I affirm the resolution that: “Targeted killing is a morally permissible foreign policy tool.”
The affirmative confines the topic to targeted killings against terrorists. The preponderance of evidence
discusses targeted killings within the context of the war on terrorism; thus, this this is the most
predictable interpretation of the topic.
The VALUE implied by the evaluative mechanism of the resolution is MORALITY.
Moral permissibility is based on consequences.
The STANDARD is MAXIMIZING NET BENEIFITS.
I CONTEND that targeted killings stop terrorism.
SUBPOINT A, targeted killings cripple terrorist organizations.
Byman1, June 8, 2011, writes:
Killing terrorist leaders and key lieutenants not only brings justice to our enemies, but can devastate the group in
question. Killing a leader like bin Laden removes a charismatic yet pragmatic leader--one who
succeeded in transforming a small group into a household name and proved time and again he
could attract recruits and funding. His replacement, be it Ayman al-Zawahiri or another senior al-Qaeda figure, may prove
less charismatic and less able to unify this fissiparous movement. Some existing affiliates and
cells may split off, and the core might be eclipsed by rivals. Less dramatic, but no less important, is a
campaign against lieutenants and bomb-makers, passport-forgers, travel-facilitators, and others
whose skills cannot easily be replaced--essentially what the United States has been doing since the end of the Bush administration in Pakistan through
drone strikes. When these individuals are hit, and hit again, it is possible to exhaust the terrorist
group's bench. During the Second Intifada, Israel found that initial strikes against Palestinian cell leaders and bomb-makers had only a limited impact on the terrorist groups it
faced, as eager replacements quickly took over. Eventually, however, there was a bottom to the barrel and less skilled, less
motivated people took over. An often-neglected impact of killing terrorist leaders is on what they and their group do not do. When a campaign
against lieutenants is in full-gear, they must spend much of their time in hiding or moving from
place to place. Communicating by phone becomes risky, and the circle of trust shrinks, making
meetings or large-scale training harder to pull off. The hunt for spies within can become all-
consuming. In the end, leaders are less able to lead, and the group's cohesion and strategic direction
suffer.
1
Daniel L. Byman, Professor at Georgetown University and Research Director of the Saban Center at Brookings
Institution, The Targeted Killings Debate, Expert Roundup, Council on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2011,
http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/targeted-killings-debate/p25230
AND, this is empirically verified.
Byman2, 2006, writes:
The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) reports that in 2005,
only 21 Israeli civilians died at the hands of Hamas—down from 67 in 2004, 45 in 2003, 185 in
2002, and 75 in 2001. Figures for deaths of Israeli soldiers show a comparable decline. This
drop-off occurred partly because Israel’s targeted killings have shattered Palestinian terrorist
groups and made it difficult for them to conduct effective operations. Consider the lethality
rate of Hamas attacks since the start of the second intifada. The number of Hamas attacks grew
steadily as the intifada progressed, even as Israel eliminated Hamas members: there were 19
attacks in 2001, 34 in 2002, 46 in 2003, 202 in 2004, and 179 in 2005 (most in the first half of
that year, before a tentative cease-fire took hold). But as the number of attacks grew, the
number of Israeli deaths they caused plunged, suggesting that the attacks themselves became
far less effective. The lethality rate rose from 3.9 deaths per attack in 2001 to 5.4 in 2002, its
highest point. Then, in 2003 the rate began to fall, dropping to 0.98 deaths per attack that year,
0.33 in 2004, and 0.11 in 2005.
AND, in the event of a future terrorist attack, the US will retaliate causing nuclear exchange.
Easterbrook3, Nov. 11, 2001, writes:
Easterbrook: Well, what held through the Cold War, when the United States and Russia had thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other,
what held each side back was the fact that fundamentally they were rational.
They knew that if they struck, they would be struck in turn. Terrorists may not be held by this,
especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the
search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to
people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current
environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S.
nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries.
2
Daniel Byman, Ph.D in Political Science, Director for Security Studies Program and for Peace and Security Studies
@ Georgetown, “Foreign Affairs volume 85 no. 2” 2006, p.103
3
Greg Easterbrook, senior editor of the New Republic, Nov 11 2001 CNN show: Greenfield At Large
AND, upholding life is the ultimate moral standard.
Uly and Rasmussen4, 1981, write:
Rand has spoken of the ultimate end as the standard by which all other ends are evaluated. When
the ends to be evaluated are chosen ones the ultimate end is the standard for moral evaluation.
Life as the sort of thing a living entity is, then, is the ultimate standard of value; and since only
human beings are capable of choosing their ends, it is the life as a human being-man's life qua
man-that is the standard for moral evaluation.
SUBPOINT B, drones are an essential tool to target killings.
Lakhani5, July 20, 2009, writes:
U.S. intelligence officials have called the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones, "their most effective
weapon against Al Qaeda." This belief seems to be manifested in the increased frequency of drone
attacks in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although the Bush administration authorized only a
handful of such strikes in 2007, the Wall Street Journal reports there were more than 30 attacks in 2008. So far in 2009, attacks are up 30
percent from last year, with Newsblogging noting there have been 27 drone attacks, "of which only two occurred before Obama took office."
Obama's administration officials have claimed that drone strikes in Pakistan have killed nine of the 20 top Al Qaeda officials. Peter Bergen and
is possible to say with some certainty that since the summer
Katherine Tiedemann echoed in an article last month, "It
of 2008, U.S. drones have killed dozens of lower-ranking militants and at least ten mid-and upper-
level leaders within Al Qaeda and the Taliban."
AND, drones strikes have become more accurate, reducing civilian causalties.
Shifrin6, Nov. 19, 2008, writes:
Two missiles destroyed a militant hideout and killed an al Qaeda commander today in one of the
deepest U.S. strikes into Pakistan, underscoring the lethal and effective link between intelligence and
technology that is helping the United States wage a covert war against militants. The missile strike on the edge
of the village of Bannu in Pakistani's volatile Northwest Frontier province was at least the 24th since early August and the first outside of
Pakistan's lawless tribal areas. It killed Abdullah al Azam al-Saudi, a local al Qaeda leader, current and former Pakistani intelligence officials tell
was incredibly
ABC News. Not only was the strike one of the deepest inside Pakistan since missile attacks began here in 2001, but it
accurate, killing at least five foreign fighters, but leaving unscathed homes around the target. While top
Pakistani officials publicly and privately protest the strikes, U.S. officials argue that they are essential. Planners say the strikes, in which missiles
4
Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen, Prof.’s Philosophy Bellarmine and St. John’s, 1981, Reading Nozick, p.
244
5
Kalsoom Lakhani, " Drone Attacks: Bombs in The Air Versus Boots on The Ground" July 20, 2009, Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kalsoom-lakhani/drone-attacks-bombs-in-th_b_241439.html
6
Nick Shifrin, “U.S. Drone Strikes With Deadly Accuracy " ABC News, Nov. 19, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=6289748&page=1]
strikes have
are launched from unmanned drone aircraft, have severely disrupted militant operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
become much more accurate, residents of the area and Pakistani intelligence sources tell ABC News,
because of a stronger cadre of on-the-ground informants as well as new technology linking the
informants, the drones and the targets together in a fashion more accurate than ever before. Lethal
Strikes Start With Small Packages Current and former Pakistani intelligence agents say residents of the area who are helping the United States
have access to what locals call "pathris," literally "small things" -- referred to by one agent as a "gadget" -- that can be thrown into homes and
used as targeting signals. Military officials declined to comment further on whether the devices map Global Positioning System coordinates,
attacks have become so precise. In
provide an RF signal or use some combination of these or other targeting technologies. "The
a village, if they want to hit a house in the middle of the village and it's surrounded by other houses,
the missile would come and hit that one house only," a resident of North Waziristan, who says he has
witnessed numerous missile strikes, told ABC News.
SUBPOINT C, drones don’t violate international law.
The Washington Post7, April 13, 2010, write:
has taken "great care" to ensure
Such actions must be undertaken with caution. Mr. Koh asserted that the administration
that drone strikes are carefully and lawfully executed. "The imminence of the threat, the sovereignty
of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat" are
taken into account before striking, he said. The president personally signs off on targets, and relevant
lawmakers are periodically briefed on the program. That accountability is one more reason the drone
strikes cannot be described as lawless.
Now is the time to affirm the resolution; terrorists will strike within the next few years if the US does not
act with a sense of urgency.
Thus, I affirm.
7
The Washington Post, " Defending drones: The laws of war and the right to self-defense" April 13, 2010.