1
PACOM, JIACG, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
Ambassador (retired) Edward Marks
Contractor, Camber Corporation
Joint Interagency Coordinating Group on Counterrorism
United States Pacific Command
2
PACOM, JIACG, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
Executive Summary
USPACOM’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counterterrorism (J3-
JIACG/CT) has successfully pursued the mission given it by the Commander following a
decision by the Pentagon to establish JIACGSs in order “to provide interagency advice
and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency
counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host-nation
efforts.”
JIACG/CT, in fact, moved beyond that mandate to draft, implement or supervise the
implementation of the CT Campaign Plan. In three and one half years of operation, from
a standing start and with no relevant experience or doctrinal guidance, this experiment in
organizational innovation has:
• Produced a CT Campaign Plan for the AOR
• Designed and implemented new CT programs
• Refocused existing programs, e.g. Security Assistance, to contribute to the WOT
• Coordinated both planning and operations with other departments and agencies
Both the organization itself and the Campaign Plan have been, and remain, works in
progress. Nevertheless, concrete achievements and progress in the War on Terrorism was
recorded. Success, thought partial and certainly incomplete, was real and due to:
• A “holistic” mission appropriate to the threat
• A combination of varied skills among the staff
• OPR designation by the Commander
• Tasking authority across the J Codes and the Components
• DIRLAUTH “asking” authority with other government agencies in the
interagency community
• Imaginative leadership, at all levels, within the Command
• An understanding that the JIACG has an interagency communication role, not an
interagency leadership or directive role.
In other words, PACOM’s JIACG has created a network inside PACOM and operated as
part of the wider CT network in the USG interagency community. This approach was
designed to respond to the particular characteristics of the terrorist threat, one that
requires a highly coordinated response by the total US Government involving interagency
vice individual department or agency solutions.
However PACOM itself has a robust stovepipe structure and required some
organizational refitting to fulfill this new, highly participatory role. JIACG is that refit, a
specific subject focused “tiger team” charged with pulling together disparate elements of
PACOM and producing a coherent, comprehensive CT program to implement national
policy and well coordinated if not integrated with the programs of other members of the
3
interagency community. Both JIACG’s organizational development and its activities have
received favorably notice in the DoD, RCC, and interagency community – including
being chosen as a model by at least one other RCC.
While the organizational development is of some interest, the important contribution to
the WOT has been the evolution of the program response to the challenge. Like most of
the USG in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, PACOM at first focused on the tactical
questions of actionable intelligence and “decapitation” action. While these activities
remain necessary to successful prosecution of the WOT they are clearly not sufficient.
JIACG came to this conclusion early on and by late 2002 was expanding its focus to put
more emphasis on institution building and environmental development. This involved
putting more effort into bilateral and multilateral engagement with governments in the
AOR, and expanding engagement programs beyond the traditional mil-to-mil focus.
While there are obvious limits to PACOM interaction with host nation police, interior
ministries, immigration, customs and similar governmental organs, there is great scope
for joining with other USG agencies and with other national interagency communities.
For instance, see the JIACG initiated comprehensive CT assessment of Cambodia, the CT
Fellowship Program, the DoD Rewards Program and Regional Maritime Security
Cooperation (nee PACOM’s Regional Maritime Security Initiative).
This broader view of the challenge and response has been further enriched by a
developing analytical judgment that terrorism is in fact only one component of the
broader problem of transnational crime, albeit the element which poses the most
immediate security threat to governments. This insight has enable JIACG to work
closely with JIATF-W on the grounds that the skill sets necessary to fight narcotics
trafficking are equally useful in fighting terrorism, and that therefore there are synergistic
affects to be obtained by ensuring that our CT and CN programs are linked to each other
and to related law enforcement programs of other agencies. Also, by approaching the
challenge this way PACOM was able to obtain a much more sympathetic response from
governments in the AOR, many of whom are extremely reluctant to join us openly in the
Global War on Terrorism. However they are very responsive to offers to cooperate on
what they perceive as local terrorist, insurgent, and criminal threats. On this basis,
cooperation with governments as skittish as Malaysia and Indonesia has exceeded the
expectations of only a few years ago.
JIACG’s success is, of course, relative and limited. Resource realities (availability of
money and personnel) continue to be limiting factors. Other agency buy-in and
cooperation is still less than complete; after three years JIACG still only has one full-time
other agency representative on board. PACOM’s internal stovepipes continue to provide
obstacles to an optimal level of flexibility and adaptability.
Meanwhile the JIACG concept has become widely known in the DoD and interagency
community and numerous proposals are being floated as to the future development of the
concept. Several models are under consideration and some expansion as well as
modification of the program is highly likely.
4
PACOM, JIACG, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
“You can’t fight networks with more hierarchy”
LTG Wallace C. Gregson, USMC
Commander, Marine Forces Pacific
The Setting, The Challenge, and the Desired End State
The assumption that today’s security challenges require coordinated interagency vice
individual department or agency solutions has become conventional wisdom. The
security challenges of the post-9/11 world require the marshalling of all elements of
national and international power. The current interagency system, however, is a legacy of
the Cold War and needs to be transformed. In particular there is a felt need to improve the
integrated performance of the US Government in three key areas:
Decision-making
Planning
Implementation, assessments, and tracking
Today’s non-traditional security threats involve terrorism, transnational crime, and post-
conflict stabilization and reconstruction. They pose challenges to traditional government
organization and operation. What is now needed is a “team” government from top
(strategic policy) to operations (down to the tactical level) with flexibility necessary to
respond to different and changing situations.
DoD is, like everyone else, concerned about the ability of the USG to respond the
particular non-traditional terrorist threat posed by Al-Qaeda and others. Only by a
significantly improved interagency, and largely non-military, coordinated performance
can this threat can be effectively met. Improved interagency performance has, of course,
been an objective for years, long before 9/11, but that event and the new situation have
increased the urgency. The 9/11 Commission itself addressed the question and gave two
reasons why past efforts at IA coordination have not worked:
1. When IA coordination is attempted or “homed” in a single agency, and reps or
LNOs are brought in from other agencies to participate, a gap between info
sharing and coordination of an operational response is often left unaddressed
because a single agency lacks authority to direct the activities of the government
as a whole.
2. When operational planning and direction is attempted at the NSC level, the staff
becomes overwhelmed and too focused on day-to-day issues at the expense of
advising the President on larger policy issues.
The current interest in improved interagency coordination was not spurred by 9/11 itself
but by the nature of the threat posed by AQ and other non-state movements. Not being
5
states they cannot be dealt with by traditional security measures – bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy, security coalitions, war. Imbedded within existing countries
around the world, including the United States, but not being part of any governmental
structure, law enforcement and other non-security activities and organs of the state
become as important as the traditional intelligence and military instruments of national
power in dealing with them. Almost immediately after 9/11, therefore, it became clear
that the almost all members of the federal interagency community as well as state and
local authorities have a role to play.
It also soon became clear that the success of the Afghanistan campaign
forced AQ into a different mode, moving it further away from a hierarchical organization
towards a decentralized network. While tactical kinetic opportunities still exist for the
US, the morphing of AQ into a network meant that longer-term strategies of pre-emption,
institution building, and environmental influence would become more important.
Achieving the desired integration requires transformation at all levels of government.
This memorandum however focuses on the question of improving interagency operations
in the War on Terror at the CoCom level in general and PACOM in particular. For the
RCCs, this new requirement poses the challenge of planning an ongoing program (fixing
the motor while driving down the road) of a non-traditional nature (largely non-military
in character) in collaboration (often as a supporting or even minor player) with other
departments and agencies.
Development of the JAICG Concept
Much discussion and several developments have been undertaken in the recent past on
interagency coordination. By the end of the last decade of the 20th century, the Armed
Forces had traveled far down the road of jointness and deep into the territory of coalition
operations. The civilian agencies had also made significant progress towards interagency
integration, for instance the creation of the National Security Council in the late 1940s. In
the 1990s an attempt was made to merge the civilian and military sides of the USG in
certain situations with the promulgation of Presidential Decision Directive Number 56 of
the Clinton Administration. This was an effort to create a formal procedure for
interagency planning and management of complex international emergencies. A parallel
effort was conducted in the War on Drugs with its a mixture of civilian and military
components.
Nevertheless it was still felt by many that the stovepipe character of American
government continued to be an obstacle to the effective pursuit of American national
interests in an increasingly globalized world. September 11, and the complex nature of
the threat to the United States galvanized the movement towards organizational
innovation and reform designed to improve interagency coordination.
Out of this concern came the JIACG concept. The JIACG concept has a dual provenance,
one being the headquarters of the US Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia before
6
9/11 and the other arising from the post-9/11 interest of several Regional Combatant
Commands, notably the US Pacific Command.
Concern for the need to better coordinate, if not integrate, the program activities of all
members of the interagency community (military and civilian) in the national security
arena at the operational level had been under consideration prior to 9/11 at the US Joint
Forces Command (USJFCOM). Both management and the senior participants in its
annual command exercise for 2001 (Universal Vision 01) wrestled with interagency
coordination questions in mid-2001. By the end of UV01 in July the concept of an
interagency staff directorate at regional command headquarters, tentatively labeled JX,
had been formulated. The Joint Experimentation staff of USJFCOM continued to
develop this concept and in March 2002 issued a White Paper entitled “A Concept for
Improving U.S. Interagency Operational Planning and Coordination.” Now called “Joint
Interagency Coordination Group” or JIACG, the proposed organizational entity was
included as a concept to be tested in USJFCOM’s 2002 exercise, Millennium Challenge
02. The final report from MC02 with respect to the JIACG was positive and USJFCOM
was instructed to prepare the concept for operational use.
The JFCOM model calls for a full-time, multifunctional advisory element of the
combatant commander’s staff that facilitates information sharing throughout the
interagency community. Through habitual collaboration, it is intended to provide a
means to integrate campaign-planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels and
throughout all US government agencies. This is referred to as the “Full Spectrum”
JIACG. (See attached USJFCOM Fact Sheet)
September 11 was an event that forced further consideration of how the USG does
national security business, and what organizational and process changes would be
necessary in order to pursue a offensive campaign against international terrorist
organizations. While the shift towards an offensive military strategy itself would not
necessarily require changes in the organizational structure and operating procedures of
RCCs, one aspect of the new situation would certainly do so. This was the realization that
the campaign against international terrorist organizations was not wholly a military
campaign but instead a full court press by the whole USG. This realization gave greater
currency to the phrase “interagency community” which emphasizes the need for the
combined efforts of almost all departments and agencies. Achieving this would require a
hitherto unprecedented level of operational coordination and cooperation, which for the
military services – in respect to the War on Terrorism – means that the traditional
“American Way of War” was no longer an applicable doctrine. “Jointness” would have to
be expanded into the interagency community.
After 9/11 several combatant commands submitted proposals for some sort of
coordination mechanism. The Joint Staff considered these various proposals and
submitted a JIACG concept paper to the NSC Deputies Committee. The Deputies
Committee approved this proposal and the Joint Staff instructed the regional combatant
commanders on February 6, 2002 to pursue implementation. The instruction stated that:
7
“JIACGs will be organized to provide interagency advice and expertise to
combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency
counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency,
and host-nation efforts.”
Actually all of the combatant commands had already responded to 9/11 by setting up
some form of joint counterterrorism office. They were officially renamed JIACGs
following the Joint Chiefs instruction, except for CENTCOM which retained the original
name of Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). While all the combatant command
JIACGs began with a counterterrorism focus their organizational structures and activities
varied with the differing mission and AOR of each command. Whereas the JIACGs in
PACOM and EUCOM are located in the Directorate of Operations (J3), CENTCOM
reports to the Deputy Commander, TRANSCOM and STRATCOM report to the
Commander, and SOUTHCOM is in the J7. These different JIACGs also concentrate on
somewhat different aspects of the counterterrorism campaign with CENTCOM mainly
concerned about activities related to Afghanistan and Iraq while EUCOM looks at
various non-military courses of action. PACOM’s focus is on the complex emerging
terrorist threat in the Asia Pacific region.
The combatant command JIACGs were authorized for an initial period of six months,
after which a JS review confirmed them as permanent organizations. Despite significant
differences between the various models, all of the JIACGs are intended to provide the
following benefits, as originally outlined by USJFCOM:
• Strengthened multi-agency planning for complex mission tasks
• Establish a mechanism to synchronize agency efforts and eliminate waste and
duplication
• Keep all agencies informed of agency efforts and prevent misconceptions
• Provide real time feedback between civilian and military agency efforts
The RCCs JIACGs have no commonly accepted name to differentiate them from the Full
Spectrum model, but are often referred to as focused, or single subject, or operational
coordination JIACGs.
History of PACOM/JIACG/CT
Prior to 9/11 the then Combatant Commander of the US Pacific Command, Admiral
Dennis Blair, had become increasingly concerned that the use of military power alone
would achieve only limited effect against the decentralized, non-state terrorist groups.
He proposed the creation of a Joint Interagency Task Force-Counterterrorism Asia
Pacific (JIATF-CTAP), an organization with an interagency mandate and broad tasking
as well as coordinating authority.
After 9/11, Admiral Blair directed the establishment of a staff team to provide Pacific
Command a new, refocused operational counterterrorism capability and the
synchronization of that effort with the elements of the interagency community. An
8
operational planning team (OPT) began to work courses of actions on a series of issues
that involved responses to national directives, and to the regional situation. This OPT
became the seed from which the new counterterrorism integrated staff team or JIACG
would grow. Although established as ad hoc organization, there was the assumption that
it would be a permanent integrated element of the USPACOM staff, not an appendage
patched together to focus on a short-term crisis or event. This assumption was justified
when the Joint Staff later (in early 2002) approved the JIACG concept and authorized
their establishment in all Combatant Commands on a regular basis.
Admiral Blair directed that this organization work under the Director for Operations (J3)
and provide one-stop shopping for a regional counterterrorism campaign. It would be a
focused team of operators, intelligence analysts, and planners possessing expertise in
special operations, intelligence, information operations, and civil affairs, and have all
necessary staff support. The new team’s leaders selected talent from across the staff, and
the importance of the effort assuaged hard feelings from staff sections that “lost” in the
reshuffling.
Admiral Blair also directed that the organization be able to accept and seamlessly plug-in
with other critical members of the interagency team. Early thinking indicated that
transparency and complementary nature of efforts with the key departments of State,
Treasury, Justice, and the CIA would be critical. From the beginning the new office was
designed with the assumption that agents and officers from these organizations would be
incorporated into the team.
Next came questions of finding a functional place for work, automation and
communication tools, and financial resources to support and sustain the organization well
into the future. All of these resources had to be found within the Command, as the JS
instructions were clear that no additional resources would be made available. In the
event, some 40 military personnel were recruited and assigned, space was found in the
Command headquarters building, and $2.0 million was allocated for the initial operations
of the newly established Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). However since
the formal establishment of JIACGs as a RCC component by JS directive, the number of
available military personnel has declined. The present TO&E provides for twelve
assigned military positions, one GS billet, five contractors, three other agency
representatives plus reserve augmentation as available.
The requirements for more intense interagency interaction called for several approaches:
1. Creation of an integrated team within PACOM tasked with the dual objective
of producing a CT campaign plan appropriate for PACOM to pursue in a
military sense while at the same time supporting the wider CT program of the
USG,
2. Integration of other agency representatives physically located in the
organization,
9
3. Establishment of “habitual” working relations with other agencies and
departments: on a continuum from Washington to Honolulu to US embassies
in the AOR.
All were pursued simultaneously:
- The JIACG was set up as a “tiger team” with personnel possessing a range of
skills and backgrounds, and instructed to operate as a team across J Code Directorate
lanes. This perspective enabled JIACG to reach out to other agencies on the action officer
level. This creation of AO to AO (or working level in the parlance of the State
Department) dialogue has been arguably the most important value added of the JIACG
experience. (See attached PowerPoint slide)
- Intelligence: At first, the most critical aspect appeared to be the need for
accurate current intelligence that produced actionable targeting information. This was
designed to feed an operationally focused organization and to encourage integration with
interagency and often times coalition partners in the field. The cry was for “Nuggets” of
true predictive actionable intelligence mined from the millions of intelligence reports
searched over by Jag’s own Ops/Intel targeting team. That team also produced terrorist
specific “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace“ overlays for all organizations,
countries and targets in the region.
- Embassies: As the actual focus of the effort were developments in the AOR,
JIACG early on focused on key countries in the AOR and on expanding working
relations with relevant US embassies. The initial approach to doing so was the creation of
a CT liaison program. This entailed placing a tailored team in embassies to provide
bilateral communication between the workings of the JIACG and the tactical initiatives
being undertaken by the Ambassador and his interagency team in “the field”. Wanting to
be as unobtrusive as possible, the LNO teams were assigned to serve under the
operational control of the USPACOM representative in the country (either the Defense
Attaché, or Mil Group commander depending on the Embassy organization).
Ambassadors are sensitive to the size and signature of their country teams and the
LNO program developed slowly as Ambassadors needed convincing that the LNO would
be a value-added addition to their Missions. JIACG leadership spent a good deal of time
visiting embassies and lobbying Ambassadors. Nevertheless by the end of JIACG’s first
year, it became clear that the LNO approach was inadequate. The LNOs were at best
duplicating what the military representatives were doing. Moreover JIACG’s direct
contact with Country Teams was expanding nicely and did not need LNOs. In fact it
appeared as if they were impeding the desired interaction between PACOM/JIACG and
embassy Country Teams.
- Washington: Direct reach back to Washington based departments and agencies
was the second key element which needed to be created. JIACG leadership traveled
extensively to Washington with two purposes, first to communicate the new approach,
and second to obtain commitment to and participation in the interagency team being
10
formed at Camp Smith in Hawaii. JIACG leadership visited the Joint Staff, United States
Special Operations Command, OSD (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations & Low Intensity Conflict), CIA, Treasury, FBI and State/CT (Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism). At every stop the JIACG program and concept were
embraced in principal, but the interagency bureaucracy proved not agile enough to
rapidly support and empower the new USPACOM organization. Other departments also
felt severely restricted by personnel and financial shortages. However, the NSA provided
a full-time analyst. Treasury sent a 60-day TDY officer from the Office of Foreign Assets
Control, and State provided a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer (in lieu of an active
duty FSO) by the end of June 2002.
The difficulty in obtaining on-site representation continues to plague JIACG, despite an
early decision by DoD to fully reimburse other agencies for up to four officers per RCC.
As of mid-2005, only Treasury has provided a full-time, active duty representative. State
is pursuing recruitment of an appropriate officer under terms of a MOA (not approved as
of mid-August 2005). Justice/FBI have agreed to do so but have not yet recruited an
officer, and USAID is in the process of organizing a DoD-wide officer exchange
program.
However the contacts made flourished and resulted in a network of direct, habitual
working relationships with counterparts in other agencies. The most important are:
- The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Combating Terrorism
(S/CT) was JIACG’s natural partner. S/CT is the lead office for coordinating USG
external CT policy and, like JIACG, has a single-minded mandate: combating terrorism.
In addition, the Bureaus of East Asian Affairs and Southeast Asian Affairs are traditional
and natural colleagues for PACOM. The collaborative relationship between JAICG and
these two offices became so productive and intimate, witness the Regional Maritime
Security Initiative, that it caused a PACOM flag officer to wistfully request that a similar
relationship might usefully be sought with the Pentagon.
- Coordination with the FBI on intelligence gleaned from interrogation reports
and interviews: The FBI conducts interviews and interrogations for the purpose of
solidifying evidence to support prosecution of a particular case. JIACG’s initial concern
was to develop targets. Therefore it was necessary to develop a relationship with FBI
case officers that facilitated this process. This unprecedented interagency cooperation
was very productive, and led to very positive actions.
- The Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), Department of the Treasury,
leverages one of the US Government’s most powerful tools. JIACG “introduced” OFAC
to PACOM’s regional bad actors through a full time, TDY officer assigned to JIACG/CT.
Incorporating OFAC into JIACG’s daily work permitted synchronization of activities and
provided OFAC with a new perspective that they have carried to other RCCs.
- USAID: As PACOM’s CT Campaign Plan evolved from a focus on detection
and destruction towards a greater concentration on capacity building and environmental
11
development, relationships with USAID missions in the field were explored and
developed. In spring 2004, JIACG approached USAID Washington with a request that
USAID assign officers to work full-time on coordinating PACOM Theater Engagement
Programs with USAID development programs. That proposal is now under active
implementation by USAID, who have expanded PACOM’s suggestion to encompass all
of the RCCs as well as the Joint Staff in Washington.
JIACG has evolved organizationally since its creation but more important has been the
evolution in its mission and programs. First JIACG/CT drafted the USPACOM CT
Campaign Plan, integrating or performing J2, J3, J5 and J7 functions. Then JIACG/CT
actually implemented parts of the Campaign Plan that do not fall naturally into the orbit
of other divisions or appropriate components, such as the bilateral CT seminar and the
Terrorism Studies Outreach programs. As CT is an additional duty and falls neither
among the traditional war planning/fighting responsibilities of PACOM, or its equally
traditional mil-to-mil engagement programs, JIACG in essence had to invent a new
program which involves all of the J Code Directorates as well as other agencies. There
was no one else in the Command to perform this task.
Originally the CT Campaign Plan had four primary themes or elements: detection,
destruction, capacity building and environment influence or development. In the
beginning, emphasis was given to the first two pillars – detection and destruction –
reflecting the short-term aggressive approach of the USG in the first stage of the WOT.
However as the first year passed it became clear that the particular character of the Asia-
Pacific AOR called for a different and more nuanced approach, especially as the
detection and destruction missions were really the primary responsibility of other
components of the USG and the US military. Without any significant kinetic activity in
the AOR, with little likelihood of any, and with a complicated network of bilateral
relationship with the 42 countries of the region, JIACG refocused the PACOM CT
Campaign Plan on the longer-term objectives of institution building and environment
development. The key assumption was, and is, that the behavior of the local governments
is the center of gravity for the US in the WOT in the region and success therefore is
dependent upon the expansion and enrichment of USG civilian and military relations with
these governments.
Other CoCom JIACGs: A Survey
After 9/11, each Combatant Command, in the absence of existing doctrine, created its
own JIACG according to its own perspectives and felt needs. None of them looked or
operated alike, and still do not. For example, in some cases the JIACG reports to the J3,
in others the Deputy Commander. The number of personnel varies significantly, from
CENTCOM’s forty or so to part-time staff only at SOUTHCOM, TRANSCOM, and
STRATCOM. (See attached chart) However all did, and largely still do, focus on the
counterterrorism mission, with some recent “mission spread” to include narcotics
trafficking and other forms of transnational crime. Overall the “limited” JIACGs have
proved valuable and several CoComs (EUCOM, PACOM) have expressed interest in
going “full-spectrum”.
12
While quite varied, the CoCom JIACGs fall into three groups:
I. Regional Combatant Commands:
• CENTCOM’s JIACG is very robust and operated as a task force in Afghanistan
before being transformed from an operation-specific task force into a
comprehensive JIACG to wage the long-term war on terrorism. It operates as an
independent staff reporting to the Deputy Commander.
• EUCOM’s JIACG is a Division within the Plans and Operations Center (SJFHQ)
and although initially focused on terrorism, recently had its mandate expanded to
include “full-spectrum” activity.
• SOUTHCOM: Notionally a “full spectrum” JIACG but without any full-time
staff. Reports to the J7.
• PACOM’s JIACG is a focused (CT, CN, WP) division within the J3.
• SOUTHCOM’s JIACG is a “virtual” organization, staffed by a couple of
contractors and resident other agency representatives occasionally called together
for meetings.
II. “Global” Combatant Commands:
• NORTHCOM’s JIACG is not a separate staff organization buy rather a “working
group” composed of representatives of all staff elements, components, LNOs, and
assigned resident representatives from other government agencies, and chaired by
an SES Director from within the Interagency Coordination Directorate. As such it
is a facilitator of already existing command and staff processes.
• STRATCOM’s JIACG is essentially still in process of being created. It has no
full-time members but draws on a very large community of resident agency
representatives, and is chaired by the Deputy Political Advisor (a military 0-6).
Because STRATCOM was given the lead in January 2005 for combating WMD,
this may become the JIACG’s primary focus.
• TRANSCOM’s JIACG is an advisory group to the Commander and staff, headed
by the Chief of Staff (a MG), composed of resident national agency
representatives and service LNOs, and focuses on the Command’s global military
distribution and transportation mission.
III. SOCOM:
• USSOCOM does not have a JIACG by that name, but has created - in a sense -
the most ambitious JIACG of them all. Essentially SOCOM has folded its J2, J3,
13
and J5 into a super-directorate called the Center for Special Operations. It is
headed by a two star general officer, reports directly to the Commander and
Deputy Commander, is focused on combating terrorism and has a staff of
approximately 450 including other agency representatives and foreign special
operations representatives.
Proposals for Further Interagency Coordination
There are a number of proposals on the table intended to deal with the perceived
interagency coordination problems of the USG at the operational level. For instance the
current DoD QDR exercise is considering various alternatives.
The current QDR draft identifies the test of transformed IA operations to be the ability to
plan, deploy, and operate at the operational and tactical levels. Several options are
proposed, two of which build off the JIACG experience to date:
o Option A: Support the development of “full spectrum” JIACGs.
o Option B: Transform the JIACG into a more integrated IA effort building
off the S/CRS deployable IA planning concept.
o Option C: Endorse the S/CRS-DoD effort to build interagency doctrine for
operations in the field.
o Option D: Ensure civilian-military “command” relationships emphasize
flexibility that maximizes unity of effort.
Option A is essentially the subject of this memorandum, and will be discussed in greater
detail later. Options D and D do not appear to freestanding proposals but rather
supporting recommendations.
Option B is a hybrid proposal that depends upon organizational development underway in
another agency: the Department of State. In a recent draft paper (“Stabilization and
Reconstruction Concepts Paper”, S/CRS, March 21, 2005 (DRAFT), State’s new Office
of Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CSR) has outlined a new civilian planning and
management organization for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Under this
plan, S/CSR would align itself closely with DoD and most notably with the CoComs, as
follows:
When a national level decision has been made to request a specific crisis war plan and
DoD has requested civilian expertise to work with an RCC, S/CSR will deploy a
Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team (HRST). The HRST will:
• Consist of civilian functional and regional experts from Washington based
departments and agencies
• Deploy to a designated RCC
• Provide civilian reconstruction and stabilization expertise
The HRST will be embedded in the appropriate military planning cells of the RCC. It
will have to be provided with appropriate resources and support. The HRST is designed
14
to be separate entity from JIACG, but will work closely with the JIACG and the Foreign
Policy Advisor (FPA).
The assumption made by S/CS is that the JIACG as presently designed does not have
the capacity to provide appropriate civilian functional and regional expertise for detailed
R & S planning. Therefore S/CSR envisions that the core members of the HRST will
have previously developed a habitual relationship with the RCC, presumably including
the JIACG and the FPA but this is not made clear in the draft paper.
The currently outstanding proposals for improved interagency cooperation at the CoCom
or operational level, although some of them focus more on post-conflict stabilization and
reconstruction rather than combating terrorism, have been summarized in a recent draft
paper1:
• JFCOM’s Full Spectrum model
• S/CRS Model: HRST as second organizational (operational) level of S/CRS
• CSIS Model: quarterly NSC-chaired interagency summits in each region, at
highest regional level (Assistant Secretaries, COCOMs, etc). Would create rapidly
deployable Interagency Crisis Action Teams, chaired by NSC staff with reps.
from relevant civilian agencies to lead interagency planning effort at operational
level, work with COCOM planners but would report to NSC not the COCOM.
• Super POLAD Model: with dual reporting channels to COCOM and regional AS.
• J-10 Model: new staff directorate headed by a senior political appointee from
OSD. (no longer under consideration)
• OSD Defense Advisor Model: OSD defense advisor assigned to a COCOM.
Equivalent to a POLAD to provide policy guidance to the COCOM. (Not a staff). Comment:
Varieties of JIACGs
Between USJFCOM’s work, the experience of the various CoComs, and consideration by
various observers a range of JIACG models has emerged. Basically, however, there are
three more or less distinctive conceptual models:
• Full Spectrum: focused on policy coordination
• Full Spectrum: focused on operational planning and operational coordination
• Specific Subject Focused: focused on one or more subjects (CT, CN, etc)
1
Catalogue of Models for Interagency Cooperation in Stability and Reconstruction
Operations” – Arnas, Barry, Oakely (CTNSP S&R)
15
Obviously these models can be combined in various configurations. These various
configurations will require different requirements for staffing and location within the
command. For instance, a policy focused “Full Spectrum” JIACG would require an
interagency staff of sufficient bureaucratic weight and authority to have credibility and
would have to report directly to the Commander and Deputy Commander. The existence
of such a staff (if it could in fact be created) would raise are turf questions involving the
Foreign Policy Advisor and workload questions in the absence of a high priority problem
(e.g. Iraq). What would a number of senior policy oriented other agency officials do in
the daily life of a CoCom in the absence of a fast-breaking priority issue?
A full spectrum operational planning JIACG would require a different staff, one
composed of other agency personnel competent to participate in the military deliberate
planning process and authorized to do so on behalf of their agencies. This JIACG should
probably be located within the J5. However a full spectrum operational planning JIACG
implies that other agencies delegate broad planning responsibility to a CoCom-located
organization. Coordination can have two meanings: “I coordinate you” or “We can
coordinate together”. Some military appear to view this JIACG model, located in a
CoCom, as an instrumentality by which the military can achieve the former. Others in
other government agencies fear that this would be the result. Needless to say, they will
not accept this, absent a fundamental reorganization of the Executive Branch.
The “focused” JIACGs are the sort that currently exists in the regional CoComs.
PACOM`s JIACG is a prime example. These JIACGs can be located in various places in
a CoCom structure, dependent on the subject and the Commander’s preferences. What is
important, is that they not be restricted to J Code “lanes” but instead operate across
Directorates.
Finally, it must be noted that the staffing problem bedevils the effort to create any version
of JIACG. Experience in soliciting much more modest participation by other agencies in
the limited role, focused JIACGs has been disappointing, even with the DoD offer to fund
exchange officers. Civilian agencies probably do not have sufficient human resources to
meet the demand for staffing a half dozen CoCom full spectrum JIACGs. And apart from
USAID, most departments probably do not have this type of planning officer on their
staffs at all.
Reflection, and experience, on these various permutations leads me to the conclusion that
they all are merely variations on a theme – expanding interagency coordination at the
operational level by creation of a bureaucratic crosscutting organization. “JIACG” has
been pretty much agreed upon as the title for this organization. The differences between
“Full Spectrum” and “focused” are matters of degree not kind. Any commander is likely
to take the JIACG concept and design his/her own JIACG, and be little concerned as to
whether it is formally “Full Spectrum” or not.
16
PACOM Experience with “Full Spectrum” JIACG
Apart from its own experience with its JIACG/CT, PACOM has conducted three JIACG
“exercises”: as part of the 2003 and 2004 Terminal Fury exercises, and a real-life
exercise in dealing with the tragic January 2005 Tsunami emergency in Southeast Asia.
Both of the Terminal Fury exercises were conducted with personnel from USJFCOM
using the UFCOM full spectrum model. PACOM has not seen JFCOM’s evaluations of
these exercises, but we are told that they validated the JFCOM model.
PACOM’s real life experience in the Tsunami emergency was a different story.
PACOM was the initial and primary USG operator in the USG Tsunami relief operation,
with the understanding that it would also be an interagency and multinational effort and
that a transition to wholly USG civilian and local government responsibility would
constitute PACOM’s “end state”. Almost immediately upon the initiative of the relief
operation, the PACOM Commander ordered the creation of a “Full Spectrum” JIACG,
separate from the existing J3/JIACG/CT. Approximately 30 staff were detailed from
other parts of PACOM and a director appointed from COE. Several officials from
USAID/OFDA were promised.
The relief operation itself is generally considered to have been a complete success, and a
model of interagency and multinational cooperation. The contribution of the FS-JIACG
to this success, however, was somewhat ambiguous:
1) There was obviously little time for advance planning: American and other relief
operators had to move immediately on the basis of existing plans and ad hoc
arrangements. These were greatly facilitated by existing relationships (mil-to-mil
in particular) and previous cooperation in exercises (e.g. Cobra Gold). There was
therefore no time or need for interagency operational planning.
2) Although PACOM was the largest initial USG provider of relief services and
supplies, USAID/OFDA was equally quick off the mark as the most experienced
USG emergency relief organization. Two OFDA representatives arrived almost
immediately at PACOM to coordinate and advise. Although it was initially
assumed they would work in the FS-JIACG, and they did spend some time there,
in fact they ended up as a key member of the J3 JOC. From there, they performed
the coordination link between Washington based relief agencies, PACOM, and
field operators (USAID, Embassies, OFDA teams, NGOs) as well as providing
expert advice and guidance to the J3.
3) Transition planning never really took off as a PACOM planning task; in this case
it constituted only hand-off to other operators (USG, local government, NGOs) as
they were prepared to accept the responsibility and as the local emergency
situation stabilized. Therefore the FS-JIACG was not called on to produce post-
emergency planning.
In essence, the Tsunami FS-JIACG was not really a full-spectrum organization. Rather it
was an ad hoc, short-term, single subject JIACG. In this case, even the primary objective
of a JIACG – interagency coordination –was largely performed by integrating a
17
representative from the other major USG player, USAID/OFDA, into the operational
command structure of the PACOM.
Joint Interagency Task Force- West (JIATF-W)
Although focused on combating terrorism, JIACG early came to two conclusions: first,
that there are links between terrorist organizations and other transnational criminals
(narcotics dealers, smugglers, etc), and second that the “skill sets” needed by
governments to respond to all these non-traditional security sets were identical. Therefore
USG assistance with institution building need not always differentiate between assistance
to CT and other security/law enforcement units. In fact, there were synergisms to be
gained by throwing a wider net.
JIATF-W is a PACOM component command responsible for combating narcotics
trafficking. Originally based in California and responsible for interdiction of the
narcotics traffic along the western and south-western borders of the US, it was moved to
Hawaii in 2003/4 and had its mission changed from coastal interdiction to international
engagement in the PACOM AOR.
In the process of moving and shifting missions, JIATF-W came to the same conclusion as
JIACG about the “nexus” of transnational crime. While continuing to focus on the
narcotics questions, therefore, JIATF-W saw the benefits to be gained by aligning its
training, assistance, and cooperation programs with the USG’s CT programs.
A major area of activity – and success – for this integrated approach is the Regional
Maritime Security Cooperation program of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Initiated
by PACOM as the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) with a heavily CT
flavor, it was adopted by ARF. This multinational cooperative program now provides a
framework for USG assistance of various forms but notably in the maritime, coastal, and
border law enforcement arenas that are the natural operating area for JIATF-W and the
US Coast Guard. Building local capability to provide enhanced maritime security in the
Malacca Straits works towards accomplishing counter narcotic and counter terrorism
objectives.
This “partnership” between JIATF-W (a component command) and JIACG/CT (a
headquarters staff unit) is only possible because of the open-ended character of JIACG
and its (actual) multi-directorate perspective and role. In this situation, various elements
of PACOM (lawyers, PIO, etc. as well as JIAFT-W, JIACG/CT) and other parts of the
USG (State Department S/CT, EAP, Legal Advisor, US Coast Guard) have combined to
form a subject specific operational “network”.
PACOM/JIACG/CT: A Scorecard and Some Comments
The initial JIACGs were stood up in a rush without much doctrinal guidance.
Nevertheless they quickly proved useful and all of the CoComs recommended their
adoption as a “permanent” instrument. This success has engendered growing enthusiasm
18
and a movement towards permanent adoption of the JFCOM concept in general, and
increasing interest in the “Full Spectrum” model.
Let us review why PACOM’s JIACG was “successful”:
• The high visibility and priority of the War on Terrorism
• A “holistic” mission appropriate to the threat
• A combination of varied skills among the staff
• OPR designation by the Commander
• Tasking authority across the J Codes and the Components
• DIRLAUTH “asking” authority with other government agencies in the
interagency community
• Imaginative leadership, at all levels, within the Command
• Innovative and flexible thinking, e.g. the “influence” campaign
• An understanding that the JIACG has an interagency communication role, not an
interagency leadership or directive role.
Several aspects of bureaucratic culture affect the implementation of all models of the
JIACG concept. USG departments and agencies operate at two geographic levels –
Washington and the “field” – except for DoD and the military services. By and large
other government agencies consider strategic, operational, and tactical concerns
conceptually as a seamless web whereas the military services have a well-developed
doctrinal approach that separates them. The major distinction is at the operational level
which other government agencies do not clearly distinguish as a completely separate
sphere for planning and action. However when there is a need to coordinate at the
operational level, whatever it is called or however it is viewed, this has traditionally been
done in Washington between civilian agencies involved and the Pentagon which in turn
brought in or informed the CoComs as it thought appropriate. In other words, other
agency “operational” planners did not interact directly with their real counterparts in the
CoComs except through the intermediary of the Pentagon.
This practice is clumsy and often places great strain on the relationship between CoCom
commanders and Chiefs of Mission. However the practice was manageable as long as
the CoComs were focused on regional ”war fighting” and security assistance was
managed through the State Department. However, the requirements of CT today places
too much strain on this indirect relationship. “Operational” coordination in the WOT
through the Pentagon is too slow and hierarchical. Strategic coordination must continue
to be done in Washington, but somehow the CoComs must be brought in direct
operational communication with their operational counterparts in Washington.
This is what PACOM/JIACG did, despite occasional muttering from the Pentagon about
the degree of CoCom DIRLAUTH with other government departments which this
process involved. JIACG created a CT network within PACOM, linking (often after long
wooing) other elements of the Command. At the same time, JIACG contributed to the
creation of an interagency network involving other agencies both in their Washington
headquarters and Honolulu and embassy field offices, a network of informal (but
19
official), habitual contacts across the Action Officer levels of relevant departments and
agencies. (Attached is a PowerPoint presentation that illustrates this communication
aspect of JIACG). Using these networks, JIACG invented, fostered and/or implemented a
number of innovative CT activities: bilateral CT seminars, Muslim Outreach, Terrorism
Studies Outreach, Country Comprehensive CT Capability Assessments, CT Fellowships,
CT Rewards, RMSC.
However enthusiasm may be running ahead of reality. There is a tendency to over
emphasize the potential of the JIACG to resolve civilian-military coordination problems,
to view it as a panacea. But the CoCom based JIACGs are limited in reach:
• They focus only on the CoCom operational level,
• They cannot resolve strategic coordination issues,
• They cannot serve as an interagency coordinating authority.
What the JIACG can do is improve the interagency process by enabling the military to
operate more effectively within the interagency community by:
• Focusing on operational and tactical level planning and activities,
• Providing the CoCom with better situational awareness of what other agencies are
thinking, planning, and doing in the same areas,
• Providing an internal mechanism by which the CoComs can overcome their own
internal stove pipes (required if meaningful CT programs are to be planned and
implemented),
• Providing a single voice on CT plans and programs at the AO level so that
meaningful communication with other agencies can to be achieved.
• Coordinating operational and tactical level activities at the action officer level
with other agencies; that is, find the CoComs’ place at the IA table,
In other words, the JIACG is an organizational innovation which will enable a CoCom to
pursue the WOT by producing internal cross-cutting planning and implementation,
improving the situational awareness of other agencies planning and activities, and
enabling the CoCom to engage directly in effective operational level coordination at the
action officer level – as lead or as a supporting player. PACOM has its own internal
stovepipes, and JIACG learned to work across them by operating as a multi-directorate
“tiger team” utilizing the varied skills of its own staff as well as co-opting other staff and
staff organizations of the Command.
Problems and limitations, of course, exist. A broad, crosscutting program such as the
PACOM CT Campaign Plan requires sufficient qualified staff, both military and civilians
from other agencies. The former have been declined recently in numbers, and the latter
have never yet achieved a desirable minimal mass. However with respect to the latter the
immediate future prospects look bright with the already on site Treasury representative
soon to be joined by State and FBI colleagues. DoD funds are available to finance this
program, Memoranda of Understanding are in place or in the final stages of negotiation,
and recruiting is underway. USAID, meanwhile, is actively implementing a system wide
20
exchange agreement with DoD that will include representative assigned to each CoCom
provided at their expense.
Operating and program funds, as always, are a problem. I am not competent to evaluate
how much an organization like JIACG needs, but the priority and scope of the CT
Campaign Plan combined with the sheer vastness of the AOR argue for generosity. The
amount of funds available is tied to the question of flexibility. The “color of money”
problem is inevitable in government budgeting, but the character of the terrorist threat
and of the necessary response calls for as much flexibility as possible. CT programs in
PACOM are not, in fact, enormously expensive in the context of defense expenditures in
the AOR.
Appropriate authority is also a problem as all organizations have conflicting objectives
and responsibilities. This is particularly a problem for JIACG as its mission sometimes
cuts across other “lanes”. However it seems to me that the OPR designation has been
effective and should be restated and possibly reinforced. There is always the danger that
over time the sense of urgency now attached to the CT Campaign Plan will moderate and
other, more traditional responsibilities will be allowed to re-assert themselves.
All of these considerations lead to another thought. Proposals for innovative CT
activities (and all CT activities are innovative) raise the cry of “not in our lane” as well as
“we don’t have the right color of money”. The existing stovepipes in the organization
inhibit effective CT planning and programming. JIACG has attempted, with some
success, to overcome this inhibitions by exercising the “holistic” approach noted above.
These observations lead to the observation that perhaps the traditional staff structure of
the CoComs does not meet the needs of the WOT. USSOCOM has obviously decided
that it does not, and merged three J Code Directorates into one – which it calls a “Super
JIACG”. On the other hand, the other combatant commands continue to be responsible
for a range of traditional activities for which the traditional staff structure is appropriate
(war plans, mil-to-mil engagement, force management, war fighting). How to square this
circle is an interesting challenge. USSOCOM has taken one approach, reorganize the
structure, while PACOM (and others) have found a different answer – create a
specialized addition to the existing structure. However while this ad hoc answer
obviously needs further refinement and adjustment, the basic approach seems sound.
This perspective leads me to the earlier observation that any discussion of the JIACG
concept that concerns itself with the value or virtue of specific categories – “Full
Spectrum”, focused, CT – probably misses the point. All of the characteristics or
capabilities of notional JIACGS described earlier in this paper can be mixed or matched.
Therefore I suggest we drop the descriptive adjective “Full Spectrum” and merely use the
term JIACG, full stop, for any particular version of the JIACG concept.
One final thought. The likelihood is that the War On Terror will continue for the
foreseeable future and the need for increasingly more effective interagency cooperation
and coordination will continue. Consideration underway at the highest levels of the
21
USG, including OSD and the JS, will soon produce new guidance (if not instructions) on
how to go about achieving this objective. Given this looming likelihood, PACOM would
be well advised to review its own experience and consider how it would like build on it to
perform even better in the future.
Enclosures:
1) USJFCOM fact sheet
2) Varieties of JIACGs
3) JIACG’s Value Added
Camp H.M. Smith
August 18, 2005