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Network-layer Security of Mobile Ad hoc Networks Jiangyi Hu Advisor: Dr. Mike Burmester Outline Introduction Secure routing Existing routing protocols Routing attacks Secure routing protocols Cooperation enforcement Solutions to enforce cooperation Network layer security of Manets 2 02/24/2004 Introduction Example of Mobile Ad hoc networks C F B A E D Network layer security of Manets 3 02/24/2004 Introduction Characteristics of Manet: Wireless connection, broadcasting Dynamic topology Unfriendly environment Limited resource Network layer security of Manets 4 02/24/2004 Introduction Advantage Ease of deployment Fast to deploy Decreased dependence on infrastructure Application of Manet emergency deployments search and rescue missions military operations commercial applications Network layer security of Manets 5 02/24/2004 Introduction Vulnerabilities The basic mechanism The security mechanism Security goals Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authentication Non-repudiation Network layer security of Manets 6 02/24/2004 Secure routing Existing routing protocols Security threats for routing Secure routing protocols Network layer security of Manets 7 02/24/2004 Existing routing protocols Table driven routing DSDV (destination sequenced distance vector) CGSR (Clusterhead Gateway Switch Routing) WRP (Wireless Routing Protocol) On demand routing DSR (dynamic source routing) AODV (ad-hoc on-demand distance vector) TORA (Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm) Network layer security of Manets 8 02/24/2004 DSR Dynamic source routing Route discovery/Route maintenance Every packet have the entire route Network layer security of Manets 9 02/24/2004 DSR A S-A-B-D S-A-B-D D S-A-B-D B S S-A S-A-B S S-A-B S-C-E-H S-C-E S E H S-C-E S-C-E S-C S-C-E-H S-C-E-F C F Network layer security of Manets 10 02/24/2004 AODV Ad-hoc on-demand distance vector routing No maintenance of routing table as in DSDV Each node remembers only the next hop for the route, not the whole route Network layer security of Manets 11 02/24/2004 AODV D C B F A : Reverse path E S : Forward path Network layer security of Manets 12 02/24/2004 Routing attacks Classification: External attack vs. Internal attack Passive attack vs. Active attack Network layer security of Manets 13 02/24/2004 Routing attacks Attacks for routing: Modification Fabrication Wormhole attack (tunneling) Denial of service attack Invisible node attack The Sybil attack Rushing attack Non-cooperation Network layer security of Manets 14 02/24/2004 Modification Modify the protocol fields of control messages Compromise the integrity of routing computation Cause network traffic to be dropped, redirected to a different destination or take a longer route Network layer security of Manets 15 02/24/2004 Fabrication Generating false routing messages, e.g. routing error messages Can cause denial-of-service S B M C D : Connected : Connected through multi-hops : Forward false error message Network layer security of Manets 16 02/24/2004 Wormhole attack Colluding attackers uses “tunnels” between them to forward packets Place the attacker in a very powerful position The attackers take control of the route by claiming a shorter path Network layer security of Manets 17 02/24/2004 Wormhole attack Example of wormhole attack tunnel N M D S C A B Network layer security of Manets 18 02/24/2004 Denial of service attack Adversary floods irrelevant data Consume network bandwidth Consume resource of a particular node Network layer security of Manets 19 02/24/2004 Invisible node attack Attack on DSR Malicious does not append its IP address M becomes “invisible” on the path S B M C D Network layer security of Manets 20 02/24/2004 The Sybil attack Represents multiple identities Disrupt geographic and multi-path routing B M1 M2 M5 M3 M4 Network layer security of Manets 21 02/24/2004 Rushing attack Directed against on-demand routing protocols The attacker hurries route request packet to the next node to increase the probability of being included in a route Network layer security of Manets 22 02/24/2004 Non-cooperation Node lack of cooperation, not participate in routing or packet forwarding Node selfishness, save energy for itself Network layer security of Manets 23 02/24/2004 Secure routing protocols SRP (Secure Routing Protocol) ARAN (Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks) Ariadne SEAD (Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing ) Cope with wormhole attack Network layer security of Manets 24 02/24/2004 SRP Assume a shared secret key between the source node and the destination node Verification of the route request/reply packet using MAC (Message Authentication Code) Identities of intermediate nodes accumulated in the route request packet Network layer security of Manets 25 02/24/2004 ARAN Requires a trusted certification authority Every node forwards a route request or a route reply must verify it and sign it Asymmetric cryptography is costly in terms of CPU and energy usage Network layer security of Manets 26 02/24/2004 ARAN Example of ARAN: S [RDP,IPD, CertS, NS, t]KS- , CertS B [[RDP,IPD, CertS, NS, t]KS- , CertS ] KB- , CertB C [[REP,IPS , CertD , NS , t]KD-, CertD ]KB- , CertB [[REP,IPS , CertD , NS , t]KD-, CertD ]KC- , CertC [[RDP,IPD, CertS, NS, t]KS- , CertS ] KC- , CertC : broadcast [REP,IPS , CertD , NS , t]KD-, CertD : unicast D Network layer security of Manets 27 02/24/2004 Ariadne Each node generates a one-way key chain (K0,K1,…Ki,…Kn) and publishes the keys in reverse order from generation The sender picks Ki which will still be secret at the time the receiver receives the packet When a receiver receives a packet, it first verifies Ki is still secret, then it buffers the packet and waits for the sender to publish key Ki Need time synchronization Network layer security of Manets 28 02/24/2004 SEAD Based on Destination-Sequence Distance Vector Protocol (DSDV) Uses one-way hash chain (h0 ,h1,…hi,…hn ) Use a hash value corresponding to the sequence number and metric in a routing update Attacker can never forge better sequence number or better metric Network layer security of Manets 29 02/24/2004 Cope with wormhole attack Geographic leash Ensures that the recipient of the packet is within a certain distance from the sender Temporal leash Ensures that the packet has an upper bound on its lifetime Network layer security of Manets 30 02/24/2004 Cooperation enforcement Introduction Solutions Currency based Local monitoring Network layer security of Manets 31 02/24/2004 Cooperation enforcement Currency based Nuglets Sprite Local monitoring Watchdog and path rater Confidant CORE Token-based Network layer security of Manets 32 02/24/2004 Nuglets Nuglets ---- a virtual currency Packet purse model Sender pay nuglets in advance Intermediate node takes nuglets for forwarding service Packet trade mode Intermediate nodes “buys” the packet from the previous one and “sells” it to the next one Network layer security of Manets 33 02/24/2004 Nuglets Advantage Disadvantage Packet deters nodes from difficult to estimate the purse sending useless data and number of nuglets that overloading the network are required model Packet source does not have to can not prevent nodes trade mode know in advance the from overloading the number of nuglets network required Network layer security of Manets 34 02/24/2004 Sprite Uses credit to provide incentive to selfish nodes Nodes keep receipt to get payments from the Credit Clearance Service (CCS) Credit that a node receives depends on whether its forwarding is successful or not Network layer security of Manets 35 02/24/2004 Watchdog and path rater A node's watchdog Listens promiscuously to the next node's transmissions If a node does not forward, it is misbehaving The path rater choose the best path from watchdog ratings S A B C D : Connected : Connected through multi-hops : Forwarding : Listening Network layer security of Manets 36 02/24/2004 Confidant Consists of: Monitor Reputation System Path Manager Trust Manager Network layer security of Manets 37 02/24/2004 Confidant Detects malicious nodes by means of observation or reports about several types of attacks Allows nodes to route around misbehaved nodes to isolate misbehaved nodes from the network Network layer security of Manets 38 02/24/2004 CORE Basic components: Reputation table stored in each node the reputation value of each node Watchdog mechanism detect misbehavior nodes Network layer security of Manets 39 02/24/2004 Token-based Each node has to have a token Local neighbors monitor The token is renewed via multiple neighbors The period of validity of a node’s token is dependent on how long it has stayed and how well it has behaved Network layer security of Manets 40 02/24/2004 Token-based Composed of: Neighbor verification Neighbor monitoring Intrusion reaction Security enhanced routing protocol Network layer security of Manets 41 02/24/2004 Summary Introduction Secure routing Existing routing protocols Security attacks Defenses Node cooperation Currency based Local monitoring Network layer security of Manets 42 02/24/2004 Thank you!
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