REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
CASE NO: 579/96
In the matter of:
NATIONAL MEDIA LIMITED First Appellant
SIBIYA, KHULU Second Appellant
ALLIED PUBLISHERS LIMITED Third Appellant
PERSKOR LIMITED Fourth Appellant
and
BOGOSHI, NTHEDI MOROLE Respondent
CORAM: HEFER, HOEXTER, HARMS, PLEWMAN JJA et
FARLAM AJA
HEARD: 2 September 1998
DELIVERED: 29 September 1998
JUDGMENT
HEFER JA
2
This appeal is against the judgment in Bogoshi v National Media Ltd and
Others 1996 (3) SA 78 (W) in which Eloff JP refused an application to amend the
plea in an action for damages arising from the publication of a series of
allegedly defamatory articles published in a newspaper, the City Press, during
the period 17 November 1991 to 29 May 1994. The parties will be designated
as in the Court a quo.
The first defendant is the owner and publisher, second defendant the
editor, third defendant the distributor and fourth defendant the printer of the City
Press. Their original plea was that the articles were substantially true and had
been published for the public benefit. In the application for amendment they
sought to introduce three additional defences to cater for their apprehension
that they might not be able to establish the truth of the statements contained
in the articles. The first proposed defence was that third defendant did not
intend to defame the plaintiff; that it was unaware of the allegedly defamatory
articles in the relevant issues of the City Press and did not know that articles
of that kind were likely to appear therein; and that it was not negligent. The
second proposed defence was to the same effect but related only to fourth
defendant. The essence of the third proposed
3
defence (quoted in full at 81D-82B of the Court a quo's judgment and
hereinafter referred to as the "third defence") was that the publication of the
articles was lawful and protected under the freedom of speech and
expression clause in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200
of 1993 (the "Interim Constitution").
Eloff JP considered the third defence to be bad in law and dismissed
the application for amendment without considering the other two. At 84G-H
the learned judge explained :
"There may be other parts of the proposed new plea which can be
sustained. However, since a vital part of the proposed plea is
assailable, I do not feel called upon to consider whether part of the
plea can be supported."
The question for decision is whether the plea in its amended form would
be excipiable. The defences which third and fourth defendants sought to raise
were argued separately and may be disposed of briefly.
The principle of English law that distributors may escape liability on the
ground of absence of negligence was recognised in Willoughby v McWade and
Others 1931 CPD 536, Trimble v Central News Agency Ltd 1934 AD 43, Masters
v Central News Agency 1936 CPD 388 and the obiter dictum in Suid-
4
Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie v O'Malley 1977 (3) SA 394 (A) at 407D-G. (See
also Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa at 175-176.) Printers,
however, are listed in Pakendorf en Andere v De Flamingh 1982 (3) SA 146 (A)
with newspaper owners, publishers and editors as persons who are strictly
liable for defamation. Defendants' counsel submitted that it is highly unlikely
that a printer (such as fourth defendant) using modern technology would know
about defamatory material in what he prints; and for this reason his position
should be brought in line with that of a distributor. There is much to be said for
the submission but, in order to decide the validity of the third defence, the whole
question of strict liability will have to be considered. Depending on the way
in which our decision goes, there may be no need to deal with fourth defendant
separately.
In considering the validity of the third defence it is useful to bear in mind
that liability for defamation postulates an objective element of
unlawfulness and a subjective element of fault (animus injuriandi - the
deliberate intention to injure). Although the presence of both elements is
presumed once the publication of defamatory material is admitted or proved, the
plaintiff is required to allege that the defendant acted unlawfully and
5
animo injuriandi, and it is for the defendant either to admit or deny these
allegations. A bare denial however is not enough: the defendant is required to
plead facts which legally justify his denial of unlawfulness or animus
injuriandi as the case may be.
When the application came before the Court a quo the plea already
contained a denial of unlawfulness and an allegation of truth and public
benefit in support thereof. The third defence contained a positive allegation in
par 7.2 that the articles had not been published unlawfully. "More
particularly and in elaboration of subpara 7.2" it was alleged (in conjunction with
various alternatives) that the articles had been published "in good faith" and
without any intention to defame the plaintiff. There was no indication of the
purport of the expression "in good faith"; but in their written heads of argument
in this Court defendants' counsel submitted that it embraced allegations to
the effect that the defendants were unaware of the falsity of the material, that they
did not publish it recklessly, that the publication was reasonable in the
circumstances and that the defendants were not negligent. Eloff JP apparently
accepted this interpretation of the amendment as correct, but was under the
impression that it was concerned with the question of fault
6
instead of wrongfulness (at 83 A-B). This impression was probably caused by
the terms of the notice of objection to the amendment and the manner in which
the case was argued. At the hearing of the appeal defendants' senior counsel
rightly conceded that all these allegations could not be implied. He then moved
for an amendment of which this Court, and presumably the plaintiff, had
received notice a day or two before and which appeared at first glance to be much
wider than the one before the Court a quo. For obvious reasons we were
reluctant to consider it. But it soon became clear that in substance the new
amendment did not differ from the one which had been refused, and that the
Court a quo's judgment and the written heads of argument submitted by both
sides covered all the salient points. Plaintiff's counsel conceded moreover
that they would suffer no inconvenience, and their client no prejudice, if
we were to consider the amendment in its new form. In the exceptional
circumstances of the case and in order to avoid unnecessary expense, we
decided to do so.
Stripped of presently irrelevant detail the third proposed defence now
reads as follows:
"7.2 ... the defendants plead that the publication of the articles
7
was not unlawful by reason of the protection afforded to the
defendants:
7.2.1 by section 15 to the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Act, 200 of 1993. . .
7.2.2 alternatively to subparagraph 7.2.1 above, by section 15 of
the Constitution read with section 35(3) of the
Constitution . ..
7.3 More particularly:
7.3.1 A the defendants were unaware of the falsity of any
averment in any of the articles; 7.3.1 B the
defendants did not publish any of the articles
recklessly, i.e. not caring whether their contents
were true of false; the facts upon the defendants
will rely in this context are .. . 7.3.1C the
defendants were not negligent in
publishing any of the articles; the
facts upon which the defendants will
rely in this context are .. . 7.3.1 D in view of
the facts alleged in paragraphs 7.3.1 A to
7.3.1 C, the publications were objectively
reasonable;
7.3.1 E the articles were published without animus
injuriandi." alternatively
to paragraph 7.3.1 above
7.3.2 the appellants repeat mutatis mutandis the
contents of paragraphs 7.3.1 A to 7.3.1 E above.
7.3.3 the articles concern matters of public interest,
7.4 in the circumstances the publication of the articles was not
unlawful and is furthermore protected by section 15,
8
alternatively section 15 read with section 35(3) of the
Constitution."
(I have omitted the supporting facts alleged in par 7.3.1 B and C. They relate mainly
to the qualifications of the reporters who wrote the articles and their
investigations before the articles were published. The omitted parts of the
amendment appear from the annexure to this judgment.)
The nub of the defence is par 7.4. The publication of the articles, it
says, was lawful and constitutionally protected by reason of the
circumstances alleged in the preceding paragraphs. Leaving constitutional
issues aside for the moment, the question is whether the allegations in the
preceding paragraphs legally justify the averment of lawfulness or whether, as
Eloff JP held (at 84F-G), the defendants can only escape liability if they can at
least establish that what they had published was true.
I am not aware of a previous case in which a plea along these lines was
considered before by a court in this country. But it is hardly necessary to add
that the defences available to a defendant in a defamation action do not
constitute a numerus clausus. In our law the lawfulness of a harmful act or
omission is determined by the application of a general criterion of
9
reasonableness based on considerations of fairness, morality, policy and the
Court's perception of the legal convictions of the community. In accordance
with this criterion Rumpff CJ indicated in O'Malleys case supra at 402fin-
403A that it is the task of the Court to determine in each case whether public
and legal policy requires the particular publication to be regarded as lawful.
(See also Marais v Richard en 'n Ander 1981 (1) SA 1157 (A) at 1168C;
Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd and Others v Sage Holdings Ltd and Another 1993
(2) SA 451 (A) at 462F-G; Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha
Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (A) at 588H-J.) Accordingly, as EM
Grosskopf JA observed in the last mentioned case at 590C-D,
"[w]here public policy so demands, [the Court] would be entitled to
recognise new situations in which a defendant's conduct in
publishing defamatory matter is lawful."
Of course, the present situation is not new. Members of the press have
often figured as defendants in defamation actions and more often than not their
citation stemmed from the publication of inaccuracies or falsehoods of which they
were unaware. The novelty of the third defence is that hitherto, whenever they
sought to escape liability for lack of knowledge of the falsity
10
of the defamatory contents of their publications, or on account of an honest
mistake, the focus has always been on animus injuriandi and not on
lawfulness. In the result, the possibility of the legality of the publication of
untruthful defamatory statements has not received adequate attention. The
emphasis on animus injuriandi, particularly during the last thirty years or so,
can be traced to De Villiers AJ's remarks in Maisel v Van Naeren 1960 (4)
SA 836 (C) at 840E-G that
" [u]nderlying the conception of animus injuriandi Is the principle
stated by Ulpian in the Digest injuriam nemo facit nisi qui scit se
injuriam facere (D.47.10.3.2). Thus, as is the position for do/us in
general, it is essential that the alleged wrongdoer should be
conscious of the wrongful character of his act . . . Do/us or
animus injuriandi is therefore consciously wrongful intent..."
(Emphasis added.)
At 850 in fin - 851A the learned judge proceeded to say :
"In particular, I can see no reason why an erroneous belief in the
existence of a so-called 'privileged occasion' could not in fit
circumstances protect a defendant.. ."
Thereafter came the decisions in Jordaan v Van Biljon 1962 (1) SA 286 (A) and
Craig v Voortrekkerpers Bpk 1963 (1) SA 149 (A) reaffirming the
11
requirement of animus injuriandi, and Nydoo en Andere v Vengtas 1965 (1) SA
1 (A) in which this Court expressly rejected the approach in Strydom v
Fenner-Solomon 1953 (1) SA 519 (E) to the effect that, in deciding whether a
privileged occasion has been established, the test is entirely objective.
Finally, in O'Malley this Court -
(1) expressly accepted the principle that consciousness of the
wrongfulness of the publication is required; and stated in a
series of obiter dicta
(2) that liability for defamation cannot be founded upon negligence; but
that
(3) essentially on the ground of lack of negligence, news
distributors may escape liability for defamation of which they
were unaware;
(4) that owners, editors, publishers and printers of newspapers
ought to be liable in accordance with the law in England where
liability arises from the publication of defamatory material and not
from any particular intention, and where these members of the
press are liable for defamation of which they were not
12
aware (403E and 404H); and that
(5) other members of the media, such as broadcasters, are liable on
the same basis.
This was the state of the law when Pakendorf supra was heard. One of
the issues was whether the owner and editor of a newspaper could avail
themselves of the fact that an untrue defamatory report had been published as
a result of a reporter's mistake. The trial Court followed the obiter dicta in
O'Malley, but when the matter came on appeal to this Court, the
appellants' counsel argued that the dicta were wrong and that animus
injuriandi in the form of consciously wrongful intent was required. This Court
held the defendants liable for defamation in the absence of fault after
mentioning the great injustice to the plaintiff if the defendants were to be
permitted to rely on the absence of animus injuriandi because a mistake had
been made. The effect of the judgment was that, unlike ordinary members of
the community, - and, for that matter, also unlike distributors - newspaper owners,
publishers, editors and printers are liable without fault and, in particular,
are not entitled to rely upon their lack of knowledge of defamatory material in their
publications or upon an erroneous belief in the lawfulness
13
of the publication of defamatory material. It should be emphasised that the
judgment was not concerned with any question of justification since counsel
for the owner and editor conceded that the publication had been unlawful (at
148A).
The ratio of Eloff JP's judgment in the present case is that the
defendants are strictly liable at common law in terms of the decision in
Pakendorf and that the Interim Constitution did not change the position. To the
extent that the third defence is concerned with lawfulness, the reliance on
Pakendorf was misplaced since it did not deal with that issue. However, as will
become apparent, the judgment in Pakendorf does have a bearing. In addition,
the third defence raises the question of fault, albeit in the framework of
lawfulness and the first and second defences raise it squarely. (Counsel for the
plaintiff in effect submitted that the position of the distributor should be brought
in line with that of the other members of the press and that the distributor
should also be liable without fault.)
In this Court the argument on behalf of the defendants was presented on
alternative bases. The first is a constitutional one: the strict liability of
members of the press is unconstitutional, it was submitted, (a) because it
14
impinges upon the freedom of speech and expression, which includes
freedom of the press and media, conferred by s 15(1); or (b) because it is not
in accordance with the spirit, purport and object of Chapter 3 as required by s 35(3)
of the Interim Constitution. The second basis is that Pakendorf's case was
wrongly decided and that the third defence is valid under the common law.
I will deal with the second leg of the argument first.
Although the ultimate question is whether the Court made the correct
decision in Pakendorf, I find it necessary to make the following remarks on the
way in which the decision was reached:
(1) Some academic writers hold the view that the decisions mentioned in the
judgment and in O'Malley do not adequately support the conclusion
that English law on the subject of strict liability had been accepted in our
law much earlier. As I read the judgment in Pakendorf, the Court took a
policy decision and set no great store by any of the previous decisions.
Whether or not the cases support the conclusion, and whether or not strict
liability was recognised before, cannot affect the answer to the
fundamental question whether it should have been recognised at all.
15
(2) In taking the policy decision to hold certain members of the press
liable without fault the Court seems to have overlooked the
inconsistent reasoning in O'Malley where a positive statement that
liability for defamation can never be founded on negligence, is
followed by a reference to the position of a distributor as a recognised
example of a defence based on the absence of negligence. Why other
members of the press were treated differently was not explained either
in O'Malley or in Pakendorf. As Burchell (op cit 193) puts it:
"Unfortunately the South African Appellate Division has
seen the problem as involving a choice between two
extremes - either requiring animus injuriandi or providing
for strict liability. The middle course of requiring
negligence has much to recommend it."
(3) In Pakendorf the Court recognized this form of liability in the law of
defamation regardless of its fate in the country of its birth, and of the
criticism which it had already attracted. In England Prof Holdsworth,
as long ago as 1941, claimed that strict liability was productive of
undesirable litigation and that it encouraged purely speculative actions
(4 Chapter of Accidents in the Law of Libel 1941 LQR 74 at 83). In
16
this country, Prof Price (1960 Acta Juridica 274) wrote:
"The suggestion that liability for defamation is absolute, or,
for that matter merely strict, can depend only on such cases
as Hulton v Jones, Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers,
Newstead v London Express Newspapers, Ltd and Hough v
London Express Newspaper, Ltd. These decisions have no
counterpart in our law, and their full implications have
given rise to much misgiving in England, leading to the
considerable changes introduced by the Defamation Act of
1952. The unhappy doctrine of contributory negligence
should have taught us a lesson in the matter of blindly
following English legal trends, only to be left high and dry
when reaction sets in. South African law owes a great deal
to English law, but that is no reason for abandoning our own
legal principles."
Although the Court's attention was apparently not drawn to these
trenchant remarks, it was at least aware of the fact that the British
Parliament had intervened to eliminate some of the doctrine's
unacceptable consequences. Yet it decided to adopt strict liability in the
form in which it existed in England thirty years earlier, and to leave it to
the South African legislature to decide whether or not it would follow its
British counterpart. The result is that we have been left with a legal
principle which had been tried in England, and was found
17
wanting. (4) It is trite that the law of defamation requires a balance
to be struck
between the right to reputation, on the one hand, and the freedom of
expression on the other. But there is no indication in the judgment of
a weighing of interests, and in particular, that the freedom of
expression received any attention.
By undertaking that very exercise, I shall endeavour to demonstrate why,
in Pakendorf this Court, in my view, took the wrong decision in regard to the
policy to be adopted in a case such as this.
It would be wrong to regard either of the rival interests with which we
are concerned as more important than the other. The importance of the
protection of reputation is self-evident. As pointed out in Argus Printing and
Publishing Co Ltd end Others v Esselen's Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A) at 23H-J,
the Courts have often quoted the following passage in Melius de Villiers (The
Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries at 24-5) with approval:
"The specific interests that are detrimentally affected by the acts of
aggression that are comprised under the name of injuries are those
which every man has, as a matter of natural right, in the possession
of an unimpaired person, dignity and reputation ...
18
The rights here referred to are absolute or primordial rights; they
are not created by, nor dependant for their being upon, any
contract; every person is bound to respect them . .."
In a judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada (Hill v Church of Scientology
of Toronto (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 129 at 162) Cory J cited an article by David
Lepofsky in which the author said that reputation is the "fundamental
foundation on which people are able to interact with each other in social
environments", and proceeded to say (at 163) that
"the good reputation of the individual represents and reflects the
innate dignity of the individual, a concept which underlies all the
Charter rights. It follows that the protection of the good
reputation of an individual is of fundamental importance to our
democratic society."
The freedom of expression is equally important. Prof van der
Westhuizen (in Van Wyk et al: Rights and Constitutionalism; The New South
African Legel Order at 264) describes it as essential in any attempt to build a
democratic social and political order. Elsewhere it has been referred to as "the
matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom"
(Palko v Connecticut (1937) 302 US 319 at 327); and in the majority
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Handyside v
19
United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 at 754 it was said that freedom of
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society and is one of the basic conditions for its progress and the
development of man. That this is not an overstatement appears from
McIntyre J's reminder in Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 et
al v Dolphinn Delivery Ltd et al (1987) 33 DLR (4th) 174 at 183 that
"[f]reedom of expression ... is one of the fundamental concepts that
has formed the basis for the historical development of the political,
social and educational institutions of western society."
Writing about the freedom of the press, Kranenburg (Het Nederlands
Staatsrecht) 524 also starts with the remark that
"[d]e vrijheid van drukpers is een der belangrijkste
grondrechten, ja, na de godsdienstvrijheid misschien het
belangrijkste",
and proceeds to tell us in practical terms that
"[n]aast de rechtsvormende invloed van de pers is van even
grote betekenis de waarborg, de zij verschaft tegen misbruik van
gezag, tegen ongerechtvaardigde aantasting van belangen en
verkregen aanspraken, tegen willekeur. . . Niets werkt zoo
zuiverend op verkeerde bevoegdheidsuitoefening, op
ongezonde toestanden, op corruptie, als het licht der
20
openbaarheid."
In the same vein Joffe J said in Government of the Republic of South
Africa v 'Sunday Times' Newspaper and Another 1995 (2) SA 221 (T) at
227H-228A:
"The role of the press in a democratic society cannot be
understated ... It is the function of the press to ferret out
corruption, dishonesty and graft wherever it may occur and to
expose the perpetrators. The press must reveal dishonest mal-and
inept administration. It must also contribute to the exchange
of ideas already alluded to. It must advance communication
between the governed and those who govern."
With this in mind we may now examine the way in which these two
interests have been weighed in this country in the past. This is reflected in
the following passage from the judgment in Argus Printing and Publishing Co
Ltd and Others v Esselen's Estate supra at 25B-E:
"I agree, and I firmly believe, that freedom of expression and of the
press are potent and indispensable instruments for the creation
and maintenance of a democratic society, but it is trite that such
freedom is not, and cannot be permitted to be, totally unrestrained.
The law does not allow the unjustified savaging of an individual's
reputation. The right of free expression enjoyed by all persons,
including the press, must yield to the individual's right, which is
just as important, not to be unlawfully
1
2
defamed. I emphasise the word 'unlawfully' for, in striving to
achieve an equitable balance between the right to speak your mind
and the right not to be harmed by what another says about you, the
law has devised a number of defences, such as fair comment,
justification (ie truth and public benefit) and privilege, which if
successfully invoked render lawful the publication of matter
which is prima facie defamatory. (See generally the Inkatha
case supra at 588G-590F.) The resultant balance gives due
recognition and protection, in my view, to freedom of
expression." (Per Corbett CJ on behalf of the Court.)
Strict liability was not in issue and is not mentioned in the judgment. But the last
sentence does create the impression that the Court was of the view that
stereotyped defences like truth and public benefit, fair comment and qualified
privilege provide adequate protection for the freedom of the press. For
reasons which will presently emerge I believe that this is not the case.
Let us first examine the possible grounds of justification for strict
liability. In the present case plaintiff's counsel relied on the fact that there are
other instances of liability without fault in our law (like the actio de pauperie, the
actio de effusis vel ejectis, and actions based on the unlawful deprivation of
personal freedom). Whilst acknowledging that the notion of liability without
fault is not foreign to our law, the short answer to this kind of
22
argument is that entirely different policy considerations underlie the strict
liability recognised in each of the instances mentioned.
In Pakendorf the Court mentioned the inequity of permitting the owner and
editor of a newspaper to rely on the absence of animus injuriandi brought about
by a mistake on the part of a reporter, but advanced no further reason for holding
them strictly liable. In O'Malley the difficulty to bring animus injuriandi home
to any particular person was suggested as possible justification. Insofar as
it implies a form of collective or substituted liability of persons who may be
entirely blameless, on the ground that no particular person can be found,
the suggestion is, with respect, wholly untenable. Compared with such
injustice, the harm done to the victim of an honest mistake becomes less
significant.
There is, however, a potent consideration which was not mentioned. It
is the social utility of strict liability in inhibiting the dissemination of harmful
falsehoods. One has a natural reluctance to open the door to the
dissemination of false information which cannot serve any purpose other than to
vilify the victim. Such reluctance Is not only natural, it is right. In the Church
of Scientology case supra at 159-160 Cory J said:
23
"False and injurious statements cannot enhance
self-development. Nor can it ever be said that they lead to
the healthy participation in the affairs of the community. Indeed
they are detrimental to the advancement of these values and
harmful to the interests of a free and democratic society . . . False
allegations can so very quickly and completely destroy a good
reputation. A reputation tarnished by libel can seldom regain
its former lustre."
In similar vein is Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc 418 US 323 at 339 - 340 where
the point is made that there is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact, but that an erroneous statement of fact is nevertheless inevitable in
free debate.
All this is very true. But, we must not forget that it is the right, and indeed
a vital function, of the press to make available to the community information
and criticism about every aspect of public, political, social and economic
activity and thus to contribute to the formation of public opinion (Prof JC van
der Walt in Gedenkbundel. HL Swanepoel at 68). The press and the rest of
the media provide the means by which useful, and sometimes vital information
about the daily affairs of the nation is conveyed to its citizens - from the
highest to the lowest ranks (Strauss, Strydom & Van der
4
2
Walt: Mediareg 4th ed at 43). Conversely, the press often becomes the voice
of the people - their means to convey their concerns to their fellow citizens,
to officialdom and to government. To describe adequately what all this
entails, I can do no better than to quote a passage from the as yet unreported
judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Reynolds v Times Newspapers
Ltd and Others delivered on 8 July 1998. It reads as follows :
"We do not for an instant doubt that the common convenience and
welfare of a modern plural democracy such as ours are best
served by an ample flow of information to the public
concerning, and by vigorous public discussion of, matters of
public interest to the community. By that we mean matters
relating to the public life of the community and those who take part
in it, including within the expression 'public life' activities such as
the conduct of government and political life, elections .
. . and public administration, but we use the expression more
widely than that, to embrace matters such as (for instance) the
governance of public bodies, institutions and companies which give
rise to a public interest in disclosure, but excluding matters
which are personal and private, such that there is no public
interest in their disclosure. Recognition that the common
convenience and welfare of society are best served in this
way is a modem democratic imperative which the law must accept.
In differing ways and to somewhat differing extents the law has
recognised this imperative, in the United States, Australia, New
Zealand and elsewhere, as also in the
25
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights ... As it is
the task of the news media to inform the public and engage in public
discussion of matters of public interest, so is that to be recognised
as its duty. The cases cited show acceptance of such a duty,
even where publication is by a newspaper to the public at large
.... We have no doubt that the public also have an interest to
receive information on matters of public interest to the community
. . ."
In endorsing this view I should add that it makes no difference that South
Africa has only recently acquired the status of a truly democratic country.
Freedom of expression, albeit not entrenched, did exist in the society that we knew
at the time when Pakendorf was decided (Hix Networking Technologies v System
Publishers (Pty) Ltd and Another 1997 (1) SA 391 (A) at 400D-G) although its
full import, and particularly the role and importance of the press, might not
always have been acknowledged.
If we recognise, as we must, the democratic imperative that the
common good is best served by the free flow of information and the task of the
media in the process, it must be clear that strict liability cannot be defended
and should have been rejected in Pakendorf. Much has been written about the
"chilling" effect of defamation actions but nothing can be
26
more chilling than the prospect of being mulcted in damages for even the
slightest error. I say this despite the fact that some eminent writers such as Prof
JC van der Walt (op cit) and Neethling, Potgieter and Visser (Law of Delict
2nd ed 351-352) hold a different view. Others like Prof Burchell (op cit 189), Van
der Merwe and Olivier (Die Onregmatige Oaad in die Suid Afrikaanse Reg
6th ed 440 and Prof PJ Visser (1982 THRHR 340) have criticized the decision
in Pakendorf. Strict liability has moreover been rejected by the Supreme
Court of the United States of America (Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc supra 323),
the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGe 12,113), the European
Court of Human Rights (Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407), the courts in
the Netherlands (as appears from Asser's work to which I will refer later), the
English Court of Appeal, the High Court of Australia (in decisions to which I will
also refer) and the High Court of New Zealand (Lange v Atkinson and Australian
Consolidated Press NZ Ltd 1997 (2) NZLR 22 - the decision was confirmed
on appeal in a judgment not available to me but part of which is quoted in the
unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal referred to earlier).
In my judgment the decision in Pakendorf must be overruled. I am,
27
with respect, convinced that it was clearly wrong. That does not mean that
its conclusion on the facts of the case is assailable. The defamatory
statement was the result of unreasonable conduct in obtaining the facts by
incompetent journalists (at 154H).
The policy considerations mentioned so far in overruling Pakendorf, are
also relevant in the context of justification and I now turn to deal with that aspect
of the third defence. We are not struggling with an endemic problem and, since
it has arisen in other jurisdictions, it will be instructive to see how it was
resolved elsewhere.
In Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd and Another (1994-1995)
182 CLR 104, Stephens and Others v West Australian Newspapers Limited
(1994-1995) 182 CLR 211 and Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation
(1997) 189 CLR 520 the High Court of Australia extended the concept of qualified
privilege to cover the publication to the general public of untrue defamatory
material in the field of political discussion. But the Court was understandably
not prepared to grant the media cade blanche in the dissemination of material
of that kind. According to the judgment in Lange v Australian Broadcasting
Corporation the requirement for protection is
28
"reasonableness of conduct" which is explained as follows at 574:
"Whether the making of a publication was reasonable must
depend upon all the circumstances of the case. But, as a
general rule, a defendant's conduct in publishing material giving
rise to a defamatory imputation will not be reasonable unless the
defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that the
imputation was true, took proper steps, so far as they were
reasonably open, to verify the accuracy of the material and did not
believe the imputation to be untrue. Furthermore, the
defendant's conduct will not be reasonable unless the defendant has
sought a response from the person defamed and published the
response made (if any) except in cases where the seeking or
publication of a response was not practicable or it was
unnecessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond."
The matter is also dealt with in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others
referred to earlier. In that case the Court of Appeal preferred a three stage test
to determine whether any individual occasion is privileged: first, the duty test:
Was the publisher under a legal, moral or social duty to those to whom the material
was published (which in appropriate cases may be the general public) to publish
the material? Second, the interest test: Did those to whom the material was
published have an interest to receive that material? And last, what it called
the "circumstantial test" which poses the
29
question:
"Were the nature, status and source of the material, and the
circumstances of the publication, such that the publication
should in the public interest be protected in the absence of proof of
express malice?"
"Status" was used to denote the degree to which information on a matter of public
concern may, because of its character and known provenance, command
respect. This test is more concise than, but does not differ materially
from, the test of "reasonableness of conduct" as expounded in Australia. Like
the first sentence in the quotation from the Lange case, it serves to indicate
that the publication in the press of false defamatory statements of fact will
be regarded as lawful if, in all the circumstances of the case, it is found to be
reasonable; but it emphasizes what I regard as crucial, namely, that protection is
only afforded to the publication of material in which the public has an interest (ie
which it is in the public interest to make known as distinct from material which is
interesting to the public - Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd and Others v Sage Holdings
Ltd and Another supra at 464C-D).
A remarkably similar approach appears in Asser's Handleiding tot de
Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht 9th ed Vol III p 224 par 238
30
where the author says:
"Een belangrijke grond ter rechtvaardiging van de uitlatingen,
waarop in zaken van aantasting van eer en goede naam
veelvuldig een beroep wordt gedaan, is het algemeen belang
. . . In de praktijk wordt zij vooral ingeroepen ter zake van
uitlatingen die via de pers en radio en televisie worden
verspreid: het algemeen belang is hier uiteraard gelegen in de,
door Grondwet en verdragen gewaarborgde, vrijheid van
meningsuiting die de pers in staat stelt al dan niet vermeende
misstanden aan de kaak te stellen. Met name - doch niet alleen
- in deze gevallen berust het oordeel omtrent de
onrechtmatigheid op een afweging van belangen, waarvan de
uitkomst afhankelijk is van alle omstandigheden van het geval."
It has been said (in Marais v Richard en 'n Ander supra at 1168D-E and
the Inkatha Freedom Parry case supra at 593F-I) that the criterion of
unlawfulness must be the legal convictions in South Africa and not
elsewhere. But the solution of the problem in England, Australia and the
Netherlands seems to me to be entirely suitable and acceptable in South
Africa. In my judgment we must adopt this approach by stating that the
publication in the press of false defamatory allegations of fact will not be
regarded as unlawful if, upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the case,
it is found to have been reasonable to publish the particular facts in
31
the particular way and at the particular time.
In considering the reasonableness of the publication account must
obviously be taken of the nature, extent and tone of the allegations. We know,
for instance, that greater latitude is usually allowed in respect of political
discussion (Pienaar and Another v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1956
(4) SA 310 (W) at 318C-E), and that the tone in which a newspaper article is
written, or the way in which it is presented, sometimes provides additional,
and perhaps unnecessary, sting. What will also figure prominently, is the
nature of the information on which the allegations were based and the reliability
of their source, as well as the steps taken to verify the information. Ultimately
there can be no justification for the publication of untruths, and members of the
press should not be left with the impression that they have a licence to lower
the standards of care which must be observed before defamatory matter is
published in a newspaper. Prof Visser is correct in saying (1982 THRHR 340) that
a high degree of circumspection must be expected of editors and their editorial
staff on account of the nature of their occupation; particularly, I would add, in
light of the powerful position of the press and the credibility which it enjoys
amongst large sections of the
32
community. (Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch Vol 5
1679.)
I have mentioned some of the relevant matters; others, such as the
opportunity given to the person concerned to respond, and the need to
publish before establishing the truth in a positive manner, also come to mind.
The list is not intended to be exhaustive or definitive. Asser loc cit says:
"Men zie voor een niet limitatieve opsomming van ten deze
relevante omstandigheden . . . Als relevante omstandigheden
word o.m. genoemd de aard van de openbaar gemaakte
verdenkingen; de ernst van de gevolgen van de publikatie voor de
gelaedeerde; de ernst van de misstand, bezien vanuit het
algemeen belang; de mate waarin de verdenkingen steun vonden
in het ten tijde van de publikatie beschikbare
feitenmateriaal; de inkleding van de verdenkingen, en de
mogelijkheid om het doel langs voor de gelaedeerde minder
schadelijke wegen te bereiken . . . is voor de betrachten
zorgvuldigheid ook de aard van het medium van belang
(televisie is indringender dan het geschreven pers) asook de
imago van onpartijdigheid en deskundigheid dat degene die de
mededeling doet bij het publiek heeft."
Matters like these are of course relevant when the liability of an owner,
publisher or editor is under enquiry. The examination of the facts in order to
determine the liability of a printer will obviously follow different lines which
33
will concentrate mainly on his ability to become aware of and prevent
mistakes and the unwitting publication of defamatory material.
In the light of all these considerations I am satisfied that the
amendment, to the extent that it relies on the lawfulness of the publications, is
not excipiable.
I revert now to the question of fault raised in the first and second
proposed defences and also, although obliquely, in the third defence.
My conclusion on Pakendorf renders it necessary to consider the
liability of members of the press on some other basis. Of course there is always
the possibility of vicarious liability: in fit cases the owner of a newspaper
will be vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of his employees,
including reporting and editorial staff, acting within the scope of their
employment. But the modern trend seems to be towards freelancing, and we
must also bear in mind the benefit which an individual employee derives from
the requirement of consciously wrongful intent. This allows the owner to escape
liability whenever his employee is able to rebut the presumption of animus
injuriandi. Vicarious liability is not the answer. Nor is it the view expressed
in Van Der Merwe and Olivier (loc cit) that the
34
liability of an owner, editor or printer can be based on dolus eventualis; for in
many cases dolus eventualis will probably be present, but in others not. Prof JC
van der Walt's theory (op cit) of risk liability, in turn, is really a rationalized
form of strict liability. Some writers (eg Burchell: op cit 193, PJ Visser in 1982
THRHR 340 and JD van der Vyver in 1967 THRHR 38) are in favour of negligence
being the basis of liability and the judgment in Hassen v Post Newspapers
(Pty) Ltd and Others 1965 (3) SA 562 (W) points the same way; but any
suggestion that liability for defamation can be founded on negligence was
rejected in the obiter dicta in O'Malley's case. On the other hand, O'Malley
did not overrule the principle discussed at the outset of this judgment that
distributors can escape liability if they are not negligent.
Against this background, it is necessary to raise the question left open in
Pakendorf (at 155A), namely, whether absence of knowledge of wrongfulness
can be relied upon as a defence if the lack of knowledge was due to the
negligence of the defendant.
If media defendants were to be permitted to do so, it would obviously make
nonsense of the approach which I have indicated to the lawfulness of
35
the publication of defamatory untruths. In practical terms (because
intoxication, insanity, provocation and jest could hardly arise in the present
context) the defence of lack of animus injuriandi is concerned with ignorance or
mistake on the part of the defendant regarding one or other element of the delict
(Burchell op cit at p 283; see also Raifeartaigh Fault Issues and Libel Law - A
Comparison between Irish, English and United States Law [1991 ] 40 ICLQ 763).
The indicated approach is intended to cater for ignorance and mistake at the
level of lawfulness; and in a given case negligence on the defendant's part may
well be determinative of the legality of the publication. In such a case a defence
of absence of animus injuriandi can plainly not be available to the
defendant.
Defendants' counsel, rightly in my view, accepted that there are
compelling reasons for holding that the media should not be treated on the same
footing as ordinary members of the public by permitting them to rely on the
absence of animus injuriandi and that it would be appropriate to hold media
defendants liable unless they were not negligent in the circumstances of the
case. As the High Court of Australia pointed out in Lange (at 572), the law of
defamation did not, in its initial stages, deal with publications to tens
36
of thousands, or more, of readers, listeners or viewers, but with publication to
individuals or a small group of persons. The Court proceeded to state that "the
damage that can be done when there are thousands of recipients of a
communication is obviously greater than when there are only a few
recipients" and for this reason held that it is not inconsistent with the implied
freedom of communication of the Australian Constitution to place an
additional burden upon the media in order to escape liability for defamation. In
that country, and in all the others mentioned earlier where strict liability is not
accepted, the media are liable unless they were not negligent. Taking into
account what I said earlier about the credibility which the media enjoys amongst
large sections of the community, such an additional burden is entirely
reasonable.
The resultant position of media defendants may not in this respect be so
different from that of other defendants because Pakendorf left open the
question whether any defendant can rely on a defence of absence of
knowledge of unlawfulness due to negligence. However, we have not been called
upon to decide the question in relation to other members of the public.
My conclusion accordingly is that, insofar as the first and second
37
defences in effect signify that third and fourth defendants were not negligent, the
amended plea will not be excipiable.
To conclude this part of the judgment in which I have been dealing with the
common law, the onus of proof remains to be dealt with.
In civil law, as was said in Mabaso v Felix 1981 (3) SA 865 (A) at
872H, considerations of policy, practice and fairness inter partes, may
require that the defendant bears the overall onus of averring and proving an
excuse or justification for his otherwise unlawful conduct. This remark is
particularly apposite to cases of the present kind where there is a
presumption of unlawfulness arising from the publication of defamatory
material. And even in the absence of a presumption, considerations of
policy, practice and fairness would require the defendant to prove the
justificatory facts. For, as the Court proceeded to say in Mabaso v Felix at
873D-F,
"[t]here is another reason why, at any rate in delicts affecting the
plaintiff's personality and bodily integrity, the onus of proving
excuse or justification, such as self-defence, should be placed on
the defendant: usually the circumstances so excusing of
justifying his wrongdoing are peculiarly within his own and not the
plaintiffs knowledge. True, Wigmore rejects that
38
consideration as a 'universal working rule' for determining the
incidence of the onus of proof (ibid), but that is no reason for its not
being most apposite in the kind of delicts just mentioned. To put
it another way, it would for that reason be fair and accord with
experience and good common sense that in such delicts the
defendant should ordinarily bear the onus of proving the excuse
or justification."
In the present case, for instance, the facts upon which the defendants rely, are
peculiarly within their knowledge. Their counsel accepted that the onus relating
to justification rested upon them but argued that it would at least be for the
plaintiff to prove negligence on their part. But how would the plaintiff set about
doing this if he does not even know, and has very little prospect of discovering,
much less proving, how the false information came to be published? Moreover,
it ought to be clear by now that the enquiry into all the circumstances of the case
involves precisely what it says and is not limited to the possibility of
negligence on a defendant's part. Negligence is obviously an important
consideration; but I have mentioned some others and I indicated that there may
be even further ones. Bearing in mind that the evidence relating to negligence
may well be intertwined with evidence on some other issue, it is unrealistic to
expect the plaintiff to prove some of the
39
facts and the defendant to prove others. In my judgment it is for the
defendant to prove all the facts on which he relies to show that the
publication was reasonable and that he was not negligent. Proof of
reasonableness will usually (if not inevitably) be proof of lack of negligence.
I turn to consider the views expressed above in the context of the
Interim Constitution. I do so in light of s 35(3) which reads a follows:
"In the interpretation of any law and the application and
development of the common law and customary law, a court shall
have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this
chapter."
This provision, as Kentridge AJ explained in Du Plessis and Others v De
Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at 885G-H," ensures that the values
embodied in chapter 3 will permeate the common law in all its aspects."
(See also the separate judgment by Mahomed DP at 897E-G and Gardener
v Whitaker 1996 (4) SA 334 (CC) at 347D-H.) The resultant position appears
to be the same as that in Canada which is described as follows in the Church
of Scientology case supra at 156 paras 91 and 92:
"It is clear from Dolphin Delivery, supra, that the common law must
be interpreted in a manner which is consistent with Charter
principles. The obligation is simply a manifestation of
40
the inherent jurisdiction of the courts to modify or extend the
common taw in order to comply with prevailing social conditions and
values ... Historically, the common law evolved as a result of the
courts making those incremental changes which were necessary
in order to make the law comply with current societal values. The
Charter represents a restatement of the fundamental values
which guide and shape our democratic society and our legal
system. It follows that it is appropriate for the courts to make such
incremental revisions to the common law as may be necessary
to have it comply with the values enunciated in the Charter."
(See also Du Plessis at 881-882 par 55, 884B-F.)
In the present case I have not sought to revise the common law
conformably to the values of the Interim Constitution; I have done no more than
to hold that this Court stated a common law principle wrongly in Pakendod
It is plain, nevertheless that s 35(3) requires an examination of the
constitutional compatibility of my conclusion.
The Constitutional Court has not in any of its judgments fully spelled out
the spirit, purport and objects of the Interim Constitution. But s 33(1) provides
sufficiently clear guidance for present purposes. The entrenched rights, it
says, may be limited only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open democratic society based on freedom
41
and equality. (Cf Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General, Transvaal and
Another 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC) at 740 par 26.) Some of the rights may only
be limited if, in addition to being reasonable, the limitation is also necessary.
One of these is the right "to respect for and protection of . . . dignity"
conferred by s 10. The right "to freedom of speech and expression which
shall include freedom of the press and other media" is conferred by s 15(1).
Any limitation on this right must, in so far as it relates to free and fair political
activity, also pass the necessity test.
The proper balance between these two rights in terms of constitutional
values may conveniently be discussed by reference to the judgments in
Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) and Buthelezi v
South African Broadcasting Corporation [1998] 1 All SA 147 (N). I share the
view expressed in Holomisa at 607E-G that
"... s 10's recognition of every person's 'right to respect for and
protection of his or her dignity' must encompass ... the right to a
good name and reputation. A further consideration is that the
Constitutional Court, although in a very different context, has
given primacy to the rights to life and dignity in the catalogue of
constitutional protections. As Chaskalson P (with whose
reasons most of the other Judges agreed) stated in S v
Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 at 451C-D:
42
'The rights to life and dignity are the most
important of all human rights, and the source of all
other personal rights in chap 3. By committing
ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of
human rights we are required to value these two rights
above all others'".
I also agree that
"[i]n a system of democracy dedicated to openness and
accountability, as ours is, the especially important role of the
media, both publicly and privately owned, must in my view be
recognised. The success of our constitutional venture depends
upon robust criticism of the exercise of power... It is for this very
reason that the Constitution recognises the especial
importance and role of the media in nurturing and strengthening our
democracy." (Holomisa at 608J-609D.)
In Buthelezi Thirion J did not dispute the correctness of these parts of the
judgment but differed on the question of the onus of proof. I will deal with that
question in a moment. But let me first say, that, in weighing the two interests,
I am unable to accept the paramountcy which Cameron J would accord,
indiscriminately and irrespective of the circumstances of each case, it seems,
to the freedom of expression relating to free and fair political activity.
Holomisa and Buthelezi were both concerned with allegedly
43
defamatory publications about policitians. The Australian decisions
recognize that the public has an interest in the performance of public
representatives and in their fitness for office; and I have indicated that
greater latitude is accorded to political discussion in our own country. But, as
I indicated before, the right to protect one's reputation weighed no less than
the freedom of expression in pre-transition times; and the quotation from the
judgment in Makwanyane confirms my own impression that the Interim
Constitution rated personal dignity much higher than before. The ultimate
question is whether what I hold to be the common law achieves a proper balance
between the right to protect one's reputation and the freedom of the press,
viewing these interests as constitutional values. I believe it does.
Cameron J's decision in Holomisa on the onus of proof in the
negligence based type of defence which he enunciated, stemmed directly from
the excessive importance which he attached to the freedom of expression
relating to political activity, and from the proposition at 611G-H of his
judgment that
"[r]eputation, though integral to 'the essential dignity and worth
44
of every human being' is not to be weighed equally with
physical integrity."
I cannot find anything in the text or the spirit of the Interim Constitution to
support this. As Thirion J said in Buthelezi at 156e-g,
"[w]hy should an invasion of a person's right to dignity and
reputation be treated differently? It too is one of the individual's
fundamental rights... Recovery from a physical injury depends on
the healing powers of the body. Recovery from an injury to
reputation depends on the memory of a fickle public which is all too
ready to believe and remember what is adverse to reputation."
In the type of defence which I have enunciated in this judgment, I have
placed the onus on the defendant. In Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another
1997 3) SA 1012 (CC) the constitutionality of a statutory presumption was
challenged under the equality provision of the Bill of Rights (s 8(1)). In the
joint judgment of Ackermann, O'Regan and Sachs JJ the following is said (at
1028 par 36):
"In any civil case, one of the parties will have to bear the onus on
each of the factual matters material to the adjudication of the
dispute ... As long as the imposition of the onus is not
arbitrary, there will be no breach of s 8(1)."
45
On the same page in par 38 the judgment continues:
"There is indeed nothing rigid or unchanging in relation to the
question of the incidence of the onus of proof in civil matters, no
established 'golden rule' like the presumption of innocence that runs
through criminal trials ... As long as the rules relating to the onus
are rationally based, therefore, no constitutional challenge
in terms of s 8 will arise."
I have explained why in my view the onus should be on the defendant. This view
is supported in a constitutional context by the Australian decisions mentioned
earlier and the judgment of Owen-Flood J in the British Columbia Supreme Court
in Pressier and Pressier v Lethbridge and Westcom TV Group Ltd 48 CRR (2d)
144. I should add that the falsity of a defamatory statement is not an element
of the delict, but that its truth may be an important factor in deciding the legality
of its publication. I find it difficult to see why (as was held in Holomisa) a plaintiff
should, as part of his claim, allege and prove something that the defendant may
rely upon in justification. Eight of the nine articles were published in the City
Press before 27 April 1994 when the Interim Constitution came into operation.
In similar circumstances the Constitutional Court unanimously held in Du
Plessis that
46
the Interim Constitution did not "turn conduct which was unlawful before it came
into force into lawful conduct" (per Kentridge AJ at 8GGD-E); and accordingly
that "the defendants are not entitled to invoke s 15 as a defence to an action for
damages for defamation published before the Constitution came into operation"
(866G). It is clear therefore that the reliance on s 15 in par 7.2.1 of the third
defence is misplaced in relation to these articles. As far as the article published
after 27 April 1994 is concerned, I have already found that the common law, as
expounded in this judgment, is in conformity with constitutional values.
On my view of the common law, the amended plea will contain all the
essential allegations for a valid defence. The amendment will accordingly be
allowed.
In conclusion I wish to acknowledge that I have perhaps not accorded
sufficient recognition to South African writers. As Prof Burchell wrote in the
preface to 77?e Law of Defamation in South Africa
"the law of defamation has provided the battleground for a
conflict between the proponents of the major theories of
delictual liability."
47
Since the conflict raged mainly in academic ranks, the literature on the
subject is so vast that one must perforce be selective. I have read as much as
I possibly could of the textbooks and articles which appeared in the journals
over the years. Several authors will probably recognise their thoughts in
what I have written.
It is recorded that the defendants applied for and were granted
condonation for non-compliance with the Rules at the hearing of the appeal. They
were ordered to pay the costs occasioned by the petition for condonation.
I make the following order:
1. The appeal is allowed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
2. Substituted for the order of the Court a quo is an order in the following
terms:
(a) The defendants' plea is amended in terms of annexure "A"
hereto.
(b) The defendants are ordered to pay the costs of the
48
application for amendment which will include the costs of
two counsel.
Judge Of Appeal
Concurred:
Hoexter JA
Harms JA
Plewman JA
Farlam AJA
ANNEXURE "A"
Paragraphs 3, 7,12,16,19,22, 25,28, 31 and 34 are replaced with the following: "3.
Ad paragraph 6
3.1 Save for denying that the fourth defendant was the printer of the
City Press during the period in which the articles referred to in
claims F, G and I of the particulars of claim were published,
the defendants admit the allegations in 6.1.
3.2 The defendants deny the allegations in 6.2.
3.3 If it is held that any of the articles referred to in the particulars of
claim is about and concerning the plaintiff and is defamatory
of the plaintiff, the third defendant states that neither it and
its employees:
3.3.1 knew at the time of distribution of the newspapers that the
articles contained therein were defamatory of the
plaintiff;
3.3.2 were negligent in not knowing that the articles were
defamatory of the plaintiff;
3.3.3 knew or ought to have known that the City Press was of such
a character that its articles were likely to be
defamatory of the plaintiff.
3.4 In elaboration of paragraph 3.3 above the third defendant
states that:
3.4.1 in the distribution of City Press newspapers the third
defendant:
3.4.1.1 collects printed and bundled copies of the
newspapers from the fourth defendant at
specified times;
3.4.1.2 loads the printed and bundled copies off the
fourth defendant's conveyor belt and on to
its trucks immediately prior to
2
the fourth defendant's conveyor belt and on to its
trucks immediately prior to delivery; and 3.4.1.3
effects delivery thereof to selected outlets through a
system of depots and routes;
3.4.2 the third defendant and its employees do not read of have
a reasonable opportunity to read the articles at any time
prior to their distribution;
3.4.3 the third defendant had no intention to defame the
plaintiff by distributing the matter referred to in
particulars of claim.
3.5 If it is held that any of the articles referred to in the particulars
of claim, and which were published during the period in which
the fourth defendant was the printer of City Press, is about
and concerning the plaintiff and is defamatory of the plaintiff,
the fourth defendant:
3.5.1 denies that it is strictly liable for the publication of such
matter;
3.5.2 denies that in printing the said matter it acted am/no
injuriandi or can be deemed to have acted am/no
injuriandi.
3.6 In elaboration upon the denials in subparagraphs 3.2 and 3.5
the fourth defendant states that neither it nor its employees:
3.6.1 knew that relevant issues of the City Press at the time they
were printed or sold contained articles which were
defamatory of the plaintiff;
3.6.2 was negligent in not knowing that the articles were
defamatory of the plaintiff;
3.6.3 knew or ought to have known that the first defendant
3
was of such a character that its articles were likely to be defamatory
of the plaintiff. 3.7 The fourth defendant states that the printing
and publication of the articles took place in the following
circumstances:
3.7.1 the fourth defendant receives a black and white make up
from the first defendant during the Thursday to
Saturday prior to printing;
3.7.2 where colour printing is involved, the fourth defendant
receives a colour slide form the first defendant which is
then sent to the fourth defendant's colour stripper who
separates the colours and then re-combines them in
colour negatives;
3.7.3 the fourth defendant uses the lithography method of
printing and did so at the time of printing the articles;
3.7.4 the fourth defendant combines the black and white make
up with the colour negatives to produce a final page
negative;
3.7.5 the fourth defendant's plate make department then
develops the page negative on to a aluminium page
plate;
3.7.6 the aluminium plate is not itself intended to be read;
3.7.7 from the aluminium plate an image is transferred into an
intermediate blanket;
3.7.8 the information is then printed from the intermediate
blanket on to the paper which is trimmed and cut on
rollers by mechanical process inside the printer to
produce folded pages which emerge in sequence;
3.7.9 the pages then move through the packer which counts,
orders and bundles complete copies of the final
4
product;
3.7.10 the bundles are then loaded on to a conveyer belt for
distribution by the third defendant;
3.7.11 the function of reading and laying out the articles is
performed by the editor of the City Press;
3.7.12 the fourth defendant and its employees have no role in
the editorial content and make up of the newspaper
they print and are not entitled to make alterations to the
content or make up thereof;
3.7.13 the printing press produces approximately 25 000
copies of a newspaper per hour;
3.7.14 the author of the article is given deadlines by the City
Press by which time the make ups for printing must be
delivered;
3.7.15 the operation is a high speed operation;
3.7.16 the fourth defendant prints at least four newspapers
over each weekend;
3.7.17 the fourth defendant prints at least seven different
newspapers in a high speed manufacturing process.
3.8 In these circumstances the fourth defendant did not, nor is it
reasonably possible for the fourth defendant to have read
through the material it prints prior to its printing, and the
system utilised is dictated by the exigencies of the newspaper
industry and is a reasonable one to use.
3.9 Save a aforesaid, the defendants admit the allegations herein.
7. Ad paragraphs 10 and 11
7.1 The defendants deny the allegations herein as if specifically
traversed.
7.2 In addition to the afore going, the defendants plead that the
5
publication of the articles was not unlawful. 7.3 More
particularly: 7.3.1 A the defendants were unaware of the falsity
of any
averment in any of the articles; 7.3.1B the defendants did not
publish any of the articles recklessly, i.e. not caring whether their
contents were true of false; the facts upon which the defendants will
rely in this context are: (a) the first and second defendants:
(i) the reporters who wrote the articles were well
qualified and responsible journalists; (ii) the
plaintiff was at all material times a practising
attorney; (iii) Mr David Sebati, who had been
seriously injured,
was his client; (iv) the said Sebati was
indigent; (v) the plaintiff was, in his professional
capacity,
being investigated by the Auditor-General; (vi) the
reporters who wrote the article took reasonable steps
to establish and/or investigate the truth of the
allegations, which steps included: investigations with
respect to fraudulent claims pertaining to the old
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund; enquiries
with the family of Mr Solomon Mogotsi who was
investigating fraudulent third party claims;
enquiries with Mr Michael Prinsloo, a
director of Assesskor;
6
enquiries with Mr Steven Kgomo in relation
to a claim submitted by the plaintiff
and/or the firm of which the plaintiff is
a partner;
enquiries with the Transvaal Law Society
relating to "touting" for work; interviews
with one Martha and one Joyce Matshane in
relation to the plaintiffs efforts to submit
a claim arising form an accident in which
they were injured; interviews or enquiries
with Mr Timothy Phale pertaining to the
aforesaid accident; investigations relating
to the practice of "touting" in streets,
hospitals, mortuaries and police stations;
interviews or enquiries with the said
Sebati and his family relating to the
conduct of the plaintiff in acting on
Sebati's behalf;
interviews or enquires with Mr A J
Tsanwani, a trustee or curator who
purportedly acted on the said Sebati's
behalf;
enquiries with Mutual and Federal
Insurance pertaining to the administration of
funds to which the said Sebati became
entitled on the settlement of his claim;
examination of application papers filed in
the Witwatersrand Local Division of the
7
Supreme Court by Dr Jackie Mphafudi in
which the plaintiff was a respondent;
enquiries with the Master of the Supreme Court
pertaining to the administration of funds to
which the said Sebati had become entitled;
the obtaining and examination of a taxed
bill of costs prepared by or on behalf of the
plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff's fees for
representing the said Sebati; efforts to
obtain powers of attorney form the said
Sebati in order to have sight of and examine
documents pertaining to Sebati's claim;
enquiries with the plaintiff pertaining to the
allegations contained in the articles;
(vii) the defendants published the enquiries made by
the journalists with the plaintiff and published the
plaintiff's response to allegations contained in
the articles;
(viii) the defendants published the result of an enquiry
by the Transvaal Law Society; (ix) the plaintiff, in his
professional capacity, has been the subject of an
investigation by the Office for Serious Economic
Offenses; (x) the journalists, in investigating and in
writing the articles, and the defendants in publishing
the articles, complied with the standards of
investigative reporting applicable in the
8
journalistic profession; (xi) the articles
constitute a fair and balanced account of the
journalists' interviews, enquiries and investigations into
their subject matter;
(b) the third defendant:
The facts alleged in paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 above;
(c) the fourth defendant:
The facts alleged in paragraphs 3.5 to 3.8 above; 7.3.1C the
defendants were not negligent in publishing any of the articles; the
facts upon which the defendants will rely in the context are:
(a) the first and second defendants:
the facts alleged in paragraph 7.3.1B(a) above;
(b) the third defendant:
The facts alleged in paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 above
(c) the fourth defendant:
The facts alleged in paragraphs 3.5 to 3.8 above; 7.3.1D in view of
the facts alleged in paragraphs 7.3.1A to 7.3.1C, the publications
were objectively reasonable;
7.3.1 E the articles were published without animus injuriandi."
alternatively to paragraph 7.3.1 above
7.3.2 the appellants repeat mutatis muutandis the contents of
paragraphs 7.3.1 A to 7.3.1E above.
7.3.3 the articles concern matters of public interest.
7.4 in the circumstances the publication of the articles was not unlawful.
.. 12. Ad paragraphs 16 and 17
The defendants repeat paragraph 7 of their plea.
9
16. Ad paragraphs 21 and 22
The defendants repeat paragraph 7 of their plea.
19. Ad paragraphs 26 and 27
The defendants repeat paragraph 7 of their plea. 22.
Ad paragraphs 31 and 32
The defendants repeat paragraph 7 of their plea.
25. Ad paragraphs 36 and 37
The defendants repeat paragraph 7 of their plea.
28. Ad paragraphs 41 and 42
The defendants repeat paragraph 7 of their plea.
31. Ad paragraphs 46 and 47
The defendants repeat paragraph 7 of their plea.
34. Ad paragraphs 51 and 52
The defendants repeat paragraph 7 of their plea.