WITTGENSTEIN AND PAIN
In talking about pain, Wittgenstein is arguing against ‘the private language argument 1’. He
begins the Philosophical Investigations2 with a discussion of language and continues with a
discussion of meaning and understanding. In these arguments, he proposes that understanding and
meaning are not mental states of consciousness. He supports this argument by saying that when one
loses consciousness (i.e. sleep is one such example) one does not lose the meaning of say ‘red’;
whereas in pain one does lose such sensation when one is not conscious.3 What follows is a
discussion of some of his arguments about pain as mentioned in the Investigations.
When he says that only human beings I am assuming that he also means animals4 as well. On
the surface what is common among all these beings is “pain-behavior” and usage in language. We
mean that it is part of our language or our grammatical usage to say that beings (including animals)
feel pain. When we say that a door does feel pain, we know that we are saying nonsense. The same
would be true if we say that color green feels pain.
1 The private Language Argument is mentioned in Philosophical Investigations paragraphs §243 - §315.
2 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell: Oxford, 1997). All references are to paragraph
numbers, unless otherwise stated.
3 For this explanation I am indebted to the work of Collin McGinn in Wittgenstein on Meaning (Basil
Blackwell: oxford, 1989), pp. 3, 94-109. He quotes Wittgenstein as saying: “I want to talk about a ‘state of
consciousness’, and to use this expression to refer to the seeing of certain picture, the hearing of a tone, a
sensation of pain or of taste, etc. I want to say that believing, understanding, knowing, intending, and others
are not states of consciousness.” (RPP vol. II, 45)
4 Or living being i.e. mammals (dogs, cats and Apes), birds, crustaceans (lobster) and insects (ants).
Though he does say that if a lion could talk we could not understand him. However we can tell when a lion
is in pain or not. We know, from biological research on the behavior of animals, at least mammals such as
lions, hyenas, and apes that they have some sort of means of communication. How much of a language is it
depends on our definition of language. The range of animal communication is quite complex. These animals
have social organization and perform many cooperative functions that would be impossible without some
means of communication. It could be a complex mix of sounds, behavior, sense signs (marking of territory)
mating, etc. that make up the ‘language’ of animals. Even in popular literature animals do have a language as
in Burroghs’ Tarzan, Kippling’s Jungle Book, not to mention Aesop’s Fables or the Biblical Solomon who
could talk to animals.
WITTGENSTEIN AND PAIN 2
Although Wittgenstein says he is not a behaviorist, he does come so very close to being one .
He is making the argument from a grammatical point of view; “Language-game” as he calls it. To me
the use of language, i.e. grammar, is “in the case of pain” tied to “pain-behavior”. When you are
describing a behavior -pain in this case- in language it would be quite an intellectual jump to divorce
it from behavior altogether. Humans react to pain because by definition it is an undesirable feeling.
We spend our lives avoiding pain from others and ourselves. We also protect our offspring from any
pain that could possibly touch them. “Do not do that because it hurts! Fire burns!, etc. ”5
There are of course minor pains, which elicit very little or no response “read: outward
behavior”. This ability to withstand pain differs from one individual to another. We say that such a
person has developed a high threshold for pain. A pianist could hammer for hours at a piano with
his arms in a twisted position; meanwhile another could do the same and would be reeling from pain
in less time.
A person is not exhibiting public signs of pain (read: pain behavior) is itself a behavior . It
could mean many things, such as, that a person has a higher pain threshold, or that something is
occupying his attention that is stronger than the pain; or that the person has lost sense in part of the
body that is the source of pain,6 or it could be that in certain social settings it is not proper to show
any outward signs of pain7.
5 Although sometimes we go through great pains to achieve a desirable end and we consider it as the price we
have to pay for the desirable end. We suffer pain for loved ones. We go through pains of rigorous physical
training to become better athletes, etc.
6 The examples that illustrated above are of the one who has a diminished (less than normal –if that can ever
be defined.) sense of pain and the other example is one that can not sense pain at all. An example of this is
someone who is bleeding heavily from his leg and we see him just sitting there whistling away a melody. We
know there is something wrong here. It could be that something is preventing him from feeling the pain of
the bleeding organ. Or it could be that he is under sedation and cannot feel pain. I remember when I had a
root canal done. The doctor gave so much anesthesia that I could not feel anything in my lip. It turns out
that when I was eating I was also chewing some of the skin from the side of the mouth and the lip. At the
time I could feel no pain, but when the anesthesia wore off, O’ boy! What a surprise. I also understand that
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WITTGENSTEIN AND PAIN 3
Medically speaking pain is a message, or a response, which tells us that something, is wrong
in that part of the body and we should do something about it. It is a safety mechanism, a survival
and a preservation device in humans as well as in animals. I believe that Wittgenstein would say that
if there was no pain behavior (public by his definition) then there is no pain and that is what I am
countering with these examples.
I am also aware that people could at different times and in different cultures “pain behave”
differently. I am of the opinion that if you feel pain there is pain, what pain is, I do not know and
pain is not just behavior, there is something triggering8 this behavior. The behavior is learned and
the trigger is not. We might not be able to find something or an object that we could find
somewhere in the body that is called pain that we could put our finger on it. This ‘not’ something
and ‘not’ nothing is what pain is when we say when you feel pain and there is nothing but behavior
that we could put our finger on or make an account for.
gangrene is the process of cells dying off. So a person with gangrene can not feel anything in that part
because it is dead. The third example is of third degree burns in which according to definition the entire
skin is burned off along with nerves so a person with such burns does not feel any pain. However the reality
of the physical condition is much worse than it feels. Not to belabor the point further, part of the comedy
routine and why some find ‘The Three Stooges’ so funny is their reaction to pain; read pain-behavior. I am
aware that it is tasteless and at times a base comedy that is patently racist on more than one occasion.
Another comedy show that plays on behavior and custom is the British show ‘Mr. Bean.’
7 Here I am thinking of rituals (such as passion plays, self flagellation of certain religious sects, body piercing,
walking on fire, sleeping on a bed of nails, etc. ) and I know that it is questionable whether they feel pain or
not. Also acting is in this. There was a story recently of an Italian actor who died while playing Jesus on the
cross. The noose that was tied to him was too tight to allow him to breathe and he just wanted to let the
play go on, soon it was discovered that he had actually died from strangulation. Here he was hiding his pain.
8 I am using trigger for lack of a better term. I get back to this nothing and something notion in §IV of this
paper. The trigger could be something physical, i.e. you injure yourself and you feel pain. Doctors are under
the assumption that pain is physically triggered. Psychiatrists are of other opinions, such as mental or
emotional triggers. Trigger is what starts pain.
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II
In §282 he mentions the doll’s feeling pain, that is part of children’s game. Here the children
are playing and imagining that these dolls are real people with feelings. Even when that child comes
to you and says: “daddy, fluffy hurt his Arm could you make it better…” we act playfully with our
child perhaps to reinforce the correct language-usage and “make fluffy feel much better.”
For children that are playing with dolls and toys they are making believe that these toys are real
people. They already know the ‘grammatical’ rules for pain behavior and they are merely applying them in
‘real-life’ –this case the play acting with the dolls– scenarios. Eventually the child learns to do away with the
toys and interact with real playmates.
Paragraphs §249 and §250 are connected to the above. In §249 a ‘child’ and a ‘dog’ in §250 are
both learning behavior. Lying, I believe for the child, comes later in life9; perhaps when he is in need
of attention he will fake pain as in the case of sibling rivalry. For instance a child could get hurt and
he will cry and run to mommy to make the pain go away. His brother upon seeing this will also tell
his mother he too has a hurt. He will cry not out of physical pain but out of the need for being
cared for or more attention, perhaps out of ‘emotional’ pain or out of sheer jealousy.
III
Wittgenstein’s use of inanimate objects such as teapots and dolls in some sense help his
argument if you understand pain as grammatical “language-game”. Here grammar would be our
9 What is necessary for a child to learn how to lie is ability to simulate the pain behavior of real pain while
realizing that this would get him the ends that he seeks. He would have to be knowledgeable in pain
behavior and the rules for understanding what reaction it might produce in others. A child knows to
complain to the parent who would react better to his emotions. If he knows that his father is callous and
would not believe him he would turn to his mother and vice versa if the opposite were true.
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guide. We know that to say that a teapot feels pain when heated is grammatically incorrect ; whereas
if we say that ‘Mary feels pain’ and Mary is a person –and not a teapot or doll- that would be correct.
Wittgenstein wants to show us that it is part of the language-game of the society, i.e. the
rules of the collective society that inanimate objects do not feel pain. It is these rules that determine
how the pain is ascribed to certain objects whereas it is not applied to others.10
In this case, no pain ever needs to exist. We simply learn the rules of the language game. If
the rules are used correctly, we can achieve the same effect as if real pain existed . We can also learn
that pain is not an attribute of inanimate objects just the same way that pain is not an attribute of
color or shape of an object.
Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein is that such a statement, ‘pain’ in our case, need not supply
us with any meaning, or the fact that there is pain. We only need to follow the rules and do not need
to state any facts at all about the world.11
Simply we can learn grammatical usage as in the following illustrations: “On that fateful
night the moon that filled the night sky was a bleeding blood-red orb, throbbing with pain, pain as
deep as that of my bleeding fist.” The previous sentence can only make sense in a poetical sense
whereas in a literal sense it becomes ludicrous. Compare the previous statement with the following:
“I heard the crack of his jaw as I quickly withdraw my fist which was throbbing with pain , pain that
was reminiscent of my youthful boxing days.” Since there is no simple way for us to test for the
existence of pain –as a physical object, a something in Wittgenstein’s terminology– in everyday
10 It could be that in certain societies teapots feel pain whereas in others cats do not. This according to
Wittgenstein is dependant on the rules that the society agrees upon. This could have social and political
implications that are ruinous. I will take this up near the end of this paper.
11 McGinn, p. 61.
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WITTGENSTEIN AND PAIN 6
experiences, except by pain-behavior.12 Hence, the argument that if there is no pain behavior there is
no pain.
From language –grammatical rules or language games in Wittgenstein’s terms– we learn that
for specific objects –or concepts- we should not apply the language-game rules for pain. When
looking at staged act we can never be sure that the actor is not feeling pain.13
IV
Where it hurts his “Pain-behavior” argument is [now back to the inanimate object and pain]
is the fact that he is not a behaviorist per say14. Even in §304 when he says, “It is not something, but
12 There is no red bulb that is turned on (or a bullhorn blown) every time someone is in pain, other than
external damage to the skin that is visible. But even that visible redness or bleeding is a sign of a higher
level of pain. You can pinch someone and he could be in pain without any visible marks. I know when I
pinch my wife it would be visible immediately because she has sensitive skin. When she does pinch me she
would have to rely on me to say, “it hurts!” without seeing any physical evidence of pain.
13 An example of this is movies that depict horror, we, the audience have no reason not to believe that the
actor is not in pain. The actors all use the correct language-game rules and any accompanied behavior.
Unless we are told that a documentary contains either real footage or fictional re-creation, we could never
tell the difference on our own. I know that we are in a Movie Theater or watching Television, however we
can not distinguish the real from the re-enactment. Part of the success of the Movie ‘the Blair witch
project’ is that the fear that the actors were going through was real fear and not one in which it was an act.
That was at least the argument that was given by the movie critics. I tend to believe that the success was in
a major part of the myth that surrounded the movie and word of mouth that made it a success. Movies
present interesting problems for philosophers that are more complicated than staged acts. I tend to agree
that for staged acts, such as Shakespearean works, that require the audience not only a suspension of
disbelief but of use of one’s imagination. Whereas in movies the reverse could be, true. I recall when
watching the movie, the Matrix, that you really could not believe that anything was real. I remember my
surprise when I read about the special effects that some of the staged stunts had to be done in real life. The
female lead actress complained how much of a physical challenge the role was for her. Upon seeing the
movie everything seems so fluid and in a ‘computer’ that would have one believe that everything was done
by a computer. I.e. nothing is real. I have also read that News casts are experimenting with a new form of
advertising that would be inserted in real-time as footage from a live event was being broadcast. This was
done I believe also by CBS sports where in broadcasting certain sports events advertising could be inserted
on billboards in the studio which replace what is in the field. The point here is the blurring of reality in the
media.
14 Collin McGinn argues in his book, ‘Wittgenstein on Meaning’: “…Wittgenstein is [not] some kind of
classical reductionist behaviourist; I mean only that he is prepared to tie the ascription of psychological
concepts to behaviour, independently of any inner states.” (p.34, n. 35)
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not a nothing either!”15 I think here what he is trying to say is in a literal sense of nothing and the
physical thing of something that can be pointed to. However, we use the something to mean a
wide variety of things. When I use the word pain, I mean something that can be felt and perhaps,
someday, measured as well16. Therefore, in that sense it is something perhaps not more than that.
What does that mean? In a sense I agree with him that it is not a nothing i.e. a thing the physicality
of it (i.e. a physical object), is problematic at least in language.
Pain is at times is not easily located to a physical location. Sometimes my arm would hurt
and I would not be able to locate the exact location of the pain. Here the pain is elusive, at one
moment it is at the joint at another moment it is in the muscle while at another it is in both and then
altogether disappears as I reach the doctor.17
Could pain possibly be “a multi-property thing” as sometimes appearing as nothing and at
other times as something?18 Something similar to light, where light sometimes measured as wave or
15 Here he does not want to commit to using something or nothing. He says, to the effect, that if you use
the word something to describe pain you could just as well as use nothing. In using something, you
would commit your self to the existence of an object and therefore you would bring on the objection of
the skeptics who would say, well what is it, then. “The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just
as well as a something about which nothing could be said.” ([§304.] The emphasis here on the terms is
mine.) I agree that Wittgenstein does not want us to use these terms to apply to pain. This is due to the
philosophical thinking that has beclouded our understanding of the real world. Further if we do say that it
is an internal object how can we be sure that someone else has it without a test.
16 Here I am exercising the Quinian pejorative that we need to look deeper. Some sort of measuring device
that read brain activity as related to pain, or the change in nerve impulses that generate the feeling of pain.
Or if it is a memory of pain (here not real pain but imaginary pain) to locate where in the brain such an
activity is taken place and therefore somehow measured at the source. Memory is an altogether other topic.
Consider the following: A man is sitting in the frozen tundra who is in pain due to the freezing winds
against his uncovered face. He begins to reminisce about a tropical Island. He says: “ahh I can taste that piña
colada right now and I can feel the warmth of the tropical sun on my skin right now.” Can he feel any pain at the
moment of his reminisce?
17 Here I am not talking about the phantom limb pain! But just ‘normal’ pain, sore muscles, arthritis, etc..
18 I think here he is trying to get away from the association that pain is some sort of a mental state type of
object but a true public physical sensation that can be talked about and shared with others (not the physical
pain but the experience of it.) The reason for this -as was pointed out in class- is to get away from
committing himself to claiming that pain is an object and fall prey to the Skeptics. Pain could be explained
as a physical (just as we have other sensations such as smell, sight, touch, etc.) symptom, as result of injury
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WITTGENSTEIN AND PAIN 8
as a particle. Is it something that can be shown “experienced” and not be said “described”?19 a la
Tractatus!
Wittgenstein’s idea of not being sure of feeling pain and his exactness in defining the concept
of pain as not something and not a nothing! Would lead someone to scream out what is it then? It
can not be an in between thing. It has to either exist as “something” or not exist as “nothing.”20
Perhaps it is best not to use these terms when describing pain, but how else does one speak of pain.
Relying on mere pain-behavior does not solve the problem nor does the grammatical language-
game, which is not without its own pitfalls.
V
I fail to see it as a gross misunderstanding or a ‘grammatical sin’ to be unsure of pain. Senses
are at times so overwhelmed that we are confused and we do not know where to draw the line
between joy and pain. I could be in the worst pain of my life and when I hear joyous news that is
dear to my heart… at that exact moment all the pain is gone! If I am asked at that exact moment do
or sickness, and that experience can only be publicly verified by “pain-behavior”; therefore getting away
from having a private language altogether.
19 All he is committing to is what is there in behavior and words as is used in language. This is used to head
off any skeptics that would argue against the existence of such a thing as pain. The kind of skepticism that
Kripke mentions in his book in chapter 2 can not be answered once you commit yourself to the existence
of pain as an object. I think that Wittgenstein pulled the rug from under the skeptics with such an
argument. In this line of argument, I am afraid that Wittgenstein has left pain out altogether.
20 I think that Wittgenstein would have some difficulty with this concept in light of modern evidence of
sensation and perception studies. We know that physical sensation triggers the nerves, which in turn send a
signal (electrical charge whereas the synapses are firing an electrochemical thing) to the brain for
processing. What the brain does with it and how it processes I do not understand and I would have to look
it up. So there is something there! Even for activities that involve our motor abilities, such as bike riding,
we might not be conscious of doing it at that exact moment but I cannot help thinking that there is some
thinking involved. This is however not the same thing as other bodily functions such as breathing, eating,
moving my arm to my mouth. However, such ‘motor functions’ such as riding a bike, driving a stick shift
car, and reading out loud have to have something behind it. These functions require learning and training,
however once trained we pay much less attention (consciousness) to them when engaged in the act.
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I feel any pain? I can not truthfully and honestly say that I do. Perhaps an accurate state of mind at
that moment would be that I am unsure of my feeling of pain.
When Wittgenstein says imagine someone is lying about pain, that is all fine and good, but
that person is not committing a grammatical error. Sometimes you go to a doctor complaining of
pain in your side and he does a physical exam. He states that it is nothing because he does not see
any physical outward signs of that pain. However you are still in pain and the doctor does not
believe you nor can he find your pain. All the pain behavior in the world here does not help advance
your case any better.
The connection between pain behavior and the grammar are difficult to break apart. To me
pain is a public experience. Because once you describe and share it with others, it no longer becomes
a private experience. Others have felt similar pain and sympathize with you and can help you if need
be.21
To the average normal healthy human being or animal pain is real and can be distinctly felt ,
whether it is internally (psychologically) or physically is irrelevant. They all feel pain and it could be
at different levels and of varying degrees. This pain we can talk about, remember, and we do
experience it in everyday life. The sentence “no one feels my pain” becomes an expression of the
degree of pain felt or the surrounding circumstances.22 The statement is meant as an appeal to others
to sympathize with him. He knows very well that we can feel pain just as he does.
21 Wittgenstein does seem to say that this does not require that we believe that that person has pain and this is
where it gets into the area of ethics and the implications are not comforting.
22 It is a given that some experiences only some of us can feel. I.e. women have tended when angry to cry that
you do not know how childbirth feels, Also others claim “you do not know how it feels to be of such and
such a color, religion, or sex.” “You don’t know what it is like to live in abject poverty, to not have
anything to eat.” One does not need to experience extreme pain to know what it is like. Just as I do not
need to live in Siberia to know how cold it is. Just by knowing what ‘cold’ is I can extrapolate and imagine
the degree of the coldness that Siberia is. These could be feelings that very few of us can ever experience.
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A similar case in wartime, in which a widow would say ‘no one feels my pain.’ That is true
except for another widow who has lost her husband as well. The difference between the two widows
would be the degree of pain. One could have an extended family supporting structure so that she
would not feel it as a terrible loss, whereas the other one has had her whole life is destroyed by the
loss of her husband. Both would have lost a loved one that is dear to them.
VI
Color is another such experience that we can draw on for similarity to pain . Color is
something that can be measured and seen. If we all saw different colors –and consequently could
not differentiate one from the other-,23 our world would be in chaos. That is why colorblind people
have difficulty functioning in society that heavily depends on color. The mere fact that we all could
agree on colors is enough to get a long in the real world. Whether we see different colors or not, is
irrelevant unless it made a physical difference.24
However, they are not beyond the range of human experience. Writers have in literature written about
experiences that most of us will never feel but we can come close to understand. Otherwise we are making
a statement about the capacity of human learning which is not true. For example Alexander Solzhenitsyn
wrote (in his The Gulag Archipelago and One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich) of conditions in the
prison camps of USSR; Fredrick Douglas has written about the conditions of slavery in 1800’s; and Upton
Sinclair’s “the Jungle” the ‘fictional’ account of meat processing plants and working conditions at the turn
of the century in the age of industrialization. All these we will never experience –thankfully- but we can
understand them. Here I am merely arguing against the notion that ‘no one can feel my pain’ and
specifically ‘know my pain.’
23 It is my understanding that the inverted spectrum argument is used to explain a possible scenario for taking
place and that we can never tell because the world would be the same. The only way we could tell is if it
would cause chaos in the world. If it did not then the inverted spectrum concept would not matter that
much from a practical point of view. As long as there is agreement among the communicants, it is
irrelevant in this scenario. One could imagine a world in which the evil genius of Descartes would make all
the left handed people see the colors in an inverted spectrum. Then, one day he would turn the lights out
and we would wake up in chaos.
24 The same concept could be applied to shapes, we could postulate that there are people who see a square
shape as a circle and vice versa but through language they have learned to assimilate. It would not make
any real difference as long as that experience continues for the rest of their lives and does not flip-flop.
Even if does flip-flop due to an accident they could relearn that allover again. People with serious injury or
even victims of strokes, lose their motor abilities and have to learn to walk all over again.
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The color green or red does signify a very solid experience that can be publicly shared with
others. Just because I point at it and say nothing, of course no one would understand me. We do not
have an agreement (read common language) on how to point to a color, shape, or number without
additional verbal clues.25
We learn these experiences, namely color distinction, early on in life; otherwise, we would
not be able to function. So much in our life depends on this distinction and it is not just those live in
modern industrial society. Nature has many messages that it delivers in colors. Animals learn that
bright colors are a sign of danger hence most brightly colored reptiles are poisonous.
To a printer26, who has a refined sense of color, he can tell the difference between 20
different shades of green27. To ask to him “print this page in green ink” is nonsense to him. You
have to specify the Pantone number28 otherwise you will get some unexpected results.
VII
It seems that Wittgenstein believes it is worse to say that ‘no one besides me feels pain’ than
to say that ‘everything feels pain.’ The reason is that to say that ‘no one besides me feels pain’ is a
serious grammatical error not to mention a moral and human error as well. Here I also would be
committing myself to the existence of pain as private sensation and therefore as pain being an object
of mental state of consciousness.
25 One could imagine a society of painters that once they point to an object they could mean its color.
26 The same applies to a purfumer if you ask him for a smell of flowers or a flavor chemist if you ask him for
a fruity taste (or even orange taste!). A common theme is that these people have highly refined senses.
What is specific to us in grammar is quite general to them.
27 I do not know the exact number of shades but they are numerous.
28 An agreed upon standard of color identification for printers developed by the Pantone corporation. See
Pantone Color Institute.
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When I say that everything feels pain I simply do not understand the language game rule for
ascribing pain.29 Here I do not know what the rule is for ascribing pain to objects. I do not know
which objects should have the term ‘pain’ assigned to them. In the case of our language, inanimate
objects do not get such an ascription. Here I am not committing myself to the existence of a private
language or a mental object called pain.
VIII
Further believing that others do not feel pain –as a consequence of the statement ‘no one
besides me feels pain’ - has ethical implications. If I claim that ‘no one besides me feels pain’, it is
only a small step away from saying that no one else feels pain. Such a person would “lash out”
against society because he believes that he is the only human in a world full of non-humans (or
automata).30 Further divorcing pain from pain-behavior could lead one to inability to distinguish the
suffering from joy of others. If that is so, one could cause others pain without acknowledging their
cries of pain.31
Such a person would have a difficulty communicating with others, when someone is
describing pain to him he would understand joy. When someone is explaining joy to him he would
understand pain. He would not be able to sympathize with his friend’s misery. In literature, such a
29 Wittgenstein focuses on natural notion of the correct application of a sign. I.e. the correct grammatical
usage of the words, in this case ‘pain’.
30 Also he believes that everyone is callous and uncaring. There are a lot of angry people out there due to
the current economic conditions and in turn could use such line of argument to support their position. The
ever increasing gap between the rich and the poor; the demonstrations against the WTO meetings in
Seattle and again in Washington, D.C. at the meeting of the world bank and IMF; these are not mere fringe
groups but a real grievance that we can not just brush away by saying that they are a bunch of neo-hippies.
31 Such a person is what we term a sadist, named after that infamous “Marquis DeSade”. You pointed out
that Wittgenstein did not discuss this case. How would -or could for that matter- society punish such a
person; assuming that the sadist is also a masochist? Sedate him to the point where he can no longer feel
any pain? Force him listen to “Barry Manilow” and “John Tesh” and watch “The Brady Bunch”.
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person would be described as a monster, whereas a friend or a lover is someone who is in tune with
these feelings.
He would understand pain-behavior all wrong. He would be analogous to a colorblind
person. Living with, or having him, as friend would be like a fire and water relationship. 32 Whenever
you are in misery (and pain) he is in joy and whenever you are in joy he is in misery (and pain).
In history, we have examples of many tragic events in which members of the same race
caused others harm just because they considered them sub-human and without feelings. Such an
argument could be used by criminals to say that “I can not cause anyone any pain, they are not
capable of feeling any pain”. Then a judge would be tempted to say: “okay then living the rest of
your life behind bars should cause you no pain either!”
If we see someone kicking a stone no one will arrest him for causing it pain , even if it
screamed and howled as if it were in pain. The same would be if he kicked a ‘sensitive automata’33.
However if we see him kicking a dog we had better do something and generally we do.
If people see someone kick an animal, they would complain loudly,34 and if we see someone
hurting another human being we do not want to get involved. We want to save animals and furs
from pain. Meanwhile we do not see it as our duty to alleviate the suffering of our fellow human
32 Or a one side of a rabbit-porcupine relationship, the rabbit would be on the receiving end of the pain.
33 A robot that is equipped with sensors that would electrically detect any physical abuse done to the robot.
Then the robot could be programmed to react to the sensors by emitting pre-programmed “crying” sound
and would mimic pain behavior.
34 The Humane society has done it job of keeping us aware of such abuses. Some would argue that they go
too far. On the movie set of the “The Shawshank Redemption”; an employee of the Humane society
would not let them use a live cockroach in the filming of the movie! Alternatively hunting of seal fur was
done with ‘baseball’ bats because it is more economical than using less painful methods, bullets. Even
though the animals would scream and howl in pain; that gruesome scene did not consciously bother any of
those that did it for a living! What is truly fearful is a backlash where people could just swing the other way
Muhammad Hozien
WITTGENSTEIN AND PAIN 14
being because it is politics and we do not want to meddle in the internal affairs of foreign countries.
When it comes to our economic welfare, we seem to have no problem with meddling in the internal affairs of
others. Perhaps pain has quite a political and economic dimension that Wittgenstein had not discussed in
these passages. Is this just a mere language-game or is it a valid move in such a society?
Descartes’ followers considered all animals to be without consciousness as mere organic
automata. I believe that Wittgenstein would not consider that what they have made to be a
grammatical error, but that they were playing a different language game. This of course has negative
moral implications. To them the mistreatment and abuse of animals is of no consequence.
Wittgenstein would only say that such a society is not playing our language game. Such a move,
abuse of animals, is a valid move in there system.
In Wittgenstein ethical system one could extend the above to racist tribes in which they
would consider any outsider to be of sub-human, a servant, a person without a soul. Even though
such a person could look exactly like them. People have argued throughout history that the ‘other’ is
either without a ‘soul’, was a ‘devil’, possessed by the ‘devil’ and therefore open game. My fear is that
Wittgenstein would look at them and say that they were using a different grammar or language game.
Imagine a society, which could use the following pain-behavior argument. Our pain behavior
is to laugh when we are in pain and to cry when we are in joy. They could take a person, torture him,
and say that they are bringing him joy and happiness. Wittgenstein would say that they have a
different pain-behavior then we do and their error is a grammatical one. Such scenarios are not very
comforting nor are they heart warming.
toward inhumane treatment of animals. The issue of the high rate of pet animal population in the U. S. is
of some concern and a potential source of adverse social implications.
Muhammad Hozien