission report acknowledges that: "Attacking or sabotaging the supporting ground
     facilities has long been considered one of the easiest methods for a U.S. adversary to conduct offensive counter-space
     operations. Most of these facilities are relatively easy to get in close physical proximity to or access by way of a computer
     network, making them a prime target." It is true that the incidences of computer hacking against U.S. military, financial and
     industrial networks continues to rise and that several countries including China are known to be exploring information
     warfare capabilities. Many countries already have developed military electronic jamming systems, and that technology is
     becoming widely available even on the commercial market.




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                                                         Space Weapons Bad – Soft Power
Space weapons cause loss of soft power and a multipolar world – outweighs hard power.
Brown 09 (Trevor Brown, MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009. Air &
Space Power Journal, ―Soft Power and Space Weaponization,‖
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html)
      The United States has plans to weaponize space and is already deploying missile-defense platforms.1 Official, published
      papers outline long-term visions for space weapons, including direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) missiles, ground-based
      lasers that target satellites in low Earth orbit, and hypervelocity rod bundles that strike from space.2 According to federal
      budget documents, the Pentagon has asked Congress for considerable resources to test weapons in space, marking the
      biggest step toward creating a space battlefield since the Strategic Defense Initiative during the Cold War.3 Although two
      co-orbital escort vehicles—the XSS-11 experimental microsatellite and the Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for
      Evaluating Local Space—are intended to monitor the space environment and inspect friendly satellites, they possess the
      technical ability to disrupt other nations‘ military reconnaissance and communications satellites.4 These developments have
      caused considerable apprehension in Moscow, Beijing, and other capitals across the world, resulting in a security dilemma.
      Russia and China believe that they must respond to this strategic challenge by taking measures to dissuade the United
      States from pursuing space weapons and missile defenses. Their response will likely include developing more advanced
      ASAT weapons, building more intercontinental ballistic missiles, extending the life of existing ballistic missiles, adopting
      countermeasures against missile defenses, developing other asymmetric capabilities for the medium of space, and
      reconsidering commitments on arms control.5 The military options for Russia and China are not very appealing since
      neither can compete directly with the United States in space on an equal financial, military, or technical footing.
      Consequently, their first and best choice is the diplomatic route through the United Nations (UN) by presenting resolutions
      and treaties in hopes of countering US space-weaponization efforts with international law. Although such attempts have
      thus far failed to halt US plans, they have managed to build an international consensus against the United States. Indeed, on
      5 December 2007, a vote on a UN resolution calling for measures to stop an arms race in space passed by a count of 178 to
      one against the United States, with Israel abstaining.6 The problem for the United States is that other nations believe it
      seeks to monopolize space in order to further its hegemonic dominance.7 In recent years, a growing number of nations have
      vocally objected to this perceived agenda. Poor US diplomacy on the issue of space weaponization contributes to increased
      geopolitical backlashes of the sort leading to the recent decline in US soft power—the ability to attract others by the
      legitimacy of policies and the values that underlie them—which, in turn, has restrained overall US national power despite
      any gains in hard power (i.e., the ability to coerce).8 The United States should not take its soft power lightly since decreases
      in that attribute over the past decade have led to increases in global influence for strategic competitors, particularly Russia
      and China. The ramifications have included a gradual political, economic, and social realignment, otherwise known as
      ―multipolarism‖ and translated as waning US power and influence. ―Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral
      popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. . . . When the United States becomes so unpopular
      that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries‘ domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to
      make helpful concessions. . . . And when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing
      U.S. leverage in international affairs.‖9 Due to US losses of soft power, the international community now views with
      suspicion any legitimate concerns that the United States may have about protecting critical assets in space, making it far
      more difficult politically for the Air Force to make plans to offer such protection.

Nuclear war

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND policy analyst, Spring 1995, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, ―Losing the
Moment?‖
    Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future.
                                                                                                                                      world in which the U nited S tates
    On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a
    exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy,
    free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world‘s major problems, such as
    nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile
    global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange.
    U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system .




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                                           Space Weapons Bad – Soft Power
The aff rhetoric causes a reduction in soft power
Brown 09 (Trevor Brown, MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009. Air &
Space Power Journal, ―Soft Power and Space Weaponization,‖
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html)
      Evidently, rhetoric emanating from the United States regarding space has made members of the international community
      suspicious that America could bar them from the medium on nothing more than a whim. Such apprehensions unnecessarily
      contribute to further reductions in soft power. The United States should take care to ensure that other nations receive the
      impression that it has no intention of hindering their peaceful use of space. If those countries find current US space
      supremacy tolerable, then perhaps in time they could endure the United States‘ possession of weapons if this were a
      significant aspect of US primacy in space and maintenance of the status quo. But if US rhetoric and posturing leave other
      nations with the belief that the United States has stratagems for orbital despotism, then the international system will hesitate
      to look to it for leadership. Furthermore, even if most nations cannot compete in space, they will nevertheless do whatever
      they can to oppose the United States.

China will overtake the United States in soft power
Brown 09 (Trevor Brown, MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009. Air &
Space Power Journal, ―Soft Power and Space Weaponization,‖
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html)
      The United States would do well to keep a low profile for its military space program and burnish its technological image by
      showcasing its commercial and scientific space programs. Doing so would enable it to accumulate rather than hemorrhage
      soft power. Such a rationale is not lost on the Chinese, who certainly have had their successes in recent years in building
      soft power and using it to extend their influence around the globe. According to National Aeronautics and Space
      Administration (NASA) administrator Michael Griffin, the Chinese have a carefully thought-out human-spaceflight
      program that will take them up to parity with the United States and Russia. They‘re investing to make China a strategic
      world power second to none in order to reap the deals and advantages that flow to world leaders.30 Analysts believe that
      the United States‘ determination to maintain dominance in military space has caused it to lose ground in commercial space
      and space exploration. They maintain that the United States is giving up its civilian space leadership—an action that will
      have huge strategic implications.31 Although the US public may be indifferent to space commerce or scientific activities,
      technological feats in space remain something of a marvel to the broader world. In 1969 the world was captivated by man‘s
      first walk on the moon. The Apollo program paid huge dividends in soft power at a time when the United States found itself
      dueling with the Soviets to attract other nations into its ideological camp. Unless the United States has a strong presence on
      the moon at the time of China‘s manned lunar landing, scheduled for 2017, much of the world will have the impression that
      China has approached the United States in terms of technological sophistication and comprehensive national power.32 If
      recent trends hold, this is likely to come at a time when the new and emerging ideological confrontation between Beijing
      and Washington will have intensified considerably




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                                                   Space Weapons Bad – Space Debris
Space militarization makes space debris unmanageable – collapses the biosphere

Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs at Harvard‘s Kennedy School of Government, 2008. ―Chinese Perspectives on Space
Weapons,‖ http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/militarySpace.pdf
    Given concerns about space debris, some senior scientists in China emphasize that the definition of environmental pollution should not refer solely to Earth,
    but should include outer space, where human activities are also carried out. As Du Xiangwan, vice president of Chinese Academy of Engineering, recently
    noted, ―Indeed prevention of pollution in space should be put on [the] agenda …as time goes by, this problem will become
    increasingly obvious.‖ He continued, ―In preventing space pollution, the following two issues are worth noticing: space garbage and weaponization of
    space.‖ 76 Recent official Chinese statements at the CD directly addressed concerns about space debris: ―The deployment and use
    of space weapons will seriously threaten the security of space assets and impair the biosphere of the Earth. The tests of space
    weapons in near-Earth orbit will exacerbate the already serious problem of ‗space debris.‘

Space debris prevents satellite use, which destroys the economy – causes resource wars

Mike Moore, author, journalist, speaker, and research fellow at the Independent Institute, former editor of The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6/10/2008, ―Twilight War: The Folly of U.S. Space Dominance,‖
http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/0048.html
    Now, I can understand that point of view. And yet, the physics are really against us. The easiest way to destroy a satellite in space is to smack into it, kinetic
    kill. We can do it without smacking into it. We have four, five, six programs that can damage and destroy satellites without creating debris. But we are so far
    ahead of everybody else that nobody else is in the same game. The way most countries would hit satellites is to hit them, smash them into
    thousands of pieces.
 
 Now, in a battlefield there is always debris left over, and it has to be cleaned up, and so on and so forth. But when you have debris
    in space it stays there. It can stay there for years, for decades, for centuries, or even forever, depending on how high above the earth it is.
 
 If we clutter up
    orbital space with a conflict, with so many hundreds of thousands of pieces of debris—and I don't kid you about that—the debris problem is huge, and it
    wouldn't take much to make it beyond home. I've talked to physicists who believe if some country smashed, say, a dozen of our big satellites, or maybe two
    dozen of our big satellites, we might make space unusable, just plain unusable. And satellites that are undamaged would wear out
    and we couldn't replace them. 
 
 The global economy depends on these satellites. We're not in the 1980s anymore. Everything we do in
    terms of the global economy depends in one way or another on satellites in space. If we can't replace satellites, if we lose the use of space, then
    we are going to have a situation where satellites fail and we are going to drift back to a 1950s-style economy.
 
 In the 1950s—and
    I grew up then, and I kind of liked it—there were only about 2 billion people in the world. Now there are 6.5 billion people If we lose the kind of global
    economy we have, which is space-dependent, how is that going to work? There are going to be wars for resources, there is going to be
    malnutrition, there is going to be mass starvation. It is going to be a very, very terrible thing. We can't go back to the 1950s.





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                                                    Space Weapons Bad – Terrorism
Space militarization causes state sponsored WMD terrorism

Theresa Hitchens, Vice President of the Center for Defense Information, 2002. ―Weapons in Space: Silver
Bullet or Russian Roulette?‖ http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm
                              race could have negative consequences for U.S. security in the long run that would outweigh the
    Such a strategic-level space
    obvious (and tremendous) short-term advantage of being the first with space-based weapons. There would be direct
    economic costs to sustaining orbital weapon systems and keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching U.S. space-weapon capabilities — raising the
    proverbial question of whether we would be starting a game we might not be able to win. (It should be remembered that the attacker will always have an
    advantage in space warfare, in that space assets are inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, have inherent
    vulnerabilities.) Again, the price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial — with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs
    commercial firms between $300 million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years, according to Ed Cornet, vice
    president of Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm.30 Many experts also argue there would be costs, both economic and strategic,
    stemming from the need to counter other asymmetric challenges from those who could not afford to be participants in the race
    itself. Threatened nations or non-state actors might well look to terrorism using chemical or biological agents as one
    alternative.




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                                                     AT: Space Weapons Good – China
Preparations for a Chinese ASAT strike would be visible and give the US opportunity to strike first

Geoffrey Forden, Research associate at MIT specializing in Russian and Chinese space systems, 2008. Wired,
―How China Loses the Coming War,‖ http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-chin/
    But Chinacould not launch the massive attack required to have anything like a significant effect on US ability to utilize space
    without months of careful planning and pre-positioning of special, ASAT carrying missiles around the country. It would also have to
    utilize its satellite launch facilities to attack any US assets in deep space: the GPS navigation satellites and communications satellites in geostationary orbit.
    Most importantly, it would have to time the attack so as to hit as many US satellites as simultaneously as possible. And, despite all that movement,
    Beijing would somehow have to keep the whole thing secret. Failure to do so would undoubtedly result in the US attacking the
    large, fixed facilities China needs to wage this kind of war before the full blow had been struck. Even if the United States failed to do so, China
    would undoubtedly plan for that contingency. Based on the orbits of US military satellites determined by the worldwide network of amateur observers, there
    appears to be a large number of low Earth orbit military satellites over China several times each week. To hit them, China would have to preposition
    its ASAT-tipped missiles and their mobile launchers in remote areas of China, one position for each satellite. (If reports of low
    reliabilities for these missiles are correct, two or more missiles might be assigned to each satellite.) Furthermore , these positions are really only
    suitable for a particular day. If China‘s political and military planners have any uncertainty at all about which day to launch
    their space war, they would need to pre-position additional launchers around the country. Thus, attacking nine low Earth orbit
    satellites could require as many as 36 mobile launchers—enough for two interceptors fired at each satellite with a contingency day if plans
    change—moved to remote areas of China; areas determined more by the satellite orbits than China‘s network of road . (As will be
    discussed below, nine is about the maximum they could reasonably expect to hit on the first day of the space war .) At the same time
    that China would be trying to covertly move its mobile missile launchers around the country, it would also have to assemble a fleet of large
    rockets — ones normally used for launching satellites. The more large rockets China uses for this task, the more deep-space satellites it can
    destroy. At present, however, China only has the facilities for assembling and launching a total for four such rockets nearly simultaneously. Two would
    have to be assembled out in the open where they could be observed by US spy satellites and two could be assembled inside a vertical
    assembly building during the 18 days it takes to stack and fuel the Long March rocket‘s stages while preparing to launch. [See right.] Even the two
    assembled indoors would need to arrive by train and eventually would have to be moved, one after the other, to the launch pad .
    Each of these rockets, usually reserved for launching satellites into geostationary orbits, could carry three to four interceptors and their special orbital
    maneuver motors to attack either US navigation satellites, at about 12,000 miles altitude, or communications satellites at about 22,000 miles.




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                                               AT: Space Weapons Good – Deterrence
Space weapons undermine deterrence – place a premium on offense

Lt Col Donald Christy, MA in Strategic Studies, 2006. ―United States Policy on Weapons in Space,‖
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil307.pdf
    The first case for deliberate acquisition of space weapons is in response to an adversary‘s threat that cannot be deterred by other means, such as the United
    States current conventional or nuclear deterrent capability. 18 For    this choice to make strategic sense, the United States must strike
    a balance between these new undeterred adversaries while not upsetting the existing balance with more
    capable historical adversaries such as Russia. 19 The strategy must also add to the existing deterrence capability of the United States or
    else we can only assume the United States seeks impunity from attack for the purpose of possible military action against the lesser adversary. For
    deterrence to work, an adversary must believe that enough of its forces would survive a first strike to
    inflict sufficient damage on the United States in order to make a first strike inconceivable. The key to
    deterrence is that both sides are taking a defensive posture. Neither side will strike first because they know the other side is
    capable of a counter strike that will inflict unacceptable damage. If one side disrupts this ―balance‖ through a combination of space or
    other weapons, then by definition, deterrence does not exist. Either the adversary will seek to rebalance the
    equation by improving their capabilities (a defensive posture) or they will seek alternate means to strike first (an
    offensive posture). If they choose the former, we can conclude they merely hope to prevent aggression from the United States. If they choose the
    latter, then deterrence is irrelevant because that adversary wants to strike at the United States regardless of our
    capabilities to respond overwhelmingly. In this case, space weapons add nothing to deterrence capability while potentially
    they could alter the deterrence equation elsewhere. The undeterred adversary can seek ways to strike that
    we cannot counter or that are unknown to us, many less complex than missiles and nuclear weapons.




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                                     AT: Space Weapons Good – Satellite Defense
Impossible to defend space assets
RAND Project Air Force 2010. PAF is the U.S. Air Force‘s federally funded research and development center for studies and
analyses ―Deterrence and First Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment,‖
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG916.pdf
      Some of these thresholds are quite low today. An opponent in a confrontation with the United States that has not yet
      engaged in conventional terrestrial hostilities might consider reversible-effects attacks on U.S. space-based intelligence,
      surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and communication assets to be a promising means of degrading the United States‘
      ability to respond to the crisis, with relatively low risk of serious retribution compared to that of a destructive attack on one
      or more U.S. satellites. Fearing the onset of U.S. air strikes, the adversary might also begin jamming Global Positioning
      System (GPS) signals in areas around command-and-control nodes and other important facilities to degrade the accuracy of
      U.S. precision-guided weapons. Even after fighting has begun, a savvy adversary might continue to abstain from destroying
      U.S. satellites in a limited war for fear of escalating the conflict, particularly if the reversible-effects attacks continued to
      yield comparable levels of benefit. However, should the terrestrial conflict escalate, it would become increasingly difficult
      to deter an enemy with the appropriate capabilities from carrying out destructive attacks in space. At some point, the
      conflict would likely reach a threshold at which the growing benefits of transitioning to destructive attacks on certain space
      systems would overtake the dwindling costs of doing so. In fact, satellites used for reconnaissance and ocean surveillance—
      being high-value, low-density assets—might become targets even at relatively low levels of conflict, and the adversary
      might attempt to damage dedicated U.S. military satellite communication (MILSATCOM) assets as well. (See pp. 16–21.)

Impossible to deter destruction of satellites
RAND Project Air Force 2010. PAF is the U.S. Air Force‘s federally funded research and development center for studies and
analyses ―Deterrence and First Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment,‖
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG916.pdf
      Deterrence in the Space Environment Deterrence entails discouraging an opponent from committing an act of aggression by
      manipulating the expectation of resultant costs and benefits. Deterring attacks on U.S. space systems will require the United
      States to fashion credible threats of punishment against potential opponents, persuade adversaries that they can be denied
      the benefits of their aggression, or some combination of both approaches. However, fashioning a space deterrence regime
      that is sufficiently potent and credible will be difficult given that U.S. warfighting capabilities, much more so than those of
      any potential adversary, depend on space support. Threatening to punish aggressors by destroying their satellites might not
      deter them from attacking U.S. assets—a game of satellite tit-for-tat would likely work to the adversary‘s advantage.
      Conversely, threats of punishment in the terrestrial domain may lack credibility in crises and at lower levels of limited war
      and would likely be irrelevant at higher levels of war, when heavy terrestrial attacks are already under way. Denial
      strategies face other hurdles. Efforts to deny adversaries the benefits of space aggression are hindered by the inherent
      vulnerability of some important U.S. space systems and the high degree of U.S. dependence on those assets. As long as
      those systems are vulnerable, the enemy‘s benefit in attacking space assets is proportionate to the United States‘
      dependence on the capabilities they provide. (See pp. 24–33.)




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                                              AT: Space Weapons Good – Space Power
Placing weapons first does not ensure space supremacy

Captain David Hardesty, U.S. Navy, teaches at Naval War College‘s Strategy and Policy Department, 2005.
―Space Based Weapons: Long Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives,‖ http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA521114&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
                                                                                                       space-based weapons are not
    Worse, space-based weapons differ in important ways from the dreadnoughts of the early 1900s. First, as we have seen,
    individually robust under attack, nor can they be hidden in port; instead, they are fragile and always exposed to attack.
    Additionally, in the 1900s a nation needed almost as many expensive dreadnoughts as the enemy fleet had to have a chance of wresting from it control of the
    sea. In the twenty-first century, high-technology space-based lasers and mirrors may be able to destroy many satellites before the attack is even detected.
    Even low-technology space mines and global-strike weapons can destroy high-technology satellites and ground facilities if
    employed first. Finally, because of these less expensive alternatives, American technical and industrial capacity advantages
    will not ensure the security in space that it would have at sea a century ago. Even if the United States deploys spacebased
    weapons first, its supremacy in space would not be ―inevitable.‖

Weaponizing space second would solve all the military benefits of weaponizing first

Colonel Stephen Latchford, USAF, 2005. Strategies for Defeating Commercial Imagery Systems. Occasional Paper No. 39.
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: USAF Center for Strategy and Technology, p. 14
   The United States strategy for weaponizing space is best served by endeavoring to be the second to engage in warfare from
   space. Since the high-altitude nuclear testing of the 1960s, the world has resisted the weaponization of space in order to preserve it for
   peaceful uses by all mankind. Changes in the post Cold War geopolitical environment, combined with advances in technology, suggest the world's few
   space powers should consider anew the benefits and implications of weaponizing space to find agreement on defensive space weapons. For instance, space-
   based capabilities against commercial imaging threats need not be placed in orbit ahead of a demonstrated peril. The desired
   deterrent effects can be achieved with capable systems stored on the ground until needed . A response-based weaponization strategy
    requires space lift to be available in sufficient quantities and timeliness to launch the weapons necessary to counter the threat and to launch replacements for
    any satellites that might have been damaged by an attack. Such a strategy will require the technology and the budget priorities be made available to make it
    possible.




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                                                          Space Weapons Fail – Technical

Multiple technical barriers for both kinetic and laser weapons
Theresa Hitchens, Vice President of the Center for Defense Information, 2002. ―Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian
Roulette?‖ http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm
              technical barriers to development and deployment of space-based weapons cannot be
    Indeed, the
    overestimated, even for the U.S. military. There are serious, fundamental obstacles to the development of
    both kinetic kill weapons and lasers both for use against targets in space and terrestrial targets — not to mention the question
    of the staggering costs associated with launch and maintaining systems on orbit. Problems with lasers
    include power generation requirements adding to size, the need for large quantities of chemical fuel and
    refueling requirements, and the physics of propagating and stabilizing beams across long distances or
    through the atmosphere. Space-based kinetic energy weapons have their own issues, including achieving
    proper orbital trajectories and velocities, the need to carry massive amounts of propellant, and concern about
    damage to own-forces from debris resulting from killing an enemy satellite. Space-based weapons also have the
    problem of vulnerability, for example, predictable orbits and the difficulty of regeneration. A detailed discussion of
    technology challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, but a comprehensive primer on the myriad problems with developing space-based weapons is a
    September 1999 paper by Maj. William L. Spacy II, "Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons?" written for the College of Aerospace Doctrine,
    Research and Education at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.


Space weapons are vulnerable and easily destroyed

Lt Col Donald Christy, MA in Strategic Studies, 2006. ―United States Policy on Weapons in Space,‖
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil307.pdf
   Space is a fragile weapons platform. For defense, space is as static as an earth bound fortification. 53 It takes a great amount of
   energy to achieve a particular orbit and it is both time and energy consuming to change an orbit. 54 As a result,
   satellite systems are typically deployed in constellations requiring large numbers and increased expense to achieve
   global coverage. Like a weakness in a fortification, this allows an adversary to concentrate on one point and
   potentially overwhelm the system. 55 Space systems reside in stable, observable and predictable orbits. The laws of
   orbital mechanics govern their motion. A satellite‘s presence is observable through the electro-optical spectrum. Therefore, an
   adversary will likely know the precise current and future location of any satellite system. Command,
   control and logistics are expensive and complex. Command and control nodes provide terrestrial targets as necessary to the overall
    systems function as the space based segment. The cost per pound to place objects in orbit is very high and launches occur from a few static terrestrial locations.
    Command and control relies on terrestrial networks subject to jamming or destruction. Maintenance,
    refueling and rearming (if necessary) are impractical or, at best, orders of magnitude more difficult than for
    aircraft.




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                                                     Space Weapons Fail – Countermeasures

Multiple simple countermeasures negate space weapons

Maj Robert J. Reiss Jr., USAF Chief, Opposing Forces Division 505 Exercising Control Squadron, 2005.
High Frontier, 2:1, p. 47
    Adversaries can conduct attacks against our space capabilities using various methods both symmetric and asymmetric.
    Adversaries may have the capacity to develop counterspace capabilities but, in many cases, may simply acquire them from a
    third party. Near and far-term threats may include the following: • Ground system attack and sabotage using conventional and
    unconventional means against terrestrial nodes and supporting infrastructure. • Radio frequency (RF) jamming equipment capable of
    interfering with space system links. • Laser systems capable of temporarily or permanently degrading or destroying satellite
    subsystems, thus interfering with satellite mission performance. • Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons capable of degrading
    or destroying satellite and/or ground system electronics. • Kinetic antisatellite (ASAT) weapons capable of destroying spacecraft or degrading their
    ability to perform their missions. • IO capabilities capable of corrupting space-based and terrestrial based computer systems utilized to control satellite
    functions and to collect, process, and disseminate mission data.


Countermeasures would overwhelm space weapons

Captain David Hardesty, U.S. Navy, teaches at Naval War College‘s Strategy and Policy Department, 2005.
―Space Based Weapons: Long Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives,‖ http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA521114&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
      In general, space-basing weapons would offer an enemy a number of interesting targeting options. Even a small number of
      kinetic weapons could have a devastating effect on space-launch or satellite-control facilities, large warships in port, and
      sensors involved in space and missile defense. Large numbers of conventional submunitions could attack military and
      economic targets across the continental United States. If the attack were preemptive, the chances of defeating it or
      preventing extensive damage would be very low.




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