HYBRID THREATS AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

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					HYBRID THREATS AND
IRREGULAR WARFARE




           Col Phil Smith
Director, USMC Center for Irregular
                                      1
             Warfare
                Agenda
Context
Hybrid Threats
Irregular Warfare
Implications
USMC and IW
                              Intro
Context: War, all of it a political endeavor, regular irregular and in
    between-compound. We can never solve the equation on the
    correct mix. The classical Clausewitzian Trinitarian view on the
    character of war: passion, politics, probability conducted by the
    government, military and needs support of its people, gave way to a
    more modern (French) view that sees people as human terrain. The
    IW challenges both these paradigms suggesting that, given the
    informational technological influence on local and social
    communications, that perhaps people (citizenry) may not be needed
    for support of a cause.
In the end it‘s a study of war and its causes. Our Maneuver Warfare
    philosophy makes it easy for us to accommodate new/different
    lexicon
               Definition-Context



Irregular Warfare            War            Regular Warfare


                    Compound (hybrid) Warfare
        2006 QDR/NDS “Quad Chart”
                                                            Higher
                                             Irregular                           Catastrophic
                               Non-state and state actors             Terrorist or rogue state
              VULNERABILITY    employing “unconventional”             employment of WMD or
                               methods to counter stronger state      methods producing WMD-like
                               opponents—terrorism,                   effects against American
                               insurgency, etc. (erode U.S.           interests. (paralyze U.S. power)
                               power)
                              Lower                                           Disruptive          Higher
                                       Traditional
                                                                     Competitors employing
                              States employing military forces in
                                                                     technology or methods that might
                              well- known forms of military
                                                                     counter or cancel our current
                              competition and conflict.
                                                                     military advantages. (capsize
                              (challenge U.S. power)                 U.S. power)
                                                            Lower


                                                         LIKELIHOOD
Strategic Guidance: broader set of challenges of which the
          most complex would be combinations.
                Some Myth Busting
• War‘s character & conduct constantly
  evolves
• War is more than just warfare
• War is a contest of wills and cultures.
• Different modes of warfare exist (have
  always existed) and different cultures
  fight differently
• Different modes of warfare have
  different solutions or operational
  ―grammars‖
                 Hybrid
Hybrid threat: Any adversary that
 simultaneously and adaptively employs
 a tailored mix of conventional weapons,
 irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal
 behavior to obtain their political
 objectives.

Frank G. Hoffman
                ―Hybrid‖
Modes of Fighting or Structure?
Simultaneous employment?
Combinations of Modes?
Fusion/mixture?
Criminality?
    What Hybrid Threats are Not

• It is not a new concept
• It is not a U.S. warfighting construct like
  RMA or EBO
• It is not historically novel
• It‘s not about Hezbollah or the IDF
• It may not be a subset of irregular warfare

“Any man who afflicts the human race with ideas
 must be prepared to see them misunderstood.”
                H. L. Mencken
  What Hybrid Construct Offers


 • Describes evolving character of conflict
 • Challenges current conventional thinking
   and binary intellectual bins
     – A concept that highlights and reinforces the
       true granularity or breadth of spectrum of
       human conflict
 • Raises awareness of potential but a and
Thus, this is not just a theoretical discussion risksdebate
about the future, what priorities should be assigned, and
   informs ongoing force posture debate
how to invest and posture forces for the future.
                             An American Perspective
                                                 Higher
VULNERABILITY




                         Irregular                                Catastrophic
                Lower                                                                      Higher




                        Traditional               Lower             Disruptive
                                                LIKELIHOOD

                 ―… it is common to define and divide the so-called "high end" from the "low
                  end," the conventional from the irregular; armored divisions on one side,
                 guerrillas toting AK-47s on the other. In reality, …, the categories of warfare
                                 are blurring and do not fit into neat, tidy boxes.‖
            Blurring Modes of War
           “The first feature we can predict with confidence is that
          there is going to be a blurring, a further blurring, of
          warfare categories.” Dr. Colin Gray, UK


 Networks have even shown a capacity to wage war toe-to-toe against
nation-states—with some success, … The range of choices available to
    networks thus covers an entire spectrum of conflict, posing the
  prospect of a significant blurring of the lines between insurgency,
                    terror, and war.” John Arquilla,


            “The boundaries between “regular” and “irregular” warfare are
           blurring. Even non-state groups are increasingly gaining access to
           the kinds of weapons that were once the exclusive preserve of sates.
           And even states will increasingly turn to unconventional strategies
           to blunt….American power.”               Max Boot
     Compounding nature

                • Compound wars: regular &
                  irregular forces that are
                  strategically coordinated,
                  employed simultaneously
                • But forces may be
                  geographically separated, not
                  integrated or fused
                  operationally/tactically
                • Designed to make
                  conventional forces decisive
                • Numerous cases

  In fighting hybrid threat, regular and irregular
capabilities can be fused in time and space to achieve
                    decisive effects.
             Alternative Conceptions
   Unrestricted Warfare
   Techno-Guerrilla
   ―New‖ Wars
   4th or ―N‖ Generation Wars
  3 Block War
   Open Source Warfare
   Global Insurgency
   Multi-modal or -variant warfare
   Diffused Warfare
   ―Net‖ Wars
   Stepchild of Chechnya
   Wars Amongst the People
   Compound Wars
  War 2.0
“We wanted to show that every age had its own kind of war, its
own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.”
                                              On War, p. 593.
         Possible Historical Cases

•   French vs. Viet Minh, 1946-1954
•   Somalia, 1993
•   Chechnya, 1995
•   Serbia vs. NATO, 1999
•   Second Lebanon War, 2006
•   Russo-Georgian conflict, 2008
           Hezbollah: Prototype Hybrid
-State-like capabilities
   –   Long Range Missiles
   –   Anti-ship Cruise Missiles
   –   Anti-armor systems
   –   UAVs
   –   SIGINT
-Selected tactics—
   – Highly trained in traditional
     and irregular modes
-Extensive preparations
-Exploitation of political effects
     ―Hezbollah’s combat cells were a hybrid It guerrillas a guerrilla
 “"The resistance withstood the attack and fought back. of did not wageand
   regular troops-- a form of opponent that U.S. forces are apt to
war either...it was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense
        encounter with increasing frequency.‖ Ralph Peters
        Hybrid Threats Exist….so?
• What strategies are appropriate to prevail
  against hybrid threats?
• What impact do hybrid threats have on existing
  campaign planning methodologies and
  operational art?
• What potential competitors or scenarios could
  present hybrid threats?
• What military capabilities or capacity does the
  hybrid threat extend or strain?
• What impact on training and education?
         Operational Implications
-   Force Protection-heavy vs light

-   Freedom of Action/Mobility
     - Dispersed

-   Organic Comprehensive Skills
    - Multi-task

-   GPF/SOF Integration
     - combinations

-   Training/Combat Advising

-   Civilian-Military Cooperation
                 Definition of Irregular Warfare
                         Operations and Activities
                           Associated with IW
                                Approved Definition (JP 1-02)
 IW is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence
over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it
    may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an
                          adversary's power, influence, and will.

       DoD IW Directive 3000.07 identified five primary activities associated with
                        IW. Do we do irregular warfare?….Yes.

The operations/activities below comprise IW and typically represent indirect aspects of
campaigns:
     – Insurgency/Counterinsurgency (COIN);
     – Unconventional Warfare (UW);
     – Terrorism/Counterterrorism (CT);
     – Foreign Internal Defense (FID);
     – Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations; (Stability
        Operations)
     – Strategic Communications (StratComm);
     – Psychological Operations (PSYOP);
     – Civil-Military Operations (CMO);
     – Information Operations (IO);
     – Intelligence/Counterintelligence (CI);                                                  19
     – Transnational criminal activities/Law enforcement activities
      American Way of War

Aggressive—Offensive
Annihilation oriented—We really do like to kill em all.
Large scale-conventional
Combat is face to face--manhood
Firepower is King/Queen
Force on Force---machine against machine, system
against systems
Logistical support is good
Impatient—quick win, some one else to clean up and
put it back together
Overly Sensitive to casualties
        American Way of War
Industrial in nature
Technologically dependant--Precision
Closed loop, internal comms, Info is protected
Media/Info is a sideshow
A Political-we like clear division of labor-Pol-Mil
A Historical (often ignore lessons that could be learned,
  applied)
A Strategic (overlook consequences)
Principles of War =MOOSEMUS= Tactics
Problem solving; Opportunistic; altruistic -
   – Hope is always a COA
Culturally challenged—We want everyone to be like us
We are professional specialists.
         Irregular Warfare
Protect the People (it’s a social system, stupid)
Culture is supreme—reinforce their beliefs,
   attitudes, behaviors d
Intelligence is King (not artillery)
Ideology Matters (What do we promise and then
   what do we do)
Protracted – Time/patience is a weapon
The target you are shooting at may not be your
   enemy!
Unity of Effort (s), first, then unity of command—
   fuzzy division of labor
Alternative decision, comms cycle in public domain
Opens up broader aspects of the Pol-Mil spectrum
               Irregular Warfare
Degrade the opponents strategy rather than attrite his force
   (tactics)
Strategic Principles of War—emphasis is long term
   -determine the nature of the conflict
   -identify center of gravity (yours and opponent)
   -criticality and risks of assumptions
   -Legitimacy- credible capacity to coerce
   -Know your opponent, what does he want, why is he fighting
   you?
   -shape w/psychological precision; influence operations
   -fracture, de-legitimize, demoralize, and
   -isolate internal and external supporters – isolate your opponents
Integrate all agencies and elements of power
   -Focus on undermining opponent politically-make him irrelevant
            Thinking and Fighting Differently


Linear                               Multi-dimensional
Large Scale Operations               Dispersed Operations
Hard Sciences                        Art and Leadership
Focus on the Enemy                   Focus on People
Stand-off Warfare-Precision          Close contact
Hierarchical/predictable Adversary   “Non-templatable” adversary
Regular                              Compound
Country focus                        Regional focus
Military Focus                       Whole of Government/Comprehensive
State Enemies                        Non-State Enemies
Reactive                             Proactive
Air, Land, Sea                       Air, Land, Sea, Cyber, and Space,
                                     Information?
                     Maritime
Violent political actors
   – Terrorists: Limited
   – Insurgents: Localized/transport
   – State-aided/proxy players: Game-changer
Criminals
   – Pirates: Somalia
‗Territorialization‘ of the sea-EEZs, Security Zones,
  Traffic in sea lanes…
   – Torres Strait, Hawaiian national park, South China
     Sea, Arctic
                    Maritime
People move out from the land
Navies drawn into the coast
Geography
  – Complex littoral environment
  – Rugged coasts
  – Crowded port cities
Fishing/Offshore infrastructure/tourism
Experiential evidence:
  – NAG, Somalia, Med, etc
  More People---More Disorder
War is still a contest
Warfare vs war/duels, not just the shot
Importance of national interest
What makes it ―irregular‖?
Exploitation of disorder:
  – Complexity-fluidity of violence-overlap of interests
  – Defense of trade (counter-piracy)-conservation of
    resources-restrictions on FON
  – Moral over material; morale over metal
                      Implied Change

  Humanitarian Assistance                             Most Likely?
                                                   More Complex?
                                                      More Lethal?


                                                  COIN




Peacetime & Crisis   Low-Intensity Conflict   Mid-Intensity Conflict   High-Intensity Conflict
                                   Complexity


Range of Inter-Agency Operations                 Range of Military Operations
Increasing Violence
            (ROIO)                                          (ROMO)

 Stable                    Unstable         Insurgency                 General
 Peace                      Peace                                         War




 “BINNING” THE FUTURE ALONG A SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT IS NO
LONGER VALID. WHAT IS TRADITIONAL/CONVENTIONAL WARFARE?
                          Implications
• Strategy—Patience; End state or constant, moving goals/objectives?
• Selective Engagement
   – Make sure you develop capability with HN…they have a vote!
   – Give them credit, even if they had little or no impact

• Design of the Strategy and Campaign-
   – Understand the nature of the conflict
   – What does the adversary want?
   – What are the interests?
   – What are my forces actually capable of doing?
   – What are coalition and HN forces actually capable of doing?
• Consider second and third order effects
   – Tactical success but strategic failure
   – Tactical failure but strategic win
• Intelligence -HumInt
      Operational Implications
(drawn from historical cases & wargames)

1. Protracted multi-dimensional contest
2. Global or regional context
3. ―Disappearing‘ tactics and low signature
   complicate targeting and discriminate-
   precision use of fires
4. Freedom of maneuver negated or limited
5. Battle of narratives critical
6. Force protection difficult-
7. Population control vice security?
            Implications for the military
• What is it we don‘t do well?
• People and how to think
   – You will always be surprised
   – Mitigate it
• Ideas
• Organizations designed for threat or capability?
• Equipment-
• Information and perception management

• Share Information
   – Commander‘s Foreign Disclosure
Combinations.
   – Hard Power + Soft Power = SMART POWER
   Prevailing Against Hybrid Threats

• Isolating the adversary in the Informational
  Domain
• Isolating the adversary from means of Financial
  and Materiel Support
• Gaining control of the moral and morale
  environment—and maintaining it
• Gaining Population Control
• Winning the Competition for Security
Balance or focus?
   ―… it is common to define and divide the so-
     called "high end" from the "low end," the
     conventional from the irregular; armored
     divisions on one side, guerrillas toting AK-
     47s on the other. In reality, …, the
     categories of warfare are blurring and do
     not fit into neat, tidy boxes.‖
   ―We can expect to see more tools and tactics
     of destruction - from the sophisticated to
     the simple - being employed
     simultaneously in hybrid and more
     complex forms of warfare.‖
         Center for Irregular Warfare

Established June 2007 by CG, MCCDC
   – Identify, coordinate and implement irregular warfare initiatives
     across all elements of DOTMLPF-P (Doctrine, Organization,
     Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel,
     Facilities - Policy)
   – Ensure IW capabilities are accurately presented to other
     services, DoD, interagency, and partner nations
   – CIW has coordinating authority with joint, interagency, and
     multinational organizations
   – Current Manning is 5 Ad and 5 Ctr: FOC 9/2 AD, 4 Gs, 3 Ctr
Events: JIW, Maritime Stab Ops, Interagency Initiatives,
  Assessments



                                                                        36
             USMC and IW
Approach and Policy
  PPO (PLU-SC)
QDR
DOD I IW
CJCS I IW
IW JOC
Vision and Strategy; Implementation Guidance
JFCOM and GPF Assessment
                IW and DOTMLPF
Concepts/Doctrine:
-MCWP 3-33.1 MAGTF Civil-Military Operations April 2003
-A Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats 7 June 2006
-Small Unit Leader‘s Guide to Counterinsurgency July 2006
-MCWP 3- 33.5/FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual October 2007
-MCRP 3-33.1A/FM 3-05.401 Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
    July 2007
-‘A Concept for Unified Action through Civil-Military Integration‘ May 2009
-‘Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century‘ March 2009
-‘Evolving the MAGTF for the 21st Century March‘ 2009
-‘Enhanced MAGTF Operations‘ (draft)
-Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications 2008
-Revisions to the planning procedures that focuses on understanding the
    nature of the problem comes before designing a solution.
               IW and DOTMLPF
Organization:
 - Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW)
- Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) initially at 44
    personnel and currently expanding to 182,
-Continued to refine Security Cooperation and Education and Training
    Command (SCETC) and their support to the regional MarFors
- Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC)
- Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) as the DoD Lead for
    Cultural Intelligence.
- Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) as the
    central USMC agency for operational culture and language training
    and education
- Advisor Training Group (ATG) to prepare Marines for advisory duties

-   Other Initiatives; 202 K CAR
                  IW and DOTMLPF
Training:
-Advise Train and Assist-Partner Nation Force Training and Readiness Manual
-Published the Operational Culture and Language Training and Readiness Manual
        *Mandatory for all personnel in unit deployments
        *Culture and language training packages for Home Station Training.
   *Training for commanders in the use of tactical language to enhance KLE.
-Enhanced Mojave Viper (30 day training package that incorporates small unit to
   battalion kinetic and nonkinetic tactics).
   **MRX that includes a four-day assessment using culturally relevant Role
   Players and simulated environment.

- Marine Corps Operations and Tactics Instructors Course
    *Heavily focused on Phases III and IV (SSTR); *Includes IW, Human Terrain,
   Interagency, NGOs/PVOs, Civil Affairs, Info Ops and COIN (57%)

-Marine Corps Civil Affairs School at SCETC to train all active/reserve CA Marines.
    -Implemented “Combat Hunter” and “Police on the Beat” programs.
-Introduced immersion training for infantry small units.
                    IW and DOTMLPF
Materiel:
-Squad Immersive Training Environment (SITE) to formalize lessons learned and encompass
    all facets of individual and small unit training, to include virtual rehearsal

-Language Learning Resource Centers at all major USMC installations are equipped with
information technology suites specifically designed and loaded with computer-based language
    courses and modeled after the Defense Language Institute classrooms to facilitate
    instructor based training. Rosetta Stone and Transparent Language’s CL-50 language
    learning software.

-The Marine Corps Cargo Unmanned Aerial System initiative to get “trucks off the road” using
autonomous cargo UASs in order to mitigate the threat to re-supply convoys.
    - beyond line-of-sight with the capability to “capture” control at a remote location,
    - deliver 10,000 pounds of cargo in a twenty-four hour period for a round-trip distance of
    150 nautical miles: demonstration successful in January 2010.

-The Marine Corps is reviewing options to modify existing load plans of Maritime Prepositioned
Ships to better support activities across ROMO.
    -Continue to pursue seabasing platforms, Mobile Landing Platform and Large, Medium,
    Roll-On-Roll off Ships(LMSR), that will facilitate conduct of a full range of IW related
    activities. A seabase allows for minimal footprint ashore and agility in supporting
    distributed operations in support of building partner capacity. Tested in Feb
                           MTVR
The Might Servant 3 (Think MLP)and Soderman (LMSR) were the ships used.
                    IW and DOTMLPF
Leadership/Education
Officer:
*The Basic School and the Infantry Officers Course have incorporated IW concepts into their
     Program of Instruction with 27 and 70 hours of IW related instruction, respectively.
*Expeditionary Warfare School devotes 3 weeks to IW specific POI that concludes with a 48
     hour practical application exercise and offers advanced war seminars to select students,
     as well as 4 hours of instruction in Civil-Military Operations (CMO) working with the
     Interagency. Students incorporate key IW-related planning considerations, such as an
     Operational Cultural analysis, in order to plan for cultural/linguistic factors.
*Command and Staff College (CSC): Devotes 107 hours of instruction to the activities of
     Irregular Warfare (COIN, transnational threats, regional cultural studies, CMO, Stab Ops
     and Reconstruction), concluding with the exercise “Nine Innings”: the final practical
     exercise that’s designed to introduce students to the complexity of Phase 0 planning within
     the context of the interagency environment. In addition, prior to 9-11, the curriculum at
     CSC dedicated exclusive lecture and seminar hours to IW themes and topics
*School for Advanced Warfighting: Incorporates an internal look at the cultural and language
     of specific regions, cultural/linguistic planning and staff rides to foreign countries to
     reinforces and validate planning assumptions and considerations.
Enlisted:
*In 2006, all instruction at USMC formal schools were revised to better incorporate the
     fundamentals of fighting in a COIN environment. Resident and non-resident enlisted PME
     have incorporated IW mirroring much of the instruction that officers receive.
                      IW and DOTMLPF
Personnel:

-From FY10 to FY15, Foreign Area Officers and Regional Area Officers will increase to 128.

-From FY 07-FY 09, Civil Affairs officers and enlisted billets increased to 202. This emerging
    capability allows the Operating Forces to field active duty CA detachments as well
as CMO planners.

-The DOD Directive for IW (DODD 3000.07) spawned the CJCSI 3210.06 for IW (DRAFT-currently in
    4-star chop/approval). This effort will lead to the linkage of service-level IW reportable readiness
    (individual IW skills and experience to future unit IW-relevant METs and METLs). The CJCSI
    further directs an annual GPF (service-level) and SOF IW Assessment on IW readiness within the
    services. The CJCSI also directs the identification and tracking of IW relevant skills, training and
    experience.
Some of these IW relevant (skills, training, experience) include:
1. Marines with training and experience on MTTs, PTTs, PoETTs, etc.
2. Marines with Civil Affairs training and/or experience.
3. Marines with IO/PSYOP experience
4. FAOs, RAOs, Defense Attaches
5. Those Marines with Sensitive Site Exploitation and BIOMETRICS experience.
CIW currently conducts IW Manpower Skills Working Groups to identify and track these Marines to
    include within the next USMC IW assessment, due in summer-2010.
Obviously, some skills are easier to identify and track, because their tied to MOSs, or specific and
    official schools or programs; however, the vast majority of the IW Skills will need to be tediously
    identified through the various IT Manpower and Training systems, local/unit databases and
    possibly self-identification.....
There is always a well-known
  solution to every human
problem--neat, plausible, and
            wrong.
         H. L. Mencken,
BACKUPS
                         Implications?
• Don‘t underestimate the adversary…. don‘t overestimate your abilities.
• Don‘t let ―terminology‖ and powerpoint prevent critical thinking.
• Combinations of assets available
   – Find out who is in your AO and contact them (HN, IGO, NGO‘s etc)
• Assessment like camouflage is continuous
   – Each village, city, farming community is different
• Dynamic Re-tasking
   – Act on actionable intelligence…time sensitive and fleeting
• Don‘t let an AO limit your actions
   – Coordinate with adjacent forces, operate in each others AO‘s
• Don‘t go to the ―well‖ too many times
   – Just as you must adapt, the enemy will also adapt
                            ―RIDING THE ROLLER COASTER‖
             Presence, Persistence and Patience, vs Move, Shoot and Communicate




ADVERSARY




RELEVANT
POPULATION




    Events
                A constant “battle” that is not irregular or conventional, but complex. Conducting
                  complex operations with a comprehensive approach. Where you will need to
                                      deconflict, coordinate and collaborate.
                Definitional Issues
• Basis for definition: modes vice structural
      – Admixture of different modes/methods of fighting or
      – Hybrid as composite of state & non-state actors
•    Element of simultaneity
•    Requirement for all four modes?
•    Degree of operational and tactical fusion
•    How to capture information/cyber challenge?
     Hybrid threat: Any adversary that simultaneously adaptively
    employs tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics,
       terrorism, and criminal behavior to obtain their political
                              objectives.
               Campaign Planning

IW ―Grammar‖                                   Conventional
                                               Warfighting
                                               Grammar
                      Cohesion/Will/
                        Influence

                          ???

                                   Critical Vulnerabilities
 Population/Support

                       Hybrid
                       Threats
Potential Hybrid Scenarios
                Iraq
                Iran
             Lebanon
            North Korea
              Russia
             Pakistan
              Nigeria
               Syria
            Afghanistan
              Balkans
             Caucuses
 China is viewed as a special case
                    Posture Options
Conventional:
   – Focus on great powers, preserve competitive advantages
   – Accept risk that force can adapt down if needed
Irregular:
   – Focus on most likely scenarios of state failure
   – Accept risk from states and advanced hybrid threats
Full Spectrum Force:
   – Focus on modular forces able to conduct 3 Block War
   – Potential risk of being suboptimal for any specific threat
   – Spread risk across range of military ops, invest in quality forces and
     flexible training
Dedicated and Separate Forces:
   – High readiness for specific IW and conventional scenarios
   – Potential risk of lack of depth/capacity for long duration scenario
   – Sub-optimized for hybrid threat if optimized for two extremes

				
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