NATO and the Transatlantic Link - The programme

Kiev Feb. 2004 The New Europe and its Transatlantic relations Mark Geleyn 1. Introduction Imagine you are back at the beginning of the nineties, say 1992, but you are reading a newspaper of today. That newspaper came to you by some strange relativistic time play, or by a joke of the Creator, no matter. What would be even more astonishing, is what you would read. Some examples: • • • Ukrainian and Polish forces are operating in Iraq, under US command, in a coalition rejected by Germany and The governor of Kaliningrad is studying the Schengen visa rules, because EU-traffic is going to disturb the quietness of his oblast. The fact that NATO is holding a seminar in Kiev, in the military academy, reflects in itself the tremendous changes that happened and are still to come. These are just a few small examples of the astonishing changes we have gone through. Change is permanent. Things that we have taken for granted for decades have been abandoned overnight, while completely new challenges prop up. To use a phrase of defence secretary Rumsfeld, there are the knowns, there are the unknowns we know about, but there are also the unknowns we don’t know about. 2. The New Europe The fall of the Berlin Wall, the implosion of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia created the conditions for a new security architecture in Europe, indeed for a new Europe. The enlargement of NATO and of the European Union completes that process of re-unification of our continent. The division of Europe after the second World War was a historic injustice. The enlargement of NATO and the EU contributed to overcome that injustice, but they were also strategic necessities. There were maybe 100 reasons for not enlarging and the West debated them passionately for years: the EU and NATO would loosen their cohesion. Their decision making would become more difficult. Were would enlargement stop? Would Russia and Ukraine not see this as a hostile act ? Would that not mean that enlargement would in fact lessen security? 1 These were strong reasons for not enlarging, for keeping old members together in a strong and select Union or Alliance. But if we had not taken the decision to enlarge, we would have made a historic mistake and a strategic blunder. If NATO would have stayed with 16 and the Union with 15, Europe would have got a number of small Central European countries belonging to no club, desperately looking for a security roof. And these countries would then have constituted a source of tension, insecurity, risky leaderships, economic mismanagement, depopulation, and thus a concern for all for years to come. The reunification of Europe restores order in the continent. It contributes to the political and military stability and at the same time contributes to the economic well being of all. But diplomacy never sits still. At the same moment that the reunification of Europe nears its completion, new breaking lines emerge, new alliances are formed, and very old alliances that were forgotten for a long time, bloom again. Not only the relationships among European nations have changed. Transatlantic relations have also been deeply affected. Let us examine these relations. 3.The transatlantic disputes Transatlantic relations have deteriorated severely over the last couple of months. Ugly accusations, simplified criticism, expressions of mistrust, real economic and political misunderstandings, and a lot of xenophobic bias all in the intellectual cloak of polical analysis. We know the European criticism of so called American unilateralism, what Europeans consider oversimplification in analysis, heavy handedness in foreign policy, lack of respect for treaties and organisations. We know also the American criticism of Europe for refusing to share the burden of defence, and for staying aside but profiting from American activism. Europeans, living in a post-conflict dreamland, who allow themselves that luxury precisely because America did not take that step and remained focused on the hard reality. In the political-military field these disputes can be brought into 3 categories: alliance versus coalitions of the willing. Does the alliance decide the format of action of does the nature of the crisis determine the format of the coalition? What is the extend of alliance solidarity outside the treaty obligation of territorial defence? The place of the strategy of preemptive strike or preventive action in our strategic thinking. - 2 - Unilateralism versus multilateralism. Do we work through international organisations or does a nation have the right to discard multilateral frameworks if it considers its interests threatened? Is the worsening of transatlantic relations temporary, or more profound? Is NATO breaking down? Is the trust broken? Are both sides of the Atlantic drifting apart? However, if we put the current transatlantic dispute into historical perspective, things don’t look so exceptional. There have been a lot of disputes, and very serious ones, in the past. Let us look back on the 50 years since the end of WWII. You would conclude this is another temporary row. Transatlantic rows have indeed existed since the Alliance was created. In fact, every decade since the end of World War II had its own major transatlantic tension: the first episode of suspicion occurred right after the War: Thru NATO the US gave Europe a security guarantee, but not an automatic one. Although the NATO Treaty stipulated that “nations will assist each other, as they deem necessary, including military means”, the American Congress refused to commit US forces (included nuclear forces) as carte blanche for the defense of European nations, whose past moreover was tainted by colonialism. American suspicion has accompanied European integration for decades. In the 50s the reluctance of Adenauer and Erhard to commit Germany to European integration, was fuelled by suspicion that Bonn would be seduced by Paris into a policy that would distance Europe from America. The 60s were rich in transatlantic conflict matter. First there were the strains of the Vietnam war and the antiwar protests. American anger with the lack of support from allies. Second, in 1962 Britain signed an agreement with the US whereby the British nuclear weapons would be strategically linked to the American arsenal. This caused French anger with Anglosaxon military strategy was the reason, among others, for president de Gaulle to refuse Britain entry into the EEC. In 1966 de Gaulle ordered the NATO Headquarters to leave Paris. Third, the introduction of flexible response in US and NATO nuclear posture raised European suspicion that America was not fully committed to its defense. The fundamental dilemma remained the same over decades: As the threat from the Soviet Union focused more on local situations, on small aggressions, the threat of massive retaliation became less credible, so that Europe became more vulnerable to Soviet pressure. Therefore the US introduced flexible response. But flexible response also lowered the nuclear treshhold, thus making the use of nuclear weapons more likely. By doing so it would make a local nuclear war in Europe possible. The Europeans felt unhappy either way In the 70s the question of burden sharing was high on the transatlantic agenda: the Americans thought that Europe did not contribute enough to the common effort. Europe considered that NATO harmonisation of armament - - - - - 3 reinforced the US military industry. The German Ostpolitik of rapprochement with communist regimes was met with considerable suspicion in Washington, because it reopened the possibility of German reunification through neutrality. A reunified but neutral Germany would have placed Germany as a strong force in the middle of Europe, insecure of its allegiance, not embedded in a security framework, and would have made Europe unstable again. In the 80s deployment of cruise missiles caused tremendous uproar among European public opinion. Criticism of America took many cultural overtones: genuine pacifism, old-fashioned nationalism, European elitism , a cultural perception of American materialism, plain xenophobia. In the Reagan period European leaders feared America would turn its back to Europe and focus on the Pacific. During the early Clinton years Europe feared American unilateralism looking inward, not being interested in world affairs. A only a few years later, when the Bush administration took power, Europeans accused the US of unilateralism in acting, forgetting that they said the same about the early Clinton years. - - - 3. Is the situation now different? That list of historical disputes seems rather reassuring? Are the disputes of today, the ugly rhetoric included, just part of a long lasting strong alliance? Is the deterioration of transatlantic relations not more profound this time? Can things be restored? Transatlantic ties are indeed loosening at a time that the unifying threat from the East is gone. Russia is just another player in international politics, not a threat anymore. World War II is half a century ago. People have forgotten the motives that forged the strong bonds across the Atlantic during and after the war. And if they know them, they don’t feel those bonds emotionally any more. The need for an Atlantic Alliance is not felt the same way. At the same time the Alliance is asked to interve as a stabilising force in situations far from our territory in a context where Europe does not have the same threat perception as the US. But does all this also mean that are our basic strategic goals have changed? Does this mean that we look at world problems differently? Have Europe and America gone different ways, with the result that they don’t share anymore the same outlook, the same values, the same strategies? That Europe lives in a naive Kantian world of peace whereas America lives in the world of brutal power the world of Hobbes? That Europe has rejected power politics? That America only thinks in military terms? 4 Reducing the debate to these terms would be grossly underestimating the power brokering of European nations, their tradition of realpolitik, their willingness to defend global interests. It would also be underestimating the sophistication of American diplomacy, the internal debate of a big democracy, and the American reluctance of policing the world. It is also underestimating the inherent sense of responsibility of every major world power towards the stability of the international system. To pretend that Europe and America do not share the same values is confusing fundamentals with atmospherics, mixing strategy with tactics, interpreting street protests for government policy. Indeed, on most world issues, the goals of America and Europe run broadly along the same lines. The differences, and they are numerous and often sharp, concern priorities, perception, and capabilities. • On the Israeli-Palestinian problem, do we not all want an Israel in peace and security and for the Palestinians fulfilment of their national ambition on certain conditions? Europe and America differ on priorities and inclination. But we are not fundamentally opposed. Some countries in the region on the other hand are very much opposed to this view of coexistence. Are we not all concerned by the bizarre behaviour of North Korea? We all want a North Korea that does not threaten its neighbours and that cares for its own people. We all want an Iraq that does not threaten its neighbours, with leaders that respect their own people. We all want, as early as possible, the transition to a responsible Iraqi leadership, representative of its own people, respectful towards religious and ethnic minorities, to succeed. On the manner how to achieve those goals, many countries differed with the US. • • 4. Transatlantic relations: the future In spite of strategic differences, Europeans and Americans will continue to act together. Although the gap between Europe and America for the moment seems to deepen (capabilities, priorities, ambitions), the fundamental solidarity between the two shores of the Atlantic will remain strong, • because of the strategic necessity, • but also because of the more fundamental values. In the hard world of diplomacy, it is less values but interests that count. At the moment the strategic interests of America and a number of European countries seem to be far apart. But it is precisely the national interests that will keep the transatlantic partnership going, because it serves both partners. Washington will 5 continue to ask European countries to join in overseas operations, less for their military contribution as for political support. For Europeans, being part of such a coalition is probably the only way to be involved in American decision making and build up credit in order to obtain American assistance at a later date. But let us not forget the values. The 2 parts of the Atlantic share the same society values, although this notion has often been put into doubt on both sides of the Atlantic. It is useful to sum them up once again: liberty of expression, of religion, political rights, liberty to dissent, to do business, get a decent education. These values remain rare goods in most parts of the world. We share the same political history. We are the common product of a heritage that brought us the Renaissance with the discovery of the individual and the Age of Enlightenment (Siècle des Lumières). We are heirs to the French revolution: after its horrors were forgotten, it left us with the notion of égalité and it had a profound impact on ordinary people. The American revolution (all men are born equal) preceded the French one. The social upheavals of the 19th century, with all their misery and suffering, gave us trade unions and a caring social system, unprecedented in history. Europe got rid of the scourge of fascism, but only with the help of Americans and Canadians. Eastern Europe got rid of communism, North America did not only share our emotions, but lent its decisive political support. Summing up the transatlantic debate could sound as follows: transatlantic relations are in bad shape, that this is not new, but it is serious but that we will continue to need each other because of strategic interests both ways because of our common values which bring us together in diplomacy the reality of decision makers is more subtle than the boxing match in the media would suggest. 5. European Security and Defence Policy After 10 years of blueprints on European security architecture, after the 15 had built the foundations of a Common Foreign Policy, (the results remain below expectations), the 15 managed to create a European Security and Defence Policy. They started with enthusiasm in 2000, built institutions, a common general staff, and declared their policy operational. Then they got stuck. Turkey decided it could not allow ESDP operations using NATO assets if it was not allowed to participate on an equal footing. After a compromise was found ESDP got stuck because September 11 changed the priorities. ESDP focused, initially at least, on lower-risk peacekeeping. The fight against terrorism became the priority however. ESDP was a good answer to a different problem. The debate about a European Common defence policy seems unreal for now. The 15 do not show enough political will to go further. The crisis in Iraq, the war against terrorism and the new divisions in Europe pushed ESDP into the margin of the 6 debate. But it remains a strategic necessity. There will always be situations where the use of NATO as a whole is not convenient, where the US will prefer not to be involved. In those situations Europe must be able to act, in harmony with NATO. Also the EU’s current weakness will not last forever. There will be new endeavours towards a common foreign and security policy and towards a European security and defence policy. The history of the Union illustrates this growth by steps, falls, steps again. We experienced it over 4 decennia in internal market, currency policy, judicial affairs, foreign policy. Will we one day have a common foreign policy, a common defence policy? Probably not. The unanimity rule and the tendency of France an Britain to cream off important issues from EU councils and transfer them to the Security Council are for now the 2 ceilings on our common policies. Moreover, now as in the past, no nation easily relinquishes decisions over life and death of its citizens or soldiers to other countries. But we can assume that more progress will be accomplished again in an international environment that can sustain it. The Place of Ukraine We welcome an independent Ukraine as one of the new players on the European chessboard. Apart from a short interlude of independence in the wake of the Russian Revolution, our memories of an independent Ukrainian nation go back to the Middle Ages. During the same period that the city-states in Italy and Flanders began to bloom, Kiev-Rus was already a haven of civilization and a beacon for the East of Europe. If that early civilization had not been destroyed by the horse peoples coming from the East, how different Europe might have looked today! The reunification of Europe goes deeper than the enlargement of NATO and the enlargement of the European Union. Ukraine, Russia and Belarus cannot be left out of the continental trend. It is in the interest of us all that stability and well being are shared. As long as my neighbour does not feel safe, I am not safe. The same goes for nations. On the other hand, the EU must be able to finish its huge task of absorbing 11 new members. Although the gross national product of these 11 new members constitutes only 20 % of the EU GNP, their integration into EU policies will be long and costly. The EU must be able to absorb these new members first. But we must think already of our future neighbours. Nobody wants new dividing lines in Europe, either in the form of impossible visa restrictions or a gap in the well being between us and our neighbours. The EU will help to eliminate dysfunctions at the borders, support development of border regions through subsidies, introduce a reasonable visa regime. Ukraine has the ambition to become a EU member. We cannot go that far now. Ukraine is just too big a country, too different in its traditions, too momumental in 7 its needs. At the same time we recognize that Ukraine has made tremendous progress in the last 15 years. It has advanced at least as far as some of the new member countries. We still have demands on Ukraine: human rights, freedom of the press, freedom of the political process, undue pressure on opposition groups, on the media, an investment climate that is not inviting enough for investors, the level of corruption in the economy and in public life. Let us look back where we stood in 1990 and where we stand now. Europe has changed inside out. For Western Europeans the old NATO and the old EU are gone. Eastern Europe is only at the beginning of a long change. We cannot predict what will happen in the future. But the reunification of the continent is in full swing, the economies of the eastern European countries grow at full speed, there is no major threat for the foreseeable future on the European continent itself. We have all the right to be confident. 8