The Treaty of Nice.
Institutional Reform of the European Union by
Intergovernmental and Domestic Veto players
The Nice Treaty and the Nature of Veto players
The Treaty of Nice, hammered out at a summit of the European Council in December 2000,
and finally ratified in a second Irish referendum in 2002, will come into force in February
2003. It sets out the reforms of the current fifteen member bloc's institutional framework
needed for the accession of ten countries that have emerged from the dissolution of the former
Soviet bloc. Two small Southern European countries, Malta and Cyprus, the latter still
divided into a Greek and Turkish part, complete this accession group. The historical decision
to almost double the number of member states was early linked to a reform of the institutional
framework of the European Union (EU), originally developed by the six founding members in
the late 1950s. The key points of reform were the redistribution of voting rights in the Council
of Ministers, the reorganization of the supranational institutions, in particular the size of the
European Parliament (EP) and European Commission, and enabling clauses for closer
cooperation among particular member states.
There are few systematic studies on the Nice Treaty, and most are concerned with the reform's
consequences for EU decision making. Tsebelis and Yatangas (2002) show that member
states had dissimilar preferences on the voting procedure, the number of countries required for
majority voting and the population percentage threshold. They find that the Nice changes will
push for policy stability (gridlock) because of introducing two additional criteria for qualified
majority voting. König and Bräuninger (2001, 2002), providing measures for the two-
dimensional policy positions of current and future member states, reveal that most member
states succeeded in improving their individual benefits and come to a similar conclusion:
Comparing EU decision making with and without the Nice changes, they demonstrate that the
qualified majority voting core will expand and shift towards the poorer states. The authors
commonly conclude that bureaucratic and judiciary powers will be increased by the Nice
reform: The more difficult member state decision making, the higher is the discretionary
power of the Commission and the Court of Justice.1 Tsebelis and Yatangas (2002) remark that
"It is not clear to us whether these were intended results of the contracting parties."
1
These findings are confirmed by the criticism of most observers, which state that member state governments
were primarily concerned with defending their status quo rather than preparing the ways for enlargement. The
European Trade Union Confederation, for example, finds the Nice Treaty regrettably lacking ambition and a
forward-looking vision of European integration. In its resolution adopted on 14 December in Strasbourg, the EP
states that the Nice Treaty fails to meet the requirements it believed were essential to strengthen the EU's
decision-making capacity.
Like all previous treaties on European integration, the Nice Treaty was negotiated at an
intergovernmental conference (IGC) and had to be signed by the negotiating member state
governments and ratified according to their domestic constitutional arrangements. From an
analytical perspective, the fifteen governments are the veto players at the IGC negotiation
table, whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo (Tsebelis 2002, 19).
However, the governments can hardly be conceived as individual veto players, because most
consist of more than one coalition partner, and all have to include additional partners in the
domestic ratification game. In ten of the fifteen member states, the government was built on
coalitions in December 2000, sometimes including more than two parties. Others had a
minority government, and all counties have ratification hurdles for EU treaties, which are
higher than those of government formation itself. This implies that, first, the identification of
the (collective) preferences becomes more complicated, and, second, the outcomes of decision
making become more complicated (Tsebelis 2002, 39).
In this study, we take a closer look at the preferences of the negotiating member states. Our
central question is how member states formed their Nice reform preferences with respect to
the nature of their government and their ratifying domestic constraints. We ask whether the
domestic constraints reduce the room for manoeuvre of negotiating actors, because they are
nested in the domestic arena (Tsebelis 1990), or whether governmental negotiators adapt their
views in order to avoid involuntary defection at home. Unlike previous studies, which focused
on the impact of ratification constraints on treaty outcomes, we are concerned about
preference changes of negotiating actors. Our analysis is thus embedded in the literature on
veto players in general, and to the literature on two-level games and divided government in
particular.2 We present different concepts for measuring domestic constraints, such as veto
points, divided government and veto players, and ask whether and how these constraints can
help to understand preference change of actors negotiating treaty outcomes.3 In the two-level
2
According to this literature, a hawkish legislature can help a more integrationist government realize its
preferences in negotiations. Milner and Rosendorff (1997) explain that this is possible so long as the legislature
is not too hawkish. Once the government and the legislature become too divided, the bargaining outcome more
closely reflects the legislature's preferences. Pahre (2001) argues that whether or not the government benefits
from a divided government depends upon the location of the status quo, what he names the reversion point.
When the government controls the reversion point, it benefits from a hawkish legislature. However, when the
legislature controls the reversion point, his predictions mirror those made by Milner and Rosendorff.
3
One reason for such contradicting views might be that scholars use different concepts for divided government,
a term that is usually reserved for presidential systems where the president's party does not control the majority
party in the legislature (Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994, Karol 2000). Fiorina (1992) notes a strong similarity,
however, between divided government in presidential systems and coalition governments, which are the norm in
parliamentary systems (Laver and Shepsle 1991, Alesina and Rosenthal 1995). Other scholars of divided
government have investigated how bicameral systems, where the second chamber can be considered to be a veto
player (Tsebelis 1995, Krehbiel 1996, Bräuninger and König 1999), may lead to unified and divided government
game literature, it is still unclear what impact domestic constraints might have. On the one
hand, some authors argue that the presence of more restricted governments, such as veto
points, divided government or veto players with distant policy positions, at the bargaining
table makes international cooperation less likely because their winsets will not overlap (e.g.,
Putnam 1988, Karol 2000). Given overlapping winsets, others suggest that constrained
governments make international cooperation more likely, because such governments have
fewer possibilities to renege on agreements they might reach (e.g., Martin 2000).
For our empirical study of preference change, we firstly gathered data on the policy positions
of IGC actors before the beginning of the Nice Treaty negotiations. These documents contain
the policy positions on eight institutional reform issues and were published in Spring 2000.
We subsequently investigated all delegates preferences during and after the Nice IGC in
December 2000. We contacted the delegates by using an internet survey, which listed the
reform issues and the alternatives, which actors proposed for their solution in the Spring
documents. For examining the impact of ratifying constraints, we use the standard concepts of
veto points and divided government as well as the Eurobarometer 54.1 that provides
November 2000 information on the public's attitudes towards the reform issues and their
support for political parties. We accordingly apply an empirical two-level game perspective
that considers the influence of domestic constraints on negotiating delegates over time.
The remainder briefly introduces EU treaty reforms and the literature about two-level games.
Next, we present our data and our analysis, before we finally draw some (preliminary)
conclusions on the change of preferences by domestic constraints.
Treaty Reforms and Two-Level Games
The EU has, over a period of almost 50 years, been created and shaped by a series of treaties,
which have been negotiated at IGCs among the governmental delegates of the member states.
The most prominent treaties are the founding Rome Treaties (1957), the Single European Act
(1987) starting the internal market program, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) introducing a
common currency, and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) starting the process of Eastern
(Tsebelis and Money 1997, König 2001). In all these views, the party affiliations of the president and the
majority (median voter) of the first and/or second chamber serve as a proxies for the preferences of the actors.
Thus, divided government is simply a dichotomous variable, which means that, for instance, divided government
can make international cooperation less likely because the party affiliation of either the president and the
legislature and/or the bicameral veto player(s) differ. Often, however, the dichotomous nature of divided
government is too reductionist, and Milner (1997, 38) proposes as continuous measure for divided government
the distance in preferences between the veto players.
enlargement. They amended previous treaties and defined the institutional framework of the
EU, the former European Communities. Since the mid 1980s, the most important institutional
changes concerned the effective use of qualified majority voting in the Council and the
increasing participation of the EP in EU decision making. All changes and amendments
require the signing by each governmental delegation and the ratification in accordance with
the domestic constitutional ratification arrangements. Two years after the IGC, the Treaty of
Nice successfully passed these ratification procedures in December 2002.
According to Table 1, the coming into force of the Nice Treaty required not only the signing
of the negotiating delegates, but also the support of parliamentary political parties or a
successful referendum in the domestic ratification processes. According to Thomas Schelling
(1960), one might expect that a member state could gain power by claiming that its hands are
tied by isolationist domestic actors.4 The study of the Schelling conjecture has produced
mixed result: Iida (1993), Schneider and Cederman (1994), Mo (1995) and Tarar (2001)
specify the conditions under which domestic constraints impact international bargaining
outcomes. Others, such as Milner (1997), Hammond and Prins (1999) and Martin (2000),
argue that domestic constraints might be either irrelevant or having the opposite effect.5
Tsebelis (1990) argued that rational actors seek to increase the number of alternatives, thereby
enlarging their strategy space, but sometimes perceive that the game is embedded inside a
bigger game that defines how contextual factors influences their payoffs. This might lead to a
suboptimal choice from the perspective of the observer who only considers the principal arena
without taking into account the contextual (domestic) factors.
Regarding IGC outcomes, Hug and König (2002) uncover that through subtraction of
substantial issues every member state benefited from the Amsterdam Treaty in relation to the
status quo. They also point out that member states with domestic constraints across more
treaty issue areas realize higher gains than those with fewer, lending credence to the Schelling
4
Robert Putnam's (1988) seminal article on two level games has been built upon this idea suggesting that
international negotiations actually occur in two separate arenas. He describes an international arena where
negotiators bargain, and a domestic arena where the agreement must be ratified in parliaments. If a domestic
(parliamentary) constraint is more isolationist, then the negotiators must settle for a less ambitious treaty,
otherwise the treaty will face defeat at the ratification stage. Fearon (1994) as well as Schneider and Cederman
(1994) have formally shown how domestic audience costs influence international bargaining outcomes.
5
As Pahre (2001) demonstrates, a conservative legislature will support an international agreement in case of
divided government, respectively with increasing distance between the ideal point of the legislature and the
government.
conjecture.6 König and Slapin (2004) find that domestic parliaments have a significant impact
on the Amsterdam outcome, and that the EP is less powerful because it does not have
ratifying domestic constraints. These studies confirm that domestic parliaments have a crucial
impact on IGC negotiations, because the ratification hurdles are often higher than government
formation itself.
While this literature is concerned about outcomes, we seek to answer whether and how
negotiating governments (can) take into account their domestic constraints when forming their
preferences on treaty reforms.7 Otherwise, governments would risk their own survival – a
situation that is sometimes called 'involuntary defection' in the two-level game literature. This,
however, is often contingent to the cases to be explored. For example, Iida (1996), when
building a theoretical model to describe involuntary defection, refers to the Danes rejection of
the Maastricht Treaty in the 1992 referendum, but admits that “empirical work to corroborate
these points are beyond the scope of this article” (1996, 297). This draws our attention to the
empirical examination of the Nice IGC, which prepares the EU for the historical step towards
Eastern enlargement.
The Policy Space of the Nice Treaty
The Treaty of Nice is designed to provide the necessary institutional framework for the
enlargement of the EU through the accession of up to twelve countries from Eastern and
Southern Europe. At the Helsinki summit in 1999, member states had taken the decision to
open negotiations over accession with ten post-communist states that have emerged from the
dissolution of the former Soviet bloc. Two small Southern European countries, Cyprus and
Malta, complete this group. The remarkable decision to almost double the number of member
states has early raised fears on redistribution and gridlock, and member states were unable to
find an institutional solution at the Amsterdam IGC. It had proved impossible to resolve a
number of important institutional questions related to enlargement, such as the future size of
the Commission and of the Court of Justice. Moreover, a French proposal intended to re-
weight the votes in favor of the large countries, while the unified Germans proposed to
6
These constraints are result from the combination of integration attitudes and formal provisions, which is nicely
illustrated by the German and British examples. In the past, ratification did not impose any problem under the
high German ratification provisions of a two-third bicameral approval because almost all German political
parties supported European integration, while the simple majority was hardly reached by British Conservatives
or Labour. Other examples, such as the Danish or French referenda, show that governments sometimes prefer a
population vote rather than parliamentary approval.
introduce an additional population quota. The background is that the twelve candidates are
relatively poor and small countries with few populations.
At Amsterdam, it was formally agreed in a treaty protocol that these issues should be
addressed again before any enlargement took place, and a comprehensive review of the
institutional framework should be carried out at least one year before the EU's membership
exceeded twenty. In June 2000, the Cologne summit agreed that an IGC would be convened
in early 2000 to consider the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes
in the Council, the possible extension of qualified majority voting in the Council and other
necessary amendments. A target date of end-2000 was set for completion of the IGC and
negotiation of a new treaty.8 In December 2000, the IGC at the Nice Summit adopted a reform
that struggled with overcoming the Irish referendum. Besides institutional issues , a number of
sensitive topics have been addressed by the Nice Treaty, such as the integration of defense,
asylum and immigration issues.9
The Treaty of Nice makes changes to the institutional framework of the EU and sets out in a
Protocol on Enlargement the revised organization of supranational committees and the
modified institutional and functional provisions. A major reform issue was the organization of
the Commission, a so-called Amsterdam left-over, with the large member states currently
nominating two and the smaller countries one Commissioner. Finally, it was agreed that all
potential 27 member states nominate one Commissioner, while a reduction of the Commission
by a rotating system was withdrawn. It was also decided that the role of the Commission's
president should be strengthened, but that the Commission will continue to operate on the
basis of collective accountability. For the EP, the current system (over-representation of
smaller countries - principle of digressive proportionality) will be accompanied by a linear
reduction of the number of seats to a maximum of 732. Table 2 shows in detail the
institutional modifications, the status quo and the outcome of the Nice IGC on a scale from 0
to 1 (the coding of these issues is clarified in the footnote of Table 3).
7
Pahre (1997, 148) notes that treating executive preferences as exogenous is only appropriate for a directly
elected executive in case of divided government; otherwise, the problem of government formation, which is
central to parliamentary government, is excluded.
8
The preparatory work for the Nice intergovernmental conference began in February 2001 by a group
comprising representatives of all member state governments and a representative of the Commission, with the
participation of observers of the European Parliament. In June 2000, enhanced cooperation was taken on the
agenda by the June summit 2000 in Fereira. In October 2000, the French presidency extended the agenda of the
upcoming intergovernmental conference at the informal summit in Biarritz.
9
Defense was a salient issue in the Irish ratification process, and after declaring the continued military neutrality
of Ireland at the Seville summit in June 2002, the Nice treaty was adopted in a second referendum.
The most disputed of the Amsterdam left-overs concerned the re-weighting of votes in the
Council and the general application of qualified majority rule among the member states.
Today, qualified majority voting requires a threshold of 71,26% of all votes, which are
weighted approximately to the size of the member states. The large member states had
expressed the fear that in an EU of 27 members the threshold for a qualified majority would,
in terms of the percentage of the EU's population, fall below the 50%. They also argued that
the number of small and medium sized members would greatly outnumber those with larger
populations. The counter-argument of smaller members was that the EU was never weighting
the votes on a strictly demographic basis. The Nice arrangement is set out in three protocols,
(i) protocol on enlargement, (ii) declaration on enlargement, (iii) declaration on the qualified
majority voting threshold. It revised the voting weights, introduced a favorable majority of
member states and a quota of at least 62% of the EU's population.
At Nice, it was also decided to expand the application of qualified majority voting, often in
conjunction with the codecision procedure including the EP. However, unanimity is still
required for some important areas, such as trade in services and financial cooperation. In
addition to the these issues, enhanced cooperation involved a closer cooperation on a given
matter within a group of member states less than the total membership of the EU. The Treaty
of Amsterdam already introduced a set of closer cooperation rules, and the provisions were to
be amended and consolidated by the Treaty of Nice. In the end, it was decided to introduce
more specific enabling clauses for closer cooperation. Such flexibility requires a minimum
size of eight member states and a qualified majority of the Council authorizing closer
cooperation.
Table 3 lists the distribution of all actors' policy positions before and during the IGC.
Regarding the size of the Commission, almost two-thirds preferred a reduction on one
Commissioner per country before and during the IGC, while the issues on the composition
and accountability of the Commission were more disputed. We also observe more preferences
changes on these two issues. Most initially favored the collegial nature of the Commission,
but the majority was finally in favor of a stronger president. Regarding accountability, almost
all actors first supported an agreement of Commissioners to resign (if requested), but some
changed their mind towards a more collective accountability. Almost 60% of the actors
favored a dual majority system in the Council, and few actors additionally became supportive
of this alternative. The increasing of the size of the EP and a specific expansion of closer
cooperation was supported by most participants, but we also find some preference changes
over time. Almost all were initially against amending the status of the current codecision
procedure, which provides the EP with equal powers in some areas, but some were more
interested in expanding the application of codecision during the negotiations. Enhanced
cooperation shows the most significant change: most favored the maintenance of the current
provisions but almost all actors supported a specific enabling clause afterwards. We also
observe many changes on the issue of using qualified majority voting, where most initially
preferred a categorization of issues, but finally favored a case-by-case selection.
Table 4 shows the changes of actors preferences over time. In case of the size of the
Commission, only the EP modified its original position, but many actors changed their view
on the organization and the accountability of the Commission as well as the weighting of
votes in the Council. It is interesting to note that changes occurred in both directions, towards
and away from the status quo. A similar picture is provided for the parliamentary seats, the
codecision procedure and the use of QMV. Regarding enhanced cooperation, however,
changes only occurred in one direction, namely away from the status quo. Comparing the
changes across the actors, we find that France and the United Kingdom made only slight
modifications to their initial preferences, while Finland and Portugal almost completely
revised their original positions. Compared to Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Germany and
Sweden also made important changes, the Commission and the European Parliament as well
as Austria, Italy, Ireland and Greece moderately revised their initial positions.
Our findings generate the question why actors changed their original position on particular
reform issues between April and December 2000, while their policy positions remained
unchanged on other issues of the Nice Treaty. A simple answer might be that the seventeen
actors either inconsistently or insincerely reported their policy positions on the eight reform
issues. A reason for inconsistency could be our usage of different instruments, but research on
party manifestos has shown a high cross-validity between survey and document analysis.
Inconsistency, however, could result from a strategic indication of policy positions, but there
is no two level game-study which shows why actors should change their strategy over time.
One explanation might be found in the nested game literature that draws our attention to
multiple arenas, which determine the payoffs of the negotiating actors. Another explanation is
related to information politics and states that actors are becoming aware of their domestic
constraints, which can threaten the negotiating governments' survival. Before examining the
reasons for actors' preference change, we introduce into the different concept on measuring of
domestic constraints.
Domestic Veto points, Divided Government and Veto players
A number of concepts for measuring domestic constraints can be found in the literature, in
particular in the field of comparative politics. The crudest comparative measure for domestic
constraints are veto points, which indicate the number of institutional hurdles, such as the
existence of bicameral procedures, presidential vetoes and referenda (Crepaz and Moser
2002)10. Veto point scholars, such as Immergut (1992: 53) or Huber, Ragin and Stephens
(1993 722), argue that political decisions require agreements at several points, which depend
on the number and location of opportunities for veto along this chain. Constitutional
provisions create veto opportunities by setting forth procedural rules, such as the separation of
powers of executive and legislative powers or the division into two chambers. Second, veto
opportunities can be affected by electoral results and features of the party system that lead to a
different distribution of partisan representatives into the different political arenas (Immergut
1992: 54).
The second notion about veto points is close to the definition of divided government with
respect to different party affiliations. In many parliamentary member states more than one
partisan actor has to form a government and to approve the ratification of an EU treaty. The
necessity for support of other partisan actors may also be the result of a president wielding
some power in particular policy areas, the type of government coalition, qualified majorities
in parliamentary votes, the presence of a second chamber, or particular provisions for
referendums. The constitutions of Finland, France, and Portugal give the president control
over foreign policy (Martinez 1999, 33). Consequently, this might lead to a type of divided
government in the event of IGCs. The more typical reason why more than one partisan actor
is involved in the policy game in EU member states is the forming of a government and the
support to pass bills. Thus, Pahre (2001, 133) suggests that many studies classify governments
as divided whenever they are minority or coalition governments.
Another way, how additional partisan actors might be needed is induced by possible
requirements of qualified majorities in support of a treaty for parliamentary ratification. In
more than half the countries, namely eight out of fifteen, the constitution required qualified
majorities, ranging from 3/5 to 5/6 of the votes, in parliament for the ratification of the Nice
Treaty. Others, such as Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom provided for
bicameral approval with additional support of an partisan actor to the parties represented in
the government, and Ireland had to pass a referendum.11. According to Table 5, nine of the
fifteen member states have two veto points when considering only the formal ratification
points. Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden have only one veto point, while France
and Ireland have three veto points. Taking into account the party affiliation, the second notion
of the veto point definition, twelve member states have only one veto point because of the
overlapping party affiliation in the different arenas. Germany and the United Kingdom have
two, and only France has three veto points. Eleven governments are divided, because we find
a single party majority only in Greece, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, and all
member state governments were divided when we consider the additional ratification
requirements. This shows that both concepts, the veto point and divided government concept,
have few variance not only over time, but also across the fifteen member states of the EU.
Most have either the same number of veto points or they must be considered of being divided.
A third way to measure domestic constraints is related to the Tsebelis' veto players theory,
which requires the identification of actors' policy positions. Hug and König (2002) introduce a
technique for identifying the political parties policy positions on the Amsterdam Treaty when
using Eurobarometer surveys on the popular opinion towards EU integration issues and the
peoples' preferred political party vote. To identify a domestic veto player's policy position on
an integration issue, they aggregate the individual survey responses to political party positions
by calculating the mean positions of the respective party sympathizers.12 Applying the same
technique, we are able to find measures for the government and the political parties on four
institutional issues in Eurobarometer 54.1 of November 2000. The last columns of Table 5 list
the aggregated number of veto players and their distances over all eight issues of the Nice
Treaty, while Table 6 provides detailed insight into the construction of policy positions,
governmental and veto players' positions on each of the institutional issues in Eurobarometer
54.1.
10
Crepaz and Moser (2002 5) argue that the concept of veto points can be found in Federalist Papers 47, where
Madison refers to the separation of powers by Montesquieu (1982[1788], 244)
11
In the case of treaty referendums, Hug and Tsebelis (2001) distinguish between required and non-required
referendums and determine among the latter who triggers the popular vote.
12
Most responses to the questions are binary, either in favor (1) or against (0) the integration of a given issue.
Since all preferences are normalized along a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the “pro-integration” position,
values below 0.5 indicate that the (aggregated) actor prefers no integration in this issue.
Briefly summarized, the number of veto points, divided government and the number of veto
players provide for almost identical measures. Correlating all concepts shows that these three
have significant high similarities. The only dissimilar measure is provided by the (aggregated)
distances of the veto players. This measure has the additional advantage that we can apply it
at the issue level, which increases the size of our small sample. This leads us to the question,
which concept of domestic constraints helps us to understand intergovernmental preference
change.
Intergovernmental Preferences Change and Domestic Constraints
For our first and preliminary analysis of intergovernmental policy change, we use the actors'
ln distances between their policy positions before and during the IGC at Nice. These attempts
will neither consider the nature of the issues nor the saliencies, which actors attributed to
them. We first examine, which concept of domestic constraints helps us to explain
intergovernmental changes. For this purpose, we use linear regression on ln preference change
and ask to what extent do veto points, divided government and veto players explain them. We
second take a closer look at the impact of the veto players' measures, because this concept
allows us to assess our expectations for a larger sample.
Table 7 shows our regression analysis on the preference changes of the seventeen actors on
the eight institutional issues of the Nice reform. We find that the veto point and divided
government concept insignificantly explain the preference change of the actors; only the
number of veto players informs us about the reasons for such changes: the more veto players,
the less preference change of negotiating actors. In general, this result confirms previous
findings of two-level game studies and IGC outcomes. Governments with high domestic
constraints made fewer changes during the negotiations. However, since this result is about
preference change in the preparatory stage, actors seem to have fewer room for manoeuvre in
order to change their initial preferences.13 This confirms the nested game view on actors'
preferences change.
In Table 8, we list the issue-wise preferences change of the seventeen actors. Many countries
did not change most of their initial preferences on the eight institutional issues. Except for
Belgium, Finland, Portugal and Sweden, half and more of their preferences remained
13
We also checked for the other measures without any substantial modification of our result
unchanged. From the 60 overall changes, about half (28) are towards the status quo, while
more than half (32) of the total preference changes went towards a more integrationist view.
While the Commission is the only actor who changed their view towards a more integrationist
attitude, the United Kingdom and the EP moved exclusively towards the status quo. However,
their status quo bias might have different reasons when we take a look at the location of the
two actors' original preferences: The EP is one of the most integrationist actors, whereas the
British attitudes were already close to the status quo. For the other actors, there is no clear-cut
pattern of their moves: many seem to change their preferences at an issue level, which
promotes a measuring at this level. This suggest that more empirical work has to be done in
order to examine the explanatory power of different views of actors' preference change.
In our future work, we intend first to examine the appropriate measures for calculating actors'
distances and include our measure on issue-specific saliency of the actors involved. We
second must consider the direction of an actor's preferences change, namely whether he
changed his initial priority in the sense of the domestic constraint or not. We finally will
assess whether the status quo has an impact, and whether this also helps to understand the
impact of domestic constraints on the outcomes of the Nice Treaty. However, our preliminary
attempts already indicate that our expectation of preference changes is confirmed and that
domestic constraints might play an important role in explaining them.
TABLE 1: RATIFICATION OF THE NICE TREATY
Procedure State of the procedure (on 19.12.2002) * Date of lodging 14
Belgium Parliamentary (ratification by the Adopted by the Senate on 7 March 2002. Adopted by the Chamber 26 August 2002
seven parliaments at the various on 28 March (106 for, 24 against, 7 abstentions). Adopted by the
levels of authority (Federal level Conseil de la Communauté française on 23 April. Adopted by the
[Senate and Chamber] + 2 Conseil régional wallon on 29 May. Adopted by the Vlaamse Raad
Communities and 3 Regions) on 19 June. Adopted by the Rat der Deutschsprachigen
Gemeinschaft on 24 June. Adopted by the Parlement de la Région de
Bruxelles-Capitale on 2 July 2002.
Denmark Draft ratification law adopted by the Folketing on 1 June 2001 (98 for, 13 June 2001
Parliamentary (Folketing) 14 against, 1 abstention). Signed by the Queen on 7 June 2001 (Act No
499).
Germany Parliamentary (Bundestag + Adopted by the Bundestag on 18 October 2001 (570 for, 32 against, 2 11 February 2002
Bundesrat) abstentions). Adopted by the Bundesrat on 9 November 2001
(unanimously). Signed by the President on 21 December 2001.
Greece Parliamentary Adopted by the Chamber on 20 March 2002 (253 for, 10 against, 3 3 June 2002
abstentions).
Spain Parliamentary (Congreso+Senado) Adopted by the Congreso on 4 October 2001 (290 for, 6 abstentions). 27 December 2001
Adopted by the Senado on 24 October 2001 (213 for, 2 abstentions).
Royal assent given on 10 December 2001.
France Parliamentary (Assemblée Draft ratification law adopted by the Assemblée Nationale on 12 19 October 2001
nationale + Sénat) June 2001 (407 for, 27 against, 113 abstentions). Adopted by the Sénat
on 28 June 2001 (288 for, 8 against).
Ireland Parliamentary (Seanad + Dail) and Publication of the ratification bill on 29 March 2001. Referendum (7 18 December 2002
referendum June 2001): NO (53.87%). National debate. Second referendum on 19
October 2002: YES (62.89%). Adopted by the Seanad on 20 November.
Adopted by the Dáil on 28 November. Signed by the President and the
Taoiseach on 10 December 2002.
14
Date of lodging of ratification instrument. The Treaty of Nice will enter into force on the first day of the second month after the lodging of the ratification instrument by the
Member State which is the last to complete this formality.
Italy Parliamentary (Camera + Senato) Submission of the draft ratification law to the Camera on 17 September 9 July 2002
2001. Adopted by the Camera on 26 March 2002 (298 for, 7 against, 6
abstentions). Adopted by the Senato by a very large majority (show of
hands) on 7 May 2002
Luxembourg Parliamentary (Chamber of Adopted by the Chamber of Deputies on 12 July 2001 (57 for, 1 24 September 2001
Deputies) against, 2 abstentions). Act sanctioned by the Grand Duke on 1 August
2001.
Netherlands Parliamentary (Eerste Kamer + Draft ratification law submitted to the Tweede Kamer on 18 June 2001. 28 December 2001
Tweede Kamer) Adopted by the Tweede Kamer on 22 November 2001 (vote by show
of hands: very large majority "for"). Adopted by the Eerste Kamer on
19 December 2001.
Austria Parliamentary (Nationalrat + Draft constitutional law adopted unanimously by the Nationalrat on 23 8 January 2002
Bundesrat) October 2001 and by the Bundesrat on 8 November 2001. Draft
ratification law adopted unanimously by the Nationalrat on 21
November 2001 and adopted by the Bundesrat on 6 December 2001.
Signed by the President on 14 December 2001.
Portugal Parliamentary (Assembleia da Draft ratification law adopted by the Assembleia da República on 25 18 January 2002
República) October 2001 (211 for, 19 against). Signed by the President of the
Republic on 11 December 2001.
Finland Parliamentary (Eduskunta) Adopted by Parliament (Eduskunta) on 14 December 2001 (170 for, 9 29 January 2002
against, 20 abstentions). Signed by the President on 4 January 2002.
Adopted by the Åland Assembly on 25 January 2002.
Sweden Parliamentary (Riksdag) Draft ratification law presented in September 2001. Adopted by 25 January 2002
Parliament (Riksdag) on 6 December 2001 (249 for, 51 against, 4
abstentions).
United Parliamentary (House of Commons Presentation of ratification bill and 1st reading in the House of 25 July 2002
Kingdom + House of Lords) Commons on 21 June 2001. Second reading on 4 July 2001. Adopted by
the House of Commons on 17 October 2001 (392 for, 158 against).
Second reading in the House of Lords: 1 November 2001 (no vote).
Adopted by the House of Lords at third reading (no vote) on 28
January 2002. Royal assent: 26 February 2002.
* The Treaty of Nice will enter into force on 1 February 2003.
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSES PER ISSUE AREA FOR T0 (SURVEY DATA)15
0 0 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.66 0.66 1.0 1.0
t-1 t0 t-1 t0 t-1 t0 t-1 t0 t-1 t0
Size of the Commission -- -- -- -- 10 11 -- -- 7 6
Composition of the Commission -- 1 8 6 -- -- 5 2 4 8
Commission's political 2 5 -- -- 1 3 -- -- 14 9
accountability
Weighting of votes in the 4 2 9 11 -- -- -- -- 4 4
Council of Ministers
Seat allocation in the European 9 9 -- -- 7 5 -- -- 1 3
Parliament
Enhanced Cooperation 8 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- 9 14
Application of Codecision 15 4 -- -- -- 7 1 -- 1 6
Use of QMV in the Council 2 -- 4 9 -- -- 10 2 1 6
15
1. Size of the Commission
0 All Member States should be entitled to one Commissioner and larger Members to two
0.5 Reduction of the college to one Commissioner per Member State
1.0 Reduction to a smaller college comprised of a fixed number of Commissioners, facilitated by a system of rotation
2. Composition of the Commission:
0 Department Principle - each Commissioner is responsible for his own budget
0.33 Collegiate Body - Commissioners of equal status
0.66 Hierarchy - creation of additional posts for Vice-Presidents
1.0 Strong President - increase the President’s powers (vote casting and allocation of portfolios)
3. Commission’s political accountability
0 Collective accountability of the Commission to the European Parliament
0.5 Introduce a motion of confidence authorizing the President of the Commission (with support of the College) to ask the European Parliament for a vote of confidence
1.0 Increase the commitment from each Member of the Commission to resign, if so requested by the President
4. Weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers
0 Adaptation of the current system to the enlarged Union
0.33 Introduction of dual majority (votes and population)
0.66 Triple majority
1.0 Re-Weighting in favor of larger countries
5. Seat allocation in the European Parliament
0 Use of the current system (over-representation of smaller countries - principle of digressive proportionality) accompanied by a linear reduction of the number of seats
0.5 Digressive proportionality based on guaranteed minimum representation with an adjustment of seats per capita or by categories
1.0 Strict proportionality between the population of each Member State and the number of seats allocated
6. Enhanced cooperation
0 Maintenance of the existing provision
1.0 The introduction of specific enabling clauses
7. Application of codecision procedure
0 No amendment to current procedure
0.5 Replacement of cooperation with codecision procedure
1.0 General application of the codecision procedure
8. Qualified Majority Voting in the Council
0 Unanimity
0.33 Case by case application of QMV
0.66 A categorization of issues to be covered by QMV
1.0 QMV as a general rule
TABLE 4: PREFENCE CHANGES OVER TIME
Country of Size Organization Accountable Vote Seats Enhanced Legislative Qmv
residence Time Commission Commission Commission Weighting Parliament Cooperation Procedures Voting Abs. Distance
AUSTRIA t0 0,5 0,33 1 0,33 0 1 1 0,33
t-1 0,5 0,33 1 0,33 0 1 0,33 0,66
1
Difference t0-t-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,67 -0,33
BELGIUM t0 0,5 0,66 1 0 1 1 1 1
t-1 0,5 1 1 0,33 0 1 0,33 0,66
2.68
Difference t0-t-1 0 -0,34 0 -0,33 1 0 0,67 0,34
DENMARK t0 0,5 0,33 1 0,33 1 0 0,33 0,33
t-1 0,5 0,66 1 0,33 0 0 0,33 0,33
1.33
Difference t0-t-1 0 -0,33 0 0 1 0 0 0
FINLAND t0 0,5 0,33 1 0,33 0 1 1 1
t-1 0,5 0,33 0 1 0,5 0 0,33 0,66
4.18
Difference t0-t-1 0 0 1 -0,67 -0,5 1 0,67 0,34
FRANCE t0 1 1 1 1 0,5 1 0,33 0,33
t-1 1 0,66 1 1 0,5 1 0,33 0
0.67
Difference t0-t-1 0 0,34 0 0 0 0 0 0,33
GERMANY t0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0,33 0,66
t-1 1 0,66 0 0,33 1 1 0,33 0,66
2.33
Difference t0-t-1 0 -0,66 1 0,67 0 0 0 0
GREECE t0 0,5 0,33 0 0,33 0 1 0,33 0,33
t-1 0,5 0,33 0,5 0 0 0 0,33 0,33
1.83
Difference t0-t-1 0 0 -0,5 0,33 0 1 0 0
IRELAND t0 0,5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0,33
t-1 0,5 0,33 1 0 0 0 0,33 0
1.33
Difference t0-t-1 0 0,67 0 0 0 0 -0,33 0,33
ITALY t0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
t-1 1 0,33 1 1 0,5 1 1 1
1.17
Difference t0-t-1 0 0,67 0 0 -0,5 0 0 0
LUXEMBOU t0 0,5 0,33 0 0,33 0,5 1 0,33 0,33
t-1 0,5 1 1 0,33 0 1 0,33 0,66
2.5
Difference t0-t-1 0 -0,67 -1 0 0,5 0 0 -0,33
NETHERLA t0 0,5 1 0,5 0,33 0 1 1 1
t-1 0,5 1 1 0,33 0 1 0,33 0,66
1.51
Difference t0-t-1 0 0 -0,5 0 0 0 0,67 0,34
PORTUGAL t0 0,5 1 0 0,33 0 1 0,33 1
t-1 0,5 0,33 1 0 0 0 0,33 0,66
3.34
Difference t0-t-1 0 0,67 -1 0,33 0 1 0
SWEDEN t0 0,5 1 1 0,33 0 1 0 0,33
t-1 0,5 0,33 1 0 0 0 0,33 0,33
2.33
Difference t0-t-1 0 0,67 0 0,33 0 1 -0,33 0
SPAIN t0 1 1 0 1 0,5 1 0 0,33
t-1 1 0,66 1 1 0,5 0 0,33 0,33
2.67
Difference t0-t-1 0 0,34 -1 0 0 1 -0,33 0
UK t0 1 0,66 0,5 0,33 0,5 0 0,33 0,33
t-1 1 0,66 1 0,33 0,5 0 0,33 0,66
0.83
Difference t0-t-1 0 0 -0,5 0 0 0 0 -0,33
COMMISS t0 1 1 0 0,33 0,5 1 1 1
t-1 1 1 1 0,33 0,5 1 0,66 0,66
1.68
Difference t0-t-1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0,34 0,34
EP t0 0,5 0,33 0,5 0,33 0 1 0 0,66
t-1 1 0,33 1 0,33 0,5 1 0,33 0,66
1.83
Difference t0-t-1 -0,5 0 -0,5 0 -0,5 0 -0,33 0
TABLE 5: VETOPOINTS, DIVIDED GOVERNMENTS AND RATIFICATION PROCEDURES IN THE EU MEMBER COUNTRIES
Country Separation Number of Composition of Government Type of Number of Distance of
of Powers Veto points Government Veto players Veto players
Austria (b)q:2/3 2 (1) c: ÖVP/FPV D 1 .150
Belgium (b) 2 (1) c: VLD/PS/PRL/SP/ECOLO/AGALEV D 1 .304
Denmark q: 5/6 1 c: SD/RV D 0 .067
Finland q:2/3(p) 2 (1) c: SDP/KOK/SFP/VIHR/VAS D 1 .121
France bq:3/5p 3 c: PS/PC/MDC/PRG/V D 2 .124
Germany bq:2/3 2 c: SPD/B90-Grüne D 0 .214
Greece q:3/5 1 M: PASOK U (D) 0 .0
Ireland (b), ref 3 (1) c: FF/Progressive Democrats D 1 .552
Italy (b) 2 (1) c: DS/PPI/UDEUR/Verdi/PCDI/RI/Dem D 1 1.30
Luxembourg q:2/3 1 c: CSV/DP D 0 .066
Netherlands (b) 2 (1) c: PVDA/VVD D 0 1.457
Portugal (p) 2 (1) M: PS U (D) 0 .0
Spain (b) 2 (1) M: PP U (D) 0 .0
Sweden q:3/4 1 m: SD D 0 0.02
United b 2 M: Labour U (D) 0 .0
Kingdom
Legend: Government: government type in December 2000 (signing of Nice treaty) (c: coalition government,
m: one-party minority government, M: one-party majority; Separation of powers (b second chamber (in parenthesis,
if controlled by same parties as lower house) q: qualified majority for passage (in parenthesis if government parties
control qualified majority), p: semi-presidentialism (in parenthesis if President belongs to a party in government).
D: Divided government, U: Unified government.
Source: EJPR Political Data Yearbook 2000 (2001)
TABLE 7: EXPLANATORY POWER OF DIFFERENT CONCEPT FOR PREFERENCE CHANGE
Coefficie Non standard. Standardized T Significance 95%-Confid. Collin.
nt Coefficient Coefficient for B Statistics
Model B Standard error Beta Lower Limit Upper Limit Tolerance VIF
(Constant) ,476 ,264 1,803 ,095 -,094 1,046
Number VPS -,472 ,247 -,620 -1,908 ,079 -1,007 ,062 ,559 1,789
Divided Gov 3,243E-02 ,290 ,034 ,112 ,913 -,595 ,660 ,640 1,563
Number Vpoi ,146 ,187 ,266 ,780 ,449 -,257 ,549 ,507 1,974
a Dependent Variable: CHANGE2 (ln Distance)
TABLE 8: PREFRENCE CHANGE AT THE ISSUE LEVEL
Austria Belgium Denmar Finland France German Greece Ireland Italy Luxemb Netherla Portugal Schwed Spain UK Commis EP
k y ourg nds en sion
- 1 1 1 1
1,33
-,83 1 1 1 1
-,67 1 1
-,66 1
-,50 1 1 2
-,34 1
-,33 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
-,30 1
,00 5 2 5 2 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 3 3 4 6 5 4
,33 1 1 1 1 1
,34 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
,50 1
,67 1 1
,67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1,00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TABLE 2: INSTIUTIONAL MODIFICAITONS, STATUS QUO AND OUTCOME
Policy Areas / Issues Article SQ Outcome
Size of the Commission
size of the commission Art.213 (1) 0 0,5
Composition of the Commission
organizing the Commission Art.217 0.33 1
Commission's political accountability
organizing the Commission Art.217(4) 0 1
Weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers
weighting of votes in the Council Art.205 0 0,66
Seat allocation in the European Parliament
number of MEPs Art.189 0 0,5
Enhanced Cooperation
Art.11 0 1
common foreign and security policy Art.27 0 1
role of Eurojust Art.29 0 1
role of Eurojust Art.31 0 1
police and judicial co-operation Art.40, 40a, 40b 0 1
provisions on enhanced cooperation Art.43-45 0 1
Application of Legislative Procedures (Codecision)
incentives to combat discrimination Art.13 0 0.66
freedom of movement for the citizens of the Union Art.18 0 0.66
specific industrial support measures Art.157 0 0.66
social cohesion and structural funds Art.159 0 0.66
statute for European political parties Art.191 0 0.66
coordination of social security systems Art.42 0 0
visas, asylum and immigration Art.62 0 0.66
visas, asylum and immigration Art.63 0 0.66
judicial cooperation in civil matters Art.65 0 0.66
QMV in the Council
anti-discrimination Art.13 0 0,66
freedom of movement for the citizens of the Union Art.18 0 0,66
international agreements in CFSP Art.24 0 0.66
coordination of social security systems Art.42 0 0
visas, asylum and immigration Art.62 0 0,66
measures on immigration policy Art.63 0 0,66
judicial cooperation in civil proceedings Art.65 0 0,66
legal basis for indirect taxation measures Art.93 0 0
legal basis for measures in the field of direct taxation Art.94 0 0
financial assistance in the event of serious difficulties Art.100 0 1
representation of the EU at international level regarding
EMU Art.111(4) 0 1
special measures for the introduction of the euro Art.123(4) 0 0,66
common commercial policy Art.133 0,66
social provisions Art.137 0 0
industrial policy Art.157(3) 0 0.66
social cohesion and structural funds Art.159 0 1
social cohesion and structural funds Art.161 0 1
legal basis for tax measures with an environmental
objective Art.175(2)a 0 0
economic, financial and technical cooperation with third
countries Art.181 a 0.66
statute for MEPs Art.190(5) 0 0.66
statute for european political parties Art.191 0 1
appointment of the Secretary-General, High
Representative, Deputy Secretary-General of the
Council Art.207 0 1
appointment of the president of the commission and the
commissioners Art.214(2) 0 1
court of justice, rules of procedure Art.223 0 1
court of first instance, rules of procedure Art.224 0 1
judicial panels for specific areas attached to the Court of
First Instance Art.225a 0,66
court of auditors, appointment of members Art.247(3) 0 1
court of auditors, rules of procedure Art.248(4) 0 1
economic and social committee, appointment of
members Art.259 0 1
committee of the region, appointment of members Art.263 0 1
committee of the region, rules of procedure Art.263 0 1
financial controls Art.279 0 0.66
TABLE 6: GOVERNMENTAL AND PARLIAMENTARY POLICY POSITIONS ON
THE INSTIUTIONAL SSUES OF THE NICE TREATY (EUROBAROMETER 54.1)
Q29.6 Q31.8 Q39.10 Q40`
Belgium
Kamer 0,928 10 3 ECOLO 0,512 22 6 CVP 0,666 10 3 PSC 0,384 22 6 CVP
Senaat 0,928 10 3 ECOLO 0,512 22 6 CVP 0,666 10 3 PSC 0,384 22 6 CVP
U U U U
Government 0.935 0.546 0.731 0.338
U D U U
Distance G and Kamer 0.007 0.034 0.065 0.046
Distance G and Senaat 0.007 0.034 0.065 0.046
Denmark
0,792 16 0,391 16
0,953 13 Socialistisk Konservative Konservative
Diet Folkeparti Folkeparti 0,811 42 Venstre Folkeparti
Government 0.965 0.829 0.823 0.385
U U U U
Distance G and Diet 0.012 0.037 0.012 0.006
Germany
Bundestag 0,909 296 SPD 0,588 43 FDP 0,811 296 SPD 0,346 296 SPD
0,917 3 CDU 0,555 4 SPD/CDU 0,788 4 SPD/CDU 0,380 5
Bundesrat Saarland Brandenburg Brandenburg CDU/FDP Hessen
U U U U
Government 0.899 0.592 0.744 0.378
U U U U
Distance G and Bundestag 0.010 0.004 0.067 0.032
Distance G and Bundesrat 0.018 0.037 0.044 0.002
Greece
0,538 158
Vouli 0,980 158 PASOK 0,691 158 PASOK 0,870 158 PASOK PASOK
Government 0.980 0.691 0.870 0.538
U U U U
Distance G and Vouli 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spain
0,549 183 150
Congreso 0,899 183 150 P.P. 0,829 183 150 P.P. P.P.
0,614 183 150 P.P.
0,549 183 150
Senado 0,899 183 150 P.P. 0,614 183 150 P.P. 0,829 183 150 P.P. P.P.
U U U U
Government 0.899 0.614 0.829 0.549
U U U U
Distance G and Congreso 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Distance G and Senado 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
France
0,879 245 Parti 0,621 245 Parti 0,725 245 Parti 0,322 245 Parti
Assemblee socialiste socialiste socialiste socialiste
Government 0.899 0.592 0.744 0.378
U D D U
Distance G and Assemblee 0.020 0.029 0.019 0.056
Ireland
0,970 77 31 Fianna 0,767 77 31 Fianna 0,904 77 31 Fianna 0,422 77 31
Dail Fail Fail Fail Fianna Fail
0,970 77 31 Fianna 0,767 77 31 Fianna 0,904 77 31 Fianna 0,422 77 31
Seanad Fail Fail Fail Fianna Fail
U U U U
Government 0.985 0.660 0.906 0.521
U U U D
Referendum 0.890 0.709 0.867 0.540
Distance G and Dail 0.015 0.107 0.002 0.099
Distance G and Seanad 0.015 0.107 0.002 0.099
Distance G and Referendum 0.049 0.039 0.019
Italy
0,907 136 102 0,284 84 43
Partito Democratico 0,587 99 42 Alleanza 0,786 99 42 Partito Socialista
Deputati della Sinistra (PDS) Nazionale Alleanza Nazionale (PS)
0,907 136 102 0,572 136 102 Partito 0,745 136 102 0,284 84 43
Partito Democratico Democratico della Partito Democratico Partito Socialista
Senato della Sinistra (PDS) Sinistra (PDS) della Sinistra (PDS) (PS)
U U U U
Government 0.953 0.677 0.893 0.528
U D U U
Distance G and Deputati 0.046 0.9 0.107 0.244
Distance G and Senato 0.046 0.105 0.148 0.244
UK
0,804 418 The 0,585 418 The 0,798 418 The 0,503 418 The
Commons Labour Party Labour Party Labour Party Labour Party
Government 0.804 0.585 0.798 0.503
U U U U
Distance G and Commons 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Luxemburg
Chamber 0,887 15 DP 0,626 19 CSV 0,767 19 CSV 0,320 13 LSAP
Government 0.887 0.641 0.764 0.272
U U U U
Distance G and Chamber 0 0.015 0.003 0.048
Netherlands
0,273 11 8 Groen
Erste Current 0,907 38 19 WD 0,702 45 15 PVDA Links
0,641 29 20 CDA
0,272 45 15
Tweede Current 0,907 38 19 WD 0,641 29 20 CDA 0,702 45 15 PVDA PVDA
U U U U
Government 0.425 0.345 0.473 0.373
U U U U
Distance G and 1 0.103 0.296 0.229 0.1
Distance G and 2 0.103 0.296 0.229 0.101
Portugal
0,835 115 PS- 0,720 115 PS- 0,856 115 PS- 0,552 115 PS-
Assembleia Partido Socialista Partido Socialista Partido Socialista Partido Socialista
Government 0.835 0.720 0.856 0.552
U U U U
Distance G and Assembleia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Finland
0,945 51 SDP Soc. 0,499 51 SDP Soc. 0,702 51 SDP Soc. 0,401 51 SDP
Eduskunta Dem. Party Dem. Party Dem. Party Soc. Dem. Party
Government 0.922 0.584 0.708 0.410
U D U U
Distance G and Eduskunta 0.023 0.085 0.006 0.009
Sweden
0,462 131
0,931 43 0,839 131 Socialdemokratern
Riksdag Vensterpartiet 0,738 42 KDS Socialdemokraterna a
Government 0.918 0.730 0.839 0.462
U U U U
Distance G and Riksdag 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Austria
0,914 52 14
Nationalrat Freheitliche FPV 0,703 65 22 SPV 0,796 65 22 SPV 0,469 65 22 SPV
0,914 52 14
Bundesrat Freheitliche FPV 0,703 65 22 SPV 0,796 65 22 SPV 0,469 65 22 SPV
U U U U
Government 0.912 0.667 0.794 0.504
U U U D
Distance G and Nationalrat 0.002 0.036 0.002 0.035
Distance G and Bundesrat 0.002 0.036 0.002 0.035