SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title Solvency Decoys can be used to confuse Chinese Friedman ’07 (Norman, United States Navel Institute, “Vol. 133 Iss. 3, pg. 90, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/pqdweb?index=0&did=12324496 21&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309& VName=PQD&TS=1310432624&clientId=3552, AB) Another possibility is to complicate the Chinese targeting problem by making satellites stealthy. If the satellites cannot be tracked in the first place, they cannot be intercepted. For the last few years reports have surfaced of stealthy or "black" satellites apparently launched by the United States. They would seem to fit this bill. If satellites cannot be stealthy, they can be made more maneuverable, particularly if short lifetimes (set by on-board fuel loads) are accepted. Yet another possibility is decoying. Just as ballistic-missile developers produce decoys to saturate defensive systems, satellite developers can presumably produce dummy inflatable satellites. At high enough altitude it may be impossible to distinguish them from real ones, at least until the Chinese become significantly more sophisticated. Given U.S. expertise in producing decoys for missile re- entry vehicles, it seems very likely that satellite decoys can be made (or perhaps already are being made). SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title Solvency Decoys are the best and least expensive way to increase survivability Pena ’02 (Charles, USA Today, “Should the U.S. Weaponize Space?”, July 2002, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/pqdweb?index=2&did=14931020 1&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309& VName=PQD&TS=1310432784&clientId=3552, AB) If a microsatellite threat were to evolve, the question is: What is the appropriate response? If the supposed microsatellite ASAT were nonnuclear, "hardening" satellites against nuclear explosions or electromagnetic pulse would not increase their survivability. Self-defense would be problematic because a microsatellite ASAT would be difficult to detect and could also reside in an otherwise nonthreatening satellite. Of course, the U.S. should not adopt a policy of shooting down every Chinese satellite launched on the presumption that it might contain a microsatellite ASAT. Maneuverability would allow a satellite to evade or dodge a directed ASAT attack, but adding maneuverability to a satellite system would increase the total cost by between 10 and 20%, depending on the satellite altitude (warning time), nature of the threat, and threat detection efficiency. Perhaps the best and least-expensive way to increase survivability against a potential microsatellite ASAT threat is to use decoys that simulate the radar and optical signatures of the target satellite. Jamming systems could be employed as well to confuse an ASAT's homing system. Analysts estimate that satellite decoys would increase the total system cost by between one and 10%. SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title Solvency Decoys can be inexpensive and useful Kosiak ’07 (Steven, CSBA writer, “Spaced-Based-Weapons”, 2007, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2007.10.31-Spaced- Based-Weapons.pdf, AB) Deception involves the use of decoys to confuse or overwhelm an enemy with false targets. In the case of satellites, decoys can be either inexpensive “traffic” decoys, designed to simulate only those characteristics of the satellite that can be measured and evaluated relatively cheaply, quickly and remotely, or complex decoys designed to much more closely mimic the satellite’s characteristics. Traffic decoys would be far less costly to deploy than actual fully functioning satellites. Satellites could also be designed to release simple “reaction decoys”—such as reflective balloons, clouds of smoke and chaff—upon warning of an attack.227 Simple decoys of this type might well be effective against a country with relatively primitive space surveillance capabilities, or against guidance sensor carried aboard an ASAT kinetic-kill vehicle. SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title Neg AT: Solvency Decoys are expensive and unnecessary Wilson ’00 (Tom, Space Commission Staff Member, Threats to the United States Space Capabilities, 2000, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html#ft91, AB) The use of decoys is another classic deception technique to increase the survivability of critical military missions. Decoys can force an enemy to waste firepower on false targets or to withhold fire for fear of doing so. To be effective, decoys must be sufficiently realistic to the space surveillance network of a potential adversary. Decoy satellites do not appear to have been deployed as yet given the rather sparse threat environment. Decoys can be expensive and do not result in any additional capability. Therefore, inactive redundant versions capable of later activation may be a preferred approach for space system survivability fault-tolerant electronic designs are possible hardening measures against such effects. Internal surfaces may also be coated with low atomic number paints to reduce inter- nal electron emission into cavities. Input and output circuits and terminals can be protected with various devices such as zener diodes, lowpass filters, and bandpass filters to limit current or clamp voltages caused by SGEMP. Circumvention is also an important hardening strategy for high-altitude nuclear weapon detonations. SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title Solvency Technology susceptible to decoys Wilson ’00 (Tom, Space Commission Staff Member, Threats to the United States Space Capabilities, 2000, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html#ft91, AB) Mechanical shielding using so-called “multiple Whipple bumper” technology,32 developed for the InterSatellite orbits are predictable in the absence of maneuvers performed in the interval between observations. This makes reconnaissance satellites particularly susceptible to denial and deception activities by those who do not wish to be observed or those who wish to deceive the observer with decoys. To overcome this limitation, such satellites may perform periodic maneuvers to re-establish the surprise of overflight observation, which may be effective given current limitations in major space surveillance networks, including those of the United States, Russia, and China. With more than 8,500 man- made objects and about 500 active satellites in orbit, space tracking systems do not simultaneously track all objects in orbit; rather, the space objects are observed on a “duty cycle” basis. If the duty cycle is not real- time observation, it is possible for space objects to disappear until new observations re-establish contact. SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title Solvency Decoys are effective and low cost methods Wilson ’00 (Tom, Space Commission Staff Member, Threats to the United States Space Capabilities, 2000, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html#ft91, AB) Decoys that credibly simulate the radar and optical signatures of the satellite are effective, potentially low- cost methods for diverting an ASAT attack from the actual satellite. The decoy would be located on or inside the host satellite and released at the precise moment for the most effective deployment. Decoys could also include lightweight optical or RF jamming systems to nullify or confuse an ASAT's homing system. Analysts estimate that employment of a decoy system would increase the total system cost by between one and ten percent of the total satellite cost. SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title Solvency Hardening is the most effective measure Wilson ’00 (Tom, Space Commission Staff Member, Threats to the United States Space Capabilities, 2000, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html#ft91, AB) Hardening of a space system's elements is the single most effective survivability measure.(86) The technologies to harden against damage from nuclear-weapons effects exist today. However, this level of hardening is reserved for a few, special mission military satellites, such as MILSTAR. Most of the hardening programs underway today are focused on providing electronic component hardening to protect satellites from natural environment effects. However, concepts such as reflective surfaces, shutters and non-absorbing materials have been proposed as a means of hardening against an attack by lasers. In the future, the U.S. must advance the state-of-the-art in hardening technology to include limiters, filters, Faraday cages, surge arrestors, waveguide cutoffs, as well as expand the use of fiber optic components to increase survivability against nuclear, high-power microwave and neutral particle beam weapons.(87) Analysts estimate that satellite hardening would increase the total system cost by between two and five percent of the total satellite cost.(88) SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title Solvency Deploys lower the probability of targeting US forces Global Security ’05 (Global Security “Passive Deffense” 2005 http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/policy/army/fm/100-12/ch7.htm, AB) Deception is designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to his intentions. Successful deception in TMD requires a good deception plan that is executed correctly, monitored constantly, modified as necessary, and deceives the enemy completely. Deception in TMD is best categorized as being either ambiguous or misdirecting. Ambiguous deception will increase confusion in the enemy’s IPB process and lower the probability of effectively targeting US forces by adding to the alternatives from which it must base targeting decisions. Misdirection reduces the uncertainty in the enemy’s IPB process by convincing it of a particular falsehood, thereby influencing targeting decision(s) by having it commit TMs prematurely or ineffectively. SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title NEG ANSWERS Attacks on satellites will be difficult and will not cause a serious problem Federation of American Scientists ’11 (“Protecting US Space Systems” 2011, http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/10072004163809.pdf, AB) The GPS constellation consists of 24 satellites, which are spread over different orbital planes at an altitude of 20,000 kilometers. In order to substantially degrade the GPS, the satellites have to be attacked individually, which is difficult to do. The satellites are also hardened against nuclear effects and have on-orbit spares. The robustness of the GPS constellation has been analyzed by Geoffrey Forden and reported in Appendix D. The analysis shows that the GPS constellation is robust to the extent that it can lose up to four satellites and yet only suffer from periodic loss of usable signal at any place. Therefore, the vulnerability of the GPS constellation to ASAT-type attacks is rather small. SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title Solvency Decoys are needed to confuse and delay the identification of a space vehicle Thomson ’10 (Allen, Former CIA analysis, “A Stealth Satellite Sourcebook”, 7-14-2010, http://22.214.171.124/~gbpprorg/mil/radar/stealth_satellite.pdf, AB) At the present state of development of the space vehicle detection art, the most important vehicle observable to be controlled is radar cross-section or signature. This is particularly true of orbiting satellite vehicles whose repeated passes around the earth allow ample time for radar signature analysis and possible ultimate identification of the satellite. A variety of techniques have been devised for controlling and reducing radar cross-section of a space vehicle in a manner such that the vehicle may be effectively decoyed. Such an antiradar device or antiradar screen must either completely deny detection of the space vehicle by search radar or reduce and modify the radar cross-section of the vehicle to permit employment of other aids, such as decoys, to confuse and delay final identification. SDI 11 File Title Neg AT Making an accurate decoy would be impractical Thomson ’10 (Allen, Former CIA analysis, “A Stealth Satellite Sourcebook”, 7-14-2010, http://126.96.36.199/~gbpprorg/mil/radar/stealth_satellite.pdf, AB) A proper signature match between target vehicle and decoys without modification in the target signature would require the external configuration of the decoys to substantially duplicate that of the target vehicle. In most cases, for example, the target vehicle has a characteristic fine structure of large magnitude in its radar signature which varies with frequency, polarization and radar look angle. Duplication of this signature with a decoy would require a decoy of the same size and shape as the target vehicle, which is often impractical. As a consequence, the most effective method of shielding a target vehicle is that wherein the radar signature of the vehicle is modified to a simplified, reduced magnitude form and the vehicle is accompanied by a swarm of decoys having essentially the same radar signature as the screened target vehicle so as to cause confusion and delay in detection. SDI 11 File Title Aff-not sure Deploying decoys would not lead to an arms race Pena ’02 (Charles, Cato’s former director of defense policy studies, “Should the US Weaponize Space?”, July 2002, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_2686_131/ai_90683546/pg_2/?t ag=mantle_skin;content, AB) To be sure, not deploying weapons in space is no guarantee that potentially hostile nations (such as China) will not develop and deploy ASATs. However, it is virtually certain that deploying American weapons in space will lead to the development and deployment of ASATs to counter such weapons. The U.S. should therefore not be the first to weaponize space--either with defensive weapons or with offensive ASATs. However, deploying defensive decoys--rather than weapons--would not inevitably lead to such an arms race. SDI 11 File Title Solvency The technology is available-Chinese propose using decoys for BMD system Hudson Institute ’05 (“High Technology and Military Power in the Next Half- Century”, 2005, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/ChinaPDF.pdf, AB) SDI 11 File Title Chinese military experts readily admit that the advancement of boost-stage laser interception systems presents major challenges to offensive ballistic missiles. But the aforementioned countermeasures “can improve the missile’s defense during the boost phase to some extent.” Chinese military scientists also stress that the creation of BMD systems and corresponding “penetrating measures” again prove the “shield-spear” dialectic, each of which will always generate the other and advance competitively. For today, the Chinese propose the following “penetrating measures:”82 (1) multiple warhead attack; (2) decoy penetration, including true decoys, signals transmitting decoys, and false decoys; (3) interruption and concealed penetrations; (4) enclosing balls (huge metallic membrane balloons); (5) trajectory change penetrations; (6) mobile launch; and (7) a preemptive strike to “attack and destroy a certain part” of the BMD system. SDI 11 File Title Solvency Space decoy technology is available-China has designed decoys for ICBMs Arms Control Association ’09 (“US Space Weaponization and China”, 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943, AB) A number of countermeasures could defeat a midcourse missile defense system like the current one in Alaska. For example, each ICBM could be deployed with decoys. Conversely, China might also disguise the warhead as a decoy by enclosing it in a radar-reflecting balloon, covering it with a shroud, hiding it in a cloud of chaff, or using electronic or infrared jamming measures. Beijing has already demonstrated that it can use decoys and similar capabilities. It has been reported that China has already made some missile flight tests with penetration aids, such as the 1999 flight test of China’s new DF-31 ICBM. Similarly, a number of measures could be developed to counter a space-based interceptor. One countermeasure would be to develop technology to boost rockets faster, rendering important boost-phase defenses impotent. China has already made steps in this direction by developing solid-fuel ICBMs that burn faster than its previous liquid-fueled missiles. SDI 11 File Title Solvency Decoys would be used to confuse and jam ASAT attacks Wilson ’01 (Tom, Space Commission Staff Member, “Threats to United States Space Capabilities” 2001, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2001/nssmo/article05.pdf, AB) Decoys that credibly simulate the radar and optical signatures of the satellite are effective, potentially low-cost methods for diverting an ASAT attack from the actual satellite. The decoy would be located on or inside the host satellite and released at the precise moment for the most effective deployment. Decoys could also include lightweight optical or RF jamming systems to nullify or confuse an ASAT’s homing system. Analysts estimate that employment of a decoy system would increase the total system cost by between one and ten percent of the total satellite cost. SDI 11 File Title SDI 11 File Title Solvency US satellites are threatened and need new technology Schendzielos ’08 (Kurt, Major, United States Air Force, “Protection in Space”, 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485553&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, AB) America is critically reliant upon space exploitation for a wide variety of activities. These range from strictly military capabilities such as intelligence gathering and secure communications to civilian financial transaction timing and remote Earth sensing for environmental analysis. Recent developments in anti- satellite technologies signal a dangerous threat to U.S. space dominance. Specifically, zero-warning threats such as ground-based lasers or direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles present the biggest challenge for which there is little or no defense. Until recently, the U.S. had been reasonably secure that its satellites were free from disablement. Unfortunately, many adversary nations acquired anti-satellite technologies and proliferated them; threatening permanent disablement of almost any American satellite. This monograph surveys available unclassified literature to assess current and emerging threats to U.S. satellites and evaluates open source defenses available, ranging from policy mechanisms to physical defenses. The level of protection is wanting and the monograph reviews various promising technologies in development currently that could be obtained to defend U.S. satellites in the timeframe commensurate with the proliferation and risk of anti-satellite threats. An advocacy suggesting that increased national resources and efforts be devoted to protecting Low-Earth Orbiting satellites from zero-warning attacks is proposed. SDI 11 File Title Solvency Decoys may be the best and least costly response to ASAT capabilities Niskanen ’01 (Bill, Former Chairmen of CATO, “The Military and Space”, 2001, http://www.cato.org/events/transcripts/010905et.pdf, AB) SDI 11 File Title Self-defense is really problematic if you can't detect these things to begin with or if they might be housed in a legitimate, non-threatening satellite and then only released during time of conflict. Certainly we wouldn't want to adopt a policy of shooting down every Chinese or other country's launch of a satellite on the assumption that maybe it might have a microsatellite on board and maybe that microsatellite might have an ASAT capability. Nor do I think we want to be in the business of presuming every satellite in orbit might be a microsatellite with ASAT capability and shooting that down. So, if this threat ever becomes real, I think maybe, at least for now, the best and least costly response might be the use of decoys that simulate the radar and optical signatures of the threatened satellites. One estimate done by one of the Commission's staff members was that decoys might increase system cost from 1 to 10 percent. And another potential way to deal with these microsatellites could be through the use of jamming, if they have to home in on the targeted satellite. SDI 11 File Title Neg Decoys will not work-China has technology to distinguish decoys Pillsbury ’01 (Michael, Analyst at RAND Corporation to publish articles in Foreign Policy and International Security, “China’s Military Strategy Toward the U.S.”, 2001, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/strat.pdf, AB) Mark Stokes has found that Chinese engineers have conducted studies to counter satellite decoys as well. The PRC has stepped up its efforts to distinguish decoys from real satellites that conventional ground tracking stations using radar or visual means. In order to distinguish targets, one study, carried out by the National University of Defense Technology, determined that this problem could be solved through use of at least three ground stations using infrared sensors and neural networks. China’s existing space tracking network can detect and track most satellites with sufficient accuracy for targeting purposes. China’s desire to field a direct ascent ASAT asset may be affiliated with a program intended to support the launch of small satellite constellations. A small solid fueled launch vehicle, most likely a derivative of the DF-21, will be able to place small payloads in orbit at a time and place of Beijing’s choosing. China intends to field these mobile, solid fueled launch vehicles by 2005.
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