Recent Connecticut Cases Affecting The Construction Industry
Case Discussion
AAIS Corp. v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., The Connecticut Department of Administrative Services has the discretion to exclude from
93 Conn. App. 437 (2006) consideration a proposal for a government contract when the department determines that the bidder
has not insulated itself sufficiently from the suspicion of criminal activity. Rather than taint the
bidding process with favoritism, such an exclusion preserves the integrity of the process, a function
well within the discretion of the department. While the department uses objective criteria to evaluate
proposals for government contracts, one of those criteria, a bidder’s past performance, including that
bidder’s skill, ability and integrity, requires some subjective analysis, although not enough to carry
with it the imprint of favoritism.
Able Plumbing, Inc. v. Sandak; Where a defendant has substituted a bond for a mechanic’s lien, the plaintiff cannot recover
2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 427 (Conn. attorney’s fees pursuant to section 52-249(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes because an action on
Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2006) the substituted bond does not entail the hearing as to the form of judgment or the time for redemption
that accompany an action to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien. By denying the recovery of attorney’s
fees, the court followed trial court precedent nullifying the last sentence of section 52-249(a).
Aronne Bldg. & Remodeling, LLC v. A plaintiff builder who signed a valid mechanic’s lien waiver could not foreclose upon a
Ksiazek, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2596 mechanic’s lien he filed against the defendants’ property despite the execution of the waiver. As the
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2006) plaintiff builder did not claim that the defendant property owners prevented him from reading the
waiver, he signed it with full knowledge of its import, not as a result of any inducement by the
defendants.
Belic v. Cavo, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS Defendant who hired plaintiff contractor to install a fence sufficiently pled a counterclaim for
2312 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 27, 2006) breach of contract by alleging the existence of an agreement to install the fence, the plaintiff’s breach
of that agreement by installing the fence in an unskilled manner with inferior material and damages
caused by the plaintiff’s breach. Defendant sufficiently pled two Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et seq.) counterclaims by alleging that the plaintiff’s
misrepresentation of his contracting experience amounted to unethical and unscrupulous conduct,
which violated the “cigarette rule,” and by alleging that the plaintiff’s failure to obtain a certificate of
registration violated the Home Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.), a per se violation
of CUTPA. Defendant could not maintain counterclaim seeking recovery under the Home
Improvement Act because the statute does not create an independent cause of action against a
contractor.
Bonnano v. Bolling, 2006 Conn. Super. Court discharged mechanic’s lien filed by defendant contractor against plaintiff owner’s
LEXIS 297 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, property because home improvement contract did not comply with provisions of the Home
2006) Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.). Specifically, the contract did not include a
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notice of owner’s cancellation rights or provide for a completion date, both conditions precedent to a
contractor even recovering a reasonable value for his services under the act. The fact that plaintiff’s
attorney prepared the home improvement contract was not evidence that the plaintiff invoked the
statutory violation in bad faith, especially since the defendant received the contract by fax prior to the
meeting at which he signed it. The legislature imposed the burden of complying with the statute on
the defendant, a licensed professional, not the plaintiff, a nonprofessional consumer.
Brian’s Floor Covering Supplies, LLC v. General contractor hired contractor to complete floor coverings on project. Contractor entered
Spring Meadow Elderly Apartments, into agreement with subcontractor to receive and install flooring materials. Subcontractor ceased work
2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 884 (Conn. when contractor failed to make a payment and then commenced action against property owner, general
Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2006) contractor and contractor claiming payment against a bond substituted for a mechanic’s lien, breach of
contract against the contractor and unjust enrichment against the owner and general contractor.
Contractor claimed subcontractor did not substantially complete its work and converted flooring
materials. Contractor also sought to recover under quantum meruit and unjust enrichment against the
general contractor and owner. Court denied recovery for either party.
Subcontractor’s presence at meetings between general contractor and contractor and consent
of representatives of general contractor to subcontractor’s installation of floors satisfied consent
requirement under Connecticut’s mechanic’s lien statute. Contractor, however, did not comply with
subcontracting procedures. Furthermore, general contractor, paid contractor for flooring and material,
and the contractor then failed to pay subcontractor. Because general contractor already paid contractor
and since it was not obligated to pay subcontractor due to contractor’s failure to comply with contract
in terms of subcontracting for labor and material, subcontractor could not recover under surety bond
substituted for mechanic’s lien.
General contractor was not liable to contractor or subcontractor under agency. General
contractor did not expressly authorize superintendent to hire subcontractors. The subcontractor’s
manual provided to contractor explicitly stated that superintendent only had authority to sign slips
verifying time and materials in the case of extra work. The superintendent had no signing authority
regarding contracting or change order matters. The general contractor did not hold out the
superintendent as having authority to hire subcontractors and contractor could not have reasonably
believed that superintendent had necessary authority to bind general contractor to his actions.
Neither contractor or subcontractor could prevail on breach of contract claims, as contract
lacked essential terms, such as the contract price, how payment was to be made and to whom, how
much flooring was to be installed at the project and, although no price was specified, stated that
“prices do not include floor prep,” rendering the agreement ambiguous. Neither party provided
sufficient evidence to establish that there was a clear and definite promise, and neither party provided
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sufficient evidence of the amount for which they contracted. With not enough evidence to establish
damages with reasonable certainty, neither the contractor or subcontractor could prevail on a breach of
contract claim.
Owner and general contractor did not receive a free benefit from subcontractor because
general contractor paid contractor for the flooring labor and material. General contractor did not
unjustly fail to pay subcontractor. Similarly, contractor could not recover against general contractor
and owner under quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, as contractor received more than the contract
price from general contractor and general contractor’s superintendent had no authority to approve
extra work for which contractor sought compensation.
Capp Indus., Inc. v. Schoenberg, 2006 Defendant property owners entered into a verbal agreement with plaintiff contractor to
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2179 (Conn. Super. demolish an existing structure and construct a new structure. Owners contended that contractor
Ct. July 21, 2006) walked off the job. Contractor brought action against owners seeking foreclosure of mechanic’s lien
and unjust enrichment. Owners counterclaimed for slander of title, abuse of process, fraud and
violations of the Home Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.) and the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et seq.) against contractor and principals of
contractor in their individual capacity.
Judgment entered in favor of plaintiff contractor on all claims and counterclaims. (1) The
waivers of mechanic’s lien executed by contractor upon receipt of installment payments from owners
functioned as waivers only for portions of the work, not a blanket waiver of the right to file
mechanic’s liens. (2) Although a violation of the Home Improvement Act is a per se violation of
CUTPA, the Home Improvement Act did not apply to the agreement between the parties. The contract
was for the construction of a new house, not for improvements of a new house, so it could not violate
the Home Improvement Act. (3) An incorrect reference by plaintiff contractor to its status as a
licensed contractor under the Home Improvement Act could not be the basis of defendant owners’
fraud counterclaim, as the Home Improvement Act did not apply to the transaction. (4) Plaintiff
contractor had the right to file both a mechanic’s lien and a lis pendens and to bring an action to
foreclose on the mechanic’s lien, so defendant owners could not counterclaim for slander of title or
abuse of process. (5) As plaintiff contractor, a corporation, and its principals acted properly in filing
the mechanic’s lien, principals were not liable individually.
City of Bridgeport v. Kasper Group, Inc., Plaintiff municipality awarded school project to defendant design firm. Municipality then
278 Conn. 466 (2006) changed the scope of the project and reopened the bidding. Design firm commenced action seeking to
enjoin municipality from taking any further action to terminate the alleged contract and from soliciting
new proposals. Design firm also sought damages for breach of an express or implied contract and the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Municipality filed motion to stay the action because
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alleged contract required the arbitration of disputes, and parties agreed to submit dispute to American
Arbitration Association before court could rule upon motion to stay.
Arbitration proceedings consisted of 12 days of hearings spanning 19 months. Municipality
claimed that, if a contract existed, it was void ab initio because it had been procured by illegal means.
Just prior to arbitration, majority shareholder of design firm entered into plea agreement with U.S.
attorney admitting, in part, to having engaged in bribery and kickback scheme with municipality’s
mayor to obtain municipal contracts. Shareholder would not testify at arbitration, and municipality
submitted offer of proof suggesting that arbitrator could draw adverse inferences from this refusal to
testify. Municipality also sought to stay post-arbitration briefing schedule until the conclusion of
criminal trial of municipality’s mayor. Municipality wished to supplement its proof with excerpts of
the majority shareholder’s lengthy testimony at the criminal trial regarding his illegal activities.
Specifically, the majority shareholder testified that, in return for “taking care of” the municipality’s
mayor, he obtained major municipal projects, including “some school jobs.” Also, in return for
political fund raising, shareholder obtained any contract he needed to obtain. Arbitrator denied
municipality’s motion to stay, refused to consider municipality’s supplemental proof and rendered
award in favor of design firm.
Court determined that arbitrator’s exclusion of the majority shareholder’s testimony
constituted misconduct. The proffered testimony was both relevant and not cumulative of the issue of
whether the design firm procured the school project illegally. The testimony also substantially
prejudiced the municipality in that, if considered by the arbitrator, the additional, new information
contained therein likely would have affected the result. Unlike the proffered testimony, none of the
proof considered by the arbitrator included any reference to the design firm obtaining “school jobs” or
successfully obtaining any contracts it needed. The court concluded that, if the arbitrator had
considered the excluded testimony, the only logical result would have been a finding that the design
firm’s majority shareholder’s activities resulted in obtaining every contract he wanted, including the
contract for the school project at issue in this dispute.
City of Milford v. Coppola Constr. Co., Court affirmed arbitrator’s award of damages for lost profits, idle equipment and materials,
93 Conn. App. 704 (2006) plus interest, to a contractor. Municipality entered into agreement with contractor to elevate six
private residential structures. After discovering that the structures all had different frames than
anticipated, municipality ordered work stopped until parties could negotiate a new price. Municipality
then canceled contract several months later.
Arbitrator’s award conformed to the submission, which, according to the contract, could not
contemplate consequential damages. In awarding damages for idle equipment and unused materials,
arbitrator awarded arbitrable general damages, not inarbitrable consequential damages.
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D’Angelo Dev. & Constr. Co. v. Plaintiff home builder filed mechanic’s lien against property of defendant new home owners
Cordovano, 278 Conn. 237 (2006) when home owners failed to pay total amount due under agreement to build their house. Builder
sought damages for breach of contract and quantum meruit and sought foreclosure of the mechanic’s
lien. Home owners substituted a bond for the lien and then filed an application to declare the
mechanic’s lien invalid due to the builder’s failure to comply with the registration, disclosure and
contract language provisions of the New Home Construction Contractors Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-
417a et seq.) . Builder was not aware of the act before closing with the home owners, but upon
learning of the law, sought the necessary certificate of registration, which he obtained 3 days after
signing the contract. Builder began construction on the home only after having received his certificate
of registration. Home owners claimed the builder’s noncompliance with the act rendered the contract
unenforceable.
The court resolved a trial court split of opinion as to whether noncompliance with the New
Home Construction Contractors Act rendered a contract unenforceable. The builder’s noncompliance
with the act did not render the contract unenforceable. The purpose of the contract was not to violate
the law but to effectuate an otherwise legal transaction. The court looked at the statutory language and
concluded that the omission of any provision regarding the enforceability of noncompliant contracts
from the New Home Construction Contractors Act suggests that the legislature did not intend for
noncompliant new home construction contracts to be deemed invalid or unenforceable. The court also
looked at the legislative history and the contrasting penalty provisions of the Home Improvement Act
(Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.), which do address the enforceability of noncompliant contracts,
and concluded that the legislature did not intend to render noncompliant contracts unenforceable under
the New Home Construction Contractors Act. Furthermore, the court concluded that the existing
statutory scheme of multiple, cumulative and qualitatively different penalties, which adequately deter
noncompliance with the act, well serves the underlying public policy of the act to protect consumers
against unscrupulous new home construction contractors. This conclusion lent independent support
for the court’s determination that holding noncompliant contracts unenforceable under the act is
unwarranted.
Diamond v. Dreambuilders Constr., Inc., Plaintiff contractor demonstrated probable cause to sustain validity of mechanic’s lien he filed
2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 716 (Conn. against defendant home owner’s property because bad faith exception to Home Improvement Act
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2006) (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.) applied to facts of this case. Home owner could not repudiate
contract as noncompliant with the act because home owner’s own actions, her repeated refusal to sign
the contract to repair mold damage in the house, rendered the contract noncompliant.
Diversified Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. The economic loss doctrine bars claims between sophisticated parties whose dispute arises
Sentinel Equities Corp., 2006 Conn. from allegedly defective performance under a contract for the sale of goods, not claims of negligence
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Super. LEXIS 2485 (Conn. Super. Ct. and negligent misrepresentation against a professional engineering and landscape architectural
Aug. 11, 2006) consulting corporation arising out of a contract for services.
Economos v. Liljedahl Bros., Inc., 279 Contractor agreed, in two home improvement contracts, to renovate a bathroom and laundry
Conn. 300 (2006) room, remodel a kitchen and add a den to homeowners’ house. Homeowners refused to pay contractor
for additional work, as set forth in seven change orders, performed over course of projects. The two
contracts provided that arbitration would settle any controversies arising out of the agreements.
The arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law when he awarded defendant contractor
damages for breach of a home improvement contract with plaintiff homeowners. The subsection of
the Home Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.) allowing quantum meruit recovery in
certain cases of noncompliance with the requirement that a home improvement contract be in writing
and signed by the owner and contractor provided a reasonable basis for the arbitrator’s award. Since
neither the Connecticut Supreme Court or Appellate Court has addressed this subsection of the act, the
applicable law is not well-defined or explicit, requirements necessary for a court to conclude an
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. Moreover, the arbitrator’s award did not provide enough
information to conclude that he had deliberately ignored a clearly governing legal principle, another
element necessary to a finding that an arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.
Fairfield Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. City of First-tier subcontractor could not bring cross claim against prime contractor claiming that the
Danbury, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS prime contractor negligently accepted too low a price for a project for a municipality where the
2058 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2006) plaintiff fourth-tier subcontractor brought an action for payment on a contract with the third-tier
subcontractor. The factual and legal issues raised in the cross claims related to a contract three
contracts removed from the contract sued upon by the plaintiff fourth-tier subcontractor, so the cross
claims did not arise out of the same transaction or transactions which are the subject of the complaint.
Freer v. Bishop, 2006 Conn. Super. For plaintiff homeowners to recover from defendant contractor for violations of the Home
LEXIS 2054 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 6, Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.), per se violations of the Connecticut Unfair
2006) Trade Practices Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et seq.), plaintiffs must present evidence of damages
arising from the alleged CUTPA violation. Because the conduct of the contractor and homeowners
would have been no different had they complied with the Home Improvement Act, homeowners
presented no evidence of damages and could not recover.
Groton Landing, LTD v. Lambtown A foreign corporation must have a certificate of authority in order to maintain an application
Dev., LLC, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 74 to dissolve a mechanic’s lien filed against its property. A court may stay an application by a foreign
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 2006) corporation to dissolve a mechanic’s lien until the court determines whether the foreign corporation
requires a certificate of authority. If a court so determines, it may further stay the proceedings until
the foreign corporation obtains the required certificate of authority. These conditions for maintaining
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an action to dissolve a mechanic’s lien do not amount to a violation of the open court provision of the
state constitution. Since the stay procedures do not apply to past conduct, they do not amount to a bill
of attainder.
Holmes v. Showah, 2006 Conn. Super. Plaintiff furniture maker and defendant homeowner entered into a written contract to build
LEXIS 1676 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 26, kitchen cabinets even though furniture maker had never built them before. Neither party was aware of
2006) the Home Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.) and its restrictions at the time they
entered into the contract. The contract included provisions that the furniture maker would install some
of the cabinets. Furniture maker filed suit after homeowner failed to pay in full for the cabinets. The
court concluded that he could recover for the freestanding cabinets but not the “installed” cabinets,
which qualified as home improvements under the Home Improvement Act. As the homeowner had
paid more than the contract price for the freestanding cabinets, furniture maker could not recover on
his breach of contract claims. Homeowner recovered damages, in the amount overpaid to the furniture
maker, and attorney’s fees for the furniture makers violations of the Home Improvement Act (failure
to be a licensed home improvement contractor), per se violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 40-218a et seq.).
Homes of Westport, LLC v. Olivia, 2006 Plaintiff property owner sued defendant contractor for damages for breach of a construction
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2515 (Conn. Super. contract contemplating framing work for a house. Property owner terminated the contract and hired
Ct. Aug. 8, 2006) another individual to complete the job. As damages, property owner recovered the amount the agreed
upon completion costs exceeded the contract price. The lack of evidence supporting property owner’s
claims to recover amount paid to the individual hired to complete the work or the accrued interest on
the construction loan failed to remove these calculations from the realm of speculation, so the court
denied recovery of these amounts.
Intercity Dev., LLC v. Andrade, 96 The difference between the cost to complete a contract and the balance due on that contract
Conn. App. 608 (2006) may only be used as a calculation of damages in an action to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien where a
contractor has proved substantial performance of the contract. With no contractual or statutory
provision for attorney’s fees, an award of such fees is not permitted to a prevailing party. A contractor
may amend a complaint after trial to include a breach of contract count in an action to foreclose upon a
mechanic’s lien because the competing claims arising from a construction contract and a mechanic’s
lien were fully heard by the court. The amendment to the complaint did not prejudice the homeowners
defending the foreclosure action.
Kasidas v. Coastal Development, 2006 A contract for the installation of a dormer, front porch and new roof on a residence that does
Conn. Super. LEXIS 702 (Mar. 10, 2006) not include a notice of the homeowner’s cancellation rights, a starting date and an ending date does not
comply with the Home Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.), and a mechanic’s lien
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based on such a home improvement contract, unenforceable under the provisions of the act, must be
discharged. When a contract substantially completes work but unreasonably delays final completion,
the time period for filing a mechanic’s lien will be computed from the date of substantial completion.
When an unreasonable period of time has elapsed since substantial completion of the work, the
performance of trivial services or the furnishing of trivial materials generally will not extend the time
for filing a mechanic’s lien past the date of substantial completion. If, however, subsequent to the date
of substantial completion, the owner requests the trivial services or material, the furnishing of such
work or material will extend the commencement of the period for filing a mechanic’s lien. The mere
removal of equipment, when not requested by an owner, does not extend the time for filing a
mechanic’s lien.
Levesque v. G. Madore Landscaping & With no written contract in evidence, the court concluded that a contractor substantially
Excavation, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS completed work on a paving project more than 90 days before the certificate of mechanic’s lien was
649 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2006) filed on the town land records, rendering the lien untimely. The court found no evidence of the
particular significance of the date of completion listed on the land records other than the listed date
was the precise day would make the claiming of the mechanic’s lien timely. Any work performed
subsequent to the date of substantial completion was not at the request of the owner, so the
commencement of the time period for filing the mechanic’s lien was not extended beyond the date of
substantial completion.
Lichtman v. Beni, 280 Conn. 25 (2006) A contractor’s appeal of a trial court’s discharge of a mechanic’s lien on a homeowner’s
property was moot because the contractor, who timely filed the appeal, did not apply for a stay of the
effect of the trial court’s order pending appeal. An automatic stay of an order discharging a
mechanic’s lien only remains in place for the 7-day window during which an appeal of this order may
be filed. An appellant must apply for a further stay in order to extend this window until the court
renders its decision on the application. The party requesting the stay must persuade the court to grant
its request or post a sufficient bond, or both. Any order of discharge, reduction or stay shall take effect
upon the recording of a certified copy thereof in the appropriate land records.
Because the contractor did not request a stay, the trial court never ordered one. With no court
order, the clerk of court never delivered a copy of such an order. Thus, the contractor had no order to
file on the land records, and no stay of the discharge was in effect. With no stay requested, it was
appropriate for the clerk of court to issue a certified copy of the court’s discharge order of the
contractor’s mechanic’s lien to the homeowners, who then properly filed the order on the land records.
Upon the recording of the court’s order discharging the lien, the contractor’s appeal became moot, as
no lien that could be affected on appeal existed.
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Magness v. CPI Home T&P Bus. The complete absence of a written contract that complies with the Home Improvement Act
Improvement, LLC, 2006 Conn. Super. (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.) or, at the very least, a written and signed memorialization of the
LEXIS 204 (Jan. 23, 2006) changes in the terms and conditions of an original contract cannot be deemed a minor and highly
technical deviation from the act. With no compliant contract, the court discharged a mechanic’s lien
filed against a homeowner’s property by a contractor. Moreover, the evidence considered by the court
did not satisfy the bad faith exception to a contractor’s inability to foreclose upon a mechanic’s lien
based on an unenforceable contract.
MD Drilling & Blasting, Inc. v. MLS The mechanic’s lien statute is not an exclusive remedy, and a party may obtain judgment on
Constr., LLC, 96 Conn. App. 798 (2006) other claims, such as breach of contract and unjust enrichment, at the same time it obtains a judgment
of strict foreclosure, particularly when defendants are defaulted for failure to plead. While a defendant
may be liable on multiple judgments, a plaintiff may recover only a single measure of damages. When
a plaintiff obtains a judgment of strict foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien and a judgment or judgments
on other claims, that plaintiff may pursue the damages to which it is entitled through either the
judgment of strict foreclosure or the judgment or judgments on the other claims. A plaintiff who
obtains a default judgment still maintains the burden of establishing damages.
Mullen v. O&G Indus., Inc., 2006 Conn. A seven-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions only applies to actions involving
Super. LEXIS 470 (Conn. Super. Ct. professional engineers or architects, not a contractor who installed a steel expansion joint in a school.
Feb. 7, 2006) The two-year statute of limitations/three-year statute of repose applies to personal injury actions
arising from the contractor’s allegedly negligent installation of that expansion joint.
Neal’s Hard Wood Flooring, Inc. v. Even though a contractor hired to install hard wood floors in a home did not take a moisture
Lenhardt, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS reading before installing the floors, the two weeks during which the flooring material was stored at the
2537 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2006) site prior to installation was more than enough time for the wood to acclimate to the sub-flooring
material, therefore the court concluded that the contractor demonstrated that there was probable cause
to sustain the validity of the lien filed against the homeowner’s property securing the unpaid balance
due under the flooring subcontract.
Northeast Tank Servs., Inc. v. 570 Main Court discharged lien filed against defendant owner’s property by contractor because
Street, LLC, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS contractor failed to produce any evidence other than an unsigned written estimate and subsequent
511 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2006) invoice to support its claim that the work was completed. The contractor did not produce a revised or
supplemental estimate, time logs for work done, payroll records, permit records, invoices, receipts or
other documentation common or customary to such transactions and/or work.
O’Donnell Bros., Inc. v. Ross, 2006 Contractor breached re-roofing contract by failing to specify a starting and completion date as
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1637 (Conn. Super. required by the Home Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.), installing 30-year
Ct. May 22, 2006) shingles rather than the 40-year shingles for which the owners contracted, substituting a lower grade
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underlayment for plywood, failing to provide roof flashing and failing to perform the re-roofing work
in such a manner as to render the roof leak-proof according to standard practices. Contractor breached
the contract and violated the Home Improvement Act, a per se violation of the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et seq.), so contractor could not recover for balance
due under the re-roofing contract.
Precision Mech. Servs., Inc. v. Shelton The modification of a contract may be inferred from the attendant circumstances and conduct
Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc., 97 Conn. of the parties, and whether the parties intended to modify a contract is a question of fact. Although an
App. 258 (2006) owner originally rejected and never signed a change order reflecting the increased price to install a
sprinkler system in a building found to be 10,000 more square feet than originally described, the
owner’s conduct functioned as an acceptance of the change order. The owner instructed the contractor
to continue working, knew that the contractor priced the job at a certain dollar amount per square foot
and needed the sprinkler system installed in order to continue operation of its business.
Pulte Homes of New Eng., LLC v. MD No statutory provision requires the addition of attorney’s fees to a bond substituted for a
Drilling & Blasting, Inc., 2006 Conn. mechanic’s lien. If a party obtains a judgment on a mechanic’s lien or a bond substituted for a
Super. LEXIS 1136 (Conn. Super. Ct. mechanic’s lien, then the party may recover attorney’s fees.
Apr. 11, 2006)
Riggs-Brewer Inds., Inc. v. Shelton A contractor sufficiently pled a cause of action for breach of contract against an architect,
Senior Housing, Inc., 2006 Conn. Super. even though the architect and contractor did not enter into a contract themselves, by alleging that the
LEXIS 1741 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 6, architect owed a contractual duty to a town to inspect work on a construction project, to approve the
2006) requisitions of the contractor on a monthly basis so that the contractor would be paid, to order extra
work when warranted or ordered by the town and to approve change orders so that the contractor
would be paid for additional or extra work. As alleged in the complaint, the contractor was a third-
party beneficiary of the contract between the architect and town and could maintain an action against
the architect for a breach of that contract.
The contractor’s allegations that the architect negligently performed its duties survived a
motion to strike. The economic loss doctrine did not bar the contractor’s claims of negligence brought
against the architect as the dispute between the parties, although both sophisticated commercial
entities, arises out of a contract for services, not a contract for the sale of goods.
Rouleau v. Walter D. Sullivan Co. , 2006 Subcontractor breached contract by failing to defend and provide insurance coverage to
Conn. Super. LEXIS 183 (Conn. Super. general contractor in a case involving injuries sustained by a worker who fell on a concrete floor. The
Ct. Jan. 17, 2006) worker’s allegations of negligence were almost wholly based on alleged facts or failures to act arising
from the work performed by the subcontractor under the contract with the general contractor,
triggering the subcontractor’s duty to defend the general contractor regardless of the merits of any
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claim by the general contractor for indemnification. Subcontractor’s insurer refused to defend general
contractor, claiming that its policy did not provide primary coverage, which amounted to a breach of
the subcontractor’s contractual duty to procure insurance for the general contractor. Regardless of the
reason for the insurer’s refusal of coverage, the bargained-for insurance was not present. The
subcontractor’s duty to indemnify the general contractor required the trier of fact to determine if the
worker’s fall arose from the subcontractor’s work, so the court could not grant summary judgment to
the general contractor on the claim for indemnification.
Royal Indem. Co. v. Terra Firma, 2006 Employees of subcontractor obtained judgment against general contractor for injuries
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2290 (Conn. Super. sustained at job site. Subcontractor’s insurer disclaimed duties to defend and indemnify general
Ct. July 24, 2006) contractor, claiming that the trial involved the general contractor’s sole negligence, which allegedly
would not be covered under the subcontractor’s insurance policy naming the general contractor as an
additional insured. Subcontractor successfully moved for summary judgment in underlying trial as the
exclusivity of workers’ compensation precluded the employees’ from maintaining their actions against
the subcontractor. Subcontractor’s insurer sought a declaratory judgment that the general contractor
was not an additional insured under the circumstances of this case. The court entered declaratory
judgment that general contractor was an additional insured under subcontractor’s insurance policy
because general contractor’s liability arose out of subcontractor’s work. Spreading risk to an insurer
by requiring the inclusion of a general contractor as an additional insured under a subcontractor’s
policy, especially where the insurer’s risk is limited to losses arising from the named insured’s work,
does not violate public policy.
Royal Indem. Co. v. Terra Firm, 2006 Insurer sought written determination from trial court that issues resolved by a ruling on a
Conn. Super. LEXIS 3324 (Conn. Super. motion for summary judgment are of such significance to the determination of the case that the delay
Ct. Nov. 7, 2006) incident to an immediate appeal of that ruling is justified. Court issued the determination, permitting
an interlocutory appeal of the summary judgment decision. Court previously determined that general
contractor was an additional insured under a subcontractor’s insurance policy because general
contractor’s liability arose out of subcontractor’s work, even though subcontractor was not party to
underlying action at which verdicts were rendered against general contractor. Even after resolving the
coverage issue, the general contractor’s counterclaims for bad faith and Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et seq.) violations remained. The court concluded that the
coverage issues were of such significance to the determination of the case that delay, to the extent
there is delay, is justified. The preparation of the counterclaims for trial still required some time, so
the delay incident to an interlocutory appeal may be minimal.
Sowell v. Konover Constr. Corp., 2006 Employees of subcontractor were injured while performing trenching work for which
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Conn. Super. LEXIS 94 (Conn. Super. subcontractor contracted with general contractor and brought suit against subcontractor and general
Ct. Jan. 17, 2006) contractor. Court granted summary judgment in subcontractor’s favor concluding that workers’
compensation afforded the employees their exclusive remedy against the subcontractor, their
employer. General contractor was permitted to introduce evidence of the subcontractor’s conduct on
the job site, its responsibilities with respect to safety and the measures it took towards satisfying safety
obligations, but the court precluded the general contractor from introducing evidence of the
subcontractor’s negligence (i.e. breaches of any duty of safety). Court concluded that general
contractor retained such right of control over safety on site so as to have assumed a non-delegable duty
with regard to safety on the job site and , accordingly, denied motion to set aside jury verdict finding
general contractor liable to subcontractor’s employees.
Thier v. Kenyon, 2006 Conn. Super. Clients alleged that after they entered into a written agreement with architects to provide
LEXIS 2576 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, architectural services for a residential building, the architects failed to advise them of problems with
2006) the project, failed to properly oversee the contractors and failed to properly represent the clients'
interests. They also alleged that the architects hired contractors even though they knew the contractors
were not qualified to work on the project and failed to disclose their relationship with the contractors,
which was substantial enough to affect their judgment as architects for the project. The court held the
facts alleged came close to stating a dishonest purpose or sinister motive on the part of the architects,
which would be sufficient to constitute a breach of good faith. As the complaint alleged, inter alia,
that the architects were hired because of the superior knowledge, skill and experience which they had
in residential construction projects, and which the clients did not have, it set out a claim for breach of
fiduciary relationship. However, since the complaint was focused on the professional responsibilities
of the architects, the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et. seq.) claim
was not valid. CUTPA claims against architects must be limited to the entrepreneurial aspects of the
profession, just as with attorneys and medical practitioners.
Weber v. Pascarella Mason St., LLC, Architect filed a mechanic’s lien on property after owner did not pay architect’s fees. Owner
2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1846 (Conn. applied for a dissolution or reduction of the lien, and architect sought foreclosure of the lien.
Super. Ct. June 16, 2006) Undisputed testimony from the architect that he signed the certificate of mechanic’s lien in the
presence of an attorney and that, before he signed it, the attorney reviewed the contents of the
certificate with him, asked him to raise his right hand, asked him whether he swore to the truth of the
statements and that the facts stated therein were true and he acknowledged the truth of the statements
to the attorney satisfied the “subscribed and sworn to” requirement for certificates of mechanic’s liens.
The court determined that the services provided by the architect qualified for the mechanic’s lien as
they laid the groundwork for physical enhancement of the property or played an essential part in such
improvement. A credit given to the owner by the architect for work performed prior to the execution
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of the written contract did not violate the terms of the contract because the contract did not include any
requirement that work had to be performed after the contract was signed. The credit did not violate the
parol evidence rule because it did not alter or contradict the terms of the written contract. The
architect had discretion to begin work on the contract before it was signed, especially since the
owner’s wife and representative had started sending design ideas for the architect’s review and
consideration prior to the signing of the contract.
West Farms Mall, LLC v. Town of West A mall claimed that a town's authorization of an agreement for the construction of a
Hartford, 279 Conn. 1 (2006) commercial project on land which housed various municipal buildings, issuance of bonds, and the
conveyance of public land to the company were unlawful. On appeal, the mall contended that the trial
court improperly imposed a heightened burden of proof as to taxpayer standing. The Connecticut
Supreme Court held that the trial court applied the proper standard by considering whether the mall
demonstrated that its taxes would increase if the project were to proceed as planned and concluded that
the mall failed to meet that burden. The mall's theory of standing was predicated on the notion that the
mall was vindicating a right common to all taxpayers and consequently was relieved of its obligation
to prove personal, special injury under the general standing rule. A majority of the town's voters twice
approved by referendum the plans for the project. The supreme court held that the challenged actions
of the town had been checked pursuant to a political process because the voters in essence ratified the
action that the mall sought to have declared as unlawful on the taxpayers' behalf.
Wright Bros. Builders, Inc. v.Shuldman, A contractor obtained the lien in question after a property owner refused to pay certain sums
2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 526 (Conn. charged by the contractor for construction of a home on the property in question. The amounts
Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2006) charged by the contractor were certified by the architect in charge of the project. The lien was filed
within 90 days after the contractor ceased performing services and furnishing materials, described the
premises, stated the amount claimed, stated the name of the person against whom the lien was being
filed, stated the date of the commencement of performance of services, stated that the amount claimed
was justly due as nearly as the same could be ascertained, was subscribed and sworn to by the
contractor and was served on the owner and recorded in the city land records. The contractor admitted
that the amount of the lien had been miscalculated and had offered to reduce the amount of the lien.
The court reduced the lien accordingly but found no grounds to discharge the lien.
Wright Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Shuldman, A homeowner’s statutory theft claim survived a motion to strike where the complaint alleged,
2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3336 (Conn. inter alia, that an officer of a contractor repeatedly represented that the contractor was current on its
Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006) payments to the subcontractors, those representations were untrue and known to be untrue when made
and the contractor had misappropriated for its own use the moneys paid by the homeowner to the
contractor for the work performed by subcontractors. Thus, the complaint adequately pled conduct
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synonymous with larceny by false pretenses. The court agreed with the majority of other superior
courts that a breach of contract did not amount to a Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et. seq.) violation unless there were substantial aggravating circumstances. In
this case, the CUTPA claim survived because the homeowner had alleged substantial aggravating
circumstances in the form of intentional misrepresentations regarding the subcontractor payments.
The homeowner also alleged that the contractor's acts caused her to suffer a substantial and
ascertainable loss of money and property.
Stamford Wrecking Co. v. United Stone The United States Navy sent out a solicitation for bids on a demolition project. A wrecking
Am., Inc., 2007 Conn. App. LEXIS 6 company and a contractor entered into a subcontracting agreement for a collaborative bid, which
(Conn. App. Ct. Jan. 2, 2007) provided that the contractor would perform 15 percent of the work and subcontract the rest to the
wrecking company. The contractor did not award any work to the wrecking company. A jury entered
judgment in favor of the wrecking company in an action against the contractor alleging breach of the
subcontract. The contractor argued that the trial court improperly excluded documents and federal
regulations that would have prevented them from awarding the wrecking company 85 percent of the
work. The appellate court held that the evidence was excluded by the parol evidence rule. The
evidence would have impermissibly varied or contradicted the terms of the agreement, as it surpassed
the bounds of evidence that would have been admissible to clarify an alleged ambiguity concerning
the classification of the project. Furthermore, there was no support for defendants' contention that the
delegation of work to the wrecking company would have violated 13 C.F.R. § 125.6 (2006) and 48
C.F.R. § 52.219-14 (2005), because those regulations required contractors to perform only 15 percent
of the work, and the agreement satisfied that standard.
Patt v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 2006 Conn. A contract between a putative indemnitor and indemnitee to perform work with due care
Super. LEXIS 3788 (Conn. Super. Ct. provides an independent legal relationship sufficient to escape the exclusive remedy provision of the
Dec. 20, 2006) workers’ compensation and permit common-law indemnification. The 2001 amendment to
Connecticut’s anti-indemnification statute (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572k) prohibits contractual
indemnification in the construction context where the indemnitee’s negligence is a substantial factor in
causing in causing injury to a plaintiff.. Previously, the statute only prohibited indemnification for
injuries caused by an indemnitee’s sole negligence. The anti-indemnification statute specifically
provides that it does not affect the validity of insurance contracts, so its prohibition of certain
indemnification agreements does not extend to an obligation to include a person as an additional
insured on an insurance contract. Agreeing to include another as an insured and paying the associated
premium is not the same obligation as an agreement to indemnify. The former is a predictable fixed
cost, which may be included in the contractor’s bid, and the latter is an unknown and perhaps
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catastrophic cost.
Barta v. Champagne, 2006 Conn. Super. An agreement to remove trees, build a concrete block retaining wall and perform drainage
LEXIS 3806 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, work on property must conform to the requirements of the Home Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat.
2006) § 20-418 et seq.) to be enforceable because the work described in the agreement falls squarely within
the definition of “home improvement” under the act.
Tradesource, Inc. v. Kemper Constr., An employment service and a construction company entered into an agreement for the
Inc., 96 Conn. App. 806 (2006) provision of laborers for construction projects. During the term of the contract, the employment
service began to add a six percent sales tax pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-408(1) onto its invoices.
The construction company refused to pay the additional charge, claiming that a separate sales tax was
not included in the original contract. The appellate court held that the construction company was not
liable for the additional tax charged by the employment service. The language of the contract was
clear and unambiguous. Among other terms, the contract stipulated that the contractor was to pay the
hourly rates as established by the employment service. As a matter of law, these rates incorporated the
six percent sales tax that defendants were legally obligated to pay under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-408(2).
Unless an agreement indicates otherwise, a statute existing at the time the agreement is executed
becomes part of it and must be read into it just as if an express provision to that effect were inserted
therein. Further, a merger clause on the final page stipulated that the contract was the entire agreement
of the parties and could not be modified except in writing signed by both parties. Such a modification
was never effectuated.
Young v. Smalley Constr., 2006 Conn. Homeowners alleged that there were problems with the repair work to their home and that
Super. LEXIS 3638 (Conn. Super. Ct. contractor refused to correct the problems. They claimed that contractor’s conduct of poor
Dec., 6. 2006) workmanship and not repairing the defects was extreme and outrageous and thus amounted to
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that plaintiffs had failed to show that
defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous. The Connecticut Appellate Court had affirmed the
dismissal of claims involving more vicious and permanently damaging conduct than that here.
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeded all bounds
usually tolerated by decent society. In cases where plaintiffs had avoided motions to strike, there had
often been public ridicule involved; there was no such allegation here. The facts here were legally
insufficient to bridge a breach of a legal duty under a contract to the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress without additional allegations showing extreme and outrageous conduct toward the
homeowners by the contractor.
Structures Unlimited, LLC v. Greene, A contractor had previously withdrawn its complaint, leaving only the counterclaim to be
2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3629 (Conn. tried. The contractor and its counsel did not appear for trial on the counterclaim, and thus, a default
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Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2006) was entered against the contractor. A hearing was held on the homeowner's damages. Based on the
homeowner's testimony, which was supported by photographs and documentary evidence, the court
awarded damages on the counterclaim for damages resulting from the contractor's failure to properly
tarp the opening after removing an old roof and failure to install proper windows in the sun room.
Those damages included attorney fees per contract provisions.
Malone v. Krieder, 2006 Conn. Super. A homeowner had multiple sclerosis and was facing progressive physical, cognitive and
LEXIS 3452 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, emotional deterioration. In three separate contracts, a contractor agreed to perform three separate
2006) stages of alterations to the owner's condominium to provide for handicap accessibility. He advised the
homeowner he was a skilled home improvement carpenter and testified he was fully licensed; neither
statement was true. The homeowner discharged him because the work was not being completed and
was being done improperly. She hired a plumber to reinstall pipes the contractor had removed and
engaged other contractors to remedy and complete the discharged contractor’s work. The court found
that in addition to violating the Home Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et seq.), under the
“cigarette rule,” defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-
110a et. seq.) as to each contract. Due to the contractor’s failure to complete the work properly, the
owner incurred additional expenses and her anxiety and depression were compounded. His conduct,
including his false representations, entitled the owner to punitive damages under CUTPA. As the
attorneys fees the owner submitted were fair and reasonable, she was entitled to them under CUTPA.
Pfeifer v. Legault & Son Constr., 2006 A homeowner filed a motion for a prejudgment remedy as to the principal of a limited liability
Conn. Super. LEXIS 3197 (Conn. Super. company. The trial court held that there was not probable cause against the principal as to the
Ct. Oct. 26, 2006) fraudulent misrepresentation, conversion and civil theft/larceny claims. The LLC could not be pierced
under either the instrumentality rule or the identity rule. There was no basis other than the Home
Improvement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-418 et. seq.) offered in support of the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et. seq.) claim. Although there were technical
violations of the Home Improvement Act, the principal did not knowingly and intentionally violate the
act. The principal was not aware there was a Home Improvement Act when he formed the LLC. He
was advised by a state agency that he could procure documents, including contractor's contracts, at
office supply stores, which he did. Finally, the CUTPA claim could not provide a basis for a
prejudgment remedy against the principal, individually, as even though the principal might have
violated the Home Improvement Act by not registering himself, he did so only inadvertently. While
the technical violation might satisfy the threshold requirement of establishing a CUTPA claim, the
homeowner did not show that her damages arose from the violation.
Dence v. Designtec, 2006 Conn. Super. A contractor agreed to design and construct improvements to the owners' facility, and the
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LEXIS 3050 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, contractor filed the mechanic's lien based on the owners' failure to make a contract payment. The
2006) owners asserted that the contractor did not perform any work within the 90 days prior to filing the
mechanic's lien, thus invalidating the lien. The contractor asserted that an employee of a subcontractor
performed carpentry work on the 90th day prior to the filing of the lien. The court held that, although
exhibits indicated that the employee was paid through the 90th day prior to the lien and was present
for some portion of the morning onsite at the facility, the evidence was insufficient to support the
contractor's assertion that it performed services or furnished materials to the owners at any time within
90 days of the lien.
Carrano’s Railings & Welding, LLC v. A contractor had a project at which it was to install screen units at an apartment complex. It
Suraci Metal Finishing, LLC, 2006 entered into an oral agreement with a subcontractor for the subcontractor to apply a protective coating
Conn. Super. LEXIS 3030 (Conn. Super. to the metal screen units. Upon completion of the coating process, the subcontractor delivered the
Ct. Oct. 11, 2006) screen units to the contractor. The screen units exhibited rust when they were unpacked and ready to
be installed. After installation, the rust on the screen units began to bleed and stain the building. A
third party painted the screen units, but it also had to repaint the faces of the balconies to cover the rust
bleed from the railings and screens. The third party filed a claim against the contractor, which was
settled. The contractor then sued the subcontractor for indemnification. The subcontractor moved to
strike and argued that facts supporting an indemnification claim had not been adequately alleged. The
trial court found, however, that the contractor had adequately asserted the subcontractor's active and
primary negligence concerning the rust-proofing applied to the screens and that the subcontractor had
exclusive control over the coating process.
United Steel, Inc. v. Haynes Constr. Co., A Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et seq.) claim alleged,
2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2701 (Conn. in addition to a breach of contract, that a subcontractor: (a) submitted false claims against the payment
Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2006) bond of which a general contractor was the principle and (b) unscrupulously threatened a project over
which the general contractor served as such in an effort to obtain more favorable terms or dismissal.
Thus, sufficient facts beyond a mere breach of contract claim were presented to survive the
subcontractor's motion to strike the CUTPA claim.
Stone-Krete Constr., Inc. v. Eder, 2006 The “subscribed and sworn to” provision of Connecticut’s mechanic’s lien statute requires a
Conn. LEXIS 466 (Conn. Dec. 19, 2006) person to sign a mechanic’s lien at the end and take part in an oath ceremony in which the person
swears to the truth of the facts set forth in the lien. The provision further requires that there be
evidence in the lien, such as a jurat, confirming the administration of the oath by a notary public or a
commissioner of the Superior Court of Connecticut. A mechanic’s lien need not include a signed,
written oath or an affidavit or similar writing in order to be valid.
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