Strauder v. West Virginia -- 1879
A black man was tried and convicted for murder in front of an all white jury, he claimed that he
was denied full and equal benefit of the laws of W.V. because no black men were allowed on the jury,
and a white man would be allowed a chance at a jury of his peers. The court held that laws should be
the same for black people and white, and all people should stand equal before the law. Brought up
idea of brands of slavery.
Plessy v. Ferguson – Brown, 1896
7/8ths white guy was kept from sitting in an all white train car. The court found that separate
but equal accomadations are cool, and that the state had a interest in honoring the custom or usage in a
state and could pass such legislation under the police power.
Brown v. Board of Education, Chief Justice Warren, 1954
Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even if the facilities are
equal, deprives the children of the minority group of equal protection of the law. Based lots of it on
psych stuff. 14th?
Bolling v. Sharpe – 1954
Segregation of schools in DC violates the 5th Amendment because the concepts of equal
protection and due process both come from the idea of fairness and are therefore incorporated in the
due process clause of the 5th A, segregation violates such ideas and is therefore not allowed in DC. I
think also something about supremacy clause.
Marbury v. Madison – 1803, Marshall
The Constitution gives the Supreme Court the authority to review acts of Congress and declare
them void (if they are repugnant to the Constitution).
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816): Supremacy Clause, Judicial Review
A state district court upheld Martin‟s land claim, which was based on a treaty between America and
Great Britain. The Virginia Court of Appeals regarded the issue as solely a STATE ISSUE, and
reversed the district court. The Supreme Court set aside the state ruling, and the state court refused to
obey. The Virginia court claimed that the Supreme Court had no authority to review its judgment, and
that Section 25 of Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state
courts, was unconstitutional.
Majority: STORY: An ardent defender of national interests, Story established the power of S.
Court to review state courts. There is nothing in constitution which restrains or limits power of
congress to establish courts under every variety of form of appellate or original jurisdiction.
Cooper v. Aaron – Warren, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, and
Whittaker (issued by Warren), 1958.
State officials may not refuse to obey federal court orders resting on constitutional grounds.
They had to desegregate their schools.
McCulloch v. Maryland – Marshall, 1819, (edited in book, we used copy)
Congress has the power to incorporate a bank and the states do not have the power to impose
fees on the operation of an institution created by Congress pursuant to its Con powers. Necessary and
proper doesn‟t mean indispensable, it could be one of many ways.
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 1995, page 761
Stevens
The states can‟t change (expand or limit) the requirements for federal office. The power
doesn‟t come from the Constitution and they didn‟t have it before the US had it, so no dice.
(Thomas, scalia, Rehnquist, o‟connor – the people acted in the states, not in an undifferentiated mass)
Harlan dissent from EC Knight
Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall, 1824
Congress has the plenary power to regulate the commerce within one state which affects other
states. (Here they couldn‟t keep Gibbons in water between states by authority of the Feds). There is
no concurrent jurisdiction here.
United States v. E.C. Knight, 1895
Fuller
U.S. refused to apply the Sherman Act to break up the Sugar trust on the ground that this was a
regulation of manufacturing, rather than commerce. In Harlan‟s dissent he alleged that the monopoly
had a direct affect on interstate commerce.
Champion v. Ames, 1903, page 777
Harlan
Upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Lottery Act which outlawed carrying lottery tickets
over state lines. It is fine to regulate to suppress evils … Dissent says that it isn‟t ok to have the goal to
be to regulate other crap.
Swift v. U.S. – 1905, page 778
Holmes
Holmes upheld the Sherman Act injunction against price fixing by meat packers. Basic
argument is that “you can control it if it is in the stream of commerce.” There is the expectation that
they will end up somewhere else.
Houston, v. U.S, 1914, page 778 (Shreveport Rate Case)
Hughes
The Interstate Commerce Commission told the railway that it had to equalize its rates between
different cities in TX and LA. Hughes reasoned for the court that Congressional authority extending to
these interstate carriers as instruments of interstate commerce because they have a close and
substantial relation to interstate traffic. That the control is essential or appropriate to that traffic
to the efficiency of the interstate service and the maintenance of conditions under which interstate
commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance.
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 1918, page 778
Day
Congress had no commerce clause power to prohibit interstate transportation of goods made by
child labor. Day distinguished these earlier cases saying that in those instances the use of interstate
transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of the harmful results. Limiting congress power
to those which deal with the transport itself.
Court just didn‟t think that legislation should use commerce clause to get stuff they wanted
done that wasn‟t related to commerce (regulating evils through commerce). So they made
manufacture/commerce distinction.
Holmes dissent disagrees, commerce power is unqualified.
Carter v. Carter Coal, Xerox, 1936
Sutherland
The federal government does not have the right to regulate the mining of coal if it will have
only an indirect effect on commerce.
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin – 1937, page 784
Hughes (5,4, not all 5/4s are marked)
Hughes upheld application of NLRB labor provisions to a national steel company. Jones and
Laughlin argued that Congress couldn‟t regulate manufacturing. Gov‟t said we can because 1. Steel is
a large enterprise which, if interrupted would disrupt the stream of interstate commerce and 2. The
disruption of intrastate manufacturing by Labor strike/strife would directly affect commerce and that
Congress can act to prevent obstructions to the overall free flow of Congress. The court also laid
to rest the E.C. Knight idea that manufacturing can’t be regulated. (sugar – p785).
United States v. Darby – 1941, Page 785
Stone
Congress has the power to set min wages/max hours for manufacturers that ship goods interstate, even
if they only sell interstate and don‟t manufacture interstate. Here is was regs of the FLSA on lumber
manufacturing.
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. – 1964, page 789
Clark
A motel which is within easy access of state and interstate highways can be regulated to keep
them from discriminating. Otherwise black people can‟t travel.
Katzenbach v. McClung – 1964, page 791
Clark, unanimous
A restaurant near the highway that refused to serve black people can be regulated to prohibit
discrimination because there is a rational connection to interstate travel and they buy their stuff from
interstate (aggregate).
United States v. Lopez – 1995, page 795
Rehnquist
Federal laws enacted under the CC must substantially affect interstate commerce. Commerce
includes means, instrumentalities, and substantial related effects (in this third group, Cong can regulate
economic concerns, what else is not clear -- Morrison)
United States v. Morrison – 2000, in little book
Rehnquist
The commerce clause doesn‟t authorize causes of actions that aren‟t within the three groupings
from Lopez, ie, they would have to be able means, instrumentalities, or substantially related to
commerce (especially if economic). This was none of the above.
South Dakota v. Dole – 1987, page 811
Rehnquist
Congress may withhold highway funds from a state that has a minimum drinking ages under 21
in order to induce the state to change their age, if the regulation is in the general welfare.
1. that it has to be in pursuit of the general welfare, 2. it must do so unambiguously enabling the
states to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation, 3.
conditions on federal grants have to have legitimate federal interests, and 4. there may be other
Constitutional provisions which limits this use.
Missouri v. Holland – 1920, page 816
Holmes
A statute that would be unconstitutional by itself can be valid to enforce a treaty. Here there
was a regulation between Canada and the US to protect some birds and Missouri tried to use their own
law because they said that this interfered and was unconstitutional on federalism grounds … no dice.
The Civil Rights Cases – 1883, page 165
Bradley
The Court held that the 1875 Civil Rights Acts which prohibited private citizens from Inns,
public transportation, and places of amusement based on race to not be good to go. Congress can‟t
prohibit private discrimination under the 13th or the 14th. The whole vestige of slavery thing doesn‟t go
that far. Jason says something about these being remedial.
Katzenbach v. Morgan – 1966, page 206
Brennan
The 1965 Voting Rights Act said that no person who had completed the 6th grade in PR in
which the language instruction was not English could be denied the right to vote based on their
inability to speak English. This provision was aimed at stopping NY from using literacy tests to keep
their Puerto Rican‟s from voting. The AG of NY argued that federal legislation would only
superceded state law if the state law was in violation of the 14th A.
The Court held that a fed statute enacted pursuant to the enabling clause of the 14th trumps
conflicting state laws.
The ct determined that the practical affect of the statue is to prohibit NY from denying the right
to vote to large segments of the PR population.
City of Boerne v. Flores – 1997, page 218
Kennedy
An act that violates the separation of powers is unconstitutional and violates the due process
clause. This is just too broad and doesn‟t respect the constitution. What?
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 2000, little book
O’Connor
O‟Connor stated the proposition that the 14th A imposes only a minimum rationality
requirement on state rules discriminating on the basis of age. The Act in question was not proportional
to the thing it was trying to fix.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co, 1968, page 227
Stewart
Purely private discrimination, unaided by any state action is not ok under §1982. Congress has
the authority under the 13th A. Here a black guy was discriminated against in housing.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority – 1985, page 822
Blackmun
Facts: This case involved whether the San Antonio MTA was subject to the minimum-wage and
overtime requirements of the FLSA. The dist Court ruled that SAMTA was immune from FLSA
regulations under National league of Cities and Long Island Railroad, the Supreme Court reversed.
State activity is immune from federal regulation if the regulation as applied to the state
activity is destructive to state sovereignty or in violation of the Constitution. The old standard
under National Leagues, is unworkable, because it was hard to distinguish between traditional and non-
traditional state governmental things.
New York v. United States – 1992, page 831
O’Connor
Facts:
Congress tried to make a big incentive to get states to deal with their own radioactive waste.
There were three incentives for compliance: The third one said -- A state that wasn‟t in compliance
by 1992 either had to take title to all their waste or become liable to instate waste generators for all
damages. New York didn‟t want to do it.
The court said that this amounted to coercion and the fed gov‟t can‟t force a state gov‟t to enact
particular legislation.
Printz v. United States – 1997, page 841 Look at xerox
Scalia
The federal government can‟t compel the states to enact or administer federal regulatory
programs. Here they tried to make state law enforcement officers enforce it.
Hans v. Louisana – 1890, page 851
Bradley
A state can‟t be sued by one of its own citizens in federal court. Here Louisiana owed Hans
under some state bonds, he tried to sue and they said no dice.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida – 1996, page 855
Rehnquist
The federal government can‟t abrogate the state‟s immunity to suit under the 11th Amendment
by a federal Act.
Alden v. Maine, 1999, Page 136 little book
Kennedy
State probation officers and Juvenile case workers in Maine sued the state to enforce overtime
pay requirements of the FLSA. They tried to sue in state court, because of Hans, but Kennedy, relying
on the common law notion of sovereign immunity, said that the principle in Hans barred a state law
suit as well as a federal one.
Gibbons v. Ogden – 1824, page 858 (take two)
Marshall
Ogden had a monopoly right to navigate between NY and NJ. Gibbons had federal right to use
it. Ogden got an injunction. Ogden claimed concurrent jurisdiction. The state has no right to regulate
interstate commerce, even if the feds haven‟t done anything. There is no concurrent jurisdiction over
commerce.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia – 1851, page 862
Curtis
The court found that there are times when Congress can give commerce power to the states.
When it is intrinsically “local” in nature and not in an area needing national uniformity, it is
appropriate to allow for state jurisdiction. This is authorized concurrent jurisdiction
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey – 1978, page 869
Stewart
Philly sued because they wanted to dump their trash in NJ and NJ said no. The court found that
states can‟t enact bans on articles of commerce (like trash) unless they have a legitimate public welfare
concern, here no such concern was deemed to exist and it was found to be protectionist.
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp – 1981, page 880
Powell
State safety regulation will be held to be unconstitutional if it its asserted safety purpose is
outweighed by the degree of its interference with interstate commerce. Here Iowa tried to pass a
statute restricting the length of vehicles which would mean everyone had to drive around. State safety
regs have a strong presumption of validity, but they are still weighed against their effect on commerce.
(also that guy said stupid stuff)
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case)
1952, page 917.
Black
Truman ordered that the government seize steel companies to stop a strike because we needed
the steel during the Korean war. This isn‟t ok. There is no Constitutional power to do that and it isn‟t
implied by the aggregate of his express powers.
United States v. Curtiss – Wright Export Corp, 1936, Page 930
Sutherland
The Court upheld the President‟s actions against Curtis Wright for selling guns to warring
factions in Bolivia. Congress had authorized the President to take such action. The Court said that
national power over external affairs in inherent and plenary and also that the President plays a uniquely
important role in foreign affairs. In this external realm, the President alone has the power to speak and
listen as a representative of this nation. We must often accord to the President a degree of discretion
and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved.
Dames and Moore v. Regan – 1981, page 940
Rehnquist
President Carter made a deal with the Iranians to get some hostages back. This deal included
terminating suits pending against Iran. Dames and Moore were suing Iran and their suits were referred
to a claims tribunal. They had a money judgment but couldn‟t collect.
That‟s ok though, the President had broad powers in this situation by Congress. Also Presidents
always do that. Also Presidents need to be head honcho internationall.
Korematsu v. U.S., ___, Xerox
Black
Korematsu got screwed by internment rules (which were conflicting). The Supreme court
found that these were discriminatory but that it is ok to curtail the rights of a single racial group in
certain situations and that it is Constitutional for Congress and the Pres to make these kind of
proclamations under the War power. Think of the greater good. Think about the spys.
United States v. Nixon – 1974, page 945
Burger
The President doesn‟t have absolute executive privilege over his communication. The privilege
is subject to judicial review. The stuff would be reviewed en camera. It would upset the constitutional
balance and make the government unworkable and impair the role of the courts. The public needs to
have confidence in full disclosure and fair proceedings.
Clinton v. Jones, 1997 page 954
Stevens
A unanimous court rejected Clinton‟s claim that a president could invoke Fitzgerald immunity
to claims that arose before the President took office. Paula Jones could sue him because it was for an
unofficial act. The court accepted that he need not have his time overly burdened, but they didn‟t think
it would take too much of his time. the doctrine of sep of powers does not require federal courts to
stay all private actions against the president until he leaves office.
Mistretta v. United States – 1989, page 962
Blackmun
The Sentencing Reform Act set up a commission to develop sentencing guidelines. There was
a challenge that this was an unconstitutional delegation of Legislative powers to an executive body.
But it isn‟t because they had clear limits and goals proscribed by Congress. The Court unanimously
found that there was no non-delegation problem. This is a narrow doctrine. Scalia dissents – he
agreed that the statute survived the non-delegation attack, but he thought that the doctrine was wussy
and that it should just be seen as a statutory interpretation principle.
INS v. Chadha – 1983, page 965
Burger
Chadha was some guy from somewhere else and he wanted to stay in the country. He met the
statutory grounds for suspension of deportation. His suspension was transmitted to Congress. One
chamber had the authority to invalidate this decision by adopting a resolution and they did. This was
not submitted to the senate or the pres. This is unconstitutional. The Congress can‟t delegate
legislative authority to itself and thereby circumvent the legislative process.
Clinton v. City of New York – 1998, page 142, little book
Stevens
The city of New York challenged the President‟s exercise of cancellation under the Line Item
Veto. The court found that the LIVA was unconstitutional. It amounted to an amendment of
legislation passed by congress. There is no provision in the Con that authorizes the President to enact,
to amend, or to repeal statutes.
Bowsher v. Synar, 1986, page 980
Burger
The Gram-Rudman-Hollings Act (Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985) sought to eliminate the federal deficit. Under the act, the comptroller general of the US was
assigned the duty of making across the board spending reductions for the federal government. The
court found that this was unconstitutional
By placing the responsibility for execution of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has
retained control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the executive function. The
Constitution does not permit such intrusion.
Here the GA was acting in a legislative function, and has always been seen as part of the
legislature, but he is only removable by the legislature, so they have ultimate say over the
implementation of their act. Also, as a member of the legislature, he has no place being in an
executive position.
Morrison v. Olson – 1988, page 989
Rehnquist
Olson was in trouble and was being prosecuted by the Independent Counsel. He said that the
IC was unconstitutional because it violated the Appoitments clause because she wasn‟t appointed by
the President. The court held that this wasn‟t unconstitutional because Congress can delegate the
courts to appoint inferior officers and she was an inferior office because her term and jurisdiction were
limited and she has to answer to both Congress and a special court.
Mistretta v. United States, 1989, p. 1005
Blackmun
The members of a Sentencing Commission were removable by the President only for neglect
of duty or malfeasance. The question in this case is whether the placement of these people violated the
separation of powers. Everyone was freaked out because it was in the Judiciary and what about
separation of powers? But it is fine, our branches aren‟t totally separate and the judiciary serves lots of
roles. It doesn‟t make the judiciary subject to the executive that they can be removed by the Pres,
because they will still be judges.
Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 1982, page 1011
Brennan
The Bankruptcy Reform Act created Bankruptcy Courts in each federal judicial district. This
act gave Art I judges plenary jurisdiction over all civil proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act which
meant that Art I judges would be adjudicating not just federal regulatory claims, but also state law
issues. The Court invalidated the statute in so far as it allowed Art I judges to resolve contract
disputes.
Art III, § 1 seems to prohibit the vesting of any judicial functions with officials who are not Art
III judges, having life tenure, and salary protection as they do. There are three exceptions to this rule –
territorial courts, court marshals, and courts that adjudicate certain disputes concerning public rights.
They define public rights (1012), and include in that definition contracting rights – only Art III courts
can adjudicate these rights, and therefore they can‟t do this.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor – 1986, page 1012
O’Connor
Some guy decided to go to in front of the CFTC and thereby waived his right to an Article III
judge.
Ex parte McCardle, 1869, page 1020
Chase
McCardle was being held for trial by a military commission and he appealed for habeas corpus
to Sup Ct, after his argument was heard, Congress passed an act taking away the Sup Ct‟s appellate
jurisdiction on appealed habeas corpus cases, and so the case was dismissed.
Baker v. Carr, 1962, page 1031
Brennan
A constitutional challenge to the Tennessee Legislature‟s apportionment was not barred from
review for being a political question. This was over the issue of vote dilution. The mere fact that this
suit presents a question of protection of a political right does not mean that it presents a political
question.
Nixon v. United States, 1993, page 1042
Rehnquist
A Judge was convicted of making false statements in front of the grand jury and sent to prison,
he refused to resign. He was impached by the House and the Senate, but Nixon sued because he said
that the Senate procedures in the suit (it was heard in committee, and then the committee presented it
to the full chamber) violated the Art I, §3. The Supreme Court held that this was non judiciable
because the Senate holds the sole power to try impeachments and the judiciary may not review that
process, according to Art I, §3, cl.6.
Aside: Standing requires: 1. The plaintiff suffers an actual injury. 2. The injury is caused by the
conduct complained of. 3. A favorable decision is likely to redress the injury.
Raines v. Byrd, 1997, page 1061
Rehnquist
Legislators who had voted against the line item veto hadn‟t suffered any “personal,
particularized, concrete, and otherwise judicially cognizable” harm and so they didn‟t have standing to
sue.
Allen v. Wright, 1984, page 1063
O’Connor
Parents of black school children brought an action to compel the IRS to deny tax exempt status
to schools that discriminate. The Court found that they didn‟t have standing because they were trying
to sue on generalized grievances. A Plaintiff must allege injury traceable to the ∆s conduct likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife – 1992, page 1075
Scalia wrote most of opinion
Individuals who had visited a place that had some endangered animals, and they wanted to sue
over the interpretation of the endangered species act because they might want to go back and the
animals might be dead. This injury was too general and there was no real harm.
Friends of the Earth, Inc v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 2000, page 160 little book
Ginsburg
People who were afraid to use their water because of mercury contamination, had concrete
injury even though they couldn‟t show physical harm – just psychological. People were scared to go
fishing, swimming, etc.
Fletcher v. Peck, 1810, xerox
Marshall
Georgia legislature was bribed to sell a ton of land for cheap. They tried to rescind the grant,
but they couldn‟t get it back because it had been sold. They can repeal their acts but that only has
effects from now forward, they can‟t invalidate a contract they made. (Contracts Clause).
Ogden v. Saunders (1827): Economic Liberties, Contracts Clause
Saunders, a Kentucky citizen, sued Ogden, a Louisiana citizen, on a contract which Ogden, then a
citizen of New York, had accepted in 1806. Saunders claimed that Ogden had not made payment on
his obligation. Ogden claimed bankruptcy as his defense under the New York bankruptcy law enacted
in 1801. The issue is whether a state bankruptcy law applying to contracts made after the law's passage
violates the Obligation of Contracts Clause of the Constitution?
The majority holds that the contracts clause only prohibits states from modifying contracts
already in existence at the time of legislation. States remain free to prescribe rules that limit the
ability to enter into certain contracts in the future.
Majority: (?): No. This is not a violation of the Contracts Clause. The state law remains
controlling. The obligation of a contract made after the enactment of a bankruptcy statute is
subject to the bankruptcy statute provisions. In effect, the bankruptcy statute becomes part of
all subsequent contracts, limiting their obligation but not impairing them.
Minority: MARSHALL, STORY, DUVALL: Marshall‟s only dissent in a constitutional case, a la
Lochner. Argued from principal of Natural law and the words of contract clause, asserting that the
government should not be able to dictate the terms of private contracts. The right to contract is natural
right that precedes government and private law. States should however be able to affect contract
remedies. He feared that the contract clause would become inoperative.
Calder v. Bull: (1798): Economic Liberties, Ex post facto
Mr. and Mrs. Caleb Bull, the stated beneficiaries of the will of Norman Morrison, were denied an
inheritance by a Connecticut probate court. When the Bulls attempted to appeal the decision more than
a year and a half later, they found that a state law prohibited appeals not made within 18 months of the
original ruling. The Bulls persuaded the Connecticut legislature to change the restriction, which
enabled them to successfully appeal the case. Calder, the initial inheritor of Morrison's estate, took the
case to the Supreme Court. The question is, was the Connecticut legislation a violation of Art. 1, Sec.
10, of the Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto laws?
Majority: CHASE: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the legislation was not an ex
post facto law. The Court drew a distinction between criminal rights and "private rights,"
arguing that restrictions against ex post facto laws were not designed to protect citizens'
contract rights. Justice Chase noted that while all ex post facto laws are retrospective, all
retrospective laws are not necessarily ex post facto. Even "vested" property rights are subject to
retroactive laws. Chase asserted that Natural Property rights can not be altered by “acts” of
Congress, which are not laws, because they violate vested property laws.
Concurring: IREDELL: Opposes Chase by saying, the Court can not declare a statute void
because it violates principles of natural justice. Must follow Legislature.
High water mark of unenumerated rights in the early republic is Calder v. Bull.
Chase invokes "the great first principles of the social compact" and Iredell (anticipating many
later writers) worries about unrestrained judicial discretion.
Pre abolition talk of positive rights.
The Slaughter House Cases – 1873, page 399
Miller
Louisiana created a monopoly for a slaughterhouse. The court refused to say that this violated
the P and I clause because that clause referred to a limited set of national privileges like access to
water.
Saenz v. Roe, 1999, page 57, little book
Stevens
California tried limit welfare benefits for newly arrived citizens. Which they can‟t do because
it violates the PI of the 14th and restricts peoples right to travel under the 14th. This right is protected
by their status as citizen of the state, but also as a citizen of the country.
Palko v. Connecticut – 1937, page 401
Cardozo
Palko appealed his life sentence saying that there was evidence missing and bad instructions.
The Court agreed, he got a new trial and was sentenced to death. He tried to say that this violated the
5th as incorporated through the 14th. Nope.
The 5th A prohibition against double jeopardy is not applicable to the states through the DP of the 14th.
Whatever would be a violation of the first 9 amendments if done by the fed govt, is not ipso facto a
violation if done by a state. A right to be incorporated must be “a principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. A fair and
enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them.”
Adamson v. California, 1947, page 404
Reed
A guy who refused to testify during his trial and the judge mentioned in the jury instructions
that he hadn‟t tried to refute the evidence against him. He tried to say that the 14th forbade that
because of the 5th. Nope. Not all the rights secured in the bill of rights have been held to be such P
and I. The right against self incrimination has specifically been held not to be applicable to the states.
It is considered a P and I of the state, not of the federal gov‟t.
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex re. Williamson, 1942, page 410
Douglas
Skinner, convicted of three crimes, (like stealing chickens), was considered a habitual criminal
by an Ok statute and was ordered sterilized. The statute applied only to those convicted to three
felonies involving moral turpitude (ie, white collar criminals were good to go). It violates Equal
Protection to arbitrarily discriminate where fundamental rights are involved (like the right to have
kids).
Reynolds v. Sims, 1964, page 452
Chief Justice Warren
Alabama Constitution required that their reps in both houses be based on population, they
weren‟t reapportioned for 60 years, and the suit was brought saying that there was vote dilution. The
Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both the houses be properly apportioned.
Bush v. Gore, 2000, page 50
Per Curiam
Bush v. Gore. The Court said that they had to count all the votes the same way and that the
Florida plan wasn‟t fair or working and didn‟t have necessary safeguards. It was too late to do that, so
they had to go with what had come in originally.
Lochner v. New York – 1905, page 420
Peckham
NY passed a law limited the work week for a signle bakery to 60 hours per employee. Lochner
violated the statute. The Court held that the state couldn‟t pass rules like this because they interfered
with the freedom to contract which is disallowed by Art I, §10.
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 1937, page 426
Hughes
Upheld a minimum wage law for women. The court said that this was okay because “The
legislature was entitled to adopt measure to reduce the evils of the „sweating system,‟ the exploiting of
workers at wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living, thus making their very
helplessness the occasion of a most injurious competition.” This statute doesn‟t violate due process.
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 1955, page 427
Douglas
Here the court upholds a stupid statute requiring a new prescription to get another pair of
glasses or contacts. It was probably motivated to make more money for doctors and screw opticians.
But, the point is, that it doesn‟t violate due process for the exact same reasoning as West Coast Hotel.
“It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it. The day is gone when this Court uses the DPC to
strike down state laws … because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought … For protection against abuses by legislature the people must resort to
the polls, not to the courts.”
Meyer v. Nebraska – 1923, page 474.
Struck down Nebraska law that prohibited teaching young children in any public or private
school in any language other than English – “no emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a
child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify [the] infringement of the
rights long freely enjoyed.”
Poe v. Ullman, 1961, page 475
Ct‟s long standing prohibition against contraception, though unenforced for many years, was
challenged as unconstitutional by Poe and other married women who said that they couldn‟t get birth
control advice because of the statute. The Court decided that the lawsuit wasn‟t ripe because there has
only been one violation since 1879 and that you could get contraception in the drug store.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965, page 479
Douglas
Griswold, the executive director of Planned Parenthood and a Doctor (Buxton) were convicted
under CT law which made counseling of married people to take contraceptives a punishable offense.
The court said the right to privacy in a marital relationship is protected by the Constitution despite the
absence of specific language recognizing it. The various guarantees create penumbras or zones of
privacy. CT law, by forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating the manner of their
sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.
It‟s great.
Roe v. Wade
Planned Parenthood v. Casey
Bowers v. Hardwick, 1986, page 523
White
Hardwick was gay, he was charged with violating statute about oral and anal sex. ACLU shat
its pants because they had a plaintiff. They challenged the constitutionality of the statute, for
criminalizing consensual sex. He claimed that the law placed him in imminent danger of arrest and
was unconstitutional on several grounds. The court decided that there was no Constitutional grant of a
fundamental right to consensual gay sex.
Michael H. v. Gerald D.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, page 533
Rehnquist
The state of WA had a statute which expressly prohibited Dr. assisted suicide, calling it murder.
This law didn‟t violate Due Process because there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to Dr. assisted
suicide. They hinted that there might be a right to death in different circumstances, but wussed out and
didn‟t decide it here.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, page 1998, page 65 little book
Souter
A passenger on a motorcycle involved in a high speed chase was killed. His estate tried to
argue that the cop had abused powers and violated the 14th. The court found that a police officer only
violates the 14th Amendment‟s guarantee of substantive due process (for death cases) if he causes death
through acts that shock the conscience of the court. (basically they have to have meant to do it).
Troxel v. Granville – 2000, page 73 little book
Everyone wrote all kinds of crap
Court struck down a WA statute that authorized anyone to seek visitation against parental
wishes as long as it would “be in the best interests of the child.” It is way to broad. The standard here
for court intervention was “best interests” as opposed to actual harm threatened to the child. It is way
too broad. It supplants court judgment for parents. Parents can keep people from their kids. The
Supreme Court, is badly fractured, but they strike it down.
Railway Express Agency, Inc v. New York – 1949, page 294
Douglas
A NY regulation prohibiting ads on the sides of trucks by other companies but allowing you to
advertise for yourself didn‟t violate equal protection under the 14th because the court gives deference to
local judgment. This ordinance passes a rational basis test and so is good to go.
Fed Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc, 1993, p. 299
Court upheld a fed statute that required cable tv systems to be franchised by local government
authorities but exempts facilities serving only subscribers in one or more multiple unit dwellings under
common ownership, control, or management. The court saw no problem with the differentiating
between multiple and single owner buildings. They used a minimal scrutiny test (rational basis). The
statute was presumed to be valid. “A leg choice is not subject to court room fact finding and may be
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”
Bradwell v. Illinois, 1873, page 307
Miller
Bradwell applied for license to practice law and she was denied because she was married. The
Sup Ct affirmed it, with one dissent. Bradwell argued that she was denied privilege and immunity,
they said that, as a citizen of Illinois, the PI clause was inapplicable to her claim because admission to
the bar of a state is not one of the privileges and immunities of US citizenship, the 14th Amendment (as
interpreted in the slaughter house cases) did not secure the asserted right either.
Frontiero v. Richardson, page 1973, page 313
Brennan/Douglas/White/Marshall
A service woman applied to increase the benefits for her dependent husband and was required
to show that he was actually dependent for more than half his support. Men applying for increased
benefits for their wives don‟t have to do that. Classifications based on sex, such as this one, are
suspect and are subject to practically strict scrutiny. And this doesn‟t pass.
Craig v. Boren, 1976, page 320
Brennan
A statute which prohibited sale of beer to women under 18 and men under 21 was
unconstitutional. This case created an intermediate level of scrutiny for gender based classifications
and this statute didn‟t pass it.
Here gender based classification is not serving the state objective. To withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
United States v. Virginia, 1996, page 330
Ginsburg
VMI excluded women from their school. They offered to set up crappy schools for women, but
that wasn‟t good enough. Gender based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny and this
doesn‟t pass. Stevens dissent points out that maybe we shouldn‟t have different levels of scrutiny
because that has no textual basis.
Watkins v. United States Army, 1989, page 376 – 9th circuit
An army guy who got kicked out of the army for being gay (even though they had known for a
while, and had even asked him to come back in the past) was declared to be unconstitutional. The first
court in this (the 9th circuit) included gays and lesbians as a suspect class and therefore subjected this
to strict scrutiny which it failed. The court heard it again en banc and said that that was wrong. It
came down to a distinction between whether you want to judge conduct or status. The first guy said
status, but this was overruled. The guy was reinstated because of estoppel.
Romer v. Evans, 1996, page 379
Kennedy
Colorado passed an Amendment which preempted local ordinances from prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual basis. It allows discrimination. This amendment was found to
fail the rational basis test. The state said that it puts gay people in the same position as everyone else,
and doesn‟t let them have special rights – which is universally acknowledged as bunk. This would be
really far reaching. This is mean and pointed, and so so not rational. We cannot say that Amendment
2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.
Baehr v. Lewin – 1993, page 389, Hawaii Sup Ct
Gay people wanted the Hawaii Sup Ct to say that the right of the people to privacy is
recognized and can‟t be infringed upon absent a compelling state interest.
The couples argued that refusing to let them married robbed them of benefits. This section of the
constitution includes a state prohibition on discriminating on the basis of sex. Marraige is a
fundamental right. The court found that the ban on same sex marriage does not violate their
constitution. The fundamental right to marry as expressed by the U.S. Sup Ct is all about a man and a
woman and having kids. Extending the right for same sex couples to marry would create a new right
under privacy.