"Existence is a real property of concrete individuals." Excerpted from Chapter Two of
Barry Miller's Philosophical Theology, forthcoming, by Elmar J. Kremer
Miller's entire philosophical theology is directed toward understanding the
difference between creatures and God. As Miller sees it, the difference is based on the
fact that every creature is distinct from its existence, whereas God is identical with his
existence. Hence the entire project depends on the controversial metaphysical claim that
existence is a real property of concrete individuals. . . . An individual is concrete if it “can
either effect real change or be subject to real change” (E, p. 40). . . .
I: Is existence a property of concrete individuals?
Miller divides the question of whether existence is a real property of concrete
individuals into two, first asking whether existence is a property of such individuals, and
only secondly whether it is a real property. His answer to the first question is a
development of Geach‟s distinction between two main senses of the predicate 'exists' and
related expressions, which can be called the there is sense, and the actuality sense.
'Exist(s)' is used in the there is sense to indicate that a general term is non-empty, as in
'Black swans exist', which means the same as 'There is at least one black swan'; and in the
latter sense to express a property of a concrete individual or concrete individuals, as in
'President Obama exists' and 'Elephants (as opposed to dinosaurs) exist'.1
Miller was aware that most philosophers in the Western tradition going back to
Greek philosophy have denied that existence is a real property; the only period in which
that view was widely held was the high middle ages. (The historical point is developed in
The Fullness of Existence, p. 10-17.) Nevertheless it receives strong initial support from
pre-philosophical common sense. Miller's strategy is to begin with singular propositions
that are or might be true and that on their face involve the use 'exists' as a predicate
standing for a property of concrete individuals. In From Existence to God, Miller begins
with just one example, 'Socrates no longer exists' (p. 66). In A Most Unlikely God, he
adds „Socrates came to exist‟ and „Socrates ceased to exist‟ (p. 26). In The Fullness of
Existence, he adds 'Socrates exists', 'Socrates is no more', 'Socrates might never have
existed', and two examples from the Bible: 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not' (Genesis
42:13) and 'Before Abraham was, I am' (John, 8:58) (F, p. 23)2. He then considers and
rejects various attempts that have been made to show that such examples should not be
taken at face value and need to be "interpreted" in some way to remove the implication
that existence is a property of concrete individuals. In E, he deals with arguments which
focus on the apparent absurdity of negative existential statements like „Joseph does not
exist‟. . . [In F, he considers objections focusing on positive existential statements,
including the oft repeated Kantian objection that existence is not a property because when
one says a thing exists one does not "make the least addition to the thing". (Critique of
Pure Reason, B628). I will turn to the Kantian argument in section III below. ]
1. Who is the Joseph that no longer exists?
1
See E, p. 68-69.
2
Henceforth From Existence to God will be referred to as "E", A Most Unlikely God as "U", and The
Fullness of Being as "F".
2
Against the view that the above examples are to be taken at face value, one
objection is that if 'Joseph exists' says something about Joseph, so also does 'Joseph does
not exist'. But the negative proposition cannot be about Joseph because if it were true,
there would be no Joseph for it to be about. So the affirmative proposition is similarly not
about Joseph, and does not predicate existence of him. This oft-repeated argument, as
Miller points out, assumes that if a name refers to an individual at a given time, the
individual must exist at that time. That assumption is false, for one can use a proper name
to refer to an individual that existed in the past and no longer exists. Reference to
individuals can, so to speak, cut across time to the past. To put the point in another way,
the argument confuses the relation being a referent of a name with the relation being a
bearer of a name. If x is a bearer of a name y at time t, then x must exist at t, but x can be
a referent of a name y at time t without existing at t. Supposing that Socrates existed but
no longer exists, then „Socrates‟ currently has no bearer, and yet may currently be used to
refer to Socrates. Miller holds that every real (as opposed to fictional) proper name has or
has had an existing bearer. But there is nothing paradoxical about the proposition that
Socrates (who existed in the past) does not (now) exist.
2. If existence is a property, is non-existence also one?
A second objection begins with the observation that if 'Joseph exists' attributes the
property of existence to Joseph, then 'Joseph does not exist' attributes the property of non-
existence to him. But an individual that does not exist cannot be the subject of a property.
So 'Joseph does not exists' does not attribute a property of non-existence to Joseph, and
similarly „Joseph exists‟ does not attribute a property of existence to Joseph. D. G.
Londey puts the point in a colorful way, speaking of the absurdity of sheep farmers
inspecting their flocks "with the aim of sorting the existing sheep from the non-existent
ones."3
Miller begins his reply with a distinction between external and internal negation,
that is, between 'Joseph (does-not-exist)' and 'It is not the case that (Joseph exists)'.
„Joseph does not exist‟, can be interpreted as a case of external negation, in which the
negative predicate „does not exist‟ fails to occur and which does not assert anything of
Joseph, though it does include a clause in which „exists‟ (not „does not exist‟) is
predicated of him. Thus the objection is disarmed.
Now the distinction between external and internal negation plays no part in
ordinary predicate logic. Nevertheless, Miller contends, it is significant in other contexts.
For example, there is a difference between saying that an action is not moral (meaning
that it is immoral) and saying that it is not the case that an action is moral (meaning that it
is amoral). Again, if one wanted to deny that pure water is green while being careful not
to imply that it is some other color, one might say, "It is not the case that pure water is
green" rather than "Pure water is not green." The difference between 'Joseph (does-not-
exist)' and 'It is not the case that (Joseph exists)' is similarly significant. . . .
II: Is existence a real property of concrete individuals?
3
Quoted by Miller (in E, p. 64) from D. G. Londey, “Existence,” Philosophia Arhusiensis 1(1970), p. 3.
3
It might seem evident that if existence is a property of concrete individuals, then it
is a real property of them—that its presence or absence makes a real difference to the
individuals that have it. But Miller tries to back up that position in two quite different
ways. In E he tries the approach of citing an equivalent property that is more evidently
real than existence itself. [The property he cites is the capacity to be referred to.]. . .That
attempt is less than a resounding success, for it is no more obvious that the capacity to be
referred to is a real property than it is that existence itself is a real property. Miller might
have been better advised to cite the property of effecting and undergoing real change. As
a concrete individual, Socrates is an individual that “can either effect a real change or be
subject to a real change or both” (p. 1 above). But it was true of him as an existing
concrete individual that he not only could, but constantly did effect and undergo real
change. Indeed, it is true of all concrete individuals of anyone‟s acquaintance that they
are constantly effecting and undergoing real change, something they cease doing just as
soon as they cease existing. Since the difference between undergoing and effecting real
change on the one hand, and not undergoing or effecting real change on the other, is a
real difference in a thing, the equivalent difference between existing and not existing is
an equally real difference. . . .
III: [There remains Kant's objection that existence "adds nothing" to an
individual.]
The Kantian objection is sometimes expressed by saying that it is
uninformative to be told that some individual exists. Let me use a passage from Brian
Davies (who happens to disagree with Miller about whether existence is a real
property) to build a counter-example: Endorsing the Kantian objection, Davies says,
"While there are predicates which do give us information about Brian Davies
(predicates truly ascribing properties to him) '____ exists' is not one of them. If 'Brian
Davies snores' is true, someone who comes to know this learns something about Brian
Davies. 'Brian Davies snores' says something about Brian Davies. This is not the case,
however, with 'Brian Davies exists'.”4 But if one concentrates on the present tense of
'Brian Davies exists', then it becomes clear that the proposition does give information
about Davies: Davies still exists. The proposition also provides a basis for classifying
Davies with, e.g., Alvin Plantinga, and setting him apart from Barry Miller (who
ceased existing on August 16, 2006). Therefore, 'Brian Davies exists', taken as a
present-tense, first-level predication about Brian Davies, is informative. It does not
give information about what Davies is, but it does give that information that he is
actual. In other words, an individual's existence does not add to what the individual is;
it does not add to what might be called the quidditative content of the individual. But it
does make a real difference to the individual: It makes the individual actual. So an
individual's existence is a real property of the individual.]
4
Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, third edition, Oxford U. P., 2003, p. 107.