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					                IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
                       JACKSONVILLE DIVISION



DANTES PARIS KEBREAU,
In Propia Persona
SUI JURIS

            Petitioner,



vs.


COUNTY COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY,
FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA et al.,
CASE NO:16-2010-MO-015341-AXXX-MA
ANGELA B. COREY,
State Attorney 4th Judicial Circuit
LEIGH F. ROSENBLOOM,
Assistant State Attorney
OFFICER - N.L. DAVIS, #60313
SERGEANT - RIVERA, #6141
SERGEANT - P.L. MCNEAL, #5688
911 OPERATOR - UNKNOWN LOCATION
Code ENFORCAMANT - T. BABCOCK/BABCOX, #1807
M&Y CONTRACTORS - UNKNOWN LOCATION,
UNNAMED OFFICERS

_____________Respondents,


                   PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

      The Petitioner, Dantes Paris Kebreau, Sui Juris, humbly

petitions the Court, pursuant to Fla.R.App.P.9.100, for a writ

of mandamus of prohibition compelling Judge Derke, Eleni Elia,

as a judge for the Fourth Judicial Circuit to strike the August

                                [1]
2, 2010, August 6, 2010, August 24, 2010, August 31, 2010 and

November 15, 2010 orders respectively, which were entered in the

above numbered and styled case.    As a basis for issuing the writ

the Petitioner will show the court as follows:



                  BASIS FOR INVOKING JURISDICTION

     This petition for mandamus is brought under article V, Sec.

4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and under Florida Rules of

Appellate Procedure 9.030, 9.100 and other relevant authorities.


In 1962, Congress conferred upon all federal district courts the
same power to issue writs of mandamus as was exercisable by
federal courts in the District of Columbia, 76 Stat. 744, 28
U.S.C. § 1361. This Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
mandamus under Article V Section 4(b) (3) of the Florida
Constitution and Fla.R.App.P.9.030 (b) (3). Mandamus is the
proper remedy to compel the lower court to comply with the
mandates in Fla.R.Crim.P.3.140 (b), 3.140(d) (3), 3.1540(d),
3.610. Florida Statues governing where parties must file actions
is the Constitutional Mandate for Issue of Writ of Mandamus of
Prohibition.


                 FACTS ON WHICH PETITIONER RELIES

1.   The petitioner submits the State's Failure to Establish

Jurisdiction over the subject matter placed before the court

violates petitioner‘s Constitutional rights and subjects suit to

dismissal voiding the judgment entered against him.

2.   The State is persecuting petitioner with Malicious

Prosecution absent a Corpus Delicti, probable cause, a witness

or testimony bra affidavit.   The State has not met its burden of

                                  [2]
proof.

3.   The Defective Instrument used to prosecute against the

petitioner is has rendered an invalid judgment against the

petitioner void any facts to substantiate the charge. (See Ex,A

& B).

4.   Officers Warrantless Entry Violates Constitution.

5.   Unlicensed Assistant State Attorney, Leigh F. Rosenbloom has

violated her Oath of Office and the Constitution.

6.   Judge Derke, Eleni Elia Violated her Judicial Oath of Office

as well as the Constitution.

7.   NOTICE OF JURY TRIAL EXPIRATION - Pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P.

3.191(a) the Petitioner is serving notice that the time allotted

by this rule has been egregiously tolled and the requirement has

not been met.    Petitioner asks for dismissal of suit.



                   THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT

     The nature of the relief sought is a Writ of Mandamus of

Prohibition humbly demanding the recusal of Judge Derke, Eleni

Elia.    Further relief is sought by the compelling of Mandamus to

the judge and or Mandamus itself to strike, void, vacate and

dismiss all charges, fines and penalties associated with this

case and the Petitioner Dantes Paris Kebreau, Sui Juris.

     The petitioner requests that this Court issue an order to

show cause to the respondents as to the actions taken to levy

                                 [3]
charges against him. He requests the writ issue to the Circuit

Court of the 4th Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in

and for Duval County.



                            ARGUMENT

Amendment V & XIV - Burden is Not Met

    Jurisdiction, once challenged, is to be proven, not by the

court, but by the party attempting to assert jurisdiction. The

burden of proof of jurisdiction lies with the asserter. The

State is the asserter against Dantes P. Kebreau, Sui Juris.   The

court is only to rule on the sufficiency of the proof tendered.

The State has no evidence of a crime as mandated by the

Constitution.

    It is the plaintiff's duty to inform the court of facts

alleged for determination of sufficiency to support conviction,

should one be obtained otherwise, there is no lawful notice, and

charge must be dismissed for failure to state a valid, truthful

offense. Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. A

judgment from a court that did not have subject-matter

jurisdiction is forever a nullity.   Any ruling made by a court

in which there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

called a ―void judgment‖ and must be vacated, dismissed, thrown

out. Proof of jurisdiction must appear on the record of the

court.

                               [4]
See, McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178
(1936). The origins of this doctrine of law may be found in
MAXFIELD v. LEVY, 4 U.S. 330 (1797), 4 U.S. 330 (Dall.) 2 Dall.
381 2 U.S. 381 1 L.Ed. 424


                 Seven Elements of Jurisdiction

     The Seven elements of jurisdiction have not been properly

satisfied rendering the charge an Invalid Judgment due to Lack

of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction thus the petitioner asserts the

charge is erroneous and subject to dismissal.

(1) There is no constitutionally valid requirement you must

identify yourself, see 4th Amendment; also see, Brown v. Texas,

443 US 47 and Kolender v Lawson, 461 US 352.    The accused must

be properly identified, identified in such a fashion there is no

room for mistaken identity. The individual must be singled out

from all others; otherwise, anyone could be subject to arrest

and trial without benefit of "wrong party" defense. The arrest

report fails to properly identify the petitioner. (see Exhibit

A)

(2) The statute of offense must be identified by its proper or

common name. A number is insufficient.   If a number were to be

deemed sufficient, government could bring new and different

charges at any time by alleging clerical error. For any act to

be triable as an offense, it must be declared to be a crime.

Charges must negate any exception forming part of the statutory

definition of an offense, by affirmative non-applicability. In

                               [5]
other words, any charge must affirmatively negate any exception

found in the law.

(3) The acts of alleged offense must be described in non-

prejudicial language and detail so as to enable a person of

average intelligence to understand nature of charge (to enable

preparation of defense); the actual act or acts constituting the

offense complained of. The charge must not be described by

parroting the statute; not by the language of same. The naming

of the acts of the offense describes a specific offense whereas

the verbiage of a statute describes only a general class of

offense. Facts must be stated. Conclusions cannot be considered

in the determination of probable cause. The State has failed to

meet this requirement.   (see Exhibit B)

(4) The accuser must be named. He/she may be an officer or a

third party, but some positively identifiable person (human

being) must accuse; some certain person must take responsibility

for the making of the accusation, not an agency or an

institution. This is the only valid means by which a citizen may

begin to face his accuser. Also, the injured party (corpus

delicti) must make the accusation. Hearsay evidence may not be

provided. Anyone else testifying that they heard that another

party was injured does not qualify as direct evidence.   The

petitioner submits the State's failure to produce a Corpus

Delicti.   The statement being used as evidence violates this

                                [6]
rule.   It is hearsay.   (see Exhibit B)

(5) The accusation must be made under penalty of perjury. If

perjury cannot reach the accuser, there is no accusation.

Otherwise, anyone may accuse another falsely without risk.

(6)   "The essential elements of due process are notice and an

opportunity to defend." Simon v Craft, 182 US 427., "One is not

entitled to protection unless he has reasonable cause to

apprehend danger from a direct answer. The mere assertion of a

privilege does not immunize him; the court must determine

whether his refusal is justified, and may require that he is

mistaken in his refusal." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479

(1951).

      To comply with the five elements above, which are for the

accusation to be valid, the accused must be accorded due

process. Accuser must have complied with law, procedure and form

in bringing the charge. This includes court-determined probable

cause, summons and notice procedure. ―If lawful process may be

abrogated in placing a citizen in jeopardy, then any means may

be utilized to deprive a man of his freedom, and all dissent may

be stifled by utilization of defective process.‖   No warrants

were issued in connection with bringing this case against the

petitioner.   The court refused to allow the petitioner to appear

in proper standing to defend against the usurping of his

Constitutional rights by dismissing all of his motions to the

                                 [7]
court without due or consideration.

(7) The court must be one of competent jurisdiction. To have

valid process, the tribunal must be a creature of its

constitution, in accord with the law of its creation, i.e.,

Article III judge. Judge Derke, Eleni Elia is operating off of

colorable law and commonly accepted practices.

    The judge has stated in open court her lack of awareness of

the case before her by answering to the petitioner inquiry of

her knowledge of the case, "it looks like an eviction case", the

petitioner questions why the judge didn't examine the

information before her further to see if there was a warrant

issued for his eviction.

    The judge did not do her due diligence in preparing for

this case.   She has demonstrated her unwillingness to operate

within the strict confines of her title pursuant to the US

Constitution, Judges Official Code of Conduct of Florida Canons,

by objecting from the bench and acting as a lawyer from her seat

which is strictly prohibited by Florida‘s Bar Association and

the United States Constitution.

    Because the judge does not adhere to the Constitutional

mandates or her Oath of office she can not allow reason with

justice, its procedures or its effect be made in this case.    The

petitioner Dantes Paris Kebreau, Sui Juris does not trust the



                                  [8]
ethics, morals or knowledge of the judge to act as a trier of

fact in this case.

    Subject matter jurisdiction is two part: (1) the statutory

or common law authority for the court to hear the case, there

must be a common law basis for a remedy to the injury and (2)

the appearance and testimony of a competent fact witness, in

other words, sufficiency of pleadings, there must be a ―corpus

delicti‖, a competent witness or notarized affidavit

demonstrating an injury.   If a court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction, it may not decide a case.   Jurisdiction is

set in law, constitutions, or case law.

    The court fails on each of these requirements to prove it

has proper jurisdiction.



                      MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Colorable Law Practices

    The presumption of innocence is a constitutional offering

to safeguard individuals from malicious prosecution by hearsay,

overzealous officers acting in colorable law and court officials

acting negligently in their offices.   The preponderance of

evidence should indisputably satisfy a determination of guilty

for the accused to be charged.

    The State has not proven a criminal offense was committed.

Absent a Corpus Delicti or Injured Party, and denying him the

                                 [9]
Right to Face his Accuser without a tenable or valid charge,

absent due process, using a defective instrument, not having met

the burden of proof as required pursuant to Amendment IV of

United States Constitution, the petitioner's right to due

process have been arrested.   The State is breaking the law!

Evidence must be present to be charged and tried by any court,

officer or tribunal but the State is acting against him without

any evidence.

    Representatives of the codes given by the Constitution have

shunned the petitioner in the court. The petitioner's

Constitutional rights under the Supreme law of the land have

been treason against. The court and its agents has acted as a

terrorist to deprive petitioner of his personal and sovereign

liberties as protected under the United States Constitution.

    Petitioner asserts his Amendment V rights were violated by

the State's colorable law practices.    The petitioner invokes his

rights under this clause and holds that he was both civilly and

criminally trespassed against.    He was mentally, physically and

spiritually assuaged by the named and unnamed officers, the

agents of the State and the State itself by means and ways of

the absence of the law advocating for truth and justice on his

behalf.

    Petitioner is convinced the issuance of the writ is the

only way to cause Judge Derke, Eleni Elia and the court to act

                                 [10]
in its lawful duty to provide justice within the well defined

articulates of the supreme law of the land.

    The court has accepted for use a defective instrument

without necessary warrants and void exigent circumstances and

making it appear as "lawful", castrating him of his rights

thereby committing treason against the Constitution.

    Due process protects the individual so that statutes,

regulations, and enforcement actions must ensure that no one is

deprived of "life, liberty, or property" without a fair

opportunity to affect the judgment.



DEFECTIVE INSTRUMENT - VOID JUDGMENT

N.Y. CPL. LAW § 170.35 : NY Code - Section 170.35: Motion to
dismiss information, simplified information, prosecutor's
information or misdemeanor complaint; as defective,
1. After arraignment upon an information, a simplified
information, a prosecutor's information or a misdemeanor
complaint, the local criminal court may, upon motion of the
petitioner, dismiss such instrument or any count thereof upon
the ground that:
(a) It is defective, within the meaning of section 170.35; or
(b) The petitioner has received immunity from prosecution for
the offense charged, pursuant to sections 50.20 or 190.40; or
(c) The prosecution is barred by reason of a previous
prosecution, pursuant to section 40.20; or
(d) The prosecution is untimely, pursuant to section 30.10; o
(e) The petitioner has been denied the right to a speedy trial;
or
(f) There exists some other jurisdictional or legal impediment
to conviction of the petitioner for the offense charged; or
(g) Dismissal is required in furtherance of justice, within the
meaning of section 170.40."




                              [11]
N.Y. CPL. LAW § 170.40 : NY Code - Section 170.40:

Motion to dismiss information, simplified traffic information,
prosecutor's information or misdemeanor complaint; in
furtherance of justice,
1. An information, a simplified traffic information, a
prosecutor's information or a misdemeanor complaint, or any
count thereof, may be dismissed in the interest of justice, as
provided in paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section
170.30 when, even though there may be no basis for dismissal as
a matter of law upon any ground specified in paragraphs (a)
through (f) of said subdivision one of section 70.30, such
dismissal is required as a matter of judicial discretion by the
existence of some compelling factor, consideration or
circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or
prosecution of the petitioner upon such accusatory instrument or
count would constitute or result in injustice. In determining
whether such compelling factor, consideration, or circumstance
exists, the court must, to the extent applicable, examine and
consider, individually and collectively, the following:
(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;
(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;
(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible
at trial;
(d) the history, character and condition of the petitioner;
(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement
personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the
petitioner;
(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the petitioner a
sentence authorized for the offense;
(g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the
community;
(h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public
in the criminal justice system;
(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the
complainant or victim with respect to the motion;
(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of
conviction would serve no useful purpose.


    An order dismissing an accusatory instrument specified in

subdivision one in the interest of justice may be issued upon

motion of the people or of the court itself as well as upon that

of the petitioner.   A Nolle Prosequi at the discretion of the

                               [12]
prosecutor would have sufficed.    Upon issuing such an order, the

court must set forth its reasons therefore upon the record.

Following is an outline of the arrest report used against the

petitioner- Arrest and Booking Report# 2010-605989 (see Exhibit

A, B).

Errors - (Exhibit A)

1)   Arrestee's Home Address

2)   Ethnicity

3)   Cell Phone #

4)   Offense Location Type

5)   Statute or Ordinance Number

6)   Charge

7)   Warrant Type

Facts and Argument – In response to each

1)   This is not the petitioner's home address, it's petitioner

property.

2)   The petitioner is not of Hispanic origin.   This is a false

statement of description.

3)   This is not the petitioner cell phone number.

4)   Petitioner denies committing any crime.

5)   Petitioner does not understand the statute or its charge.

6)   Petitioner is innocent of the charges.

7)   Petitioner arrest was executed warrantless and de novo

exigent circumstances without a corpus delicti.

                               [13]
Errors – (Exhibit B)

1) Attempt Code

2) Reporting Officer

3) Additional Information statement

4) Complaint information, Age, Address

5) Triage questions – Injuries from Accident

Facts and Argument – In response to each

1) The petitioner committed no crime.    He is innocent.

2) The reporting officer is not the officer who engaged him.

3) The statement doesn't identify a victim, injured party or

allege a crime.    There is no Corpus Delicti. The information

provided is vague, lacking, and there is no description of the

harm or violation, the criminal and illegal acts have not been

specified.    Statement constitutes of hearsay, no witness are

named to the criminal event.    The petitioner is innocent and

alleges the officer was not acting in unlawful performance of

his duty by arresting him without a warrant and absent exigent

circumstances.

4)   The petitioner can not face his accuser. No information is

provided.    Petitioner does not know to whom he offends.

5)   While being processed for an unknown crime the petitioner

identified an injury to intake personnel of injuries sustained

to his wrist, hand and fingers, by the actions of officer N.L.

Davis #60313    The woman simply responded, ―You‘re a big boy,

                                [14]
you‘ll be alright‖, she dismissed his claims of injury because

of bias and assumptions.   She like her colleagues discounted the

information and did not record his injuries supplied by the

petitioner. The petitioner has no hope that the current system

of this court is obligated morally, consciously or dutifully to

the laws of the Constitution.



                  Unlawful Performance of Duty

OFFICERS - WARRENTLESS ENTRY

  Jacksonville Ordinance Code, Section 518.123(a) and (f) CAMARA

v. MUNICIPAL COURT, 387 U.S. 523 (1967):

authorizes removal of "junk" vehicles without proper notice or a
hearing… amounts to auto theft under color of law.


Steagald v. United States, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 Held: 2. The search in

question violated the Fourth Amendment, where it took place in

the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. (a) Absent

exigent circumstances or consent, a home may not be searched

without a warrant (c) A search warrant requirement will not

significantly impede effective law enforcement efforts warrant

is required to apprehend a suspected felon in a public place.

Moreover, the exigent-circumstances doctrine significantly

limits the situations in which a search warrant is needed. And

in those situations in which a search warrant is necessary, the

inconvenience incurred by the police is generally insignificant.

                                [15]
In any event, whatever practical problems there are in requiring

a search warrant they cannot outweigh the constitutional

interest at stake in protecting the right of presumptively

innocent people to be secure in their homes from unjustified,

forcible intrusions by the government.


  "the Constitution requires ‗that the deliberate, impartial
judgment of a judicial officer be interposed between the citizen
and the police."
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-482

  Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior

approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under

the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically

established and well-delineated exceptions..' Beck v. Ohio, 379

U.S. 89, 96.

  Bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search

leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations ‗only

in the discretion of the police'." KATZ v. UNITED STATES, 389

U.S. 347 (1967), Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39

(1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).     Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed. 266 (2002) The

standard was not recognized by the Supreme Court even prior to

Hope. see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526., Beck v.

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 , 96.

  In Oliver, 466 U.S., at 182, n. 12, 104 S.Ct., at 1743, n. 12

"for most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly

                              [16]
marked; and the conception defining the curtilage -- as the area

around the home to which the activity of home life extends -- is

a familiar one easily understood from our daily experience."

Maughon v. Bibb County, 160 F.2d 658 (11th Cir. 1998).

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, at page 635, 6 S.Ct.524, at

page 535, 29 L.Ed. 746 reads:

―It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.
Adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed
can only obviate this. A close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation
of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. Further, it does not require being so
branded in open court to determine its nullity.‖


Norton v. County of Shelby, 118 U.S. 425 (1886). Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 814

"(When government officials abuse their offices), action[s] for
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees."

  The purpose of a warrant is to allow a neutral judicial

officer to assess whether the police have probable cause to make

an arrest or conduct a search. As we have often explained, the

placement of this checkpoint between the Government and the

citizen implicitly acknowledges that an officer engaged in the

often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, Johnson v.


                                [17]
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948), at 14, may lack

sufficient objectivity to weigh correctly the strength of the

evidence supporting the contemplated action against the

individuals interests in protecting his own liberty and the

privacy of his home.

  Warrantless search or arrest can ONLY occur in a public place

during HOT PURSUIT.    In all other cases, a fair, neutral and

detached judicial officer determines FROM THE COMPLAINT that a

warrant should issue based upon the commission OF A FELONY.      The

petitioner states there is no evidence to support a warrantless

search or seizure of property or to detain and charge the

petitioner.   The petitioner did not resist arrest, was not in

the act of ―fleeing‖, was not in the commission of a crime or

involved in any exigent circumstance that would warrant the

unlawful actions of the officers.      He denies all charges being

made against him in connection to this case against him by the

State.

  On August 2, 2010 the petitioner found Code Enforcement had

Trespassed and Stolen property off of his real property.     Due to

lack of jurisdiction for code enforcement to remove his property

the petitioner called the authorities to aid him in removing the

trespasser from his property and in recovering his property.

The petitioner began repossessing his property and began to

secure it on other parts of his property behind lock and key,

                                [18]
under restricted access.

  When the police arrived instead of coming to his aid ferreting

out information or considering his information they immediately

sided with the agents of the state called Code Enforcement.

This was an act of colorable law.     Because Code Enforcement also

works for the City of Jacksonville the officers likened them as

one of their "own" and dismissed the petitioner's complaint.

The police officers began demanding the petitioner relinquish

his rights to protect his property and surrender to the

unauthorized and warrantless, colorable law authority of code

enforcement.   The petitioner was puzzled and refused.    He called

the police yet again in hopes of receiving the aid he sought in

removing trespassers from his property.    Code enforcement and

the unlawfully performing officers who were now violating his

rights under color of law.   Petitioner instead was declined by

the 9-1-1 operator and told there was a Sergeant on the scene

but this Sergeant, Sergeant Rivera was violent, threatening,

forceful and non compliant with the petitioner. Despite the

petitioners pleas he was ignored.

  The officers engaged in unlawful duty by allowing and

facilitating the trespass and theft of his property by parties

of non interest.   Under duress and threat by the officers, the

petitioner was forced to allow the breach of entry.

  Acting outside of their legal performance of duty, each of the

                               [19]
officers were required to know that the Ordinance, which

authorized warrantless entry, was unconstitutional. Under the

terms of Harlow, N.L. Davis and the other officers were required

to know this, and act accordingly. The knowledge required only

to know that his invasion was unlawful was minimal at best.

  The petitioner alleges violations of the Fourth Amendment and

various state torts.   He contends the County court erred in

granting judgment in favor of N.L. Davis' arrest report, the

unnamed deputies, and prosecutor by allowing a charge to be

entered against him.   The petitioner asserts this judge is

derelict in her duties to ascertain validity of charges against

her desire to perform monetarily for the state by arguing:



(1) his arrest inside his home was unlawful because the officers
did not have a warrant, exigent circumstances, or consent to
enter, and the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly
established such that they are guilty of trespassing; (2) the
officers used excessive force in making the arrest because any
force used in an unlawful arrest is excessive; (3) the facts
and circumstances of his arrest are sufficient to create a
triable issue with respect to whether the deputies acted with
actual malice towards offending the petitioner's rights under
the Constitution.

  There is nothing as terrible and scary as corrupt prosecutors

and corrupt cops. Ignorance of the law is no excuse of the law.

An officer acting lawfully exercises the law rightfully; an

officer acting outside of his legal performance has no excuse of

the law.   It is his duty and responsibility to know the law.


                               [20]
  This abuse of power has caused the petitioner injury by

deprivation of his Constitutional rights and has shifted the

burden to him to prove his innocence, creating chaos and

confusion in the petitioner's life, causing him to be in a state

of abject loss of spirit, community, business and trust. He is

regressed in his relationships with others and even in his own

studiousness.



                   Absent Exigent Circumstances

  In Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. at 1380, which sets

forth the law with ―obvious clarity,‖ Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351.

Moreover, Gonzalez, supra, is not ―distinguishable in a fair

way‖ from the facts of this case.     Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121

S.Ct. at 2157.



―The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a
right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.‖


Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. At 2156 the right the

official is alleged to have violated has been ‗clearly

established‘ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant,

sense:   The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.   ‖Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

                               [21]
635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citation

omitted); see also Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. At 2516

(―The salient question - is whether the state of the law - gave
the officers fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the
plaintiff] was unconstitutional.‖)

See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413,

57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (stating a warrantless entry must be

―strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its

initiation‖) United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 830 (11th

Cir.1996), where we found consent to enter could not be

inferred.

  The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement

recognizes a ―‗warrantless entry by criminal law enforcement

officials may be legal when there is compelling need for

official action and no time to secure a warrant.‘‖   United

States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir.2002)(quoting

Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 56

L.Ed.2d 486 (1978).   ― Situations in which exigent circumstances

exist include:   ―danger of flight or escape, loss or destruction

of evidence, risk of harm to the public or the police, mobility

of a vehicle, and hot pursuit.‖

Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-89, 100 S.Ct. at 1381 (quoting with

approval United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir.1978);

see also Kirk, 536 U.S. at 637, 122 S.Ct. at 2459 (reversing

state court ruling that warrantless entry, arrest, and search

                               [22]
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there had been

probable cause to arrest);

Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 109

L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (―It was held in Payton- that a suspect should

not be arrested in his house without an arrest warrant, even

though there is probable cause to arrest him.‖);    United States

v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir.1986) (―A finding of

probable cause alone - does not justify a warrantless arrest at

a suspect's home.‖)   The deputies must show their presence in

the home was justified, either by exigent circumstances or

consent.

  It is a ―basic principle of Fourth Amendment law‘ that

searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are

presumptively unreasonable.‖    Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,

586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).

  This basic principle is founded on ―the very core‖ of the

Fourth Amendment:   ―the right of a man to retreat into his own

home and there be free from unreasonable governmental

intrusion.‖   Id. at 590, 100 S.Ct. at 1382 (quoting Silverman v.

United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 683, 5 L.Ed.2d

734 (1961)

  The sanctity of the home is afforded special protection under

the Fourth Amendment, such that ―the reasons for upholding

warrantless arrests in a public place do not apply to

                               [23]
warrantless invasions of the privacy of the home.‖    Id. at 576,

100 S.Ct. at 1375.

―The Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to

the house.    Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not

reasonably be crossed without a warrant.‖    Id. at 590, 100 S.Ct.

at 1382.    ―As Payton makes plain, police officers need a warrant

or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a

lawful entry into a home.‖    Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635,

638, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 2459, 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002).

  None of these exigencies existed at the time of the

petitioner's arrest.    According to officer N.L. Davis's own

deposition the testimony affirms he witnessed the petitioner

engaged in the use of his own property.     Officer Davis' account

merely states hearsay from the contractor.    He verified no

information.    He received no proper authorization to allow the

contractor access to petitioner's property.    There was no

violation of law being committed by the petitioner.     The

petitioner was not in the commission of any crime when he was

arrested.    In fact the notation is he was not violent.   He was

in full rights to be on his property and to refuse any entry

onto his property without proper notice or authorization from

the courts.

  Dantes Paris Kebreau, Sui Juris contends his Fourth Amendment

rights were violated when N.L. Davis and the unnamed officers

                                [24]
unlawfully entered his property, directed him to surrender his

rights, threatened to shoot him and animals if he didn‘t

―cooperate‖ and allow entry to his locked backyard.   M&Y

contractors (Agents for the State) at the directive of the

officers were literally engaged in breaking petitioner's locks

to gain unlawful access to the petitioner‘s private and secured

backyard.   He argues this right of privacy was clearly

established at the time, such that a reasonable police officer

in the officers' position would have known what they were giving

permission to the contractors to do clearly offended the

Constitution and the petitioners rights.



Overton v. Ohio, 151 L.Ed 2d 317 (October 2001): The Fourth
Amendment provides that no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. United States Constitution,
Amendment 4. The probable-cause determination must be made by a
neutral magistrate in order to insure that the deliberate,
impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed
between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and
credibility of the information, which the complaining officer
adduces as probable cause. If there is no victim, there is no
crime.
California Penal Code ß 1548(d): Laws of the United States
means (1) those laws of the United States passed by Congress
pursuant to authority given to Congress by the Constitution of
the United States where the laws of the United States are
controlling, and (2) those laws of the United States not
controlling the several states of the United States but which
are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.
CONGRESS makes laws, NOT counties, cities, code enforcement, or
dog-catchers.



                               [25]
West Virginia State Board of Education et al. v. Barnett et al.,
319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 The United States Government was set
up by the consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies
those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. The
Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the states protects the
citizen against the state itself and all of its creatures.


                 DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN

Protection; California Constitution Article 1, section 9 Due
Process; Equal Privileges and Immunities: (a) A person may not
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law or denied equal protection of the laws. .
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S., 143 L Ed 2d 882, 119
S.Ct. (1999): The District Courts jury instructions directed
the jury that (1) it should find for the landowner if the jury
found that (a) the landowner had been denied all economically
viable use of its property, or (b) the city's decision did not
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose. Damages for
the takings without just compensation and for the extortion will
be decided by a jury pursuant to the Seventh Amendment.
California Civil Code Title 1 Nature of Property, section 654
Ownership defined: The ownership of a thing is the right of one
or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of
others.




    CITIES AND COUNTIES CANNOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

U.S. CONSTITUTION Amendment 4. Search and Seizure: The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.

People v. Camacho, 23 Cal.4th 824; 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 232; 3 P.3d
878 (2000): Police observation from non-public area constitutes
unlawful search. The County is liable for Fourth Amendment
violations, and has no immunity when its employees trespass upon
areas that members of the public cannot be said to have been
implicitly invited. No such implicit public invitation exists
in a side yard, back yard, or neighbor‘s yard for county

                              [26]
employees or anybody else to conduct invasion of privacy and/or
pretextual search without probable cause to inventory livestock
or other property by peeking over or through fences, even chain-
link fences, which are there to exclude the eyes of strangers
and trespassers.

U.S. v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998).   To comply with

Fourth Amendment, anticipatory search warrant must either on its

face or on the face of the accompanying affidavit clearly,

expressly, and narrowly specify the triggering event. See Monell

v. Dept. of Social Services, 435 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), 436 U.S.

at 692 (holding that a ß 1983 plainly imposes liability on a

government that, under color of some official policy, causes an

employee to violate another's constitutional rights);

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) at 385 (stating

that our first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability

under ß 1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal

link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged

constitutional deprivation); City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480

U.S. 378 (1987) at 267 (stating that the Court repeatedly has

stressed the need to find a direct causal connection between

municipal conduct and the constitutional deprivation);

Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1981) at

1125 (liability under ß 1983 can be established by showing that

the defendants either personally participated in a deprivation

of the plaintiffs rights, or caused such a deprivation to

occur). There is a constitutional right, however, to have police

                              [27]
services administered in a nondiscriminatory manner a right that

is violated when a state actor denies such protection to

disfavored persons. See Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 715-17

(9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a cause of action under ß 1983

based upon the discriminatory denial of police services)



                    Unlawful Performance of Duty

PROSECUTOR - Sovereign Obligation

  Office of Prosecutor which is The United States Attorney who

is representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but

of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as

compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose

interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it

shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is

in a peculiar and very definite sense that servant of the law,

the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or

innocence suffers. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor

indeed, he should do so, but, while he may strike hard blows, he

is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to

refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful

conviction, as it is to use every legitimate means to bring

about a just one.




                                [28]
 "…The very purpose of Title 42U.S.C.§1983 was to interpose the
federal court between the State and the people (Ex parte
Virginia 100 US 339, 25 L, Ed, 6760) as the guardian of the
people federal rights, to protect the people from
unconstitutional actions under color of state law whether the
action be executive, legislative or judicial."

"Congress enacted Title 42U.S.C.§1983 … The remedy was
considered necessary because state courts were being used to
harass and injure individuals either because the state courts
were powerless to stop deprivations, or were in league with
those who were bent upon abrogation of federal protected
rights."
Pulliam v. Allen, 446 US 522, 80 L, Ed, 2d, 565‖



                        Fraudulent Traverse

  The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed its view of the special

ethical obligations of prosecutors in Berger v. United States,

295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935): Provides that a "prosecutor has a

responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of

an advocate.‖   Corpus Juris Secundum assumes courts will operate

in a lawful manner.

  Leigh F. Rosenbloom has committed fraud by falsifying

information on Certificate of Service of traverse filed to the

court on September 20, 2010.   This act deprived petitioner of

vital facts and necessary information to mount a sufficient

defense for the September 28, 2010 (see Exhibit G) hearing on

his motion to dismiss filled on September 17, 2010.   Both the

judge and the prosecutor are responsible for timeliness in entry

of motions.   Petitioner received a copy of the State's traverse


                               [29]
on September 29, 2010.   The unlicensed Assistant State Attorney

attested to the petitioner being furnished a copy by mail on

September 20, 2010 (see Exhibit G).     This was a lie.

  Upon the face of the traverse document submitted by the State,

the traverse lacked sufficiency of pleading against the

petitioner's motion to dismiss.     The judge failed in her

dismissal of the States traverse for it lacks the necessity

serious laments for legal standing in a court of law.     It was

not furnished to petitioner; adequate proof was not provided to

the judge to satisfy this statement.     The petitioner received a

copy of the traverse not at the hearing or before the hearing

but on September 29, 2010, a full day after the hearing (see

Exhibit G).

   At the hearing for the petitioner‘s motion, his motion as

dismissed and the traverse accepted. Petitioner was told it was

procedural to dismiss anything that comes against the state'

(see Exhibits H,I,J). There seems to be something wrong with the

judicial process.   At a basic level, procedural due process

mandates that the petitioner be entitled to adequate notice, a

hearing, and a neutral judge.     United States v. Carolene

Products Co., 304 U.S. 144(1938).      The Supreme Court held in

1967 that ―we cannot leave to the States the formulation of the

authoritative ... remedies designed to protect people from

infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights.‖

                                [30]
                   Unlawful Performance of Duty

JUDGE - FAILURE TO ACT JUDICIOUSLY

   Judge, Derke Eleni Elia's bias against the petitioner for

reasons unknown is evident by her unwillingness to treat the

petitioner according to lawful mandates.   The former traffic

court judge acts with hostility and is openly enraged, bothered

and annoyed by the petitioner acting in accordance to his

rights.   His inquiries, submissions of motions, and protests to

the court have been threatened with contempt of court and

petitioner's motions charged as being a barrage to the court.

Petitioner just seeks to be in his proper standing as a

sovereign, not a minor and to be recognized by the full power of

the United States Constitution.

    Instead of determining whether the Petitioner‘s motion is

sufficient on its face, warranting voiding the judgment,

vacating the charges or quashing the defective instrument,

Fourth Judicial Circuit Judge Derke, Eleni Elia dismissed it.

She rejected the motions, refused to accept it without reading

or discussing the merits of the submission.

    The record in these proceedings reliably establishes

neither the State nor the Petitioner filed a motion invoking

Judge Derke, Eleni Elia jurisdiction to act against the

petitioner. The implementation of the petitioner‘s rights

                               [31]
pursuant to the United States Constitutions provides an

indemnity against those freedoms our forefathers worked so

carefully and preciously to secure.

   This judge and prosecutor seem to be working in concert with

the prosecutor to illegally deprive petitioner of his 4th

Amendment rights to cause him to suffer and fear of his freedom,

and to lose quality of life and the benefit of privacy,

property, and protection under the United States Constitution.

  There is no evidence to allow the State to proceed with

prosecution for a criminal matter.    The prima facie evidence is

at best is nominal or non existent, it‘s as if the claims

submitted by the officers were made out of thin air.    It seems

obvious that the unlicensed prosecutor is seeking to use the

case against the petitioner as a way of scoring points.    The

best way the petitioner can describe the Judges actions is, the

judge is acting as an agent for the state to collect equity as

opposed to a trier of facts and a magistrate.

  She is not impartial.   The judge dismissed motions submitted

by the petitioner as procedural and is combative and

discouraging in reference to the petitioner exercising his

rights in court.   The prosecution and judge are acting in

concert to defraud the petitioner of his rights and to force him

into contract by accepting or pleading to false charges.

  The requirement of a neutral judge has introduced a

                               [32]
constitutional dimension into the question of whether a judge

should recuse himself or herself from a case. Specifically, the

Supreme Court has ruled that in certain circumstances, the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a judge to

recuse himself on account of a potential or actual conflict of

interest. For example, on June 8, 2009, in Caperton v. A. T.

Massey Coal Co. (2009), the Court ruled that a justice of the

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia could not participate

in a case involving a major donor to his election to that court.

  The petitioners motion for dismissal of the charges due to

lack of subject matter jurisdiction was dismissed without ever

being read on September 28, 2010. (See exhibit A)   This means

even the judge who is supposed to perform under the dictates of

the law has accepted and grown accustomed to colorable law

practices.   The petitioner's motion for dismissal of the charge

due to defective instrument used was also dismissed.

  The judge chooses to participate in a racketeering event to

purport funds for the state of Florida by trumping up charges.

This judge has removed the last hope of trust petitioner has in

the system to be performed by a clear thinking and bold acting

judge.   Petitioner was hoping on the precepts of the law to

establish order in the court and uphold and defend the

Constitution against the breaking of the RICCO laws and numerous

codes of ethical and legal and moral standards.

                               [33]
  Petitioner has been deprived of information to prepare a

defense where he has been bogusly charged with a criminal

offense. First there is no corpus delicti or witness or injured

party. Second, petitioner has been kidnapped, illegally

detained, suffered bodily injury, false imprisonment and

slander. Thirdly, The defective instrument is vague, lacking,

insufficient. Lastly the defendant has had evidence and

information withheld from him from the court house and police

station and the petitioner asks, "What is my crime?"     The judge

refuses to answer this question as well.



                   Violation of Judicial Canons

1)   Judge Derke, Eleni Elia has caused public confidence in the

judiciary to deteriorate due to her unprofessional and

unbecoming conduct especially her rulings regarding Petitioner

Dantes Paris Kebreau, Sui Juris and thus violated Judicial Canon

1.

2)   Judge Derke, Eleni Elia has made rulings, which advance the

private interests of the State of Florida by allowing the

statutes, which apply, to protecting innocent persons rights and

preventing abuse of the law by its officials to be overlooked

and colorable law practiced in its place and thus is in

violation of United States Code, Title 28, Section 455

Disqualification of Justice, Judge, or Magistrate, Code of

                               [34]
Judicial Conduct Canon 2(A), 3.

  3)   It's apparent that on the face of the documents submitted

as evidence by the State the language clearly indicates that

code enforcement had tolled in its time allotted to carry out

their assignment.   Further in order to access private property

of an unwilling owner the process is still the courts have to

issue remedy in the form of a warrant.    There is no

documentation or information that describes a warrant has been

sought or issued in this case.    (See Exhibit A)

4)   Clearly the Municipal Ordinance code has established a set

of rules to manage its business of rectifying or abating

nuisances however there is included a non defined portion of the

policy that does not speak in terms of bounds or limitations

that would lend to the idea that Code Enforcement believes it is

not bound by those mandates strictly governing all processes

occurring within the laws of the United States.     ―Sec. 518.134.

Judicial proceedings (b)

  The judicial remedies authorized to be sought by this Section

are in addition to the power of the Chief to terminate public

nuisances. The Chief shall, as much as possible, terminate

public nuisances without recourse to the courts."    This would

explain why there is no court order or such on record in the

code enforcements attempts to proceed under color of law to

collect revenue from the states citizens.    The added fact that

                                 [35]
the police department and courts often see code enforcement as

an extension of themselves further compounds the issue.   Where

is the remedy for the citizens of the United States?

5)   The court is forcing suit against the petitioner without

having met the Constitutional requirements, the court is trying

to press the petitioner to plea and rush to judgment despite his

objections to the instrument used, his lack of understanding of

the charges, its nature or origin.    The Judiciary and

Prosecutorial components of the court are excising the

petitioner of his Constitutional rights to own and protect

property, to be secure in his home, to be free and sovereign.

  The petitioner Dantes Paris Kebreau, Sui Juris trust is dulled

in the ability of the current court to act judiciously, without

bias or malice towards him as evidenced by the Judges push for

the petitioner to hire her colleague and contract with the

court.   It is the petitioners understanding that the Sixth

Amendment (Amendment VI) sets forth rights related to criminal

prosecutions which allow him to refuse an officer of the court

who is party to the charges levied against him and to bring

representation on the petitioners own behalf.    Judge Derke,

Eleni Elia has not ruled according to law in the case of whether

to dismiss charges made against the Petitioner where no corpus

Delicti exists.   The charges issued upon arrest were upgraded to

a more serious crime upon Petitioners refusal to submit to the

                               [36]
jurisdiction of the court.   Thus evidencing arbitrary

fabrication of charges in an effort to force a plea from the

Petitioner to avoid the penalty of the charge.

  Her performance in this case is inconsistent with values her

Oath and Office upholds.   She fails to practice jurisprudence

without issue.   The rulings made by Judge Derke, Eleni Elia,

which are inconsistent with the United States and Florida

Constitution are:

1. Judge Derke, Eleni Elia has allowed the lack of due process

by prosecutor‘s defective instrument to act as ―real‖ basis to

manifest charges and conduct procedures against the Petitioner.

Upon review of the records of facts you will find the case

brought before her to be meritless because it lacked the

Constitutional elements required for the Petitioner to be

charged with a crime.   The instrument used against the

petitioner is vague and erroneous nature.   The description of

the actual criminal act is not concise, definite or taken by a

witness to the actual crime or from the injured party.

The court is forcing suit against the petitioner without having

met the Constitutional requirements, the court is trying to

press the petitioner to plea and rush to judgment despite his

objections to the instrument used, his lack of understanding of

the charges, its nature or origin.

  The Judiciary and Prosecutorial components of the court are

                               [37]
excising the petitioner of his Constitutional rights to own and

protect property, to be secure in his home, to be free and

sovereign.

  The petitioner Dantes Paris Kebreau, Sui Juris trust is dulled

in the ability of the current court to act judiciously, without

bias or malice towards him as evidenced by the Judges push for

the petitioner to hire her colleague and contract with the

court.   It is the petitioners understanding that the Sixth

Amendment (Amendment VI) sets forth rights related to criminal

prosecutions which allow him to refuse an officer of the court

who is party to the charges levied against him and to bring

representation on the petitioners own behalf.

2. Case law further sows that by The Sixth Amendment, which is

applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-74

(1948), guarantees a criminal defendant a fundamental right to

be clearly informed of the nature and cause of the charges

against him. In order to determine whether a defendant has

received constitutionally adequate notice, the court looks first

to the information. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 333 (1994). "The principal purpose of

the information is to provide the defendant with a description

of the charges against him in sufficient detail to enable him to

prepare his defense." Id.

                               [38]
  The U.S. Constitution regulates the division of labor between

judge    and    jury.      The   Sixth    Amendment      guarantees   "[i]n     all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury…" The U.S.Supreme

Court recently declared, "[t]he Constitution gives a criminal

defendant      the    right      to    have   a   jury   determine,    beyond     a

reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with

which he is charged." United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310,

2320 (1995); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078,

2080 (1993); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

  While the jury is the arbiter of the facts, the judge is the

arbiter of the law: "the judge must be permitted to instruct the

jury    on   the     law   and    to    insist    that   the   jury   follow    his

instructions." Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2315 (citing Sparf & Hansen

v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06 (1895)). However, the jury

has a constitutional responsibility "not merely to determine the

facts, but to apply the law to those facts and draw the ultimate

conclusion of guilt or innocence." Id. at 2316.

  Florida Statute SECTION 9.             Due process.--No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of

law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be

compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against

oneself.



                                         [39]
  Judge Derke, Eleni Elia has allowed the warrantless entry of

Petitioners property by officers of the court, absent exigent

circumstances, to appear lawful.   She supported, granted,

approved and overlooked the unlawful actions thereby condoning

them.   In her official capacity as a judge she has the

responsibility to be a trier of facts.   How can she act on facts

if she doesn‘t allow the Petitioner to submit any?   She instead

focuses on the charges of the officers who were performing

unlawfully as valid, tenable and executable. Her actions are in

direct conflict with Constitutional law and Florida statute

SECTION 12.

  Searches and seizures.--The right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable

interception of private communications by any means, shall not

be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable

cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place

or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things

to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the

nature of evidence to be obtained.

  This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th

Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by

the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information

obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in

                               [40]
evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible

under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing

the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution., SECTION

23.   Right of privacy.   Every natural person has the right to be

let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's

private life except as otherwise provided herein.

  This section shall not be construed to limit the public's

right of access to public records and meetings as provided by

law., (a)   Every person has the right to inspect or copy any

public record made or received in connection with the official

business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state,

or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to

records exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made

confidential by this Constitution.

  This section specifically includes the legislative, executive,

and judicial branches of government and each agency or

department created there under; counties, municipalities, and

districts; and each constitutional officer, board, and

commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this

Constitution.

3. Judge Derke, Eleni Elia has allowed the Petitioner to be

illegally jailed by arresting/transporting officer N.L. Davis

#60313, Sergeant Rivera#6141, Supervisor P.L. McNeal#5688,

detained, kidnapped, restrained, separated from his

                                [41]
Constitutional rights to freedom, liberty, the pursuit thereof,

kept from his property, forced to accept the theft of his

property by agents of the state – code enforcement T.

Babcock/Babcox#1807, prosecutor under color of law.

  Pursuant to Constitutional law Judge Derke, Eleni Elia

facilitated a transgress against the people, the State and a

treasonous offense against et Constitution thereby

disenfranchising the Petitioner of his sacred and unalienable

rights - Amendment VI "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an

impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall

have been committed, which district shall have been previously

ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause

of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against

him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his

favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

4. Judge Derke, Eleni Elia has allowed the Petitioner's rights

to be circumvented by colorable law statues.   The Petitioner

relies on the judge to perform lawfully to protect his rights in

this tribunal as the person responsible for maintaining the law

at every stage.

  A judge is charged with upholding the law, and the ethical

standards as set forth by the state bar.   The job of a judge is

                              [42]
to follow and uphold the Constitution. The Law is the law and

this is what they should strictly adhere to.

5. The rulings and actions listed above are in violation of

Judicial Canon 3B(2)

6. Judge Derke, Eleni Elia has violated Judicial Canon 3B(4) as

heard in a transcript of a court proceeding where Judge Derke,

Eleni Elia was visibly impatient and angry during court

proceedings. The judge at one point at the very first meeting

was not aware of the facts of the case and when asked by the

Petitioner of her knowledge she stated that it was some sort of

eviction case!   If it were true and those were her thoughts why

wasn't there a inquiry to substantiate there was a court order

to that end?

  Upon discovery the Petitioner finds there is no court order

issued, pending or otherwise in reference to case noted on

Arrest report or in this case at all.

1. On August 2, 2010, petitioner was arrested, incarcerated

and injured by police officers without warrant or permission,

performing unlawful duty, and absent exigent circumstances.

2. On August 2, 2010 A bond was issued for $1,008.00, Company

Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.     Judge Derke, Eleni Elia

acting as equity court to collect revenue for the state.

3. On August 6, 2010 charge of Resisting Police Officer using a

defective instrument and void and legitimate pleadings, witness

                               [43]
or corpus delicti.

4. On August 24, 2010 Information Filed S843.02 Resisting

officer without violence to his or her person, charge upgraded

because petitioner refusal to plea to colorable law statues.

5.September 17, 2010 Sworn Motion to Dismiss Information

Filed

6. On September 28, 2010 hearing on petitioners motion to

dismiss (denied).    Traverse was granted but petitioner states it

was void because it was untimely.      Petitioner received the

traverse pm September 29, 2010 after the hearing date.      As

evidenced by Exhibit , the traverse was mailed after the date

signed, sworn, attested to by the unlicensed State Attorney

Leigh F. Rosenbloom and the State Attorney, Angela B. Corey.

This created a prejudice and bias in having petitioner prepared

for all facts of the case against him.      Malicious prosecution in

suit on him.   Traverse does not indicate any information to

substantiate the States denials of petitioners claims in motion

for dismissal other than that it denies the information or has

no knowledge of the information.

7. On September 28, 2010 Petitioner submits motion to dismiss

defective instrument it was filed and denied.

8. On September 28, 2010 Petitioner submits objection to this

courts jurisdiction over petitioner, challenge to service of

process, summons, complaint - all filed and denied

                                [44]
Rule of Governance

  "The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though

having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is

wholly void…. unconstitutional law bears no power to enforce, it

purports to settle as if it never existed, for

unconstitutionality dates from the enactment of such a law and

not such time as branded in an open court of law...   it confers

no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it

creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative

as though it had never been passed. No courts are bound to

uphold it and no persons are bound to obey it."

  Strength of Constitutional Law - While the triviality of

Constitutional law has repeatedly been asserted the Court should

not endorse such an untenable position.    Violations of

Constitutional law are not trivial matters, and the warrantless

invasion the curtilage and real property of petitioner Dantes

Paris Kebreau, Sui Juris hardly trivial.

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Officers are required to know the law, which governs their

actions. The Courts have established clear and simple guidelines

for determining what is protected curtilage, and none of the

factors identified lends itself to questionable circumstances in

this case.

                              [45]
  The officers clearly trespassed against the petitioner Dantes

Paris Kebreau, Sui Juris property.     The petitioner Sui Juris

property is clearly marked and defined as private property as

per his signage and steps to secure it via locks on the fence

and animals behind the fence.   (See Exhibit C, D, E, F)



The Fourth Amendment (Amendment IV): This amendment to the
United States Constitution guards against unreasonable searches
and seizures by specifically requiring search and arrest
warrants be judicially sanctioned and supported by probable
cause. Search and arrest should be limited in scope according
to specific information supplied to the issuing court, usually
by a law enforcement officer, who has sworn by it. As
previously stated the petitioner has made no discovery of any
warrants or orders.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure - Rule 12. (a) Pleadings
(a) Pleadings. - The pleadings in a criminal proceeding are the
indictment, the information, and the pleas of not guilty,
guilty, and nolo contendere.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure - Rule 12. (b) Pretrial
Motions
(b) Pretrial Motions.
(1) In General. Rule 47 applies to a pretrial motion.
A party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or
request that the court can determine without a trial of the
general issue.
(3) Motions That Must Be Made Before Trial.
The following must be raised before trial:
(A) a motion alleging a defect in instituting the prosecution;
(made on)
(B) a motion alleging a defect in the indictment or information
-- but at any time while the case is pending, the court may hear
a claim that the indictment or information fails to invoke the
court's jurisdiction or to state an offense;
(made On August 31, 2010) while in open court, when asked to

plea the petitioner refused.    .

  The causative actions of the entire court from its agents

(i.e. code enforcement & M&Y contractors) to the bench (i.e.

                                [46]
judge, prosecutor) manifested great ills and madness in the

petitioner life.   On November 15, 2010 the courts offer is for

the petitioner to plead No Contest and he will not receive any

jail time, but should an innocent man agree to a crime?

Article VI Clause 2 directs that the Constitution is the Supreme

Law of the Land and all treaties and laws must be made within

the pale and ken of the Constitution. This same article and

clause also directs that all judges in every State shall be

bound by the Constitution.

  Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160, 28 S.Ct. 441 Ex Parte Young
gives life to the Supremacy Clause, as remedies designed to end
a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate
the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.
Cities and Counties are private municipalities; they CANNOT
assume legislative powers to regulate federally protected
articles livestock (including dogs, cats and pigeons) and feeds
in commerce. Cities and counties have NO IMMUNITY for
legislating away ANY property rights and/or ownership rights
without the Governors signature, or without it going through the
State Legislature. If they do, it‘s impersonating an officer
and treason against the United States.
522; and Owen v. City of Independence, 455 U.S. 622, 100 Salinas
v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 469 (1997): Interpretative canon is
not license for judiciary to rewrite language enacted by
legislature Predominant elements in substantive Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations are
(1) conduct (2) of enterprise (3) through pattern of
racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. ß 1962(c). Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C. ß 1962(d) (RICO)
conspiracy conviction does not require overt or specific act. If
conspirators have plan which calls for some conspirators to
perpetrate crime and others to provide support, supporters are
as guilty as perpetrators. Conspiracy may exist and be punished
whether or not substantive crime ensues, for conspiracy is a
distinct evil, dangerous to the public, and punishable in
itself. Judges and cities are forbidden to rewrite language
enacted by legislature.
The Sixth Circuit recently held in Isaak v. Trumble Savings &

                               [47]
Loan Co., 169 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1999), that the use and
enjoyment of real estate constitutes property within the meaning
of RICO so as to trigger the accrual of a RICO claim. The county
and its cities are liable for racketeering conduct of its
employees/agents use of fear, threats, and intimidation to
interfere with the use and enjoyment of property by citizens who
pay city and county employees to protect and serve their
property rights.
U.S. v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) at 793: To establish
conspiracy under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) does not require proof that individual defendant
participated personally, or agreed to participate personally, in
two predicate offenses; rather, the conspiracy must contemplate
the commission of two predicate acts by one or more of its
members. 18 U.S.C. section 1962(d). More than two predicate acts
occur when private individuals conspire with public employees to
violate state and federal law by restricting property ownership
without just compensation in furtherance of a racketeering
scheme or artifice (denial of honest government services and
theft under color of law); therefore, the County is the
municipality upon which the liability is imposed for conduct
constituting RICO conspiracy through fraud and deceit to effect
takings without due process and without just compensation, which
is theft under color.
Salinas v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 469 (1997): Conspiracy is a
distinct evil, dangerous to the public, and punishable in
itself. City and county employees are liable for conspiring to
restrict property (including old cars) and agricultural
commodities (Title 7, section 2) without just compensation, and
conspiring to target disenfranchised livestock owners and feed
mills in violation of Title 42 section 1983, when they admit to
having met (conspired) with code enforcement and private persons
in violation of the Brown Act in order to steal. The county is
liable for its employee‘s intent (conspiracy) to conduct city
and county business as a racketeering enterprise.
Guerrero v. Gates, et al, CV 00-7165, WILLIAM J. REA, August 28,
2000, United States District Court for the Central District of
California, quoting pertinent parts relating to nationwide news
the LAPD CONDUCT SUBJECT TO CIVIL RICO: DISCUSSION: Legal
Standard Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): A
party may bring a motion to dismiss a plaintiffs claims if the
plaintiffs allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

  Generally, [a] complaint should not be dismissed for failure

to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the

                              [48]
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957). Thus, dismissal is proper where the complaint

lacks either a cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts to

support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).



            PROPERTY OWNERS STANDING TO SUE UNDER RICO

Rotella v. Wood, 528 US, 145 Led 2d 1047, 120 SCt., at pg. 1047:

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)

(18 USCS ßß 1961 et seq.) provides that (1) it is unlawful to

conduct an enterprises affairs through a pattern of racketeering

activity (18 USCS ß 1962(c), (2) a pattern requires at least two

acts of racketeering activity, the last of which occurs within

10 years after the commission of a prior act (18 USCS ß 1962(c),

(3) a person injured by a RICO violation can bring a civil RICO

action (18 USCS 1964(c)). Any person injured by racketeering

activity can file a civil RICO lawsuit.   Racketeering activity

is anything, which interferes with land use, and property.

NOTICE OF EXPIRATION OF SPEEDY TRAIL

(See Exhibit M) On October 11, 2010, sixty-eight days since the

petitioner has been arrested on August 2, 2010, Judge Derke,

Elena Elia ceased tolling for petitioners demand for a speedy

trial.   On November 15, 2010 tolling resumed for petitioner's

                               [49]
demand for a speedy trial and as of December 7, 2010 its been

past 90 days as per Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. Petitioner requests a

dismissal of this case.

  The petitioner requested a trial by a jury of his peers (a

constitutional right) and was told by the judge he would have a

bench trial, he asked for further clarification and the judge

proceeded to inform him, it consisted of a trial without a jury

(dictionary.com - a trial in which there is no jury and the

judge decides the case), the petitioner Dantes Paris Kebreau,

Sui Juris adamantly refused and insists on having a trial by his

peers a trial in which a jury serves as the trier of fact called

also trial by jury —see also Article III Article VI and VII

Amendments VI and VII to the CONSTITUTION.



―The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State
Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which
law should be enforced and justice administered. The Government
grants a right to jury trial to criminal petitioners in order to
prevent oppression. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from
history and experience that it was necessary to protect against
unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and
against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority.‖

  The framers of the constitutions strove to create an

independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection

against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to

be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable

safeguard against the corrupt overzealous prosecutor and against


                              [50]
the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge… The jury trial

provisions… reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of

official power, a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the

life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of

judges. Fear of unchecked power… found expression in the

criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in

the determination of guilt or innocence.''

  The court is operating under colorable law statutes,

regulations and relationships that are commonly practiced and

accepted to knowingly diminish the petitioner's life by stealing

his liberties, to erode his wealth by corporately arresting his

properties by colorable law, to swiftly change his spirits'

constitution by committing the treasonous act of abating his

Constitutional rights and evacuating his privileges.

  The petitioner informed the court he was not submitting to the

jurisdiction of the court. The petitioner informed the court he

did not commit any crime. The petitioner inquired of the charge,

requested to see the injured party he was alleged to harm and

was ignored.   None of the petitioner's statements,

proclamations, denials or assertions were given consideration.

They were not addressed.   The petitioner did not enter a plea

and refused to plea bargain.   His charges were upgraded in a

malicious attempt to create fear and force petitioner to plea.

  Judge Derke, Eleni Elia has openly denied the petitioner the

                               [51]
right to a jury trial once he invoked his Sixth Amendment Right

pursuant to the Constitution.   On November 15, 2010, Judge

Derke, Elena Elia offers the petitioner a bench trial.      The

petitioner declined.   The petitioner submits he never entered a

plea.   The petitioner states if he is going to have a trial it's

going to be a jury trial.   The petitioner is opposed to the

judge who has conducted herself in the role of the prosecutor,

and petitioner believes she has proven that she is unable to

govern as a judge.   The judge presumes the petitioner is

incompetent and is a minor.   She keeps insisting the petitioner

takes a public defender which she states is the only way the

petitioner will get a fair trial.      She is behaving with bias.

   The judge is acting as an agent for the state to collect

equity as opposed to a trier of facts and a magistrate.      She is

not impartial.   The judge dismissed motions submitted by the

petitioner as procedural and is combative and discouraging in

reference to the petitioner exercising his rights in court.         The

prosecution and judge are acting in concert to defraud the

petitioner of his rights and to force him into contract by

accepting or pleading to false charges.




                                [52]
                         OATH/VERIFICATION

    The Petitioner Dantes Paris Kebreau, Sui Juris, declares

under penalty of perjury pursuant to Florida Statute 92.525

(2008), that I have read the foregoing Petition for Writ of

Mandamus of Prohibition and find the statements submitted herein

true and correct to the best of my ability.   This oath serves as

my sworn affidavit to the matters contained herein, subscribed

this ____, day of December, 2010.

    __________________________________________

Dantes P. Kebreau, Sui Juris

                     CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

     I, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Petition for Writ of Mandamus with appendices has been

served upon all parties of interest as noted in this petition by

service of process via entry to the Clerk of Courts by hand

delivery for all Parties mentioned..

December _______, 2010         _______________________________

                               Dantes P. Kebreau, Sui Juris

                               In care of: 3045 Columbus Avenue

                               Non-Resident/ Non-Domestic

                               Jacksonville, Florida [32254]

                               Real Land North American




                                [53]
                    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

      I, hereby certify that this motion complies with the font

requirements of the Fla.R.App.P. 9.100(l)



_____________________________________

Petitioner, Dantes P. Kebreau, Sui Juris    December ____, 2010




                              [54]

				
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