Final Decoy Cards by linzhengnd

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                                              Solvency
Decoys can be used to confuse Chinese
Friedman ’07 (Norman, United States Navel Institute, “Vol. 133 Iss. 3, pg. 90,
http://proquest.umi.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/pqdweb?index=0&did=12324496
21&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&
VName=PQD&TS=1310432624&clientId=3552, AB)
Another possibility is to complicate the Chinese targeting problem by making satellites stealthy. If
the satellites cannot be tracked in the first place, they cannot be intercepted. For the last few years
reports have surfaced of stealthy or "black" satellites apparently launched by the United States. They would
seem to fit this bill. If satellites cannot be stealthy, they can be made more maneuverable, particularly if
short lifetimes (set by on-board fuel loads) are accepted.
Yet another possibility is decoying. Just as ballistic-missile developers produce decoys to saturate
defensive systems, satellite developers can presumably produce dummy inflatable satellites. At high
enough altitude it may be impossible to distinguish them from real ones, at least until the Chinese
become significantly more sophisticated. Given U.S. expertise in producing decoys for missile re-
entry vehicles, it seems very likely that satellite decoys can be made (or perhaps already are being
made).
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                                               Solvency
Decoys are the best and least expensive way to increase survivability
Pena ’02 (Charles, USA Today, “Should the U.S. Weaponize Space?”, July
2002,
http://proquest.umi.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/pqdweb?index=2&did=14931020
1&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&
VName=PQD&TS=1310432784&clientId=3552, AB)

If a microsatellite threat were to evolve, the question is: What is the appropriate response? If the supposed
microsatellite ASAT were nonnuclear, "hardening" satellites against nuclear explosions or
electromagnetic pulse would not increase their survivability. Self-defense would be problematic
because a microsatellite ASAT would be difficult to detect and could also reside in an otherwise
nonthreatening satellite. Of course, the U.S. should not adopt a policy of shooting down every Chinese
satellite launched on the presumption that it might contain a microsatellite ASAT. Maneuverability would
allow a satellite to evade or dodge a directed ASAT attack, but adding maneuverability to a satellite system
would increase the total cost by between 10 and 20%, depending on the satellite altitude (warning time),
nature of the threat, and threat detection efficiency. Perhaps the best and least-expensive way to increase
survivability against a potential microsatellite ASAT threat is to use decoys that simulate the radar
and optical signatures of the target satellite. Jamming systems could be employed as well to confuse an
ASAT's homing system. Analysts estimate that satellite decoys would increase the total system cost by
between one and 10%.
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                                               Solvency
Decoys can be inexpensive and useful
Kosiak ’07 (Steven, CSBA writer, “Spaced-Based-Weapons”, 2007,
http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2007.10.31-Spaced-
Based-Weapons.pdf, AB)

Deception involves the use of decoys to confuse or overwhelm an enemy with false targets. In the case
of satellites, decoys can be either inexpensive “traffic” decoys, designed to simulate only those
characteristics of the satellite that can be measured and evaluated relatively cheaply, quickly and remotely,
or complex decoys designed to much more closely mimic the satellite’s characteristics. Traffic decoys
would be far less costly to deploy than actual fully functioning satellites. Satellites could also be
designed to release simple “reaction decoys”—such as reflective balloons, clouds of smoke and
chaff—upon warning of an attack.227 Simple decoys of this type might well be effective against a
country with relatively primitive space surveillance capabilities, or against guidance sensor carried
aboard an ASAT kinetic-kill vehicle.
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                                      Neg AT: Solvency
Decoys are expensive and unnecessary
Wilson ’00 (Tom, Space Commission Staff Member, Threats to the United
States Space Capabilities, 2000,
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html#ft91, AB)
The use of decoys is another classic deception technique to increase the survivability of critical
military missions. Decoys can force an enemy to waste firepower on false targets or to withhold fire for
fear of doing so. To be effective, decoys must be sufficiently realistic to the space surveillance network
of a potential adversary. Decoy satellites do not appear to have been deployed as yet given the rather
sparse threat environment. Decoys can be expensive and do not result in any additional capability.
Therefore, inactive redundant versions capable of later activation may be a preferred approach for
space system survivability fault-tolerant electronic designs are possible hardening measures against
such effects. Internal surfaces may also be coated with low atomic number paints to reduce inter- nal
electron emission into cavities. Input and output circuits and terminals can be protected with various
devices such as zener diodes, lowpass filters, and bandpass filters to limit current or clamp voltages
caused by SGEMP. Circumvention is also an important hardening strategy for high-altitude nuclear
weapon detonations.
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                                                Solvency
Technology susceptible to decoys
Wilson ’00 (Tom, Space Commission Staff Member, Threats to the United
States Space Capabilities, 2000,
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html#ft91, AB)
Mechanical shielding using so-called “multiple Whipple bumper” technology,32 developed for the
InterSatellite orbits are predictable in the absence of maneuvers performed in the interval between
observations. This makes reconnaissance satellites particularly susceptible to denial and deception
activities by those who do not wish to be observed or those who wish to deceive the observer with
decoys. To overcome this limitation, such satellites may perform periodic maneuvers to re-establish the
surprise of overflight observation, which may be effective given current limitations in major space
surveillance networks, including those of the United States, Russia, and China. With more than 8,500 man-
made objects and about 500 active satellites in orbit, space tracking systems do not simultaneously track all
objects in orbit; rather, the space objects are observed on a “duty cycle” basis. If the duty cycle is not real-
time observation, it is possible for space objects to disappear until new observations re-establish contact.
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                                               Solvency
Decoys are effective and low cost methods
Wilson ’00 (Tom, Space Commission Staff Member, Threats to the United
States Space Capabilities, 2000,
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html#ft91, AB)
Decoys that credibly simulate the radar and optical signatures of the satellite are effective, potentially low-
cost methods for diverting an ASAT attack from the actual satellite. The decoy would be located on or
inside the host satellite and released at the precise moment for the most effective deployment. Decoys
could also include lightweight optical or RF jamming systems to nullify or confuse an ASAT's
homing system. Analysts estimate that employment of a decoy system would increase the total system
cost by between one and ten percent of the total satellite cost.
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                                             Solvency
Hardening is the most effective measure
Wilson ’00 (Tom, Space Commission Staff Member, Threats to the United
States Space Capabilities, 2000,
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html#ft91, AB)
Hardening of a space system's elements is the single most effective survivability measure.(86) The
technologies to harden against damage from nuclear-weapons effects exist today. However, this level
of hardening is reserved for a few, special mission military satellites, such as MILSTAR. Most of the
hardening programs underway today are focused on providing electronic component hardening to protect
satellites from natural environment effects. However, concepts such as reflective surfaces, shutters and
non-absorbing materials have been proposed as a means of hardening against an attack by lasers. In the
future, the U.S. must advance the state-of-the-art in hardening technology to include limiters, filters,
Faraday cages, surge arrestors, waveguide cutoffs, as well as expand the use of fiber optic
components to increase survivability against nuclear, high-power microwave and neutral particle
beam weapons.(87) Analysts estimate that satellite hardening would increase the total system cost by
between two and five percent of the total satellite cost.(88)
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                                             Solvency
Deploys lower the probability of targeting US forces
Global Security ’05 (Global Security “Passive Deffense” 2005
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/policy/army/fm/100-12/ch7.htm,
AB)
Deception is designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to
induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to his intentions. Successful deception in TMD requires
a good deception plan that is executed correctly, monitored constantly, modified as necessary, and
deceives the enemy completely. Deception in TMD is best categorized as being either ambiguous or
misdirecting. Ambiguous deception will increase confusion in the enemy’s IPB process and lower the
probability of effectively targeting US forces by adding to the alternatives from which it must base
targeting decisions. Misdirection reduces the uncertainty in the enemy’s IPB process by convincing it of a
particular falsehood, thereby influencing targeting decision(s) by having it commit TMs prematurely or
ineffectively.
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                                       NEG ANSWERS
Attacks on satellites will be difficult and will not cause a serious problem
Federation of American Scientists ’11 (“Protecting US Space Systems” 2011,
http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/10072004163809.pdf, AB)
The GPS constellation consists of 24 satellites, which are spread over different orbital planes at an
altitude of 20,000 kilometers. In order to substantially degrade the GPS, the satellites have to be
attacked individually, which is difficult to do. The satellites are also hardened against nuclear effects and
have on-orbit spares. The robustness of the GPS constellation has been analyzed by Geoffrey Forden and
reported in Appendix D. The analysis shows that the GPS constellation is robust to the extent that it can
lose up to four satellites and yet only suffer from periodic loss of usable signal at any place. Therefore,
the vulnerability of the GPS constellation to ASAT-type attacks is rather small.
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                                            Solvency
Decoys are needed to confuse and delay the identification of a space vehicle
Thomson ’10 (Allen, Former CIA analysis, “A Stealth Satellite Sourcebook”,
7-14-2010, http://72.52.208.92/~gbpprorg/mil/radar/stealth_satellite.pdf, AB)
At the present state of development of the space vehicle detection art, the most important vehicle
observable to be controlled is radar cross-section or signature. This is particularly true of orbiting
satellite vehicles whose repeated passes around the earth allow ample time for radar signature analysis
and possible ultimate identification of the satellite. A variety of techniques have been devised for
controlling and reducing radar cross-section of a space vehicle in a manner such that the vehicle may
be effectively decoyed. Such an antiradar device or antiradar screen must either completely deny
detection of the space vehicle by search radar or reduce and modify the radar cross-section of the
vehicle to permit employment of other aids, such as decoys, to confuse and delay final identification.
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                                               Neg AT
Making an accurate decoy would be impractical
Thomson ’10 (Allen, Former CIA analysis, “A Stealth Satellite Sourcebook”,
7-14-2010, http://72.52.208.92/~gbpprorg/mil/radar/stealth_satellite.pdf, AB)
A proper signature match between target vehicle and decoys without modification in the target
signature would require the external configuration of the decoys to substantially duplicate that of the
target vehicle. In most cases, for example, the target vehicle has a characteristic fine structure of large
magnitude in its radar signature which varies with frequency, polarization and radar look angle.
Duplication of this signature with a decoy would require a decoy of the same size and shape as the
target vehicle, which is often impractical. As a consequence, the most effective method of shielding a
target vehicle is that wherein the radar signature of the vehicle is modified to a simplified, reduced
magnitude form and the vehicle is accompanied by a swarm of decoys having essentially the same radar
signature as the screened target vehicle so as to cause confusion and delay in detection.
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                                           Aff-not sure
Deploying decoys would not lead to an arms race
Pena ’02 (Charles, Cato’s former director of defense policy studies, “Should
the US Weaponize Space?”, July 2002,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1272/is_2686_131/ai_90683546/pg_2/?t
ag=mantle_skin;content, AB)
To be sure, not deploying weapons in space is no guarantee that potentially hostile nations (such as China)
will not develop and deploy ASATs. However, it is virtually certain that deploying American weapons
in space will lead to the development and deployment of ASATs to counter such weapons. The U.S.
should therefore not be the first to weaponize space--either with defensive weapons or with offensive
ASATs. However, deploying defensive decoys--rather than weapons--would not inevitably lead to
such an arms race.
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                                Solvency
The technology is available-Chinese propose using decoys for BMD system
Hudson Institute ’05 (“High Technology and Military Power in the Next Half-
Century”, 2005, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/ChinaPDF.pdf, AB)
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Chinese military experts readily admit that the advancement of boost-stage laser interception
systems presents major challenges to offensive ballistic missiles. But the aforementioned
countermeasures “can improve the missile’s defense during the boost phase to some extent.”
Chinese military scientists also stress that the creation of BMD systems and corresponding
“penetrating measures” again prove the “shield-spear” dialectic, each of which will always
generate the other and advance competitively. For today, the Chinese propose the following
“penetrating measures:”82 (1) multiple warhead attack; (2) decoy penetration, including true
decoys, signals transmitting decoys, and false decoys; (3) interruption and concealed penetrations;
(4) enclosing balls (huge metallic membrane balloons); (5) trajectory change penetrations; (6)
mobile launch; and (7) a preemptive strike to “attack and destroy a certain part” of the BMD
system.
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                                              Solvency
Space decoy technology is available-China has designed decoys for ICBMs
Arms Control Association ’09 (“US Space Weaponization and China”, 2009,
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943, AB)
A number of countermeasures could defeat a midcourse missile defense system like the current one in
Alaska.[18] For example, each ICBM could be deployed with decoys. Conversely, China might also
disguise the warhead as a decoy by enclosing it in a radar-reflecting balloon, covering it with a
shroud, hiding it in a cloud of chaff, or using electronic or infrared jamming measures. Beijing has
already demonstrated that it can use decoys and similar capabilities. It has been reported that China has
already made some missile flight tests with penetration aids, such as the 1999 flight test of China’s new
DF-31 ICBM. Similarly, a number of measures could be developed to counter a space-based
interceptor.[19] One countermeasure would be to develop technology to boost rockets faster, rendering
important boost-phase defenses impotent. China has already made steps in this direction by developing
solid-fuel ICBMs that burn faster than its previous liquid-fueled missiles.
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                                             Solvency
Decoys would be used to confuse and jam ASAT attacks
Wilson ’01 (Tom, Space Commission Staff Member, “Threats to United
States Space Capabilities” 2001,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2001/nssmo/article05.pdf,
AB)
Decoys that credibly simulate the radar and optical signatures of the satellite are effective, potentially
low-cost methods for diverting an ASAT attack from the actual satellite. The decoy would be located
on or inside the host satellite and released at the precise moment for the most effective deployment.
Decoys could also include lightweight optical or RF jamming systems to nullify or confuse an ASAT’s
homing system. Analysts estimate that employment of a decoy system would increase the total system
cost by between one and ten percent of the total satellite cost.
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                                               Solvency
US satellites are threatened and need new technology
Schendzielos ’08 (Kurt, Major, United States Air Force, “Protection in
Space”, 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485553&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, AB)
America is critically reliant upon space exploitation for a wide variety of activities. These range from
strictly military capabilities such as intelligence gathering and secure communications to civilian financial
transaction timing and remote Earth sensing for environmental analysis. Recent developments in anti-
satellite technologies signal a dangerous threat to U.S. space dominance. Specifically, zero-warning
threats such as ground-based lasers or direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles present the biggest challenge
for which there is little or no defense. Until recently, the U.S. had been reasonably secure that its
satellites were free from disablement. Unfortunately, many adversary nations acquired anti-satellite
technologies and proliferated them; threatening permanent disablement of almost any American
satellite. This monograph surveys available unclassified literature to assess current and emerging threats to
U.S. satellites and evaluates open source defenses available, ranging from policy mechanisms to physical
defenses. The level of protection is wanting and the monograph reviews various promising technologies
in development currently that could be obtained to defend U.S. satellites in the timeframe commensurate
with the proliferation and risk of anti-satellite threats. An advocacy suggesting that increased national
resources and efforts be devoted to protecting Low-Earth Orbiting satellites from zero-warning attacks is
proposed.
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                               Solvency
Decoys may be the best and least costly response to ASAT capabilities
Niskanen ’01 (Bill, Former Chairmen of CATO, “The Military and Space”,
2001, http://www.cato.org/events/transcripts/010905et.pdf, AB)
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Self-defense is really problematic if you can't detect these things to begin with or if they might be housed
in a legitimate, non-threatening satellite and then only released during time of conflict. Certainly we
wouldn't want to adopt a policy of shooting down every Chinese or other country's launch of a satellite
on the assumption that maybe it might have a microsatellite on board and maybe that microsatellite
might have an ASAT capability. Nor do I think we want to be in the business of presuming every satellite
in orbit might be a microsatellite with ASAT capability and shooting that down.
So, if this threat ever becomes real, I think maybe, at least for now, the best and least costly response
might be the use of decoys that simulate the radar and optical signatures of the threatened satellites.
One estimate done by one of the Commission's staff members was that decoys might increase system cost
from 1 to 10 percent. And another potential way to deal with these microsatellites could be through the use
of jamming, if they have to home in on the targeted satellite.
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                                                Neg
Decoys will not work-China has technology to distinguish decoys
Pillsbury ’01 (Michael, Analyst at RAND Corporation to publish articles in
Foreign Policy and International Security, “China’s Military Strategy
Toward the U.S.”, 2001,
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/strat.pdf, AB)
Mark Stokes has found that Chinese engineers have conducted studies to counter satellite decoys as
well. The PRC has stepped up its efforts to distinguish decoys from real satellites that conventional
ground tracking stations using radar or visual means. In order to distinguish targets, one study,
carried out by the National University of Defense Technology, determined that this problem
could be solved through use of at least three ground stations using infrared sensors and neural
networks. China’s existing space tracking network can detect and track most satellites with
sufficient accuracy for targeting purposes. China’s desire to field a direct ascent ASAT asset may
be affiliated with a program intended to support the launch of small satellite constellations. A
small solid fueled launch vehicle, most likely a derivative of the DF-21, will be able to place
small payloads in orbit at a time and place of Beijing’s choosing. China intends to field these
mobile, solid fueled launch vehicles by 2005.

								
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