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VIEWS: 25 PAGES: 22

									                                                                                  Draft REPORT




Cairo,                                European
Egypt,
16-19 October
2007
                                      Commission for
                                      the Control of
                                      Foot-and-Mouth
                                      Disease



                                      Session of the Research Group
                                      of the Standing Technical
                                      Committee




      Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   1
                                    EUFMD Research Group - Closed Session

                                                       16-18th October

                                                          Cairo, Egypt



OPENING .......................................................................................................................... 4
ITEM 1 ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ELECTION OF THE CHAIRPERSON ..................... 4
SECTION 1: ITEMS UNDER THE REMIT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEILLANCE AD HOC
GROUP.............................................................................................................................. 5
ITEM 2. INTERNATIONAL FMD SURVEILLANCE ................................................................. 5
ITEM 3. TECHNICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM OUTBREAKS IN THE UK IN 2007 .................. 7
SECTION II: ITEMS UNDER THE REMIT OF THE LABORATORY STANDARDIZATION AND
BIOSAFETY AD HOC GROUP .............................................................................................. 8
ITEM 4. PROMOTION OF MOLECULAR TESTS AS THE FIRST CHOICE METHOD FOR FMD
DIAGNOSIS, AND ON REDUCING FALSE NEGATIVE FINDINGS IN TURKEY AND IRAN ...... 8
   ON FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF REAL-TIME RT-PCR (RTRT-PCR) FOR FMD CONFIRMATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES
   AND IN EUROPE ................................................................................................................... 8
   POSITION ON DECENTRALISED TESTING FOR SECONDARY CASES OF FMDV IN NORMALLY FREE REGIONS .............. 8
   REDUCING FALSE NEGATIVE RATES IN FMD CONFIRMATION IN IRAN AND TURKEY ........................................ 9
ITEM 5. FMD LABORATORY BIOCONTAINMENT............................................................... 10
SECTION III: ITEMS UNDER THE REMIT OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON SURVEILLANCE AND
SERO-MONITORING ISSUES ........................................................................................... 11
ITEM 6. POST-VACCINATION SURVEILLANCE (PVS) IN FMD FREE COUNTRIES OR
POPULATIONS APPROACHING DISEASE FREEDOM ......................................................... 11
   6.1 TECHNICAL ISSUES REQUIRING SOLUTIONS IDENTIFIED AT THE PVS WORKSHOPS .................................. 11
   6.1.1REVIEW OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE FIRST TWO WORKSHOPS ................................................... 11
   6.1.2 VIEW POINT ON RESOLUTION OF REMAINING TECHNICAL ISSUES WITH PVS FOLLOWING EMERGENCY
   VACCINATION .................................................................................................................... 12
   6.2 PROGRESS WITH USE OF SCENARIO TREES TO OPTIMISE SURVEILLANCE FOR CONFIDENCE IN DISEASE FREEDOM 12
   6.3 NSP TEST PERFORMANCE ISSUES......................................................................................... 12
ITEM 7 ISSUES ARISING FROM MONITORING OF PREVENTIVE VACCINATION PROGRAMS
IN NON-FREE COUNTRIES .............................................................................................. 14
   STABILITY OF TYPE O TITRES AFTER VACCINATION (NACI BULUT) ......................................................... 14
   STANDARDISATION OF SERO-MONITORING RESULTS; DRAFT REPORTING FORMAT (CARSTEN POTSZCH) .............. 14
   MODELLING POPULATION IMMUNITY AFTER VACCINATION CAMPAIGNS : CONCEPT PAPER (ARNAUD LE MENACH, FAO)
       .............................................................................................................................. 14
ITEM 8 FINAL PAPERS –INFORMATION SESSION ........................................................... 15
SECTION IV: OTHER ISSUES ........................................................................................... 16
ITEM 9. VACCINATION OF SHEEP: UPDATED GUIDANCE PAPER , PREVENTIVE AND
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS ............................................................................................... 16
ITEM 10 .GROUP WORK TO DEVELOP CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND ACTIONS
      ............................................................................................................................. 17
ITEM 11. READING OF THE REPORT................................................................................ 17
ITEM 12. OTHER TASKS HELD OVER THE THE 2005-7 WORKPLAN .................................. 17
ITEM 13 PLANNING OF THE OPEN SESSION ................................................................... 17
CLOSING CEREMONY ...................................................................................................... 17




               Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007                     2
                                          LIST OF APPENDIXES
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       Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007     3
                                                   REPORT


OPENING

A Session of the Research group of the Standing Technical Committee of the EuFMD was held in
Cairo, between 16 and 18th October 2007, and jointly hosted by the General Organization of
Veterinary Services (GOVS) of the Ministry of Agriculture and land reclamation, Government of
Egypt, and by the FAO Regional Office for the Middle-East (FAORNE).

The Session was opened by Mr Ahmed Chikhaoui, on behalf of Mr Albraithen, Regional
representative of FAO for the Middle-East, Acting FAO Representative for Egypt, and by Dr Hamed
Samaha, Chairman of the GOVS.

Eleven of the twelve Committee members were present, plus the ex-officio member for the World
Reference Laboratory (Dr Paton). Those present were Kris de Clercq (KdC), Aldo Dekker (AD),
Emiliana Brocchi (EB), Bernd Haas (BH), Stefan Zientara (SZ), Hakan Vigre (HV), Donal Sammin
(DS), Soren Alexandersen (SA), Naci Bulut (NB), Hagai Yadin (HY) and Georgi Georgiev (GG) .
Invited experts were present from South Africa (Dr Maree), Iran (Drs Otorod and Shirazi).
Observers were present from Australia (Dr Hammond) and Botswana (Dr Thomson). From FAO
(EuFMD and FAO AGAH - Animal health Service) were the Secretary, Keith Sumption (KS), Tom
Murray (TM), Carsten Potzsch (CP), Francis Geiger (FG), and Arnaud le Menach (FAO-AGAH), and
Dr Hassan Aidaros (Manager, FAO/OIE Regional Animal Health Centre, Beirut).

Apologies were received from Mark Bronsvoort, member RG (MB), and Alf Fuessel, DG-SANCO (EC
Observer).

The list of participants is found in Appendix 1.


Item 1. Adoption of the Agenda and election of the chairperson

The Agenda adopted with minor changes, as given in Appendix 2.

Following the decision of Dr de Clercq to not stand again for the position of Chairman, an election
was held, as required by the EuFMD Constitution at the first meeting of the Committee after their
election by the previous EuFMD Session (the 37th General Session April 2007).

The Secretary called for nominations from the membership; one nomination was received, of Dr
Aldo Dekker, (proposed by Dr de Clercq, seconded by Dr Sammin). There being no other
nominations, Dr Dekker was elected as Chairman and indicated his acceptance of the
responsibilities. In his response, he proposed a vote of thanks for the leadership and effort of Dr de
Clercq, which was enthusiastically supported by all present. Although not in the constitution for the
Commission, he asked if Dr de Clercq was prepared to continue as supportive role (Vice-
Chairman),in case of his unavailability, this was accepted.

Chairman of the Group, 2007: Dr Aldo Dekker.

Vice-Chairman, 2007: Dr Kris de Clercq.




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   4
SECTION 1: ITEMS UNDER THE REMIT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SURVEILLANCE AD HOCGROUP

Item 2. International FMD surveillance

Four papers were presented relating to the FMD situation in the European neighbourhood,
excluding the situation in the United Kingdom; an overview of the recent epidemiological events in
2006-7, presented by Keith Sumption (Appendix 3); a paper on the issue of FMD in sheep and
goats in Iran (Appendix 4) and on the molecular epidemiology of FMD types O and A in Iran
(Appendix 5), and a review of FMD type O epidemic in Israel in 2007 (Appendix 6). Analysis of
the situation in Iran had been assisted by geo-referencing epidemiological units and analysis of
FMD and vaccination at this level. Capacity for rtRT-PCR has been established at the CVL, Iran, and
studies on type A and O molecular epidemiology conducted during a 6 month study tour at the
WRL.

The regional situation with the A Iran 05 virus genotype had much improved but appeared to be
entering a phase where circulation was continuation with low level of outbreaks in Turkey and Iran,
possibly preceding extinction in small or larger areas. However, the situation with type O PanAsia II
genotype over the past year had been severe, with incursion into most of the ME, and recent
spread to central Asian countries. The genotype appeared to have replaced the resident type O in
Turkey and now accounted for almost all outbreaks, including those in Thrace in September 07.

Last year type A Iran 05 was main problem, but this year it is O PanAsia type II. It is likely that as
population immunity from infection wanes, then replacement by a different serotype occurs.
Vaccination level at less than 20% in cattle is probably not sufficient to change this situation.
Geographic distribution is type A from the East with type O all over.

The 2006-7 type O epidemic in Israel, had as in previous major epidemics, affected wild boar and
gazelles which were shown to become infected. Their role in perpetuating domestic outbreaks
remains uncertain but given the locations, it is also possible they play a role in transboundary
spread, since wild boar may tunnelling under border fences, and possibly aerosols could be
sufficient for short range airborne transmission to wild or domestic species.
A collaborative study with DHS (US) and EuFMD support has evaluated the role of thermal imaging
for detection of febrile cattle at distance, during the FMD epidemic; this could be achieved up to 30
metres distance.

The situation in Egypt was also discussed, where FMD type A had been confirmed by the local
(Abbasia) vaccine research laboratory in samples collected from outbreaks in September 07, and
following an apparent break of more than 12 months since previous type A outbreaks. At the time
of the Session the virus type had not been confirmed in samples sent to the WRL.

Vigorous discussion followed, on:
      the issue of vaccine suitability, r-values and their interpretation, and performance of O
         Manisa vaccine in the field against the O PanAsia II virus;
      the apparent drift in FMDV type A from Afghanistan from the A Iran 05 cluster, with reduced
         match top A22 Iraq and other type A vaccine strains;
      there is a paucity of data on the situation in regions outside the ones discussed above, e.g.
         South-America;
      countries should try to get more information on the quality of the vaccine they use, e.g. by
         vaccinating small groups (e.g. 10-15 cattle) of animals and collecting approximately 250
         ml of serum three weeks post-vaccination to be tested in various laboratories.

Conclusions

1. Access to data is required for risk assessment, therefore sharing of the information with those
   that require it is important. Although the information obtained is better than in the past, there
   is still room for improvement on the quality of the data provided to the regional laboratories
   (data capture) and the data outputs (display).
2. There is a need for a regional ecosystem based (Eurasia, Middle-east and Africa) analysis of
   virus spread and risk, linking outbreak and laboratory data there might be a role for regional




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   5
       animal health centres of OIE/FAO. This would probably need more data, especially on
       husbandry systems.
  3.   Further work is needed to establish the role of sheep and goats in FMD epidemiology in
       different ecosystems. It is likely small ruminants play a more important role in epidemiology
       when clinical disease is present in large ruminants. It is probably wise to include small-
       ruminants in emergency vaccinations around outbreaks. Detailed studies in Turkey and Iran
       are required as the benefit to cost of vaccination of small ruminants is unclear.
  4.   Infrared cameras may prove useful to detect clinical disease in extensively kept animals.
  5.   The level and duration of protection of commercially available type O vaccines against the O
       PanAsia II virus strain remains unclear.
  6.   More information on antigen quantity in each dose is required to assess the apparent limited
       protection obtained with the three component type O vaccine used in Israel.
  7.   The relative efficacy of monovalent and multivalent vaccines against a particular challenge
       strain should be further evaluated.

Recommendations

  1.   A minimum standard of information should be provided with samples submitted to national and
       international (WRL and other) reference laboratories.
  2.   Guidance to countries is required on the definition of epidemiologically significant events that
       should be reported;
  3.   A web-based sequence database for shared access is urgently required, and the ad hoc group
       should identify how this can be achieved and the suitability of the systems under development
       for use in risk assessment;
  4.   A teleconference between the EUFMD secretary, the Research Group Chairman and WRLFMD
       should immediately follow the issue of WRLFMD quarterly reports, to review findings that may
       indicate changing level of risk and require follow up actions.

  Papers to be prepared by the ad hoc group

  1. Minimum standards for information to be provided with samples submitted to national and
     international (WRL and other) reference laboratories EUFMD member countries and for use in
     programs supported by EUFMD/EC [Action point: delivery 12/07];
  2. Definition and reporting of epidemiologically significant events: guidance paper, based on
     criteria developed under the EUFMD/EC/IVO program in Iran [Action point: delivery 12/07];
  3. Paper on the risk of spread from wild boar in the Israeli circumstances (SA and HY);
  4. Report on the use of thermal imaging camera for use in extensively kept cattle for the purpose
     of detection of febrile animals (HY, to be reviewed by DP);
  5. Complete the review of duration of immunity after type O vaccination (N Bulut and AD), to
     include the antibody decline by VNT, and the data should be analysed with linear mixed effect
     model. (by 12/07).

  Further, serum from the trials with ARRIAH vaccine, and or other type O vaccine used in the
  neighbourhood should be tested by the SAP Institute or RL partners for inclusion in a more
  complete review (CP, EB and NB).

  Recommendations specifically relating to type O control in Turkey

  The Turkish authorities are recommended to:

  1. Undertake an urgent study on increasing biosecurity measures to prevent movement of
     infection from animal markets in Istanbul to European Thrace [GDPC/EuFMD/EC program];
  2. Monitor immunity in Thrace and Anatolia after autumn vaccination 2007 and subsequent
     campaigns (SAP Institute/GDPC), and continue NSP sero-monitoring in Thrace with assistance
     of the ad hoc group of the EuFMD Research Group in design;
  3. Study the effect of homologous vaccination on the duration of O Manisa immunity in a large
     group of animals by vaccinating half of the animals with monovalent type O vaccine;
  4. Review the current timing of the vaccination campaigns, to take into account the duration of
     immunity and the need to achieve maximum immunity before the main periods of risk,
     particularly the Kurban Bayram festival;
  5. Introduce booster vaccination of young animals 6 – 8 weeks after the primary vaccination, at
     least in regions which are prioritised for FMD control. The priorities should take into
     consideration the role of young animals in spread between breeding and finishing areas of
     Turkey;


              Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   6
6. If the immunity in population is insufficient to achieve the intended purpose a vaccination
   schedule which results in a better immunity should be introduced.


The CRL should

7. complete a cross-immunity test (EurPh potency test) of O Manisa vs O PanAsiaII challenge,
   including assessment of the homologous potency based on serology.

The research group should

8. continue work on improving surveillance [including confidence in freedom and optimization of
    surveillance actions to achieve];
9. through the ad hoc group on international surveillance, assess the significance of new strains
    (antigenic and genetic developments, revision of use of r value readout) and advise the EU and
    vaccine companies on the need for development of new vaccine strains;
10. convene a subgroup with specific interest in the technical support to Turkey, to respond to
    issues raised by the Turkish authorities through the national FMD task force or by EuFMD or
    EC;
11. be as a group provided with more information on a regular basis on the status and plans of the
    EC funded FMD control project in Turkey.


Item 3. Technical Issues arising from outbreaks in the UK in 2007

Two papers were given, an overview of the Pirbright laboratory involvement in surveillance and
outbreak investigation, given by David Paton (Appendix 7), by Soren Alexandersen (Appendix 8)
on the results of independent full length sequencing of the FMDV genomes as part of the post-
outbreak investigation.

Discussion

The papers provided detailed insight in the sequence of the outbreak, still is not possible to track
the escape and route to the first outbreak from the Pribright Laboratories. All the possible escape
mechanism were considered unlikely, e.g. flooding would dilute the virus very much and the first
infected premises were upstream, and the pH treatment of the centrifuge waste might have been
inadequate, still most of the virus should be inactivated. The incident, however shows that the
building concept with different containment buildings on site connected with piping is far from
ideal.
The outbreak showed that the assumption that clinical disease will be notified in cattle and pigs is
not always true; it depends on the expertise of the owner and the frequency of contact. Notification
is reliable in dairy cattle, but less reliable in extensively kept fattening cattle.
In the laboratory lateral flow devices (strip tests) were evaluated and showed valuable in detecting
FMD virus infection.

Conclusions

1. The group agrees with conclusions of earlier independent inquiries that the source of the UK
   2007 outbreaks was escape of FMDV from the Pirbright site.

2. Far greater attention is needed in contingency plans to the system to be applied to detect
   infection in extensively kept animals, to ensure early detection (e.g. by requiring a daily
   inspection by the farmer).

3. Evidence of spread of infection to just outside 10 km surveillance zones raises question of need
   for larger zones, which could be termed an observation zone, especially given the damage
   resulting from re-imposition of national standstills.

4. Lateral flow test devices for FMDV detection were demonstrated to be useful to provide rapid
   diagnosis on farm and in the NRL.




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   7
Recommendations

1. Veterinarians conducting surveillance for clinical FMD must undertake examination of the
   mouth of each animal under surveillance, following a standard protocol, and be given the
   facilities to undertake this. If not possible, routine blood testing for viraemia and antibody
   response must be introduced;
2. Countries should re-evaluate their national FMD contingency plans and allied operational
   manuals to address the issue of detection of infection in husbandry systems where there is a
   low level of owner inspection and an expected problem in clinical inspection;
3. The issue of mutual assistance in case of inability of an NRL in Europe to undertake diagnosis,
   e.g. due to fire, flood or regulatory non-compliance, should be addressed at the CVO level
   (EUFMD Executive) as well as through development of mutual agreements between NRLs;
4. Further evaluation needed of cost-benefit for preclinical diagnostic tests e.g. large-scale RT-
   PCR on blood or other samples.


Papers to be completed

1. Recommended procedure (standard) for clinical examination and recording of findings during
   veterinary surveillance visits for detection of clinical FMD (DS: for the report: 1-2 pages, by
   end October);
2. Draft contract or form of agreement whereby a network of FMD labs in Europe could agree to
   provide services to NRLs that are temporarily incapacitated;
3. Review paper on the size and purpose of zones established for the purpose of FMD control
   (protection, surveillance and additional zones) [review at the November Executive; complete
   by June 2008].


SECTION II: ITEMS UNDER THE REMIT OF THE LABORATORY STANDARSIZATION AND
   BIOSAFETY AD HOC GROUP

Item 4. Promotion of molecular tests as the first choice method for FMD diagnosis, and
   on reducing false negative findings in Turkey and Iran

On further development of real-time RT-PCR (rtRT-PCR) for FMD confirmation in third
   countries and in Europe

Dr Sumption introduced the item, illustrating the number of countries in the Middle-east and South
Asia which now had real-time RT-PCR for HPAI conformation. Several countries had requested FAO
to provide training and support to introduce RT-PCR for FMD and other pathogens, mainly to make
efficient use of the new capacity but also to address the problem of low sensitivity in other
methods (immunocapture ELISA) and biosafety (virus isolation).
Dr Dekker had been requested to provide a guidance paper (Appendix 9) for EuFMD/FAO to assist
training and support for laboratories wishing to adopt or evaluate RT-PCR for FMDV diagnosis,
including the issue of external quality assurance and harmonisation of test performance.

Discussion

The main issues discussed were: sustainability of rtRT-PCR, there being several incidences where
tests for HPAI had been established in third countries but per test costs were prohibitively
expensive; quality control issues, particularly the use of internal controls to detect possible false
negative extractions and amplifications; primer design and risk of false negatives as sequences
evolve; and the issue of performance standards versus standardized procedures. Several countries
in Europe were involved in decentralizing animal disease confirmation to lower biosecurity labs at
sub national level and therefore the need for performance testing of these services within countries
was a precedent for a similar international QA for newly established rtRT-PCR capacity in the
European neighbourhood.

Position on Decentralized testing for secondary cases of FMDV in normally free regions
This issue arose out of the earlier work on pen-side diagnostic tests and their role in FMD diagnosis
in relation to laboratory based services normally provided by an NRL in Europe. Donal Sammin
provided a summary of key points to be included in the guidance or position paper (Appendix 10).




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   8
Reducing false negative rates in FMD confirmation in Iran and Turkey
Keith Sumption summarized the concerns of the Secretariat and Executive Committee that reports
of FMD outbreaks in Turkey and Iran in the past year included a high proportion of outbreaks
defined on clinical grounds which had not been confirmed by laboratory tests. However, when
comparing the results in Turkey with those in other countries the detection rate was not low. Still,
the reporting of suspected FMD cases has to be encouraged to keep the percentage of unconfirmed
outbreaks at the current level, otherwise it could lead to the range of epidemic events associated
with late detection.
The reasons for negative results in suspected cases included late notification, late stage lesions,
and treatments of the lesions that would lead to failure to isolate virus, but of course other
infections that caused the lesions. Therefore, the protocol for investigation should include active
search for early cases, and repeated serology to look for seroconversion in a herd, to reduce the
risk of false negative herd investigations. Plans for improving sample collection procedures were in
place for introduction into the instructions to field vets in 2008. The situation in Iran was also
described by Dr Otorod to be similar.
It was agreed that problems were multiple, involving late notifications, poor sampling,
transportation issues and test sensitivity; a review in each country is needed before proposing
solutions. It was also agreed that introduction of new test procedures (including pre-clinical
diagnosis) offered new opportunities to improve conformation rates.

Conclusions

1. Proficiency testing has shown that between lab variation with RT-PCR (either real time or
    classical) is lower than with VI and therefore use of the method is encouraged;
2. Several RT-PCR tests have been described, each with its own advantages and disadvantages,
    therefore it is not possible to prescribe one single RT-PCR test for FMDV;
3. There are limiting factors in the application of real-time RT-PCR in third countries that affect
    sustainability (e.g. costs of reagents, power supply during process, and contamination control)
    and therefore countries that elect for using real-time RT-PCR should retain a backup
    confirmation test;
4. Real-time RT-PCR has a higher analytical sensitivity than conventional RT-PCR for FMD;
5. There is no validated RT-PCR available that can differentiate between serotypes, therefore in
    countries where more than one type is present or suspected to be circulating it is essential to
    type the isolate with a another RT-PCR or by virus isolation combined with serological
    techniques;
6. An internal control may be useful to rule out false negatives;
7. There can be discrepancies between results of RT-PCR and other diagnostic techniques, which
    can be difficult for authorities, and training in the method must assist the countries to develop
    a clear process for decision making following RT-PCR results;
8. Quality control procedures are very important for reproducible test performance, e.g. batch
    control of ingredients;
9. Multiplex testing can be useful for differential diagnosis, but there is often a reduction in
    sensitivity for a specific agent. Work on internal controls shows that the reduction in sensitivity
    can be minimised;
10. Test performance of lateral flow devices evaluated in a laboratory setting indicates that they
    can play a useful role in secondary cases. However, not all serotypes are detected with
    sufficient sensitivity; one such device did not detect SAT types but detected approximately
    86% of the samples containing A, O and Asia-1 serotypes. The other device had the same
    sensitivity for these serotypes, but also detected some of the SAT types.

Recommendations:
1. Sequences in the target regions should be studied by the WRL and NRLs in endemic regions
   and the international recommended primers kept under review (yearly update by the
   CRL/WRL);
2. The international FAO/CRL EQA system involving proficiency panels should be continued and
   should assist the harmonisation of performance of real-time and classical RT-PCR in the hands
   of the NRLs;
3. Each NRL using RT-PCR should maintain a back-up protocols to be used to confirm a negative
   result on samples from strongly suspected FMD cases;
4. Whatever test is applied it should be validated in the laboratory and should achieve a basic
   level of performance as identified in proficiency tests. The same applies for multiplex tests;




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   9
5. Companies are encouraged to produce standardized kits with primers and probes for FMDV, as
   currently can be purchased for other diseases such as Avian Influenza, for all possible
   platforms.
6. Further studies are encouraged to finalize the standardization of serological tests with respect
   to protection afforded by vaccines against homologous challenge (a study on O Manisa
   serological responses is part of the FMD Improcon project).

Actions /papers

1. Position paper on the use of RT-PCR for the diagnosis of FMD (AD 1 December 2007)
2. Position paper on the options of decentralized testing (DS 1 December 2007)
3. Analysis of the reasons for low confirmation rates in Turkey and Iran (CP, ZZ and NS by 1
   December 2007) and proposed solutions;
4. Sampling instructions for field veterinarians to collect samples with the primary biocontainment
   at the point of sampling for use in RT-PCR (SZ or BH).

Item 5. FMD laboratory biocontainment

Dr Haas introduced this item, as Chairman of the working group (under the Research Group) on
FMD laboratory biosecurity. The “Minimum Standards for FMD Laboratories” adopted by the EuFMD
Commission in 1993 remained the reference text for the Council Directive on FMD ad therefore the
revision of this document fell in the mandate of the EuFMD Commission and inter alia, the research
group of the Standing Technical Committee.

A working group had been convened in September 2007 to review the 1993 standards, comprising
biosafety officers of six of the licensed laboratories to handle FMDV in Europe for diagnostic,
research and vaccine production purposes. In addition the group included a biocontainment expert
with expertise in air filtrations, a representative of the WRL (Dr Paton) and the EuFMD Secretary.

The first meeting had agreed that updating of the text was required, for several reasons: technical
specifications of components such as air filters had changed; modern biosafety thinking places
greater emphasis on documenting the approach taken in assessing and managing risks, and there
is generally greater concern on the human element and the need to ensure FMDV risk in considered
when laboratories have multiple use, for example where kits and reagents are produced for a range
of animal pathogens.

The working group had taken on the updating of sections without proposing major changes to the
overall layout of the document, except for introduction of new texts on risk assessment and
management, including training.

Discussion

The Chairman thanked Dr Haas for his effort, and that of the working group, to progress the
updating of the document. Discussion followed the suitability of the OIE requirements for
biocontainment for application in endemic areas, where the requirements for handling live FMD do
not take into account the status and epidemiologic circumstances, and the impact of escape of
endemic strains of FMD is quite different from that in free countries. Members of the group felt that
OIE requirements did not differentiate according to risk and therefore it is not surprising that many
countries outside of Europe choose to work with FMD virus for diagnostic purposes (and also
vaccine production) without fulfilling OIE requirements. The 4 levels used in the OIE code is not in
line with the containment levels in human laboratories where the fourth level is for pathogens that
can severly harm the person working with the agent and the physical containment requirements
are more stringent than at level 3 to protect the person working with the agent. A containment
level, in which escape of the agent to people or animals outside the laboratory and is needed when
working with FMD, is consistent with a human containment level 3.

The question of the need for EuFMD standards on biocontainment was raised; the Secretary
answered that this was really a matter for the European regulatory authorities (at the level of the
Council) as the 1993 Standard was referenced in regulations, and until this was changed the
EuFMD Commission and inter alia its technical committee were asked to regular review the
Standard.




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   10
Conclusions

1. The group agreed on the need to update the 1993 Standards, and to give the responsibility for
   this to a working group chaired by a member of the Research Group, and accountable to the
   Chairman for progress in this area.
2. The OIE requirements for laboratories handling live FMD are relevant, but should be reviewed
   with respect to the numbers of levels included, and consideration should be given to ensure
   that EuFMD standards are compatible with the OIE requirements, but the EUFMD standards
   should make clear where risk assessment can enable the safe application of non-live virus
   techniques in FMD diagnosis, for example in decentralised, secondary laboratories.
3. A working principle in the standard should be that laboratories have responsibility to validate
   the risk reduction measures they put in place, as part of the risk assessment and risk reduction
   approach.
4. The working group must consider if the scale of virus production, for example in vaccine
   production plants, requires a different requirement for risk management than for other
   situations.

Recommendations

1. The new minimum containments standard should include consensus terms used in the
   international terminology on biosafety, such as those included in the "Laboratory Biorisk
   Management Standard".
2. The OIE should be asked to reduce the number of biosafety levels, to be consistent with
   containment levels in human medicine.
3. The new minimum standard should include strengthened sections on risk assessment and on
   management.
4. The paper on minimum containment standards should be finalized by the ad hoc working work,
   and a decision taken on circulation for wider consultation by the Chairman of he research group
   together with the Chair of the EuFMD Commission and the Secretariat. The entire process of
   review and consultation should be complete before the Open Session in 2008.
5. The group should refer to the paper the "serology laboratory paper" and the concepts from OIE
   guidelines

Biosafety papers to be completed

1. Revised position paper of minimum requirements for FMD laboratories (BH 31 December 2008)
2. Revised position paper, as an addition or addendum to the document on live virus facilities, to
   include the requirements for applying non-live FMD techniques in serology and for RT-PCR (BH
   31 December 2008).


SECTION III: ITEMS UNDER THE REMIT OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON SURVEILLANCE AND
SERO-MONITORNING ISSUES

Item 6. Post-vaccination surveillance (PVS) in FMD free countries or populations
approaching disease freedom

Papers, viewpoints and progress reports on PVS were given by Kris de Clercq, David Paton, Tom
Murray, François Maree, Gavin Thomson, Emiliana Brocchi and Donal Sammin.

6.1 Technical issues requiring solutions identified at the PVS workshops

6.1.1Review of main conclusions of the first two workshops

Dr Kris de Clercq summarised the main conclusions from the first two simulation exercise
workshops (Appendix 11) at which the surveillance approaches after emergency vaccination in
relevant European scenario were selected and evaluated by country participants. A final Workshop
(week of 22nd October) was planned after which a synthesis of findings and their implications would
be needed. It was evident that the workshops had uncovered several areas of remaining difficulty,
and a probable need for some changes in the regulatory standards (OIE and Council Directive).

It was agreed by the group that there must be follow on meetings to reach consensus on some
points which constrain confidence in application of emergency vaccination/PVS and that the ad hoc



           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   11
group of the RG should take this forward with the partners involved in the PVS workshops. The key
decision points or technical problems also need to be relayed to the CVO level, for example at the
EUFMD executive in order that sufficient time and effort is placed to reach a resolution.

6.1.2 View point on resolution of remaining technical issues with PVS following
emergency vaccination

Dr David Paton outlined his thinking in a presentation (Appendix 12); in order to better design
PVS, a modelling study was conducted to estimate the target prevalence of FMDV infected animals
after an epidemics in which EV had been applied. In the model a 10 km ring vaccination was
assumed. The model allowed for differences in risks between small herds and large herds,
therefore the model predicted little benefit from vaccinating small herds. Whether risk for large
holding are truly higher needs to be established, because large holdings often also have a higher
standard bio security on the farm. The approach, however very nicely shows how modelling can be
used in the planning phase.


6.2 Progress with use of scenario trees to optimise surveillance for confidence in disease
freedom
Dr Tom Murray, EuFMD, presented a progress report (Appendix 13) on the use of this approach to
explore the contribution of sero-surveillance, test performance, and other surveillance activities to
an overall level of confidence in freedom from FMD, using the example of Thrace region of Turkey,
and using surveillance design for NSP reactors used in 2006 in this region.
The group agreed this was a interesting approach that required to be continued.

Conclusions:

1. NSP workshops have identified need for potential modification to the Council Directive 2003
   and/or the OIE Code Annexes, on surveillance after emergency vaccination;
2. There is a need to replace the text and concept of “demonstration of freedom” to
   “substantiation of freedom from infection” in livestock populations, given the impossibility of
   the former, in texts with regulatory importance in which the purpose of PVS is indicated;
3. There remains a lack of detail in OIE Code and specific Annexes relating to the requirements
   for surveillance after emergency vaccination in normally free countries, which affects the
   decision making of counties in designing and implementing PVS;
4. There is a need to quantify confidence in freedom from infection following surveillance activities
   after emergency vaccination.

Recommendations

1. Countries performing surveillance should further develop the scenario tree approach as part of
   the effort to quantify the contribution of each part of an entire surveillance system to
   confidence in DF;
2. Relating to pigs, the requirement of the Council Directive 2003, currently to test all animals in
   PVS surveys, should be reviewed, with consideration given to replacement with a 95/5 survey;
3. The EU and OIE should consider making regulations allowing for the slaughter of individual
   animal slaughter versus herd slaughter, following a singleton or limited number of positive NSP
   test results. If only the NSP positive animals are slaughtered the risk from such a herd is will
   be vary low in a vaccinated area. Because all ruminants are tested approximately 85% of the
   carrier animals will be found and removed;
4. The Research Group should evaluate the literature on disease spread, to determine whether
   the assumption that small herds contribute less to disease spread is true. If this is true then
   national Contingency plans should consider and put into place a clear strategy for inclusion or
   exclusion of small herds in emergency vaccination programs, ahead of any decision to
   vaccinate, to reduce complications in the later PVS phase.
5. Criteria should be developed to assist countries to substantiate a claim of an effective level of
   herd immunity in the vaccinated herds and zones.


6.3 NSP test performance issues

6.3.1 Performance of NSP tests for use following SAT type infections




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   12
Two papers were presented for discussion. In the first, Francois Maree (Appendix 14) highlighted
the level of diversity in SAT viruses in regions which are utilised in the current NSP tests, with a
focus on the 3ABC coding regions. Following experimental infection of non-vaccinated animals, the
antibody response as measured by commercially available NSP kits had been of limited duration
and with high variability between test systems, although the Ceditest was the most reliable test
system currently available. He concluded that there exists a problem for selection and use of NSP
test for regions affected by SAT viruses that requires to be resolved.

In the second, Gavin Thomson (Appendix 15), summarized a recent independent review that had
been commissioned by the SADC-FMD project, which supported the above view point that currently
available NSP test kits had not been shown to have a sufficient performance for use in PVS after
SAT infection. He gave an overview of the purpose of NSP test use in areas affected by SAT
viruses, particularly the policy issue of how to promote FMD control in populations of cattle in
southern Africa that live in close proximity to cape buffalo, and not separated by fences, as
increasingly is the trend in the proliferation of trans-frontier national parks across southern Africa.
In his view, a more sensitive test could perhaps be a test based on the 3D protein.


6.3.2 Key performance data for NSP tests; a performance summary for tests available for
use in Europe

Dr Emiliana Brocchi (Appendix 16) and Dr Donal Sammin (Appendix 17) provided a review of
key information on test characteristics and test validation available for recently described NSP
antibody tests for FMD. Only the six ELISAs that were compared during the Brescia workshop 2004
(FMD_ImproCon/EuFMD/EC) have achieved a validation level for application in cattle complying
with the requirements of the OIE validation template.Comparative performance data of the six NSP
tests were made available through a series of publications, with emphasis given to DSp and DSe
evaluated for different FMD conditions, the most critical for PVS being the condition of vaccinated
and infected animals in the time interval 28-100 days post exposure.

An overview of newly described NSP tests has been provided by EB, with a critical discussion of
performance data reported in literature. For most of these tests, estimates of DSp are adequate, in
contrast of estimates of DSe that are preliminary and incomplete. Comparability of new DIVA tests
for FMD with the validated ones requires availability and testing of comprehensive panels of sera.

Conclusions

1. Insufficient studies have been completed on test performance (DSe and Dsp) with FMD
   vaccinated and infected sheep;
2. A review is needed to assess the relevance and importance of improving the test performance
   estimates for vaccinated and infected pigs;
3. There is not sufficient information to demonstrate that there is or is not a problem with use of
   NSP tests to detect SATs with the Cedi-test or other tests that are comparable to the OIE Index
   test.

Recommendations:

1. The EU should stimulate in their research programme further development of DIVA tests and
   /or test combinations suitable as confirmatory test, with diagnostic performance at least
   comparable to that of best NSP assays currently available;
2. National reference laboratories should study the performance of tests (and test combinations)
   that are currently available for use by NRLs for detection of SAT infections;
3. The ad hoc group should on a regular (yearly) basis update the “most appropriate validation
   data ” that indicates the test performance (DSp and DSe) of the commercial anad in-house
   tests available for Europe;
4. The ad hoc group should also annually review of the reported performance of new generation n
   NSP tests;
5. The CRL should also use proficiency testing exercises (CRL/Phases studies) to upgrade
   validation of certain parameters for NSP test used in NRL, such as DSp (through testing of 500
   sera from negative populations) and reproducibility (by collating results reported by NRL for
   the proficiency panel of sera).




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   13
Papers to be completed

1. Review of the performance of NSP tests for detection of SAT infections (Roeder and Thomson –
   by 1/12);
2. Summary table(s) giving estimates of test performance (DSp and Dse) for the commercially
   available NSP tests (OIE index test, Ceditest, Svanova, Brescia test) for use in main species
   (EB and DS, 1/12).

Item 7. Issues arising from monitoring of preventive vaccination programs in non-free
countries

This issue arises from the program of activities of the EuFMD with non-free countries in the Near-
East and South-East Europe. Three papers were presented and discussed; the first, by Naci Bulut,
on the problem of inadequate duration of protective antibody titres after type O vaccination in
Turkey (Appendix 18); the second, by Carsten Potzsch, on the development of a minimum
standard for reporting sero-monitoring activities (Appendix 19), including standards of data
collection and expected outputs; the third being a concept paper on development of a model to
predict the population immunity in space and time after vaccination campaigns, to assist decision
makers to predict the outcome of changing vaccines and vaccination regimes.

Stability of type O titres after vaccination (Naci Bulut, Appendix 18)

Dr Bulut showed that the percentage of cattle with LPBE titre higher than 1/100 was diminishing
more quickly with type O than with type A or Asia-1. The observed reduction in time was not
related to differences in vaccines used. This might indicate that the protective response to type O is
more short lived than for the other types, which correlates with the high percentage of O outbreaks
in Turkey. The probably lower herd protection to type O is a risk for the evolution of new type O
strains. The data should also be analysed in a different way by looking at the titres found.
Nevertheless, the epidemiological situation shows already that new tyoe O strains are evolving and
this should be monitored very closely, and perhaps new vaccine strains should be selected to cover
better the recent isolates.

Standardization of sero-monitoring results; draft reporting format (Carsten Potzsch,
Appendix 19)

When sero-monitoring data are made available to neighbouring countries, which is very important
to understand the situation in the area, the format of the reports should be standardised. Dr
Potzsch developed a draft reporting format which can be used for this purposed.

Modelling population immunity after vaccination campaigns : concept paper (Arnaud le
Menach, FAO. Appendix 20)

Dr Le Menach showed the outcome of a deterministic SEIR model on the population immunity.
According to this model 30% of the animals protected against FMD infection would be sufficient if
movement restrictions are in place (note by AD, this corresponds with a R of approximately 1.4
which has been found after movement restrictions were in the UK. It will be essential to estimate
protection against heterologous challenge, because a normal 3 PD50 vaccine will only protect
75%of the animals against homologous challenge. To achieve at least 30% of protection against
infection with a heterologous strain a large part of the population has to be vaccinated still).

Conclusions

    1. There is a need for harmonization of methods used in sero-monitoring of vaccination in the
        programs served by the EUFMD Commission to ensure comparability between results of
        population level surveys and vaccine trials.




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   14
Recommendations

   1. The ad hoc group on laboratory standardisation should guide the Secretariat in what should
       be done, including, as required, the exchange of sera of parallel or repeat testing from the
       Caucasus, Turkey, Iran and Egypt, to give examples;
   2. Continued development of a model to predict the immunity in a population after vaccination
       campaign over time is strongly supported. If this cannot be continued by FAO staff then a
       proposal should be made for possible EUFMD/EC/other support, with the aim of
       development and testing before the Open Session 2008.


Papers to be finalized

   1. Finalize paper on type O antibody kinetics induced by different FMD type O vaccines (NB and
       Aldo Dekker);
   2. Finalize paper on standardisation of information collection and information output (Carsten
       Potzsch).

Item 8. Final papers –information session

The final Session involved offered five offered papers; these were subsequently reviewed and
conclusions and recommendations reported under relevant ad hoc working group.

8.1 Progress report on experimental infections in dromedary and Bactrian camels (S.
Alexandersen, Appendix 21)

Dr. Alexandersen showed very eloquent data on studies in which attempts were made to infect
dromedary camels.
Conclusion: Dromedary camels have proved refractory to infection with FMDV serotypes O and A,
whereas Bactrian camels were successfully infected with serotype A and developed severe lesions
on hind feet.

8.2    View point on role of sheep and goats in the epidemiology of FMD in Iran (V.
Otarod, Appendix 4)

This paper arose from the Iran/EUFMD/EC program. The analysis showed that most outbreaks of
FMD were reported in non-vaccinated units. But the absence of laboratory confirmation cannot
exclude the some of the disease was caused by other infections than FMD (e.g. PPR or ecthyma
contagiosa). The consensus was that assessment of the role of sheep in transmission to cattle
could not simply be based on reported incidences in each species but required also sero-monitoring
information on age-related exposure.

8.3 Molecular epidemiology of FMD in Iran (N. Shirazi, Appendix 5)

This paper reported on progress made during a study tour at the WRL supported by the
Iran/EUFMD/EC program. The conclusion was that the typing results need to be further assessed
for evidence of local area heterogeneity (“mixing vessels”), local persistence (limited change over
time).

8.4   Reports and issues raised in the control of type O FMD in Israel in 2007, including
assessment of the use of a thermal imaging device (Hagai Yadin, Appendix 22)

FMD is causing epidemics in Israel almost on a yearly basis. The current vaccine contains 3 O type
strains, e A type strains and one Asia-1 strain. In 20007 all isolates were type O, and the most
likely rout of introduction was from neighbouring countries. Dr Yadin presented several examples of
outbreaks and showed that sometimes the number of NSO positive cattle can be very low (1-2 in a
herd). In a herd in which there was massive infection in cattle (20% NSP antibody positive) an
even higher percentage (80%) of NSP antibody positive sheep were found, although no clinical
disease was observed in the sheep.
Because in some previous outbreaks wild boar and gazelles were also affected, a system with a
thermal imaging device was tested from a helicopter. The system had been shown to be effective
at short distances of approximately 25 meters.



           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   15
8.5. Position paper on decentralised testing (Donal Sammin, Appendix 17)

The current lateral flow devices are only validated for type A, O and Asia-1. Sensitivity seems
similar to the currently used antigen detection ELISA.

SECTION IV: OTHER ISSUES

Item 9 Vaccination of sheep: Updated guidance paper, preventive and emergency
situations

Keith Sumption introduced this Item (Appendix 23). A previous paper on control and eradication
of FMD in livestock populations with a high density of sheep had been prepared for the EuFMD
Session in 20001. The issues of vaccination of sheep in European countries as part of an emergency
response, and in non-free countries as part of routine preventive vaccination, had been raised by
CVOs at various meetings including the recent FAO/OIE Roundtable on FMD control in the Middle-
east. In countries such as Iran, with 80 million sheep and only 8 million cattle, the question of
vaccination also has large resource implications, also the case where emergency vaccination is
considered with limited vaccine bank reserves compared to total livestock populations in a control
zone.

Since 2000, there had been additional evidence from field and experimental studies on the role of
sheep that required consideration. From the UK 2001 it was suggested that sheep acted as
”porters” of FMDV between holdings. This was especially very clear in the period before the
national movement ban was in place but the evidence was unclear as to there role in long term
persistence of FMDV circulation within an area and of their role as first recipients of infection on a
holding (with subsequent spread to cattle). It was clear at a macro-epidemiologic level that FMD
could cease to circulate in a country without significant sheep vaccination (types Asia-1 and type A
Iran 96 in Turkey, for example) but unclear if type O circulation could cease with only cattle
vaccination in such an area. The question of inclusion of sheep in vaccination buffer zones remains
important, with sheep included in once yearly vaccination in Thrace region of Turkey but not under
the EC funded buffer zone program in the Caucasus.

Discussion

The group agreed that the Guidelines needed to be updated and that the issue of vaccination of
sheep in endemic countries required specific attention, having major implications for the middle-
east.
The lack of data from field studies on the role of sheep remained a problem. The group supported
the proposal for specific review of the UK data on the role of sheep and the potential
epidemiological impact of vaccination after the movement ban. Detailed serological studies in Iran
and Turkey could help resolve issues of the role of sheep and an expert group should develop a
proposal for a cost-effective form of study.

Conclusions

1. The Guidelines in the 2000 EUFMD report require updating, and in so doing the authors should
   consider other relevant texts, particularly requirements stated in the OIE Code.

Recommendations

1. A systematic study on the role of sheep in FMD transmission after the movement ban in UK in
   2001, and the possible epidemiologic benefits of vaccination of sheep, should be undertaken
   [Action: Secretariat]

Papers to be prepared

1. Guidelines on the inclusion of vaccination of sheep into control programs in FMD free and non-
   free regions
2. The systematic study indicated in Recommendation 1.




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   16
Item 10. Group work to develop conclusions, recommendations and actions

The participants divided into three groups, each with a rapporteur.

1. International surveillance group:
DP, TM, SA, JH, VO, FG.
The group summarized Items 2,3, including FMD information from Iran, Turkey, Israel, plus the
study on FMD in camels.

2. Lab standardization and biosafety group
AD, EB, BH, HY, NS, DS. Tackled Items 4, 5, and decentralised lab tests.

3. Post-vaccination surveillance and vaccination monitoring group:,
SZ, HV, NB, KdC, GG, CP, FM, GT. Tackled Items under Items 7 and 8.


Item 11. Reading of the report
The summaries, conclusions and recommendations were collated and a preliminary read-through
and amendment was made by the group on day 3.

Item 12. Other tasks held over from the 2005-7 work plan
The group discussed items held over from the previous work plan.

1. Type C position paper: no progress, remained an issue. FAO was requested to commission
review to be presented to the International Surveillance ad hoc group;
2. Naming of strains (WRL): to be followed up under Laboratory Standardization ad hoc group;
3. Position paper on potency testing in pigs. The Chairman proposed this be completed by the
Open Session 2008. As there is no dedicated ad hoc group for vaccine quality assurance, he would
oversee this task;
4. Virus inactivation studies: proposals drafted, but not funded. Executive Committee should be
informed;
5. Laboratory Contingency Plans: a generic LCP is an output of the Co-ordination Action and will
be completed under this project;
6. Replacement of challenge with serological assessment: progress is being made under the
Improcon project, to be reported to the Open Session 2008 (progress and implications to be
monitored by the Standardization ad hoc group).

Item 13. Planning of the Open Session

Venues were discussed; the offer made at the 2006 meeting (Italy and UK) were reconfirmed. The
IVO also indicated willingness to host a meeting in Iran.
Dates: end of September 2008 (to enable University accommodation if in UK) to mid October
(Italy).
Cost: the group discussed the maximum daily cost for budget purposes, and agreed the total cost
per participant must be kept below < 130€ per day.
Decision: both DP and EB would identify options and report back to the Secretariat and Chairman
to enable a decision by the 75th Executive (29th November).

Closing ceremony
On behalf of all the members of the group, the incoming Chairman thanked the outgoing Chairman
(Dr de Clercq) for his outstanding efforts over at least the past 10 years to build a truly
collaborative and productive scientific network. This was wholeheartedly endorsed by all present.
The Chairman thanked Dr de Clercq for being willing to say as Vice-Chairman during the Session.
The Secretary thanked all members and participants for their willingness to give time to the
international effort on FMD and thanked the Chairman of the GOVS, Dr Samaha, and Deputy
Director of the SVSRI Abbasia laboratory, Dr Azab, for their support and hospitality.
Finally he said that the success of the meeting was largely the work of the persons, Nadia Rumich
(EUFMD Secretariat) and Yaser Gado, GOVS Liaison officer. Their work was warmly applauded by
the group. He also thanked FAO staff in Cairo, particularly M.Mirreh and Toni Ettel for support with
arrangements.



           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   17
Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   18
                                                                                                        Appendix 1
                                         LIST OF PARTICIPANTS


              Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee
                                         Cairo – Egypt
                                      16- 19 October 2007



Dr Kris DE CLERCQ (Chairman)
Head                                                            Dr Georgi Kirilov GEORGIEV
Department of Virology                                          Head of Exotic and Emerging Diseases
Section Epizootic Diseases                                      National Diagnostic and Research Veterinary
CODA-CERVA-VAR                                                  Medical Institute
Groeselenberg 99                                                1606 Sofia, Bulgaria
B-1180 Ukkel, Belgium                                           Tel/Fax: +359-2-8341004
Tel/Fax: +32-2-3790400 / +32-2-3790666                          georgivet@yahoo.com
kris.de.clercq@var.fgov.be
                                                                Dr Bernd HAAS
Dr Søren ALEXANDERSEN                                           Head of National FMD Reference Laboratory
Research Professor                                              Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut
Danish Institute for Food and Veterinary Research               Federal Research Institute for Animal Health
Department of Virology, Lindholm                                Boddenblick 5 a
DK-4771, Kalvehave, Denmark                                     17493 Greifswald, Insel Riems, Germany
Tel/Fax: +45-72-347833 / +45-72-347883 (direct)                 Tel/Fax: +49-(0)3835170 / +49-(0)383517151
or 347901                                                       bernd.haas@fli.bund.de
sax@dfvf.dk
                                                                Dr Stephan ZIENTARA
Dr Emiliana BROCCHI                                             AFSSA – Lerpaz - BP 67
Head                                                            94703 Maisons-Alfort Cedex, France
National Reference Laboratory for Vesicular                     Tel/Fax: +33-1-49-771333 / +33-1-43-689762
Diseases                                                        s.zientara@afssa.fr
Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della
  Lombardia e dell’Emilia Romagna                               Dr Dónal SAMMIN
Via A. Bianchi, 7/9                                             Senior Research Officer
25124 Brescia, Italy                                            Central Veterinary Research Laboratory
Tel/Fax: +39-30-2290310 / +39-30-2290369                        Daf Laboratories, Backweston, Celbridge Co.
 ebrocchi@bs.izs.it                                             Kildare, Ireland
                                                                Tel/Fax: +353-1-615-7242 / +353-1-615-7253
Dr Aldo DEKKER                                                  donal.sammin@agriculture.gov.ie
Senior Scientist
Laboratory Vesicular Diseases                                   Dr Hagai YADIN
Central Institute for Animal Disease Control                    Head of Virology Division and
PO Box 2004, Lelystad                                           FMD Laboratory
8203 AA, The Netherlands                                        Kimron Veterinary Institute
Tel/Fax: +31-320-238603 / +31-320-238668                        c/o Ministry of Agriculture
Aldo.Dekker@wur.nl                                              PO Box 12
                                                                Beit-Dagan 50250, Israel
                                                                Tel/Fax: +972-3-968-1619 / +972-3-968-1788




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007        19
hagaiy@moag.gov.il
                                                                Prof. Hassan AIDAROS
Dr Naci BULUT                                                   FAO Regional Animal Health Center,Beirut
FMD Expert                                                      Tel: +2012 2185166
Head of the Diagnosis Department                                Fax: +202 7607055
FMD Institute                                                   haidaros@netscape.net
Ankara
Tel: +90 312 2873600 /                                          Dr Gavin THOMSON
Fax: +90 312 2873606                                            SADC –FAO Project
Mobile: +90 533 3571484                                         Private Bag 0095
nacib@sap.gov.tr                                                Gaborone
                                                                Botswana
Dr Haken Vigre                                                  tel: +267 3913357
International Epilab Danish institute for Food and              gthomson@sadc.int
Veterinary Research Morkhoj Bygade 19 DK-
2860 Soborg Denmark                                             Dr Francois MAREE
hvi@vet.dfu.dk                                                  Exotic Diseases Division, OVI, ARC
                                                                Private Bag X05
                                                                Onderstepoort
FAO WRL                                                         0110
                                                                South Africa
Dr David PATON (ex-officio)                                     Tel: +27 12 5299584/94
Pirbright Laboratory                                            Fax: +27 12 5299595/05
Institute for Animal Health                                     mareef@arc.agric.za
Ash Road, Pirbright, Surrey GU24 0NF, UK
Tel/Fax: +44-1483-231012 / +44-1483-232621                      Dr Ibrahim EL BEN-DARY
david.paton@bbsrc.ac.uk                                         Govs-Egypt
                                                                Tel: +2 0 63725533
                                                                Ibelbendary@hotmail.com
OBSERVERS
                                                                Dr Yasser M. GADOU
Dr Jeffrey HAMMOND                                              Govs-Egypt
CSIRO, AAHL                                                     Tel: +2 0 05665720
Private Bag 24, Geelong, VIC 3220, Australia                    Yaser_Gov@yahoo.com
Tel/Fax: +61-03-522-75767 / +61-03-522-75555
jef.hammond@csiro.au
                                                                FAO
Dr Vahid OTAROD
Iran Veterinary Organization                                    Arnaud LEMENACH
23, Seyed Asad Abadi St.                                        EMPRES – FAO
PO Box 14155-6349, Tehran, Iran                                 Viale delle Terme di Caracalla
Tel/Fax: +98-982-188806407 / +98-982-                           00100 Rome, Italy
188902712                                                       arnaud.lemenach@fao.org
votarod@hotmail.com

Dr Mohammed Nazem SHIRAZI
Iran Veterinary Organization
23, Seyed Asad Abadi St.
PO Box 14155-6349, Tehran, Iran
Tel/Fax: +98-982-188806407 / +98-982-
188902712




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   20
       EUFMD SECRETARIAT

Dr Keith SUMPTION
Secretary, EUFMD
Animal Health Service
Animal Production and Health Division
FAO – Viale delle Terme di Caracalla
00100 Rome, Italy
Tel/Fax: +39-065705-5528 / +39-065705-5749
keith.sumption@fao.org

Dr Tom MURRAY
Associate Professional Officer, EUFMD
Animal Health Service
Animal Production and Health Division
FAO – Viale delle Terme di Caracalla
00100 Rome, Italy
Tel/Fax: +39-065705-5124 / +39-065705-5749
tom.murray@fao.org

Ms Nadia RUMICH
EUFMD Secretariat
Animal Health Service
Animal Production and Health Division
FAO – Viale delle Terme di Caracalla
00100 Rome, Italy
Tel/Fax: +39-065705-2637 / +39-065705-5749
nadia.rumich@fao.org

Dr Francis GEIGER
Iran Veterinary Organization
23, Seyed Asad Abadi St.
PO Box 14155-6349
Tehran, Iran
Tel/Fax: +98-2188957251 / +98-2188902712
francis.geiger@fao.org.

Dr Carsten PÖTZSCH
FAO International Coordinator
FMD Control and Surveillance
Ivedik Cad. No.551
06170 Yenimahalle, Ankara, Turkey
0090 31 23079554
carsten.potzsch@fao.org




         Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007   21
                                                                                                                Appendix 2

Agenda of the Research Group Session

Day 1 (16th). At FAO-RNE
1 Opening. Adoption of the Agenda, meeting organization
2 International FMD surveillance; recent FMD epidemic events
3 UK outbreak 2007: events, issues arising
   3.1. IAH paper (David Paton)
   3.2. Lindholm paper on full genome sequencing results ( Soren Alexandersen)
4 FMD confirmation :
   4.1. RG position on promotion of molecular tests as the main method/first choice for FMD
        confirmation. What conditions need to be present for sustainable and harmonised RT-PCR
        performance? (Aldo Dekker)
   4.2. low confirmation rates in endemic regions: problems and solutions; sample collection
        guidelines
5 FMD lab biosecurity working group (Bernd Haas)


Day 2 (Wedns; at SVSRI Abbasia vaccine production and control centre)
6 Post-vaccination surveillance (PVS);
   6.1. technical issues requiring solutions identified at the PVS workshops
       6.1.1. Review of main conclusions of the first two workshops (Kris de Clercq)
       6.1.2. view point on resolution of remaining technical issues with PVS (David Paton)
   6.2. Progress with use of scenario trees to optimise surveillance for confidence in disease
        freedom (Tom Murray)

    6.3. NSP test performance issues
        6.3.1. diagnostic sensitivity to SAT infection (Francois Maree, OVI), and purpose of NSP
             test use in areas affected by SAT viruses (Gavin Thomson, SADC-FMD project)
        6.3.2. key performance data for NSP tests; a performance summary for tests available for
             use in Europe (Emiliana Brocchi and Donal Sammin)

7   Issues arising from monitoring of vaccination programs
    7.1. stability of type O titres after vaccination (Naci Bulut)
    7.2. standardisation of sero-monitoring results; draft reporting format (Carsten Potszch)
    7.3. modelling population immunity: how can we do this? (Arnaud le Menach, FAO)

Discussion and conclusions on issues raised on day 2.

Day 3. Research Group Session at FAO-RNE

8   Final papers –information session
    8.1. progress report on experimental infections in dromedary and Bactrian camels (S.
                Alexandersen)
    8.2. View point on role of sheep and goats in the epidemiology of FMD in Iran (V. Otorod)
    8.3. Molecular epidemiology of FMD in Iran (N. Shirazi)
    8.4. Reports and issues raised in the control of type O FMD in Israel in 2007, including
                assessment of the use of a thermal imaging device (Hagai Yadin)
    8.5. Paper on decentralised laboratory testing (Donal Sammin)

9   Vaccination of sheep: Updated guidance paper , preventive and emergency situations (Keith
    Sumption)

10 Group work to develop conclusions
11 Reading of the report
12 Planning of the Open Session




           Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, Cairo-Egypt, 16-19 October 2007          22

								
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