CONTEMPT OF PARLIAMENT
By Japhet Sagasii
IN modern democratic governments, three pillars of State do exist, that is the Legislature,
Executive and Judiciary. Each pillar has its own functions provided for in Constitutions.
Our country being a democratic society, has a Constitution which provides the three organs and
stipulates their functions. These functions are provided for under article 4(2) of the Constitution
which states that,
The organs vested with executive powers shall be the Government of the United Republic ... the
organs vested with judicial powers shall be the Judiciary of the United Republic ... and the Organs
vested with the legislature, and supervisory powers over public affairs shall be the Parliament of
the United republic.
Under these circumstances therefore, it is expected that matters of adjudication have to be
entertained by the Judiciary and not by any of the two organs even if the two are offended.
Likewise, the Judiciary cannot enact a law even if it feels so, i.e.. to enact a law dealing with fixing
Judicial salaries. The Executive (Republic officers) lay charges, but once the charges have been
laid, it is the Judiciary which delivers impartial justice to the accused person according to the
evidence. The Executive though is the source of the laws and execute the judgements of the
courts, but cannot dictate to the court what the law should be in a particular case.
The Judiciary and the Legislature however on certain instances can entertain on offences which are
committed against them, and these are nothing other than contempt cases.
MEANING OF CONTEMPT
Contempt in the ordinary meaning means, act, mental attitude of despising, disobedience to
sovereigns lawful commands or authority of Houses of Parliament or to other legislative body.
Contempt of Court in the legal meaning means, interference with the functions of the court either
direct (occurring before a judge) or constructive (actions of obstructing justice, e.g. disobeying an
injunction or publishing information about a case against a judges instructions.
Contempt in the Parliamentary meaning means, any act or omission which obstructs or impedes
any Member of Parliament or Officer of Parliament in the discharge of his duty, or which has a
tendency , directly or indirectly, to produce such results.
JUDICIAL POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT
As it has been pointed above, the Judiciary enjoys the power to punish persons who offend against
it particularly for contempt. A clear example is found in a recent Civil Case no. 197/1997 of
KITERIA MENEZES +33 OTHERS and AFRA ENGINEERING WORKS + THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL (unreported)
Facts of the case are as follows: A civil suit in relation to the demolition of a building along Zanaki
and UVv7 Street Dar Es Salaam; occupied by about 300 tenants was before the High Court. While
the civil case was pending in the High Court, the Judge issued a temporary injunction ordering
that the building should not be demolished until the matter was determined. The two officials of
the Afra Engineering went to the City Commission, hired a bulldozer and demolished the
building. Sentencing the two Afra Engineering officials thirty days to civil prison, Judge Buxton
Chipeta, had this to say -
It is I think, self-evident that the power to punish for contempt of court is not there so as to exalt
judicial officers, nor is it there as a weapon for offence. Its sole purpose is as a weapon for defence.
It is there to protect and defend the authority, dignity, and the impartial discharge of the duties of
the machinery for the dispensation of justice, and in so doing to maintain the confidence of the
public in that machinery for whose service this machinery was set up by the law of the land - the
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. ... such manner of committing contempt should
not be allowed to pass without some commensurate sanction. This court would be failing in its
duty if it were to shrink from sending out the right signals to people like these two customers who
try to undermine, the authority and dignity of the machinery for the administration of justice or
whose conduct tends to undermine public confidence in that machinery
CAN PARLIAMENT ADJUDICATE AND PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT OR IN CASE OF BREACH OF ITS PRIVILEGES
The Parliament or the Legislature is also empowered to adjudicate and punish those who commit
or breach its privileges. This power which Parliament shares with the courts has been described as
the keystone of parliamentary privileges and, as we shall see, it is accepted by the courts.
The main principle that underlie such powers is to protect the actions of Members of Parliament in
the course of Parliamentary proceeding by parliamentary privileges. Without such protection,
individual members would have being severely handicapped in performing their parliamentary
functions and the authority of the House itself, in confronting the Executive and as a forum for
expressing the anxieties of the citizen, would be correspondingly diminished.
In many jurisdictions, such as the House of Commons (UK.) , Lok Sabha of India etc. do not rely
on the courts to impose penalties on those who break them but have their own penal jurisdictions.
A test case to this effect is exemplified in the House of Commons (UK). In December 1985, The
Times published a leaked version of a draft report of the Environment Committee on radioactive
waste; the matter was referred to the Committee for consideration. Having taken the evidence
from the Chairman of the Environment Committee and from the Editor of The Times and the
lobby correspondent concerned, the Committee concluded that, the publication had caused a
substantial interference with the work of the Environment Committee and that serious contempt
had been committed by the anonymous leaker and by the journalists who published the story.
The Committee therefore recommended that the lobby correspondent be suspended for six months
and that The Times should forfeit one of its lobby passes for the same period.
The House debated on May, 1986 the recommendations of the Committee of Privileges. The
House (on division) disagreed with the committees recommendations stating that it would be
proper to punish an honourable Member who disclosed the draft report of the Select Committee
before it had been reported to the House; but it would be wrong to punish a journalist merely for
doing his job.
The power of the House of Commons to impose penalties also includes the power of sentencing to
prison. It is said that for many years, committed to prison those including members who
challenged its authority, infringed its privileges or otherwise offended against it. This power is
used to secure compliance with orders such as for attendance of witnesses.
I earlier on said that, the Parliament has power to adjudicate and punish those who commits
contempt or breach it privileges, and that the court take note of it. This is witnessed in the case of
member and Another v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 119961 ILRC 584 C)
(Zambia)
Facts of the case are as follows: Two applicants wrote articles in the Post newspaper opposing the
government attack on a recent judgement. The vice-president raised a point of order and
complained to the Speaker about the said articles, which he alleged were a breach of privileges
and immunities of the House. The Speaker then made a ruling in the House on 20 February 1996
in which he found a prima facie case of contempt of the House against the two writers. He
decided that some of the terms and phrases used in all articles were injurious to and
contemptuous of the dignity and standing of the House. He then referred the matter to the
Standing Orders Committee of the House for further consideration. The Standing Orders
Committee considered the case against the applicants and resolved that they were guilty of gross
contempt of the House and breach of the privileges thereof.
The Committee committed the applicants to custody for an indefinite period until they became
contrite or until the House resolved to discharge them. Each of them was also ordered to pay a
fine. The writers were then summoned by the Speaker to appear at the bar to be informed of the
decisions of the House. They failed to go to Parliament on that day as they were not at their
offices where the summonses were directed. Their counsel tried to enter Parliament Building to
explain to the Speaker why his clients had been unable to comply with the summonses, but he was
turned away at the gate and was thus unable to see the Speaker. Warrants of committal were
prepared against them. The applicants later went to Parliament to find out why they had been
summoned, whereupon they were apprehended and detained in custody. The applicants now
applied to court seeking the grant of a writ of habeas corpus ad - subjiciendum to secure their
release from custody.
One of the issues before the court was whether or not the action taken by Parliament in detaining
the applicants was proper and legal. The Court was of the view that, the Zambia Parliament was
not a court of law or a court in any judicial sense, because, unlike its counterparts in Britain, it did
not carry judicial functions, and accordingly was neither at per with, nor a court subordinate to the
High Court. The Court went on to say that, although it was not a court, Parliament enjoyed the
power to punish for contempt, which power was inherent in the nature of its status and was
exercisable in order to protect its dignity and honour. Such power included the common law
power to imprison, and not only to reprimand. Other Commonwealth Parliaments also exercise
the power of committal in order to deter those who deliberately planned to ridicule its members
and officials or lower its dignity through odious utterances or writings. Furthermore, the court
said, Parliament even in the absence of express constitutional or other statutory provisions, had
the power to commit to prison any person whom it found guilty of contempt of it, or of breach of
any of its privileges.
POSITION IN THE PARLIAMENT OF TANZANIA
Members of the National Assembly of Tanzania like their counterparts in Parliaments of the world
in the course of Parliamentary proceedings, are protected by parliamentary privileges. These
privileges are provided for in the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1997 as well as
in one of the 1988 legislation’s. This piece of statute is nothing other than the Parliamentary
Immunities. Powers and Privileges Act, 1988 (Act No. 3 / 88) which declares and define the
immunities, powers and privileges of Parliament and of the members and committees of the
National Assembly.
Article 100 of the Constitution stipulates that
“100(1) There shall be freedom of opinion, debate and procedure in the National Assembly and
that freedom shall not be breached or questioned by any organ in the United Republic or in any
court or elsewhere outside the National Assembly
(2) Subject to this Constitution or to the provisions of any other relevant law, a Member of
Parliament shall not be prosecuted and no civil proceedings may be instituted against him in a
court in relation to anything which he has said or done in the National Assembly by way of a
petition, bill, motion or otherwise
The immediate question which follows is whether or not the Tanzania Parliament, or to be specific
the National Assembly of Tanzania enjoy the power to punish for contempt or breach of
Parliament privileges.
To answer this issue, one has to give examples to the effect, showing the power of the House to
punish or showing that the House has no such power. My research has shown that very few
questions of breach of parliamentary privileges or contempt of the House have occurred. I am of
the view also that questions of contempt may have arose, but may be were so trivial such that the
House took no notice of them.
Nevertheless, I have one example which would show if at all our National Assembly has or hasn’t
such power to punish for contempt or breach of its privileges.
In 1994 when the House was deliberating on the 1994/95 Budget Session, in particular, when the
Members of Parliament were debating on the Estimates Expenditure of the Ministry of Tourism,
Natural Resources and Environment, a motion was moved by Hon Phillip Marmo (MP.) to
commission a select committee to inquire the accusation against the Directorate of Wildlife. The
motion was accepted by the House and the Select Committee was commissioned.
When the Committee was sitting at Dar Es Salaam, Bunge Sub-Office, summoned one Muhidin
Ahmed Ndolanga, the then Director of Wildlife to appear before the Committee as a witness.
While being interviewed, he did not answer properly one of the questions raised by one of the
members, Hon. Mateo Qares, and was therefore asked to answer as it had been asked. All of a
sudden, he rose from his seat went straight to Hon. Qares and squeezed him from behind
threatening to beat him. Lucky enough one of the members, Hon. Charles Kagonji requested
Hon. Qares not to act in any way, but to remain seated. Sensing that Hon. Qares was not
revenging; he retired to his seat and was ordered to get out of the room by Chairman Marmo. The
matter was reported to the Attorney General as well as to the Police for further action.
No doubt that, the act of witness Ndolanga was a contempt of the committee or breach of
parliamentary privileges hence deserved punishment as a weapon for defence to protect and
defend the authority, dignity and honour of Select Committee, which every Member of Parliament
individually and the House collectively and the public at large would expect. However, it is very
unfortunate to say that the witness escaped the arm of law for no apparent reason went free to-
date.
CONCLUSION
Although there is Constitutional provision, (Article 100) and Statutory provisions (Act No. 3/88),
providing for protection of the parliamentary privileges, (Section 3, 4, 5 & 6) stipulating
punishment (Section 24), in the practical sense, the House does not enjoy the power to punish for
contempt, like its counterparts such as the House of Commons (UK), Lok Sabha (India).
The basis of this line of argument is the fact that, the House surrendered its power to punish to the
Executive and the Judiciary as per section 12(3)(4) of the Parliamentary Immunities, Powers and
Privileges Act, 1988. The subsections reads:-
“12(3) The Assembly or, as the case may be, a Committee may in relation to any act, matter or
thing, recommend to the Speaker that he request the Attorney General (emphasis mine) to take
necessary to bring to trial before a court of competent Jurisdiction (emphasis mine) any person
connected with the commission of an offence under this Act 3. The Speaker shall, either of his
own accord or upon a recommendation of a Committee, report to the Attorney General (emphasis
mine) all acts, matters and things amount to offences under this Act, committed by any person,
and the Attorney General shall proceed in relation to such report in accordance with law
If such power could have been vested on the House like in other jurisdictions mentioned earlier,
then, there could have been no need of reporting the matter to the Attorney General. The House
could have proceeded to adjudicate the matter itself either by reprimanding him, or the House
could have accepted the witnesses apology if asked to do so or the House could have even set him
free for the reason that no contempt or breach of its privileges had been committed.
IS OUR PARLIAMENT LOSING ITS ESTEEM,
PRESTIGE AND DIGNITY?
(Sunday Observer, October 12, 1997)
A reply article by Hon, Pius Msekwa, MP.
Speaker of the National Assembly
I read with considerable interest, Wilson Bukholi’s article which was published in the SUNDAY
OBSERVER of October 12, 1997, entitled “Is our Parliament losing its esteem prestige and dignity?”
In this article. Bukholi argues in favour of a “Yes” answer. And he is basically right, because the
whole question of general public discontent with the performance of their MPs is a matter which often
comes up for discussion in many meetings or Commonwealth Parliamentarians in different parts of the
Commonwealth. Hence this is a general problem affecting nearly all parliaments. It certainly is not
confined to Tanzania alone.
The essence of the problem lies in the following basic question: What Exactly Does The
Tanzanian Public Expect From Their Parliamentarians?
Bukholi quotes a statement made by a senior journalist to the effect that “very little of public
interest comes out of Parliament these days”; while another journalist is reported to have said that
“discussions in parliament have become dull”. In my view, these comments seem to point to a desire for
entertainment. So the vital questions are: Does the Tanzania Public really expect to be entertained by
Parliamentary debates? What in fact is the perceived role of MPs? Do they perform that role
satisfactorily?
Members of the public may indeed be entitled to some entertainment from the debates of their
representatives in parliament; but it must be emphasized that unlike public rallies, the primary function
of Parliament is to give serious consideration to a variety of proposals which are regularly submitted by
the government of the day for Parliament’s approval. The bulk of these proposals relate to legislation, or
the making of laws for our country; while budget proposals constitute the other major category of
government proposals which require parliamentary debate and approval.
There Is No Room For Entertainment In Serious Business
Legislative proposals are mostly technical in nature, and hence they do not lend themselves
easily to entertaining discussion or debate on the floor of the that august House. Similarly, government
budgetary proposals are very serious matters of utmost importance for the good governance and well-
being of our Nation. The famous slogan of “no taxation without representation” reminds us of the
urgent need for our parliamentarians to undertake the task of discussing government taxation proposals
with all the seriousness it deserves. It is therefore unfair for anyone to expect MPs to be making
entertaining speeches when they are discussing such important and serious business as making the laws
of our country; or approving taxation and expenditure proposals submitted to them by the government.
It is a truism that any serious discussion is necessarily dull. It may well be very lively as far as
the participants themselves are concerned; but it will be made of rather hard stuff which will generally
appear to be dull and uninteresting to an external observer. Take, for example some serious discussion
which takes place in a University tutorial class. It may be lively and intellectually rewarding to the
participating academicians; but outside observers, including journalist who are not specialist in that
particular field, will easily find it dull and uninteresting.
This is what usually happens when Parliamentarians get down to the business of discussing
government legislative proposals, otherwise known as government Bills. Outside people listening to the
relevant debate will most likely regard it as dull and uninteresting. This is because many people usually
enjoy the performance of politicians at public rallies. And, because their MPs are basically politicians,
members of the public tend to expect the same performance from them when they are debating issues in
Parliament. But it should be noted that there is a world of difference between these two forums.
Whereas public rallies have no rules of procedure to be followed, Parliamentary debates are strictly
regulated by established rules of procedure known as Standing Orders. For example, whereas at a
public rally, a politician may talk for as long as he likes about virtually anything under the sun, and may
even make remarks whose authenticity is highly doubtful; the parliamentary rules are prohibitive of any
such conduct. A member of parliament is allowed to speak only on the particular topic which is under
discussion at the material time; and he or she must never introduce any fraudulent material by making
statements which are false or untrue. For this reason alone, the entertaining which is normally generated
at public rallies has no place whatsoever in parliamentary proceedings.
But The Public Rightly Expects Vigorous Challenges To The Government
I am of course aware that what many interested Tanzanians would like to hear from the floor of
parliament is a vigorous challenge to the proposals which are submitted by the Government; a challenge
which preferably should be spiced by an occasional rejection of some of these proposals. So they get
thoroughly disappointed when this does not happen. Hence, as far as they are concerned, the debates
become dull and uninteresting.
But there is a very valid explanation for this state of affairs, which is as follows:-
There are two fundamental principles which are the foundation of the Parliamentary system of
government which is distinctly different from, and should not be confused with, the Presidential system.
The first of these two principles is that in the Parliamentary system of government, government
ministers must be appointed only from among the members of parliament. This means that the
ministers are at the same time members of parliament, elected in the same manner as all the other MPs,
and being answerable in similar manner as all the other MPs, and being answerable in similar manner to
the people of Tanzania. This is because they too, like the other MPs, have to constantly think of the need
to fight and win the next election. This naturally restrains them from making any ghastly or “anti-
people” proposals and submitting them to parliament for approval! Because of that, government
proposals are of necessity prepared very carefully, thereby leaving no opportunity for a “vigorous”
challenge from the other parliamentarians, including those of the opposition camp. This is how the
government ensures its survival in office; i.e. by submitting to Parliament only those proposals which
appear to have a reasonable chance of being accepted there. Because under multipartysm, a serious
defeat in parliament may cause the removal of the government from office.
The second principle is that parliamentary government is essentially “government by the
majority Political Party”. This means that whereas all the qualifying political parties are given the
opportunity to compete for people’s votes during a general election, it is the winning party alone which
takes the entire prize of that competition, namely, the right to form the government. In other words, it is
a “winner-take-all” situation. Naturally, the winning party wants to retain its prize for the whole five-
year life of parliament. For that reason, they will strive to avoid doing anything which might bring
about the loss of that precious prize before the end of their term.
Multi-Partysm Always Puts Great Emphasis On Party Discipline
It is therefore absolutely native for anyone to expect that the majority ruling party members of
parliament will do anything which might result in their government’s proposals being defeated. It is a
moral obligation for them to support the government of their party on the floor of the House. Hence the
reason for the concept of party discipline and its application in all multi-party parliaments.
These are some of the rules of multi-party political competition which we must now learn to
accept, because that is the modus operandi of any multi-party parliament. Such rules were of course
non-existent during the long period of the one party system of government. Therefore they are new to
most Tanzanians, and this may be one of the factors contributing to the general public’s cynical view that
“nothing interesting comes out of parliament these days”.
The Role Of The Media In Making Parliament Lose Its Dignity
Like in so many other things where the power of the mass media can make itself felt, the same
media can also shape the public image of parliament, either positively or negatively, depending on how
parliamentary proceedings are reported therein.
In the course of any one parliamentary sitting day many words are spoken, and numerous
comments are made by individual Members of Parliament. The majority of them will have made quite
serious contributions to the on-going debate. But perhaps in conformity with the proverbial one rotten
fish which spoils the whole basket, one or two publicity-seeking MPs may deliberately choose to make
some absurd remarks, which are entirely unrepresentative of the general mood of the House as a whole.
And yet, for some obscure reason, the press will pick up these individual remarks and sell them to the
public as if they were the consensus opinion of the whole Parliament! Naturally, because of the
absurdity of those remarks, the dignity of Parliament will have been dented.
We have already seen a few examples of this in the last two years since the present multi-party
parliament was elected in October 1995. For example, there was the case of one MP who in one
parliamentary debate, advanced a purely personal opinion that all the MPs should upon being elected,
be paid an allowance of one million shillings, each, to enable them to buy appropriate clothing which is
commensurate with their newly acquired high status. Surprisingly, this was quoted widely and
repeatedly in the press, being fraudulently misrepresented as if it was a decision of the whole
parliament! Thereby creating a very negative public impression of parliament itself as an institution; as
well as painting a similarly negative picture of MPs as persons who spend their time in parliament
discussing their own personal needs, instead of addressing the general problems of the whole
community.
The other example is the recent event of one MP marrying a school girl in Dodoma, which was
given such extraordinary publicity that it almost created the impression that all MPs were now
concentrating on marrying school girls, thereby causing some painful embarrassment to the innocent
majority of MPs, and considerably damaging their reputation. It is this kind of misinformation which
will almost certainly lower the esteem and dignity of parliament in the eyes of the public. Bukholi’s
article, presumably unwittingly, makes the same unfortunate misrepresentation.
In this article, Bukholi picks out an isolated remark which he claims was made by a member of
parliament, that “Tanzanian male parliament cannot have their beer or drink it without the company of
their female colleagues”. I have personally searched through, but have not been able to find it anywhere
in the HANSARD, which is the verbatim report of all parliamentary proceedings. Therefore if such a
remark was made at all, then it must have been made jokingly in one of the weekly Saturday seminars
for members of parliament, and not in Parliament itself.
But even if it had been made on the floor Parliament itself, it would surely be unreasonable to
claim that one funny joke like that can make the whole Institution of Parliament lose its dignity! Indeed,
as the proverb says, “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”. The claim that our Parliament is losing its
dignity just because of such isolated light-hearted jokes, seems to be based entirely on purely subjective
individual considerations.
Conclusion
It is therefore hereby submitted, in conclusion, that if it is indeed the general view of the in
Tanzania that “parliament is losing its esteem, prestige and dignity”, then this view is probably based on
a misunderstanding of the functioning of the parliamentary system under multi-partysm. The public is
advised that multi-partysm is a competitive system, with fixed but transparent rules of the game.
According to these rules, the members of each party which is represented in Parliament must always act
together as one team. The ruling party MPs in particular, must act together in support of all the
proposals which are submitted to parliament by the government of their own party; in order to avoid
the possibility of those measures being defeated on the floor of the House.
If this is what, in the eyes of the public, makes our parliamentary debates “dull and
uninteresting” as has been suggested in Bukholi’s article, then we now know the true reason for the
existence of such state of affairs. In whatever country, where the electorate has given one Political Party
an overwhelming majority in Parliament, as happened in Tanzania in October 1995 and in Britain in May
1997 (to name only two countries out of many), expectations of parliamentary “vigorous challenges” to
government proposals are largely misplaced. Our on-going parliamentary civic education which was
recently initiated by the Speaker’s Office, is intended to help create a better understanding of these
issues. it should perhaps be mentioned, as a point of further clarification, that the ruling party MPs (in
all multi-party parliaments) have their own internal caucuses, whose rules permit them to hotly criticise
their government in the meetings of their caucuses, and even force it to withdraw an unpopular
proposal. But that particular aspects of the conduct of business in multi-party parliaments cannot be
adequately discussed within the ambit of this article, for it is broad enough to require separate treatment.
It will however be well covered in our Parliament civic education programme, which is already being
implemented.
SOME ASPECTS OF LOBBYING PARLIAMENT IN TANZANIA
By Ben Lobulu,
An Advocate based in Arusha
WHAT is lobbying ?
In normal parlance, lobbying is a derogatory word in our part of the world. Lobbying has acquired a
bad taste. This is because the term has been associated with wheeling and dealing. It has been
associated with negative influence peddling. It has been associated with procurement of undue and
unmerited advantages and all under the cover of darkness. In a sense, lobbying has acquired illicit and
sinister attributes.
But lobbying is licit. The word lobbying itself, according to Michael Moran, is traced to the practice,
perfectly licit, of entering the lobby of Parliament to accost Parliamentarians - for a perfectly licit
enterprise. Lobbying does now include all lawful attempts by interest, organised groups to influence
both the Legislature and the Executive. The practice of lobbying is so widespread in other jurisdictions
that lobbying has become a kind of a profession. One may ask, as we are edging towards the next
millennium, are we ready to formalise lobbying Parliament in and make a profession out of it? We
should be excused, if some of us are already itching for it!
What it Entails
But we should look more closely at what lobbying entails: It entails influencing Parliament in its law
making functions; it entails influencing Parliament in its supervisory functions and in its constitutional
endeavours to bring the Executive - way, the Judiciary into account.
But that is not all about lobbying - lobbying is also about protecting certain, often sectarian, interests
from legislation. When we mobilise a section of the press to advocate for the preservation of the ATC
status quo, when we mobilise a section of the press to agitate for the preservation of the NBC status quo,
or for the preservation of the NIC status quo, that is lobbying against legislation that is lobbying for
sectarian interests. For goodness sake, there is nothing wrong in advocating for sectarian interests even
though we always try to give those sectarian interest the facade of Public interest - Selling the family
jewels.
Let me not digress. Let me not be carried away by NBC, lobbying is also the noble exercise of alerting
Parliament on certain issues of the day. It encompasses availing Parliament with expertise on a
particular subject. It encompasses availing with researched information. And this is as it should be
because Parliament sometimes does not have research facilities. Lobbying avails Parliament with the
potential implications and ramifications of a Bill. And this is just as well to prevent Parliament from
exposing its ignorance and to prevent Parliament from shooting itself on the foot!
Lobbying methods
A synopsis of Lobbying methods include, direct methods such as personal presentation of view - points
and of research findings; testimonies at Committee hearings; They include indirect methods such as;
letters, through the Press and Editorials and Press Features; Petitions;
Action-cum-Citizens Committees normally on single issues established by concerned citizens;
Mass lobbying entailing a mass demonstration; and seminars, lunch/dinner talks attended by targeted
MPs.
Executive Lobbying Parliament.
Where Parliament is powerful, where Parliament is assertive of its constitutional supremacy, the
Executive may find it self in a position where it has to lobby Parliament. This appears to be on the case
of Uganda where there are no political parties to discipline MPs. Because there are no Party whips,
Uganda Parliament has the potential for being ÒunrulyÓ or obstructive. It is assertive and independent
minded.
The Executive in Uganda, as elsewhere, indeed, would use The carrot as a lobby instrument. Such
carrots are usually in the form of ministerial appointments. Sometimes appointments to Boards of
parastatal Organisation. Whether this is lobbying or is political games and gimmicks, that remains a
matter for debate.
We gather that President Museveni would in the past offer a pay-rise and new perks to Parliamentarians.
He would then come away with a deal.
Parliamentary Need for Lobbyists
We have already alluded to the need by Parliamentary standing committees for expert opinion. There is
also the need by Parliament for a sounding - board, as it were. This helps to gauge the mood of
voters on a particular subject. Committees, and by extension, Parliament, become alerted to issues public
interest and of sectarian interests. This is why Parliament needs lobbyists.
Lobbying may operate to galvanise public support for bills.
Lobbying does also help to stimulate closer scrutiny of bills by MPs.
We have what is described as Symbiotic relations between Parliament and lobbyists. Lobbyists need
Parliament in order to advance their interests.
Similarly, Parliament needs lobbyists for reasons already stated and to accord legitimacy to
Parliamentary decisions. Are we already seeing this, in the NBC saga?
Lobbying in the Context of Democracy
Lobbying involves consultation between the legislature and particular interests. In a way it is
consultation between Parliament and the electorate. This is democratic consultation. Lobbying can
therefore instil in us, a culture of democratic consultation.
The importance of this democratic consultation cannot be overemphasized. It cannot be over-
emphasised because the electorate is ever hardly consulted by MPs except during nominations and
elections. As a general proposition, the electorate is seldom consulted save at the time the votes are
required, save at the time the votes are being solicited.
Through lobbying, Parliament, on one hand, becomes alternative to the needs of the society. On the
other hand the society would know what implications and impact the Bills would have on their interests.
In a Democracy, organised groups cannot be ignored. A member of Parliament can only ignore those
groups at his/her political peril. These interest groups are even known to sponsor Parliamentary
candidates. in one constituency in Kilimanjaro Region, there was evidence led in court after the 1985
Parliamentary Elections, that the successful candidate had been sponsored by the Church. The Green
Party in Germany was an environmental lobby turned political party and sponsoring candidates. Juma
Boy in Matuga, Coast Region of Kenya was known as a Dockworkers Parliamentary candidate in Kenya.
He maintained his seat for years. On his death, his son Boy Juma Boy took over, courtesy of the
Dockworkers.
It is maintained that Lobbying creates an opening, creates some space for civil society to have a say in
policy making and in the legislative process. This is democracy at work.
By so taking part, the civil society will be under a moral obligation, apart from the legal obligation to
accept the eventual legislation and to accept the authority of government.
Negative Aspects
Lobbying is like a coin it has two sides. We have had a glance at one side. Its time to look at the other
side.
The thesis is that Lobbying is all about influence not about power. Yet, Lobbying can germinate into
power. We may recall the mine workers, and trade unions generally, in the 70s in UK during the
Conservative Government of Edward Heath - through the Labour Government of Jim Callaghan. The
influence of the Trade Union Lobby became a power to seat and to unseat governments. A Lobby can be
so powerful that it virtually calls the shots, that it has to be pampered. That is not good in a democracy.
Parliament should not be put in a situation whereby it caves in to a particular Lobby.
At times the line between lobbying and corruption become blurred. This reminds us of the 10 Tory MPs
who accepted money of favours in the Cash for questions scandal. The MPs would be given money.
In return they would ask questions in Parliament on behalf of lobbyists. Some of the lobbyists are the
Faved Brothers who own the Harrods store in London. Lobbying can easily generate rumours, deep
suspicions that may put to a scar on the beautiful face of Parliament.
We do of course, have the fact that Lobbyists influence decisions but they do not take responsibility for
those decisions. The responsibility, political, social or otherwise, squarely lies on Parliament.
Lobbying can also bring to the fore the potential for a conflict between public interest and sectarian
interest. For instance, the Anti-Privatisation lobby is in full gear. But the interest fronted by the lobby
are not always the interest of the public. There are those who believe, rightly, that privatisation is a
threat, that privatisation spells doom to vested privileges and to an imbedded on-going looting spree.
The success of this lobby might turn out to be their success. Not the success of the paramountcy of
public interest over selfish interests.
Some Conclusions
All said and done, do we need to formalise Lobbying Parliament in Tanzania? If the answer is in the
affirmative, we need to examine the following areas as a pre-request for formal lobbying.
The Statement of Reasons for a Bill have to be more explicit. At the moment the Statement of
Reasons for a Bill are too general and vague. An elaborate statement may assist lobbyists to
counter the reasons or to amplify them.
Miscellaneous Amendments Bills sometimes hide major changes in the law. These may escape
the attention of the public and of lobbyists. Sometimes, these Bills do not contain reasons for
each of the proposed amendments to Acts.
The law should enjoin Standing Committees to call upon organised groups likely to be affected
by a proposed legislation, to find out their views. This was done in respect of the Basic Land
Law Bill.
To make lobbying worthwhile, Committees should have power to reject a Bill or to affect
amendments. The proceedings of these Committees should be made available to Parliament in
plenary in good time before the debate.
Bills should be published 21 days before first reading in Parliament as required by law.
These are just areas to be looked at by way of clearing the field for lobbying as an institution.
NAFASI YA BUNGE KATIKA UONGOZI WA NCHI
Na Mhe. Pius Msekwa, (Mb.)
Spika wa Bunge
MAKALA hii inajadili nafasi ya Bunge katika uongozi wa nchi yetu kwa kuzungumzia kwanza nafasi
ya Bunge kama Taasisi, na pili kuangalia nafasi aliyo nayo Mbunge mmoja mmoja katika uongozi huo
wa nchi yetu.
Bunge kama Taasisi
Ili kulifanya jambo hili liwe rahisi sana kueleweka, nitatumia mfano wa mafiga matatu, ambayo
kina mama wengi wa Vijijini huyatumia kwa kupikia chakula.
Kwa mujibu wa Katiba ya nchi yetu, kuna vyombo vikuu vitatu,ambavyo imepewa madaraka
ya uongozi wa Nchi. Vyombo hivyo ni SERIKALI, BUNGE, na MAHAKAMA. Hayo ndiyo mafiga
matatu ya uongozi wa nchi yetu.
Siwa: Alama ya Mamlaka ya Bunge
Kwa hiyo mtu akitaka kujua nafasi ya Bunge iko wapi katika uogozi wa nchi, jibu sahihi ni
kwamba Bunge ni figa mojawapo katika mafiga matatu ya uongozi wa nchi yetu.
Na kama ilivyo kwa mafiga yale ya kupikia, kwamba lazima yawepo yote matatu ndipo chungu
kiweze kukaa vizuri juu yake, basi ni hivyo hivyo pia kwa mafiga yetu matatu ya uongozi wa Nchi,
yaani Serikali, Bunge na Mahakama.
Ni lazima vyombo hivyo vyote vitatu viwepo, ili kuweza kupata ufanisi halisi uliokusudiwa na
Katiba. Ingawa ni kweli kwamba kila Chombo kimepewa madaraka yake mahsusi, lakini chombo
kimoja peke yake hakiwezi kufanya kazi kwa ufanisi. Inabidi vyombo vyote vitatu vishirikiane ili
kuweza kupata ufanisi. Kikatiba, madaraka ya vyombo hivyo vitatu yamegawanywa kama ifuatavyo:-
SERIKALI imepewa mamlaka ya kutawala;
BUNGE limepewa mamlaka ya kutunga sheria;
MAHAKAMA zimepewa mamlaka ya kusikiliza na kutoa hukumu juu ya mashauri
ya uvunjaji wa sheria hizo zilizotungwa na Bunge.
JINSI VYOMBO HIVI VINAVYOTEGEMEANA.
Serikali inategemea Bunge kwa sababu utawala bora wa Serikali unatakiwa uendeshwe
wakati wote kwa kufuata sheria zilizotungwa na Bunge. Ndiyo kusema kwamba Serikali peke yake
haiwezi kuendesha utawala bora bila msaada wa Bunge wa kuitungia Serikali hiyo sheria zinazohitajika
kwa ajili ya utawala bora wa nchi.
Hali kadhalika, Bunge linategemea Mahakama kwa sababu utekelezaji wa sheria ambazo zinatungwa
na Bunge unasimamiwa na MAHAKAMA, ambazo ndizo pekee zenye mamlaka ya kutoa adhabu
zinazostahili kwa wale wanaopatikana na hatia ya kuvunja sheria hizo.
Ndiyo kusema kwamba bila kuwepo figa hilo la Mahakama, Sheria zilizotungwa na Bunge zinaweza
zisiwe na maana yoyote; na bila kuwapo Bunge linalotunga sheria ambazo zinasimamiwa na
Mahakama, Mahakama hizo zitakosa kazi za kufanya.
Kwa hiyo ni dhahiri kabisa kwamba vyombo hivi vitatu vyenye madaraka ya uongozi wa Nchi, yaani
SERIKALI, BUNGE na MAHAKAMA, vinategemeana kwa kiwango kile kile ambacho mafiga yale
matatu ya kina mama yanavyotegemeana. Likipungua mojawapo; yale mawili yaliyobaki hayawezi
kufanya kazi kwa ufanisi.
MAMLAKA YA BUNGE NI MAKUBWA ZAIDI
Hata hivyo, pamoja na kwamba vyombo hivi vitatu vinategemeana kama ilivyoelezwa hapo juu, kuna
ukweli pia kwamba BUNGE lina mamlaka makubwa zaidi kuliko SERIKALI na MAHAKAMA.
Kwa mfano, kwa mujibu wa Katiba ya Nchi;
Bunge linayo mamlaka ya kumuondoa Rais madarakani na
Bunge pia linayo mamlaka ya kuiondoa Serikali madarakani kwa kupitisha azimio
la kutokuwa na imani na Serikali hiyo.
Lakini Serikali haina mamlaka ya kulivunja Bunge, isipokuwa pale tu ambapo haguzimkuu mpya
inabidi ufanyike, kutokana na sababu mahsusi ambazo Inaendelea zimeelezwa wazi ndani ya Katiba
yenyewe. Hali kadhalika, Bunge linayo mamlaka ya kutunga sheria ya kubatilisha uamuzi fulani wa
Mahakama; wakati mahakama hazina uwezo wa kubatilisha sheria zilizotungwa na Bunge, isipokuwa
pale tu ambapo sheria fulani itaonekana inapingana na Katiba ya nchi.
Nafasi Ya Mbunge Mmoja Mmoja Katika Uongozi Wa Nchi.
Mbunge mmoja mmoja binafsi, anazo nafasi mbili katika uongozi wake. Nafasi ya kwanza ni ndani ya
Bunge lenyewe, ambako anapaswa kushiriki kikamilifu katika vikao vyote vya Bunge; na nafasi yake ya
pili ni katika jimbo lake la uchaguzi.
Uzoefu uliopo unaonyesha kwamba kuna mitazamo ya aina mbili tofauti kuhusu nafasi ya Mbunge
katika uongozi. Kwanza ni mtazamo wa wananchi waliomchagua; na pili ni mtazamo wa Katiba ya
Nchi.
Tuanze na mtazamo wa wananchi kwa Mbunge wao. Mtazamo wa wananchi walio wengi kwa Mbunge
wao, unaelekea kumuona Mbunge katika sura tatu zifuatazo:-
Kwamba Mbunge ni kiongozi wa kuwaletea maendeleowananchi liomchagua. Ndiyo maana
wakati wa kampeni za Ubunge, wagombea Ubunge huwa mara nyingi wanaulizwa maswali
kwamba je, tukikuchagua utatuletea maendeleo gani?
Kwamba Mbunge ni mfadhili, au mhisani wa wananchi wa jimbo lake. Ndiyo maana wananchi
wengi wenye shida ya fedha za matumizi mbali mbali huenda kwa Mbunge wao kuomba
msaada. Wanafanya hivyo wakiwa na imani kamili kwamba nafasi aliyo nayo Mbunge
kiuongozi, inamruhusu kutoa msaada huo.
Kwamba Mbunge ni mtetezi anayepaswa kuzungumzia matatizo yao Bungeni. Ndiyo maana
wananchi walio wengi hushabikia kumlaumu Mbunge wao, kama hawakumsikia akiwatetea
Bungeni.
Huo kwa jumla ndio mtazamo wa wananchi walio wengi kuhusu nafasi ya uongozi wa unge.Sasa
tuangalie mtazamo wa Kikatiba ukoje.
Katiba ya nchi yetu, imeorodhesha na kuweka wazi kabisa, majukumu ya Bunge ni nini. Katiba yetu
imeainisha bayana kwamba majukumu ya Bunge ni haya yafuatayo:-
Kusimamia utekelezaji wa shughuli za umma unaofanywa na Serikali iliyopo madarakani;
Kutunga sheria za nchi;
Kupitisha bajeti ya Serikali, kwa maana ya kuidhinisha kodi zitakazotozwa katika mwaka
unaohusika, pamoja na kuidhinisha matumizi ya mapato yatakayotokana na kodi hizo.
Hizi ndizo kazi ambazo Mbunge anapaswa kuzifanya anapokuwa kwenye vikao vya Bunge lenyewe.
Yaani nafasi aliyo nayo Mbunge mmoja mmoja binafsi katika sehemu hii ni kushiriki kwa kujadili na
kufikia maamuzi juu ya mambo hayo yaliyotajwa, akifanya hivyo kwa niaba ya wananchi
anaowawakilisha.
Lakini Katiba inatambua vile vile kwamba Mbunge pia anayo majukumu ya uongozi ambayo anapaswa
kuyatekeleza katika jimbo lake la uchaguzi.
Ndiyo sababu kila Mbunge anapewa vitendea kazi muhimu, vya kumuwezesha kufanikisha majukumu
yake ya uongozi katika jimbo lake la uchaguzi. Vitendea kazi hivyo, ambavyo anapewa na Serikali,ni
pamoja na ofisi ya kufanyia kazi katika jimbo lake, pamoja na msaidizi mmoja anayelipwa na Serikali,
wa kumsaidia Mbunge katika ofisi yake hiyo ya jimboni kwake.
Kuwapo kwa ofisi hiyo kunawawezesha wananchi wa jimbo lake wenye shida, au wanaotaka kutoa
maoni au ushauri kwa Mbunge wao, waweze kwenda kumuona na kuzungumza naye katika ofisi yake
hiyo ya jimbo.
Pili, Mbunge pia anakopeshwa na Serikali fedha za kununulia gari, ambazo zinarejeshwa kwa
kukata mshahara wake wa Ubunge kila mwezi. Gari hilo linamwezesha kuwa na usafiri wa
hakika ambao unamwezesha Mbunge kuwatembelea wananchi wa Jimbo lake la uchaguzi.
Kuhamasisha maendeleo na kuwafahamisha maamuzi yaliyofanywa na Bunge juu ya mambo
mbali mbali yanayowahusu; kama vile sheria zilizopitishwa na Bunge, n.k.
Kwa hiyo, ukilinganisha mtazamo wa wananchi ulivyo kuhusu nafasi ya uongozi ya Mbunge, na
mtazamo wa Katiba ya nchi ulivyo, utaona kwamba kuna tofauti zifuatazo:-
Wakati mtazamo wa wananchi wengi ni kwamba Mbunge ni kiongozi wa kuwaletea maendeleo
katika jimbo lao, msimamo wa Katiba unasema kwamba mtu mmoja peke yake hawezi kuleta
maendeleo, kwa sababu hakuna kisima cha maendeleo ambacho Mbunge peke yake anaweza
kwenda na ndoo kuchota na kuwapelekea wananchi wa jimbo lake.
Maendeleo ya watu huletwa na watu wenyewe. Ila Mbunge anasaidia katika
kuwahamasisha wafanye hivyo.
Katika mfumo wa demokrasia ya Vyama Vingi vya Siasa, msimamo sahihi wa Katiba katika suala hili ni
kwamba unapofika wakati wa uchaguzi mkuu wa Wabunge, wananchi anategemewa wachague chama
cha Siasa ambacho wanakiona kuwa kinafaa kuunda Serikali ambayo itawaletea maendeleo.
Wakati mtazamo wa wananchi wengi ni kumuona Mbunge wao kama mfadhili au mhisani
anayepaswa kuwapatia misaada mbalimbali; mtazamo wa Katiba unamhesabu Mbunge kama
mfanyakazi mwingine yeyote, ambaye analipwa mshahara kila mwezi. Mbunge hapewi fungu maalum
la kumwezesha kutoa misaada kwa wananchi wa jimbo lake.
Hata hivyo, kuna sehemu moja muhimu ambapo mtazamo wa wananchi unakubaliana na mtazamo wa
Katiba kuhusu nafasi ya Mbunge, nayo ni kwamba Mbunge ni mwakilishi wa wananchi Bungeni. Kwa
mantiki hiyo,anapaswa kuzungumzia matatizo ya wananchi Bungeni. Ndiyo sababu Katiba ya nchi,
pamoja na Kanuni za Bunge, zinatoa fursa kubwa kwa Wabunge kuuliza maswali Bungeni, au
kuwasilisha hoja binafsi, kwa madhumuni ya kupata ufumbuzi wa matatizo ya wananchi.
Lakini ni vizuri ifahamike pia kwamba kazi kubwa ya Bunge, ni kutunga sheria za nchi, na muda
mwingi zaidi wa Bunge hutengwa kwa ajili hiyo tu. Kwa hakika, wakati wa kujadili miswada ya sheria,
hakuna nafasi kwa Mbunge kuzungumzia matatizo ya wananchi wa jimbo lake, kwa sababu sheria
zinatungwa kwa ajili ya nchi nzima, na siyo kwa jimbo moja moja. Nafasi pana ya kuzungumzia
matatizo ya wananchi Bungeni hupatikana wakati wa vikao vya bajeti, ambapo kila Wizara inatengewa
nafasi ya shughuli zake kujadiliwa.
MFUMO WA UCHAGUZI WA UWAKILISHI WA UWIANO
Jaji Brigadia Jenerali Augustino S.L. Ramadhani,
Makamu Mwenyekiti,
Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi
UTANGULIZI:
Tanzania kama nchi karibuni zote zilizotawaliwa na Uingereza zinao mfumo wa uchaguzi wa kuchagua
mshindani wa kwanza aliyepata kura nyingi. Hii inaweza kuleta matokeo ya mtu kuchaguliwa ingawa
idadi ya wapiga kura waliowapigia kura wagombea wengine inaweza kuwa kubwa kuliko idadi ya
wale waliomchagua huyo anayechukuliwa kuwa ni mshindi. Kwa bahati nzuri tu hapana jimbo lolote la
uchaguzi ambalo swala hili lilijitokeza.
Lakini athari nyingine ya mfumo wa sasa ni kuwa kunaweza kupatikana chama cha siasa ambacho
wagombea wake wanashika nafasi ya pili ya kuwa na kura nyingi katika majimbo kadha ya uchaguzi.
Chama hicho hakitopata kiti katika Bunge ingawa dhahiri kinakuwa na wafuasi wengi tu nchini.
Hii ina maana kuwa upo uwezekano wa idadi ya kutosha ya wapiga kura kutokuwa na uwakilishi
katika Bunge. Halikadhalika chama kimoja kinaweza kupata viti vingi bungeni ingawa jumia ya kura
kilichopata hailingani na wingi wa viti kilichopata.
Katika uchaguzi mkuu uliopita wa mwaka 1995, kwa mfano, CCM ilipata 59.22% ya kura zote
zilizopigwa katika uchaguzi wa wabunge lakini kilipata 80.2% ya viti vyote katika Bunge. NCCR-
MAGEUZI ambacho kilikuwa chama cha pili katika kupata wingi wa kura kwa kiasi ya 21.83% kilipata
6.9% ya viti. CHADEMA walipata viti 3 kama UDP ingawa CHADEMA walipata 6.16% ya kura
ambapo UDP walipata 3.32% tu; karibu nusu ya kura walizopata CHADEMA.
CUF ni swala tofauti. Wao ingawa walipata 5.02% ya kura na kuwa chama cha nne, walikuwa wa pili
katika kupata wingi wa viti - 10.3%. Hii ni kwa sababu ya mgawanyo wa majimbo ya uchaguzi ambao
unaipa Zanzibar, ambako CUF walishinda sana, viti 50 ingawa idadi ya watu ni ndogo.
I.akini suala la CUF linadhihirisha ubaya wa mfumo wa sasa. CUF ndiyo
chama rasmi cha upinzani kikiwa na Kiongozi wa Upinzani kwa kuwa tu kina viti 28 bungeni ingawa
kinawakilisha wapiga kura 323,432 tu. Kwa upande mwengine NCCR-MAGEUZI, kinacho wakilisha
wapiga kura 1,406,343, kina viti 19 (kabla ya Temeke),
Mfumo wa uchaguzi ungekuwa tofauti, CUF isingepata uongozi usio wa stahili.
AINA MBILI KUBWA ZA FUMO ZA UCHAGUZI:
Mfumo wa Uchaguzi unatambua namna ya kutafsiri kura zilizopigwa katika uchaguzi na kuzifanya viti
vya uwakilishi katika baraza la kutunga sheria (Bunge).
Kwa ujumla zipo fumo za aina mbili kubwa:
Majority systems (whether absolute au relative) - mifumo ya wingi wa kura. Mifumo hii
inasaidia chama au muungano wa vyama kufanya kuwa na wingi wa viti bungeni na hivyo
kutawala bila ya shida.
Proportional representation systems - mifumo ya uwakilishi wa uwiano. Mifumo hii ina lengo
la kuwakilisha kwa karibu iwezekanavyo vikundi vya aina mbalimbali vya kijamii ndani ya
bunge.
AINA ZA MIFUMO YA UWAKILISHI WA UWIANO:
Takribani kuna aina tatu tofauti za mifumo ya uwakilishi wa uwiano:
Single - transferable - vote system (STV System) - mfumo wa kura moja inayohamishika.
Mfumo huu unatumiwa sana Ireland. Karatasi ya kura inakuwa na majina ya
wagombea wote katika jimbo la uchaguzi. lnawekwa kiwango maalum cha kura ambacho
mgombea lazima akipate ili awe amechaguliwa. Mpiga kura anawapanga wagombea kufuatana
na matakwa yake kwa kuandika tarakimu “1” pembeni ya yule amtakaye kuwa wa kwanza na
“2” kwa yule anayemtaka kama akimkosa yule wa kwanza na vivyo hivyo hadi mgombea wa
mwisho. Kama hakuna mgombea yeyote aliyepata kiwango cha chini cha kura basi yule
aliyepata kura chache kuliko wote anaenguliwa na unachukuliwa uteuzi wa pili wa wapiga
kura kama ulivyoainishwa katika karatasi zake za kura na kugawiwa kwa wagombea waliobaki.
Utaratibu unarejewa mpaka inapatikana idadi ya wabunge katika jimbo hilo. Lakini
kama kuna mgombea au wagombea waliopata kura zaidi ya kiwango kilichowekwa na bado
idadi ya wabunge watakiwao haijatimia basi zile kura zaidi ya kiwango kilichowekwa
zinagawiwa kwa wagombea wengine kufuatana na uteuzi wa pili wa wapiga kura hadi idadi ya
wabunge ipatikane.
Tatizo la mfumo huu ni kuwa linahitaji wapiga kura wenye elimu. Watu wetu kutia
alama ya vyema tu inawapa shida. Tatizo lengine ni ucheleweshaji katika kuhesabu. Hivi sasa
tu matokeo yanachukua hata juma moja.
Pure proportional system - mfumo wa uwiano halisi.
Hapa kunakuwepo na orodha ya wagombea ya vyama kwa taifa zima. Mpiga kura
anapigia kura chama. Kila chama kinaweka orodha ya wagombea wake majina
yakiorodheshwa kwa upendeleo na hicho chama. Aghalab serikali zipatikanazo haziwi na
nguvu au inabidi vyama vingi kuungana kufanya serikali ya mseto. Mfumo huu pia unataka
vyama viwe na demokrasia ya dhati ndani ya vyama vyenyewe katika kuteua majina ya
wagombea na mlolongo wao.
Personalised proportional representation - Hii inatumika Ujerumani.
Kila mpiga kura anazo kura mbili: ya kwanza (Erststimme) ni kura binafsi apigiwayo
mgombea fulani kwa ajili ya viti 328 katika majimbo ya mwakilishi mmoja mmoja. Kura ya pili
(Zweitstimme) ni kura ya chama ipigwayo kwa orodha ya chama kitaifa. Kila mgombea apataye
kura nyingi katika kura aina ya kwanza anakuwa amechaguliwa.
Kwa upande wa kura ya aina ya pili kuna utaratibu ufuatao. Kwanza ni vyama vilivyopata 5% ya kura
zote au vilivyopata walau viti vitatu katika kura aina ya kwanza ndio vinafikiriwa.
ATHARI ZA UWAKILISHI WA UWIANO
Mfumo wa uwakilishi wa uwiano unazo athari zake kadha wa kadha kubwa katika hizo ni zifuatazo:-
Mpiga kura hana uchaguzi kati ya mgombea na mgombea bali kati ya chama na chama.
Mpiga kura hanayo nafasi ya kumwita mtu mbunge wangu.
Mwakilishi anajali sana na kunyenyekea chama na uongozi wake kuliko kuwaenzi wapiga kura.
Chama kinakuwa na nafasi kubwa kuliko wapiga kura.
Mwakilishi hajishughulishi na kampeni hasa wale walio kwenye orodha ya chama na ambao
hawana tamaa ya kupitishwa kuwa wawakilishi.
Kunatakiwa kuwepo demokrasia ya dhati ndani ya kila chama hasa katika kuchagua watu wa
kupangwa kwenye orodha ya chama ya wagombea. Uzoefu uliopatikana katika Uchaguzi
Mkuu wa 1995 unaonyesha kuwa uteuzi wa wagombea katika vyama vyote una matatizo
makubwa.
FAIDA ZA UWAKILISHI WA UWIANO.
Mfumo wa uwakilishi wa uwiano unazo faida zake ambazo baadhi yake ni kama zifuatazo:-
Vikundi vingi vya kijamii katika nchi vinawakilishwa kwenye bunge.
Vyama vinapata viti kulingana na wingi wa kura zilizopatikana.
Kampeni za matusi na kashfa kati ya mgombea na mgombea zitakoma kwani
haitokuwepo fursa hiyo.
Kampeni zitasisitiza zaidi sera za vyama na hivyo vyama vya kubabaisha havitokuwa na bao.
Tatizo la kesi za uchaguzi (election petitions) linaweza kupunguzwa ama kuondolewa kabisa,
na tatizo la chaguzi ndogo linaweza kupunguzwa ama kufutwa kabisa.
MWISHO
Kila nchi ni budi kuchagua mfumo utakaoifaa nchi hiyo. Hii ni kutilia maanani kiwango cha elimu cha
wananchi wake na kiwango cha maendeleo ya demokrasia ndani ya vyama vyenyewe.
Napendekeza kwamba Tanzania tuchukue mseto wa mfumo. Hata hivi sasa kwa kweli tunao mseto
kutokana na viti vya upendeleo wa wanawake. Kasoro inaweza kuwa kwa kugawa viti hivyo kwa
msingi wa viti vya majimbo vilivyopatikana na chama. Hivyo vyama vyenye viti vingi vinaongezewa
na vyama visivyo na viti vinaachwa vitupu. Lakini kama ugavi utafuata kura ambazo chama kimepata
kitaifa, vyama vingi zaidi vingekuwa na uwakilishi zaidi ya ilivyo sasa.
Pia viti vya majimbo vinaweza kupunguzwa na hivyo vigine vikafanywa viti vya uwiano. Hivyo isiwe
ni kwa wanawake tu.