Representational Qualia Theory
There are two fundamental unanimous doctrines of the Representational Qualia Theory camp.
Doctrines:
1. A red quale is not a property of something that reflects 700nm light, it is a property of our
knowledge of such. It is the final result of the perception process, not the initial cause.
2. Quale are ineffable and thereby blind to cause and effect observation. One must use 'effing'
techniques to know what the ineffable is like.
Information theory mandates that if you know something, there must be something physical that is that
knowledge. If something 'seems' some way, there must be something that is that seeming, or has the
property that it is like that is the knowledge of such.
Computers represent knowledge with ones and zeros. By design, what is doing the representation
doesn't matter. There must be some distinguishable properties that can be interpreted in different
ways, and reliable correct interpretation of such properties is the key required step for knowledge
representation to take place in such systems.
We, on the other hand, represent conscious information with qualia. A computer can represent
something like a strawberry patch with ones and zeros. Ones can represent the strawberries and
zeroes can represent the leaves sufficiently to allow such a system to pick the strawberry. Both types
of representations are perfectly capable of doing the same representation, enabling the same
knowledgeable behavior such as picking the strawberry from the leaves. The fact that the red property
is subjectively distinguishable from the green is what enables the red to be interpreted as the
strawberry, and the green to be interpreted as the leaves. In addition to both systems doing
interpretation of distinguishable properties of the representations, what is doing the representations for
the conscious system, and what they are introspectively like, and how they are phenomenally different
is all important.
Though both phenomenal and causal properties can be interpreted as representations, they are
categorically very different. If the surface of the strawberry, in addition to having the causal property
of reflecting 700nm light, was phenomenally like something, the reflected light would not be anything
like this and would require interpretation in order to represent such. This is what makes qualia
ineffable and blind to cause and effect observation that requires proper interpretation at every causally
transducing stage.
Since the surface of the strawberry is made of very different stuff than is inside our head, I believe it
would be a bad bet to think the surface of the strawberry, if it had phenomenal properties at all, was
anything like a red quale. Similarly, if you opened up the brain and shined light on whatever it was that
our brain was using to be our conscious knowledge of the strawberry, you wouldn't expect it to reflect
700nm light - though it would likely reflect some kind of light - possibly grey - as you watched it all being
causally bound together in whatever physical system it uses to enable simple conscious knowledge
before we could have enough spatial knowledge to pick the strawberry from the leaves.
This theory predicts that we will find neural correlates that reliably have the red and green that we
experience. Without the correct stuff, in the right state, red will not be possible, and with the correct
correlate identified, you will be able to predict with 100% reliability that the person is experiencing red.
With such reliable knowledge, you will be able to observe these same neural correlates in other's minds,
and discover such things as whether or not this person has a subjectively different representations such
as inverted qualia (representing the leaves with red and the strawberries with green).
If we are looking at a strawberry in our left field of vision, and a leaf in our right field of vision - then the
theory predicts there is a neural correlate that is responsible for the red knowledge in the right
hemisphere and something that has the green in our left. In some way, the corpus callosum must
enable the unification of both of these qualia into our unified world of conscious awareness. We are
obviously aware of both the red, and the green, at the same time in a way that enables us to interpret
such distinguishable properties as strawberries and leaves.
V. S. Ramachandra, in his 3 laws of qualia paper suggested connecting two brains with a 'bundle of
neurons' that would do the same thing as the corpus callosum was doing to unify these phenomenal
properties into the same conscious awareness. Given this, the prediction is that we will be able to then
experience firsthand, together with our own representations, what another's representation of
strawberries and leaves was like, and how similar it is to our own representations of the same.
Many people seem to believe that memories, associations, and many other related cognitive stuff is
important to the subjective nature of qualia. But I'm in the camp that believes, at least for color qualia
like red and green, this is all secondary, and requires additional stuff to achieve. I bet it will soon be
possible to have a system that is trivially phenomenally only representing information with red and
green, with no significant higher order reflective abilities, no historical memory or relationships of such
to anything like sweetness or warmth, and so on. In other words, it wouldn't be much more than a
camera. Whereas the representations a traditional camera was using wouldn't matter, what the
representations this phenomenal camera was using, and what they were phenomenally like, would be
important to the system's ability to reliably distinguish between the two and any interpretation of such.
This theory has been collaboratively developed, concisely stated, named and continues to be defended
by a group of people participating in the consciousness survey project at canonizer.com over the last
several years. There are too many people to list here, however what everyone contributed is clearly
documented, and who joined what camp when, can be definitively seen at canonizer.com by using the
history mechanisms such as the 'as of' operation on the side bar.
There is obviously still quite a bit of difference of opinion on just what qualia are within this camp, but
there is unanimous agreement on the two key doctrines that a red qualia is a property of our
knowledge, and that such will soon be effable. And there is so far no other theory even close to this
Representational Qualia Theory in the amount of consensus it has generated. Of course, at this still far
from comprehensive state it can be argued that this is simply because there are to date only 23
participators in this particular survey topic. But we believe it is much more than this and that no other
theory will ever get close to the amount of consensus this theory has.
We believe that we are in the midst of a scientific revolution, similar to the last time it was still popular
to believe in a geocentric solar system. The general population today (I believe, including many great
nuts and bolts neuroscientists and funders of scientific research) believe that a red qualia is a property
of the strawberry, or worse, that qualia are nothing at all, not important, or not sharable. But we
believe there is already a clear scientific consensus that realizes qualia are all important and at the other
end of the cause and effect based perception process. The only thing that remains is for someone to
rigorously measure for such scientific consensus, so the rest of the world will finally realize what the
experts already know, to provide enough motivation to achieve an understanding of such for
themselves.
As far as what qualia are, the so far most popular consensus camp is based on what Chalmers argued for
in his paper. This is that "qualia arise from any functionally equivalent organization."
However, I am in a different camp - the 'property dualism' camp. Of course since this is my camp, the
above is written from this perspective. Unlike the above, the online statement defining the
Representational Qualia Theory at canonizer.com has been carefully worded in a "what are qualia?"
blind way to maintain the unanimous agreement of all in the camp. What everyone believes the best
theories about qualia are is concisely and quantitatively represented in the camp sub structure.
Though Chalmers claims to be a 'property dualist', his phenomenal properties are so far disconnected
from anything physical it makes them seem to me like something neither worldly. It is of my opinion
that he does not deserve to be considered a property dualist. According to the 'arises from anything'
theory he argues for, anything can in some more than 'hard' way connect up to the same phenomenal
property, from a set of water pipes, to a set of silicone transistors, as long as it simply 'behaves
equivalently'. The supporters of the 'property dualism' camp, on the other hand, believe there is
simply something in the brain that, in addition to having the traditional causal properties that science
can see - has the subjective ineffable properties that we experience in a unified way. We believe that
things in nature simply reliably have ineffable properties in addition to their equally reliable causal
properties. Without that material stuff, in the proper state, you can't have the phenomenal
properties. Once we fully understand and can share or eff them together I bet they will turn out to be
tightly integrated in some way. They will both be properties of the same stuff, and to think that you
could have non causal epiphenomenal properties just shows one's lack of understanding of how this
phenomenal stuff is used to represents our conscious knowledge in a way that enables us to know
where the strawberry is amongst the green leaves so we can pick them.
The members of the 'arises from anything' camp think they are compelled to accept this more than hard
idea because of the neural substitution argument. We believe this to be an obvious fallacy, the
development and defense of this argument is continuing in the camp at canonizer.com.
argued in his plenary speech at TSC 2010, that we should work to unify the many theories of
consciousness, and this is the same goal we have with the consciousness survey project at
canonizer.com. We want to have concise descriptions of the best theories of consciousness, using
definitive terminology agreed on by the consensus, and quantitative measures of how much consensus
there is for each. So of course everyone is encouraged to indicate what they do and do not agree with
in the above, and why, so we can find out how many experts agree with you at canonizer.com going
forward as ever more scientific data, arguments, and debating methods continue to be developed.