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VIEWS: 20 PAGES: 117

									Report of the "International Expert Consulting Team” to advise the government
of Taiwan March 1991 final revision, figures and tables missing

                              EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


                The "International Expert Consulting Team" was appointed by Mr. Vincent
SIEW, Minister of Economic Affairs, to evaluate the performance of the three nuclear power
plants operated by TAIWAN POWER COMPANY. The Team chose its' own agenda, scope, and
procedure. It interpreted performance broadly and included many aspects that impact upon that
performance.

               THE TEAM MET IIN TAIIPEIIFOR 9 DAYS IIN OCTOBER 1991,,AND 10 DAYS IIN
                THE TEAM MET N TA PE FOR 9 DAYS N OCTOBER 1991 AND 10 DAYS N
NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER,,IIT THEN IISSUED AN IINTERIIM REPORT.. AT A FURTHER 6 DAY MEETIING
 NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER T THEN SSUED AN NTER M REPORT AT A FURTHER 6 DAY MEET NG
IINTAIIPEI IINMARCH 1992 IITPREPARED THIIS FIINALREPORT.. IITVIISITEDEACH OF THE NUCLEAR
 N TA PEI N MARCH 1992 T PREPARED TH S F NAL REPORT T V SITED EACH OF THE NUCLEAR
 POWER PLANTS AND THE LAN YU NTERIM LOW LEVEL WASTE REPOS TORY, AND RECE VED
POWER PLANTS,,AND THE LAN--YU IINTERIM LOW--LEVELWASTE REPOSIITORY, AND RECEIIVED
 PRESENTAT ONS FROM TA POWER HEAD OFF CE, FROM ROCAEC AND FROM EACH OF THE
PRESENTATIIONS FROM TAIIPOWERHEAD OFFIICE, FROM ROCAEC,,AND FROM EACH OF THE
 POWER PLANT S TES. A FEW PUBL C C TIZENS ALSO GAVE T THE R GU DANCE.
POWER PLANT SIITES.A FEW PUBLIICCIITIZENSALSO GAVE IITTHEIIRGUIIDANCE.


                The Team reviewed the operation of the nuclear power plants in Taiwan and
compared their performance with that of the rest of the world by a number of Performance
Indicators. It concluded that the operation in Taiwan is comparable to that of other nuclear power
plants and that the performance is, in most respects, improving.

             THE TEAM ALSO REVIIEWED THE RADIIOACTIIVE WASTE HANDLIING UP TO THE
              THE TEAM ALSO REV EWED THE RAD OACT VE WASTE HANDL NG UP TO THE
 NTERIM WASTE STORAGE ON LAN YU ORCHID SLAND). T CONCLUDED THAT THE WASTES ARE
IINTERIMWASTE STORAGE ON LAN--YU((ORCHID IISLAND). IITCONCLUDED THAT THE WASTES ARE
HANDLED IINA RESPONSIIBLEMANNER,,WIITHNEGLIIGIBLEEFFECT ON PUBLIIC HEALTH AND THE
 HANDLED N A RESPONS BLE MANNER W TH NEGL GIBLE EFFECT ON PUBL C HEALTH AND THE
 ENV RONMENT.
ENVIIRONMENT.


               All human endeavors have a room for improvement and the nuclear power
operations of TAIPOWER are no exception. The TEAM tried to identify fields of possible
improvement.

             THE FIIRST CRIITIICAL FIINDIING OF THE TEAM IIS AN IINABIILIITY OF TAIIPOWER TO
             THE F RST CR T CAL F ND NG OF THE TEAM S AN NAB L TY OF TA POWER TO
COMMUN CATE WELL BOTH W THIN TA POWER, AND BETWEEN TA POWER AND THE
COMMUNIICATE WELL,,BOTH WIITHINTAIIPOWER,AND BETWEEN TAIIPOWERAND THE
GOVERNMENT OR THE PUBLIIC..THIIS SHOWS UP IIN A NUMBER OF DIIFFERENT WAYS AND IIS A
GOVERNMENT OR THE PUBL C TH S SHOWS UP N A NUMBER OF D FFERENT WAYS AND S A
PROBLEM N ALL ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR POWER OPERAT ON. COUPLED W TH A FA LURE TO
PROBLEM IINALL ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIION.COUPLED WIITHA FAIILURE TO
UNDERSTAND AND EXPLAIIN THE MEANIINGOF MEASUREMENTS,, IITIISA MAJJORSOURCE OF
UNDERSTAND AND EXPLA N THE MEAN NG OF MEASUREMENTS T S A MA OR SOURCE OF
M SUNDERSTANDINGS BY THE PUBL C.
MIISUNDERSTANDINGSBY THE PUBLIIC.
                The Team found that an adequate Safety Culture had not penetrated to all
levels among the staff of the power plants. This is a serious problem that must be addressed.
It may be a result of the previous two issues. How can one gain the commitment of all if the
justifications are not clear enough, or the improvements take too long to be implemented?


              THE TEAM HAS NOTIICED A LACK IIN FLEXIIBIILIITY IIN ALL LEVELS LEADIING TO A
              THE TEAM HAS NOT CED A LACK N FLEX B L TY N ALL LEVELS LEAD NG TO A
        ME TAKEN TO MPLEMENT RECOMMENDAT ONS. TH S SEEMS TO BE DUE TO A DEC SION
LONG TIIME TAKEN TO IIMPLEMENTRECOMMENDATIIONS.THIISSEEMS TO BE DUE TO A DECIISION
LONG T
STRUCTURE WH CH APPEARS TO BE TOO CENTRAL ZED, BOTH N HEAD OFF CE, AND N THE
STRUCTURE WHIICHAPPEARS TO BE TOO CENTRALIIZED,BOTH IINHEAD OFFIICE,AND IIN THE
SUPERIINTENDENTS NOT DELEGATIING ADEQUATELY TO THEIIR STAFF..
SUPER NTENDENTS NOT DELEGAT NG ADEQUATELY TO THE R STAFF

                The Team has also noticed and approves the ROCAEC desire to develop and
to think independently of TAIPOWER. This is extremely important in the progress of
developing a normal regulatory process. However the Team recommends that the
independence of the safety authorities from the operating utility be explained carefully and
frequently to the public and to the communication media.

              A NUMBER OF IISSUES NEED FURTHER CONSIIDERATIION::
              A NUMBER OF SSUES NEED FURTHER CONS DERAT ON

       * water chemistry
       * OPERATOR AND MAIINTENANCE TRAIINIING
       * OPERATOR AND MA NTENANCE TRA N NG
       * optimizing outage time and maintenance works
       * FUEL CYCLE MANAGEMENT
       * FUEL CYCLE MANAGEMENT
       * documentation
      * radioactivity radiation measurements
       * regulation

              THE TEAM CONCLUDES THAT TAIIPOWER OPERATES IITS''NUCLEAR POWER
              THE TEAM CONCLUDES THAT TA POWER OPERATES TS NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS SAT SFACTORILY AND S MOV NG N THE R GHT D RECTION TO FURTHER MPROVE THAT
PLANTS SATIISFACTORILY AND IISMOVIING IIN THE RIIGHTDIIRECTION TO FURTHER IIMPROVE THAT
OPERAT ON. THE TEAM BEL EVES THAT F THE SSUES OF COMMUN CATION, FLEX BILITY OF
OPERATIION.THE TEAM BELIIEVES THAT IIFTHE IISSUESOF COMMUNIICATION, FLEXIIBILITYOF
THOUGHT AND ATTENT ON TO SAFETY CULTURE ARE PROPERLY ADDRESSED TA POWER HAS
THOUGHT AND ATTENTIIONTO SAFETY CULTURE ARE PROPERLY ADDRESSED,, TAIIPOWERHAS
THE POTENTIIALTO JJOIN THE GROUP OF VERY GOOD OPERATORS IIN THE WORLD VERY SOON..
THE POTENT AL TO OIN THE GROUP OF VERY GOOD OPERATORS N THE WORLD VERY SOON
                                           CONTENTS
                                                                                    page
                                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I.     INTRODUCTION                                                            7

II.    PREVIOUS REVIEWS AND STUDIES                                            10

III.   DETAILED EVALUATION                                                     13

       III.A              Performance Indicators                               13

               III.A.1          General
               III.A.2          TAIPOWER Indicators Status

       III.B              Organization and Administration                 16

               III.B.1                 Head Office and Plants
               III.B.2          Safety Review and Inspection

       III.C              Safety Culture                                       25

               III.C.1            What is a Safety Culture?
               III.C.2                  Foundations of a Safety Culture
                          III.C.2.a            Responsibilities
                          III.C.2.b            Training
                          III.C.2.c            Discipline
                          III.C.2.d            Control
                          III.C.2.e            Commitment

               III.C.3                The TAIPOWER Position
               III.C.4          Importance of Proper Routine Work
               III.C.5          Evidence of Deficiencies

       III.D              Operation                                            29

                III.D.1        General
                III.D.2        Operating Procedures
           III.D.3           Experience Feedback
                III.D.4        Housekeeping
                III.D.5        Operator Training

       III.E              Maintenance                                     33

               III.E.1          Plant Performance Indicators
               III.E.2          Site Tour
               III.E.3          Organization
               III.E.4          Documentation
               III.E.5          Training

       III.F              Chemistry                                            37
          III.F.1           Chemistry Indices
          III.F.2           Detailed Evaluations
                    III.F.2.a      BWR (CHINSHAN and KUOSHENG)
                    III.F.2.b      PWR (MAANSHAN)

          III.F.3          Betterment of Chemistry
          III.F.4          Further Studies

III.G               Radiation Protection                          `    42

          III.G.1          Radiation Protection Control
          III.G.2          External Dose Equivalent
          III.G.3          Individual Dose Equivalent
          III.G.4          Environmental Monitoring and Control
             III.G.5          ALARA program

III.H               Industrial Safety                                  47

III.I               Plant Security Program                             48

III.J               Emergency Response Plan                            49

          III.J.1          General Considerations
          III.J.2          General Organization
          III.J.3          TAIPOWER Organization
          III.J.4          Emergency Drills

III.J.5             Public Education

III.K               Plant Betterment                                   52

          III.K.1 Current Status
                  III.K.1.a             Unit Capability Factor
                  III.K.1.b             Forced Outage Rate
                  III.K.1.c             Unplanned Scram Rate

          III.K.2 Five year Performance Improvement Program
                  III.K.2.a          Performance Goals
                  III.K.2.b          5 yr Improvement Program

          III.K.3 Routine Betterment Activities

III.L               Refueling Outage Management                   62
III.M               Radioactive Waste Management                  64

          III.M.1         Radioactive Waste
                  III.M.1.a            High Level Waste
                  III.M.1.b            Low Level Waste
          III.M.2         Releases to the Environment
                  III.M.2.a            Gaseous Releases
                  III.M.2.b            Liquid Releases
        III.M.3         Low-level Solid Radioactive Waste
        III.M.4         Betterment of Radwaste Management
        III.M.5         Interim Low Level Waste Storage
        III.M.6         Final Disposal of Low Level Waste

III.N             Engineering                                   75

III.O             Instrumentation and Control                        77

        III.O.1 Avoiding Unit Trips: general
                III.O.1.a            Unit Trips in BWRs
                III.0.1.b            Unit Trips in PWRs
                III.O.1.c            TEAM Comments
                III.O.2.d            Countermeasures and Improvements

        III.O.2 Advanced Technology

        III.O.3 Maintenance for Aging Deterioration

III.P             Fuel Performance                                   84

        III.P.1 Introduction
        III.P.2 Review of TAIPOWER's Performance
                III.P.1.a        Reliability
                III.P.1.b        Flexibility
                III.P.2.c        Economics

        III.P.3 Recommendations
                III.P.3.a             Fuel Reliability
                III.P.3.b             Fuel Flexibility
                III.P.3.c             Company Policy
                III.P.3.d             A Consolidated Division

III.Q             Probabilistic Risk Assessments                88

        III.Q.1         What is a PRA?
        III.Q.2         PRAs for the Three Nuclear Plants
        III.Q.3         Recommendations for future PRA work

III.R   Quality                                                      91
        III.R.1         Quality Assurance (QA)
        III.R.2                Quality Control (QC)
        III.R.3         Supervision
        III.R.4         Implementation
        III.R.5         Follow up

III.S             Social Aspects                                     93

III.T             Relations with the Public                     95

        III.T.1         The opinion of the neighbors
              III.T.2   Public information about incidents
              III.T.3   Recommendations

      III.U   Load Management                                98

IV.   OVERALL EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS                       99

      IV.A              The present status                   99

      IV.B              Areas for Further Consideration      101

              IV.B.1    Water Chemistry
              IV.B.2    Operator and Maintenance Training
              IV.B.3    Outage Duration Improvement
              IV.B.4    Fuel Cycle Management
              IV.B.5    Documentation

           IV.B.6       Radioactivity and Radiation
      Measurements
           IV.B.7       Regulation

V.    APPENDICES                                                   103

      V.A               Members of the TEAM                        103
      V.B               Reports Available to the TEAM        104
      V.C               Schedule, Visits, and Presentations  105
      V.D               Public Comments Received by the TEAM       106
      V.E               Definition of Performance Indicators 107
      V.F               10 year Operating License Renewal          109
              V.F.1     Introduction
              V.F.2     CHINSHAN first 10-year Relicensing
              V.F.3     Regulatory Guidelines

      V.G               Items Raised by the Public           111
              V.G.1           The case of Mr Chan Ju-I
              V.G.2           Radioactivity at CHINSHAN
              V.G.3           Loss of Boric Acid
              V.G.4           Radioactive Waste Discharges
              V.G.5           An Operator/Inspector Argument
I.   INTRODUCTION

        The "international expert consulting team" was appointed by the Minister of
Economic Affairs, Mr. Vincent Siew, "to evaluate the performance of the three nuclear plants
in Taiwan operated by the Taiwan Power Company. The scope, procedure and schedule of
the evaluation will be determined by the team."

         The freedom of the team to decide its' own scope is flattering but conveys a great
responsibility. In meeting this responsibility we are mindful of the areas of expertise of the
consultants and our inability to judge many affairs of Taiwan. We have taken advantage of a
list of issues that concern them that was made to the government of ROC by the county
government of Taipei.

        The international expert consulting team (hereinafter called the TEAM), visited each
nuclear power plant operated by Taiwan Power Company (hereinafter called by the common
colloquial expression TAIPOWER), and examined its' operating performance and safety
record, paying particular attention to improvements made in the last five years. The TEAM
interpreted "operation" broadly, to include all matters that concern each plant superintendent
such as management, regulation, emergency preparedness, and impact on the public. These
are evaluated in detail in section III.

         However, there are a number of issues surrounding nuclear power that transcend an
individual power station, an individual owner or operator, and even an individual country.
For some of these we find it inappropriate to comment in detail. These issues are listed and
it is noted where further information may be found and where further evaluation may be
useful.

        THE TEAM NOTES THAT THERE EXIIST MANY COMPARIISONS OF THE ENVIIRONMENTAL
        THE TEAM NOTES THAT THERE EX ST MANY COMPAR SONS OF THE ENV RONMENTAL
 EFFECTS OF D FFERENT WAYS OF GENERAT NG ELECTR CITY. THE EXPERT TEAM D D NOT
EFFECTS OF DIIFFERENT WAYS OF GENERATIING ELECTRIICITY. THE EXPERT TEAM DIID NOT
EVALUATE THESE BUT NOTES THAT A RECENT IINTERNATIONAL "SENIIOR EXPERT SYMPOSIIUM ON
 EVALUATE THESE BUT NOTES THAT A RECENT NTERNATIONAL "SEN OR EXPERT SYMPOS UM ON
 ELECTR CITY AND THE ENV RONMENT" WAS HELD N HELS NKI, F NLAND, SPONSORED BY 11
ELECTRIICITY AND THE ENVIIRONMENT" WAS HELD IIN HELSIINKI, FIINLAND, SPONSORED BY 11
 NTERNATIONAL ORGAN ZATIONS N 13 17 MAY 1991 THE REPORTS AND RECOMMENDAT ONS
IINTERNATIONAL ORGANIIZATIONS IIN 13--17 MAY 1991.. THE REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIIONS
 WERE PUBL SHED BY AEA. THEY STATED THAT "THE HUMAN HEALTH R SKS FROM NUCLEAR
WERE PUBLIISHED BY IIAEA. THEY STATED THAT "THE HUMAN HEALTH RIISKS FROM NUCLEAR,,
 O L, AND NATURAL GAS ARE OF THE SAME ORDER OF MAGN TUDE AND TWO ORDERS OF
OIIL, AND NATURAL GAS ARE OF THE SAME ORDER OF MAGNIITUDE AND TWO ORDERS OF
 MAGN TUDE SMALLER THAN THESE FROM THE HYDROELECTR C OPT ON". THESE HEALTH R SKS
MAGNIITUDE SMALLER THAN THESE FROM THE HYDROELECTRIIC OPTIION". THESE HEALTH RIISKS
IINCLUDE THE PROBABIILITY OF ACCIIDENTS AND THE EXPERTS AT HELSIINKI NOTED THAT "THE
 NCLUDE THE PROBAB LITY OF ACC DENTS AND THE EXPERTS AT HELS NKI NOTED THAT "THE
POTENT AL FOR SEVERE ACC DENTS EX STS FOR MOST ENERGY SYSTEMS AT VAR OUS STAGES OF
POTENTIIAL FOR SEVERE ACCIIDENTS EXIISTS FOR MOST ENERGY SYSTEMS AT VARIIOUS STAGES OF
THEIIR FUEL CYCLES" AND "MAJJOR ACCIIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED PARTIICULARLY IIN THE COAL,,
THE R FUEL CYCLES" AND "MA OR ACC DENTS HAVE OCCURRED PART CULARLY N THE COAL
OIIL AND GAS FUEL CYCLES".. THE RIISK OF SEVERE ACCIIDENTS CANNOT BE AVOIIDED BY
O L AND GAS FUEL CYCLES" THE R SK OF SEVERE ACC DENTS CANNOT BE AVO DED BY
REPLAC NG NUCLEAR POWER BY FOSS L FUEL BURN NG, ALTHOUGH FOR COAL THE ACC DENTS
REPLACIING NUCLEAR POWER BY FOSSIIL FUEL BURNIING, ALTHOUGH FOR COAL THE ACCIIDENTS
ARE AT THE COAL M NES WH CH ARE MOSTLY OUTS DE OF TA WAN. THE EXPERTS AT HELS NKI
ARE AT THE COAL MIINES WHIICH ARE MOSTLY OUTSIIDE OF TAIIWAN. THE EXPERTS AT HELSIINKI
ALSO STATED THAT WH LE "ALL THE FUEL CYCLES WHEN F TTED TO STATE OF-THE-ART
ALSO STATED THAT WHIILE "ALL THE FUEL CYCLES,, WHEN FIITTED TO STATE--OF-THE-ART
TECHNOLOGY,, ARE ABLE TO DELIIVER ELECTRIICITY AT RELATIIVELY LOW RIISKS TO HEALTH AND
TECHNOLOGY ARE ABLE TO DEL VER ELECTR CITY AT RELAT VELY LOW R SKS TO HEALTH AND
THE ENV RONMENT. AN EXCEPT ON S CO EM SSIONS FROM FOSS L FUELS" THE TEAM
THE ENVIIRONMENT. AN EXCEPTIION IIS CO2 EMIISSIONS FROM FOSSIIL FUELS".. THE TEAM
                                             2
L MITED TS' STUDY OF THESE ENV RONMENTAL MATTERS TO ENSUR NG THAT TA POWER
LIIMITED IITS' STUDY OF THESE ENVIIRONMENTAL MATTERS TO ENSURIING THAT TAIIPOWER
USES STATE OF-THE-ART TECHNOLOGY N THE R NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
USES STATE--OF-THE-ARTTECHNOLOGY IIN THEIIRNUCLEAR POWER PLANTS..


        TAIPOWER anticipates a doubling in electricity demand in the next ten years. We
are not equipped to evaluate whether this doubling is indeed a likely expectation, but note that
the main determinants of this increase are:
               * A SMALL IINCREASE IIN POPULATIION,,
               * A SMALL NCREASE N POPULAT ON
               * an increase in living standards,
               * MORE ELECTRIIFIICATIION OF IINDUSTRY AND SERVIICES..
               * MORE ELECTR F CAT ON OF NDUSTRY AND SERV CES

        TAIPOWER expects to meet this increase in demand by an increase in fossil fuel
burning, expanding the use of coal in the near future, and later increasing markedly the use of
natural gas. This means that Taiwan will make a major increase in CO2 emissions just at the
time when the governments of the major industrial countries are committing themselves to
stabilize CO2 emissions in this ten year period and reduce them thereafter. Taiwan will be
(environmentally) out of step with the world; but even more out of step if any of the present
nuclear units are shut down, or new ones are not constructed.

         The TEAM did not evaluate TAIPOWER's economic analysis which compared
nuclear costs with fossil fuel costs. However, it notes that fossil fuels are imported into
Taiwan and shipping costs are a significant fraction of the total cost. Nuclear fuel (uranium)
is also imported, but the energy density is over ten thousand times higher than for fossil fuels
so that the shipping cost for nuclear fuel is negligible. Therefore, nuclear power is likely to
be more economically sensible for Taiwan than for other countries.

         The TEAM also did not evaluate the various options for disposal of high-level nuclear
waste. The issue is how to dispose of the waste in such a way that it does not have to be
guarded. This is an international issue, and a political one. For example, an expert
committee of the American Physical Society stated in 1978 that "they see no technical
obstacle to a sensible disposal of nuclear waste by 1985". The obstacles are political.
Nonetheless, Sweden is preparing a waste repository in granite and Germany is preparing one
in salt deposits. For Taiwan, a permanent solution is not urgent, and it is likely that
TAIPOWER can use the experience and technology of one of the other countries when those
are available.

        CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED BY SOME PEOPLE THAT THE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM
        CONCERN HAS BEEN EXPRESSED BY SOME PEOPLE THAT THE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM
IINTAIIWANMIIGHTBE USED AS A FACIILITY FOR PRODUCIINGPLUTONIIUM FOR ATOMIICBOMBS..
 N TA WAN M GHT BE USED AS A FAC LITY FOR PRODUC NG PLUTON UM FOR ATOM C BOMBS
WHIILE THIIS COMMIITTEE IIS NOT THE PROPER COMMIITTEE FOR ADDRESSIING THIIS QUESTIION IIN
 WH LE TH S COMM TTEE S NOT THE PROPER COMM TTEE FOR ADDRESS NG TH S QUEST ON N
 TS' ENT RETY, THE TEAM NOTES THAT THE FUEL OF EACH POWER STAT ON S NSPECTED
IITS'ENTIIRETY, THE TEAM NOTES THAT THE FUEL OF EACH POWER STATIION IIS IINSPECTED
EVERY THREE MONTHS UNDER THE SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM OF THE IINTERNATIONALATOMIIC
 EVERY THREE MONTHS UNDER THE SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM OF THE NTERNATIONAL ATOM C
ENERGY AGENCY.. THIIS MAKES SUCH MIILIITARY USE ALMOST IIMPOSSIIBLE.. THE TEAM NOTES
 ENERGY AGENCY TH S MAKES SUCH M L TARY USE ALMOST MPOSS BLE THE TEAM NOTES
 THAT TA POWER COOPERATES FULLY W TH AEA NSPECTORS N THESE NSPECTIONS, AND
THAT TAIIPOWERCOOPERATES FULLY WIITH IIAEAIINSPECTORS IIN THESE IINSPECTIONS,AND
 HAVE ASCERTA NED THAT THERE ARE NO COMPLA NTS FROM AEA. THE TEAM
HAVE ASCERTAIINED THAT THERE ARE NO COMPLAIINTS FROM IIAEA. THE TEAM
 RECOMMENDS THAT TA POWER, AND THE AEC COOPERATE ACT VELY AND NOT MERELY
RECOMMENDS THAT TAIIPOWER,AND THE AEC COOPERATE ACTIIVELYAND NOT MERELY
 PASS VELY; BECAUSE T S TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE REPUBL C OF CH NA THAT T BE
PASSIIVELY;BECAUSE IITIIS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE REPUBLIICOF CHIINA THAT IITBE
 PUBL CLY SEEN TO COOPERATE THE PRESENT NTERNATIONAL IAEA) NSPECTIONS OF THE
PUBLIICLYSEEN TO COOPERATE.. THE PRESENT IINTERNATIONAL((IAEA) IINSPECTIONSOF THE
POWER REACTORS CAN ASSURE THE CHIINESEPEOPLE AND THE WORLD THAT THESE PARTIICULAR
 POWER REACTORS CAN ASSURE THE CH NESE PEOPLE AND THE WORLD THAT THESE PART CULAR
REACTORS ARE NOT BEIINGUSED TO PREPARE FUEL FOR BOMBS.. BUT ONLY ACTIIVE
 REACTORS ARE NOT BE NG USED TO PREPARE FUEL FOR BOMBS BUT ONLY ACT VE
COOPERATIIONAND OPENNESS OF EVERYONE WIITHINROC CAN ASSURE THE WORLD THAT
 COOPERAT ON AND OPENNESS OF EVERYONE W THIN ROC CAN ASSURE THE WORLD THAT
THERE ARE NO SECRET FAC LITIES N OTHER LOCAT ONS THAT ARE BE NG PREPARED FOR THE
THERE ARE NO SECRET FACIILITIES IINOTHER LOCATIIONS THAT ARE BEIINGPREPARED FOR THE
PURPOSE..
PURPOSE

         The TEAM is well aware that the government of the Republic of China has decided to
build a fourth nuclear power station with two or more reactors at a fourth site at YENLIAO.
It is self evident that the excellent operation of the existing nuclear power plants was a factor
in that decision. Although other factors entered into that decision that went far beyond the
scope of this TEAM, this report, and the interim report that preceded it, lend support.
            THE TEAM HAS EVALUATED IIN DETAIIL THE OPERATIION OF THE EXIISTIING THREE
            THE TEAM HAS EVALUATED N DETA L THE OPERAT ON OF THE EX ST NG THREE
 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SIX REACTORS , EMPHAS ZING A COMPAR SON W TH S MILAR
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ((SIXREACTORS)),EMPHASIIZINGA COMPARIISON WIITHSIIMILAR
OPERATIIONSELSEWHERE IIN THE WORLD..THE EVALUATIION WORK STARTED WIITHA REVIIEWOF
 OPERAT ONS ELSEWHERE N THE WORLD THE EVALUAT ON WORK STARTED W TH A REV EW OF
 PREV OUS REPORTS LISTED N SECT ON I) AND OTHER NFORMATION THAT WERE MADE
PREVIIOUSREPORTS ((LISTEDIINSECTIION III)AND OTHER IINFORMATION THAT WERE MADE
 AVA LABLE TO T. THE PRESENT STATUS OF NDIVIDUAL PLANTS N TERMS OF PERFORMANCE
AVAIILABLE TO IIT. THE PRESENT STATUS OF IINDIVIDUALPLANTS IIN TERMS OF PERFORMANCE
IINDIICATORS WAS COMPARED WIITH IINTERNATIIONAL AVERAGES CALCULATED BY THE WORLD
   ND CATORS WAS COMPARED W TH NTERNAT ONAL AVERAGES CALCULATED BY THE WORLD
ASSOCIIATIION OF NUCLEAR OPERATORS ((WANO))AND THESE ARE PRESENTED IIN SECTIION
 ASSOC AT ON OF NUCLEAR OPERATORS WANO AND THESE ARE PRESENTED N SECT ON
IIIIII..A.. THE ORGANIIZATIION AND ADMIINIISTRATIION OF TAIIPOWER AND IITS''NUCLEAR PLANTS
        A THE ORGAN ZAT ON AND ADM N STRAT ON OF TA POWER AND TS NUCLEAR PLANTS
  S D SCUSSED N SECT ON II.B. N II.B ALSO THE TEAM D SCUSSES THE RELAT ONSHIP W TH
IISDIISCUSSED IINSECTIION IIII.B. IIN IIII.BALSO THE TEAM DIISCUSSES THE RELATIIONSHIP WIITH
THE REGULATORY AUTHORIITYWIITHIN THE AEC..AN ADEQUATE "SAFETY CULTURE" IISNOW
 THE REGULATORY AUTHOR TY W THIN THE AEC AN ADEQUATE "SAFETY CULTURE" S NOW
CONS DERED TO BE A VERY MPORTANT ASPECT OF THE QUAL TY OF OPERAT ON OF NUCLEAR
CONSIIDERED TO BE A VERY IIMPORTANTASPECT OF THE QUALIITYOF OPERATIIONOF NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS.. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIIONSOF THE SAFETY CULTURE IIN
POWER PLANTS      COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDAT ONS OF THE SAFETY CULTURE N
TA P OWER ARE G VEN N SECT ON C TECHN CAL APPRA SALS OF THE PLANT OPERAT ON
TAIIPOWER ARE GIIVEN IIN SECTIION IIIIII..C..TECHNIICAL APPRAIISALS OF THE PLANT OPERATIION,,
MA NTENANCE, WATER CHEM STRY, RAD ATION CHEM STRY, RAD ATION PROTECT ON, PLANT
MAIINTENANCE,WATER CHEMIISTRY,RADIIATIONCHEMIISTRY,RADIIATIONPROTECTIION,PLANT
BETTERMENT,,RADIIOACTIVEWASTE MANAGEMENT,, FUEL PERFORMANCE AND QUALIITY
BETTERMENT RAD OACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT FUEL PERFORMANCE AND QUAL TY
ASSURANCE AND CONTROL ARE D SCUSSED N MORE DETA L N SECT ONS II.D TO II.R.
ASSURANCE AND CONTROL,,ARE DIISCUSSED IINMORE DETAIIL IINSECTIIONS IIII.DTO IIII.R.
SOCIIAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIION ARE DIISCUSSED IIN SECTIION IIIIII..S AND THE
SOC AL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERAT ON ARE D SCUSSED N SECT ON S AND THE
RELAT ONSHIP W TH THE NE GHBORING PUBL C ARE BROADLY D SCUSSED N SECT ON II.T.
RELATIIONSHIP WIITH THE NEIIGHBORINGPUBLIICARE BROADLY DIISCUSSED IIN SECTIION IIII.T.


        An Overall Evaluation and Recommendations based on the present status are given in
section IV.A, and areas where further consideration should be given are listed in section
IV.B.

       SEVERAL APPENDIICES V..A TO V..G GIIVE ADDIITIIONAL IINFORMATIION,,AND DIISCUSS SOME
       SEVERAL APPEND CES V A TO V G G VE ADD T ONAL NFORMAT ON AND D SCUSS SOME
DETAIILSOF IISSUES THAT WERE RAIISEDBY OTHERS..
DETA LS OF SSUES THAT WERE RA SED BY OTHERS
II. PREVIOUS REVIEWS AND STUDIES.

        The operation of the nuclear power plants in Taiwan has been reviewed by a number
of groups before this one. The TEAM has had the opportunity of reading and analyzing each
of their reports.

        The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, (INPO), based in Atlanta, GA, USA,
organizes regular technical exchange visits and reviews of the power plants of its' members.
The visiting reviewers include personnel from other power plants, and they carry out, over a
period of 10 days for each visit, an intensive, in depth, review of the operations of the power
plant visited. The results of each review visit are discussed with the superintendent and staff
of the power plant visited, as well as with the owner and operator of the power plant, in this
case TAIPOWER. The reports are not made available to the general public. Nonetheless,
INPO reports are serious reports and are taken seriously; the reports to TAIPOWER seem no
exception.

       THE TEAM HAS READ THE REPORTS OF THE FOLLOWIING IINPO VIISIITS::
       THE TEAM HAS READ THE REPORTS OF THE FOLLOW NG NPO V S TS

        - to CHINSHAN power plant the week of October 24th 1983
       --TO CHIINSHAN POWER PLANT FROM JUNE 20TH TO 27TH 1986
          TO CH NSHAN POWER PLANT FROM JUNE 20TH TO 27TH 1986
        - to CHINSHAN power plant from May 9th to 20th 1988
       --TO CHIINSHAN POWER PLANT FROM JANUARY 10TH TO 18TH 1991
          TO CH NSHAN POWER PLANT FROM JANUARY 10TH TO 18TH 1991
        - to KUOSHENG power plant from April 18 to 22nd 1985
       --TO KUOSHENG POWER PLANT FROM MAY 25TH TO 29TH 1987
          TO KUOSHENG POWER PLANT FROM MAY 25TH TO 29TH 1987
        - to KUOSHENG power plant July 24th to August 4th 1989
       --TO KUOSHENG POWER PLANT FROM AUGUST 15TH TO 23RD 1991
          TO KUOSHENG POWER PLANT FROM AUGUST 15TH TO 23RD 1991
        - to MAANSHAN power plant from April 23rd to 27th 1985
       --TO MAANSHAN POWER PLANT FROM MAY 18 TO 22ND 1987
          TO MAANSHAN POWER PLANT FROM MAY 18 TO 22ND 1987
        - to MAANSHAN power plant July 24th to August 4th 1989
       --TO TAIIPOWER HEAD OFFIICE MAY 9TH TO 20TH 1988
          TO TA POWER HEAD OFF CE MAY 9TH TO 20TH 1988

       THE WORLD ASSOCIIATIION OF NUCLEAR OPERATORS ((WANO))SENT A TEAM FROM
       THE WORLD ASSOC AT ON OF NUCLEAR OPERATORS WANO SENT A TEAM FROM
JAPAN FOR A BRIIEF VIISIIT,,FROM MARCH 11TH TO 15TH,,1991..WANO ALSO REPORTED DIIRECT
JAPAN FOR A BR EF V S T FROM MARCH 11TH TO 15TH 1991 WANO ALSO REPORTED D RECT
TO TA POWER.
TO TAIIPOWER.


        On July 8th 1988, a Nuclear Safety Review Panel, hereinafter called the KOUTS
panel, chaired by Dr Herbert J.C.Kouts, reported to Mr Chen-Hsing Yen, Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China. This was an outstanding
independent panel. Dr Herbert Kouts is a scientist of outstanding repute; he has been
Director of Nuclear Regulatory Research for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the US;
he was Chairman for many years of the Department of Nuclear Energy at the Brookhaven
National Laboratory; is on a special committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
and now on the Defense Nuclear Agency. Other members are equally distinguished:
Professor Adolf Birkhofer of the Technical University of Munich, and Director of
Gesellschaft für Reaktor-Sicherheit, is Germany's outstanding nuclear safety analyst; Dr
Nozawa, is an outstanding Japanese nuclear expert; Dr Nunzio Palladino, has been
Chairman of the Nuclear Engineering Department at the Pennsylvania State University, and
Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Professor Norman C Rasmussen, of
the Massachussets Institute of Technology, was awarded the Fermi prize of the US
Department of Energy for his work on reactor safety analysis, and in particular his
development of Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA); Pierre Tanguy was a principal nuclear
regulator for the Government of France, and is now Inspector-General for Safety of
Electricite de France; Dr Long Sun Tong works for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The independence of such a distinguished panel is evident.

       ALTHOUGH PRAS DO NOT CONSTIITUTE OFFIICIIAL REVIIEWS IIN THE SAME SENSE,, THE
       ALTHOUGH PRAS DO NOT CONST TUTE OFF C AL REV EWS N THE SAME SENSE THE
 SAFETY OF THE POWER PLANTS HAS ALSO BEEN STUD ED N DEPTH WH LE CARRY NG OUT THESE
SAFETY OF THE POWER PLANTS HAS ALSO BEEN STUDIIED IINDEPTH WHIILECARRYIINGOUT THESE
PROBABIILIISTIIC RIISK ASSESSMENTS ((PRAS))..PROBABIILIISTIIC RIISK ASSESSMENTS WERE
 PROBAB L ST C R SK ASSESSMENTS PRAS PROBAB L ST C R SK ASSESSMENTS WERE
PIIONEEREDBY PROFESSOR NORMAN C..RASMUSSEN OF MASSACHUSETTS IINSTITUTEOF
 P ONEERED BY PROFESSOR NORMAN C RASMUSSEN OF MASSACHUSETTS NSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY IIN 1975..ALTHOUGH THE CALCULATED RIISK HAS A SIIGNIIFIICANT UNCERTAIINTY
 TECHNOLOGY N 1975 ALTHOUGH THE CALCULATED R SK HAS A S GN F CANT UNCERTA NTY
 ATTACHED TO T, AS KOUTS PANEL NOTED THE TECHN QUE DOES FORCE THE ENG NEERS,
ATTACHED TO IIT,AS KOUTS''PANEL NOTED,, THE TECHNIIQUEDOES FORCE THE ENGIINEERS,
DESIIGNERSAND OPERATORS,,TO THIINKTHROUGH THE OPERATIIONOF THE POWER PLANT IIN
 DES GNERS AND OPERATORS TO TH NK THROUGH THE OPERAT ON OF THE POWER PLANT N
 ACC DENT COND TIONS,AND THEREBY PO NT TO THE DOM NANT CONTR BUTORS TO THE R SK.
ACCIIDENTCONDIITIONS,AND THEREBY POIINTTO THE DOMIINANTCONTRIIBUTORSTO THE RIISK.
THIIS PERMIITS THE UTIILIITY TO IIDENTIIFY SYSTEMS IIMPROVEMENTS TO REDUCE THE RIISK.. THESE
 TH S PERM TS THE UT L TY TO DENT FY SYSTEMS MPROVEMENTS TO REDUCE THE R SK THESE
PRAS WERE CARRIIED OUT BY A COOPERATIIVE TEAM FROM A CONSULTANT CORPORATIION IIN
 PRAS WERE CARR ED OUT BY A COOPERAT VE TEAM FROM A CONSULTANT CORPORAT ON N
 THE USA THE REGULATORY AUTHOR TY WH CH S ATOM C ENERGY COUNC L AEC), THE
THE USA,, THE REGULATORY AUTHORIITYWHIICH IIS ATOMIICENERGY COUNCIIL((AEC), THE
IINSTIITUTE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY RESEARCH ((IINER))IIN TAIIWAN,,AND STAFF OF THE UTIILIITY
  NST TUTE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY RESEARCH NER N TA WAN AND STAFF OF THE UT L TY
 TA P OWER N THE F RST OF THESE FOR KUOSHENG PR NTED N JULY 1985 THE US
TAIIPOWER.. IINTHE FIIRST OF THESE,,FOR KUOSHENG,,PRIINTED IIN JULY 1985,,THE US
CONSULTANT WAS THE MANAGER;; IIN THE SECOND FOR MAANSHAN,,PRIINTED IINOCTOBER
 CONSULTANT WAS THE MANAGER N THE SECOND FOR MAANSHAN PR NTED N OCTOBER
 1987 THE US CONSULTANT WAS MERELY AN ADV SOR AND N THE TH RD FOR CH N SHAN
1987,,THE US CONSULTANT WAS MERELY AN ADVIISOR,,AND IIN THE THIIRD,, FOR CHIINSHAN
((NOT YET OFFIICIIALLY RELEASED BUT AVAIILABLE FOR COMMENT)),,THE US CONSULTANT WAS
  NOT YET OFF C ALLY RELEASED BUT AVA LABLE FOR COMMENT THE US CONSULTANT WAS
 NOT D RECTLY NVOLVED BUT REMA NED AS REV EWER. NDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF TH S TEAM
NOT DIIRECTLY IINVOLVEDBUT REMAIINEDAS REVIIEWER. IINDIVIDUALMEMBERS OF THIISTEAM
HAVE DIISCUSSED THE RESULTS OF THE ASSESSMENTS WIITHVARIIOUSOF THE PRA TEAMS,,AND
 HAVE D SCUSSED THE RESULTS OF THE ASSESSMENTS W TH VAR OUS OF THE PRA TEAMS AND
  N PART CULAR W TH SOME OF THE REV EWERS. N OUR V EW T S MPORTANT TO KEEP SOME
IINPARTIICULARWIITHSOME OF THE REVIIEWERS. IIN OUR VIIEW IITIIS IIMPORTANTTO KEEP SOME
 EQU VALENT FORE GN EXPERT GROUP AS REV EWERS TO ASSURE ONE EXTRA LAYER OF
EQUIIVALENT FOREIIGNEXPERT GROUP AS REVIIEWERSTO ASSURE ONE EXTRA LAYER OF
IINDEPENDENTEXAMIINATIONOF PROBLEMS WIITH THE REACTORS..
  NDEPENDENT EXAM NATION OF PROBLEMS W TH THE REACTORS


        The present review TEAM is different from any of these, in that it reports to the
Minister of Economic Affairs. The TEAM has therefore a more general task than any of
these reviews. However, in examining the reports the TEAM notes the seriousness and
methodical way in which each of the review groups approached their task. In general the
reports make excellent sense.

       NONE OF THESE GROUPS UNCOVERED ANY PROBLEMS THAT WERE DEEMED SERIIOUS
        NONE OF THESE GROUPS UNCOVERED ANY PROBLEMS THAT WERE DEEMED SER OUS
ENOUGH TO WARRANT SHUT DOWN OF ANY OF THE REACTORS EVEN TEMPORAR LY. NPO N
ENOUGH TO WARRANT SHUT DOWN OF ANY OF THE REACTORS,,EVEN TEMPORARIILY. IINPO IIN
THE PAST HAS NOT HES TATED TO RECOMMEND THE SHUT DOWN OF NUCLEAR REACTORS UNT L
THE PAST HAS NOT HESIITATED TO RECOMMEND THE SHUT DOWN OF NUCLEAR REACTORS UNTIIL
OUTSTANDIING EQUIIPMENTOR MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN CORRECTED.. THE
OUTSTAND NG EQU PMENT OR MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN CORRECTED               THE
PIILGRIIM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IIN THE USA AND SOME OF THE TVA POWER PLANTS IIN THE
P LGR M NUCLEAR POWER PLANT N THE USA AND SOME OF THE TVA POWER PLANTS N THE
USA ARE NOTABLE EXAMPLES.. ALTHOUGH AN ADVERSE IINPO REPORT MIIGHT HAVE LESS
USA ARE NOTABLE EXAMPLES ALTHOUGH AN ADVERSE NPO REPORT M GHT HAVE LESS
EFFECT N TA WAN, T S S GNIFICANT AND MPORTANT THAT NONE OF THE NPO REPORTS
EFFECT IINTAIIWAN, IITIISSIIGNIFICANTAND IIMPORTANTTHAT NONE OF THE IINPOREPORTS
RECOMMENDED EVEN TEMPORARY CLOS NG OF ANY OF THE TA POWER NUCLEAR REACTORS
RECOMMENDED EVEN TEMPORARY CLOSIINGOF ANY OF THE TAIIPOWERNUCLEAR REACTORS..
WHIILE THIIS TEAM DIID NOT GO IINTO SUCH DETAIIL,,WE CONCUR IIN THIIS GENERAL CONCLUSIION..
WH LE TH S TEAM D D NOT GO NTO SUCH DETA L WE CONCUR N TH S GENERAL CONCLUS ON

        Each of the INPO reports raised a number of smaller particular issues, and the Kouts
panel raised a number of general issues, including management issues. In our view, all these
comments have been taken seriously by TAIPOWER. For example, TAIPOWER gleaned
from the INPO reports over 100 recognizably different items for each reactor, and set about to
address them all. One was considered and rejected, a small percentage are still pending but
one, discussed in section III.D (housekeeping) is still unsatisfactory. For a second, an
alternate solution was found.

         AT THE LAST MEETIING OF THIIS TEAM,,THE DRAFT OF A SPECIIAL REPORT TO THE
          AT THE LAST MEET NG OF TH S TEAM THE DRAFT OF A SPEC AL REPORT TO THE
MIINIISTER OF ECONOMIIC AFFAIIRS BY DR C..C..LIIN BECAME AVAIILABLE..REFERENCE IIS MADE TO
 M N STER OF ECONOM C AFFA RS BY DR C C L N BECAME AVA LABLE REFERENCE S MADE TO
 T N SECT ON II.F CHEMISTRY).
IIT IINSECTIION IIII.F ((CHEMISTRY).
        It is this TEAM's view that these independent external reviews are extremely valuable
and should continue. They result in a safer operation, and the morale of the staff of each of
the power plants is improved by their knowledge that their plants are operated as well as any
in the world. The TEAM notes, however, that the INPO reports are from the USA and INPO
therefore comments on the basis of their US experience. Although the WANO report was by
a Japanese team it was not as detailed as the INPO reports.

         The TEAM suggests a broadening of the experience of the review teams by equivalent
visits from Japanese and European teams, perhaps under WANO sponsorship.

       A first step in that direction was made when TAIPOWER volunteered to receive, in
the years to come, a "peer review team" in a pilot program being developed by WANO.

       An academic program has begun for "Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant Safety"
organized by Professor Kent F.Hansen of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The
TEAM recommends that TAIPOWER participate in this program and thereby take further
advantage of the best analysis and advice that the rest of the world has to offer.
III. DETAILED EVALUATION


III.A Performance Indicators

       IIIIII..A..1..GENERAL
               A 1 GENERAL

         The concept of using performance indicators to judge a power plant, whether nuclear
or non-nuclear, is very tricky to grasp, even for specialists. A performance indicator taken
out of context, has no sense if it is not associated to other criteria such as economics or
general policy of the utility company. An excellent performance can be met while spending
a lot of money, on the opposite a more modest performance can be accepted while
deliberately reducing expenses.

     THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT ANY COMPARIISON IIS IIMPOSSIIBLE OR VALUE JJUDGEMENT
      THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT ANY COMPAR SON S MPOSS BLE OR VALUE UDGEMENT
CANNOT BE EXPRESSED.. IITIISPOSSIIBLE TO MAKE A VALIIDCOMPARIISON WIITHWHAT WAS
CANNOT BE EXPRESSED T S POSS BLE TO MAKE A VAL D COMPAR SON W TH WHAT WAS
 EXPECTED AT NAT ONAL LEVEL AND WHAT S NTERNATIONALLY CONS DERED TO BE GOOD
EXPECTED AT NATIIONAL LEVEL AND WHAT IIS IINTERNATIONALLYCONSIIDERED TO BE GOOD
 PRACT CE. THESE EXPECTED F GURES, OR THE AVERAGE OF THE BEST NTERNATIONAL
PRACTIICE. THESE EXPECTED FIIGURES,OR THE AVERAGE OF THE BEST IINTERNATIONAL
 NDICATORS BECOME REFERENCE TARGETS TO BE USED AS A BAS S FOR ANY COMPAR SON.
IINDICATORSBECOME REFERENCE TARGETS TO BE USED AS A BASIIS FOR ANY COMPARIISON.


        Concerning the time basis used for an overall evaluation, special care has to be taken:
an annual basis is often insufficient due to the necessity of assessing durability and tendency
of the results.

       FIINALLY,,SOME IINDIICATORS ((SUCH AS CAPACIITY FACTOR))GIIVE A DIISTORTED PIICTURE
        F NALLY SOME ND CATORS SUCH AS CAPAC TY FACTOR G VE A D STORTED P CTURE
OF THE PERFORMANCE DUE TO LOCAL PART CULARITIES N PLANT OPERAT ON.
OF THE PERFORMANCE DUE TO LOCAL PARTIICULARITIES IINPLANT OPERATIION.


        For these reasons a huge effort has been done last year at the international level in
defining and homogenizing a set of performance indicators. INPO and UNIPEDE, under
the WANO umbrella, have performed this harmonizing task and have set up 10 performance
indicators.

        The TEAM noticed, with approval, that TAIPOWER recently adopted those indicators
and uses at the moment both WANO indicators and a previous local set of indicators.
TAIPOWER plans to use only WANO indicators in 1993 and beyond. This provision will
permit in the future an adequate checking at international level.

       III.A.2. TAIPOWER Indicators Status

      THE TEN WANO PERFORMANCE IINDIICATORS ((PII))THAT ALLOW A RELEVANT
       THE TEN WANO PERFORMANCE ND CATORS P THAT ALLOW A RELEVANT
ASSESSMENT OF THE TA POWER S TUATION COMPARED W TH WHAT S PERFORMED
ASSESSMENT OF THE TAIIPOWERSIITUATIONCOMPARED WIITHWHAT IISPERFORMED
WORLD WIDE ARE THE FOLLOW NG:
WORLD--WIDEARE THE FOLLOWIING:
       a. Unit Capability Factor
       B..UNPLANNED CAPABIILITY LOSS FACTOR
       B UNPLANNED CAPAB LITY LOSS FACTOR
       c. Unplanned Automatic Scram per 7000 hrs critical
       D..SAFETY SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE
       D SAFETY SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE
       e. Thermal Performance
       F..FUEL RELIIABILITY
       F FUEL REL ABILITY
       g. Collective Radiation Exposure
       H VOLUME OF LOW LEVEL RAD OACTIVE WASTE
       H..VOLUME OF LOW--LEVELRADIIOACTIVEWASTE
       i. Chemistry Index
        . NDUSTRIAL LOST TIME ACC DENT RATES
       JJ. IINDUSTRIALLOST--TIMEACCIIDENTRATES
       Table III.A.1 shows the results achieved in 199O for the six units of TAIPOWER.
The definitions and units used for each indicator are given in the WANO document entitled:
"Detailed Descriptions of the WANO Power Plant Performance Indicators", summarized in
Appendix V.E.

      IITEMS B,,E,,AND JJSHOW THAT TAIIPOWER HAS IIN THESE RESPECTS,,A SUPERIIOR OR
        TEMS B E AND SHOW THAT TA POWER HAS N THESE RESPECTS A SUPER OR OR
EQUAL PERFORMANCE WHEN COMPARED TO THE WORLD--WIDEPERFORMANCE.. ALTHOUGH THE
EQUAL PERFORMANCE WHEN COMPARED TO THE WORLD WIDE PERFORMANCE ALTHOUGH THE
TA P OWER RESULTS FOR THE UN T CAPAB L TY FACTOR A ARE ABOVE THE WORLD
TAIIPOWER RESULTS FOR THE UNIIT CAPABIILIITY FACTOR ((A))ARE ABOVE THE WORLD
AVERAGE THEY COULD ST LL BE MPROVED. TH S M GHT BE DONE BY REDUC NG THE
AVERAGE,, THEY COULD STIILLBE IIMPROVED. THIIS MIIGHTBE DONE BY REDUCIING THE
DURATIIONOF THE REFUELIINGOUTAGE..
DURAT ON OF THE REFUEL NG OUTAGE

        The Unplanned Auto-Scram rate (item c) is considerably above the WANO average
value (4.4 vs 1.0). This is not an evidence of unacceptable operation conditions or lack in
safety culture. The Scram of a reactor is clearly planned to prevent any safety degradation.
However, it inevitably degrades economic performance.

       TAIPOWER has to convince the public that the occurrence of a scram does not mean
danger, and the TEAM urges public education in this respect. However, an improvement of
the unplanned Auto-Scram rate is desirable.

        TAIPOWER laid down a target of 1 scram per Reactor-year in 1993. Meeting this
target requires additional actions on both the education of operation personnel as well as
maintenance personnel and an effective use of good practices.

         THE OTHER IINDIICATORS WIILL BE MODIIFIIED BY THE IIMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS THAT
         THE OTHER ND CATORS W LL BE MOD F ED BY THE MPROVEMENT PROGRAMS THAT
WIILL BE IIMPLEMENTED UP TO 1993.. THESE IINDICATORS IINCLUDE RADIIATION EXPOSURE,,
W LL BE MPLEMENTED UP TO 1993           THESE NDICATORS NCLUDE RAD ATION EXPOSURE
RADWASTE IINDICATORS AND UNPLANNED CAPABIILITY LOSS FACTOR..
RADWASTE      NDICATORS AND UNPLANNED CAPAB LITY LOSS FACTOR              IIN ADDIITIION,,
                                                                           N ADD T ON
TA P OWER HAS AN NTERNAL TARGET TO REDUCE BY DES GN CHANGES THE TOTAL
TAIIPOWER HAS AN IINTERNAL TARGET TO REDUCE BY DESIIGN CHANGES THE TOTAL
PROBAB LITY OF CORE MELT DOWN, N ORDER TO REACH AT THE SAME DATE 5 X
PROBABIILITY OF CORE MELT--DOWN, IIN ORDER TO REACH AT THE SAME DATE 5 X
10--5//REACTOR--YEAR..
10 5 REACTOR YEAR

       The TEAM considers that an effort must also be made to improve Fuel Reliability
(BWR) and Safety Systems Performance indicators (AC power systems availability). Also,
the water chemistry is not good, and needs improvement as discussed in III.F.

        THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF TA P OWER CAN BE CONS DERED AS ACCEPTABLE
        THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF TAIIPOWER CAN BE CONSIIDERED AS ACCEPTABLE
 AND TA POWER S N A CORRECT POS TION AMONG THE WHOLE GROUP OF NUCLEAR POWER
AND TAIIPOWERIIS IINA CORRECT POSIITIONAMONG THE WHOLE GROUP OF NUCLEAR POWER
 PLANT OPERATORS TH S SHOULD NOT BE A CAUSE OF EQUAN MITY AND RELAXAT ON. EVERY
PLANT OPERATORS.. THIIS SHOULD NOT BE A CAUSE OF EQUANIIMITYAND RELAXATIION. EVERY
 UT LITY COMPANY HAS TO STR VE FOR EXCELLENCE AND TA POWER N PART CULAR MUST
UTIILITYCOMPANY HAS TO STRIIVE FOR EXCELLENCE,,AND TAIIPOWERIINPARTIICULARMUST
 MPROVE TS' RECORD N THE DOMA N OF UNPLANNED SCRAM COLLECT VE DOSE BWR),
IIMPROVE IITS'RECORD IIN THE DOMAIINOF UNPLANNED SCRAM,,COLLECTIIVEDOSE ((BWR),
 SAFETY SYSTEMS AVA LABILITY, RADWASTE MANAGEMENT WATER CHEM STRY AND FUEL
SAFETY SYSTEMS AVAIILABILITY,RADWASTE MANAGEMENT,,WATER CHEMIISTRYAND FUEL
 REL ABILITY.
RELIIABILITY.
TABLE III.A.1
COMPARISON OF TAIPOWER AND WANO
Nuclear Power Plant Performance Indicators 1990

********************************************************

NOTE THAT WE MUST HAVE THE NEW TABLE

**********************************************************
III.B      ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

        IIIIII..B..1 HEAD OFFIICE AND PLANTS..
                B 1 HEAD OFF CE AND PLANTS

       The nuclear production organization of TAIPOWER reports to the Executive
Vice-President/Nuclear. The TEAM considers that the organization, on the whole, works
well.

      THE KOUTS PANEL SUGGESTED THAT A SPECIIAL SECTIION OF THE NUCLEAR OPERATIIONS
       THE KOUTS PANEL SUGGESTED THAT A SPEC AL SECT ON OF THE NUCLEAR OPERAT ONS
DEPARTMENT BE DEVOTED TO SAFETY IIN ORDER TO EMPHASIIZE THE IIMPORTANCE OF SAFETY..
DEPARTMENT BE DEVOTED TO SAFETY N ORDER TO EMPHAS ZE THE MPORTANCE OF SAFETY
TA P OWER ACCORD NGLY NCLUDED TH S SECT ON AND RENAMED THE DEPARTMENT
TAIIPOWER ACCORDIINGLY IINCLUDED THIIS SECTIION AND RENAMED THE DEPARTMENT
NUCLEAR OPERATIION AND SAFETY DEPARTMENT.. FIIGURE IIIIII..B..1..A IIS A DIIAGRAM SHOWIING
NUCLEAR OPERAT ON AND SAFETY DEPARTMENT F GURE B 1 A S A D AGRAM SHOW NG
THE ORGAN ZATION OF TA POWER HEADQUARTERS AS SHOWN N F GURE II.B.2.B, EACH OF
THE ORGANIIZATIONOF TAIIPOWERHEADQUARTERS..AS SHOWN IINFIIGURE IIII.B.2.B,EACH OF
THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT S TES HAS A S MILAR ORGAN ZATION.
THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SIITESHAS A SIIMILARORGANIIZATION.


         At the present time, TAIPOWER is considering another change, whereby the Safety
section would be disassociated from the operation. In the opinion of the TEAM, both the
present and the planned solutions are possible, but the TEAM is reluctant to see major
organizational changes be made at too frequent intervals. It suggests that TAIPOWER
allows a sufficient time for one organization to fall into place and to be correctly implemented
at all levels, in order to be able to appreciate the advantages and disadvantages.

        THE GENERAL ORGANIIZATIION COMPRIISES A HEAD OFFIICE,,AND THREE SIITE
        THE GENERAL ORGAN ZAT ON COMPR SES A HEAD OFF CE AND THREE S TE
ORGAN ZATIONS. THE HEAD OFF CE EXERTS A CLOSE SURVE LLANCE OF THE ACT VITIES ON
ORGANIIZATIONS. THE HEAD OFFIICEEXERTS A CLOSE SURVEIILLANCEOF THE ACTIIVITIESON
EACH S TE. THE HEAD OFF CE SURVE LLANCE S OFTEN N THE COMMAND L NE, BECAUSE
EACH SIITE. THE HEAD OFFIICESURVEIILLANCE IIS OFTEN IIN THE COMMAND LIINE,BECAUSE
THERE S A MANDATORY PASSAGE OF NFORMATION NTO AND OUT OF THE HEAD OFF CE.
THERE IISA MANDATORY PASSAGE OF IINFORMATION IINTOAND OUT OF THE HEAD OFFIICE.
THIIS COMPLIICATES COMMUNIICATIION AND CAN IINCREASE LOSS OF TIIME..
TH S COMPL CATES COMMUN CAT ON AND CAN NCREASE LOSS OF T ME

        Moreover, it appears that both at Head Office and at the sites, decisions are made at
the highest level, and often after a meeting involving a large number of people. Of course,
coordination is mandatory, but other possibilities exist. Objectives can be clearly defined,
communicated, and understood; power and responsibilities at the appropriate level can be
written down. Then the follow-up of implementation and the resolution of a large number
of difficulties can be solved at each level of the organization, or by a limited number of
people, thereby leaving more time for each individual to perform productive activities,
preparations, and plant visits.

       THE TEAM WAS IINFORMED OF IINSTANCES WHERE SAFETY--RELATED MODIIFIICATIIONS
       THE TEAM WAS NFORMED OF NSTANCES WHERE SAFETY RELATED MOD F CAT ONS
HAD BEEN DELAYED FOR BUDGETARY REASONS OR OTHER CONSTRA NTS. T SEEMS THAT THE
HAD BEEN DELAYED FOR BUDGETARY REASONS OR OTHER CONSTRAIINTS. IIT SEEMS THAT THE
CONDIITIONS IINHERENTIIN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE ROC IIMPLIEDCONSTRAIINTS IINCLUDING
COND TIONS NHERENT N THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE ROC MPLIED CONSTRA NTS NCLUDING
F NANCIAL CONSTRA NTS AND DELAYS THAT WERE CERTA NLY COUNTERPRODUCT VE FOR THE
FIINANCIALCONSTRAIINTS AND DELAYS THAT WERE CERTAIINLYCOUNTERPRODUCTIIVE FOR THE
AVAIILABILITYOF THE REACTORS,,AND COULD EVEN BE DETRIIMENTAL TO SAFETY BY..
AVA LABILITY OF THE REACTORS AND COULD EVEN BE DETR MENTAL TO SAFETY BY

       In respect of the involvement of the management with the power plant operation, the
TEAM spotted some very praiseworthy decisions that demonstrate the active concrete
involvement of the management. Among these decisions, the TEAM notes the following
which are especially praiseworthy:

        - the installation of gas turbines at all three sites to cope with the possibility of
        electricity failure under the local conditions of typhoons and long connection lines
        between the north and the south of the island.
        - the decision to install an additional diesel generator at each site (made in
       accordance with the guidance of the PRAs -see section III.Q).

       - the decision to perform PRA studies as noted in section III.Q.

       - the decision to call upon the assistance of international organizations at frequent
       intervals. In section II the TEAM has already noted the inspections and reports of
       INPO and WANO; the TEAM also noted the decision to ask for help in specific topics
       such as chemistry, from utility companies in other countries and from
       architect-engineers (AEs) for help in organization of refueling outages or configuration
       management.

       The TEAM especially praises the desire of TAIPOWER to follow the recommendations
given at the end of these reports, but suggests that a higher priority be given to a discussion
and review of these recommendations rather than following them automatically.

       This might lead to alternate proposals. This recommendation applies to all plants, but
especially to KUOSHENG, where the efforts undertaken by the superintendent to improve the
team spirit and plant operating conditions should be supported to speed up the modifications
suggested by INPO.

         N CONCLUS ON THE TEAM CONS DERS THAT THE TA P OWER HEAD OFF CE
       IIN CONCLUSIION,, THE TEAM CONSIIDERS THAT THE TAIIPOWER HEAD OFFIICE
MANAGEMENT S FULLY AWARE OF TS' RESPONS BILITIES, AND THAT T R GHTLY CONS DERS
MANAGEMENT IIS FULLY AWARE OF IITS'RESPONSIIBILITIES,AND THAT IITRIIGHTLYCONSIIDERS
THAT WHATEVER THE REVIIEWSAND ACTIIONSOF THE SAFETY AND OTHER NATIIONAL
THAT WHATEVER THE REV EWS AND ACT ONS OF THE SAFETY AND OTHER NAT ONAL
AUTHOR TIES, T REMA NS THE ORGAN ZATION SOLELY RESPONS BLE FOR THE SAFE AND
AUTHORIITIES, IITREMAIINS THE ORGANIIZATIONSOLELY RESPONSIIBLE FOR THE SAFE AND
RELIIABLEOPERATIIONOF THE REACTORS AND THE PLANTS GENERALLY..
REL ABLE OPERAT ON OF THE REACTORS AND THE PLANTS GENERALLY

        The TEAM considers, however, that efforts should be made to improve communication
and understanding both between TAIPOWER and the authorities, and within TAIPOWER,
between the Head Office and the power plant sites, to improve mutual understanding and
reduce time losses. One efficient way to implement this suggestion might be to encourage
rotation of personnel between Head Office and the sites and between the sites.

        III.B.2 Safety Review and Inspection

        When considering the organization of the plants, the importance of friendly but proper
relations with the safety authorities (ROCAEC) cannot be overestimated.

       ATTACHED AS FIIGURES IIIIII..B..2..B AND IIIIII..B..2..C ARE TWO ORGANIIZATIION CHARTS THAT
       ATTACHED AS F GURES B 2 B AND B 2 C ARE TWO ORGAN ZAT ON CHARTS THAT
IINDICATE THE EXTENT OF THE ROLE OF THE AEC,,AND ESPECIIALLY THE NUCLEAR REGULATIION
 NDICATE THE EXTENT OF THE ROLE OF THE AEC AND ESPEC ALLY THE NUCLEAR REGULAT ON
DEPARTMENT,, WHIICHENCOMPASSES::
 DEPARTMENT WH CH ENCOMPASSES

       - a licensing section which covers the various aspects related to design.

       - an operational safety section which covers operation in its' various aspects.

       - an inspection section which covers construction (new plants but also modifications to
       existing plants), as well as maintenance.

       The licensing process is basically similar to the process in the USA, except that the
operating license is given for only 10 years, and has to be extended for additional 10 year
periods on the basis of a review of an updated Safety Analysis Report (SAR), plus a safety
assessment report. This is described in the Appendix V.F in the case of CHINSHAN, the
first plant to undergo this process. It is the view of the TEAM that this practice should be
encouraged. It allows the opportunity to make step changes, to introduce at the same time
plant modifications, documentation updating and adaptation of the training programs. The
TEAM considers this to be preferable to a process of continuous changes, although it is well
understood that the present process must be superseded whenever important safety-related
weaknesses appear, as they did after the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI).

        The TEAM received a presentation by the director of the regulatory section of the
AEC on the Safety Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants in ROC, which included a description
of the organization and objectives of AEC inspection activities during operation, testing,
refueling outages, accidental scrams and other incidents, and found them consistent with
practices around the world. The TEAM noticed that the communication chain, although
reasonable, was long:

PLANT ------> HEAD OFFIICE ------> AEC ------> HEAD OFFIICE ------> PLANT
PLANT > HEAD OFF CE > AEC > HEAD OFF CE > PLANT

        The TEAM, however, learned that each plant has a resident AEC inspector, and
informal communications are authorized between plant management and the resident
inspector to speed up the process. The TEAM, however, acquired the conviction that, at the
working level, the personnel sometimes take a limited view of the regulatory role. In a
similar vein to the remark about the determination of the root cause by the operators after an
incident, some members of the TEAM acquired the impression, while discussing with AEC
staff the incident referred to in Appendix V.G.2, that the inspectors tended to accept, without
sufficient criticism or verification, the measurements of TAIPOWER. Also, they accepted
the solution to the problem proposed by TAIPOWER without tracing the origin of the
situation to the ultimate root cause. An opportunity of improving the situation for the future
was therefore missed. Nor did they prepare a report for the public.

        THE TEAM HAS BEEN IINFORMED THAT THE STAFF OF ROCAEC HAS BEEN RECENTLY
         THE TEAM HAS BEEN NFORMED THAT THE STAFF OF ROCAEC HAS BEEN RECENTLY
 NCREASED.
IINCREASED. AEC NOW ROUTIINELY GIIVES OUT THEIIR OWN PRESS RELEASES AFTER AN
                AEC NOW ROUT NELY G VES OUT THE R OWN PRESS RELEASES AFTER AN
 NCIDENT, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT SSUE A TECHN CAL REPORT THE TEAM STRESSES THE
IINCIDENT, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT IISSUE A TECHNIICAL REPORT.. THE TEAM STRESSES THE
 MPORTANCE OF ACCEPT NG TH S SOMEWHAT EXPANDED ROLE BY THE ROCAEC AND TS' STAFF
IIMPORTANCE OF ACCEPTIING THIIS SOMEWHAT EXPANDED ROLE BY THE ROCAEC AND IITS' STAFF
AT ALL LEVELS..
 AT ALL LEVELS

        Beside these points, the TEAM considers that the organization that is in place is good,
and is oriented towards safety. However, the TEAM stresses:

       - that the independence of the safety authorities from the operating utility must
       continue to be maintained and explained carefully, (and frequently!) to the public and
       to the communications media;

       - that a pragmatic approach must nevertheless be maintained.         There is
       some danger that a desire to demonstrate the independence of the safety
       authority (AEC) could lead the latter to too restrictive a position;

       - AEC and TAIPOWER have to continue to work together to achieve the objectives of
       safe operation, of dose reduction to personnel, and to the public, as well as limiting the
       wastes to a minimum. This is not an easy compromise and requires a continuous
       effort of both parties.
       Maintaining the image of independence is certainly more difficult in a small country
with only one utility company than in a large one with several utility companies. The TEAM
noticed that the ROCAEC has sometimes been involved with promotion of nuclear power
which might be considered to compromise their objectivity in a safety review, while at the
same time it dealt with surveillance of the power plants, issuance of rules, and with research
and development. It is important to emphasize that the regulatory branch of ROCAEC is
independent of the other branches and reports directly to the Chairman.

        The necessary administrative independence of ROCAEC from TAIPOWER is
indicated by the fact that the activities of the AEC are supported by an internal budget
supported directly by the national budget of the ROC and by a licensing fee paid by
TAIPOWER independently of the actual surveillance that AEC implements. Moreover,
ROCAEC reports directly to the Prime Minister, and does not report through the Minister of
Economic Affairs. It is important, perhaps even vital, to continue to maintain and even to
strengthen this independence and show the public and the media this independence.

       IIT IIS ALSO IIMPORTANT TO REALIIZE THAT,,BEIING A SMALL ORGANIIZATIION,, THE AEC
         T S ALSO MPORTANT TO REAL ZE THAT BE NG A SMALL ORGAN ZAT ON THE AEC
DOES NOT HAVE RESOURCES COMPARABLE TO THOSE OF THE USNRC AND TO A GREATER
DOES NOT HAVE RESOURCES COMPARABLE TO THOSE OF THE USNRC AND TO A GREATER
EXTENT THEREFORE T USES THE EXPERT SE OF THE UT LITY, TA POWER, AND RESEARCH
EXTENT,, THEREFORE,, IITUSES THE EXPERTIISEOF THE UTIILITY,TAIIPOWER,AND RESEARCH
PERFORMED BY TA POWER TSELF OR REQUESTED BY TA POWER FROM OTHER
PERFORMED BY TAIIPOWERIITSELFOR REQUESTED BY TAIIPOWER FROM OTHER
ORGAN ZATIONS N ROC SUCH AS THE UN VERSITIES, OR FROM OVERSEAS ORGAN ZATIONS.
ORGANIIZATIONS IINROC,,SUCH AS THE UNIIVERSITIES,OR FROM OVERSEAS ORGANIIZATIONS.
THE ROLE OF THE IINSTIITUTE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY RESEARCH ((IINER))IIS LIIKE THAT OF A
THE ROLE OF THE NST TUTE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY RESEARCH NER S L KE THAT OF A
NATIIONALLABORATORY,, SIINCE IITIISA PART OF AEC ALTHOUGH PERFORMIINGRESEARCH
NAT ONAL LABORATORY S NCE T S A PART OF AEC ALTHOUGH PERFORM NG RESEARCH
UNDER CONTRACT TO TA POWER. THE AEC ROLE MUST THEREFORE BE TO REV EW THE
UNDER CONTRACT TO TAIIPOWER. THE AEC ROLE MUST THEREFORE BE TO REVIIEW THE
REPORTS AND MAKE UP TS' M ND, POSS BLY W TH THE HELP OF OVERSEAS CONSULTANTS OR
REPORTS AND MAKE UP IITS'MIIND,POSSIIBLYWIITH THE HELP OF OVERSEAS CONSULTANTS OR
SAFETY EXPERTS ON THE ACCEPTAB LITY OF THE CONCLUS ONS. THE TEAM CONS DERS TH S
SAFETY EXPERTS,,ON THE ACCEPTABIILITYOF THE CONCLUSIIONS. THE TEAM CONSIIDERS THIIS
TO BE REASONABLE N THE NAT ONAL ENV RONMENT.
TO BE REASONABLE IIN THE NATIIONALENVIIRONMENT.


        In conclusion, the TEAM considers that the present regulatory situation is satisfactory
from the safety aspect. The safety authorities should be careful to demonstrate to the public
their independence, while maintaining the pragmatism of the interactions with TAIPOWER
and its' employees.
Figure III.B.1.a here
Figure III.B.1.b here
FIIGURE IIIIII..B..2..A HERE
F GURE B 2 A HERE
Figure III.B.2.b here
III.C. SAFETY CULTURE

       III.C.1 What is a Safety Culture?

        IIT IIS IIMPORTANT THAT EVERY PERSON IINVOLVED WIITH THE NUCLEAR POWER
          T S MPORTANT THAT EVERY PERSON NVOLVED W TH THE NUCLEAR POWER
          ON TH NKS ABOUT SAFETY N EACH AND EVERY ONE OF H S ACT ONS. AS STATED N
OPERATIION THIINKSABOUT SAFETY IINEACH AND EVERY ONE OF HIISACTIIONS. AS STATED IIN
 OPERAT
 MANY POSTERS N THE USA "SAFETY S NO ACC DENT." NUCLEAR ELECTR CITY PRODUCERS
MANY POSTERS IIN THE USA "SAFETY IISNO ACCIIDENT." NUCLEAR ELECTRIICITYPRODUCERS
 THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WERE MADE PART CULARLY AWARE OF TH S MPORTANCE BY THE
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WERE MADE PARTIICULARLYAWARE OF THIIS IIMPORTANCEBY THE
 ACC DENT AT THE V I.LENIN ATOM C ENERGY STAT ON NEAR CHERNOBYL N THE UKRA NE.
ACCIIDENTAT THE V..I.LENINATOMIICENERGY STATIIONNEAR CHERNOBYL IINTHE UKRAIINE.
THE ATTIITUDE OF MIIND THAT ENCOURAGES THIIS HAS BEEN CALLED A "SAFETY CULTURE" AND
 THE ATT TUDE OF M ND THAT ENCOURAGES TH S HAS BEEN CALLED A "SAFETY CULTURE" AND
 TH S EXPRESS ON HAS NOW NTERNATIONAL IAEA) APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE A NUMBER
THIISEXPRESSIIONHAS NOW IINTERNATIONAL((IAEA)APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE..A NUMBER
OF RECOMMENDATIIONSHAVE BEEN MADE BY IINTERNATIONALCOMMIITTEES AND THE TEAM
 OF RECOMMENDAT ONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY NTERNATIONAL COMM TTEES AND THE TEAM
 MAKES PART CULAR REFERENCE TO THE REPORT BY A COMM TTEE OF THE AEA, NUMBERED
MAKES PARTIICULARREFERENCE TO THE REPORT BY A COMMIITTEEOF THE IIAEA,NUMBERED
IINSAG3,,AND ENTIITLED "SAFETY PRIINCIIPLES"..
  NSAG3 AND ENT TLED "SAFETY PR NC PLES"

        There are many aspects to a Safety Culture. The designer uses defense-in-depth and
analyses the final design with a PRA; the operator trains with simulators, safety rules are
openly discussed, and willingly obeyed; inspectors are thanked for bringing (occasional)
violations to the notice of colleagues and management.

           THE ADVIISORY COMMIITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS ((ACRS))OF THE US NRC HAS
           THE ADV SORY COMM TTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS ACRS OF THE US NRC HAS
 WARNED AGA NST EXCESS VE REL ANCE ON THE "BOTTOM L NE" OF A PRA TO EXPRESS THE
WARNED AGAIINSTEXCESSIIVERELIIANCEON THE "BOTTOM LIINE"OF A PRA TO EXPRESS THE
 SAFETY OF A POWER PLANT THE TEAM RE TERATES TH S WARN NG. THE TOTAL CORE
SAFETY OF A POWER PLANT.. THE TEAM REIITERATES THIIS WARNIING.THE TOTAL CORE
 DAMAGE FREQUENCY CALCULATED N A PRA SEEMS AT F RST TO BE A GOOD NDICATOR. BUT
DAMAGE FREQUENCY CALCULATED IINA PRA SEEMS AT FIIRST TO BE A GOOD IINDICATOR. BUT
 T S MPORTANT TO RECOGN ZE AND UNDERSTAND THE PREM SES AND ASSUMPT ONS THAT GO
IIT IIS IIMPORTANTTO RECOGNIIZEAND UNDERSTAND THE PREMIISESAND ASSUMPTIIONS THAT GO
 NTO A PRA THESE NCLUDE PROBAB LITIES OF COMPONENT FA LURE, EXPECTAT ON OF
IINTOA PRA.. THESE IINCLUDEPROBABIILITIESOF COMPONENT FAIILURE,EXPECTATIIONOF
 OPERATOR PERFORMANCE N UNDERSTAND NG AND EXECUT NG THE OPERAT ONAL
OPERATOR PERFORMANCE IINUNDERSTANDIINGAND EXECUTIING THE OPERATIIONAL
 PROCEDURES THESE N TURN ARE COMPLEX FUNCT ONS OF MA NTENANCE, EDUCAT ON AND
PROCEDURES.. THESE IINTURN ARE COMPLEX FUNCTIIONSOF MAIINTENANCE, EDUCATIIONAND
THE MANAGEMENT WHIICHSUPERVIISESALL OF THESE.. THE ACRS POIINTED OUT,, THEREFORE,,
 THE MANAGEMENT WH CH SUPERV SES ALL OF THESE        THE ACRS PO NTED OUT THEREFORE
THAT A PRA IISMOST RELIIABLE IINASSESSIING THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ENSEMBLE OF POWER
 THAT A PRA     S MOST REL ABLE N ASSESS NG THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ENSEMBLE OF POWER
PLANTS AFTER ALL OF THESE FACTORS ARE KNOWN;;ALTHOUGH IIT IISUSED MUCH MORE
 PLANTS AFTER ALL OF THESE FACTORS ARE KNOWN ALTHOUGH T S USED MUCH MORE
 QUAL TATIVELY N DES GN AND CONS DERATION OF MOD FICATIONS.
QUALIITATIVELY IINDESIIGNAND CONSIIDERATIONOF MODIIFICATIONS.


       The management and organization of TAIPOWER, and documentation by
TAIPOWER seem well established. However, the TEAM noted several places where the
"Safety Culture" can be improved. These are noted below in III.C.5.

       IIIIII..C..2 FOUNDATIIONS OF A SAFETY CULTURE
               C 2 FOUNDAT ONS OF A SAFETY CULTURE

               The Safety Culture must be, above all, the state of mind of all personnel whose
actions may have an effect on safety, particularly nuclear safety, from top to bottom of the
hierarchy. This state of mind can be seen in terms of an individual and collective attitude
which consists of paying especial attention to all problems which arise that may have an
importance for safety. This attitude must be paramount and take precedence over all other
legitimate concerns of TAIPOWER. Insofar as Man first, and then the Organization to
which he belongs, is considered, it is not easy to define how to implement a Safety Culture.
Nonetheless there are five basic principles which can be identified, which must be respected:

       IIIIII..C..2..A
               C2A       RESPONSIIBIILIITIIES
                         RESPONS B L T ES

               Starting at the very highest level of the hierarchy, every manager must set up a
structure in which the responsibility, particularly for safety, of every element and person in
the organization for which he is responsible is clearly defined. It must be clearly understood
by every such element and person in the organization. There must be absolutely no
ambiguity about the areas of responsibility of the staff. The manager must also ensure that
this structure enables him to exercise his own responsibility.

       IIIIII..C..2..B
               C2B        TRAIINIING
                          TRA N NG

              In order to understand fully the significance of their responsibilities, all
personnel must be aware of the safety consequences of any inadequate performance of their
jobs. This covers both the intentional and the unintentional violation of any procedures for
which they are responsible. This knowledge is acquired through the initial and through
continuous subsequent training.

       IIIIII..C..2..C
               C2C                DIISCIIPLIINE
                                  D SC PL NE

                Whatever the quality of the documentation and the training, the application in
the field depends upon the behavior of each individual, and can be dependent upon their
personal motivation and personal concerns. Management has an important role to play; it
must create a working environment which facilitates the correct performance of their jobs;
management must set up an assessment system which can effectively detect shortfalls;
suggest solutions; and make sure that everyone can be confident that the system is working
for the benefit of all. Management must not, however, forget the disciplinary aspect, and
must know how to apply it for serious or repeated breaches of safe working practices, as the
general atmosphere of the Safety Culture will be undermined if such breaches are not
promptly and effectively dealt with.

       IIIIII..C..2..D
               C2D        CONTROL
                          CONTROL

               Every manager must have the means at his disposal to enable him to follow the
day to day operation of the Safety Culture. This implies the use of audits, the quality of the
safety organizations, and also the use of indicators. Indicators may include but not be limited
to, the frequency and number of safety meetings, the number of times an alarm is set off in
the control room, or the number of straps in the electrical circuits.

       IIIIII..C..2..E
               C2E        COMMIITMENT
                          COMM TMENT

                Operating personnel must not be allowed to feel that management is more
concerned with productivity or profitability than safety. Example must come from above.
Every level of management must be seen by its' actions to be personally committed to the
safety of the operation through specific follow-up, work-place visits and the like. The
essential condition for a true Safety Culture is a commitment freely agreed upon by all.

       IIIIII..C..3 THE TAIIPOWER POSIITIION
               C 3 THE TA POWER POS T ON

               These essential principles of a Safety Culture have been identified by
TAIPOWER management, who seem to be convinced of the necessity of the concept. The
assimilation and spreading of the safety culture across the whole hierarchy varies from one
nuclear power plant site to another.

       IIIIII..C..4 IIMPORTANCE OF PROPER ROUTIINE WORK
               C 4 MPORTANCE OF PROPER ROUT NE WORK

                   The maintenance of safety, not only nuclear related safety but industrial safety
generally, is contingent upon the continuous proper routine work activities, every day, of all
related personnel. This proper performance of routine work, even in small details, is
different from, but as important as, the documentation prepared by management.

       IIT IIS OBVIIOUSLY THE RESPONSIIBIILIITY OF MANAGEMENT TO PUT ACROSS THESE IIDEAS,,
         T S OBV OUSLY THE RESPONS B L TY OF MANAGEMENT TO PUT ACROSS THESE DEAS
TO PROMOTE THEIIRPERFORMANCE,, TO PROMOTE EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS AMONGST THE
TO PROMOTE THE R PERFORMANCE TO PROMOTE EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS AMONGST THE
OPERAT NG PERSONNEL SO THAT THEY THEMSELVES CAN DENTIFY THE PROBLEMS AS SOON AS
OPERATIINGPERSONNEL SO THAT THEY THEMSELVES CAN IIDENTIFY THE PROBLEMS AS SOON AS
THEY AR SE. THE TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT THE D FFERENT POWER PLANT SUPER NTENDENTS,
THEY ARIISE. THE TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT THE DIIFFERENTPOWER PLANT SUPERIINTENDENTS,
TOGETHER WIITHOTHER APPROPRIIATEPERSONNEL,,VIISITEACH OTHER''S PLANTS TO CRIITICIZEEACH
TOGETHER W TH OTHER APPROPR ATE PERSONNEL V SIT EACH OTHER S PLANTS TO CR TICIZE EACH
OTHER,,AND LEARN FROM EACH OTHER HOW BEST TO EMPHASIIZETHIIS SAFETY CULTURE..
OTHER AND LEARN FROM EACH OTHER HOW BEST TO EMPHAS ZE TH S SAFETY CULTURE

        Ensuring a Safety Culture is, perhaps most difficult, but no less important, when
applied to outside contract workers. The TEAM has no doubt that the Safety Culture in
TAIPOWER is better than in Taiwan society as a whole. It is essential that this continue to
be the case. The TEAM notes that one of the causes considered for an unscheduled reactor
trip on KUOSHENG unit 1 was interference signal caused by a welding operation by a
contract welder. Although there is no certainty, this emphasizes the need for strict training
and checking, of all contract workers.

       IIIIII..C..5 EVIIDENCE OF DEFIICIIENCIIES
               C 5 EV DENCE OF DEF C ENC ES

               In its' visits to the power plants the TEAM found considerable variations:

      - In one case puddles of drain water that had leaked from some valves were left on the
      floor without any warnings. There was no identification of what kind of water had
      leaked: radioactive, chemically toxic etc. There was no temporary hosing to an
      equipment drain.

      - A safety rail around an access hatch in the third floor of a building was easily
      shaken and therefore in a dangerous condition.

      - At KUOSHENG the floor inside the containment was untidy.


      - At KUOSHENG there were several packages wrapped in plastic film in the
      auxiliary building and the fuel building. Their presence could well impede fire
      fighters, and therefore their presence does not provide evidence of a positive attitude
      towards a Safety Culture.

      - at KUOSHENG, a security guard was smoking (and smoking is forbidden) and none
      of the TAIPOWER staff reminded him of the violation.

        Although these violations are not direct contributors to nuclear safety, some are major
contributors to ordinary industrial safety, and all are symptomatic of a lack of a "Safety
Culture". It is important for every individual to do the right thing, or nobody will do the
right thing. In this, management must take the lead and advise.

        AT MAANSHAN,, IIN CONTRAST TO KUOSHENG,,THE BUIILDIINGS SEEN BY THE
         AT MAANSHAN N CONTRAST TO KUOSHENG THE BU LD NGS SEEN BY THE
TEAM,,IINCLUDIING A STORAGE WAREHOUSE,, WERE IIMPECCABLE.. UNFORTUNATELY,,A VIISIIT
 TEAM NCLUD NG A STORAGE WAREHOUSE WERE MPECCABLE UNFORTUNATELY A V S T
IINSIDE THE CONTAIINMENTDURIINGOPERATIION WAS IINAPPROPRIATE FOR A PWR AND
 NSIDE THE CONTA NMENT DUR NG OPERAT ON WAS NAPPROPRIATE FOR A PWR AND
 CORRECTLY D SALLOWED BY THE HEALTH PHYS CS RADIATION SAFETY D VISION, SO THAT A
CORRECTLY DIISALLOWED BY THE HEALTH PHYSIICS ((RADIATIONSAFETY))DIIVISION,SO THAT A
 D RECT COMPAR SON W TH KUOSHENG WAS MPOSSIBLE.
DIIRECTCOMPARIISONWIITHKUOSHENG WAS IIMPOSSIBLE.
III.D   OPERATION

                III.D.1 General

               This section deals with "Operation" in the broad sense, including topics such
as procedures, education and training, housekeeping and experience feedback.

      THE TEAM HAS VIISIITED THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND HELD MEETIINGS
       THE TEAM HAS V S TED THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND HELD MEET NGS
WIITHRELEVANT OPERATIIONPERSONNEL..
W TH RELEVANT OPERAT ON PERSONNEL

        Several visits and inspections have already been performed on this topic, mainly by
INPO and by WANO-TC. Following these visits, recommendations have been issued.
TAIPOWER assessed these recommendations and adopted a large majority of them. For that,
a betterment program and follow-up have been implemented by TAIPOWER.

        DUE TO THE GOALS OF IITS MIISSIION,,IIT IIS NOT THE IINTENTIION OF THE TEAM TO ASSESS
        DUE TO THE GOALS OF TS M SS ON T S NOT THE NTENT ON OF THE TEAM TO ASSESS
   S TOP C N THE SAME DETA LED WAY AS NPO, BUT TS PURPOSE S TO SUGGEST SOME
THIIS TOPIIC IIN THE SAME DETAIILED WAY AS IINPO,BUT IITSPURPOSE IIS TO SUGGEST SOME
TH
RECOMMENDAT ONS N ORDER TO ASS ST THE MPLEMENTATION OF THE ONGO NG BETTERMENT
RECOMMENDATIIONS IINORDER TO ASSIISTTHE IIMPLEMENTATIONOF THE ONGOIINGBETTERMENT
PROGRAM..
PROGRAM

         A successful and satisfactory operation result is achieved if several conditions are
fulfilled at the same time:

         - there are motivated personnel in sufficient number, adequately trained and
        indoctrinated with a Safety Culture (see III.C).

        - there is a strong experience feed-back organization which enables an adequate
        assessment of adverse operating events and information provided to all affected people
        in order to prevent recurrence of these events.

        - there are upgraded procedures available to face all the most conceivable situations

        III.D.2 Operating Procedures

             AS FAR AS PROCEDURES ARE CONCERNED,,OPERATORS HAVE A COMPLETE SET
              AS FAR AS PROCEDURES ARE CONCERNED OPERATORS HAVE A COMPLETE SET
OF OPERAT NG PROCEDURES AT THE R D SPOSAL. THE V SITS N THE CONTROL ROOMS HAVE
OF OPERATIINGPROCEDURES AT THEIIRDIISPOSAL.THE VIISITS IIN THE CONTROL ROOMS HAVE
SHOWN THAT NORMAL,, IINCIDENTALAND ACCIIDENTALPROCEDURES WERE PRESENT AND
SHOWN THAT NORMAL NCIDENTAL AND ACC DENTAL PROCEDURES WERE PRESENT AND
PROMPTLY AVA LABLE.
PROMPTLY AVAIILABLE.


       The TEAM has noticed that there is a number of temporary modifications that seem to
be permanent. This number can be considered as an indicator of quality in operation.
Reducing this number should be a pertinent target for management staff. Some of these
temporary modifications, mainly those which are safety related, are still valid for one year or
more! This is too long and should be accelerated. Since it is at the boundary between
TAIPOWER and ROCAEC responsibilities, both organizations should pay attention to it.

        THERE S ONE REMA N NG N PO RECOMMENDAT ON CONCERN NG TAGG NG AND
        THERE IIS ONE REMAIINIING IINPO RECOMMENDATIION CONCERNIING TAGGIING AND
SYSTEM REAL GNMENT THAT TA POWER DOES NOT NTEND TO MPLEMENT, THE REASON
SYSTEM REALIIGNMENTTHAT TAIIPOWERDOES NOT IINTEND TO IIMPLEMENT, THE REASON
BEIING THAT THE SIITUATIONSARE NON REPETIITIVE AND IITIISBETTER TO TRUST THE SHIIFT
BE NG THAT THE S TUATIONS ARE NON REPET TIVE AND T S BETTER TO TRUST THE SH FT
SUPERVIISOR IIN EACH CASE..
SUPERV SOR N EACH CASE

        The TEAM is convinced that the system realignment process comprises many common
attitudes and good practices according to the equipment involved. TAIPOWER should set-up
a guideline for that purpose.

       III.D.3 Experience Feedback

              TAIPOWER has set up an organization to deal with this issue. Problems raised
during Operation are properly investigated and the main lessons to be drawn are brought to
light.

       AN IIMPORTANT POIINT IIS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF IINCIIDENTS,, FOR IINSTANCE TRIIPS
        AN MPORTANT PO NT S TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF NC DENTS FOR NSTANCE TR PS
OCCURRED SEVERAL TIIMESWHEN CHANGIING LOW//HIGH FEEDWATER FLOW RATE IIN
OCCURRED SEVERAL T MES WHEN CHANG NG LOW HIGH FEEDWATER FLOW RATE N
STEAM GENERATORS MAANSHAN). PREVENT NG SUCH AN NCIDENT FROM RECURR NG
STEAM--GENERATORS((MAANSHAN).PREVENTIINGSUCH AN IINCIDENTFROM RECURRIING
REQU RES SEVERAL ACT ONS: F RST ON DES GN, N CHECK NG THE ADEQUACY AND RESPONSE
REQUIIRESSEVERAL ACTIIONS: FIIRSTON DESIIGN, IIN CHECKIING THE ADEQUACY AND RESPONSE
TIIMEOF IINSTRUMENTATIONAND CONTROL AND REPLACIING IIFNECESSARY,, SECOND IIN
T ME OF NSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL AND REPLAC NG F NECESSARY SECOND N
TRA NING OPERATORS N ORDER THAT THEY FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SENS TIVITY OF TH S
TRAIININGOPERATORS IINORDER THAT THEY FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SENSIITIVITYOF THIIS
OPERATIIONPHASE,, THIIRD IINDIISSEMINATING IINFORMATIONAT THE APPROPRIIATE LEVEL IIN
OPERAT ON PHASE TH RD N D SSEMINATING NFORMATION AT THE APPROPR ATE LEVEL N
ORDER TO MAKE SURE THAT EVERY OPERATOR KNOWS WHAT HAS HAPPENED ELSEWHERE..THIIS
ORDER TO MAKE SURE THAT EVERY OPERATOR KNOWS WHAT HAS HAPPENED ELSEWHERE TH S
LAST PO NT S PART CULARLY MPORTANT BECAUSE T PREVENTS AND L MITS D SCIPLINARY
LAST POIINT IISPARTIICULARLY IIMPORTANTBECAUSE IITPREVENTS AND LIIMITSDIISCIPLINARY
ACT ONS.
ACTIIONS.


       TAIPOWER should also set up a system to check that these objectives are effectively
met and which makes the management staff sure that the different messages are perfectly
understood at the appropriate level.

        Several incidents, mainly during maintenance activities, have shown the necessity to
get a procedure of agreement of subcontractors: this point is directly linked to Quality issues.
TAIPOWER plans to have such a procedure next year at its disposal and is developing a
special training program for subcontractors.

       The Team recommends that these provisions be accelerated. Then their efficiency
should be checked, because a lot of incidents originate from a lack of subcontractor
education.

        TAIPOWER is also aware of methodologies and practices used in this field. For
instance the TEAM has seen a notebook dedicated to root cause analysis and used by relevant
personnel. Additional chapters could be added, for instance on fault analysis, in order to fully
cover this topic.

       The Station Operation Review Committee (SORC) seems to play the most important
role in deciding what measures to adopt to improve the plant performance in the NPP.
Adding unique or single purpose items like "Zero Defect" to SORC's current function items
might be helpful to improve plant performance.




       IIIIII..D..4 HOUSEKEEPIING
               D 4 HOUSEKEEP NG

                Housekeeping is not by itself a safety issue, but can be considered as an
indicator of the general frame of mind of those involved with operation. As it has already
been mentioned in III-C, the situation is different from one site to another. A special effort
has to be made at KUOSHENG site. There were cans of paint on the floor and walls and
there were packages in the different buildings of the nuclear island. The TEAM considers that
these packages must be stored elsewhere in order to limit fire consequences and to facilitate
personnel movements.

       IINPO HAS ON TWO SUCCESSIIVE VIISIITS TO KUOSHENG RECOMMENDED IINCREASED
         NPO HAS ON TWO SUCCESS VE V S TS TO KUOSHENG RECOMMENDED NCREASED
         ON TO HOUSEKEEP NG. THE TEAM NOTES THAT ENOUGH ATTENT ON HAS NOT YET
ATTENTIION TO HOUSEKEEPIING. THE TEAM NOTES THAT ENOUGH ATTENTIIONHAS NOT YET
ATTENT
BEEN PA D TO TH S PO NT.
BEEN PAIID TO THIISPOIINT.


       There is a procedure that defines the general requirements to be met in the cleanliness
area. The TEAM thinks that this procedure could be usefully complemented by a set of
particular procedures describing specific requirements according to the different rooms and
operation phases of the plant: the requirements can be different during normal operation or
during outages.

       III.D.5 Operator Training

               At this moment, TAIPOWER implements a large training program based both
on courses, lessons and use of the simulator existing at each plant.

       THE TEAM HAS NOTIICED THAT THE SIIMULATOR CONTROL ROOM IIS NOT CONSIISTENT
        THE TEAM HAS NOT CED THAT THE S MULATOR CONTROL ROOM S NOT CONS STENT
W TH THE ACTUAL CONTROL ROOM AS THE SAFETY PARAMETER D SPLAY SYSTEM SPDS) S
WIITH THE ACTUAL CONTROL ROOM AS THE SAFETY PARAMETER DIISPLAYSYSTEM ((SPDS) IIS
NOT REPRESENTED..HOWEVER,, THE TEAM WAS TOLD THAT AN IIMPROVEMENTPROGRAM IIS
NOT REPRESENTED HOWEVER THE TEAM WAS TOLD THAT AN MPROVEMENT PROGRAM S
UNDERWAY AND THAT THE PRESENT SIITUATIONSHOULD BE CORRECTED IIN1993 AT
UNDERWAY AND THAT THE PRESENT S TUATION SHOULD BE CORRECTED N 1993 AT
CH N SHAN AND MAANSHAN PLANTS THE LATTER W LL ALSO PROV DE A TWO PHASE
CHIINSHAN AND MAANSHAN PLANTS..THE LATTER WIILL ALSO PROVIIDE A TWO PHASE
S MULATION.
SIIMULATION.


        Licensed operators must comply with a periodic retraining on an annual basis (160
hrs) to get license renewal.

      A TRAIINIING PROGRAM IIS SIIGNIIFIICANT WHEN IIT IIS ACCOMPANIIED BY AN EVALUATIION
      A TRA N NG PROGRAM S S GN F CANT WHEN T S ACCOMPAN ED BY AN EVALUAT ON
PROGRAM WH CH ASSESSES THE RESULTS OBTA NED ON EACH NDIVIDUAL. THE TEAM
PROGRAM WHIICHASSESSES THE RESULTS OBTAIINEDON EACH IINDIVIDUAL.THE TEAM
ENCOURAGES TA POWER TO ENHANCE SUCH AN EVALUAT ON PROGRAM
ENCOURAGES TAIIPOWERTO ENHANCE SUCH AN EVALUATIIONPROGRAM..


        TAIPOWER operates its nuclear power plants in a satisfactory way. The basic safety
principles which rule operational safety are understood and implemented by TAIPOWER.

       IIN MOST RESPECTS,, THE RELATIIONS WIITH THE AEC ARE GOOD,,ALLOWIING EFFIICIIENT
         N MOST RESPECTS THE RELAT ONS W TH THE AEC ARE GOOD ALLOW NG EFF C ENT
 MPLEMENTATION OF TECHN CAL SSUES. N SOME CASES THE T ME ALLOWED TO GET AN
IIMPLEMENTATIONOF TECHNIICALIISSUES. IINSOME CASES,, THE TIIMEALLOWED TO GET AN
ANSWER OR TO BE AUTHORIIZED TO GO ON,,COULD BE SHORTENED..
 ANSWER OR TO BE AUTHOR ZED TO GO ON COULD BE SHORTENED

        Due to the geographic position of TAIWAN, TAIPOWER is a long distance from
other utilities that have achieved a good performance. A possible mean could be to strengthen
the cooperation program with overseas utilities, for instance by twinning actions between
TAIPOWER plants and foreign plants, with periodic exchanges of results and good practices.

       TRAIINIING IIS A KEY CONTRIIBUTOR TO THE ACHIIEVEMENT OF SAFETY IIN OPERATIIONS..
       TRA N NG S A KEY CONTR BUTOR TO THE ACH EVEMENT OF SAFETY N OPERAT ONS
THIIS IISSUE CANNOT BE FULLY ASSESSED WIITHOUT AN IIN DEPTH ANALYSIIS WHIICH TAKES IINTO
 TH S SSUE CANNOT BE FULLY ASSESSED W THOUT AN N DEPTH ANALYS S WH CH TAKES NTO
 ACCOUNT ALL THE ASPECTS OF TRA NING: SELECT ON OF PERSONNEL TRA NING PROGRAMS
ACCOUNT ALL THE ASPECTS OF TRAIINING:SELECTIIONOF PERSONNEL,, TRAIININGPROGRAMS
((IINCLUDIING USE OF SIIMULATOR)),,QUALIIFIICATIION AND LIICENSIING,,RETRAIINIING,,EVALUATIION
    NCLUD NG USE OF S MULATOR QUAL F CAT ON AND L CENS NG RETRA N NG EVALUAT ON
 OF TRA NEES.
OF TRAIINEES.


       The human aspects should also be examined: attraction of good candidates, selection
criteria, career development, promotion and incentives.

        THESE LAST POIINTS ARE ALSO ADDRESSED IIN SECTIION IIIIII..S "SOCIIAL ASPECTS",,BUT
        THESE LAST PO NTS ARE ALSO ADDRESSED N SECT ON S "SOC AL ASPECTS" BUT
ARE OF PART CULAR MPORTANCE N THE TRA NING AREA BECAUSE OF THE MPORTANCE OF
ARE OF PARTIICULAR IIMPORTANCE IIN THE TRAIINING AREA BECAUSE OF THE IIMPORTANCEOF
GETTIINGCOMPETENT AND MOTIIVATEDPEOPLE IIN THE LONG TERM.. THAT IISA REASON WHY
GETT NG COMPETENT AND MOT VATED PEOPLE N THE LONG TERM THAT S A REASON WHY
TH S TOP C S DENTIFIED N SECT ON V.B AS AN AREA FOR FURTHER EVALUAT ON.
THIIS TOPIIC IIS IIDENTIFIED IINSECTIION IIV.BAS AN AREA FOR FURTHER EVALUATIION.


       Such an analysis has already begun, mainly on the technical aspects, with the INPO
technical visits. The TEAM encourages TAIPOWER to continue in this direction and to
broaden the scope, with the assistance of competent organizations, in order to continuously
improve its' performance.
III.E   MAINTENANCE

       The TEAM visited TAIPOWER Head Office, Maintenance Training Center and three
nuclear power plants operated by TAIPOWER, and had a number of meetings with
TAIPOWER personnel. In all these meetings, the TEAM were provided with detailed
information on the Head Office, Maintenance Training Center and the Nuclear Power Plants
and their operations. In these meetings, including presentations by TAIPOWER, discussions
and facility tours escorted by TAIPOWER personnel, members of the TEAM asked a number
of questions and got both oral and written answers.

      MAIINTENANCE WORK DURIING A REFUELIING OUTAGE IIS CLASSIIFIIED IINTO THREE
       MA NTENANCE WORK DUR NG A REFUEL NG OUTAGE S CLASS F ED NTO THREE
CATEGOR ES. THE WORK DONE BY TA POWER ENG NEERS AND TECHN CIANS; THE WORK
CATEGORIIES. THE WORK DONE BY TAIIPOWERENGIINEERSAND TECHNIICIANS;THE WORK
DONE BY LOCAL CONTRACTORS UNDER TA POWER SUPERV SION, AND THE WORK DONE BY
DONE BY LOCAL CONTRACTORS UNDER TAIIPOWERSUPERVIISION,AND THE WORK DONE BY
EACH OF THE NSSS VENDORS,,TURBIINEGENERATOR VENDORS AND EQUIIPMENT
EACH OF THE NSSS VENDORS TURB NE GENERATOR VENDORS AND EQU PMENT
MANUFACTURERS UNDER TA POWER SUPERV SION. THE VOLUME OF MA NTENANCE WORK N
MANUFACTURERS UNDER TAIIPOWERSUPERVIISION. THE VOLUME OF MAIINTENANCE WORK IIN
TERMS OF MAN DAYS S AROUND 70% 25% AND 5% RESPECT VELY. MA NTENANCE WORK
TERMS OF MAN--DAYS IISAROUND 70%,,25% AND 5%,,RESPECTIIVELY. MAIINTENANCE WORK
DONE BY NSSS VENDORS,,TURBIINEGENERATOR VENDORS AND EQUIIPMENTMANUFACTURERS IIS
DONE BY NSSS VENDORS TURB NE GENERATOR VENDORS AND EQU PMENT MANUFACTURERS S
L MITED TO THE R OWN MANUFACTURED EQU PMENT AND COMPONENTS WH CH ARE MOSTLY
LIIMITED TO THEIIROWN MANUFACTURED EQUIIPMENTAND COMPONENTS WHIICHARE MOSTLY
KEY COMPONENTS OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT,, AND THEY GENERALLY DIISPATCH THEIIR
KEY COMPONENTS OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND THEY GENERALLY D SPATCH THE R
SUPERVIISORSAND ONLY THEIIRHIIGHLYSKIILLEDWORKERS.. THEREFORE,,MOST OF THE
SUPERV SORS AND ONLY THE R H GHLY SK LLED WORKERS THEREFORE MOST OF THE
MA NTENANCE WORK HAS BEEN EXECUTED BY TA POWER TSELF AND TS' LOCAL
MAIINTENANCEWORK HAS BEEN EXECUTED BY TAIIPOWERIITSELFAND IITS'LOCAL
CONTRACTORS..
CONTRACTORS

        From another point of view, almost all equipment and components of the three nuclear
power plants were imported from outside, mostly from USA, so that it seems logical for
TAIPOWER to rely upon themselves in maintenance work. (The discussion here is mainly
limited to maintenance work during a refueling outage. If the discussion were extended to
maintenance work during operation, the percentage of TAIPOWER'S direct maintenance
work would be much higher).

      THE TEAM'S EVALUATIION OF,,AND RECOMMENDATIIONS ABOUT,,THE NUCLEAR POWER
       THE TEAM'S EVALUAT ON OF AND RECOMMENDAT ONS ABOUT THE NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT MA NTENANCE ACT VITIES OF TA POWER, ARE AS FOLLOWS
PLANT MAIINTENANCEACTIIVITIESOF TAIIPOWER,ARE AS FOLLOWS::


        III.E.1 Evaluation of Maintenance Performance from Plant Performance Indicators.

                The trend of the plant performance can be directly or indirectly revealed in
the Plant Performance Indicators, such as "Unit Capability Factor"and the "Forced Outage
Rate" for each plant. These are discussed in detail in section III.K (Betterment) where by
comparison with INPO and WANO indicators, it is suggested that the main performance
factors have recently been improving.

        III.E.2 Site Tour, Interview and Discussion with the Site Personnel

               The following are a few impressions for each nuclear power plant.


        1) CHINSHAN

        DIIFFERENT MEMBERS OF THE TEAM VIISIITED CHIINSHAN ON THREE DIIFFERENT
        D FFERENT MEMBERS OF THE TEAM V S TED CH NSHAN ON THREE D FFERENT
       ONS. TH S AFFORDED THE OPPORTUN TY OF SEE NG F RST CH NSHAN 2 AND THEN
OCCASIIONS. THIISAFFORDED THE OPPORTUNIITYOF SEEIING FIIRSTCHIINSHAN2 AND THEN
OCCAS
CH N SHAN 1 N THE END OF CYCLE EOC 10 OUTAGE N EACH CASE THE OTHER WAS
CHIINSHAN 1 IIN THE END--OF--CYCLE ((EOC--10))OUTAGE.. IIN EACH CASE,,THE OTHER WAS
SEEN N OPERAT ON.
SEEN IINOPERATIION.
        When in operation, only a few annunciators were seen lit on the main control panel in
either of the two reactors. Those which were lit were not essential in safe and reliable
operation. This gave us the feeling that the plant was operated in a well-maintained
condition. (An exception was the brief visit on December 2nd when a number of annunciators
had just appeared.)

       WHEN THE TEAM FIIRST VIISIITED CHIINSHAN,,UNIIT 2 WAS IIN THE EOC--10 OUTAGE..
       WHEN THE TEAM F RST V S TED CH NSHAN UN T 2 WAS N THE EOC 10 OUTAGE
THOUGH THE STATUS OF THE OUTAGE WAS NOT IIN THE FIINAL STAGE,, THE AREAS THE TEAM
 THOUGH THE STATUS OF THE OUTAGE WAS NOT N THE F NAL STAGE THE AREAS THE TEAM
 SURVEYED WERE CLEAN AND REASONABLY WELL ORGAN ZED. A FEW LEAKY DRA N VALVES
SURVEYED WERE CLEAN AND REASONABLY WELL ORGANIIZED. A FEW LEAKY DRAIINVALVES
OF SMALL SIIZE WERE SEEN ALONG THE SURVEY ROUTE.. IIFTHERE WERE LEAKY DRAIINVALVES
 OF SMALL S ZE WERE SEEN ALONG THE SURVEY ROUTE F THERE WERE LEAKY DRA N VALVES
 N OTHER AREAS AND LEAKAGE OCCURRED OCCAS ONALLY, THE TEAM FEELS THAT
IINOTHER AREAS AND LEAKAGE OCCURRED OCCASIIONALLY, THE TEAM FEELS THAT
 TA P OWER SHOULD DEVELOP AND MPLEMENT A PREVENT VE T METABLE
TAIIPOWER SHOULD DEVELOP AND IIMPLEMENT A PREVENTIIVE TIIMETABLE..

       2) KUOSHENG

      BOTH UNIITS WERE IIN OPERATIION WHEN THE TEAM VIISIITED IIN OCTOBER.. THE
       BOTH UN TS WERE N OPERAT ON WHEN THE TEAM V S TED N OCTOBER THE
HOUSEKEEP NG WAS NOT AS GOOD AS AT CH NSHAN, AS NOTED N II.C.5 AND II.H.
HOUSEKEEPIINGWAS NOT AS GOOD AS AT CHIINSHAN,AS NOTED IIN IIII.C.5 AND IIII.H.
OTHERWIISE,,THEY WERE WELL ORGANIIZED,,AND ONLY A FEW,,NOT IIMPORTANT ANNUNCIIATORS
OTHERW SE THEY WERE WELL ORGAN ZED AND ONLY A FEW NOT MPORTANT ANNUNC ATORS
WERE SEEN LIITON MAIINCONTROL ROOM PANELS AND THE TEAM HAD AN IIMPRESSION THAT
WERE SEEN L T ON MA N CONTROL ROOM PANELS AND THE TEAM HAD AN MPRESSION THAT
BOTH UN TS WERE OPERATED N WELL MAINTAINED COND TION. THE TEAM MADE ANOTHER
BOTH UNIITS WERE OPERATED IIN WELL--MAINTAINEDCONDIITION. THE TEAM MADE ANOTHER
V SIT NSIDE THE REACTOR BU LDING ALONG THE ROUT NE PATROL ROUTE W TH SH FT
VIISITIINSIDE THE REACTOR BUIILDINGALONG THE ROUTIINEPATROL ROUTE WIITHSHIIFT
EQUIIPMENTOPERATORS,, AND HAD AN IIMPRESSIONTHAT THE AMBIIENTTEMPERATURE IIN
EQU PMENT OPERATORS AND HAD AN MPRESSION THAT THE AMB ENT TEMPERATURE N
CERTA N AREAS WAS A L TTLE H GHER THAN S THE USUAL ENV RONMENTAL COND TION FOR
CERTAIINAREAS WAS A LIITTLEHIIGHER THAN IIS THE USUAL ENVIIRONMENTALCONDIITION FOR
EQU PMENT, AND THERE S A POTENT AL THAT THESE COND TIONS M GHT ACCELERATE
EQUIIPMENT,AND THERE IISA POTENTIIALTHAT THESE CONDIITIONSMIIGHTACCELERATE
EQUIIPMENTDEGRADATIIONIIN THESE PLACES OF ELEVATED TEMPERATURE..
EQU PMENT DEGRADAT ON N THESE PLACES OF ELEVATED TEMPERATURE

       3) MAANSHAN

      BOTH UNIITS WERE IIN OPERATIION.. LIIKE CHIINSHAN,,THEY WERE CLEAN AND WELL
       BOTH UN TS WERE N OPERAT ON L KE CH NSHAN THEY WERE CLEAN AND WELL
ORGAN ZED, AND ONLY A FEW NOT MPORTANT ANNUNC ATORS WERE SEEN L T ON MA N
ORGANIIZED,AND ONLY A FEW,,NOT IIMPORTANTANNUNCIIATORS WERE SEEN LIITON MAIIN
CONTROL ROOM PANELS AND THE TEAM HAD AN IIMPRESSION THAT BOTH UNIITSWERE
CONTROL ROOM PANELS AND THE TEAM HAD AN MPRESSION THAT BOTH UN TS WERE
OPERATED N A WELL MAINTAINED COND TION.
OPERATED IINA WELL--MAINTAINEDCONDIITION.
       III.E.3 Organization

                 TA P OWER SEEMS TO BE WELL ORGAN ZED FOR MA NTENANCE AND THE
                 TAIIPOWER SEEMS TO BE WELL ORGANIIZED FOR MAIINTENANCE AND THE
       ZATION S WELL ESTABL SHED. TH S WAS ALREADY D SCUSSED N A GENERAL WAY N
ORGANIIZATION IISWELL ESTABLIISHED. THIIS WAS ALREADY DIISCUSSED IINA GENERAL WAY IIN
ORGAN
SECT ON II.B.
SECTIION IIII.B.


       III.E.4. Documentation

              TA P OWER'S DOCUMENTAT ON SYSTEMS FOR MA NTENANCE PROCEDURES
              TAIIPOWER'S DOCUMENTATIION SYSTEMS FOR MAIINTENANCE PROCEDURES
SEEM TO BE WELL ORGAN ZED AND WELL ESTABL SHED. RELATED DOCUMENTS N THE THREE
SEEM TO BE WELL ORGANIIZEDAND WELL ESTABLIISHED. RELATED DOCUMENTS IIN THE THREE
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SEEM TO BE WELL PREPARED,,AND SEEM TO BE REVIIEWEDAND
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SEEM TO BE WELL PREPARED AND SEEM TO BE REV EWED AND
REV SED SYSTEMAT CALLY. TH S HAS NOT BEEN NVESTIGATED N DETA L AND SHOULD BE
REVIISEDSYSTEMATIICALLY.THIISHAS NOT BEEN IINVESTIGATED IINDETAIILAND SHOULD BE
SUB ECT FOR FURTHER MORE COMPLETE NVESTIGATION.
SUBJJECTFOR FURTHER MORE COMPLETE IINVESTIGATION.


       Adding to the current system, a documentation system that is dedicated to the "Zero
Defect" activity might be helpful to enhance the SORC functions mentioned above.

       III.E.5 Training
        The Maintenance training system and programs of TAIPOWER are organized by the
head office of TAIPOWER, of which the responsible organization is the Training Division of
Nuclear Operation and Safety Department. Each nuclear power plant and Radiation
Laboratory are involved to develop and implement training programs which include initial
and annual continuing training, qualification for maintenance personnel, and NDE personnel
qualifications. These are mainly done in the corporate Training Center located at
SHIEN-DIEN. There are 60 training courses in FY 1992. The total includes lectures and
exercises. These programs seem to be well organized and fully established with some
exceptions described later.

       BESIIDES THE MAIINTENANCE PERSONNEL AT EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT,,PERSONNEL
       BES DES THE MA NTENANCE PERSONNEL AT EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PERSONNEL
FROM THE HEAD OFF CE AND THE CORPORATE MA NTENANCE CENTER SHOUN SAN SUPPORT
FROM THE HEAD OFFIICEAND THE CORPORATE MAIINTENANCECENTER SHOUN--SANSUPPORT
AND EXECUTE MAIINTENANCEWORK DURIINGANY REFUELIINGOUTAGE.. THE NUMBER OF THESE
AND EXECUTE MA NTENANCE WORK DUR NG ANY REFUEL NG OUTAGE THE NUMBER OF THESE
PERSONNEL ARE NEARLY DOUBLE OF THOSE OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TSELF. TH S MUST
PERSONNEL ARE NEARLY DOUBLE OF THOSE OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IITSELF. THIISMUST
BE A GOOD OPPORTUN TY FOR ON THE-JOB TRA NING ESPEC ALLY FOR THE PERSONNEL OF THE
BE A GOOD OPPORTUNIITY FOR ON--THE-JOB TRAIININGESPECIIALLY FOR THE PERSONNEL OF THE
HEAD OFF CE. ON THE OTHER HAND T S NECESSARY TO TRA N MANY PERSONNEL THERE ARE
HEAD OFFIICE. ON THE OTHER HAND,, IIT IISNECESSARY TO TRAIINMANY PERSONNEL ((THEREARE
ABOUT 600 MAIINTENANCEPERSONNEL FOR EACH REFUELIINGOUTAGE)) IINCLUDING THE
ABOUT 600 MA NTENANCE PERSONNEL FOR EACH REFUEL NG OUTAGE NCLUDING THE
PERSONNEL FROM THE CORPORATE MA NTENANCE CENTER WHO ARE ALSO DO NG
PERSONNEL FROM THE CORPORATE MAIINTENANCE CENTER WHO ARE ALSO DOIING
MAIINTENANCEWORK OF OTHER NON--NUCLEARPOWER GENERATIIONPLANTS AND
MA NTENANCE WORK OF OTHER NON NUCLEAR POWER GENERAT ON PLANTS AND
TRANSM SSION L NES.
TRANSMIISSION LIINES.


        The equipment,tools and facilities for maintenance training of TAIPOWER are
available in each nuclear power plant and the training center. Training equipment and tools
such as valves and their actuators (MOV, AOV) mockups, nuclear instrumentation mockups,
process instrumentation mockups, etc., are available both in nuclear power plants and the
training center. Most of the training facilities such as NDE, I & C, electrical, chemistry, etc.,
are available in the training center. Just looking at various mockups in some nuclear power
plants, shows that they seem to be very newly installed. Maintenance training facilities seem
to be less developed than the operation training facilities such as simulators. Although this
situation exists in all countries, the level of TAIPOWER's existing maintenance facilities is
lower than that in other countries.

      MEANWHIILE,,AN EXPANSIION OF THE WELDIING MACHIINE SHOP AND MECHANIICAL
       MEANWH LE AN EXPANS ON OF THE WELD NG MACH NE SHOP AND MECHAN CAL
MA NTENANCE WORKSHOPS W LL BE COMPLETED N 1992 FURTHERMORE TA POWER HAS A
MAIINTENANCEWORKSHOPS WIILLBE COMPLETED IIN1992.. FURTHERMORE,,TAIIPOWERHAS A
PLAN TO SETUP A NEW ORGANIIZATIONNAMED THE NUCLEAR TECHNIICALTRAIININGCENTER
PLAN TO SETUP A NEW ORGAN ZATION NAMED THE NUCLEAR TECHN CAL TRA NING CENTER
WH CH W LL NCLUDE MANY MORE SOPH STICATED MOCKUPS SUCH AS A FULL SCALE UNDER
WHIICH WIILL IINCLUDEMANY MORE SOPHIISTICATED MOCKUPS SUCH AS A FULL SCALE UNDER
VESSEL MOCKUP OF A BWR A MOCKUP OF A HYDRAUL C CONTROL UN T HCU) FOR A BWR
VESSEL MOCKUP OF A BWR,,A MOCKUP OF A HYDRAULIICCONTROL UNIIT((HCU) FOR A BWR,,
AND A FULL SCALE MOCKUP OF A CONTROL ROD DR VE MECHAN SM CRDM) FOR A PWR
AND A FULL SCALE MOCKUP OF A CONTROL ROD DRIIVEMECHANIISM((CRDM) FOR A PWR..


        Good quality maintenance work depends upon not only the procedures and documents
but also largely upon actual skills of the technicians and workers. This can be mastered
through experience in the field, but this takes time. This becomes even more important in
view of the environment at nuclear power plant and limited outage time. Therefore, it seems
to be very important for the maintenance personnel to be trained with more sophisticated
training mockups.

       THE F RST PHASE OF A TRA N NG PLAN FOR CONTRACTORS OF TA P OWER HAS UST
       THE FIIRST PHASE OF A TRAIINIING PLAN FOR CONTRACTORS OF TAIIPOWER HAS JJUST
STARTED IIN1991.. TWO MORE PHASES WIILLBE COMPLETE BY 1994..THIIS IIS TO STRENGTHEN
STARTED N 1991 TWO MORE PHASES W LL BE COMPLETE BY 1994 TH S S TO STRENGTHEN
THE CAPABIILITYOF CONTRACTED AND TEMPORARY PERSONNEL WHO ARE DOIINGABOUT 25%
THE CAPAB LITY OF CONTRACTED AND TEMPORARY PERSONNEL WHO ARE DO NG ABOUT 25%
OF THE VOLUME OF THE MA NTENANCE WORK ALONGS DE TA POWER PERSONNEL
OF THE VOLUME OF THE MAIINTENANCE WORK ALONGSIIDETAIIPOWERPERSONNEL..


       The training of maintenance workers has been improved and strengthened in all
respects compared with the beginning. However, the TEAM recommends that efforts be
made to expand and speed up the training of contractors, and also speed up construction of
the Nuclear Technical Training Center.
III.F   CHEMISTRY

        In this section the chemistry of the three nuclear power plants is evaluated mainly in
the areas of reactor coolant (both BWR and PWR), feedwater for BWR and steam generator
feedwater for PWR. The chemistry is related to radiation build-up in the primary coolant
systems, integrity of the key components such as nuclear fuels, reactor pressure vessels,
reactor core internal structures, steam generators, etc. The performance indices are
compared with those of nuclear power plants of other countries. There has been a
world-wide focus on water chemistry in nuclear power plants during the last 10 years. Also,
TAIPOWER's betterment programs for this area are briefly reviewed and commented upon.

        IIIIII..F..1.. CHEMIISTRY IINDIICES ((OVERALL MEASURE))
                F 1 CHEM STRY ND CES OVERALL MEASURE

       The chemistry index defined by WANO (see Appendix V.E) is a gross measure of
chemistry of nuclear power plants that enables the performance of power plants to be
compared at a glance. Chemistry indices of five of the six units in 1990 are summarized and
compared with WANO's data base in Table III.F.1 (There are no available indices from
CHINSHAN unit 1). A declining chemistry index indicates improving performance.

       THE CHEMIISTRY IINDEX OF CHIINSHAN UNIIT 2 IIS NEARLY EQUAL TO THE MEDIIAN
        THE CHEM STRY NDEX OF CH NSHAN UN T 2 S NEARLY EQUAL TO THE MED AN
VALUE OF THE NDICES FOR BWRS WORLDW DE, WH CH ARE ALMOST THE SAME AS THOSE OF
VALUE OF THE IINDICES FOR BWRS WORLDWIIDE, WHIICHARE ALMOST THE SAME AS THOSE OF
THE USA AND JAPAN NO CHEM STRY NDEX S AVA LABLE FROM CH NSHAN UN T 1 BUT T
THE USA AND JAPAN.. NO CHEMIISTRY IINDEX IISAVAIILABLE FROM CHIINSHANUNIIT1,,BUT IIT
MAY BE EST MATED TO BE ROUGHLY S MILAR TO THAT OF UN T 2 FROM TS' RECORD OF
MAY BE ESTIIMATED TO BE ROUGHLY SIIMILAR TO THAT OF UNIIT2 FROM IITS'RECORD OF
AVERAGE REACTOR WATER CONDUCT VITY. CHEM STRY NDICES FOR BOTH KUOSHENG
AVERAGE REACTOR WATER CONDUCTIIVITY. CHEMIISTRY IINDICES FOR BOTH KUOSHENG
UNIITS1 AND 2 HOWEVER,, ARE WORSE THAN THE MEDIIANVALUE AND ARE ALSO AMONG A
UN TS 1 AND 2 HOWEVER ARE WORSE THAN THE MED AN VALUE AND ARE ALSO AMONG A
GROUP OF THE WORST NDICES. FOR KUOSHENG UN T 1 THE REACTOR WATER
GROUP OF THE WORST IINDICES. FOR KUOSHENG UNIIT1 THE REACTOR WATER
CONDUCTIIVITY IINCREASEDABRUPTLY IINOCTOBER 1990 AND THE SUSPECTED CAUSE IIS THE
CONDUCT VITY NCREASED ABRUPTLY N OCTOBER 1990 AND THE SUSPECTED CAUSE S THE
PRESENCE OF H GH TOTAL ORGAN C CARBON TOC) CONCENTRAT ON N CONDENSATE AND
PRESENCE OF HIIGH TOTAL ORGANIICCARBON ((TOC) CONCENTRATIION IINCONDENSATE AND
FEEDWATER..TOC IISDECOMPOSED IINREACTOR CORE FIIELDAND MAY PRODUCE IIONSSUCH AS
FEEDWATER TOC S DECOMPOSED N REACTOR CORE F ELD AND MAY PRODUCE ONS SUCH AS
SULPHATE AND ALSO NCREASE THE CONDUCT VITY. THE CHEM STRY NDICES OF
SULPHATE,,AND ALSO IINCREASE THE CONDUCTIIVITY. THE CHEMIISTRY IINDICESOF
MAANSHAN UNIITS 1 AND 2 ARE WORSE THAN THE MEDIIAN VALUE OF WORLDWIIDE PWRS
MAANSHAN UN TS 1 AND 2 ARE WORSE THAN THE MED AN VALUE OF WORLDW DE PWRS
W THOUT MORPHOL NE. TH S WANO DATA BASE NCLUDES SOV ET VVER TYPE PWRS N THE
WIITHOUTMORPHOLIINE. THIISWANO DATA BASE IINCLUDESSOVIIETVVER TYPE PWRS IIN THE
USSR,,FIINLAND AND HUNGARY..((THE WANO AVERAGES EXCLUDE CZECHOSLOVAKIIA AND
USSR F NLAND AND HUNGARY THE WANO AVERAGES EXCLUDE CZECHOSLOVAK A AND
BULGARIIA WHERE THEY HAVE NO DATA..)).. THE CHEMIISTRY IINDIICES FOR THESE REACTORS ARE
BULGAR A WHERE THEY HAVE NO DATA THE CHEM STRY ND CES FOR THESE REACTORS ARE
H GHER THAN FOR OTHER PWRS PERHAPS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF D FFERENT CHEM STRY. F
HIIGHER THAN FOR OTHER PWRS,,PERHAPS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DIIFFERENTCHEMIISTRY. IIF
THE DATA BASE OF VVERS IISSUBTRACTED FROM THE WORLDWIIDEDATA BASE,, THE MEDIIAN
THE DATA BASE OF VVERS S SUBTRACTED FROM THE WORLDW DE DATA BASE THE MED AN
VALUE OF THE CHEMIISTRYIINDEX FOR WORLDWIIDE PWRS WIILLBE SMALLER,,AND THEREFORE
VALUE OF THE CHEM STRY NDEX FOR WORLDW DE PWRS W LL BE SMALLER AND THEREFORE
BETTER TH S W LL EMPHAS ZE THE H GH VALUE OF THE NDICES FOR TA POWER.
BETTER..THIISWIILLEMPHASIIZE THE HIIGHVALUE OF THE IINDICES FOR TAIIPOWER.


      III.F.2. Detailed Evaluations
      THE CHEMIISTRY DIISCUSSED HERE IIS QUIITE DIIFFERENT FOR A BWR FROM THAT FOR A
      THE CHEM STRY D SCUSSED HERE S QU TE D FFERENT FOR A BWR FROM THAT FOR A
PWR,,SO HEREIINAFTER THEY ARE DIISCUSSED SEPARATELY..
PWR SO HERE NAFTER THEY ARE D SCUSSED SEPARATELY
       III.F.2.a BWR (CHINSHAN and KUOSHENG)

        The specific conductivity of the reactor water seems to be a gross measure of its' ionic
quality, which comes mainly from main condenser leak tightness, makeup water quality,
performance of condensate demineralizers (CDs) and performance of reactor water filter
demineralizers (FDs). The average conductivities of the reactor water in each of
CHINSHAN units 1 and 2 have been fairly stable in the last 5 or 6 years, although sometimes
they exceed 0.2 µS/cm (in this sense unit 2 is better than unit 1), and have been considerably
improved compared to those at the beginning. It seems that the median value in 1990 for
unit 1 was slightly higher than that of unit 2 and lower than the median of US INPO's data
base (0.136 µS/cm) in 1990. The exact calculated data are not available at this moment. On
the other hand, reactor water conductivities for both KUOSHENG units 1 and 2 are not so
good as those of CHINSHAN units 1 and 2.

        All the main condenser tubes of CHINSHAN have been replaced with titanium tubes
before 1990. So, as far as sea water leakages through main condensers have not occurred,
the regeneration method of CD and/or precoating method of powdered ion exchange resins of
reactor water cleanup FD, might not be properly checked.

       THE TOTAL FE CONCENTRATIIONS IIN FEEDWATER,,WHIICH ARE USUALLY MORE THAN
        THE TOTAL FE CONCENTRAT ONS N FEEDWATER WH CH ARE USUALLY MORE THAN
90% OF TOTAL METALLIIC IIMPURIITIIES,, FOR CHIINSHAN UNIITS 1 AND 2 HAVE BEEN ROUGHLY 1
90% OF TOTAL METALL C MPUR T ES FOR CH NSHAN UN TS 1 AND 2 HAVE BEEN ROUGHLY 1
TO 3 PPB IIN THE LAST FIIVEYEARS EXCEPT FOR A HIIGHERNUMBER IIN1987 AND 1988 FOR UNIIT1..
TO 3 PPB N THE LAST F VE YEARS EXCEPT FOR A H GHER NUMBER N 1987 AND 1988 FOR UN T 1
ALSO THE YEARLY TREND FOR UNIIT 2 HAS BEEN GETTIING WORSE THAN THE TREND OF THE
ALSO THE YEARLY TREND FOR UN T 2 HAS BEEN GETT NG WORSE THAN THE TREND OF THE
PERIIOD1983 THROUGH 1985.. IINSOLUBLEFE CONCENTRATIIONS IIN FEEDWATER IINKUOSHENG
PER OD 1983 THROUGH 1985 NSOLUBLE FE CONCENTRAT ONS N FEEDWATER N KUOSHENG
UN TS 1 AND 2 ALSO ARE GETT NG WORSE N 1990 THAN N THE PREV OUS YEARS TOTAL FE
UNIITS1 AND 2 ALSO ARE GETTIINGWORSE IIN1990 THAN IIN THE PREVIIOUSYEARS ((TOTALFE
CONCENTRAT ONS ARE NOT AVA LABLE AT THE MOMENT .
CONCENTRATIIONSARE NOT AVAIILABLEAT THE MOMENT)).


       These Fe concentrations may come from concentrations of oxygen in condensate and
feedwater, and also the removal efficiency of CDs for insolubles. High linear velocity
Condensate Demineralizers (CDs) of the deepbed type cannot reduce total Fe concentrations
to below one tenth of the present value by themselves, so that if further improvement is
desired, additional equipment is needed.

       THE RADIIOACTIIVIITY OF CO 60 IIN REACTOR WATER IIS AN IIMPORTANT CONTRIIBUTOR TO
       THE RAD OACT V TY OF CO 60 N REACTOR WATER S AN MPORTANT CONTR BUTOR TO
    ATION EXPOSURE THE RAD OACTIVITY OF THE WATER N CH NSHAN UN T 1 HAD BEEN
RADIIATIONEXPOSURE..THE RADIIOACTIVITYOF THE WATER IINCHIINSHAN UNIIT1 HAD BEEN
RAD
              3
WELL BELOW 10--3µCII/CCUP TO 1988 AND THEN HAS IINCREASED TO ROUGHLY ((1TO 3))
WELL BELOW 10 µC /CC UP TO 1988 AND THEN HAS NCREASED TO ROUGHLY 1 TO 3            X 10--3
                                                                                   X 10 3
                                                                               3 µ C /C C
µCII/CCIIN THE LAST THREE YEARS.. FOR UNIIT2 IIT HAS VARIIEDUP TO ABOUT 3 X 10--3 µCII/CC
 µC /CC N THE LAST THREE YEARS FOR UN T 2 T HAS VAR ED UP TO ABOUT 3 X 10
IIN THE LAST FIIVEOR SIIX YEARS,,NEGLECTIINGA FEW DATA POIINTS WHIICHSHOW ABRUPT
 N THE LAST F VE OR S X YEARS NEGLECT NG A FEW DATA PO NTS WH CH SHOW ABRUPT
CHANGES.. THE RADIIATIONEXPOSURE CAUSED BY BUIILDUP OF RADIIOACTIVITYON THE
 CHANGES THE RAD ATION EXPOSURE CAUSED BY BU LD UP OF RAD OACTIVITY ON THE
 PR MARY REC RCULATION P PING OF CH NSHAN UN TS 1 AND 2 NEARLY DOUBLED AND SEEMS
PRIIMARYRECIIRCULATION PIIPINGOF CHIINSHANUNIITS1 AND 2 NEARLY DOUBLED AND SEEMS
TO CORRESPOND TO THIIS IINCREASE IINRADIIOACTIVITYOF THE WATER.. THE RADIIOACTIVITIES
 TO CORRESPOND TO TH S NCREASE N RAD OACTIVITY OF THE WATER THE RAD OACTIVITIES
OF THE WATER IINBOTH KUOSHENG UNIITS1 AND 2 HAVE BEEN MOSTLY CONSTANT BELOW 3
 OF THE WATER N BOTH KUOSHENG UN TS 1 AND 2 HAVE BEEN MOSTLY CONSTANT BELOW 3
X 10--4 µCII//CC IIN THE LAST FIIVE OR SIIX YEARS..
 X 10 4 µC CC N THE LAST F VE OR S X YEARS

        The radiation exposures from radioactivity buildups on the primary recirculation
piping of KUOSHENG units 1 and 2 have been mostly constant in the last five or six years,
with a slightly higher value than those of CHINSHAN units, although Co 60 radioactivities in
reactor water have been lower than those of CHINSHAN units. Radioactivity buildup may
change not only with total Fe concentrations in feedwater but also with the ratio of metallic
solubles and insolubles, and other variables.
       IIIIII..F..2..B PWR ((MAANSHAN))
               F 2 B PWR MAANSHAN

        The TEAM did not evaluate the PWR chemistry in detail in this report. As described
in section III.F.1, the chemistry indices of MAANSHAN are not good comparing with
WANO median value. However, the Team was impressed with the exceptionally good
behavior of the Steam Generators at MAANSHAN, where the number of plugged tubes is
particularly low (<20 for the three steam generators of one unit). Therefore the TEAM
recommends that a more detailed investigation of the PWR chemistry be done in a near
future.

       IIIIII..F..3 BETTERMENT OF CHEMIISTRY
               F 3 BETTERMENT OF CHEM STRY

        The chemistry of the existing three nuclear power plants has improved in all respects
since the commercial operation of the first unit, CHINSHAN unit 1. Improvements include:

      - preventive measures for main condenser leakage.

      - reduction of total Fe in feedwater feedback experienced in the initial start of the
      previous unit.

      - improvements of operational procedures for reactor water cleanup FDs and CDs.
      These can be easily recognized by comparing the operational data for the start up of the
      oldest unit with the data from the new ones.

       These improvements correspond to a worldwide tendency.

       TA P OWER HAS DEVELOPED TS OWN BETTERMENT PROGRAMS OF
       TAIIPOWER HAS DEVELOPED IITS''OWN BETTERMENT PROGRAMS OF
chemistry such as installation of constant temperature equipment on conductivity meter to
upgrade the reliability of data, use of ion chromatography to know more detailed chemistry,
and evaluation of ion exchange resin characteristics.

       ALSO TAIIPOWER HAS ADOPTED FOR MAANSHAN THE WATER CHEMIISTRY
        ALSO TA POWER HAS ADOPTED FOR MAANSHAN THE WATER CHEM STRY
GUIIDELIINE FROM THE ELECTRIIC POWER RESEARCH IINSTIITUTE ((EPRII))IIN THE USA AND IIS
GU DEL NE FROM THE ELECTR C POWER RESEARCH N ST TUTE EPR N THE USA AND S
PREPAR NG TO SET UP PROCEDURES N ACCORDANCE W TH TH S GU DELINE FOR CH NSHAN
PREPARIING TO SET UP PROCEDURES IINACCORDANCE WIITH THIISGUIIDELINE FOR CHIINSHAN
AND KUOSHENG..
AND KUOSHENG

        It is important to implement these betterment programs step by step, and this demands
the strong support by the high level management. For example, it may not be possible to
adopt the EPRI Water Chemistry Guidelines in their entirety only by using changes in
operational procedures. That means that major modifications of water treatment systems
might become necessary to avoid limitation of power operation. Furthermore, chemistry
problems are often likely to be attributed only to a small number of highly specialized
chemists. Important subsystems and equipment for chemistry related treatment should be
properly designed, fabricated and constructed. That means a large commitment and effort of
mechanical engineers and material engineers, in addition to the commitment of chemists and
chemical engineers (the same applies to trouble shooting in this area).

       FOR EXAMPLE,,FLOW DIISTRIIBUTIION IINSIIDE FD AND CD,,PROPER DESIIGN OF PIIPIING AND
       FOR EXAMPLE FLOW D STR BUT ON NS DE FD AND CD PROPER DES GN OF P P NG AND
VESSELS IIN THE REGENERATIIONSUBSYSTEM OF CD,,MUCH SOPHIISTICATEDPIIPING LAYOUT OF
VESSELS N THE REGENERAT ON SUBSYSTEM OF CD MUCH SOPH STICATED P PING LAYOUT OF
FD,,AND PROPER SELECTIION OF PIIPIING AND VESSELS MATERIIALS,,ARE VERY IIMPORTANT.. IIF
FD AND PROPER SELECT ON OF P P NG AND VESSELS MATER ALS ARE VERY MPORTANT F
THESE ARE NOT DONE PROPERLY,,PERFORMANCES OF THESE SUBSYSTEMS AND EQUIIPMENTWIILL
THESE ARE NOT DONE PROPERLY PERFORMANCES OF THESE SUBSYSTEMS AND EQU PMENT W LL
BE POOR,,EVEN IIFHIIGHQUALIITY IIONEXCHANGE RESIINSAND FIILTERAIIDSARE USED..
BE POOR EVEN F H GH QUAL TY ON EXCHANGE RES NS AND F LTER A DS ARE USED
       III.F.4 Further considerations

        THE CHEMIISTRY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS THAT IIS BRIIEFLY DIISCUSSED HERE IIS
         THE CHEM STRY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS THAT S BR EFLY D SCUSSED HERE S
LIIMITED TO NARROW AREAS..THE CHEMIISTRY IINGASEOUS AND LIIQUIDRADIIOACTIVE
L MITED TO NARROW AREAS THE CHEM STRY N GASEOUS AND L QUID RAD OACTIVE
TREATMENT SYSTEMS,, IIN COMPONENT COOLIINGSYSTEMS,, FUEL POOL COOLIINGAND
TREATMENT SYSTEMS N COMPONENT COOL NG SYSTEMS FUEL POOL COOL NG AND
PUR FICATION SYSTEMS AND MAKEUP WATER SYSTEMS S ALSO VERY MPORTANT.
PURIIFICATIONSYSTEMS AND MAKEUP WATER SYSTEMS IISALSO VERY IIMPORTANT.


       Recommendations for improving the chemistry indices both for the BWRs and for the
PWRs have been recently made in the draft special report to the Minister referred to in
section II. The TEAM considers these recommendations as a first contribution for
improving the overall chemistry situation. They must be supplemented as 1III.G
       RADIATION PROTECTION

       IIN THIIS SECTIION THE RADIIATIION PROTECTIION OF THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IIS
         N TH S SECT ON THE RAD AT ON PROTECT ON OF THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS S
EVALUATED MA NLY N THE AREAS OF RAD ATION PROTECT ON CONTROL MANAGEMENT),
EVALUATED MAIINLY IIN THE AREAS OF RADIIATION PROTECTIIONCONTROL ((MANAGEMENT),
OCCUPAT ONAL EXTERNAL DOSE EQU VALENT, NTERNAL CONTAM NATION AND
OCCUPATIIONALEXTERNAL DOSE EQUIIVALENT, IINTERNALCONTAMIINATIONAND
ENVIIRONMENTALMONIITORINGAND CONTROL.. THE REPORT COMPARES THESE IINDICES WIITH
ENV RONMENTAL MON TORING AND CONTROL THE REPORT COMPARES THESE NDICES W TH
THOSE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OF OTHER COUNTR ES. ALSO TA POWER''S ALARA
THOSE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OF OTHER COUNTRIIES. ALSO TAIIPOWERS ALARA
PROGRAM IISBRIIEFLYREVIIEWEDAND COMMENTED UPON..
PROGRAM S BR EFLY REV EWED AND COMMENTED UPON

       III.G.1 Radiation Protection Control

       TA P OWER HAS THE OVERALL RESPONS B L TY FOR RAD AT ON PROTECT ON AND
       TAIIPOWER HAS THE OVERALL RESPONSIIBIILIITY FOR RADIIATIION PROTECTIION AND
DOSE EVALUAT ON. TH S NCLUDES THE FULL RANGE OF WORK FROM F ELD DETECT ON TO THE
DOSE EVALUATIION. THIIS IINCLUDES THE FULL RANGE OF WORK FROM FIIELDDETECTIION TO THE
DOSE RECORD KEEP NG. ACCORD NG TO THE REQU REMENT OF THE ROCAEC REGULAT ON,
DOSE RECORD KEEPIING. ACCORDIING TO THE REQUIIREMENTOF THE ROCAEC REGULATIION,
THE PLANT SUPER NTENDENT, SUPPORTED BY THE HEAD OFF CE, HAS THE FULL RESPONS BILITY
THE PLANT SUPERIINTENDENT,SUPPORTED BY THE HEAD OFFIICE,HAS THE FULL RESPONSIIBILITY
FOR RADIIOLOGICALSAFETY..
FOR RAD OLOGICAL SAFETY

        Inside each nuclear power plant, areas are classified as radiation areas, airborne
radioactivity areas and contaminated areas. Work in the restricted areas is controlled with
Radiation Work Permit (RWP) issue and the control by the health physics (HP) division and
the shift engineer of the plant. Devices used for measuring radiation exposure and internal
contamination of personnel are pocket type dosimeters and thermo-luminescent dosimeters
(TLD), and whole body counters, respectively.

       IINPO REPORTS HAD COMPLAIINED THAT ACCESS TO THE RESTRIICTED AREAS IIS NOT AS
         NPO REPORTS HAD COMPLA NED THAT ACCESS TO THE RESTR CTED AREAS S NOT AS
STR CTLY CONTROLLED AS DES RABLE, AND THE TEAM OBSERVED THAT TH S ST LL SEEMS TO
STRIICTLYCONTROLLED AS DESIIRABLE,AND THE TEAM OBSERVED THAT THIISSTIILLSEEMS TO
BE THE CASE OTHERW SE, THE WORK CONTROLS AND THE DEV CES N THE RESTR CTED AREAS
BE THE CASE.. OTHERWIISE, THE WORK CONTROLS AND THE DEVIICES IIN THE RESTRIICTEDAREAS
ARE S MILAR TO THOSE OF OTHER COUNTR ES.
ARE SIIMILAR TO THOSE OF OTHER COUNTRIIES.


       III.G.2 Occupational External Dose Equivalent

       THE COLLECTIIVE OCCUPATIIONAL EXTERNAL DOSE EQUIIVALENT OF THE THREE NUCLEAR
        THE COLLECT VE OCCUPAT ONAL EXTERNAL DOSE EQU VALENT OF THE THREE NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS ARE COMPARED WIITH IINTERNATIONALDATA BASE SUCH AS WANO'S ((DATA IIN
 POWER PLANTS ARE COMPARED W TH NTERNATIONAL DATA BASE SUCH AS WANO'S DATA N
1990 ONLY))AND US IINPO'S ((FIIGURE IIIIII..G..1))..THE AVERAGE YEARLY DOSE AT THE FOUR
 1990 ONLY AND US NPO'S F GURE G 1 THE AVERAGE YEARLY DOSE AT THE FOUR
BWRS IIN 1990 ((354 MAN--REM//YR PER UNIIT))IIS SLIIGHTLY HIIGHER THAN THE WANO'S MEDIIAN
 BWRS N 1990 354 MAN REM YR PER UN T S SL GHTLY H GHER THAN THE WANO'S MED AN
((276 MAN--REM//YR))BUT LESS THAN THE IINPO'S AVERAGE ((436 MAN--REM//YR)).. THE TREND
  276 MAN REM YR BUT LESS THAN THE NPO'S AVERAGE 436 MAN REM YR                 THE TREND
OVER THE LAST FIIVEYEARS IISROUGHLY CONSTANT BETWEEN 350 TO 500,,EXCEPT IIN1989
 OVER THE LAST F VE YEARS S ROUGHLY CONSTANT BETWEEN 350 TO 500 EXCEPT N 1989
 DUR NG THE REC RCULATION SYSTEM P PING REPLACEMENT AT CH NSHAN. THE THREE YEAR
DURIING THE RECIIRCULATIONSYSTEM PIIPINGREPLACEMENT AT CHIINSHAN. THE THREE YEAR
 AVERAGE PER UN T S 429 MAN REM/YR, AND TH S S LESS THAN THE MED AN FOR THE THREE
AVERAGE PER UNIIT IIS429 MAN--REM/YR,AND THIIS IISLESS THAN THE MEDIIAN FOR THE THREE
 YEAR AVERAGE OF NPO PLANTS OF 460 MAN REM/YR THE NPO F GURES ARE SOMET MES
YEAR AVERAGE OF IINPO PLANTS OF 460 MAN--REM/YR((THE IINPO FIIGURES ARE SOMETIIMES
EXPRESSED AS A MED AN, AND SOMET MES AS AN AVERAGE .
EXPRESSED AS A MEDIIAN, AND SOMETIIMESAS AN AVERAGE)).

     The average of the collective dose at the two PWRs in 1990
(69.5 man-rem/yr) is much lower than the WANO's median (179) and
best quartile (119), and also much lower than the INPO's average
(294). The three year average per reactor of MAANSHAN is 90
man-rem/yr, and this is significantly lower than INPO's median of
284 man-rem/yr from the same data.

       EACH OF THE TWO BWR PLANTS ARE OF A COMPARATIIVELY OLDER DESIIGN AS
       EACH OF THE TWO BWR PLANTS ARE OF A COMPARAT VELY OLDER DES GN AS
COMPARED WIITH THE PWR PLANT,,SO THERE HAVE BEEN A RELATIIVELY LARGE NUMBER OF
COMPARED W TH THE PWR PLANT SO THERE HAVE BEEN A RELAT VELY LARGE NUMBER OF
MODIIFICATIONSSUCH AS RECIIRCULATIONSYSTEM PIIPINGREPLACEMENT..HIIGHERRADIIATION
MOD FICATIONS SUCH AS REC RCULATION SYSTEM P PING REPLACEMENT H GHER RAD ATION
BUIILDUP IINPRIIMARYCOOLANT SYSTEM SEEMS TO BE A MAJJORCONTRIIBUTOR((MUCHNEWER
BU LDUP N PR MARY COOLANT SYSTEM SEEMS TO BE A MA OR CONTR BUTOR MUCH NEWER
BWRS HAVE RECORDED LOWER THAN 100 MAN--REM//YR IIN OTHER COUNTRIIES..))..
BWRS HAVE RECORDED LOWER THAN 100 MAN REM YR N OTHER COUNTR ES

     As far as the collective occupational external dose equivalent is concerned, each of
TAIPOWER nuclear power plants seems to be very good taking account of their ages.

        THE PERCENTAGE OF EXTERNAL DOSE DURIING PLANT OPERATIION HOWEVER,, SEEMS TO
        THE PERCENTAGE OF EXTERNAL DOSE DUR NG PLANT OPERAT ON HOWEVER SEEMS TO
BE FAIIRLY LARGE COMPARED TO THAT DURIINGA REFUELIINGOUTAGE,,AND THIISSUPPOSES THAT
BE FA RLY LARGE COMPARED TO THAT DUR NG A REFUEL NG OUTAGE AND TH S SUPPOSES THAT
A LARGE AMOUNT OF MA NTENANCE AND REPA R WORK HAS BEEN PERFORMED DUR NG PLANT
A LARGE AMOUNT OF MAIINTENANCEAND REPAIIR WORK HAS BEEN PERFORMED DURIINGPLANT
OPERAT ON.
OPERATIION.

       IIIIII..G..3 IINDIIVIIDUAL OCCUPATIIONAL DOSE EQUIIVALENT..
               G 3 ND V DUAL OCCUPAT ONAL DOSE EQU VALENT

        The individual occupational dose equivalent and individual internal contamination are
nowadays well below the ROCAEC limits (annual accumulated dose = 5 rem/year and a
maximum permissible organ burden (MPOB) which varies with the radionuclide). All the
data for individuals are computerized and recorded. The total annual average individual dose
equivalent is approximately 0.19 rem in the last five years (Table III.G.1). The average dose
for the contract workers is approximately three times that for TAIPOWER personnel (This
tendency is similar to that in Japan.). The percentage of personnel whose annual doses are
larger than 2 rem is approximately 2%, and those personnel mostly work for In Service
Inspection (ISI). The new ICRP guideline for 1990 recommends a maximum of 20 mSv/yr
(2 rem/yr) averaged over five years and a maximum of 50 mSv each yr. If and when
ROCAEC will adopt this recommendation is not clear at this moment.

        THE TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT IIMMEDIIATE PLANS BE MADE TO REDUCE THE DOSE OF
        THE TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT MMED ATE PLANS BE MADE TO REDUCE THE DOSE OF
THESE NDIVIDUALS TO THE NEW GU DELINE. TH S CAN PREFERABLY BE DONE BY SOME NNOVATIVE
THESE IINDIVIDUALS TO THE NEW GUIIDELINE. THIIS CAN PREFERABLY BE DONE BY SOME IINNOVATIVE
PROCEDURE FOR PERFORM NG THE NSPECTIONS W TH LESS DOSE TO THE NSPECTORS, OR
PROCEDURE FOR PERFORMIING THE IINSPECTIONS WIITH LESS DOSE TO THE IINSPECTORS, OR
OTHERWIISE BY TRAIINING MORE PERSONNEL SO THAT THE IINSPECTION TASKS,, AND THE DOSE,, MAY BE
OTHERW SE BY TRA NING MORE PERSONNEL SO THAT THE NSPECTION TASKS AND THE DOSE MAY BE
SHARED AMONG MORE PEOPLE..
SHARED AMONG MORE PEOPLE

       IIIIII..G..4..ENVIIRONMENTAL MONIITORIING AND CONTROL
               G 4 ENV RONMENTAL MON TOR NG AND CONTROL

       Environmental monitoring and control is related to III.M. ROCAEC has requested that
TAIPOWER set up an environmental radiological monitoring program to provide data for
determining the highest individual (public) doses and environmental radiation status (AEC
also monitors the environment by itself.). Data of direct radiation, airborne, waterborne and
food product specimens in the site environs of the nuclear power plants are collected and
compared with the data collected from preoperational measurements at the same locations.
There are no significant changes in measurable levels of radiation and radioactive materials,
and also the off-site maximum individual doses evaluated from measured data are much
below the ROCAEC regulation limits.

       IIIIII..G..5 ALARA PROGRAM
               G 5 ALARA PROGRAM

        The ALARA program is related to III.M. TAIPOWER has developed and
implemented its' own ALARA program which aims at reduction of personnel exposure both
collective and individual, reduction of the release of gaseous and liquid radioactive wastes to
the environment and reduction of radioactive solid waste production. For each of these
objectives much detailed pre-planning and follow-up are being done, and corrective actions
have been implemented. The results of these efforts can be seen in some of the operational
data. As evaluated in III.G.2, TAIPOWER's collective occupational external dose of each
plant is good or very good by comparison with international average data. However, the
yearly trend of this has not decreased. The international data base shows average or median
of mixtures of old and new plants, and most plants in each group show a yearly decrease of
the collective dose.

       For further reduction of dose and radioactivity release the TEAM recommends the
following:

        -- TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE THE COLLECTIIVE EXTERNAL DOSE DATA FOR EACH WORK MORE
           TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE THE COLLECT VE EXTERNAL DOSE DATA FOR EACH WORK MORE
        IIN DETAIIL TO THE EXTENT OF WHAT KIIND OF MAIINTENANCE WORK LEADS TO WHAT DOSE.. AT
         N DETA L TO THE EXTENT OF WHAT K ND OF MA NTENANCE WORK LEADS TO WHAT DOSE AT
         THE PRESENT T ME, THE COLLECT VE DOSE SEEMS TO BE ANALYZED ONLY NTO REFUEL NG,
        THE PRESENT TIIME, THE COLLECTIIVE DOSE SEEMS TO BE ANALYZED ONLY IINTO REFUELIING,
         MA NTENANCE, SI AND "OTHERS" TH S MAY HELP TO MORE DETA LED AND CONCRETE
        MAIINTENANCE, IISI AND "OTHERS".. THIIS MAY HELP TO MORE DETAIILED AND CONCRETE
        ALARA PROGRAMS..MORE COMPUTERIIZATIION FOR DATA COLLECTIION MAY BE NECESSARY..
         ALARA PROGRAMS MORE COMPUTER ZAT ON FOR DATA COLLECT ON MAY BE NECESSARY
 - to use remote controlled machines such as automatic handling machine for the control rod
 drives (CRD) of a BWR.
--TO PROVIIDE MORE PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY SHIIELDIING AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIIS AND
   TO PROV DE MORE PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY SH ELD NG AFTER FURTHER ANALYS S AND
 EVALUAT ON.
EVALUATIION.
 - to decrease maintenance and repair work during power operation.
--TO IIMPROVE THE WATER CHEMIISTRY FURTHER..AT PRESENT,,CHEMIISTRY AND MATERIIAL
   TO MPROVE THE WATER CHEM STRY FURTHER AT PRESENT CHEM STRY AND MATER AL
PERSONNEL SEEM NOT TO BE FULLY DEVOTED TO THE ALARA PROGRAMS..
 PERSONNEL SEEM NOT TO BE FULLY DEVOTED TO THE ALARA PROGRAMS
 - to replace materials with Co free alloy where applicable and possible.
--TO PROVIIDE MORE CLEAR AND UNDERSTANDABLE SIIGNS AND NOTIICES THAT IIDENTIIFY HIIGH
   TO PROV DE MORE CLEAR AND UNDERSTANDABLE S GNS AND NOT CES THAT DENT FY H GH
RADIIATIONAREAS OR CONTAMIINATED AREAS..
 RAD ATION AREAS OR CONTAM NATED AREAS
 - to reduce fuel failures for both BWR and PWR.

      THE REGULATIION LIIMIITS ARE MIINIIMUM REQUIIREMENTS,,AND NO NUCLEAR POWER
       THE REGULAT ON L M TS ARE M N MUM REQU REMENTS AND NO NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT CAN BE OPERATED LEGALLY W TH DOSES OVER THESE L MITS. ALARA S NOT A STR CT
PLANT CAN BE OPERATED LEGALLY WIITHDOSES OVER THESE LIIMITS.ALARA IISNOT A STRIICT
LEGAL REQU REMENT, BUT MUST BE CONS DERED AS AN ESSENT AL REQU REMENT N THE
LEGAL REQUIIREMENT,BUT MUST BE CONSIIDEREDAS AN ESSENTIIALREQUIIREMENTIIN THE
ETERNAL SEARCH FOR EXCELLENCE IIN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY..
ETERNAL SEARCH FOR EXCELLENCE N THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
Figure III.G.1 Collective Occupational Dose equivalent
TABLE IIIIII..G..1 AVERAGE IINDIIVIIDUAL DOSE EQUIIVALENT
TABLE G 1 AVERAGE ND V DUAL DOSE EQU VALENT
III.H   INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

       IINDUSTRIIAL SAFETY IIS A GENERAL IISSUE WHIICH CONCERNS ALL IINDUSTRIIAL
         NDUSTR AL SAFETY S A GENERAL SSUE WH CH CONCERNS ALL NDUSTR AL
    VITIES. N THE PART CULAR CASE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY EVEN F THE TARGETS ARE THE
ACTIIVITIES. IIN THE PARTIICULARCASE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY,,EVEN IIFTHE TARGETS ARE THE
ACT
SAME AS IINGENERAL,,A GOOD PERFORMANCE IIN THIIS FIIELDREVEALS AN APPROPRIIATE FIITNESS
SAME AS N GENERAL A GOOD PERFORMANCE N TH S F ELD REVEALS AN APPROPR ATE F TNESS
TO ACHIIEVEALSO A GOOD PERFORMANCE IINNUCLEAR SAFETY.. IIT IISAN ELEMENT,,AMONG
TO ACH EVE ALSO A GOOD PERFORMANCE N NUCLEAR SAFETY T S AN ELEMENT AMONG
OTHERS,,OF A SAFETY CULTURE..
OTHERS OF A SAFETY CULTURE

         HOUSEKEEPIING ACTIIONS FOR IINSTANCE,,CONTRIIBUTE TO ACHIIEVIING A SATIISFACTORY
         HOUSEKEEP NG ACT ONS FOR NSTANCE CONTR BUTE TO ACH EV NG A SAT SFACTORY
IINDUSTRIIAL SAFETY PROGRAM BY STRENGTHENIING FIIRE PREVENTIION AND BY LIIMIITIING THE
  NDUSTR AL SAFETY PROGRAM BY STRENGTHEN NG F RE PREVENT ON AND BY L M T NG THE
 R SK OF WORK ACC DENTS. THEY ARE A PART OF A SAFETY CULTURE AS HAS ALREADY BEEN
RIISKOF WORK ACCIIDENTS.THEY ARE A PART OF A SAFETY CULTURE AS HAS ALREADY BEEN
 SA D N SECT ONS II.C "SAFETY CULTURE" AND II.D "OPERAT ON".
SAIID IINSECTIIONS IIII.C"SAFETY CULTURE" AND IIII.D"OPERATIION".


         T SEEMS THAT THE TA P OWER ND CATOR OF NDUSTR AL SAFETY S NOT EXACTLY
       IIT SEEMS THAT THE TAIIPOWER IINDIICATOR OF IINDUSTRIIAL SAFETY IIS NOT EXACTLY
CALCULATED N THE SAME WAY AS THE WANO NDICATOR: " NDUSTRIAL SAFETY LOST TIME
CALCULATED IIN THE SAME WAY AS THE WANO IINDICATOR:"IINDUSTRIALSAFETY LOST--TIME
ACC DENT RATE" TA P OWER COUNTS THE NUMBER OF LOST WORK NG DAYS RELATED TO
ACCIIDENT RATE"::TAIIPOWER COUNTS THE NUMBER OF LOST WORKIING DAYS RELATED TO
ONE M LLION OF WORK NG HOURS NSTEAD OF THE NUMBER OF ACC DENTS AND FATAL TIES
ONE MIILLIONOF WORKIINGHOURS IINSTEADOF THE NUMBER OF ACCIIDENTSAND FATALIITIES
RELATED TO THE SAME WORK NG PER OD, SO THAT THE COMPAR SON S NOT EASY
RELATED TO THE SAME WORKIINGPERIIOD,SO THAT THE COMPARIISON IISNOT EASY..


        TAIPOWER still uses its' own indicator for comparisons within the company. It is
important that TAIPOWER adopt the WANO indicator, maybe in addition to the existing
indicator, to allow comparison with other reactors and to facilitate follow-up. The TEAM
recommends that TAIPOWER compare to the WANO index as soon as possible.

        In spite of this difficulty of comparing guidelines, it seems that the TAIPOWER
record is located around the average worldwide WANO figure. This result has to be at least
maintained, and hopefully improved, by increasing the current effort on personnel motivation,
education and follow-up.
IIIIII..II   PLANT SECURIITY PROGRAM
             PLANT SECUR TY PROGRAM

        Regarding attempts against nuclear facilities, operating a nuclear power station was in
the past a normal industrial activity. Unfortunately, at the present time, it requires serious
provisions to prevent voluntary or occasional intrusions from malevolent people.

       IIN ORDER FOR THE IINSTALLATIIONS AND THE PUBLIIC TO BE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED,,
         N ORDER FOR THE NSTALLAT ONS AND THE PUBL C TO BE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED
THE OVERALL AREA OF EACH TA POWER NUCLEAR PLANT S SPL T NTO FOUR D FFERENT
THE OVERALL AREA OF EACH TAIIPOWERNUCLEAR PLANT IISSPLIITIINTO FOUR DIIFFERENT
ZONES FROM THE OUTS DE TERR TORY TO THE REACTOR BU LDING. THE SURVE LLANCE
ZONES FROM THE OUTSIIDE TERRIITORY TO THE REACTOR BUIILDING.THE SURVEIILLANCE
PROV SIONS ARE ADAPTED TO EACH ZONE AND BECOME MORE AND MORE SOPH STICATED WHEN
PROVIISIONSARE ADAPTED TO EACH ZONE AND BECOME MORE AND MORE SOPHIISTICATED WHEN
COM NG CLOSER TO THE REACTOR BU LDING.
COMIINGCLOSER TO THE REACTOR BUIILDING.


        The devices used for that purpose are consistent with international practices: fences,
internal network for a television monitoring system, external lighting system, cardread
controlled doors, etc., and redundant means of communication between the involved partners.

       TA P OWER'S SET UP AN ORGAN ZAT ON UNDER THE CONTROL OF A SECUR TY
       TAIIPOWER'S SET UP AN ORGANIIZATIION UNDER THE CONTROL OF A SECURIITY
CONTROL CENTER LOCATED IIN THE MAIIN GUARD BUIILDIING AND IINVOLVIING BOTH PLANT AND
CONTROL CENTER LOCATED N THE MA N GUARD BU LD NG AND NVOLV NG BOTH PLANT AND
EXTERNAL PERSONNEL TA POWER CONTRACTED W TH POL CE AND ARMY FORCES TO SUPPLY
EXTERNAL PERSONNEL..TAIIPOWERCONTRACTED WIITHPOLIICEAND ARMY FORCES TO SUPPLY
SAFETY GUARDS AS ADDIITIONALFORCES IIN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY..SO,,140 SAFETY
SAFETY GUARDS AS ADD TIONAL FORCES N THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY SO 140 SAFETY
GUARDS ARE PERMANENTLY AT THE DIISPOSALOF EACH OF THE PLANT MANAGEMENTS..THEY
GUARDS ARE PERMANENTLY AT THE D SPOSAL OF EACH OF THE PLANT MANAGEMENTS THEY
PROVIIDEPATROLS AND SPECIIALSURVEYS AT SEVERAL POIINTSAROUND THE PLANTS..
PROV DE PATROLS AND SPEC AL SURVEYS AT SEVERAL PO NTS AROUND THE PLANTS

        This provision would certainly be efficient if firstly good coordination between safety
guards and Security Control Center is ensured, and secondly each of the personnel is perfectly
trained and knows his duty. Particular attention must be paid to military and police guards
whose assignments are changed more frequently than those of plant personnel.

      THE TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT ADEQUATE DRIILLS BE PERFORMED REGULARLY,, AT LEAST
       THE TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT ADEQUATE DR LLS BE PERFORMED REGULARLY AT LEAST
ONCE PER UN T AND PER YEAR TO ENSURE TH S COORD NATION AND TRA NING.
ONCE PER UNIITAND PER YEAR,,TO ENSURE THIIS COORDIINATIONAND TRAIINING.
III.J   EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

        IIIIII..J..1 GENERAL CONSIIDERATIIONS
                J 1 GENERAL CONS DERAT ONS

      In all planning for emergencies, it is important to be clear what one is planning for,
and why. The TEAM found this to be less clear than desirable.

        THE EMERGENCY PLANS SHOULD IINCORPORATE DIISTIINCTIIONS BETWEEN UNLIIKELY
        THE EMERGENCY PLANS SHOULD NCORPORATE D ST NCT ONS BETWEEN UNL KELY
EXTREME ACCIIDENTSWIITHTHE LIIBERATIONOF MUCH OF THE RADIIOACTIVITYIIN THE CORE,,
EXTREME ACC DENTS W TH THE L BERATION OF MUCH OF THE RAD OACTIVITY N THE CORE
AND LESS SEVERE ACC DENTS THAT L BERATE COMPARAT VELY L TTLE. THERE S A HAZARD N
AND LESS SEVERE ACCIIDENTS THAT LIIBERATECOMPARATIIVELY LIITTLE. THERE IISA HAZARD IIN
EXCESS VE PRECAUT ONARY ACT ON, SUCH AS AN UNNECESSARY EVACUAT ON. EVEN N THE
EXCESSIIVEPRECAUTIIONARYACTIION,SUCH AS AN UNNECESSARY EVACUATIION. EVEN IIN THE
FIIRSTCASE,,EXPERT STUDIIES IIN THE USA HAVE SUGGESTED THAT IIMMEDIATEEVACUATIION
F RST CASE EXPERT STUD ES N THE USA HAVE SUGGESTED THAT MMEDIATE EVACUAT ON
BEYOND 3 KM FROM A POWER PLANT,,BEFORE RADIIATIONDOSES ON THE GROUND ARE
BEYOND 3 KM FROM A POWER PLANT BEFORE RAD ATION DOSES ON THE GROUND ARE
MEASURED S MORE HAZARDOUS THAN STAY NG N PLACE AND SHELTER NG. NDEED, AT
MEASURED,, IISMORE HAZARDOUS THAN STAYIING IINPLACE AND SHELTERIING. IINDEED,AT
CHERNOBYL,,ALTHOUGH EVACUATIION WAS DELAYED MUCH TOO LONG ((ESPECIIALLY IIN THE
CHERNOBYL ALTHOUGH EVACUAT ON WAS DELAYED MUCH TOO LONG ESPEC ALLY N THE
V LLAGES MMEDIATELY DOWN WIND), NO ONE N THE PUBL C GOT ACUTE RAD ATION
VIILLAGES IIMMEDIATELY DOWN--WIND),NO ONE IIN THE PUBLIICGOT ACUTE RADIIATION
S CKNESS, AND MMEDIATE WITHIN HOURS EVACUAT ON WOULD NOT HAVE HELPED
SIICKNESS,AND IIMMEDIATE((WITHINHOURS))EVACUATIION WOULD NOT HAVE HELPED..
REALIIZATIION OF THIIS POIINT CAN ENSURE RELIIABLE PLANNIING FOR A PROMPT EVACUATIION FOR
REAL ZAT ON OF TH S PO NT CAN ENSURE REL ABLE PLANN NG FOR A PROMPT EVACUAT ON FOR
THOSE WIITHIN3 KM,, WIITHOUTFORECLOSIINGA MORE LEIISURELYEVACUATIIONOF OTHERS
THOSE W THIN 3 KM W THOUT FORECLOS NG A MORE LE SURELY EVACUAT ON OF OTHERS
LATER..
LATER

       One of the major lessons of the TMI-accident has been to question the provisions
previously made in case of severe accident. TMI has underlined some of their weaknesses,
mainly in the fields of post-accidental operation, organization and management of human and
material resources, internal and external communication, public information.

       TA P OWER HAS SET UP A GENERAL ORGAN ZAT ON WH CH TAKES NTO ACCOUNT
       TAIIPOWER HAS SET UP A GENERAL ORGANIIZATIION WHIICH TAKES IINTO ACCOUNT
THESE ASPECTS AND WH CH S STRONGLY NSPIRED BY US CR TERIA AND PRACT CES.
THESE ASPECTS AND WHIICHIISSTRONGLY IINSPIRED BY US CRIITERIAAND PRACTIICES.


        III.J.2. General Organization

     THE HIIGHEST AUTHORIITY FORMED IIN THIIS CASE IIS THE NATIIONAL NUCLEAR
      THE H GHEST AUTHOR TY FORMED N TH S CASE S THE NAT ONAL NUCLEAR
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMIITTEE ((NNEMC))WHIICH REPORTS TO THE EXECUTIIVE YUAN
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMM TTEE NNEMC WH CH REPORTS TO THE EXECUT VE YUAN
AND PROPOSES TO TAKE MPORTANT DEC SIONS SUCH AS F AND WHEN TO ORDER A PUBL C
AND PROPOSES TO TAKE IIMPORTANTDECIISIONSSUCH AS IIFAND WHEN TO ORDER A PUBLIIC
EVACUAT ON.
EVACUATIION.


        Two main partners are involved in case of a crisis: TAIPOWER and Governmental
Authorities. TAIPOWER will set up an organization at Headquarters level and another one
in the damaged plant at the local level. TAIPOWER also will put additional experts and
means at the disposal of the Government in order to strengthen the expertise of the
Government teams in the areas of accident assessment, radiation protection, and radiation
monitoring. On the other side, governmental authorities set up an equivalent organization at
central and local levels (outside the damaged plant), under the authority and responsibility of
AEC which currently is the regulatory body which controls TAIPOWER.

       THIIS GENERAL ORGANIIZATIION APPEARS TO BE ACCEPTABLE AND SUIITED TO THE
       TH S GENERAL ORGAN ZAT ON APPEARS TO BE ACCEPTABLE AND SU TED TO THE
PART CULAR S TUATION N TA WAN.
PARTIICULARSIITUATION IINTAIIWAN.


        III.J.3. TAIPOWER Organization

       ALL FUNCTIIONS THAT ARE ESSENTIIAL IIN CASE OF A CRIISIIS HAVE BEEN PROPERLY
        ALL FUNCT ONS THAT ARE ESSENT AL N CASE OF A CR S S HAVE BEEN PROPERLY
 DENTIFIED BY TA POWER AND THE ORGAN ZATION S WELL EQU PPED N ALL THESE
IIDENTIFIEDBY TAIIPOWERAND THE ORGANIIZATION IISWELL EQUIIPPED IIN ALL THESE
FUNCT ONS.
FUNCTIIONS.


       Difficulties generally arise when the whole system is running, mainly due to a lack of
adequate coordination between technical groups and different partners. The responsibilities
of each partner have to be clearly defined and limited in order to ensure a common and
unique opinion at the end of the assessment process and so as to prevent any inconsistency in
information supplied to the public. It is quite normal that differences appear between
judgements of experts, but a common approach is necessary to solve them before
announcing any proposed action outside. Adequate drills, involving all the actors and
performed in conditions as realistic as possible, allow these points to be checked.

       AT THE NATIIONAL LEVEL THE EMERGENCY COORDIINATOR GROUP BELONGIING TO
       AT THE NAT ONAL LEVEL THE EMERGENCY COORD NATOR GROUP BELONG NG TO
CENTRAL EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER CECC OF TA P OWER HEAD OFF CE ASSESSES
CENTRAL EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER ((CECC)) OF TAIIPOWER HEAD OFFIICE,, ASSESSES
THE OFF--SITE POPULATIION RADIIATION DOSES.. THIIS TASK IIS ALSO PERFORMED BY THE
THE OFF SITE POPULAT ON RAD ATION DOSES        TH S TASK S ALSO PERFORMED BY THE
TECHNIICAL SUPPORT GROUP OF THE NEAR SIITE EMERGENCY OPERATIION CENTER WHIICH
TECHN CAL SUPPORT GROUP OF THE NEAR S TE EMERGENCY OPERAT ON CENTER WH CH
REPORTS TO NNEMC.. BEFORE PUBLIICLY IISSUING ESTIIMATES AND CALCULATIIONS OF DOSES,,
REPORTS TO NNEMC BEFORE PUBL CLY SSUING EST MATES AND CALCULAT ONS OF DOSES
STRONG COORDIINATIONIIS NEEDED BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS..
STRONG COORD NATION S NEEDED BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS

       WHEN AN ACCIIDENT OCCURS,,IIT IIS LIIKELY THAT JJOURNALIISTS WIILL COME NEAR TO THE
       WHEN AN ACC DENT OCCURS T S L KELY THAT OURNAL STS W LL COME NEAR TO THE
  TE AND CONT NUOUSLY ASK FOR A LOT OF NFORMATION. THE PUBL C RELAT ONS SECT ON
SIITEAND CONTIINUOUSLY ASK FOR A LOT OF IINFORMATION. THE PUBLIICRELATIIONSSECTIION
S
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND THE PUBLIICRELATIIONS GROUP AT HEADQUARTER LEVEL ARE IIN
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND THE PUBL C RELAT ONS GROUP AT HEADQUARTER LEVEL ARE N
CHARGE OF THIIS TASK AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE AVAIILABLE FOR THAT..
CHARGE OF TH S TASK AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE AVA LABLE FOR THAT

        In order to prevent disorders and overloading of communication personnel, it would
be useful to plan Press Centers. One should be in TAIPEI, the others close to the three
stations. This provision would allow journalists to hear information in groups, allow the
making of periodic appointments with them, and display relevant and checked information.

       III.J.4 Emergency drills

      EFFIICIIENT DRIILLS ARE THE ONLY MEANS TO CONFIIRM THE ADEQUACY OF THE
       EFF C ENT DR LLS ARE THE ONLY MEANS TO CONF RM THE ADEQUACY OF THE
ORGAN ZATION. T S MPORTANT THAT THE DR LLS BE BL ND DR LLS. SCENAR OS ARE
ORGANIIZATION. IITIIS IIMPORTANTTHAT THE DRIILLS BE BLIINDDRIILLS.SCENARIIOSARE
PREPARED BY TA POWER HEAD OFF CE AND ARE NOT KNOWN BY PLANT PERSONNEL WHO
PREPARED BY TAIIPOWERHEAD OFFIICEAND ARE NOT KNOWN BY PLANT PERSONNEL WHO
ONLY KNOW THE SCHEDULED DATE OF THE DR LL.
ONLY KNOW THE SCHEDULED DATE OF THE DRIILL.


      Scenarios could alternately be prepared by TAIPOWER and AEC so as to take into
account the concerns of both parties and endow them with more credibility.

       The knowledge of the date of the exercise prevents a good evaluation of the average
time necessary firstly to call the required personnel, and secondly for them to join the
damaged plant. This might be long during weekends and holiday times. Accordingly the
TEAM recommends that some of the internal drills be at unscheduled, randomly chosen,
dates and times. By limiting this requirement to internal drills, the unnecessary risk of panic
can be avoided.

        At KUOSHENG and CHINSHAN sites 1 to 2 hours are necessary to actuate the
different emergency teams due to various location of personnel. It can be supposed that in a
real situation, this delay would probably be longer. In so far as a prompt actuation of
emergency organization is a key to success, TAIPOWER should review this point and strive to
reduce this delay.

       During its previous inspections, INPO has recommended to broaden scope and depth
of the scenarios used for drills in order to improve their credibility and realism and to
strengthen assessment of incidents at corporate level. TAIPOWER has taken into account
these recommendations and uses a simulator for drills.

        Once a year, TAIPOWER Head Office performs an exercise with one of the three
plants (each of them performing an annual internal drill) and, every two years, an exercise is
performed with the external organizations actuated.

       THESE FREQUENCIIES ARE PROBABLY TOO LOW AS FAR AS THE TARGET IIS MAIINTAIINIING
       THESE FREQUENC ES ARE PROBABLY TOO LOW AS FAR AS THE TARGET S MA NTA N NG
COMPETENCE AND MOTIIVATION OF THE WHOLE PERSONNEL.. THE TEAM RECOMMENDS A
COMPETENCE AND MOT VATION OF THE WHOLE PERSONNEL                 THE TEAM RECOMMENDS A
      NG OF THESE RATES TO MPROVE TH S S TUATION, MA NLY FOR GENERAL DR LLS NVOLVING
DOUBLIING OF THESE RATES TO IIMPROVE THIIS SIITUATION, MAIINLY FOR GENERAL DRIILLS IINVOLVING
DOUBL
EXTERNAL ORGAN ZATIONS. A DR LL ALSO NVOLVING PRESS AND MED A REPRESENTAT VES SHOULD
EXTERNAL ORGANIIZATIONS. A DRIILL ALSO IINVOLVING PRESS AND MEDIIA REPRESENTATIIVES SHOULD
SUPPLY TA POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL AUTHOR TIES A GOOD EXPER ENCE OF MED A PRESSURE
SUPPLY TAIIPOWER AND GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORIITIES A GOOD EXPERIIENCE OF MEDIIA PRESSURE
AND REACTIIONS IINSUCH A CASE..
AND REACT ONS N SUCH A CASE

IIIIII..J..5 PUBLIIC EDUCATIION
        J 5 PUBL C EDUCAT ON

        Education actions can be usefully extended to other people than plant personnel. The
experience shows that generally speaking, physicians and pharmacists who have the
advantage of a large credibility in the public opinion, are not aware of nuclear risks. They
need to be provided with additional information, mainly in the area of protection against
radiation, this information has to be as objective as possible. Medical civil personnel are
helpful in case of a nuclear crisis and can support efficiently the actions of civil authorities.

      THE TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT SPECIIAL IINFORMATIION SESSIIONS BE SET UP FOR ALL
      THE TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT SPEC AL NFORMAT ON SESS ONS BE SET UP FOR ALL
DOCTORS AND PHARMAC STS L VING N THE V CINITY OF THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT S TES.
DOCTORS AND PHARMACIISTS LIIVINGIINTHE VIICINITY OF THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SIITES.
IIIIII..K PLANT BETTERMENT
        K PLANT BETTERMENT

       To improve plant performance it is important to have Betterment Programs with Goal
Values, Implementation Time Tables and Budgets.

       THE TRENDS OF RELEVANT PLANT PERFORMANCE IINDIICATORS ARE LIIKELY TO SHOW
        THE TRENDS OF RELEVANT PLANT PERFORMANCE ND CATORS ARE L KELY TO SHOW
HOW WELL THE PLANT BETTERMENT PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN MPLEMENTED. THE MOST
HOW WELL THE PLANT BETTERMENT PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN IIMPLEMENTED. THE MOST
EFFECT VE AND PRACT CAL ONES AMONG THE SO CALLED NDICATORS, M GHT BE THE "UN T
EFFECTIIVEAND PRACTIICALONES AMONG THE SO CALLED IINDICATORS,MIIGHT BE THE "UNIIT
CAPABIILIITY FACTORS OR AVAIILABIILIITY FACTORS",,"FORCED OUTAGE RATE",,"UNPLANNED
CAPAB L TY FACTORS OR AVA LAB L TY FACTORS" "FORCED OUTAGE RATE" "UNPLANNED
SCRAM RATE" AND "COLLECTIIVE RADIIATIION EXPOSURE".. SIINCE THE COLLECTIIVE
SCRAM RATE" AND "COLLECT VE RAD AT ON EXPOSURE" S NCE THE COLLECT VE
RADIIATIION EXPOSURE WAS ALREADY REVIIEWED IIN IIIIII..G..((RADIIATIION PROTECTIION)),, THE
RAD AT ON EXPOSURE WAS ALREADY REV EWED N G RAD AT ON PROTECT ON THE
OTHER THREE NDICATORS ARE REV EWED N TH S SECT ON.
OTHER THREE IINDICATORSARE REVIIEWED IIN THIISSECTIION.


       The TEAM is pleased that TAIPOWER Headquarters has already provided goals to
each of the three nuclear power plants and each Nuclear power plant has already, in
accordance with these goals, established its own Five-Year Performance Improvement
Program beginning in 1989, and to be completed by 1993.

               K 1 CURRENT STATUS OF TA P OWER'S THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
       IIIIII..K..1.. CURRENT STATUS OF TAIIPOWER'S THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

       III.K.1.a Unit Capability Factor/Availability Factor

       AS SHOWN N F GURE K 1 TA P OWER'S "MARK" N 1990 FOR THE AVA LAB L TY
       AS SHOWN IIN FIIGURE IIIIII..K..1,,TAIIPOWER'S "MARK" IIN 1990 FOR THE AVAIILABIILIITY
FACTOR AVERAGED OVER THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS S UST AT THE WORLDW DE
FACTOR AVERAGED OVER THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IISJJUSTAT THE WORLDWIIDE
LEVEL AND BETTER THAN THAT FOR THE USA.. FOR EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT THE TRENDS
LEVEL AND BETTER THAN THAT FOR THE USA FOR EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT THE TRENDS
ARE::
ARE

       1) CHINSHAN 1 and 2 (Figure III.K.2)

       THE AVAIILABIILIITY FACTOR DECREASED FROM 1986 TO 1989,,BUT IIT HAS IIMPROVED IIN
       THE AVA LAB L TY FACTOR DECREASED FROM 1986 TO 1989 BUT T HAS MPROVED N
1990 RESPONDIING TO IITS FIIVE YEAR PERFORMANCE IIMPROVEMENT PROGRAM AND IIS
1990 RESPOND NG TO TS F VE YEAR PERFORMANCE MPROVEMENT PROGRAM AND S
APPROACHIING THE US LEVEL..
APPROACH NG THE US LEVEL

       2) KUOSHENG 1 and 2 (Figure III.K.3)

         THE TREND IIS SIIMIILAR TO THAT FOR CHIINSHAN 1 AND 2,,BUT THE LOWEST FIIGURE IIN
         THE TREND S S M LAR TO THAT FOR CH NSHAN 1 AND 2 BUT THE LOWEST F GURE N
1989 IIS STIILL HIIGHER THAN THE US LEVEL..
1989 S ST LL H GHER THAN THE US LEVEL

       3) MAANSHAN 1 and 2 (Figure III.K.4)

      THE AVAIILABIILIITY FACTOR FOR MAANSHAN 1 HAS STEADIILY IIMPROVED YEAR BY
      THE AVA LAB L TY FACTOR FOR MAANSHAN 1 HAS STEAD LY MPROVED YEAR BY
YEAR AND HAS KEPT HIIGHERTHAN THAT FOR US REACTORS SIINCE1987.. THE TREND FOR
YEAR AND HAS KEPT H GHER THAN THAT FOR US REACTORS S NCE 1987 THE TREND FOR
MAANSHAN 2 IIS SIIMIILAR TO KUOSHENG 1 AND 2..
MAANSHAN 2 S S M LAR TO KUOSHENG 1 AND 2

       III.K.1.b Forced Outage Rate (Figures III.K.5,6,7 and 8)

       TA P OWER'S MARK FOR THE AVERAGE OF THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS S
       TAIIPOWER'S MARK FOR THE AVERAGE OF THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IIS
SLIIGHTLYHIIGHER THAN THE WORLDWIIDE LEVEL AND MUCH BETTER THAN THAT FOR US
SL GHTLY H GHER THAN THE WORLDW DE LEVEL AND MUCH BETTER THAN THAT FOR US
REACTORS BY A FACTOR OF TWO IIN1990.. STEADY IIMPROVEMENTSARE SEEN IINKUOSHENG
REACTORS BY A FACTOR OF TWO N 1990 STEADY MPROVEMENTS ARE SEEN N KUOSHENG
FROM 1988 AND MAANSHAN 1 FROM 1986 FOR CH NSHAN 1 AND 2 THE 1990 MARKS ARE
FROM 1988 AND MAANSHAN 1 FROM 1986.. FOR CHIINSHAN1 AND 2 THE 1990 MARKS ARE
WORSE THAN THOSE FOR 1989,,THOUGH THESE ARE BETTER THAN US.. FOR MAANSHAN 2,,
WORSE THAN THOSE FOR 1989 THOUGH THESE ARE BETTER THAN US FOR MAANSHAN 2
THE 1989 VALUE WAS WORSE THAN IIN THE US,,BUT THE VALUE HAS BEEN MUCH IIMPROVED IIN
THE 1989 VALUE WAS WORSE THAN N THE US BUT THE VALUE HAS BEEN MUCH MPROVED N
1990..
1990

         III.K.1.c Unplanned Scram Rate (Figure III.K.9)

       TA P OWER'S MARK AVERAGED OVER ALL THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 4 4 SCRAMS
       TAIIPOWER'S MARK AVERAGED OVER ALL THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS,,4..4 SCRAMS
PER 7000 HOURS CR TICAL PER UN T, S MUCH WORSE THAN THE WORLDW DE AVERAGE 1 0
PER 7000 HOURS CRIITICALPER UNIIT, IIS MUCH WORSE THAN THE WORLDWIIDE AVERAGE,,1..0
AND THE US AVERAGE 1.2. THE TEAM ALSO EXAM NED THE TRENDS FOR EACH PLANT
AND THE US AVERAGE,,1.2.THE TEAM ALSO EXAMIINED THE TRENDS FOR EACH PLANT::


         1) CHINSHAN 1 and 2 (Figure III.K.10)

      THE SCRAM RATE OF THE LAST FIIVE YEARS ((1986--1990))HAS SURELY IIMPROVED FROM
       THE SCRAM RATE OF THE LAST F VE YEARS 1986 1990 HAS SURELY MPROVED FROM
THAT OF THE EARLY DAYS OF THE PLANT OPERAT ON, E G. 15 FOR CH NSHAN 1 AND 13 FOR
THAT OF THE EARLY DAYS OF THE PLANT OPERATIION,E..G.15 FOR CHIINSHAN1 AND 13 FOR
CH N SHAN 2 N 1981 HOWEVER THE F GURES GO UP AND DOWN AROUND 3 AND NO
CHIINSHAN 2 IIN 1981,,HOWEVER,, THE FIIGURES GO UP AND DOWN AROUND 3,,AND NO
APPARENT IIMPROVING TREND IISSEEN.. THE FIIGURE IISABOUT TWIICE THAT OF THE US..
APPARENT MPROVING TREND S SEEN THE F GURE S ABOUT TW CE THAT OF THE US

         2) KUOSHENG 1 and 2 (Figure III.K.11)

        THE SCRAM RATE OF THE LAST FIIVE YEARS ((1986--1990))HAS SURELY IIMPROVED FROM
         THE SCRAM RATE OF THE LAST F VE YEARS 1986 1990 HAS SURELY MPROVED FROM
 THAT OF THE EARLY DAYS OF THE PLANT OPERAT ON, E G. 10 FOR KUOSHENG 1 N 1982 AND
THAT OF THE EARLY DAYS OF THE PLANT OPERATIION,E..G.10 FOR KUOSHENG 1 IIN1982 AND
10 FOR KUOSHENG 2 IIN 1983;;THIIS IIMPROVEMENT IIS ESPECIIALLY MARKED FOR KUOSHENG
 10 FOR KUOSHENG 2 N 1983 TH S MPROVEMENT S ESPEC ALLY MARKED FOR KUOSHENG
2..HOWEVER,, THE FIIGURES GO UP AND DOWN AROUND 3,,AND NO APPARENT IIMPROVIING TREND
 2 HOWEVER THE F GURES GO UP AND DOWN AROUND 3 AND NO APPARENT MPROV NG TREND
IISSEEN.. THE FIIGURE IISABOUT TWIICE THAT OF THE US..
 S SEEN THE F GURE S ABOUT TW CE THAT OF THE US

         3)   MAANSHAN 1 and 2 (Figure III.K.12)

       THE SCRAM RATE OF MAANSHAN 1 WAS REDUCED FROM 8 IIN 1987 TO 2 IIN 1989 AND
        THE SCRAM RATE OF MAANSHAN 1 WAS REDUCED FROM 8 N 1987 TO 2 N 1989 AND
THAT OF MAANSHAN 2 WAS ALSO REDUCED FROM 14 IIN1986 TO 2 IIN1988.. THESE WERE
THAT OF MAANSHAN 2 WAS ALSO REDUCED FROM 14 N 1986 TO 2 N 1988 THESE WERE
THE BEST RECORDS IIN THESE FIIVEYEARS AND REACHED A LEVEL COMPARABLE WIITH THE US
THE BEST RECORDS N THESE F VE YEARS AND REACHED A LEVEL COMPARABLE W TH THE US
LEVEL AFTER THAT THE RATE HAS NCREASED AGA N.
LEVEL.. AFTER THAT THE RATE HAS IINCREASEDAGAIIN.


         III.K.2. TAIPOWER Five Year Performance Improvement Program

        AS SEEN ABOVE,,TAIIPOWER'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SEEM TO BE OPERATED
        AS SEEN ABOVE TA POWER'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SEEM TO BE OPERATED
EFFIICIENTLYAND IINA WELL--CONTROLLEDMANNER,,JJUDGING FROM TWO PLANT
EFF CIENTLY AND N A WELL CONTROLLED MANNER UDGING FROM TWO PLANT
PERFORMANCE IINDIICATORS::UNIIT CAPABIILIITY FACTOR ((OR AVAIILABIILIITY FACTOR))AND
PERFORMANCE ND CATORS UN T CAPAB L TY FACTOR OR AVA LAB L TY FACTOR AND
FORCED OUTAGE RATE TO GA N THE H GHEST STANDARD OF OPERAT ON TA P OWER
FORCED OUTAGE RATE.. TO GAIIN THE HIIGHEST STANDARD OF OPERATIION,,TAIIPOWER
SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO MAKE CONT NUOUS EFFORTS N MPLEMENTING VAR OUS
SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO MAKE CONTIINUOUS EFFORTS IIN IIMPLEMENTINGVARIIOUS
PERFORMANCE MPROVING PROGRAMS WH CH HAVE ALREADY BEEN ESTABL SHED.
PERFORMANCE IIMPROVINGPROGRAMS WHIICHHAVE ALREADY BEEN ESTABLIISHED.
         As for the other important indicator of nuclear power plant operating performance,
Unplanned Scram Rate, this indicator does not directly measure the safety level of the reactor.
However, Taiwan has a small electricity grid, and a scram may force a temporary regional
blackout with much consequent public inconvenience. Therefore scrams are a major source
of public concern and TAIPOWER should devote much effort to reduce the number of
unplanned scrams to the worldwide level. This should not, however, be at the expense of
failing to scram when that is necessary, and thereby reducing safety.

        FROM TAIIPOWER'S PRESENTATIIONS AND FROM A NUMBER OF MEETIINGS WIITH STAFF
         FROM TA POWER'S PRESENTAT ONS AND FROM A NUMBER OF MEET NGS W TH STAFF
 N THE HEAD OFF CES, NUCLEAR POWER PLANT S TES AND THE MA NTENANCE TRA NING
IIN THE HEAD OFFIICES,NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SIITESAND THE MAIINTENANCETRAIINING
CENTER,, THE TEAM UNDERSTANDS THAT ALL STAFF OF TAIIPOWER HAVE ALREADY
 CENTER THE TEAM UNDERSTANDS THAT ALL STAFF OF TA POWER HAVE ALREADY
 RECOGN ZED TA POWER''S CURRENT S TUATIONS WELL THEY HAVE ESTABL SHED THE F VE
RECOGNIIZEDTAIIPOWERS CURRENT SIITUATIONS WELL.. THEY HAVE ESTABLIISHED THE FIIVE
YEAR PERFORMANCE IIMPROVEMENT PROGRAM AND HAVE BEEN IIMPLEMENTIING IIT SIINCE 1989..
 YEAR PERFORMANCE MPROVEMENT PROGRAM AND HAVE BEEN MPLEMENT NG T S NCE 1989
       III.K.2.a Performance Goals

       THE FOLLOWIING PERFORMANCE GOALS WERE ESTABLIISHED TO BE REACHED IIN 1993..
       THE FOLLOW NG PERFORMANCE GOALS WERE ESTABL SHED TO BE REACHED N 1993

Item                              Unit               TAIPOWER   Ref. INPO
                                              1993 GOAL 1990 GOAL
                                              1993 GOAL 1990 GOAL

Energy Availability Factor         %/unit/yr            77.0            76.0
SCRAM RATE
SCRAM RATE                      T MES/UNIT/YR
                                TIIMES/UNIT/YR        1
                                                      1          1..5
                                                                 15
Core Meltdown Probability            X 10  -5/unit/yr       5
Collective Radiation Exposure       man-rem/unit/yr      400             469(BWR)
LIIQUIID WASTE RELEASE
L QU D WASTE RELEASE                CII//UNIIT//YR
                                    C UN T YR           0..10
                                                        0 10
Forced Outage Rate                  %/unit/yr              2.2


        The TEAM understands that the TAIPOWER 1993 Goal was established by
TAIPOWER top management and given to each nuclear power plant. The goals seem to be
at the worldwide standard level or more stringent. They seem to be reasonable and
challenging goals considering TAIPOWER's current status and the fact that it does not have a
long experience in nuclear power operation.

       III.K.2.b Five Year Performance Improvement Program

      ON A CONTIINUOUS AND DAIILY BASIIS,, THE STAFF OF EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAVE
       ON A CONT NUOUS AND DA LY BAS S THE STAFF OF EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAVE
BEEN ASSESS NG THE R PLANT OPERAT ON EXPER ENCES AND MAK NG ROOT CAUSE ANALYSES
BEEN ASSESSIING THEIIRPLANT OPERATIIONEXPERIIENCESAND MAKIINGROOT CAUSE ANALYSES
FOR EACH TROUBLE..COUNTERMEASURES HAVE BEEN ESTABLIISHED FOR AVOIIDING
FOR EACH TROUBLE COUNTERMEASURES HAVE BEEN ESTABL SHED FOR AVO DING
RECURRENCES OF TROUBLES AND FOR IIMPROVING PLANT PERFORMANCE MEASURES.. THEY
RECURRENCES OF TROUBLES AND FOR MPROVING PLANT PERFORMANCE MEASURES THEY
HAVE DEVELOPED THE R OWN F VE YEAR PERFORMANCE MPROVEMENT PROGRAM SU TABLE
HAVE DEVELOPED THEIIR OWN FIIVEYEAR PERFORMANCE IIMPROVEMENTPROGRAM SUIITABLE
FOR THEIIRNUCLEAR POWER PLANTS FROM THESE DAIILYEFFORTS..
FOR THE R NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS FROM THESE DA LY EFFORTS

       Most countermeasures are included in this program. The TEAM agrees that
implementing the program in accordance with the time-table is the most important and the
only way to reach the 1993 goal.

       III.K.3. Routine Betterment Activities

       EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAS IITS OWN BETTERMENT ORGANIIZATIION.. ROUTIINE
        EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAS TS OWN BETTERMENT ORGAN ZAT ON ROUT NE
BETTERMENT ACT VITIES ARE DONE THROUGH TH S ORGAN ZATION, MA NLY N THE FORM OF
BETTERMENT ACTIIVITIESARE DONE THROUGH THIISORGANIIZATION, MAIINLY IINTHE FORM OF
DESIIGN CHANGE REQUEST..
DES GN CHANGE REQUEST

        The TEAM recommends that the function of this betterment organization be enhanced
in the following directions:


         1)) ROUTIINE TECHNIICAL IINFORMATIION TRANSFER,,OR ROUTIINE OPERATIING EXPERIIENCE
         1 ROUT NE TECHN CAL NFORMAT ON TRANSFER OR ROUT NE OPERAT NG EXPER ENCE
((ESPECIIALLY TROUBLE EXPERIIENCE))FEEDBACK TO THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS THROUGH
  ESPEC ALLY TROUBLE EXPER ENCE FEEDBACK TO THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS THROUGH
ODEG..
 ODEG

      2) The trend of the number of forced shutdowns, including both planned and
unplanned, in terms of numbers of occurrences, direct and indirect causes, recurrence.
       3)) ESTABLIISHIING IINTEGRATED REMEDY ACTIIONS FOR PREDOMIINANT FORCED SHUTDOWN
        3 ESTABL SH NG NTEGRATED REMEDY ACT ONS FOR PREDOM NANT FORCED SHUTDOWN
CAUSES E G. LEAKAGE FROM VALVES SEEMS TO BE THE PREDOM NANT CAUSE OF FORCED
CAUSES,,E..G.LEAKAGE FROM VALVES SEEMS TO BE THE PREDOMIINANTCAUSE OF FORCED
SHUTDOWNS OF BWR PLANTS IINTHE LAST FIIVEYEARS.. THEREFORE,, ESTABLIISHINGAN IINTEGRATED
SHUTDOWNS OF BWR PLANTS N THE LAST F VE YEARS THEREFORE ESTABL SHING AN NTEGRATED
VALVE LEAKAGE CORRECT ON PROGRAM M GHT BE EFFECT VE.
VALVE LEAKAGE CORRECTIIONPROGRAM MIIGHTBE EFFECTIIVE.
figure III.K.1 here
F GURE II.K.2 HERE F GURE II.K.3 HERE F GURE II.K.4 HERE
FIIGURE IIII.K.2HERE;; FIIGURE IIII.K.3HERE;; FIIGURE IIII.K.4HERE



MAKE SURE DEFINITION OF AVAILABILITY FACTOR IS CORRECT
F GURE II.K.5 HERE
FIIGURE IIII.K.5HERE
figure III.K.6 here; figure III.K.7 here; figure III.K.8 here
F GURE II.K.9 HERE
FIIGURE IIII.K.9HERE
figure III.K.10 here;figure III.K.11 here;figure III.K.12 here
IIIIII..L REFUELIING OUTAGE MANAGEMENT
        L REFUEL NG OUTAGE MANAGEMENT

       The time spent for refueling and associated management reduces significantly the
availability of the nuclear power plants and hence the total electricity production. Any
reduction in the duration of an outage directly affects the performance indicators.

         The present duration of the outages of TAIPOWER's nuclear power plants (50-60
days) is long, even much longer than the best performers in the world (average for Western
Europe 35 days, best case 13 days). The general management of TAIPOWER is well aware
of this situation and has taken the necessary actions to determine benchmarks, to compare this
situation with other countries, and to detect possible improvements. In particular,
TAIPOWER awarded contracts to foreign consultant firms in 1989 and 1990 to review the
present situation and to propose improvements. TAIPOWER has also sent some crews
abroad to learn measures that can be taken to shorten the outage periods. From the studies
it appears that a reduction of approximately two weeks might be achieved in the near future
and that it is not impossible to go even further.

       THE STUDIIES CONCLUDE THAT::
       THE STUD ES CONCLUDE THAT

      - there is more concern with the preparation for the outages and the organization
      thereof than with the technical aspects;

       --THERE WAS AN ACCEPTABLE TECHNIICAL LEVEL OF THE CREWS;;AND
         THERE WAS AN ACCEPTABLE TECHN CAL LEVEL OF THE CREWS AND
- the crews were performing routine operations in times comparable with the best performers
outside the ROC.

     THEY HAVE HOWEVER STRESSED SOME POIINTS THAT NEED IIMPROVEMENTS,,AND WHIICH THE
      THEY HAVE HOWEVER STRESSED SOME PO NTS THAT NEED MPROVEMENTS AND WH CH THE
TEAM URGES TAIIPOWER TO IIMPLEMENT DIILIIGENTLY.. THE TEAM PARTIICULARLY REFERS TO::
TEAM URGES TA POWER TO MPLEMENT D L GENTLY THE TEAM PART CULARLY REFERS TO

      - the importance of a careful and timely preparation of the outages and the need to
      implement a scheduling system that enables an immediate adaptation of the schedule to
      take advantage of any advance taken during the course of the work. The critical path
      has to be determined, examined and continuously verified, and the personnel has to be
      aware of the importance of the critical path analysis. The program should include all
      operations, including the secondary side and BOP, which often caused delay to the
      restart of the units. And the duration of the various tasks, in particular those
      involving external contractors, should be more precisely defined;

       -- THE NEED TO WORK IIN SHIIFTS AND DURIING WEEK--ENDS FOR OPERATIIONS ON THE CRIITIICAL
          THE NEED TO WORK N SH FTS AND DUR NG WEEK ENDS FOR OPERAT ONS ON THE CR T CAL
       PATH;;
        PATH
- the improvement of some systems such as the capability of the purification system;

      -- THE TRAIINIING OF THE PERSONNEL,, BOTH IIN--HOUSE AND EXTERNAL,, IINCLUDIING IINSTIILLIING
         THE TRA N NG OF THE PERSONNEL BOTH N HOUSE AND EXTERNAL NCLUD NG NST LL NG
       A FEEL NG OF RESPONS BILITY;
      A FEELIINGOF RESPONSIIBILITY;

      - the training in health physics, as well as familiarization of the personnel with the
      access control system which should take place before the refuelling starts;

      - increase the independence of the site superintendents from the head office
      management;

      -- REVIIEW THE SIITUATIION AT THE VARIIOUS LEVELS OF THE ORGANIIZATIION,, REDUCIING THE
         REV EW THE S TUAT ON AT THE VAR OUS LEVELS OF THE ORGAN ZAT ON REDUC NG THE
      NEED TO REFER TO UPPER LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT FOR ALL DEC SIONS;
      NEED TO REFER TO UPPER LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT FOR ALL DECIISIONS;


- review the policy that keeps only a minimum of spare parts at the power plant;

      -- MODIIFY,, IIN AGREEMENT WIITH THE SAFETY AUTHORIITIIES,, THE PROCEDURE TO REDUCE
         MOD FY N AGREEMENT W TH THE SAFETY AUTHOR T ES THE PROCEDURE TO REDUCE
       UNNECESSARY DELAYS ESPEC ALLY FOR THE TESTS BEFORE RESTART OF THE UN T;
      UNNECESSARY DELAYS,,ESPECIIALLYFOR THE TESTS BEFORE RESTART OF THE UNIIT;


      - maintain head office overall management functions and safety authorities'
      surveillance functions, but avoid too prescriptive a procedure for intervention on their
      part;

      --IINCREASE THE IINVOLVEMENT OF EVERYONE IIN THE FIINAL RESULT;;
          NCREASE THE NVOLVEMENT OF EVERYONE N THE F NAL RESULT

      - the selection criteria for the subcontractors have to be modified; modifications must
      include an increase of the subcontractor's responsibility, and long term contracts,
      qualification of their personnel, selection on the basis of quality of work, not only on
      the basis of the lowest bid. It has to be noted, however, the bid procedure must be
      transparent to the public; large contracts such as power station contracts, wherever in
      the world they are made, inevitably attract those willing to engage in financial
      improprieties, and this possibility is increased whenever the lowest bid is not used.
      The TEAM urges particular attention to this problem which can have an enormous
      effect upon public trust in TAIPOWER and acceptance of nuclear power generally.
III.M. RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT

       IIN SEPTEMBER 1988 THE GOVERNMENT OF ROC STIIPULATED THAT::
         N SEPTEMBER 1988 THE GOVERNMENT OF ROC ST PULATED THAT

        - the waste management programs must be carried out by adopting the currently
feasible technologies and be adapted to Taiwan's local conditions;

     --THE WASTE PRODUCER MUST PURSUE POSSIIBLE WAYS TO MIINIIMIIZE THE AMOUNT AND
       THE WASTE PRODUCER MUST PURSUE POSS BLE WAYS TO M N M ZE THE AMOUNT AND
VOLUME OF WASTE;;
VOLUME OF WASTE

      - the waste producer must be responsible and bear costs for conducting the waste
management programs;

      --THE PROTECTIION OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIIC AND THE QUALIITY OF
         THE PROTECT ON OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBL C AND THE QUAL TY OF
        RONMENT MUST BE WARRANTED AND THE NTERNATIONAL CONVENT ONS MUST BE
THE ENVIIRONMENTMUST BE WARRANTED AND THE IINTERNATIONALCONVENTIIONSMUST BE
THE ENV
OBSERVED..
OBSERVED

       The TEAM considers that these are sensible requirements.

      A "FLOW CHART" OF THE RADIIOACTIIVE WASTE SYSTEM IIS SHOWN IIN FIIGURE IIIIII..M..1
       A "FLOW CHART" OF THE RAD OACT VE WASTE SYSTEM S SHOWN N F GURE M 1
WH CH SHOWS THE FAC LITIES D SCUSSED N THE FOLLOW NG SECT ONS.
WHIICHSHOWS THE FACIILITIESDIISCUSSED IIN THE FOLLOWIINGSECTIIONS.


        III.M.1 Radioactive Waste.

               IIIIII..M..1..A HIIGH LEVEL WASTE..
                       M 1 A H GH LEVEL WASTE

        Radioactive waste is generated by the nuclear fission process which produces
radioactive products. In addition the neutrons from the fission produce radioactivity from
bombardment of, and capture by the elements of, critical components or impurities in the
water, and also transuranic elements from capture in the uranium (or plutonium) fuel itself.
The vast majority of the fission products and the transuranic elements are kept in the fuel,
contained by the fuel rod cladding. These are considered "high-level wastes".

       THE SPENT FUEL RODS ARE KEPT IIN A SPENT FUEL PIIT NEXT TO THE REACTOR FOR
        THE SPENT FUEL RODS ARE KEPT N A SPENT FUEL P T NEXT TO THE REACTOR FOR
SEVERAL YEARS..AN EXTENSIIONOF THE ON--SITESTORAGE CAPACIITY IISPLANNED,, TO ALLOW A
 SEVERAL YEARS AN EXTENS ON OF THE ON SITE STORAGE CAPAC TY S PLANNED TO ALLOW A
 FULL CORE RESERVE STORAGE UP TO 1999 FOR THE CH NSHAN PLANT 2004 FOR THE
FULL CORE RESERVE STORAGE UP TO 1999 FOR THE CHIINSHANPLANT,,2004 FOR THE
KUOSHENG PLANT AND 2027 FOR THE MAANSHAN PLANT.. STUDIIES FOR FIINAL DIISPOSAL
 KUOSHENG PLANT AND 2027 FOR THE MAANSHAN PLANT STUD ES FOR F NAL D SPOSAL
 N AN APPROPR ATE GEOLOG CAL STRUCTURE ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY N ORDER TO SELECT
IINAN APPROPRIIATEGEOLOGIICALSTRUCTURE ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IINORDER TO SELECT
AND CONFIIRMA SIITE IIN2016,,AND THEN TO USE IITFOR WASTE DIISPOSALIIN2032..
 AND CONF RM A S TE N 2016 AND THEN TO USE T FOR WASTE D SPOSAL N 2032

         Finally the spent fuel will be put into the high level waste repository, perhaps after
fuel reprocessing to remove the useful uranium and plutonium fuel. The disposal of these
high level wastes is a matter of great public concern in all countries, and ROC seems no
exception as evidenced, for example, by the concerns of the local government of Taipei.
However, as noted in the introduction, the TEAM felt that detailed examination was beyond
it's scope.

               IIIIII..M..1..B LOW LEVEL WASTE..
                       M 1 B LOW LEVEL WASTE

        Roughly speaking, low level waste is every radioactive waste that is not high level
waste. It includes all the neutron activation products, and that part of the fission products and
transuranic radionuclides that leave the fuel rods by leakage or otherwise. It is obvious that
the best method of controlling the amount of low-level waste is not producing it; and that the
reduction of fuel leakage is an important element in this strategy. It is noteworthy here that
fuel failure rates have dropped from somewhat over 0.1% to below 0.01% as fuel fabrication
has improved. It appears that some fuel failures occur by intrusion of debris, some by
manufacturing, and others under rapid power level increases which can be reduced. The
TEAM was shown the research at INER, where failed fuel rods are critically examined to
study this question. The TEAM applauds this careful study.

       ONCE LOW LEVEL WASTE HAS BEEN GENERATED,, IIT HAS BECOME CONVENTIIONAL TO
        ONCE LOW LEVEL WASTE HAS BEEN GENERATED T HAS BECOME CONVENT ONAL TO
CHARACTERIIZE IITBY VOLUME -- FOR IITIIS THE VOLUME THAT GOVERNS THE SIIZEOF STORAGE
CHARACTER ZE T BY VOLUME FOR T S THE VOLUME THAT GOVERNS THE S ZE OF STORAGE
AND D SPOSAL FAC LITIES. THE TEAM FOLLOWS THAT APPROACH N THE NEXT SECT ONS.
AND DIISPOSALFACIILITIES. THE TEAM FOLLOWS THAT APPROACH IIN THE NEXT SECTIIONS.
WHIILE DOIING THIIS,, THE TEAM CAUTIIONS AGAIINST FORGETTIING WHAT THE WASTE IIS
WH LE DO NG TH S THE TEAM CAUT ONS AGA NST FORGETT NG WHAT THE WASTE S
COMPOSED OF;; FOR IITIIS THAT WHIICHWIILLDETERMIINE THE HAZARD IIFTHERE IISANY FAIILURE
COMPOSED OF FOR T S THAT WH CH W LL DETERM NE THE HAZARD F THERE S ANY FA LURE
OF A WASTE REPOS TORY. TH S S D SCUSSED FURTHER N II.M.5.
OF A WASTE REPOSIITORY. THIIS IISDIISCUSSED FURTHER IIN IIII.M.5.


       They are also very obvious indicators for the environmentally conscious members of
the general public. In this evaluation the TEAM depends upon the reliability of the numbers
provided to it by TAIPOWER. However, at various points in this report the TEAM
questioned the meaning of these numbers. The importance of understanding exactly what
the numbers mean, and to what they refer, cannot be overemphasized.

     THE RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT OF THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IS EVALUATED
     THE RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT OF THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IS EVALUATED
MAINLY IN THE AREAS OF THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES (GASEOUS AND LIQUID) TO
MAINLY IN THE AREAS OF THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES (GASEOUS AND LIQUID) TO
THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE VOLUME OF LOW-LEVEL SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTES, BOTH OF WHICH
THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE VOLUME OF LOW-LEVEL SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTES, BOTH OF WHICH
ARE TYPICAL PERFORMANCE INDICES OF OPERATIONAL RESULTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, AND
ARE TYPICAL PERFORMANCE INDICES OF OPERATIONAL RESULTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, AND
ARE USED TO COMPARE THE OPERATION WITH THAT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OF OTHER
ARE USED TO COMPARE THE OPERATION WITH THAT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OF OTHER
COUNTRIES. ALSO TAIPOWER'S BETTERMENT PROGRAMS FOR THIS AREA ARE BRIEFLY
COUNTRIES. ALSO TAIPOWER'S BETTERMENT PROGRAMS FOR THIS AREA ARE BRIEFLY
REVIEWED AND COMMENTED UPON.
REVIEWED AND COMMENTED UPON.

       III.M.2. Release of Radioactive Wastes to the Environment

          RADIIOACTIIVE WASTES ((GASEOUS AND LIIQUIID))OF THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
          RAD OACT VE WASTES GASEOUS AND L QU D OF THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
ARE MON TORED BEFORE BE NG RELEASED NTO THE ENV RONMENT. TH S RELEASE IN C /YR)
ARE MONIITOREDBEFORE BEIINGRELEASED IINTO THE ENVIIRONMENT. THIISRELEASE ((INCII/YR)
HAS BEEN LESS THAN THE ROCAEC REGULAT ON L MITS TABLE II.M.1). T S NOTED THAT
HAS BEEN LESS THAN THE ROCAEC REGULATIION LIIMITS((TABLE IIII.M.1). IIT IISNOTED THAT
ROCAEC HAS ONLY SET UP A LIIMIIT ON DOSE;;PRIIMARIILY DOSE TO THE PUBLIIC AT THE SIITE
ROCAEC HAS ONLY SET UP A L M T ON DOSE PR MAR LY DOSE TO THE PUBL C AT THE S TE
BOUNDARY..THERE IISNO LEGAL RELEASE LIIMITOF RADIIOACTIVEMATERIIALS IIN TERMS OF
BOUNDARY THERE S NO LEGAL RELEASE L MIT OF RAD OACTIVE MATER ALS N TERMS OF
CII//YR.. TAIIPOWER HAS SET UP SUCH A RELEASE LIIMIIT IIN CII//YR FOR EACH NUCLEAR POWER
C YR TA POWER HAS SET UP SUCH A RELEASE L M T N C YR FOR EACH NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT..
PLANT

        Neither WANO nor INPO has set up an international data base to compare with
TAIPOWER's data. However, there is a data base in Japan from the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry: Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, 1991 Nuclear
Power Plant Operational Annual Report of Aug., 1991 (in Japanese) which can be used for a
rough comparison. The Japanese definitions seem basically the same as those of
TAIPOWER but there may be small differences.

       IIIIII..M..2..A
               M2A       GASEOUS RADIIOACTIIVE WASTE RELEASES..
                         GASEOUS RAD OACT VE WASTE RELEASES

        The gaseous radioactive waste release to the environment from each nuclear power
plant (in Ci/yr) has decreased slightly year by year and is well below the regulation limit.
This is shown in Figure III.M.2 where the Japanese data are also shown for reference.
       THE TOTAL MAGNIITUDE OF THE GAS RELEASES PRESENTED IIN THESE FIIGURES,,IIN THE
       THE TOTAL MAGN TUDE OF THE GAS RELEASES PRESENTED N THESE F GURES N THE
   TS OF C /YR, S DOM NATED BY THE NOBLE GASES KRYPTON AND XENON ODINE S
UNIITSOF CII/YR, IISDOMIINATEDBY THE NOBLE GASES KRYPTON AND XENON.. IIODINE IIS
UN
RELEASED N MUCH SMALLER QUANT TIES, ALTHOUGH WHEN MEASURED N C , T HAS A MUCH
RELEASED IINMUCH SMALLER QUANTIITIES,ALTHOUGH,,WHEN MEASURED IIN CII, IITHAS A MUCH
GREATER SIIGNIFICANCE FOR PUBLIICHEALTH.. FIIGURES FOR IIODINEARE HARDER TO MEASURE
GREATER S GNIFICANCE FOR PUBL C HEALTH F GURES FOR ODINE ARE HARDER TO MEASURE
AND COMPARE.. WHIILEUSIING THE FIIGURE FOR THE TOTAL GAS RELEASE AS AN IINDICATOROF
AND COMPARE WH LE US NG THE F GURE FOR THE TOTAL GAS RELEASE AS AN NDICATOR OF
THE COMPETENCE OF WASTE MANAGEMENT,, THE CRIITICALIIMPORTANCEOF IIODINEMUST NOT
THE COMPETENCE OF WASTE MANAGEMENT THE CR TICAL MPORTANCE OF ODINE MUST NOT
BE FORGOTTEN..
BE FORGOTTEN

       The amount of the release from CHINSHAN, however, is comparatively larger than
those of the others. One reason might come from the past experienced fuel failures because
CHINSHAN (both units 1 and 2) had experienced a larger number of fuel failures than the
other units, except MAANSHAN unit 1.

       ALSO,,CHIINSHAN HAD SOME DEFIICIIENCY IIN IITS''OFF--GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM,,WHIICH
       ALSO CH NSHAN HAD SOME DEF C ENCY N TS OFF GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM WH CH
WAS THE CAUSE OF UNUSUALLY LARGE AIIRBORNE RELEASES BEFORE 1987.. COMPLETED
 WAS THE CAUSE OF UNUSUALLY LARGE A RBORNE RELEASES BEFORE 1987 COMPLETED
IIMPROVEMENTS IINCLUDE AN HVAC MODIIFICATION AND SEALIING THE CONDENSATE
 MPROVEMENTS NCLUDE AN HVAC MOD FICATION AND SEAL NG THE CONDENSATE
SUMPTANK.. THESE WIILLPROBABLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM BOTH IIN THE SHORT--TERMAND IIN
 SUMPTANK THESE W LL PROBABLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM BOTH N THE SHORT TERM AND N
 THE LONG TERM THIS S D SCUSSED FURTHER N APPEND X V G.2).
THE LONG--TERM((THIS IIS DIISCUSSED FURTHER IINAPPENDIIXV..G.2).


       III.M.2.b        Liquid Radioactive Waste Releases.

      THE LIIQUIID RADIIOACTIIVE WASTE RELEASES TO THE ENVIIRONMENT FROM CHIINSHAN
       THE L QU D RAD OACT VE WASTE RELEASES TO THE ENV RONMENT FROM CH NSHAN
AND KUOSHENG IN C /YR) HAVE NOT DECREASED YEARLY AND ALSO THE AMOUNTS OF THE
AND KUOSHENG ((INCII/YR)HAVE NOT DECREASED YEARLY AND ALSO THE AMOUNTS OF THE
RELEASE ARE STIILLNOT AT AS LOW A LEVEL AS THE JAPANESE DATA,,ALTHOUGH THEY ARE
RELEASE ARE ST LL NOT AT AS LOW A LEVEL AS THE JAPANESE DATA ALTHOUGH THEY ARE
WELL BELOW THE REGULAT ON L MIT. THE RELEASE FROM MAANSHAN HAS SL GHTLY
WELL BELOW THE REGULATIION LIIMIT. THE RELEASE FROM MAANSHAN HAS SLIIGHTLY
DECREASED YEARLY..MOREOVER THE AMOUNT OF THE RELEASE IIS LOW BUT STIILLHIIGHER
DECREASED YEARLY MOREOVER THE AMOUNT OF THE RELEASE S LOW BUT ST LL H GHER
THAN THE RELEASES N JAPAN FIGURE II.M.3).
THAN THE RELEASES IINJAPAN ((FIGURE IIII.M.3).


       Both CHINSHAN and KUOSHENG have had cross-contamination between wastes.
Some of this cross-contamination has been reduced by various modifications. These
include addition of drain tanks to collect oil, sea water, etc. This problem, however, seems
to remain in both plants and seems to be a cause of relatively high radioactivity release.

       IIIIII..M..3..
               M3       LOW--LEVEL SOLIID RADIIOACTIIVE WASTE
                        LOW LEVEL SOL D RAD OACT VE WASTE

        Most of the liquid radioactive wastes, including filtered sludge, spent resins, etc., of
three nuclear power plants have been solidified by cement for the eventual interim storage at
the offshore Lan-Yu interim storage facility. The other major radioactive wastes, so called
dry solid wastes, such as used clothes, used polyethylene sheets, used HVAC filters, piping
parts replaced, etc., are packed in drums and also shipped to the Lan-Yu facility.
TAIPOWER has constructed a new facility (Volume Reduction Center) equipped with a
supercompactor and an incinerator at the KUOSHENG site for the three nuclear power plants
to reduce the volume of these wastes.

        THE LIIQUIID RADIIOACTIIVE TREATMENT SYSTEM OF EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAS
         THE L QU D RAD OACT VE TREATMENT SYSTEM OF EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAS
SPECIIFIC FEATURES,,BECAUSE THE TREATED LIIQUIDSDIIFFERACCORDIING TO THE REACTOR TYPE
 SPEC FIC FEATURES BECAUSE THE TREATED L QUIDS D FFER ACCORD NG TO THE REACTOR TYPE
((BWR AND PWR)).. THERE IIS ALSO A DIIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SIITUATIION AT KUOSHENG
  BWR AND PWR THERE S ALSO A D FFERENCE BETWEEN THE S TUAT ON AT KUOSHENG
 AND THAT AT CH NSHAN WH CH SEEMS TO COME FROM THE D FFERENT DES GNS OF THE
AND THAT AT CHIINSHANWHIICHSEEMS TO COME FROM THE DIIFFERENTDESIIGNSOF THE
 ARCH TECT ENG NEERS.
ARCHIITECTENGIINEERS.


      CHINSHAN has an independent radwaste system for each unit, and waste from
equipment drains and waste from floor drains are treated in separate subsystems.
KUOSHENG has a common radwaste system for both units, and wastes from equipment
drains and waste from floor drains are mixed and treated in the same subsystems.
MAANSHAN has a common radwaste system for both units, but wastes from both the
equipment drains and from the floor drains are treated in different subsystems of the Boron
Recycle System (BRS) and the Liquid Radwaste System (LRS).

        THE WASTE SOLIIDIIFIIED IIN CEMENT IIS PUT IINTO 200 LIITER DRUMS AND IITS''VOLUME IIS
        THE WASTE SOL D F ED N CEMENT S PUT NTO 200 L TER DRUMS AND TS VOLUME S
EXPRESSED AS THE NUMBER OF THESE DRUMS.. THE VOLUME OF THE NON--SOLIDIFIED WASTE IIS
EXPRESSED AS THE NUMBER OF THESE DRUMS THE VOLUME OF THE NON SOLIDIFIED WASTE S
ALSO EXPRESSED IIN THE NUMBER OF 200 LIITERDRUMS.. THE TOTAL YEARLY SOLIID WASTE
ALSO EXPRESSED N THE NUMBER OF 200 L TER DRUMS THE TOTAL YEARLY SOL D WASTE
VOLUME S THE SUM OF THESE TWO SOL D WASTES AND S SHOWN N F GURE II.M.4. THE
VOLUME IIS THE SUM OF THESE TWO SOLIIDWASTES,, AND IISSHOWN IINFIIGURE IIII.M.4. THE
DATA OF JAPANESE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ARE CHOSEN FOR COMPAR SON, AND BECAUSE OF
DATA OF JAPANESE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ARE CHOSEN FOR COMPARIISON,AND BECAUSE OF
THE S MILAR PRACT CE STORAGE N 200 L TER DRUMS , AND BECAUSE THE CONSTRA NT OF
THE SIIMILARPRACTIICE((STORAGE IIN200 LIITERDRUMS)),AND BECAUSE THE CONSTRAIINTOF
SPACE S S MILAR N THE TWO COUNTR ES. THESE ARE SHOWN ON THE SAME F GURE.
SPACE IISSIIMILAR IIN THE TWO COUNTRIIES.THESE ARE SHOWN ON THE SAME FIIGURE.


       The solid waste from CHINSHAN increased in 1989 and 1990, and this seems to
come from an increase in dry solid wastes from modifications.

         THE SOLIID WASTE PRODUCTIION AT KUOSHENG DECREASED IIN 1990.. HOWEVER,,THE
         THE SOL D WASTE PRODUCT ON AT KUOSHENG DECREASED N 1990 HOWEVER THE
5 YEAR AVERAGE IIS LARGER THAN THAT FOR CHIINSHAN,,AND THIIS SEEMS TO COME FROM
5 YEAR AVERAGE S LARGER THAN THAT FOR CH NSHAN AND TH S SEEMS TO COME FROM
H GH L QUID WASTE PRODUCT ON.
HIIGH LIIQUID WASTE PRODUCTIION.


       The solid waste volumes at both CHINSHAN and KUOSHENG are much larger than
the Japanese data.

      ALTHOUGH THE VOLUME OF SOLIID WASTE FROM MAANSHAN HAS DECREASED,, THE 5
      ALTHOUGH THE VOLUME OF SOL D WASTE FROM MAANSHAN HAS DECREASED THE 5
YEAR AVERAGE IISCLOSE TO THE AVERAGE FROM THE JAPANESE DATA..
YEAR AVERAGE S CLOSE TO THE AVERAGE FROM THE JAPANESE DATA

       The volume of dry solid wastes, which are almost half of the total wastes, should be
reduced much lower after commencement of operation of the new Volume Reduction Center.

       IIIIII..M..4 BETTERMENT OF RADWASTE MANAGEMENT
               M 4 BETTERMENT OF RADWASTE MANAGEMENT

        TAIPOWER has developed its own radwaste management programs for
improvement, under which operational and design changes have been implemented and also
are now under planning specifically using feedback from each of the nuclear power plants.
Some of those results are demonstrated by the operational data described in the previous
paragraphs, as a yearly recorded betterment. Also, TAIPOWER sets the (intermediate) goal of
liquid radioactive release to the environment at less than 0.1 Ci/unit per year.

       THE IIMPROVED IITEMS SUCH AS THE REDUCTIION OF RADIIOACTIIVIITY RELEASE TO THE
       THE MPROVED TEMS SUCH AS THE REDUCT ON OF RAD OACT V TY RELEASE TO THE
ENV RONMENT, THE REDUCT ON OF L QUID WASTE PRODUCT ON AND THE REDUCT ON OF SOL D
ENVIIRONMENT, THE REDUCTIIONOF LIIQUID WASTE PRODUCTIIONAND THE REDUCTIIONOF SOLIID
WASTE VOLUME ARE OBV OUSLY RECOGN ZED BY COMPAR NG THE OPERAT ONAL DATA OF THE
WASTE VOLUME ARE OBVIIOUSLYRECOGNIIZEDBY COMPARIING THE OPERATIIONALDATA OF THE
BEGIINNINGOF THE OLDEST UNIITWIITH THE NEW ONES..HOWEVER,, THE TEAM CONSIIDERS THAT
BEG NNING OF THE OLDEST UN T W TH THE NEW ONES HOWEVER THE TEAM CONS DERS THAT
FURTHER IIMPROVEMENTS ARE NECESSARY..
FURTHER MPROVEMENTS ARE NECESSARY

        One of the most important aspects of a radwaste management program involves not
only radwaste personnel, chemical personnel, materials personnel, health physics personnel,
but also all the related personnel who are in charge of the upstream systems and equipment
and also of operation and maintenance.

     RADIIOACTIIVE WASTES ((GASEOUS AND LIIQUIID))TREATMENT SYSTEMS ARE THE MOST
      RAD OACT VE WASTES GASEOUS AND L QU D TREATMENT SYSTEMS ARE THE MOST
DOWNSTREAM SYSTEMS OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT..THE MIINIMIZATIONOF THE VOLUME
DOWNSTREAM SYSTEMS OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT THE M NIMIZATION OF THE VOLUME
 NTO THE RADWASTE SYSTEMS AND THE REDUCT ON OF CROSS CONTAM NATION OF THE WASTES
IINTO THE RADWASTE SYSTEMS AND THE REDUCTIIONOF CROSS CONTAMIINATIONOF THE WASTES
BY OIILAND SEA WATER MUST BE STRIICTLYCONTROLLED IIN THE UPSTREAM SYSTEMS,,NOT IIN
 BY O L AND SEA WATER MUST BE STR CTLY CONTROLLED N THE UPSTREAM SYSTEMS NOT N
THE RADWASTE SYSTEM.. FOR EXAMPLE,,OIILCONTAMIINATED LIIQUIDMAY IINFLUENCE THE
 THE RADWASTE SYSTEM FOR EXAMPLE O L CONTAM NATED L QUID MAY NFLUENCE THE
 PERFORMANCES OF PRESSURE PRECOAT F LTERS AND DEM NERALIZERS WH CH CANNOT THEN
PERFORMANCES OF PRESSURE PRECOAT FIILTERSAND DEMIINERALIZERS WHIICHCANNOT THEN
DECREASE THE RADIIOACTIVITYOF THE WASTE RELEASE.. SEA WATER LEAKAGE IINTO THE
 DECREASE THE RAD OACTIVITY OF THE WASTE RELEASE SEA WATER LEAKAGE NTO THE
 RADWASTE SYSTEMS MAY NOT ONLY ACT S MILARLY BUT ALSO BE A CAUSE OF FA LURES OF
RADWASTE SYSTEMS MAY NOT ONLY ACT SIIMILARLYBUT ALSO BE A CAUSE OF FAIILURESOF
 P PING AND EQU PMENT ESPEC ALLY N ZONES OF CONCENTRAT ON, BECAUSE ALLOYED
PIIPINGAND EQUIIPMENTESPECIIALLY IINZONES OF CONCENTRATIION,BECAUSE ALLOYED
 MATER ALS ARE SUSCEPT BLE TO CORROS ON BY CHLOR DES. THE PREVENT ON OF CROSS
MATERIIALSARE SUSCEPTIIBLE TO CORROSIIONBY CHLORIIDES. THE PREVENTIIONOF CROSS
 CONTAM NATION OF O L AND L QUID S NOT D FFICULT. LEAKAGE FROM H GH PRESSURE O L
CONTAMIINATIONOF OIILAND LIIQUID IISNOT DIIFFICULT. LEAKAGE FROM HIIGHPRESSURE OIIL
 SYSTEMS SUCH AS TURB NE CONTROL SYSTEM CAN BE S MPLY PREVENTED BY GOOD WORK NG
SYSTEMS SUCH AS TURBIINECONTROL SYSTEM CAN BE SIIMPLYPREVENTED BY GOOD WORKIING
 FOR P PING AND OINTS. CROSS CONTAM NATION DUR NG MA NTENANCE WORK CAN BE
FOR PIIPINGAND JJOINTS. CROSS CONTAMIINATION DURIINGMAIINTENANCE WORK CAN BE
 PREVENTED BY UST NOT THROW NG AWAY EXCESS O L NTO FLOOR DRA NS. TO REDUCE
PREVENTED BY JJUSTNOT THROWIINGAWAY EXCESS OIILIINTO FLOOR DRAIINS. TO REDUCE
 L QUID RADWASTE VOLUME GENERAT ON T S VERY MPORTANT TO CHECK EVERY VALVE SEAT
LIIQUIDRADWASTE VOLUME GENERATIION IITIISVERY IIMPORTANT TO CHECK EVERY VALVE SEAT
 AND PACK NG, AND STOP ANY LEAK
AND PACKIING,AND STOP ANY LEAK..


       The performance of the radioactive waste treatment system cannot be improved
without upstream improvement and without proper operation and maintenance of the
upstream systems.

       IIIIII..M..5 IINTERIIM LOW LEVEL WASTE STORAGE..
               M 5 NTER M LOW LEVEL WASTE STORAGE

         The drums containing solidified low level waste are taken to an interim waste storage
facility at Lan-Yu (Orchid Island) off the east coast of Taiwan. This facility was originally
operated by the Radwaste Administration (a part of ROCAEC) but starting from July 2nd
1990 it has been operated by TAIPOWER. This enables the operation to be more closely
associated with the operation of the nuclear power plants. In the opinion of the TEAM this is
a sensible change (The volume of wastes generated by research and medical and industrial
applications of nuclear science, are much smaller than those generated by the power plants.)
Wastes are transported in a special ship; a new ship has been constructed and commissioned
in December 1991, and will be put in service in summer 1992.

      THE IINTERIIM STORAGE FACIILIITY IIS AT THE END OF THE LAN--YU IISLAND,,IIS 4 KM FROM
       THE NTER M STORAGE FAC L TY S AT THE END OF THE LAN YU SLAND S 4 KM FROM
THE NEAREST HAB TATION, AND S SEPARATED FROM THESE BY A MOUNTA N. THE 11
THE NEAREST HABIITATION,AND IISSEPARATED FROM THESE BY A MOUNTAIIN. THE 11
TA P OWER STAFF L VE ON S TE GROW NG VEGETABLES ON S TE AND THEREBY
TAIIPOWER STAFF LIIVE ON--SIITE,,GROWIING VEGETABLES ON SIITE,,AND THEREBY
DEMONSTRATE TO THE LOCAL PEOPLE THE SAFETY OF THE FAC LITY. A V SIT TO THE SLAND
DEMONSTRATE TO THE LOCAL PEOPLE THE SAFETY OF THE FACIILITY. A VIISITTO THE IISLAND
SHOWED THE TEAM THAT THE TA POWER STAFF HAVE AN EXCELLENT RELAT ONSHIP W TH
SHOWED THE TEAM THAT THE TAIIPOWERSTAFF HAVE AN EXCELLENT RELATIIONSHIPWIITH
THE LOCAL NDIGENOUS POPULAT ON. 12 OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE ARE ALSO EMPLOYED BY THE
THE LOCAL IINDIGENOUSPOPULATIION. 12 OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE ARE ALSO EMPLOYED BY THE
WASTE STORAGE FAC LITY.
WASTE STORAGE FACIILITY.


        The waste drums are stacked in covered trenches. When open, there is an acceptable
occupational radiation dose of the order of tens of millirems/hour. When closed, there is no
observable radiation. Originally there were reports of entry of water into the trenches, leading
to corrosion of the drums and leakage. In the last 2 years, extensive efforts have been made
to seal the covers. Now, about 40 m3 of water a month is collected from the sumps. This
water contains a minuscule amount of radioactivity. The sample seen by one of the TEAM
contained Cs137 and occasionally Co60 is seen. After treatment with ion-exchange resins,
the radioactivity is reduced a hundredfold, and is measured in microcuries rather than Curies.
The resultant water contains much less artificial radioactivity than the natural radioactivity of
most deep drinking water wells.

       III.M.6    Final Disposal of Low Level Waste
                UNDER PRESENT PROJJECTIIONS OF THE AMOUNT OF LOW--LEVEL WASTE,, THE
                UNDER PRESENT PRO ECT ONS OF THE AMOUNT OF LOW LEVEL WASTE THE
LAN--YU WASTE STORAGE FACIILIITY WIILL BE FIILLED TO CAPACIITY WIITH 98,,000 DRUMS BY 1994..
 LAN YU WASTE STORAGE FAC L TY W LL BE F LLED TO CAPAC TY W TH 98 000 DRUMS BY 1994
THIIS WIILL BE EASED SOMEWHAT BY THE VOLUME COMPACTIION THAT WIILL BE PUT IIN SERVIICE
 TH S W LL BE EASED SOMEWHAT BY THE VOLUME COMPACT ON THAT W LL BE PUT N SERV CE
IIN THE NEAR FUTURE,,BUT PRESENT CAPACIITYWIILL BE EXHAUSTED BY THE MIID1990S..
 N THE NEAR FUTURE BUT PRESENT CAPAC TY W LL BE EXHAUSTED BY THE M D 1990S
 TA P OWER BEL EVE THAT A 70% NCREASE N STORAGE CAPAC TY CAN BE ACH EVED BY
TAIIPOWER BELIIEVE THAT A 70% IINCREASE IIN STORAGE CAPACIITY CAN BE ACHIIEVED BY
 MPROVEMENTS TO SH ELDING, LOAD PATTERN AND LAND UT LIZATION. THE EXPANS ON HAS
IIMPROVEMENTS TO SHIIELDING, LOAD PATTERN,,AND LAND UTIILIZATION. THE EXPANSIIONHAS
 BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE LOCAL COMMUN TY ON LAN YU SLAND, BUT TH S COMMUN TY S
BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE LOCAL COMMUNIITYON LAN--YU IISLAND,BUT THIISCOMMUNIITY IIS
PRESENTLY OPPOSED TO ANY EXPANSIIONBEYOND THAT DESCRIIBEDABOVE..
 PRESENTLY OPPOSED TO ANY EXPANS ON BEYOND THAT DESCR BED ABOVE

        Interim storage of low level waste is not merely procrastination, or postponing the evil
day, as is sometimes portrayed by critics. In the intervening time, many of the fission
products will have decayed, making final disposal much simpler. It is important, both for
technical reasons and in order to properly explain the problem to the non-specialist, to
characterize the waste at this point in time in terms of its' radioactivity content. This is
particularly important for the site selection process presently under way; for it is the residual
radioactivity and the potential hazards it poses that govern the engineering specification of the
site.

       A TIIMELY CONSIIDERATIION OF THE SPECIIFIICATIIONS FOR A FIINAL DIISPOSAL FACIILIITY CAN
       A T MELY CONS DERAT ON OF THE SPEC F CAT ONS FOR A F NAL D SPOSAL FAC L TY CAN
PROVIIDE IINSIGHTS IINTO THE OPTIIMUM METHOD OF IINTERMEDIATE STORAGE.. FOR EXAMPLE,, A
PROV DE NSIGHTS NTO THE OPT MUM METHOD OF NTERMEDIATE STORAGE FOR EXAMPLE A
REQU REMENT THAT T BE ASSUMED THAT WASTE LEACH NTO NEARBY GROUND WATER ONE
REQUIIREMENT THAT IIT BE ASSUMED THAT WASTE LEACH IINTO NEARBY GROUND WATER ONE
CENTURY AFTER ADMIINISTRATIVE CONTROL IIS LOST,, PUTS EMPHASIIS ON THE LONGER LIIVED
CENTURY AFTER ADM NISTRATIVE CONTROL S LOST PUTS EMPHAS S ON THE LONGER L VED
                                                  129, C14 AND ANY TRANSURAN CS
COMPONENTS OF THE WASTE STREAM,, WHIICH IINCLUDE II129, C14 AND ANY TRANSURANIICS
COMPONENTS OF THE WASTE STREAM WH CH NCLUDE
WH CH WOULD ARR VE MOSTLY AFTER DECOMM SSIONING.
WHIICH WOULD ARRIIVEMOSTLY AFTER DECOMMIISSIONING.


        THE TEAM S A L TTLE CONCERNED W TH THE STATEMENT OF TA P OWER THAT
       THE TEAM IIS A LIITTLE CONCERNED WIITH THE STATEMENT OF TAIIPOWER THAT
 MPLIES THAT TA POWER W LL SELECT THE MOST FAVORABLE S TE. TH S MPLIES THAT THE
IIMPLIES THAT TAIIPOWER WIILL SELECT THE MOST FAVORABLE SIITE. THIIS IIMPLIES THAT THE
 R SK AND HAZARD OF A FA LURE OF A REPOS TORY FOR LOW LEVEL WASTE D SPOSAL S MORE
RIISK AND HAZARD OF A FAIILURE OF A REPOSIITORY FOR LOW LEVEL WASTE DIISPOSAL IIS MORE
IIMPORTANT THAN ALL OTHER CONSIIDERATIONS IIN THE SELECTIION OF A LOW--LEVEL WASTE
 MPORTANT THAN ALL OTHER CONS DERATIONS N THE SELECT ON OF A LOW LEVEL WASTE
 REPOS TORY. TH S DEA G VES A S GNAL TO THE GENERAL PUBL C THAT NUCLEAR WASTE S
REPOSIITORY. THIIS IIDEA GIIVES A SIIGNAL TO THE GENERAL PUBLIIC THAT NUCLEAR WASTE IIS
UNIIQUELY DANGEROUS -- A VIIEW WHIICH IIS WIIDESPREAD BUT WHIICH IIN THE OPIINION OF THE
 UN QUELY DANGEROUS A V EW WH CH S W DESPREAD BUT WH CH N THE OP NION OF THE
 TEAM S WRONG FAR BETTER WOULD BE FOR TA P OWER TO PRESENT SEVERAL S TES THAT
TEAM IIS WRONG.. FAR BETTER WOULD BE FOR TAIIPOWER TO PRESENT SEVERAL SIITES THAT
 ARE ACCEPTABLE FROM A TECHN CAL PO NT OF V EW, AND THEN ALLOW THE DEC SION PROCESS
ARE ACCEPTABLE FROM A TECHNIICALPOIINTOF VIIEW, AND THEN ALLOW THE DECIISION PROCESS
 TO BE BROADENED TO NCLUDE OTHER MATTERS OF PUBL C NTEREST.
TO BE BROADENED TO IINCLUDEOTHER MATTERS OF PUBLIIC IINTEREST.
FIIGURE IIIIII..M..1 HERE
F GURE M 1 HERE
Table III.M.1 here

NEW T ABLE
NEW ||TABLE
Figure III.M.2 and Figure III.M.3 here
FIIGURE IIIIII..M..4 HERE
F GURE M 4 HERE
III.N. ENGINEERING

       EXPERIIENCE IIN ALL COUNTRIIES HAS SHOWN THAT VERY CONSIIDERABLE AMOUNT OF
       EXPER ENCE N ALL COUNTR ES HAS SHOWN THAT VERY CONS DERABLE AMOUNT OF
ENGIINEERINGSUPPORT HAD TO BE ALLOCATED TO KEEP THE PLANTS IINGOOD RUNNIINGORDER..
ENG NEERING SUPPORT HAD TO BE ALLOCATED TO KEEP THE PLANTS N GOOD RUNN NG ORDER


       There is a large variety of tasks:

               OF ABNORMAL CONDIITIONS DIISCOVERED IIN THE PLANTS,, E..G. FRACTURE
                OF ABNORMAL COND TIONS D SCOVERED N THE PLANTS E G. FRACTURE
      -- STUDIIES
         STUD ES
      MECHANIICSEVALUATIIONOF DEFECTS REVEALED BY NDE
      MECHAN CS EVALUAT ON OF DEFECTS REVEALED BY NDE


      - review of the safety rules and modifications thereof, and evaluation of the impact on
      the plants

      --STUDY OF MODIIFIICATIIONS RENDERED NECESSARY BY THE ABOVE CHANGES
        STUDY OF MOD F CAT ONS RENDERED NECESSARY BY THE ABOVE CHANGES

      - study of modifications requested by the plant operators to
      improve reliability or for other reasons

       --UPDATIING OF SARS AND OTHER PLANT DOCUMENTATIION
         UPDAT NG OF SARS AND OTHER PLANT DOCUMENTAT ON

      - preparation and implementation of the 10 year revision of the plants.

       THESE TASKS HAVE TO BE PERFORMED IIN FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAFETY RULES IIN
       THESE TASKS HAVE TO BE PERFORMED N FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAFETY RULES N
FORCE FOR THE PLANT,,OF THE ORIIGINALDESIIGNBASES OF THE PLANT,,AND OF THE
FORCE FOR THE PLANT OF THE OR GINAL DES GN BASES OF THE PLANT AND OF THE
AUTHOR ZATION DEC SION. THEREFORE THEY HAVE TO BE EXECUTED BY PERSONS OF THE
AUTHORIIZATIONDECIISION. THEREFORE,, THEY HAVE TO BE EXECUTED BY PERSONS OF THE
OWNER ORGAN ZATION, OR THEY CAN BE SUBCONTRACTED W TH A CLOSE CONTROL BY THE
OWNER ORGANIIZATION,OR THEY CAN BE SUBCONTRACTED WIITHA CLOSE CONTROL BY THE
OWNER'S ENGIINEERING TEAM..
OWNER'S ENG NEERING TEAM

         In the present situation of the nuclear program in Taiwan, most of the engineering
force is oriented towards support of the operating plants. With the 6 units operating on 3
sites, the TEAM considers that the present engineering force is reasonable. When and if it is
decided to build a new plant, TAIPOWER will have to reconsider the situation according to
the type of contracting which will be adopted.

       THE MAJJOR PART OF THE ENGIINEERIING FORCE IIS PRESENTLY CONCENTRATED IIN THE
       THE MA OR PART OF THE ENG NEER NG FORCE S PRESENTLY CONCENTRATED N THE
HEAD OFFIICE IIN TAIIPEII..A SMALL GROUP OF DESIIGN ENGIINEERS OF TAIIPOWER AND
HEAD OFF CE N TA PE A SMALL GROUP OF DES GN ENG NEERS OF TA POWER AND
DOMEST C AES S, HOWEVER PRESENT ON EACH OF THE S TES, AT THE D SPOSAL OF THE PLANT
DOMESTIICAES IIS,HOWEVER,,PRESENT ON EACH OF THE SIITES,AT THE DIISPOSALOF THE PLANT
SUPER NTENDENT, TO TAKE CARE OF SMALL SPEC FIC PROBLEMS AND TO ACT AS L AISON W TH
SUPERIINTENDENT, TO TAKE CARE OF SMALL SPECIIFICPROBLEMS AND TO ACT AS LIIAISONWIITH
THE LARGE ENG NEERING GROUP N THE HEAD OFF CE. SUCH AN APPROACH APPEARS
THE LARGE ENGIINEERING GROUP IIN THE HEAD OFFIICE. SUCH AN APPROACH APPEARS
REASONABLE TO THE TEAM MEMBERS FOR THE FOLLOWIINGREASONS::
REASONABLE TO THE TEAM MEMBERS FOR THE FOLLOW NG REASONS

      - a non negligible amount of problems are generic either to families of plants (BWRs
or PWRs) or to all types.

       --THE SAME APPLIIES TO PROBLEMS CONNECTED TO,,OR EMANATIING FROM,, LIICENSIING
         THE SAME APPL ES TO PROBLEMS CONNECTED TO OR EMANAT NG FROM L CENS NG

       - the engineering often involves very specialized engineers in very limited, highly
technical, fields; the dispersion of the solution of these problems would be detrimental to the
upgrading of the "know-how".

      TA P OWER HAS SET UP A METHOD TO PROCESS THE MOD F CAT ONS THE TEAM
      TAIIPOWER HAS SET UP A METHOD TO PROCESS THE MODIIFIICATIIONS.. THE TEAM
APPROVES THIISMETHOD.. IITIISBASED UPON THE IISSUANCEOF A DESIIGNCHANGE REQUEST
APPROVES TH S METHOD T S BASED UPON THE SSUANCE OF A DES GN CHANGE REQUEST
((DCR))WHIICH IINCLUDES SAFETY ASSESSMENT,,CONCEPTUAL DESIIGN,,PROCUREMENT
  DCR WH CH NCLUDES SAFETY ASSESSMENT CONCEPTUAL DES GN PROCUREMENT
 SPEC FICATION DRAW NGS, DETA L AND NTERFACE DES GN BY ODEG , UPGRAD NG OF
SPECIIFICATIONDRAWIINGS,DETAIILAND IINTERFACE DESIIGN((BYODEG)),UPGRADIINGOF
 OR GINAL DRAW NGS AND DOCUMENTS AND REV EW OF F ELD CHANGE REQUESTS FCR).
ORIIGINALDRAWIINGSAND DOCUMENTS AND REVIIEWOF FIIELDCHANGE REQUESTS ((FCR).
EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAS DEVELOPED AND IIMPLEMENTED IITS''BETTERMENT PROGRAM
 EACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAS DEVELOPED AND MPLEMENTED TS BETTERMENT PROGRAM
 AND PRO ECTS. CH NSHAN S NOW N THE PHASE 2 STAGE JULY 1988 JUNE 1993 ,
AND PROJJECTS. CHIINSHAN IISNOW IIN THE PHASE 2 STAGE ((JULY1988 --JUNE 1993)),
KUOSHENG IIS IIN THE PHASE 2 STAGE ((JULY 1989 --JUNE 1994)),,BUT MAANSHAN IIS IIN THE
 KUOSHENG S N THE PHASE 2 STAGE JULY 1989 JUNE 1994 BUT MAANSHAN S N THE
 PHASE 1 STAGE JUNE 1988 JUNE 1993 . THE BUDGETS NVESTED ALREADY AND BE NG
PHASE 1 STAGE ((JUNE1988 --JUNE 1993)). THE BUDGETS IINVESTEDALREADY,,AND BEIING
  NVESTED, ARE APPROX MATELY 46% FOR SAFETY MPROVEMENTS, 37% FOR REL ABILITY AND
IINVESTED,ARE APPROXIIMATELY46% FOR SAFETY IIMPROVEMENTS,37% FOR RELIIABILITYAND
 PLANT EFF CIENCY MPROVEMENTS, AND 17% FOR RADWASTE MPROVEMENTS RESPECT VELY.
PLANT EFFIICIENCY IIMPROVEMENTS,AND 17% FOR RADWASTE IIMPROVEMENTSRESPECTIIVELY.


       Trouble shooting, especially related to facilities deficiency and development of new
technology, is a very important task of the engineering organizations, and may involve R and
D. This is supported domestically by the corporate Institute of Power Research, the
government owned and sponsored Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER), Industrial
Technology Research Institute, etc.

       THE TEAM WANTS ALSO TO ADD TWO REMARKS::
       THE TEAM WANTS ALSO TO ADD TWO REMARKS

      - the root cause analysis should be more thoroughly executed and pushed to the
      determination of the ultimate root cause. It appears that sometimes the determination
      of the most apparent or proximate cause is considered adequate. Similarly some
      theoretical evaluations are not confirmed by testing in the field.

      - the selection of supplier and contractor has to be made very carefully.
      Specifications should be carefully written, and conformance of the proposal with the
      bid should be thoroughly evaluated. The comparison should be made on comparable
      bases, and any difference has to be evaluated positively or negatively and incorporated
      into the price before comparing. Other intangible factors should also be considered
      such as the supplier's knowledge of the subject, its' experiences and references, the
      quality of previous performance or of material supplied. The procedure has to be
      documented so as to avoid any criticism from the public. Such an appraisal should be
      justified to the controlling authorities, in order to maintain credibility and acquire
      public confidence.
III.O. INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL (I&C)

         IIN ORDER FOR THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OF TAIIPOWER TO SUPPLY RELIIABLE
           N ORDER FOR THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OF TA POWER TO SUPPLY REL ABLE
          CITY THROUGHOUT THE PLANT DES GN L FE, THE NSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
ELECTRIICITY THROUGHOUT THE PLANT DESIIGN LIIFE, THE IINSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
 ELECTR
((II&C))SYSTEMS OF THE PLANTS SHOULD CONTIINUOUSLY BE IIMPROVED AND KEPT IIN HIIGHLY
    &C SYSTEMS OF THE PLANTS SHOULD CONT NUOUSLY BE MPROVED AND KEPT N H GHLY
 REL ABLE COND TION. TO MPLEMENT TH S, VAR OUS MPROVEMENT PROGRAMS SHOULD BE
RELIIABLECONDIITION. TO IIMPLEMENT THIIS,VARIIOUS IIMPROVEMENTPROGRAMS SHOULD BE
 ESTABL SHED FROM SHORT MED UM, AND LONG TERM V EWPOINTS. .E:
ESTABLIISHED FROM SHORT,, MEDIIUM,AND LONG TERM VIIEWPOINTS. II.E:


       a) Short term: to establish and implement improvement programs for avoiding system
                             trips and unit trips;

      B))
      B    MEDIIUM
            MED UM      TERM::TO
                        TERM TO    UPDATE
                                   UPDATE     II&C
                                                &C           BY
                                                             BY      ADOPTIING
                                                                     ADOPT NG       ADVANCED
                                                                                    ADVANCED
                  ES OF TODAY FOR MORE REL ABLE AND
       TECHNOLOGIIESOF TODAY FOR MORE RELIIABLEAND
       TECHNOLOG                                                                 EFFECT VE
                                                                                 EFFECTIIVE
      OPERAT ON;
      OPERATIION;


       c) Long term: to overcome deterioration of I&C by ageing. The spare parts for
                           equipment repair and replacements by the same model or even
                           by another model of the same manufacturer, becomes
                           increasingly difficult year by year.

       THE TEAM REV EWED THE CURRENT S TUAT ONS OF &C N TA P OWER NUCLEAR
      THE TEAM REVIIEWED THE CURRENT SIITUATIIONS OF II&C IIN TAIIPOWER NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS BY FOCUS NG ON THE MA OR ASPECTS .E. AVO DING UN T TR PS III.O.1),
POWER PLANTS BY FOCUSIINGON THE MAJJORASPECTS,, II.E.AVOIIDINGUNIITTRIIPS ((III.O.1),
RENEW NG &C III.O.2), AND &C AG NG III.O.3), DESCR BED ABOVE
RENEWIING II&C((III.O.2), AND II&CAGIING((III.O.3),DESCRIIBEDABOVE..


III.O.1. Avoiding Unit Trips: general.

       THE UNIIT TRIIP ((REACTOR SCRAM WHEN THE GENERATOR IIS ON--LIINE))RATE IIS WORSE
       THE UN T TR P REACTOR SCRAM WHEN THE GENERATOR S ON L NE RATE S WORSE
 FOR TA POWER PLANTS THAN FOR THE WORLDW DE AVERAGE TA POWER HAS ALREADY
FOR TAIIPOWERPLANTS THAN FOR THE WORLDWIIDEAVERAGE.. TAIIPOWERHAS ALREADY
RECOGNIIZED THIISSIITUATIONWELL AND HAS ESTABLIISHEDA FIIVEYEAR PERFORMANCE
 RECOGN ZED TH S S TUATION WELL AND HAS ESTABL SHED A F VE YEAR PERFORMANCE
  MPROVEMENT PROGRAM TA P OWER HAS BEEN MPLEMENT NG TH S PROGRAM S NCE 1989
IIMPROVEMENT PROGRAM..TAIIPOWER HAS BEEN IIMPLEMENTIING THIIS PROGRAM SIINCE 1989
 AND OBTA NING SOME GOOD RESULTS WH CH ARE SHOWN N SECT ON II.K.2.
AND OBTAIININGSOME GOOD RESULTS WHIICHARE SHOWN IINSECTIION IIII.K.2.


       The TEAM studied the relevant records of scram events that had occurred in
TAIPOWER's six nuclear power units to understand their causes and the TEAM also
reviewed the countermeasures for avoiding them proposed by TAIPOWER and under way.

       THE RESULTS OF THE TEAM'S STUDY OF THE CAUSES ARE SHOWN IIN FIIGURES IIIIII..O..1
       THE RESULTS OF THE TEAM'S STUDY OF THE CAUSES ARE SHOWN N F GURES O 1
((BWR))AND IIIIII..O..2 ((PWR)),,WHERE THE CAUSES ARE CLASSIIFIIED IINTO THREE CATEGORIIES,,
  BWR AND O 2 PWR WHERE THE CAUSES ARE CLASS F ED NTO THREE CATEGOR ES
II&C,,HUMAN FACTOR ((HF)),,AND OTHERS ((MECHANIICAL,,OFF--SIITE FACTORS SUCH AS A
  &C HUMAN FACTOR HF AND OTHERS MECHAN CAL OFF S TE FACTORS SUCH AS A
TYPHOON,,TRANSMIISSIION SYSTEM FAIILURE,,ETC..)).. THE STUDY RANGE COVERED IIS THE
 TYPHOON TRANSM SS ON SYSTEM FA LURE ETC THE STUDY RANGE COVERED S THE
RECENT FIIVEYEARS,, FROM 1986 TO 1990.. THE FIIGURESSHOW::
 RECENT F VE YEARS FROM 1986 TO 1990 THE F GURES SHOW

       a)     the trends, plotted versus calendar year of the number of unit trips. Figure
              III.O.1 shows the total number of trips in the four BWR units, and Figure
              III.O.2 shows the total number of trips in the two PWR units. Since the
              absolute numbers are shown in the previous Figures, III.K.10.to III.K.12., the
              normalized values are shown here with the latest 1990 value set equal to 100.
              In the PWR case, MAANSHAN 2 was omitted from the sum over 1986, since
              several operational tests were being performed in this unit during the year to
              investigate the cause of the turbine problems in unit 1.

       B))
       B      THE PERCENTAGE OF THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF TR PS N EACH THREE
              THE PERCENTAGE OF THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF TRIIPS IIN EACH THREE
        CATEGOR ES DUR NG 1986 1990.
        CATEGORIIESDURIING1986--1990.


 III.O.1.a Major contributors to unit trips in the BWRs are:

        A))
        A       IINSTRUMENTATIION AND CONTROL
                  NSTRUMENTAT ON AND CONTROL

 i)     I&C was involved in more than half (54%) of the trips. This ratio has not
        varied widely during the five year period of the study.

 I)
III)    TURBIINE DEH SYSTEM FAIILURE WAS IIDENTIIFIIED AS THE CAUSE OF REPEATED
        TURB NE DEH SYSTEM FA LURE WAS DENT F ED AS THE CAUSE OF REPEATED
        UN T TR PS N CH NSHAN 2 DUR NG 1986 AND 1987 HOWEVER TH S HAS
        UNIIT TRIIPS IIN CHIINSHAN 2 DURIING 1986 AND 1987.. HOWEVER,, THIIS HAS
        BEEN MPROVED AND T SEEMS TO BE D FFICULT TO DENTIFY THE OTHER &C
        BEEN IIMPROVED AND IIT SEEMS TO BE DIIFFICULT TO IIDENTIFY THE OTHER II&C
        SYSTEMS WH CH CAUSES REPEATED UN T TR PS.
        SYSTEMS WHIICHCAUSES REPEATED UNIITTRIIPS.


         B)     Human Factors (HF)

 )
II)     HUMAN FACTORS WERE IINVOLVED IIN ABOUT A QUARTER ((24%)) OF THE UNIIT
        HUMAN FACTORS WERE NVOLVED N ABOUT A QUARTER 24% OF THE UN T
        TR PS. TH S RAT O HAS NOT VAR ED W DELY DUR NG THESE F VE YEARS
        TRIIPS. THIISRATIIOHAS NOT VARIIED WIIDELYDURIING THESE FIIVEYEARS..

 ii)    Around 40% of trips caused by Human Factors were related to deficiencies of
        planning, design and procedures and this type of HF caused trip seems to have
        a slight increasing tendency.

 II)
IIII)   AROUND 60%
        AROUND 60%   OF TRIIPS CAUSED BY HUMAN FACTORS WERE RELATED TO
                     OF TR PS CAUSED BY HUMAN FACTORS WERE RELATED TO
        PERFORMANCE ERRORS AND HAVE A SLIIGHTDECREASIING TENDENCY..
        PERFORMANCE ERRORS AND HAVE A SL GHT DECREAS NG TENDENCY

         C)     Others

IIN THIIS CATEGORY MUCH MORE THAN HALF ((13% OF TOTAL)) OF THE TRIIPS WERE
  N TH S CATEGORY MUCH MORE THAN HALF 13% OF TOTAL OF THE TR PS WERE
 RELATED TO OFF SITE FACTORS TYPHOON AND TRANSM SSION SYSTEM . TH S SEEMS TO
RELATED TO OFF--SITE FACTORS ((TYPHOON AND TRANSMIISSION SYSTEM)). THIIS SEEMS TO
 BE UN QUE TO TA WAN.
BE UNIIQUE TO TAIIWAN.


 III.O.1.b      Major contributors to unit trips in the PWRs are:

        A))
        A       II&C
                  &C

 i)     I&C was involved in more than one third (36%) of trips. This ratio has not
        varied widely during the five years, though the number of trips itself has varied
        year by year.

 I)
III)    TURBIINE//GENERATOR CONTROL AND PROTECTIION SYSTEMS SEEM TO BE THE
        TURB NE GENERATOR CONTROL AND PROTECT ON SYSTEMS SEEM TO BE THE
        CAUSE OF REPEATED UN T TR PS. PC CARD FA LURES WERE NVOLVED N SOME
        CAUSE OF REPEATED UNIIT TRIIPS. PC CARD FAIILURES WERE IINVOLVED IIN SOME
        OF THEM.. IIT MAY BE USEFUL TO NOTIICE THAT AROUND ONE QUARTER OF THE
        OF THEM T MAY BE USEFUL TO NOT CE THAT AROUND ONE QUARTER OF THE
        TR PS CAUSED BY &C SEEM TO BE ATTR BUTED TO FUSE BLOW-OUTS.
        TRIIPSCAUSED BY II&CSEEM TO BE ATTRIIBUTED TO FUSE--BLOW-OUTS.


         B)     Human Factors

 )
II)     HUMAN FACTORS WERE IINVOLVED IIN AROUND ONE QUARTER ((24%)) OF TRIIPS..
        HUMAN FACTORS WERE NVOLVED N AROUND ONE QUARTER 24% OF TR PS
        THIIS RATIIO HAS NOT VARIIED WIIDELY DURIING THESE FIIVE YEARS..
        TH S RAT O HAS NOT VAR ED W DELY DUR NG THESE F VE YEARS

 ii)    About half of the trips caused by Human Factors were related to deficiencies of
        planning, design and procedures and this type of HF caused trip seems to have
               a slightly increasing tendency.

        II)
       IIII)   ANOTHER HALF OF THE TRIIPS CAUSED BY HUMAN FACTORS WERE RELATED TO
               ANOTHER HALF OF THE TR PS CAUSED BY HUMAN FACTORS WERE RELATED TO
               PERFORMANCE ERRORS..
               PERFORMANCE ERRORS

               C)          Others

       AROUND ONE FIIFTH OF UNIIT TRIIPS IIN THIIS CATEGORY,,((7% OF TOTAL))WERE RELATED
       AROUND ONE F FTH OF UN T TR PS N TH S CATEGORY 7% OF TOTAL WERE RELATED
TO THE TRANSM SSION GR D BEHAV OR. TH S AGA N SEEMS TO BE UN QUE TO TA WAN.
TO THE TRANSMIISSIONGRIIDBEHAVIIOR. THIISAGAIINSEEMS TO BE UNIIQUE TO TAIIWAN.


       III.O.1.c           TEAM comments:

        ((A)) WHERE SOME COMPONENTS HAVE BEEN IIDENTIIFIIED AS THE ELEMENTS THAT
          A   WHERE SOME COMPONENTS HAVE BEEN DENT F ED AS THE ELEMENTS THAT
CAUSED A PART CULAR UN T TR P, AND ESPEC ALLY F THE COMPONENT CAUSED REPEATED UN T
CAUSED A PARTIICULARUNIITTRIIP,AND ESPECIIALLYIIFTHE COMPONENT CAUSED REPEATED UNIIT
TR PS, SUCH AS PC CARDS AND FUSES T SEEMS APPROPR ATE TO ASK THE R MANUFACTURERS
TRIIPS,SUCH AS PC CARDS AND FUSES,, IITSEEMS APPROPRIIATE TO ASK THEIIR MANUFACTURERS
TO JJOIN THE STUDY AND IINVESTIGATE THEIIR "DEEPER" ROOT CAUSES..
TO OIN THE STUDY AND NVESTIGATE THE R "DEEPER" ROOT CAUSES

         (b) In order to reduce the potential of unnecessary trips, all contributing
components or systems, of which malfunction and/or trip leads to a unit trip, should be
modified to adopt reliability-enhanced components or systems such as analog transmitter type
trip instruments, redundant trip logic, or redundant control systems with self-diagnosis
functions.

       ((C)) ENHANCIING EDUCATIION AND TRAIINIING,,AND REVIIEWIING RELATIING DOCUMENTS
         C   ENHANC NG EDUCAT ON AND TRA N NG AND REV EW NG RELAT NG DOCUMENTS
THOROUGHLY N ADVANCE BY PLANT FUNCT ONS PEOPLE MAY BE AN EFFECT VE WAY TO
THOROUGHLY IINADVANCE BY PLANT FUNCTIIONSPEOPLE MAY BE AN EFFECTIIVEWAY TO
REDUCE THE POTENT AL OF UN T TR PS DUE TO DEF CIENCIES OF PLANN NG, DES GN AND
REDUCE THE POTENTIIALOF UNIIT TRIIPSDUE TO DEFIICIENCIESOF PLANNIING,DESIIGNAND
PROCEDURES..
PROCEDURES

        (d) Enhancing education and training, encouraging to make good communication
between operating function people and testing and/or repairing function people may reduce
the performance errors.

        ALSO ADOPTIING RELIIABIILIITY--ENHANCED COMPONENTS AND//OR SYSTEMS,,MENTIIONED
        ALSO ADOPT NG REL AB L TY ENHANCED COMPONENTS AND OR SYSTEMS MENT ONED
 N B) ABOVE MAY G VE ANOTHER EFFECT VE WAY TO REDUCE THE POTENT AL FOR UN T TR PS
IIN((B)ABOVE,,MAY GIIVEANOTHER EFFECTIIVEWAY TO REDUCE THE POTENTIIALFOR UNIITTRIIPS
DUE TO THESE PERFORMANCE ERRORS..
 DUE TO THESE PERFORMANCE ERRORS

        (e) As for transmission grid behavior which is sometimes unstable, enhancing the
plant side ability to respond well to outside disturbances seems to be necessary.

       ((F)) IIDENTIIFYIING CAUSE--EFFECT CONSEQUENCES FROM A ONCE--OCCURRED EVENT AND
         F    D ENT FY NG CAUSE EFFECT CONSEQUENCES FROM A ONCE OCCURRED EVENT AND
ESTABL SHING EFFECT VE COUNTERMEASURES ACCORD NGLY, SURELY BECOMES NECESSARY
ESTABLIISHING EFFECTIIVE COUNTERMEASURES ACCORDIINGLY,SURELY BECOMES NECESSARY
AFTER THE CURRENT STATUS OF RATHER FREQUENT UN T TR PS HAD BEEN MPROVED.
AFTER THE CURRENT STATUS OF RATHER FREQUENT UNIITTRIIPSHAD BEEN IIMPROVED.


       Adopting event recording and analyzing software or devices with sufficient resolution
should be considered.

               IIIIII..O..1..D
                       O1D          COUNTERMEASURES AND IIMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
                                    COUNTERMEASURES AND MPROVEMENT PROGRAMS

              The TEAM reviewed TAIPOWER's countermeasures or improvement
programs and understands that TAIPOWER's programs seem to cover the necessary issues.
The following are examples of some improvement items in TAIPOWER's programs:
                    A))
                    A      FROM MAIINTENANCE PROGRAM
                           FROM MA NTENANCE PROGRAM

         (i)         Integrated Reliability Improvement (IRI) Program.
      ((IIII))      AUTOMATIIC VOLTAGE REGULATOR ((AVR)):: IIMPROVEMENT FOR SYSTEM
                     AUTOMAT C VOLTAGE REGULATOR AVR                 MPROVEMENT FOR SYSTEM
                              STAB LITY.
                             STABIILITY.
         (iii)       Instrument Setpoint Drift Tracking Program.
        ((IIV))
            V       ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIIS OF ROSEMOUNT TRANSMIITTER..
                     ROOT CAUSE ANALYS S OF ROSEMOUNT TRANSM TTER
         (v)         Operation Technology Improvement Study
                    ----UNIIT TRIIP REDUCTIION PLAN
                        UN T TR P REDUCT ON PLAN
                             --Development and Application of Root Cause Analysis Program

                    B))
                    B     FROM BETTERMENT PROGRAM AND SCRAM AVOIIDANCE PROGRAM
                          FROM BETTERMENT PROGRAM AND SCRAM AVO DANCE PROGRAM

         (i)        Key Component Failure Rate Reduction
        ((IIII))    MAIINTENANCE AND SURVEIILLANCE PROCEDURE UPGRADE
                    MA NTENANCE AND SURVE LLANCE PROCEDURE UPGRADE
         (iii)      Avoid Repair/Test Error
        ((IIV))
             V      ANALOG TRANSMIITTER TRIIP SYSTEM IINSTALLATIION
                    ANALOG TRANSM TTER TR P SYSTEM NSTALLAT ON

                    C)     From Five Year Performance Improvement Program

       ((II))       REACTOR PROTECTIION SYSTEM LOGIIC CARD REPLACEMENT
                    REACTOR PROTECT ON SYSTEM LOG C CARD REPLACEMENT
        (ii)        Reactor Feedwater Control System Modification
       ((IIIIII))   TURBIINE DEH SYSTEM UPGRADIING
                    TURB NE DEH SYSTEM UPGRAD NG
      (iv)          Reactor Recirculation M-G Set Control Logic Modification

        TA P OWER SHOULD NOW MPLEMENT THESE PROGRAMS N ACCORDANCE W TH A F RM
        TAIIPOWER SHOULD NOW IIMPLEMENT THESE PROGRAMS IIN ACCORDANCE WIITH A FIIRM
T METABLE.
TIIMETABLE.

        IIIIII..O..2..ADOPTIION OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY OF IINSTRUMENTATIION AND CONTROL
                O 2 ADOPT ON OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY OF NSTRUMENTAT ON AND CONTROL
                           ((II&C))AND MONIITORIING//DIIAGNOSIIS SYSTEMS
                               &C AND MON TOR NG D AGNOS S SYSTEMS

        The oldest nuclear power unit of TAIPOWER, CHINSHAN unit 1 commenced its
commercial operation in December 1978, and has been successfully operated for more than
13 years. Considering the age of this unit, the I&C of both CHINSHAN unit 1 and unit 2
seems to have been designed and manufactured in the early to mid seventies. In the past
twenty years, the development of the technology related to I&C has progressed remarkably
and rapidly. The newest nuclear power plants in the world are adopting the advanced and
sophisticated I&C, and there is a worldwide tendency to backfit older plants with advanced
technology to ensure reliable and effective operation.

        TA P OWER ALSO HAS BEEN MPROV NG THE &C OF TS NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
       TAIIPOWER ALSO HAS BEEN IIMPROVIING THE II&C OF IITS''NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS,,
      ALLY OF TS' OLDER ONES THE FOLLOW NG ARE THE MA OR MPROVEMENTS N TH S
ESPECIIALLYOF IITS'OLDER ONES.. THE FOLLOWIINGARE THE MAJJOR IIMPROVEMENTS IIN THIIS
ESPEC
F ELD OF CH NSHAN PLANTS N RECENT YEARS
FIIELDOF CHIINSHANPLANTS IINRECENT YEARS::


        (i)               Process computer; upgrade (renewal): in progress.

        ((IIII))          NUCLEAR NSTRUMENTAT ON TRAVERS NG NCORE PROBE T P
                          NUCLEAR IINSTRUMENTATIION;; TRAVERSIING IINCORE PROBE ((TIIP));;
                          UPGRADE DIGITAL AND AUTOMAT C), ALREADY COMPLETED
                          UPGRADE ((DIGITALAND AUTOMATIIC),ALREADY COMPLETED..


      (iii)          Nuclear instrumentation; replacement of source range     monitor
                           (SRM) and intermediate range monitor (IRM) to wide range neutron
                           monitor, (WRNM) digital: in progress.
       ((IIV))
           V            MAIIN
                        MA N  TURBIINE CONTROL SYSTEM;; UPGRADE
                              TURB NE CONTROL SYSTEM UPGRADE               ((DIIGIITAL EHC))::
                                                                             D G TAL EHC         IIN
                                                                                                  N
                        PROGRESS..
                        PROGRESS

      (v)               Monitoring/diagnosis system for the primary recirculation pump/motor:
                        completed.

       ((VII))
         V              PLANT TRANSIIENT MONIITOR::COMPLETED..
                        PLANT TRANS ENT MON TOR COMPLETED

        (vii)     Radwaste system; computerized monitoring: in progress.

      ((VIIII))
        V         MOTOR OPERATED VALVE ((MOV));;DIIAGNOSIIS PROGRAM::TEST COMPLETED..
                  MOTOR OPERATED VALVE MOV D AGNOS S PROGRAM TEST COMPLETED

      The status of these adoptions of the advanced technology seems to be well planned
and implemented, although there is no available average data base with which it can be
compared. If there are additional items, the TEAM recommends that the following are
examples of items to be studied further:

        (i)             Redundant control systems for reactor coolant and reactor feedwater
                        control (to avoid the unit trip with single failure).

       ((IIII))         DIIGIITAL REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM..
                        D G TAL REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM

      (iii)       Reactor feedwater pump turbine control system; (digital EHC)

       ((IIV))
           V            DIIGIITAL PROCESS IINSTRUMENTATIION..
                        D G TAL PROCESS NSTRUMENTAT ON

        III.O.3. Maintenance for Ageing Deterioration of Instrumentation and Control
                       Equipment

        For reliable and effective operation of nuclear power plants, it is very important to
predict properly residual lives of instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment and repair or
replace them before they attain their useful lives. I&C equipment are composed of various
kinds and types of electric and electronic components (parts), and most of their useful lives
are generally below 15 to 20 years although they vary largely depending on the conditions
such as the stress, the environment (temperature, humidity, radiation), the operating time,
normally energized or deenergized, etc. For example, among the many parts which compose
a printed circuit board, an aluminum electrolytic capacitor, a miniature relay and a fuse have
useful lives which are generally no longer than 10 years.

      A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAS A LARGE NUMBER OF II&C EQUIIPMENT,,AND
       A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT HAS A LARGE NUMBER OF &C EQU PMENT AND
CONSEQUENTLY THE QUANTIITYOF THE COMPONENTS WIILLBE HUGE.. FURTHERMORE,, THERE
CONSEQUENTLY THE QUANT TY OF THE COMPONENTS W LL BE HUGE FURTHERMORE THERE
HAS RECENTLY BEEN A RAPIIDDEVELOPMENT IINELECTRONIIC TECHNOLOGY.. FREQUENTLY
HAS RECENTLY BEEN A RAP D DEVELOPMENT N ELECTRON C TECHNOLOGY      FREQUENTLY
 THERE ARE MODEL CHANGES OF THESE P ECES OF EQU PMENT AND OF COMPONENTS WHEN
THERE ARE MODEL CHANGES OF THESE PIIECESOF EQUIIPMENTAND OF COMPONENTS WHEN
 PURCHASE THE SAME SPARE PARTS AS OR GINALLY MANUFACTURED S MPOSSIBLE.
PURCHASE THE SAME SPARE PARTS AS ORIIGINALLY MANUFACTURED IIS IIMPOSSIBLE.
THEREFORE,,SYSTEMATIIC APPROACH IIS NECESSARY BOTH FOR PLANNIING AND
 THEREFORE SYSTEMAT C APPROACH S NECESSARY BOTH FOR PLANN NG AND
 MPLEMENTATION OF PRACT CAL PREVENT VE MA NTENANCE.
IIMPLEMENTATIONOF PRACTIICALPREVENTIIVEMAIINTENANCE.


      Systematic categorization of the thousands of component parts and items of
equipment is necessary, which can be done with either reliability centered maintenance
(RCM) or by integrated reliability improvements (IRI).
      THE FOLLOWIING IIS AN EXAMPLE OF THE CATEGORIIZATIION OF CRIITERIIA FOR
      THE FOLLOW NG S AN EXAMPLE OF THE CATEGOR ZAT ON OF CR TER A FOR
REPLACEMENT OF CONTROL EQU PMENT:
REPLACEMENT OF CONTROL EQUIIPMENT:


        (i)            after its' failure - applied to equipment/components the failure of which
                       does not affect safety or reliability of the plant.

      ((IIII))         BEFORE TS' FA LURE BY CATCH NG THE PRECURSOR
                       BEFORE IITS' FAIILURE BY CATCHIING THE PRECURSOR -- APPLIIED TO
                                                                           APPL ED TO
                           PMENT/COMPONENTS WHEN A PRECURSOR OF THE FA LURE CAN BE
                       EQUIIPMENT/COMPONENTS WHEN A PRECURSOR OF THE FAIILURE CAN BE
                       EQU
                       DETECTED BY ROUT NE NSPECTION OR MON TORING.
                       DETECTED BY ROUTIINE IINSPECTIONOR MONIITORING.


      (iii)      before it has reached the end of its' useful predicted life - applied to
                       equipment/components whose residual life can be predicted by
                       diagnosis or examination of a data base (the latter is applied especially
                       to those items for which the cost of replacement is less expensive).

      ((IIV))
          V      BECAUSE OF WORSE MA NTAINABILITY APPL ED TO EQU PMENT/COMPONENTS
                 BECAUSE OF WORSE MAIINTAINABILITY -- APPLIIED TO EQUIIPMENT/COMPONENTS
                      FOR WHIICHREPLACEMENTS CANNOT BE PURCHASED..
                      FOR WH CH REPLACEMENTS CANNOT BE PURCHASED

        (v)            for up-grade of its' performance - applied to equipment/components for
                       both up-grade and preventive maintenance.

       TA P OWER HAS A PREVENT VE MA NTENANCE PROGRAM FOR THE DEGRADAT ON OF
       TAIIPOWER HAS A PREVENTIIVE MAIINTENANCE PROGRAM FOR THE DEGRADATIION OF
EQUIIPMENTAND COMPONENTS.. THIISPROGRAM,,HOWEVER,,SEEMS TO BE FOCUSED MAIINLY TO
EQU PMENT AND COMPONENTS TH S PROGRAM HOWEVER SEEMS TO BE FOCUSED MA NLY TO
THE MECHAN CAL PORT ONS, AND S YET FULLY ESTABL SHED FOR &C PORT ONS.
THE MECHANIICALPORTIIONS,AND IISYET FULLY ESTABLIISHED FOR II&CPORTIIONS.


        The TEAM recommends that this program be strengthened for I&C portions
especially for the older nuclear power plants. The I&C portions of the thirteen year old
CHINSHAN unit may not have yet attained their useful lives, but it is necessary to establish
this program in advance because it takes a long time, and it is not easy to establish it.
FIIGURE IIIIII..O..1 HERE;;
F GURE O 1 HERE               FIIGURE IIIIII..O..2 HERE
                              F GURE          O 2 HERE
III.P    FUEL PERFORMANCE

        IIIIII..P..1 IINTRODUCTIION
                P 1 NTRODUCT ON

        Most discussions of the fuel performance address only the fuel failure rate, because
the impact on public acceptance of nuclear power as well as operation and maintenance cost
due to release of fission products from fuel pins is very significant. But in a broader sense,
the fuel performance could be represented by an integral credit in the following areas:
(1)reliability (2) flexibility and (3) economics.

        THE FUEL ROD FAIILURE RATE PER CYCLE AND THE IINPO'S FRII((FUEL RELIIABIILIITY
        THE FUEL ROD FA LURE RATE PER CYCLE AND THE NPO'S FR FUEL REL AB L TY
IINDEX))ARE THE MOST POPULAR IINDIICES FOR FUEL RELIIABIILIITY TODAY.. FLEXIIBIILIITY RESULTS
  NDEX ARE THE MOST POPULAR ND CES FOR FUEL REL AB L TY TODAY FLEX B L TY RESULTS
FROM THE MARG N BETWEEN THE OPERAT NG L MITS OF THE REACTOR WH CH ARE SPEC FIED N
FROM THE MARGIINBETWEEN THE OPERATIING LIIMITSOF THE REACTOR WHIICHARE SPECIIFIED IIN
THE TECHN CAL SPEC FICATIONS AND THE ACTUAL OPERAT NG COND TIONS. UT LITIES MAY
THE TECHNIICALSPECIIFICATIONSAND THE ACTUAL OPERATIINGCONDIITIONS. UTIILITIESMAY
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ENHANCED FLEXIIBILITYBY::
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ENHANCED FLEX BILITY BY

        - (1) increasing maneuvering capability (e. g. remove PCIOMR, employing load
        following.... etc)

        --((2))ACHIIEVIING LOWER FUEL CYCLE COST THROUGH REDESIIGN
            2 ACH EV NG LOWER FUEL CYCLE COST THROUGH REDES GN

         - (3) plant updating and

        --((4))REDUCIING VESSEL FLUENCE TO EXTEND PLANT LIIFE..
            4 REDUC NG VESSEL FLUENCE TO EXTEND PLANT L FE

        The scope of fuel economics should include the complete fuel cycle, namely, front
end, operation and back end. In addition to the floating commercial price, the fuel cycle cost
is strongly dependent on the government policy and regulation, e. g. energy inventory policy,
licensing process, back-end policy, etc. Presently, the estimated back-end cost varies
significantly among countries. The motivation to optimize the fuel cycle cost is to enhance
the competitive ability of nuclear energy.

        IIIIII..P..2 REVIIEW OF TAIIPOWER'S PERFORMANCE
                P 2 REV EW OF TA POWER'S PERFORMANCE

                The three above-mentioned areas are clearly interrelated, the detailed
description of each area is presented in the following sections.

        IIIIII..P..2..A
                P2A       RELIIABIILIITY
                          REL AB L TY

         The fuel failure rates as well as the failure root causes are summarized by plant and
cycle in Table III.P.1 For CHINSHAN, the reliability            history could be divided into three
periods. The first period CS1CY1-CS1CY4, CS2CY1-CS2CY3, is characterized by high
fuel reliability. The major failure root cause is from manufacturing defect. The second
period CS1CY5-CS1CY8, CS2CY4-CS2CY7 is characterized by poor reliability and the
major failure root cause is from improper operation. And the third period is characterized by
improving fuel reliability, in comparison to the second period, and the failure root causes are
undetermined.

       WHIILE THE FUELS ARE OF THE SAME DESIIGN AND WERE PROVIIDED BY SAME VENDORS,,
        WH LE THE FUELS ARE OF THE SAME DES GN AND WERE PROV DED BY SAME VENDORS
THE FUEL REL ABILITY H STORY OF KUOSHENG S S GNIFICANTLY SUPER OR TO CH NSHAN
THE FUEL RELIIABILITYHIISTORYOF KUOSHENG IISSIIGNIFICANTLYSUPERIIORTO CHIINSHAN
EXCEPT FOR THE LATEST THREE CYCLES.. HOWEVER,,AN UNCOMFORTABLE TREND IIN FUEL
EXCEPT FOR THE LATEST THREE CYCLES HOWEVER AN UNCOMFORTABLE TREND N FUEL
RELIIABILITY WAS OBSERVED IINKUOSHENG.. A DEBRIIS FAIILURE WAS OBSERVED IIN THE 5TH
REL ABILITY WAS OBSERVED N KUOSHENG A DEBR S FA LURE WAS OBSERVED N THE 5TH
CYCLE KS1CY5) AND S NCE THEN COOLANT ACT VITY DATA SHOWS DEFECTS N MOST OF
CYCLE ((KS1CY5)AND SIINCE THEN COOLANT ACTIIVITYDATA SHOWS DEFECTS IINMOST OF
CYCLES..ALTHOUGH NO EXAMIINATIONWAS PERFORMED,,DEBRIIS IINDUCED FAIILURE WAS
CYCLES ALTHOUGH NO EXAM NATION WAS PERFORMED DEBR S NDUCED FA LURE WAS
SUSPECTED ..
SUSPECTED

        For MAANSHAN, the results show significantly different failure rates between the
units. Unit 1 has a failure rate of around 10-4, while unit 2 is nearly defect-free. The
major failure mechanism of unit 1 is grid-rod fretting caused by a manufacturing defect. In
addition, it is noticeable that one fuel rod was damaged by debris in MS1CY5. Therefore,
debris control is important.

        In comparison to the international experience (1985~1988) the average fuel failure
rate of USA, France and Japan is (3-30)X10-5, 7 X 10-5 and better than 10-5 respectively.
TAIPOWER's current fuel reliability is better than that for France. But it still has large room
for improvement to equal the Japanese performance as well as to meet the company's goal of
zero defect.

       III.P.2.b. Flexibility

       TA P OWER'S CURRENT FOCUS S TO MEET REGULATORY REQU REMENTS AND ENERGY
       TAIIPOWER'S CURRENT FOCUS IIS TO MEET REGULATORY REQUIIREMENTS AND ENERGY
DEMAND..OPTIIMIZATIONOF FUEL CYCLE COST AS WELL AS PLANT LIIFE EXTENSIION THROUGH
DEMAND OPT MIZATION OF FUEL CYCLE COST AS WELL AS PLANT L FE EXTENS ON THROUGH
REDUCIINGVESSEL FLUENCE HAVE NOT BEEN EMPHASIIZEDYET..
REDUC NG VESSEL FLUENCE HAVE NOT BEEN EMPHAS ZED YET

        In this section two areas are discussed, one is power maneuvering capability and the
other is flexibility of reload design. The current restriction of power ascension for
TAIPOWER's reactors is to follow PCIOMR for BWR and using 2.5%.hr-1 for PWR. The
limitation for the BWR is expected to be removed by new reload fuel with the introduction of
9 X 9 and 8 X 8 B in 1992. However, it was reported that single failed barrier fuel could
result in heavy contamination of reactor system.             So during enjoying enhanced
maneuverability, the preventive measures to avoid fuel failure and minimize post-fuel-defect
consequences should be undertaken after the barrier fuel is utilized.

        Due to the one year inventory policy and no local fuel fabrication capability, long lead
time is required. For the worst case, the enrichment has to be fixed 18 months prior to
inserting fuel into the core. However, under such circumstances the capability of reload
design are highly challenged. It has to accommodate the often different requirements
between the estimated cycle energy and the actual energy demand based on the enrichment
and burnable poisons configuration determined 18 months previously. This is especially
difficult for a small core like CHINSHAN.

       IIIIII..P..2..C..ECONOMIICS
               P 2 C ECONOM CS

         THE FUEL CYCLE COST IIS AROUND 20~25%((EXCLUDIING)),, AND 35~41% ((IINCLUDIING
         THE FUEL CYCLE COST S AROUND 20~25% EXCLUD NG AND 35~41% NCLUD NG
 BACK END COST OF THE TA POWER''S ELECTR CITY PRODUCT ON COST COMPARED TO THE
BACK END COST)) OF THE TAIIPOWERS ELECTRIICITY PRODUCTIION COST.. COMPARED TO THE
 AVERAGE VALUE FOR A U S. PLANT 13%), FRANCE 28~30%, BACK END COST NCLUDED) AND
AVERAGE VALUE FOR A U..S. PLANT ((13%), FRANCE ((28~30%, BACK END COST IINCLUDED) AND
JAPANESE PLANT,, TAIIPOWER'S VALUE SEEMED TO BE ON THE HIIGH SIIDE.. THEREFORE,, EVEN
 JAPANESE PLANT TA POWER'S VALUE SEEMED TO BE ON THE H GH S DE THEREFORE EVEN
IIF THE FIIGURES ARE NOT DIIRECTLY COMPARABLE,, IIT APPEARS THAT THERE IIS LARGE ROOM FOR
 F THE F GURES ARE NOT D RECTLY COMPARABLE T APPEARS THAT THERE S LARGE ROOM FOR
 MPROVEMENT N FUEL CYCLE ECONOM CS.
IIMPROVEMENTIIN FUEL CYCLE ECONOMIICS.

IIIIII..P..3 RECOMMENDATIIONS
        P 3 RECOMMENDAT ONS

       Based on the review of past performance as well as the higher expectation for the
future, the following suggestions are recommended.

       IIIIII..P..3..A
               P3A         ESTABLIISHMENT OF AN IINTEGRAL PLAN FOR FUEL RELIIABIILIITY
                           ESTABL SHMENT OF AN NTEGRAL PLAN FOR FUEL REL AB L TY
 MPROVEMENT.
IIMPROVEMENT.


         - to enhance manufacturing auditing.
--TO ENHANCE DEBRIIS CONTROL IIN PLANT..
   TO ENHANCE DEBR S CONTROL N PLANT
 - to introduce new fuel design at an early stage to take advantage of its benefit but with very
 deliberate steps

                --((1))DETAIILED DESIIGN REVIIEW
                    1 DETA LED DES GN REV EW
 - (2) small number of fuel assemblies(e.g. lead use assembly)
--((3))SURVEIILLANCE PROGRAM FOR THE FIIRST RELOAD BATCH OF NEW DESIIGN FUEL..
    3 SURVE LLANCE PROGRAM FOR THE F RST RELOAD BATCH OF NEW DES GN FUEL

          III.P.3.b        Establishment of a program to improve fuel flexibility.

        --TO ESTABLIISH RELOAD ANALYSIIS CAPABIILIITY IINDEPENDENTLY OF THE FUEL VENDORS..
          TO ESTABL SH RELOAD ANALYS S CAPAB L TY NDEPENDENTLY OF THE FUEL VENDORS

          III.P.3.c        Establishment of a company policy to optimize fuel cycle cost.

       -- TO OPTIIMIIZE THE OUTAGE MANAGEMENT BETWEEN THE ELECTRIICIITY PRODUCTIION AND
          TO OPT M ZE THE OUTAGE MANAGEMENT BETWEEN THE ELECTR C TY PRODUCT ON AND
       FUEL CYCLE COST..
        FUEL CYCLE COST
- to determine the target fuel burn up by optimizing the overall cost of front end, reliability,
flexibility and back-end.

          IIIIII..P..3..D.. DECIISIION TO CREATE A CONSOLIIDATED FUEL DIIVIISIION..
                  P 3 D DEC S ON TO CREATE A CONSOL DATED FUEL D V S ON

         - The three above-mentioned subjects are highly technical and deeply interrelated.
         They are now conducted by different departments in TAIPOWER. To minimize the
         interface problems, it is recommended that a new consolidated division should be
         established to take the overall responsibility to optimize among the different demands
         of fuel reliability, flexibility and economics. In addition, The TEAM recommends that
         TAIPOWER train more staff to be become familiar with nuclear fuel area so that the
         knowledge can be broadened and performance can be improved.
TABLE IIIIII..P..1 HERE
TABLE P 1 HERE
III.Q   PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENTS (PRAs)

        IIIIII..Q..1 WHAT IIS A PRA?
                Q 1 WHAT S A PRA?

        Reactor safety designers in the west, whose design and procedures have been followed
by TAIPOWER, have used for 40 years a procedure called "defense-in-depth". A
"maximum credible accident" is postulated, and engineered devices are installed to prevent
the accident. Such a procedure leads naturally to an analysis pioneered by Professor Norman
Rasmussen in his report to the old U.S. Atomic Energy Commission - the Reactor Safety
Study (WASH 1400).

       IIN THIIS,,AN "EVENT TREE" IIS CONSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW EACH ACCIIDENT SCENARIIO.. HE
         N TH S AN "EVENT TREE" S CONSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW EACH ACC DENT SCENAR O HE
 FOUND THAT F THE DES GN S APPROPR ATE, THERE S AN APPROX MATE FACTOR ZATION OF
FOUND THAT IIFTHE DESIIGNIISAPPROPRIIATE, THERE IISAN APPROXIIMATE FACTORIIZATIONOF
THE CALCULATIIONOF THE PROBLEM.. THIISENABLES PROBABIILITY NUMBERS TO BE ASSIIGNED
 THE CALCULAT ON OF THE PROBLEM TH S ENABLES PROBAB LITY NUMBERS TO BE ASS GNED
 WH CH, ALTHOUGH VERY UNCERTA N, HAVE SOME MEAN NG. THE PROCEDURE S NOW CALLED
WHIICH,ALTHOUGH VERY UNCERTAIIN,HAVE SOME MEANIING. THE PROCEDURE IISNOW CALLED
"PROBABIILIISTIIC RIISK ANALYSIIS" OR PRA.. MOST ANALYSTS,,HOWEVER,,AGREE THAT THE
 "PROBAB L ST C R SK ANALYS S" OR PRA MOST ANALYSTS HOWEVER AGREE THAT THE
 MOST MPORTANT USE OF A PRA S TO ENSURE THAT OWNERS DES GNERS, OPERATORS AND
MOST IIMPORTANTUSE OF A PRA IIS TO ENSURE THAT OWNERS,,DESIIGNERS,OPERATORS,,AND
IINSPECTORSALL THIINKTHROUGH THE SAFETY ASPECTS OF THE PLANT CAREFULLY,,AND MAKE
 NSPECTORS ALL TH NK THROUGH THE SAFETY ASPECTS OF THE PLANT CAREFULLY AND MAKE
 WHATEVER MOD FICATIONS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO PLUG ANY WEAKNESSES N DES GN OR
WHATEVER MODIIFICATIONSTHAT ARE NECESSARY TO PLUG ANY WEAKNESSES IINDESIIGNOR
 OPERAT ON.
OPERATIION.

        IIIIII..Q..2
                Q2     PRAS FOR THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
                       PRAS FOR THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

        Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) have been performed for all three nuclear
power plants of Taiwan Power Company. The analyses were performed by a task force
made up of personnel from the utility (TAIPOWER), the research institute (Institute of
Nuclear Energy Research, INER), and the regulatory authority (Atomic Energy Council,
AEC). When performing the first PRA, a consulting company was contracted to manage the
project and lead the team technically in the analysis. The major work was performed by the
domestic task force. The responsibility of the consulting company was reduced subsequently
as a result of successful technology transfer. Their role was changed from manager (in
KUOSHENG PRA) to advisor (MAANSHAN) to reviewer (CHINSHAN). The TEAM
considers that this technology transfer was effective and successful. The external peer
review and assistance by USNRC is also considered valuable.

        THERE ARE THREE LEVELS OF A PRA ANALYSIIS.. LEVEL 1 IIS FOR THE REACTOR;; LEVEL
        THERE ARE THREE LEVELS OF A PRA ANALYS S LEVEL 1 S FOR THE REACTOR LEVEL
2 IINCLUDES THE CONTAIINMENT,, AND LEVEL 3 IINCLUDES OVERALL CONSEQUENCES.. THE PRAS
 2 NCLUDES THE CONTA NMENT AND LEVEL 3 NCLUDES OVERALL CONSEQUENCES THE PRAS
 FOR KUOSHENG AND CH NSHAN ARE LEVEL 2 ANALYSES AND T S A LEVEL 1 PRA FOR
FOR KUOSHENG AND CHIINSHAN ARE LEVEL 2 ANALYSES AND IIT IIS A LEVEL 1 PRA FOR
MAANSHAN.. IIN ADDIITIION TO IINTERNAL EVENTS,, EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS SEIISMIIC,,
 MAANSHAN N ADD T ON TO NTERNAL EVENTS EXTERNAL EVENTS SUCH AS SE SM C
TYPHOON,, FIIRE AND IINTERNAL FLOODIING ARE ALSO ANALYZED.. THE ESTIIMATED "POIINT
 TYPHOON F RE AND NTERNAL FLOOD NG ARE ALSO ANALYZED                  THE EST MATED "PO NT
 EST MATE" CORE MELT FREQUENCY FOR KUOSHENG CH NSHAN AND MAANSHAN WAS
ESTIIMATE" CORE MELT FREQUENCY FOR KUOSHENG,, CHIINSHAN AND MAANSHAN WAS
3..7 X 10--4,, 1..4 X 10--4,, AND 1..1X 10--4 PER REACTOR--YEAR RESPECTIIVELY.. ((AFTER FOUR
 3 7 X 10 4 1 4 X 10 4 AND 1 1X 10 4 PER REACTOR YEAR RESPECT VELY AFTER FOUR
 MOD FICATIONS, DETA LED FRAG LITY ANALYS S OF SOME CR TICAL COMPONENTS UPDAT NG
MODIIFICATIONS, DETAIILED FRAGIILITY ANALYSIIS OF SOME CRIITICAL COMPONENTS,, UPDATIING
THE FAIILURE PROBABIILITY OF DIIESEL GENERATORS,, IINCLUDING THE NORMAL CHIILLED WATER
 THE FA LURE PROBAB LITY OF D ESEL GENERATORS NCLUDING THE NORMAL CH LLED WATER
 SYSTEM NCHW) SYSTEM OPERAT ON PROCEDURE AFTER LOSS OF THE EMERGENCY CH LLED
SYSTEM ((NCHW) SYSTEM OPERATIION PROCEDURE AFTER LOSS OF THE EMERGENCY CHIILLED
WATER SYSTEM ((ECHW)),, AND IINCLUSIION OF THE ANTIICIIPATED TRANSIIENT WIITHOUT SCRAM
 WATER SYSTEM ECHW AND NCLUS ON OF THE ANT C PATED TRANS ENT W THOUT SCRAM
((ATWS)) OPERATIION PROCEDURE,, THE "POIINT ESTIIMATE" CALCULATIION FOR THE CORE MELT
  ATWS OPERAT ON PROCEDURE THE "PO NT EST MATE" CALCULAT ON FOR THE CORE MELT
FREQUENCY ESTIIMATION FOR KUOSHENG WAS REDUCED,, AS DESCRIIBED IIN A SEPARATE
 FREQUENCY EST MATION FOR KUOSHENG WAS REDUCED AS DESCR BED N A SEPARATE
                       5
REPORT,, TO 9..6 X10--5 PER REACTOR--YEAR, WIITH A "MEAN" FREQUENCY ESTIIMATE OF 8..5 X
 REPORT TO 9 6 X10 PER REACTOR YEAR, W TH A "MEAN" FREQUENCY EST MATE OF 8 5 X
10--5 PER REACTOR YEAR.. RECOMMENDATIIONS WERE MADE TO EACH PLANT FOR
 10 5 PER REACTOR YEAR               RECOMMENDAT ONS WERE MADE TO EACH PLANT FOR
 MPROVEMENT WH CH NCLUDE MPROVING THE REL ABILITY OF D ESEL GENERATOR AND GAS
IIMPROVEMENT WHIICH IINCLUDE IIMPROVING THE RELIIABILITY OF DIIESEL GENERATOR AND GAS
TURBIINE GENERATOR,, MODIIFICATION OF OPERATIING PROCEDURES,, AND SOME PLANT SPECIIFIC
 TURB NE GENERATOR MOD FICATION OF OPERAT NG PROCEDURES AND SOME PLANT SPEC FIC
 HARDWARE MOD FICATIONS.      TA POWER HAS TAKEN THESE RECOMMENDAT ONS NTO
HARDWARE MODIIFICATIONS. TAIIPOWER HAS TAKEN THESE RECOMMENDATIIONS IINTO
          CONS DERATION,                                         FOLLOW NG-UP
SERIIOUS CONSIIDERATION, AND ROCAEC IIS PERIIODICALLY FOLLOWIING-UP THEIIR
 SER OUS                    AND ROCAEC S          PER ODICALLY                  THE R
 MPLEMENTATION.
IIMPLEMENTATION.

        IIT WAS FOUND THAT THE IINTERNAL--EVENT--IINDUCED CORE MELT FREQUENCIIES FOR
          T WAS FOUND THAT THE NTERNAL EVENT NDUCED CORE MELT FREQUENC ES FOR
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS N TA WAN ARE ON THE SAME LEVEL AS THE U S. PLANTS AS
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IINTAIIWANARE ON THE SAME LEVEL AS THE U..S.PLANTS AS
CALCULATED N NUREG 1150. CORE MELT FREQUENC ES NDUCED BY EXTERNAL EVENTS
CALCULATED IINNUREG--1150. CORE MELT FREQUENCIIES IINDUCEDBY EXTERNAL EVENTS
ARE SIITESPECIIFICAND MAY VARY FROM PLANT TO PLANT.. THE DIIFFERENCESIINPLANT
ARE S TE SPEC FIC AND MAY VARY FROM PLANT TO PLANT THE D FFERENCES N PLANT
CONFIIGURATIONARE THE MAJJORREASONS FOR THE DIIFFERENCE IINPRA RESULTS..
CONF GURATION ARE THE MA OR REASONS FOR THE D FFERENCE N PRA RESULTS

        As a response to the recommendations of the PRA study, TAIPOWER is installing an
additional diesel generator on each site to reduce the significance of a station blackout event,
and a concrete housing has been built around the gas turbine generators. Some other plant
specific modifications, such as the installation of hydrogen ignitors in KUOSHENG, the
inerting of the containment vessel in CHINSHAN and practice of operating procedure in
events of loss of component cooling water system, are also implemented. These will
definitely improve the safety and reliability of nuclear power plant operation.

       IIIIII..Q..3
               Q3     RECOMMENDATIIONS FOR FUTURE PRA WORK
                      RECOMMENDAT ONS FOR FUTURE PRA WORK

        The formation of the PRA task force with personnel from three organizations is a
good approach. It can make the best use of domestic human resources. The diverse staff
also generates a consensus among the utility, the research institute, and the regulatory
authority on the PRA methodologies, models and results. Since PRA is receiving more and
more attention, the TEAM recommends that each organization, especially the utility, to train
more staff in the PRA field so that the application of PRA technology and results can be
broadened.

        TAIPOWER is working with the Institute of Nuclear Energy research (INER) to
create a living PRA project. The objective of this project is to establish the plant model on a
personal computer so that it can be easily updated and manipulated. This is a praiseworthy
project and is unique to TAIPOWER. PRA has been used by TAIPOWER in design change
evaluation, operator training and emergency response planning. This effort should prove
very useful. The TEAM encourages TAIPOWER to continue in this direction.

        Studies of accident sequences during shutdown have been done in FRANCE and are
undergoing in the USA. These accident sequences have been found leading to core melt with
a probability of the order of 10-5 to 10-6/year. Among them, the most sensitive include
station blackout. This applies to both BWR and PWR.


       The TEAM recommends that TAIPOWER become involved with this PRA effort,
paying especial attention to local conditions such as the necessary preventive measures when
a typhoon is predicted. The TEAM understands that such a shutdown PRA is planned with
INER and the TEAM applauds this initiative.
IIIIII..R QUALIITY
        R QUAL TY

       III.R.1 Quality Assurance (QA)

        TA P OWER HAS SET UP A QUAL TY ASSURANCE STRUCTURE THROUGHOUT TS ENT RE
        TAIIPOWER HAS SET UP A QUALIITY ASSURANCE STRUCTURE THROUGHOUT IITS''ENTIIRE
        ZATION. THE NUCLEAR QUAL TY DEPARTMENT NQD) OF TA POWER
ORGANIIZATION. THE NUCLEAR QUALIITYDEPARTMENT ((NQD)OF TAIIPOWER
 ORGAN
 HEADQUARTERS REPORTS TO THE V CE-PRESIDENT-CONSTRUCTION, AND D RECTS THE
HEADQUARTERS REPORTS TO THE VIICE-PRESIDENT-CONSTRUCTION,AND DIIRECTS THE
 ACT VITIES OF THE QA GROUP OF EACH OF THE POWER PLANT S TES, ENSUR NG THE NECESSARY
ACTIIVITIESOF THE QA GROUP OF EACH OF THE POWER PLANT SIITES,ENSURIING THE NECESSARY
IINDEPENDENCE FROM THE OPERATIIONGROUP..
 NDEPENDENCE FROM THE OPERAT ON GROUP


       The Nuclear Quality Department has a staff of 115 persons, which includes 10
persons at each nuclear power plant site.

      THE US REGULATIION 10CFR50 APPENDIIX B SERVES AS A BASIIS FOR THE QUALIITY
      THE US REGULAT ON 10CFR50 APPEND X B SERVES AS A BAS S FOR THE QUAL TY
ASSURANCE ACTIIVIITIIES..
ASSURANCE ACT V T ES

       The QA activities can be divided into several categories:

      -- ROUTIINE AUDIITS:: THE NUCLEAR--RELATED ORGANIIZATIIONS IIN THE HEAD OFFIICE ARE
         ROUT NE AUD TS THE NUCLEAR RELATED ORGAN ZAT ONS N THE HEAD OFF CE ARE
      AUDIITEDAT LEAST ONCE A YEAR;;
       AUD TED AT LEAST ONCE A YEAR

      - task audits: designated audit teams survey important specific activities;

       --SUPPLIIERS AUDIITS;;
         SUPPL ERS AUD TS

      - operations activities audits to verify compliance with                   procedures,
      instructions and drawings, and to appreciate the effectiveness of the procedures;

      --OPERAT ONS ACT VITIES SURVE LLANCE ON SELECTED QUAL TY RELATED S TE
        OPERATIIONS ACTIIVITIES SURVEIILLANCE ON SELECTED QUALIITY RELATED SIITE
      ACT VITIES.
      ACTIIVITIES.


       An important part of QA activities is performed during outages.

      THE DEFIICIIENCIIES ARE RECORDED ON AUDIIT CORRECTIIVE ACTIION REQUESTS ((ACARS))
       THE DEF C ENC ES ARE RECORDED ON AUD T CORRECT VE ACT ON REQUESTS ACARS
   CH ARE TRANSM TTED TO THE AUD TED ORGAN ZATION OR DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECT ON.
WHIICHARE TRANSMIITTEDTO THE AUDIITEDORGANIIZATIONOR DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECTIION.
WH

       A computerized list of outstanding ACARs and of AEC Inspection Notices is
transmitted to management. The Nuclear Quality Department also submits to management
monthly reports and trends.

       IIIIII..R..2 QUALIITY CONTROL ((QC))
               R 2 QUAL TY CONTROL QC

         Most activities are connected to In Service Inspection (ISI) during Outage. The ASME
Boiler Code, section XI, is used to perform the In Service Inspection and testing with the help
of a specialized company from the USA.
        IIIIII..R..3 SUPERVIISIION
                R 3 SUPERV S ON

       The ROC AEC reviews the QA program of TAIPOWER and inspects TAIPOWER
nuclear activities.

       IIIIII..R..4 IIMPLEMENTATIION
               R 4 MPLEMENTAT ON
        TAIPOWER-NQD has established procedures to implement its' QA program. In
order to maintain the effectiveness of the teams at the power plant sites, TAIPOWER rotates
the personnel between the power plant sites and headquarters.

       IIIIII..R..5 FOLLOW--UP
               R 5 FOLLOW UP

        Whenever a significant finding is identified, it is reported in a timely manner to the
director of NQD and then further to the Vice-President for prompt action, prior to issuing
formal and written reports.

       SEMII--ANNUAL REVIIEW MEETIINGS ARE HELD BY THE DIIRECTOR OF THE NUCLEAR
       SEM ANNUAL REV EW MEET NGS ARE HELD BY THE D RECTOR OF THE NUCLEAR
QUALIITY DEPARTMENT ((NQD))..
QUAL TY DEPARTMENT NQD

       The TEAM appreciates the effort made by TAIPOWER to develop a QA/QC program
compatible with good practices in countries having a major nuclear power program. By
reviewing some of the reports, the TEAM has been able to appreciate, and applauds the
freedom of action of the QA group. The TEAM however, recommends a more thorough
implementation of administrative controls on the follow-up of internal QA/QC reports.
III.S   SOCIAL ASPECTS

       THE OPERATIION OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT RELIIES VERY HEAVIILY UPON THE
       THE OPERAT ON OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REL ES VERY HEAV LY UPON THE
QUALIITYOF THE OPERATIINGPERSONNEL IINSEVERAL DIIFFERENTASPECTS::
QUAL TY OF THE OPERAT NG PERSONNEL N SEVERAL D FFERENT ASPECTS


        - technical knowledge

        --TRAIINIING FOR THE FUNCTIION
          TRA N NG FOR THE FUNCT ON

        - discipline

         THE TEAM REVIIEWED THESE THREE ASPECTS.. THE TEAM NOTIICED THAT THE
          THE TEAM REV EWED THESE THREE ASPECTS THE TEAM NOT CED THAT THE
 EDUCAT ONAL CR TERIA FOR THE TA POWER PERSONNEL WERE MORE STR NGENT THAN
EDUCATIIONALCRIITERIA FOR THE TAIIPOWERPERSONNEL WERE MORE STRIINGENTTHAN
 THOSE REQU RED FOR S MILAR FUNCT ONS BY THE UT LITY COMPAN ES OF OTHER COUNTR ES.
THOSE REQUIIRED FOR SIIMILAR FUNCTIIONSBY THE UTIILITYCOMPANIIESOF OTHER COUNTRIIES.
IIN PARTIICULAR,, THE PROPORTIION OF ENGIINEERS IIS CONSIIDERABLY HIIGHER.. THE TEAM
  N PART CULAR THE PROPORT ON OF ENG NEERS S CONS DERABLY H GHER THE TEAM
 CONS DERS TH S PROPORT ON OF ENG NEERS TO BE VERY WORTHWH LE, SUB ECT TO THE
CONSIIDERS THIISPROPORTIIONOF ENGIINEERS TO BE VERY WORTHWHIILE,SUBJJECTTO THE
 COND TION THAT THE MOT VATION OF SUCH PERSONNEL CAN BE MA NTAINED THROUGHOUT
CONDIITION THAT THE MOTIIVATIONOF SUCH PERSONNEL CAN BE MAIINTAINEDTHROUGHOUT
THE YEARS.. DIISCUSSIONSTHAT TEAM MEMBERS HAD WIITHSOME PERSONNEL SHOWED THAT
 THE YEARS D SCUSSIONS THAT TEAM MEMBERS HAD W TH SOME PERSONNEL SHOWED THAT
THIIS IISPRESENTLY THE CASE.. THIISALSO IISDEMONSTRATED BY AN EXCEPTIIONALSTABIILITY
 TH S S PRESENTLY THE CASE TH S ALSO S DEMONSTRATED BY AN EXCEPT ONAL STAB LITY
 OF THE PERSONNEL THE TEAM SUGGESTS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF TA POWER THAT THEY
OF THE PERSONNEL.. THE TEAM SUGGESTS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF TAIIPOWERTHAT THEY
PROGRESSIIVELYDEVELOP,,IINCOLLABORATIION WIITHTHAT PERSONNEL AND USIING THEIIR
 PROGRESS VELY DEVELOP N COLLABORAT ON W TH THAT PERSONNEL AND US NG THE R
 SUGGEST ONS, A PROGRAM TO MA NTAIN THAT SP RIT ESPEC ALLY DUR NG THE PER OD WHEN
SUGGESTIIONS,A PROGRAM TO MAIINTAIN THAT SPIIRITESPECIIALLYDURIING THE PERIIOD WHEN
 THE ABSENCE OF ANY NEW NUCLEAR PROGRAM L MITS THE PROMOT ON OF PERSONNEL AND N
THE ABSENCE OF ANY NEW NUCLEAR PROGRAM LIIMITS THE PROMOTIIONOF PERSONNEL AND IIN
 THAT WAY REDUCES THE R MOT VATION.
THAT WAY REDUCES THEIIRMOTIIVATION.


        The TEAM was able to verify that the engineers are motivated, know the operating
procedures well, and are able to cope correctly with abnormal situations. However some
deficiencies still exist. The TEAM suggests that some engineers be entrusted with the
homogenization of these procedures and the development of procedures that are more
user-friendly. Small groups might be considered to carry out such research, taking into
account the Chinese education and culture.

        THE TEAM FELT,,WIITH POSSIIBLE DIIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER
        THE TEAM FELT W TH POSS BLE D FFERENCES BETWEEN THE THREE NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT S TES, THAT A GOOD COLLABORAT ON EX STS BETWEEN THE D VISIONS: OPERAT ON,
PLANT SIITES, THAT A GOOD COLLABORATIIONEXIISTSBETWEEN THE DIIVISIONS:OPERATIION,
MAIINTENANCE,,SAFETY,,QA//QC..THAT ATTIITUDE SHOULD BE SUPPORTED AND ENCOURAGED
MA NTENANCE SAFETY QA QC THAT ATT TUDE SHOULD BE SUPPORTED AND ENCOURAGED
BY MANAGEMENT,, TO OBTAIINA CLIIMATEOF FREE EXCHANGE OF IINFORMATIONWIITHA
BY MANAGEMENT TO OBTA N A CL MATE OF FREE EXCHANGE OF NFORMATION W TH A
DIISCIPLINE THAT IIS FREELY ACCEPTED AND NOT CONSIIDERED TO BE A BURDEN..
D SCIPLINE THAT S FREELY ACCEPTED AND NOT CONS DERED TO BE A BURDEN

        The TEAM noted the existence of professional groups within TAIPOWER. It
wonders whether the good relations between management and those groups could not be used
to improve the present constraints of time schedule and movement of personnel, particularly
maintenance personnel, between power plant sites. Would it not be advisable, possibly by
using monetary or other compensation, to acquire the acceptance of shift work for urgent
tasks, such as those on the critical path of the outages.
       FIINALLY,, THE TEAM WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIIBIILIITY OF STRIIKES,, AND THE
       F NALLY THE TEAM WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSS B L TY OF STR KES AND THE
 MPACT THAT THEY M GHT HAVE ON POWER PLANT OPERAT ON AND N PART CULAR UPON
IIMPACT THAT THEY MIIGHT HAVE ON POWER PLANT OPERATIION AND IIN PARTIICULAR UPON
SAFETY.. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IIS AN EXIISTING LAW TO FORBIID SUCH ACTIIONS IIN THE PUBLIIC
 SAFETY WHETHER OR NOT THERE S AN EX STING LAW TO FORB D SUCH ACT ONS N THE PUBL C
 SECTOR THE TEAM ADV SES TA POWER TO CONS DER THE M NIMUM FUNCT ONS THAT MUST
SECTOR,, THE TEAM ADVIISES TAIIPOWER TO CONSIIDER THE MIINIMUM FUNCTIIONS THAT MUST
BE FULFIILLED TO ENSURE SAFETY IINSUCH A CASE..
 BE FULF LLED TO ENSURE SAFETY N SUCH A CASE
III.T   RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC

        IIIIII..T..1 THE OPIINIION OF THE NEIIGHBORS..
                T 1 THE OP N ON OF THE NE GHBORS

         It is axiomatic that any enterprise must endeavor to have good relations with its'
neighbors. If, for example, the majority of the people in a country are in favor of a project,
but its' immediate neighbors do not like it, there remains a problem. A classic way of
ensuring local approval in such circumstances is by especial environmental educational or
monetary compensation to the local people or their neighborhoods. The TEAM was therefore
distressed to note the results of two polls; one carried out by Chinese Credit, by interview,
and the other by United Daily by telephone. Chinese Credit noted that 62% of the people in
the whole island are in favor of a new plant at YENLIAO with 12% against (the rest
undecided) whereas only 39% of those near an existing nuclear power plant are in favor
compared with 31% against. (The numbers are 66:14 and 35:38 for the United Daily
telephone interview).

       IIN THE USA AND EUROPE,,THE NEIIGHBORS OF OPERATIING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ARE
         N THE USA AND EUROPE THE NE GHBORS OF OPERAT NG NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ARE
USUALLY MORE N FAVOR OF THE PLANTS THAN THOSE WHO RES DE AT A D STANCE. TH S
USUALLY MORE IIN FAVOR OF THE PLANTS THAN THOSE WHO RESIIDEAT A DIISTANCE. THIIS
SUGGESTS THAT E THER TA POWER S DO NG SOMETH NG WRONG THAT ONLY TS' NE GHBORS
SUGGESTS THAT EIITHERTAIIPOWER IISDOIINGSOMETHIINGWRONG THAT ONLY IITS'NEIIGHBORS
KNOW OR THAT TA POWER HAS NOT SUCCESSFULLY DESCR BED TS' OPERAT ON TO TS'
KNOW,,OR THAT TAIIPOWERHAS NOT SUCCESSFULLY DESCRIIBED IITS'OPERATIION TO IITS'
NE GHBORS, OR THAT THERE S NOT ADEQUATE COMPENSAT ON FOR ANY D SADVANTAGES OF
NEIIGHBORS,OR THAT THERE IISNOT ADEQUATE COMPENSATIION FOR ANY DIISADVANTAGESOF
BE NG CLOSE TO A LARGE NDUSTRIAL FAC LITY. THE TEAM RA SED TH S QUEST ON AT EACH
BEIINGCLOSE TO A LARGE IINDUSTRIALFACIILITY. THE TEAM RAIISED THIISQUESTIIONAT EACH
OF THE V SITED POWER PLANTS AND ALSO RA SED T W TH TA POWER MANAGEMENT BUT
OF THE VIISITEDPOWER PLANTS,,AND ALSO RAIISED IITWIITHTAIIPOWERMANAGEMENT,,BUT
RECEIIVEDNO OBVIIOUSANSWER..
RECE VED NO OBV OUS ANSWER

        III.T.2   Public information about incidents.

        IIN ALL COUNTRIIES OF THE WORLD NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIIONS ARE SCRUTIINIIZED IIN
          N ALL COUNTR ES OF THE WORLD NUCLEAR POWER OPERAT ONS ARE SCRUT N ZED N
 MORE DETA L THAN GENERAL NDUSTRIAL OPERAT ONS. T S THEREFORE MPORTANT THAT
MORE DETAIILTHAN GENERAL IINDUSTRIALOPERATIIONS. IITIIS THEREFORE IIMPORTANTTHAT
 ALL CONCERNED WHICH NCLUDES BOTH TA POWER AND THE REGULATORY BRANCH OF
ALL CONCERNED ((WHICH IINCLUDESBOTH TAIIPOWERAND THE REGULATORY BRANCH OF
ROCAEC)) LEARN HOW TO PROVIIDE SIIMPLE YET ACCURATE AND RELIIABLE IINFORMATIION TO
 ROCAEC LEARN HOW TO PROV DE S MPLE YET ACCURATE AND REL ABLE NFORMAT ON TO
 THE PUBL C, AND EXPLA N TS' S GNIFICANCE. THE CASES BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENT ON BY
THE PUBLIIC,AND EXPLAIINIITS'SIIGNIFICANCE. THE CASES BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENTIIONBY
 MEMBERS OF THE PUBL C N APPEND CES V G.1 TO V G.5 RA SE SOME SSUES.
MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIIC IINAPPENDIICESV..G.1 TO V..G.5RAIISESOME IISSUES. IINPARTIICULAR
                                                                          N PART CULAR
 T SEEMS THAT THE TA POWER RESPONSE TO LEG TIMATE QUEST ONS BY MEMBERS OF THE
IITSEEMS THAT THE TAIIPOWERRESPONSE TO LEGIITIMATEQUESTIIONSBY MEMBERS OF THE
 PUBL C WAS NADEQUATE.        T WAS TOO L TTLE, AND NOT SUSTA NED.
PUBLIICWAS IINADEQUATE. IITWAS TOO LIITTLE,AND NOT SUSTAIINED.


        The radioactivity releases at CHINSHAN in 1985/6 illustrate the weaknesses most
clearly. Questions rarely come from the public in simple forms, and addressed to the right
person; however they need a response anyway.

       THE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM WHO VIISIITED CHIINSHAN,,WIITH ADVANCE NOTIICE
        THE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM WHO V S TED CH NSHAN W TH ADVANCE NOT CE
 THAT THEY W SHED TO STUDY TH S QUEST ON, D D NOT GET CLEAR DESCR PTIONS FROM THE
THAT THEY WIISHED TO STUDY THIISQUESTIION,DIID NOT GET CLEAR DESCRIIPTIONS FROM THE
STAFF MOST CONCERNED --THE HEALTH PHYSIICSSTAFF.. IINDEED IINFORMATIONWAS AT FIIRST
 STAFF MOST CONCERNED THE HEALTH PHYS CS STAFF NDEED NFORMATION WAS AT F RST
PROVIIDED THAT THE TWO VIISITINGTEAM MEMBERS IIMMEDIATELYQUESTIIONEDAS UNUSUAL;;
 PROV DED THAT THE TWO V SITING TEAM MEMBERS MMEDIATELY QUEST ONED AS UNUSUAL
IITWAS LATER FOUND TO BE IINERROR.. IIFEXPERIIENCEDSCIIENTISTS WERE MIISINFORMEDAFTER
 T WAS LATER FOUND TO BE N ERROR F EXPER ENCED SC ENTISTS WERE M SINFORMED AFTER
 ADVANCE NOT CE, HOW MUCH MORE L KELY S T THAT A MEMBER OF THE PUBL C GETS
ADVANCE NOTIICE,HOW MUCH MORE LIIKELY IIS IIT THAT A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIICGETS
 NCORRECT NFORMATION, OR ALMOST AS BAD NFORMATION THAT CAN BE M SINTERPRETED?
IINCORRECTIINFORMATION,OR ALMOST AS BAD,, IINFORMATION THAT CAN BE MIISINTERPRETED?


        III.T.3 Recommendations

        ((1)) TAIIPOWER SHOULD APPOIINT A SPECIIAL IINDIIVIIDUAL AT HIIGH LEVEL,,TO DEAL
          1 TA POWER SHOULD APPO NT A SPEC AL ND V DUAL AT H GH LEVEL TO DEAL
EXCLUS VELY W TH MATTERS RELAT NG TO THE NE GHBORING PUBL C AS WELL AS TO THE WELL
EXCLUSIIVELY WIITHMATTERS RELATIINGTO THE NEIIGHBORING PUBLIICAS WELL AS TO THE WELL
BEIINGOF THE POPULATIIONOF TAIIWANAS A WHOLE..
BE NG OF THE POPULAT ON OF TA WAN AS A WHOLE

         (2) "Openness" is always the best policy. The time has gone, if indeed it ever came,
when it was possible to carry out a successful policy in secret. Therefore regular reports
regarding environmental, public health and safety issues should be published and made
available on a timely basis to the public.
REAL--TIIME MONIITORIING OF RADIIATIION SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED IIN THE NEIIGHBORHOOD OF THE
REAL T ME MON TOR NG OF RAD AT ON SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED N THE NE GHBORHOOD OF THE
POWER PLANTS..
POWER PLANTS

      (3) Each and every employee must be made aware, by information and training
programs, of the importance, yet the difficulty, of communicating to the public.

       ((4)) A DIIRECT,,CAREFUL AND DETAIILED PUBLIIC RESPONSE MUST BE MADE TO ANY QUERIIES
         4 A D RECT CAREFUL AND DETA LED PUBL C RESPONSE MUST BE MADE TO ANY QUER ES
OR COMMENTS BY THE AUTHOR TIES OF ANY LOCAL TY N WH CH A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT S
OR COMMENTS BY THE AUTHORIITIES OF ANY LOCALIITY IINWHIICHA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IIS
LOCATED.. THIIS PARTIICULARLYAPPLIIES TO THE URGENT NEED FOR A RESPONSE TO THE
LOCATED     TH S PART CULARLY APPL ES TO THE URGENT NEED FOR A RESPONSE TO THE
QUEST ONS RA SED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TA PEI D STRICT, N WH CH KUOSHENG AND
QUESTIIONS RAIISEDBY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TAIIPEIDIISTRICT,IIN WHIICHKUOSHENG AND
CHIINSHAN ARE LOCATED,,AND WHERE THE SIITE IIS LOCATED FOR THE PROPOSED YENLIIAO
CH NSHAN ARE LOCATED AND WHERE THE S TE S LOCATED FOR THE PROPOSED YENL AO
PLANT THE TEAM REFERRED TO THE TA PEI D STRICT'S SSUES N THE NTRODUCTION TO TH S
PLANT..THE TEAM REFERRED TO THE TAIIPEIDIISTRICT'S IISSUES IINTHE IINTRODUCTIONTO THIIS
REPORT..
REPORT

       (5) Since the best proponents of a nuclear power plant are the enthusiastic
employees of the plant, and their families, TAIPOWER employees should be encouraged by
appropriate incentives to live near the power plants whenever possible, and priorities should
be established for hiring local personnel and contractors.

       ((6)) EMPLOYEES OF TAIIPOWER AT ALL LEVELS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO ATTEND
         6 EMPLOYEES OF TA POWER AT ALL LEVELS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO ATTEND
LOCAL MEET NGS WHEN ENV RONMENTAL AND OTHER SSUES OF PUBL C CONCERN ARE D SCUSSED,
LOCAL MEETIINGS WHEN ENVIIRONMENTALAND OTHER IISSUES OF PUBLIICCONCERN ARE DIISCUSSED,
TO HELP TO ESTABL SH A COMMUN CATION BR DGE W TH THE PUBL C. TH S MUST BE A TWO WAY
TO HELP TO ESTABLIISHA COMMUNIICATIONBRIIDGEWIITHTHE PUBLIIC. THIIS MUST BE A TWO WAY
BR DGE: TA POWER MUST SHOW TS W LLINGNESS TO L STEN TO THE PUBL C AS WELL AS TO
BRIIDGE:TAIIPOWERMUST SHOW IITS WIILLINGNESS TO LIISTENTO THE PUBLIICAS WELL AS TO
LECTURE TO THEM..
LECTURE TO THEM
        (7) TAIPOWER must recognize that communicating with the public is not
straightforward or easy. A sustained program of communication is necessary. Patience
and humility on the part of the communicating official is vital. The public needs to be
brought into the decision process about alternative policies early enough to influence them.

        ((8)) THE IINSTRUMENTS FOR COMMUNIICATIING WIITH THE PUBLIIC NEED TO BE ADAPTED FOR
          8 THE NSTRUMENTS FOR COMMUN CAT NG W TH THE PUBL C NEED TO BE ADAPTED FOR
      FFERENT TARGET GROUPS OF THE PUBL C: SC ENTISTS AND ENG NEERS; OTHER ACADEM CS;
THE DIIFFERENTTARGET GROUPS OF THE PUBLIIC:SCIIENTISTS AND ENGIINEERS; OTHER ACADEMIICS;
THE D
LEG SLATORS; NE GHBORS OF POWER PLANTS ETC NO GROUP SHOULD BE GNORED.
LEGIISLATORS;NEIIGHBORS OF POWER PLANTS ETC.. NO GROUP SHOULD BE IIGNORED.


        (9) TAIPOWER should consider giving scholarships for pupils from the
neighborhood of the power plants to study and pave a way for working with TAIPOWER as a
life-long career. TAIPOWER should also consider encouraging employees of the power
plants to help in special programs for educating local pupils about science generally, and
nuclear energy and the uses and effects of radiation in particular.

       ((10))ONE PARTIICULAR ENVIIRONMENTAL IISSUE DEMANDS PUBLIIC PARTIICIIPATIION::AT
         10 ONE PART CULAR ENV RONMENTAL SSUE DEMANDS PUBL C PART C PAT ON AT
MAANSHAN,,THE HEATED WATER DIISCHARGE KIILLS A SMALL AMOUNT OF THE CORAL IIN THE
MAANSHAN THE HEATED WATER D SCHARGE K LLS A SMALL AMOUNT OF THE CORAL N THE
SUMMER MONTHS.. ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE THE TEMPERATURE OF THE DIISCHARGEBY SPRAYS HAVE
SUMMER MONTHS       ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE THE TEMPERATURE OF THE D SCHARGE BY SPRAYS HAVE
BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL.. OTHER SOLUTIIONS SUCH AS A 3 MIILELONG PIIPEGOIING OUT TO SEA,,SUCH
BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL OTHER SOLUT ONS SUCH AS A 3 M LE LONG P PE GO NG OUT TO SEA SUCH
AS WAS ADOPTED AT SEABROOK NEW HAMPSH RE, ARE POSS BLE BUT EXPENS VE AND MAY HAVE
AS WAS ADOPTED AT SEABROOK,,NEW HAMPSHIIRE,ARE POSSIIBLEBUT EXPENSIIVE AND MAY HAVE
OTHER PROBLEMS..
OTHER PROBLEMS
       (11) Employees of TAIPOWER, at all levels, should pay more attention to the method
of releasing data of public concern. These include: waste discharge, gaseous releases,
amount of solid waste generated in each particular plant, and so forth. These employees
should all understand the meaning of the measurements and the methods of derivation of the
data. In meeting the necessary requirement of a timely release of preliminary data, labels
such as "DRAFT REPORT NOT FOR QUOTATION" should always be used, to avoid
confusion and misquotation.

       (12) TAIPOWER should involve the public with its' decision making as soon as that is
appropriate. Possible areas for public participation include the final site selection for a
low-level waste repository, discussed in III.M.6.
III.U   LOAD MANAGEMENT

       AMONG PUBLIIC COMMENTS,,THE TEAM HAS NOTED STRONG REACTIION TO THE FACT
       AMONG PUBL C COMMENTS THE TEAM HAS NOTED STRONG REACT ON TO THE FACT
THAT A SCRAM OF A NUCLEAR UNIITWAS VERY OFTEN ACCOMPANIIEDBY BLACK--OUTSOF SOME
THAT A SCRAM OF A NUCLEAR UN T WAS VERY OFTEN ACCOMPAN ED BY BLACK OUTS OF SOME
AREAS OF THE COUNTRY..
AREAS OF THE COUNTRY

        The TEAM has observed that TAIPOWER was at this time operating with a very low
reserve electricity generating capacity, much below what is considered as a good operating
practice. This was due to delay in the ordering and installation of new generating capacity,
and a high increase of consumption over the years (8.4% annual average in the last four
years). Black-outs were then a logical consequence.

       One way to cope with such a situation is to try to reduce the peak of the consumption
by load management; new plant installation and demand side management have to be
optimized in order to minimize power shortage and to increase utilization.

        Good planning should take the two factors into account and also incorporate the
increasing duration of any inplementation
DUE TO ENV RONMENTAL, ADM NISTRATIVE AND PUBL C ACCEPTANCE PROBLEM
DUE TO ENVIIRONMENTAL, ADMIINISTRATIVEAND PUBLIICACCEPTANCE PROBLEM..


        Great attention has also to be given to the verification of the grid behavior and
response in all conditions, and the availability of the smaller units should be kept under
scrutiny as they might play an important role.

       THE TEAM HAS NOTIICED THAT TAIIPOWER WAS VERY CONSCIIOUS OF THE PROBLEM
        THE TEAM HAS NOT CED THAT TA POWER WAS VERY CONSC OUS OF THE PROBLEM
AND HAD STARTED SEVERAL ACT ONS, AMONG WH CH AN MPROVEMENT OF THE RELAT ON
AND HAD STARTED SEVERAL ACTIIONS,AMONG WHIICHAN IIMPROVEMENTOF THE RELATIION
W TH THE CUSTOMERS AND NITIATION OF PROGRAMS TO BETTER MEET THE THE R NEEDS AND
WIITH THE CUSTOMERS AND IINITIATIONOF PROGRAMS TO BETTER MEET THE THEIIRNEEDS AND
TO DEVELOP NCENTIVES FOR THEM TO AD UST THE R CONSUMPT ON.
TO DEVELOP IINCENTIVES FOR THEM TO ADJJUSTTHEIIRCONSUMPTIION.


        The TEAM agrees with the TAIPOWER conclusion that load management is the best
way to equilibrate the system peak and off-peak loads, that a variety of load management
measures must be carefully implemented, and that the effect may accumulate gradually.
However load management by itself should not be expected to be a panacea to the present
situation; therefore additional electricity generating capacity is unavoidable.
IIV..
  V      OVERALL EVALUATIION AND RECOMMENDATIIONS
         OVERALL EVALUAT ON AND RECOMMENDAT ONS

IV.A THE PRESENT STATUS OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS

         THE TEAM HAS DEVOTED TS T ME N TA W AN TO TRY TO EVALUATE TA POWER
         THE TEAM HAS DEVOTED IITS''TIIME IIN TAIIWAN TO TRY TO EVALUATE TAIIPOWER
    VITIES N THE ENV RONMENT OF THE R O.C. CHARACTER ZED BY SOME VERY SPEC FIC
ACTIIVITIES IIN THE ENVIIRONMENTOF THE R..O.C.CHARACTERIIZEDBY SOME VERY SPECIIFIC
ACT
ASPECTS AN SOLATED SLAND, PECUL AR GEOGRAPHY W TH CONSUMPT ON AREAS AT BOTH
ASPECTS::AN IISOLATED IISLAND,PECULIIARGEOGRAPHY WIITHCONSUMPTIION AREAS AT BOTH
ENDS,, LONG HIIGHVOLTAGE LIINESBETWEEN THE TWO,,VULNERABIILITY TO TYPHOONS,,A VERY
ENDS LONG H GH VOLTAGE L NES BETWEEN THE TWO VULNERAB LITY TO TYPHOONS A VERY
H GH NCREASE OF ELECTR CITY CONSUMPT ON, AND ONE UN QUE UT LITY THAT S SUB ECT TO
HIIGH IINCREASEOF ELECTRIICITYCONSUMPTIION,AND ONE UNIIQUEUTIILITY THAT IISSUBJJECTTO
SOME CR TICISM FROM THE MED A AND THE PUBL C.
SOME CRIITICISM FROM THE MEDIIAAND THE PUBLIIC.


        What the TEAM has seen is reassuring. The management of TAIPOWER is aware
of most of the strengths and weaknesses and shows a strong determination to improve and
become equal to the best nuclear power operators in the world. Already, the performance
indicators for TAIPOWER's nuclear power plants shown in section III.A, are comparable
with those of nuclear power plants in the rest of the world and demonstrate that TAIPOWER
has arrived at an acceptable level of competence. The trend of the performance indicators
show that there is improvement (section III.K).

             THE PR NC PAL SOURCE OF WEAKNESS N TA P OWER S AN NAB L TY TO
             THE PRIINCIIPAL SOURCE OF WEAKNESS IIN TAIIPOWER IIS AN IINABIILIITY TO
 COMMUN CATE WELL BOTH W THIN TA POWER, AND BETWEEN TA POWER AND THE
COMMUNIICATE WELL,,BOTH WIITHINTAIIPOWER,AND BETWEEN TAIIPOWERAND THE
GOVERNMENT OR THE PUBLIIC..THE PROBLEM SHOWS UP IIN MANY WAYS AND PARTIICULARLY
 GOVERNMENT OR THE PUBL C THE PROBLEM SHOWS UP N MANY WAYS AND PART CULARLY
 APPEARS N SECT ON II.B.1, II.C, II.D.2, II.J.3, II.K.3, II.T FOR COMMUN CATION W THIN
APPEARS IINSECTIION IIII.B.1, IIII.C, IIII.D.2, IIII.J.3, IIII.K.3, IIII.T FOR COMMUNIICATION WIITHIN
 TA P OWER AND N SECT ON
TAIIPOWER,,AND IIN SECTIION II,, IIIIII..A..2,, IIIIII..B..2,, IIIIII..J..3,,IIIIII..T FOR COMMUNIICATIION WIITH THE
                                         A2             B2             J3            T FOR COMMUN CAT ON W TH THE
OTHERS..AS A CONSEQUENCE,, THIISHAS LED TO A FAIILUREOF ALL PERSONNEL,, IINCLUDING
 OTHERS AS A CONSEQUENCE TH S HAS LED TO A FA LURE OF ALL PERSONNEL NCLUDING
 CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL TO FULLY COMPREHEND THE SAFETY CULTURE III.C AND
CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL,,TO FULLY COMPREHEND THE SAFETY CULTURE ((III.CAND
 D SCUSSED AGA N N II.H). T S A MA OR SOURCE OF M SUNDERSTANDINGS BY THE PUBL C
DIISCUSSEDAGAIIN IIN IIII.H). IIT IISA MAJJORSOURCE OF MIISUNDERSTANDINGS BY THE PUBLIIC
((IIIIII..T AND AS IILLUSTRATED IIN APPENDIIX V..G))..FOR HOW CAN TAIIPOWER EXPLAIIN TO
          T AND AS LLUSTRATED N APPEND X V G FOR HOW CAN TA POWER EXPLA N TO
 OTHERS WHAT T FA LS TO EXPLA N TO TSELF?
OTHERS WHAT IITFAIILS TO EXPLAIIN TO IITSELF?


        The decision structure in TAIPOWER seems to be too centralized, both in the Head
office, and in the superintendents not delegating adequately to their staff (section III.D).
Such an approach was mandatory during the phase of rapid development of the nuclear
energy program of the country. The TEAM estimates, however, that the time has now come
to delegate more power and responsibilities to the sites and to the various levels of the
organization, in such a way that good communication and coordination are developed and
maintained, with enough flexibility.

               A CERTAIIN LACK OF FLEXIIBIILIITY WAS NOTIICED BY THE TEAM AT ALL LEVELS IIN
               A CERTA N LACK OF FLEX B L TY WAS NOT CED BY THE TEAM AT ALL LEVELS N
          P OWER TH S SHOWS UP N THE LONG T ME TAKEN TO MPLEMENT RECOMMENDAT ONS
TAIIPOWER.. THIIS SHOWS UP IIN THE LONG TIIME TAKEN TO IIMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIIONS
 TA
((IIIIII..B));;A FAIILURE TO PUSH ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIIS TO THE ULTIIMATE CAUSE ((IIIIII..K))AND A
          B A FA LURE TO PUSH ROOT CAUSE ANALYS S TO THE ULT MATE CAUSE                 K AND A
FA LURE TO AD UST THE SCHEDULE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF TASKS THAT WERE COMPLETED MORE
FAIILURE TO ADJJUSTTHE SCHEDULE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF TASKS THAT WERE COMPLETED MORE
RAP DLY THAN ANT CIPATED. III.L) THE TEAM EMPHAS ZES ALSO THE MPORTANCE OF
RAPIIDLY THAN ANTIICIPATED.((III.L) THE TEAM EMPHASIIZESALSO THE IIMPORTANCEOF
FLEX BILITY N OPERAT ON, AND OF TRA NING OPERATORS TO BE FLEX BLE, SO THAT THEY CAN
FLEXIIBILITY IINOPERATIION,AND OF TRAIININGOPERATORS TO BE FLEXIIBLE,SO THAT THEY CAN
RESPOND TO UNANT CIPATED EVENTS III.D).
RESPOND TO UNANTIICIPATEDEVENTS ((III.D).


         Personnel seem to be good at following written procedures and instructions but not so
good at understanding the purpose of the instructions, the "whys and wherefores". For
example, the essential condition for a safety culture is a commitment freely agreed upon by
all (section III.C). No one can make a free commitment without understanding.

         The TEAM had a limited opportunity only, to examine the role of the regulatory
authority (AEC) in the nuclear power operation (III.B.2). It notes that the role of the AEC is
developing and approves this trend, however the TEAM recommends that the independence
of the safety authority from the operating utility, TAIPOWER, be explained carefully and
frequently to the public and to the communication media.

       The TEAM was briefed by TAIPOWER on its' policy concerning radioactive waste
and disposal of spent fuel. It concurs with the present TAIPOWER position.

      THE TEAM CONSIIDERS THAT THE LAN--YU IINTERMEDIIATE LOW--LEVEL WASTE
       THE TEAM CONS DERS THAT THE LAN YU NTERMED ATE LOW LEVEL WASTE
STORAGE FACIILITY IISWELL RUN,,AND POSES A NEGLIIGIBLERIISKTO THE PUBLIICHEALTH AND TO
STORAGE FAC LITY S WELL RUN AND POSES A NEGL GIBLE R SK TO THE PUBL C HEALTH AND TO
THE ENV RONMENT.
THE ENVIIRONMENT.


        The TEAM was also informed of the approach presently taken by TAIPOWER for
load management, and noticed its' awareness of the importance of the problem to cope with
one of the facets of power shortage.

       THE TEAM CONCLUDES THAT TAIIPOWER OPERATES IITS''NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
        THE TEAM CONCLUDES THAT TA POWER OPERATES TS NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
SAT SFACTORILY, AND F THE SSUES OF COMMUN CATION, FLEX BILITY OF THOUGHT AND
SATIISFACTORILY,AND IIFTHE IISSUESOF COMMUNIICATION, FLEXIIBILITYOF THOUGHT AND
ATTENT ON TO SAFETY CULTURE ARE PROPERLY ADDRESSED TA POWER HAS THE
ATTENTIION TO SAFETY CULTURE ARE PROPERLY ADDRESSED,, TAIIPOWERHAS THE
POTENT AL TO OIN THE GROUP OF VERY GOOD OPERATORS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS N THE
POTENTIIALTO JJOIN THE GROUP OF VERY GOOD OPERATORS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IIN THE
WORLD..
WORLD
       IV.B            AREAS FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION

       THE TEAM DEVOTED IITS''TIIME TO THE ASPECTS THAT THE MEMBERS FELT TO BE THE
       THE TEAM DEVOTED TS T ME TO THE ASPECTS THAT THE MEMBERS FELT TO BE THE
      MPORTANT. DUR NG THE NVESTIGATION THE TEAM D SCOVERED OTHER AREAS
MOST IIMPORTANT. DURIING THE IINVESTIGATION THE TEAM DIISCOVEREDOTHER AREAS
MOST
WHERE A FURTHER NVESTIGATION, N MORE DETA L, W THIN TA POWER OR POSS BLY W TH
WHERE A FURTHER IINVESTIGATION, IIN MORE DETAIIL, WIITHINTAIIPOWEROR POSSIIBLYWIITH
SOME EXTERNAL SUPPORT MAY BE BENEF CIAL.
SOME EXTERNAL SUPPORT,, MAY BE BENEFIICIAL.


       IV.B.1 Water Chemistry (Section III.F.2)

       THIIS IIS A MAJJOR IISSUE IIN ORDER TO PREVENT LEAKAGE OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBES
        TH S S A MA OR SSUE N ORDER TO PREVENT LEAKAGE OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBES
((FOR PWRS))AND CORROSIION OF SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS ((FOR BOTH
  FOR PWRS AND CORROS ON OF SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS FOR BOTH
PWRS AND BWRS)).. THERE SHOULD BE A DETAIILED STUDY OF WHY THE CHEMIISTRY IINDEX
 PWRS AND BWRS THERE SHOULD BE A DETA LED STUDY OF WHY THE CHEM STRY NDEX
FOR THE BWRS AND PWRS IISWORSE THAN THE WORLD AVERAGE..THE TEAM SUGGESTS THAT
 FOR THE BWRS AND PWRS S WORSE THAN THE WORLD AVERAGE THE TEAM SUGGESTS THAT
 TA P OWER NCREASE CONTACTS W TH NPP OPERATORS AND NPO
TAIIPOWER IINCREASE CONTACTS WIITH NPP OPERATORS AND IINPO..

       IV.B.2 Operator and Maintenance Training (Section III.D.5 and III.M.5)

       THIIS HAS AN EXTREME IIMPORTANCE IIN THE LONG TERM..THE TEAM RECOMMENDS
       TH S HAS AN EXTREME MPORTANCE N THE LONG TERM THE TEAM RECOMMENDS
THAT A DETAIILEDREVIIEWOF THE WHOLE TRAIININGPROCESS,,IINCLUDINGHUMAN ASPECTS,,BE
THAT A DETA LED REV EW OF THE WHOLE TRA NING PROCESS NCLUDING HUMAN ASPECTS BE
UNDERTAKEN.. THIISREVIIEWCOULD USEFULLY BE PERFORMED WIITH THE SUPPORT OF SOME
UNDERTAKEN       TH S REV EW COULD USEFULLY BE PERFORMED W TH THE SUPPORT OF SOME
COMPETENT NTERNATIONAL ORGAN ZATION.
COMPETENT IINTERNATIONALORGANIIZATION.


       IV.B.3 Outage Duration Improvement (Section III.L)

             THE OUTAGES HAVE A LONG DURATIION WHEN COMPARED WIITH THE WORLD AVERAGE
              THE OUTAGES HAVE A LONG DURAT ON WHEN COMPARED W TH THE WORLD AVERAGE
((IIIIII..L))AND IIN PARTIICULAR EUROPEAN EXPERIIENCE.. THE TEAM HAS NOTIICED THE
          L AND N PART CULAR EUROPEAN EXPER ENCE THE TEAM HAS NOT CED THE
 MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN BY TA POWER AND TS' W LLINGNESS TO CONT NUE ASK NG THE
MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN BY TAIIPOWER AND IITS'WIILLINGNESS TO CONTIINUEASKIING THE
 HELP OF NPO.
HELP OF IINPO.


       IV.B.4 Fuel Cycle Management

        This subject has important bearings on the overall results of the plant operation.
Therefore the TEAM encourages TAIPOWER and ROCAEC to devote the necessary
attention to the various aspects of this topic.

       IIV..B..5 DOCUMENTATIION
         V B 5 DOCUMENTAT ON

        Documentation is important throughout the whole system. It is important that anyone
who needs, be able to find out the state of the hardware; the operations; the radioactivity
releases; the radiation levels; and so forth. A detailed documentation, including computer
retrieval, is needed to operate nuclear power plants. The TEAM only examined the
documentation briefly and is unable, partly because of a language problem, to reach a
conclusion. It advises TAIPOWER to look closely at this question.

       IIV..B..6 RADIIOACTIIVIITY AND RADIIATIION MEASUREMENTS
         V B 6 RAD OACT V TY AND RAD AT ON MEASUREMENTS

        During presentations made by TAIPOWER and ROCAEC it was not clear what some
of the radioactivity and radiation measurements meant, and some were certainly not presented
well. This is important, because this is the "bottom line" in presenting the situation to the
public.

       IIV..B..7 REGULATIION
         V B 7 REGULAT ON
       The TEAM did not fully evaluate the interactions between ROCAEC and
TAIPOWER. This should, however, be a continuing concern of the government as it is a
continuing concern of the people in TAIWAN.
V
V      APPEND C ES
       APPENDIICES

V.A MEMBERS of the TEAM to EVALUATE NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS

RIICHARD WIILSON,, TEAM LEADER
R CHARD W LSON TEAM LEADER
Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics,
HARVARD UNIIVERSIITY
HARVARD UN VERS TY
Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA

KENZO AMOH
KENZO AMOH
Toshiba Corporation
8,,SHIINSUGIITA--CHO,,IISOGO--KU
8 SH NSUG TA CHO SOGO KU
Yokohama 235,
JAPAN
JAPAN

 Jen Chang Chou
IINSTIITUTE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY RESEARCH ((IINER))
  NST TUTE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY RESEARCH NER
 Lung Tan, 32500
REPUBLIIC OF CHIINA
 REPUBL C OF CH NA

Dr Chou's place was taken by Dr Chen Yi-bin at the same address during October 1992 and
after February 1992.

PAUL DOZIINEL
PAUL DOZ NEL
Electrabel
BOULEVARD DU REGENT 8
BOULEVARD DU REGENT 8
B 1000 Brussels
BELGIIUM
BELG UM

Henri Guimbail
ELECTRIICIITE DE FRANCE,, SPT
ELECTR C TE DE FRANCE SPT
Quartier Michelet: Esplanade Charles de Gaulle
CEDEX 57,,92060,,PARIIS LA DEFENSE
CEDEX 57 92060 PAR S LA DEFENSE
France

TOHRU HASEGAWA
TOHRU HASEGAWA
Hitachi Engineering and Services Ltd
HIITACHII--SHII,,OHMIIKA--CHO 5--2--3
H TACH SH OHM KA CHO 5 2 3
Ibaraki-ken
319--12 JAPAN
319 12 JAPAN

       The addresses are given for identification only and do not imply any commitment of
the organizations.
V..B
VB               REPORTS AVAIILABLE TO THE TEAM
                 REPORTS AVA LABLE TO THE TEAM

       V.B.1      TAIPOWER Reports

         TA P OWER NUCLEAR POWER OPERAT O NS SEPTEMBER 1991
       --TAIIPOWER NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIIONS //SEPTEMBER 1991
 - TAIPOWER NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS / October 1991
--KUOSHENG NPP OPERATIION AND MAIINTENANCE PROGRAM AUGUST 1991
   KUOSHENG NPP OPERAT ON AND MA NTENANCE PROGRAM AUGUST 1991
 - MAANSHAN NPP OPERATION REPORT / 7 October 1991
   CH N SHAN NPP SAFETY OPERAT ON AND MA N TENANCE PROGRAM OCTOBER
--CHIIN--SHAN NPP SAFETY OPERATIION AND MAIINTENANCE PROGRAM OCTOBER
1991
 1991
 - ESSENTIAL OF NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN OF TAIPOWER EP-005
 March 1986


       V..B..2
       VB2            AEC REPORTS
                      AEC REPORTS

      - THE ATOMIC ENERGY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
   SAFETY REGULAT ON OF NPP N THE REPUBL C OF CH NA 1991 OCTOBER 3
--SAFETY REGULATIION OF NPP IINTHE REPUBLIIC OF CHIINA//1991 OCTOBER 3
 - NUCLEAR LAWS AND REGULATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
   PROBAB L ST C R S K ASSESSMENT
--PROBABIILIISTIIC RIISK ASSESSMENT::
            FOR KUOSHENG NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 1
   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND VOLUMES 1-4/JULY 1985
   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND VOLUMES 1-4/JULY 1985
              FOR MAANSHAN NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 1
               EXECUT V E SUMMARY AND VOLUMES 1 4 OCTOBER 1987
               EXECUTIIVE SUMMARY AND VOLUMES 1--4//OCTOBER 1987
              FOR CHIN-SHAN NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 1
               DRAFT EXECUTIIVE SUMMARY //SEPTEMBER 1991
               DRAFT EXECUT VE SUMMARY SEPTEMBER 1991
      - REVIEW SUMMARY OF Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) ON THE
      YENLIAO NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT / September 1991

       V..B..3
       VB3            OTHER REPORTS
                      OTHER REPORTS

         - REPORT OF THE NUCLEAR SAFETY PANEL TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY
         COUNCIL (KOUTS Panel) July 8, 1988
          WANO TC TECHN C AL EXCHANGE V S T REPORT 1991 JULY 30
       --WANO--TC TECHNIICAL EXCHANGE VIISIIT REPORT //1991,,JULY 30
 - INPO REPORT ON ASSISTANCE VISIT / December 5, 1983
    NPO MEMORANDUM ON TECHN C AL EXCHANGE V S T TO KS AND MS NPPS
--IINPO MEMORANDUM ON TECHNIICAL EXCHANGE VIISIIT TO KS AND MS NPPS//
MAY 16,,1985
 MAY 16 1985
 - INPO MEMORANDUM ON TECHNICAL EXCHANGE VISIT TO TP FIRST NPP/
 August 22, 1986
    NPO MEMORANDUM ON TECHN C AL EXCHANGE V S T TO MS AND KS NPPS
--IINPO MEMORANDUM ON TECHNIICAL EXCHANGE VIISIIT TO MS AND KS NPPS//
JUNE 30,,1987
 JUNE 30 1987
 - INPO MEMORANDUM ON TECHNICAL EXCHANGE VISIT TO TP
 HEADQUARTERS AND CS NPP/ June 28, 1988
    NPO MEMORANDUM ON ASS S TANCE V S T TO MS AND KS NPPS
--IINPO MEMORANDUM ON ASSIISTANCE VIISIITTO MS AND KS NPPS
         August 29, 1989
            NPO MEMORANDUM ON TECHN C AL EXCHANGE V S T TO CS NPP
       --IINPO MEMORANDUM ON TECHNIICAL EXCHANGE VIISIIT TO CS NPP
         February 19, 1991
           N PO MEMORANDUM ON TECHN C AL EXCHANGE V S T TO KS NPP AND
       -- IINPO MEMORANDUM ON TECHNIICAL EXCHANGE VIISIIT TO KS NPP AND
       HUMAN PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT SYSTEM COURSE// SEPTEMBER 5,,
        HUMAN PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT SYSTEM COURSE SEPTEMBER 5
       1991
        1991
V.C            SCHEDULE, VISITS and PRESENTATIONS

      THE TEAM ASSEMBLED IIN TAIIPEIION OCTOBER 1ST 1991 FOR A 9 DAY GENERAL VIISIIT,,
       THE TEAM ASSEMBLED N TA PE ON OCTOBER 1ST 1991 FOR A 9 DAY GENERAL V S T
REASSEMBLED NOVEMBER 28TH 1991 FOR A 10 DAY VIISITAND ASSEMBLED AGAIINON MARCH
REASSEMBLED NOVEMBER 28TH 1991 FOR A 10 DAY V SIT AND ASSEMBLED AGA N ON MARCH
23RD 1992 FOR A 6 DAY VIISIIT..
23RD 1992 FOR A 6 DAY V S T
Some members were also present at other times.

      DURIING IITS STAYS IIN TAIIWAN,,SEVERAL VIISIITS WERE MADE,,AND PRESENTATIIONS
      DUR NG TS STAYS N TA WAN SEVERAL V S TS WERE MADE AND PRESENTAT ONS
WERE MADE TO THE TEAM.. THE FOLLOWIINGARE PARTIICULARLYNOTEWORTHY::
WERE MADE TO THE TEAM THE FOLLOW NG ARE PART CULARLY NOTEWORTHY



October 1991

--2 AND 3 ((AM))::GENERAL PRESENTATIION BY TAIIPOWER AT CNC OFFIICE;;
   2 AND 3 AM GENERAL PRESENTAT ON BY TA POWER AT CNC OFF CE
 - 3 (pm): Presentation by Dr. HSIA ROCAEC at CNC office;
--4::AT KUOSHENG PLANT,,PRESENTATIION BY PLANT SUPERIINTENDENT AND HIIS STAFF TO
   4 AT KUOSHENG PLANT PRESENTAT ON BY PLANT SUPER NTENDENT AND H S STAFF TO
 ALL TEAM EXCEPT J C CHOU
ALL TEAM EXCEPT J..C CHOU;;
 - 7: At MAANSHAN Plant, presentation by Plant Superintendent and his staff to all members
 except J.C CHOU;
--11 AND 12 ((AM))::AT KUOSHENG PLANT,,PRESENTATIION BY PLANT SUPERIINTENDENT AND
   11 AND 12 AM AT KUOSHENG PLANT PRESENTAT ON BY PLANT SUPER NTENDENT AND
HIISSTAFF TO K..AMOH AND T..HASEGAWA;;
 H S STAFF TO K AMOH AND T HASEGAWA
 - 15 and 16 (am): At CHINSHAN Plant, presentation by Plant Superintendent and his staff to
 K. AMOH and T. HASEGAWA;
   17 PM AT TA P OWER TRA N NG CENTER PRESENTAT ON BY CENTER GENERAL MANAGER
--17 ((PM))::AT TAIIPOWER TRAIINIING CENTER,,PRESENTATIION BY CENTER GENERAL MANAGER
AND HIISSTAFF TO K..AMOH AND T..HASEGAWA..
 AND H S STAFF TO K AMOH AND T HASEGAWA



November 1991

--5 ((PM)),,6 AND 7::AT HEAD OFFIICE,,PRESENTATIION BY NQSD AND NED TO K..AMOH AND T..
   5 PM 6 AND 7 AT HEAD OFF CE PRESENTAT ON BY NQSD AND NED TO K AMOH AND T
HASEGAWA;;
 HASEGAWA
 - 26: At CHINSHAN Plant, presentation by Plant Superintendent and his staff on operation
 issues to Y-B CHEN and H. GUIMBAIL.


DECEMBER 1991
DECEMBER 1991

- 2: At CHINSHAN Plant, presentation by Plant Superintendent and his Radiation and
Chemistry staff to R. WILSON, P. DOZINEL and J.C CHOU.

MARCH 1992
MARCH 1992

 - 24: At CNC: presentation and answers to questions by TAIPOWER staff;.
--25::AT THE IINTERIIM LOW--LEVEL WASTE STORAGE FACIILIITY AT LAN--YU ((ORCHIID IISLAND)),,
   25 AT THE NTER M LOW LEVEL WASTE STORAGE FAC L TY AT LAN YU ORCH D SLAND
 PRESENTAT ON TO AND V SIT BY R W LSON;
PRESENTATIION TO AND VIISITBY R..WIILSON;
 - 25: Visit to headquarters, TAIPOWER, by H.GUIMBAIL.
V..D
VD     PUBL C COMMENTS RECE V ED BY THE TEAM
       PUBLIIC COMMENTS RECEIIVED BY THE TEAM

        Invitations to address the TEAM were sent by the TEAM leader to sixteen members
of the public believed to be interested in the nuclear energy program in Taiwan.

       THE TEAM RECEIIVED LETTERS DECLIINIING TO COOPERATE WIITH THE TEAM FROM::
       THE TEAM RECE VED LETTERS DECL N NG TO COOPERATE W TH THE TEAM FROM

       Professor K.L.Chang

       PROFESSOR LIIN JUN--YII
       PROFESSOR L N JUN Y


The TEAM received apologies of unavailability from:

       PROFESSOR KEN HSIIUNG CHANG
       PROFESSOR KEN HS UNG CHANG


The TEAM had oral presentations from:

       PROFESSOR GEORGE J..Y..HSU
       PROFESSOR GEORGE J Y HSU

       Mr J Fang


THE TEAM LEADER RECEIIVED,,AND PASSED ON,,TELEPHONE CALLS FROM::
THE TEAM LEADER RECE VED AND PASSED ON TELEPHONE CALLS FROM

       Professor Sue Lin Lewis

       DR W..S MA
       DR W S MA

The TEAM is grateful to these people for giving it some of their valuable time.
V..E
VE             DEFINITIONS OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
               DEFINITIONS OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS


               UNIT CAPABILITY FACTOR
               UNIT CAPABILITY FACTOR

       THE UNIIT CAPABIILIITY FACTOR IIS THE RATIIO OF THE AVAIILABLE ENERGY OVER A GIIVEN
       THE UN T CAPAB L TY FACTOR S THE RAT O OF THE AVA LABLE ENERGY OVER A G VEN
 T ME PER OD TO THE MAX MUM AMOUNT OF ENERGY WH CH COULD BE PRODUCED
TIIMEPERIIOD TO THE MAXIIMUMAMOUNT OF ENERGY WHIICHCOULD BE PRODUCED
((CONTIINUOUS OPERATIION OF MAXIIMUM CAPABIILIITY))OVER THE SAME PERIIOD,,WIITH THE UNIIT
  CONT NUOUS OPERAT ON OF MAX MUM CAPAB L TY OVER THE SAME PER OD W TH THE UN T
PRESUMED TO BE PERMANENTLY UNDER REFERENCE OPERATIINGCONDIITIONS ((PARTICULARLY
 PRESUMED TO BE PERMANENTLY UNDER REFERENCE OPERAT NG COND TIONS PARTICULARLY
 THE COOL NG WATER TEMPERATURE . AVA LABLE ENERGY S THE ENERGY THAT COULD HAVE
THE COOLIINGWATER TEMPERATURE)). AVAIILABLE ENERGY IIS THE ENERGY THAT COULD HAVE
 BEEN PRODUCED CONS DERING ONLY L MITATIONS W THIN THE CONTROL OF THE PLANT
BEEN PRODUCED CONSIIDERINGONLY LIIMITATIONS WIITHIN THE CONTROL OF THE PLANT
MANAGEMENT..
 MANAGEMENT

               AVAILABILITY FACTOR

        The Availability Factor (in time) is the ratio between the time in hours when the unit
is available to generate energy to the total number of hours in the period concerned.

               UNPLANNED CAPABILITY LOSS FACTOR
               UNPLANNED CAPABILITY LOSS FACTOR

       THE UNIIT UNPLANNED CAPABIILIITY LOSS FACTOR IIS THE RATIIO OF THE UNPLANNED
       THE UN T UNPLANNED CAPAB L TY LOSS FACTOR S THE RAT O OF THE UNPLANNED
       LABLE ENERGY ''UNPLANNED MEANS THAT THERE WAS LESS THAN FOUR WEEKS
UNAVAIILABLEENERGY ((UNPLANNED''MEANS THAT THERE WAS LESS THAN FOUR WEEKS
UNAVA
NOT CE) OVER A G VEN PER OD OF T ME, TO THE MAX MUM AMOUNT OF ENERGY WH CH COULD
NOTIICE)OVER A GIIVENPERIIODOF TIIME, TO THE MAXIIMUMAMOUNT OF ENERGY WHIICHCOULD
BE PRODUCED OVER THE SAME PER OD. THE UN T S PRESUMED TO BE PERMANENTLY UNDER
BE PRODUCED OVER THE SAME PERIIOD. THE UNIITIISPRESUMED TO BE PERMANENTLY UNDER
REFERENCE OPERAT NG COND TIONS, AND ONLY UNAVA LABILITY W THIN THE OPERATOR'S
REFERENCE OPERATIINGCONDIITIONS,AND ONLY UNAVAIILABILITYWIITHIN THE OPERATOR'S
CONTROL IIS TAKEN IINTO ACCOUNT..
CONTROL S TAKEN NTO ACCOUNT

               INDUSTRIAL SAFETY: ACCIDENT RATE

       The accident rate is the ratio of the number of accidents involving the Operator's
personnel assigned to the site under consideration (and involving at least one day of time off
work, beyond the day of the accident itself) to the total amount of work performed by the
personnel, expressed per million of hours worked.

               THERMAL PERFORMANCE

        Thermal performance compares the efficiency of the observed heat to electricity
conversion rate with that which would be observed on the same installation operating under
optimum (design) conditions, at a given power rating. This indicator is expressed as a
percentage (%), as it compares actual performance with the optimum performance on a
reactor under steady-state operating conditions.

               SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
               SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

       FOR EACH OF THE MOST IIMPORTANT SAFETY SYSTEMS,,THIIS IINDIICATOR ENABLES TO
        FOR EACH OF THE MOST MPORTANT SAFETY SYSTEMS TH S ND CATOR ENABLES TO
MONIITOR THE UNAVAIILABILITYOF THE COMPONENTS OF THESE SAFETY SYSTEMS.. IINSPIITEOF
MON TOR THE UNAVA LABILITY OF THE COMPONENTS OF THESE SAFETY SYSTEMS N SP TE OF
A SIIMPLIFIEDAPPROACH,,THE SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE IINDICATORPROVIIDESAN
A S MPLIFIED APPROACH THE SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE NDICATOR PROV DES AN
EXCELLENT MEANS OF EVALUAT NG AND OF DEMONSTRAT NG HOW SAFETY MARG NS ARE
EXCELLENT MEANS OF EVALUATIINGAND OF DEMONSTRATIINGHOW SAFETY MARGIINSARE
EVOLV NG.
EVOLVIING.


               UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC SCRAMS PER 7000 HOURS CRITICAL
        This indicator enables to monitor changes over time in      unplanned and automatic
(excluding any manual action) reactor scrams, expressed as a rate per 7000 hours critical in
order to take into account the different observed operating regimes.

              FUEL RELIABILITY
              FUEL RELIABILITY

        THIIS IINDIICATOR ENABLES THE MONIITORIING OF NUCLEAR FUEL RELIIABIILIITY,, NOT JJUST
        TH S ND CATOR ENABLES THE MON TOR NG OF NUCLEAR FUEL REL AB L TY NOT UST
  N TERMS OF MA NTAINING CLAD NTEGRITY, BUT ALSO THE ABSENCE OF F SSION PRODUCT
IIN TERMS OF MAIINTAINING CLAD IINTEGRITY, BUT ALSO THE ABSENCE OF FIISSION PRODUCT
 D SPERSION N THE ACT VITY OBSERVED N THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NORMAL ZED TO A
DIISPERSION IIN THE ACTIIVITY OBSERVED IIN THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM NORMALIIZED TO A
``REFERENCE''STATE OF OPERATIION FOR THE REACTOR..
  REFERENCE STATE OF OPERAT ON FOR THE REACTOR

              CHEMISTRY INDEX
              CHEMISTRY INDEX

       THE CHEMIISTRY IINDEX COMPARES THE CONCENTRATIIONS OF CERTAIIN IIMPURIITIIES TO
       THE CHEM STRY NDEX COMPARES THE CONCENTRAT ONS OF CERTA N MPUR T ES TO
THEIIRRESPECTIIVEREFERENCE VALUES,,DEPENDIINGON THE TYPE AND DESIIGNOF THE REACTOR..
THE R RESPECT VE REFERENCE VALUES DEPEND NG ON THE TYPE AND DES GN OF THE REACTOR
A CHANGE IIN THIIS IINDEX EXPRESSES A VARIIATIION IIN CHEMIICAL CONDIITIIONS DURIING SYSTEM
A CHANGE N TH S NDEX EXPRESSES A VAR AT ON N CHEM CAL COND T ONS DUR NG SYSTEM
OPERAT ON.
OPERATIION.


       This indicator uses a global approach and must be associated with complementary
analyses in order to judge potential corrosion risk.

       A LOW CHEMIISTRY IINDEX REPRESENTS A SUPERIIOR PERFORMANCE WHEN COMPARED
       A LOW CHEM STRY NDEX REPRESENTS A SUPER OR PERFORMANCE WHEN COMPARED
W TH A H GH CHEM STRY NDEX.
WIITHA HIIGHCHEMIISTRYIINDEX.

      FOR THE BWR THE IINDEX IIS EXPRESSED IIN MIICROCURIIES PER SECOND ((MEASURED IIN
       FOR THE BWR THE NDEX S EXPRESSED N M CROCUR ES PER SECOND MEASURED N
THE OFF GAS SYSTEM ; FOR THE PWR T S EXPRESSED N M CROCURIE PER GRAM NDICATING
THE OFF--GAS SYSTEM)); FOR THE PWR IIT IIS EXPRESSED IIN MIICROCURIE PER GRAM,, IINDICATING
                 131
THE ACTIIVITYOF II131
 THE ACT VITY OF
IIN THE PRIIMARYCOOLANT..
 N THE PR MARY COOLANT


               COLLECTIVE RADIATION EXPOSURE

      The collective radiation exposure is the cumulative total of all the individual doses,
measured over a given period of time, for all persons working in controlled areas.

              VOLUME OF LOW--LEVEL SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE
              VOLUME OF LOW LEVEL SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE

       THE VOLUME OF LOW--LEVEL SOLIID RADIIOACTIIVE WASTE IIS THE TOTAL VOLUME OF THE
        THE VOLUME OF LOW LEVEL SOL D RAD OACT VE WASTE S THE TOTAL VOLUME OF THE
CONTAIINERS TRANSPORTED FROM A NUCLEAR PRODUCTIIONSIITE TO A LONG--TERMSTORAGE
CONTA  NERS TRANSPORTED FROM A NUCLEAR PRODUCT ON S TE TO A LONG TERM STORAGE
AREA OVER A G VEN PER OD OF T ME. TH S NDICATOR ALLOWS TO MON TOR THE
AREA,,OVER A GIIVENPERIIODOF TIIME.THIIS IINDICATORALLOWS TO MONIITOR THE
EFFECT VENESS OF THE POL CY A MED AT REDUC NG THE AMOUNT OF SOL D RAD OACTIVE
EFFECTIIVENESSOF THE POLIICYAIIMEDAT REDUCIINGTHE AMOUNT OF SOLIID RADIIOACTIVE
WASTES..
WASTES
V.F     TEN-YEAR OPERATING LICENSE RENEWAL for NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS


        V..F..1 IINTRODUCTIION
        V F 1 NTRODUCT ON

        Although the designed life of current nuclear power plants is forty years, for safety
considerations, the operating license of all nuclear power plants issued by the Republic of
China Atomic Energy Council (ROCAEC) are validated for only ten years. Before the
operating license expires, the licensee must submit another safety assessment report to
reapply for the operating license. This practice provides an opportunity for both utility and
authority to thoroughly reexamine the operating history of nuclear power plant at the end of
each decade so that operating safety and public health can be further assured.

       THE FIIRST TEN--YEAR RELIICENSIING FOR CHIINSHAN UNIITS 1 AND 2 HAS BEEN
        THE F RST TEN YEAR REL CENS NG FOR CH NSHAN UN TS 1 AND 2 HAS BEEN
COMPLETED AND IIS IINPROGRESS FOR KUOSHENG UNIITS1 AND 2.. THE APPROACH OF
COMPLETED AND S N PROGRESS FOR KUOSHENG UN TS 1 AND 2 THE APPROACH OF
TEN--YEARRELIICENSING FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IIN THE REPUBLIICOF CHIINA IISA SPECIIAL
TEN YEAR REL CENSING FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS N THE REPUBL C OF CH NA S A SPEC AL
L CENSING PROCESS THAT ALSO EX STS N A FEW COUNTR ES N ALL THE WORLD AND HAS
LIICENSINGPROCESS THAT ALSO EXIISTS IINA FEW COUNTRIIES IINALL THE WORLD AND HAS
PROVED EFF CIENT.
PROVED EFFIICIENT.


        V.F.2 CHINSHAN First Ten-Year Relicensing

       THE ROCAEC AND TAIIPOWER WORKED TOGETHER TO IIDENTIIFY THE SPECIIFIIC IITEMS
       THE ROCAEC AND TA POWER WORKED TOGETHER TO DENT FY THE SPEC F C TEMS
TO BE ASSESSED FOR THE CHIINSHAN TEN--YEAR RELIICENSINGPROGRAM..
TO BE ASSESSED FOR THE CH NSHAN TEN YEAR REL CENSING PROGRAM

        The original operating licenses of CHINSHAN Units 1 and 2 expired by December 5,
1988 and July 15, 1989 respectively. The relicensing program started at the end of 1985.
The proposed program plan was submitted to the ROCAEC by October 1986 and approved
by June 1987. Beside the updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the safety assessment
report, which includes 23 subjects, was the principal relicensing application document.

        (a) Safety Assessment Program

            The safety assessment program for CHINSHAN ten-year relicensing includes several
 issues. The past ten years operating experiences and the current status to plan an integrated
 strategy for the operation of the next 10 years were reviewed. The abidance of the current
 status by new nuclear regulations and the conformity of the current status with design criteria
 were then evaluated. The whole program can be further categorized into eight areas:
           ((II))OPERATIION,,((IIII))MAIINTENANCE,,((IIIIII))TEST AND IINSPECTIION,,((IIV))RADIIATIION
                 OPERAT ON           MA NTENANCE             TEST AND NSPECT ON V RAD AT ON
                ON, V) LOW LEVEL RADWASTE MANAGEMENT VI) FUEL AND CORE MANAGEMENT
PROTECTIION,((V) LOW LEVEL RADWASTE MANAGEMENT,,((VI) FUEL AND CORE MANAGEMENT,,
 PROTECT
((VIIII))DESIIGN AND SAFETY IIMPROVEMENTS,,AND ((VIIIIII))IIMPLEMENTATIION OF ROCAEC'S
  V DES GN AND SAFETY MPROVEMENTS AND V                             MPLEMENTAT ON OF ROCAEC'S
 REQU REMENTS.
REQUIIREMENTS.
       (b) Review and Recommendations

       THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT REPORT OF CHIINSHAN UNIIT 1 RELIICENSIING WAS
       THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT REPORT OF CH NSHAN UN T 1 REL CENS NG WAS
SUBMIITTED TO THE ROCAEC ON JULY 1,,1988.. A TASK FORCE CONSIISTINGOF 37 MEMBERS OF
SUBM TTED TO THE ROCAEC ON JULY 1 1988 A TASK FORCE CONS STING OF 37 MEMBERS OF
NUCLEAR EXPERTS HAD BEEN SET UP TO PERFORM THE L CENSING REV EW.
NUCLEAR EXPERTS HAD BEEN SET--UP TO PERFORM THE LIICENSINGREVIIEW.


        The task force team completed their review by issuance of the Safety Evaluation
Report (SER) in November, 1988. In the SER, it was concluded that no significant safety
problem be identified for CHINSHAN unit 1 and the continuous operation in next decade was
justified. However, in order to further enhance the operation safety and reliability,
TAIPOWER was requested to implement corrective measures addressed in the SER within a
limited time frame.

       V..F..3 REGULATORY GUIIDELIINES FOR OPERATIING LIICENSE RENEWAL
       V F 3 REGULATORY GU DEL NES FOR OPERAT NG L CENSE RENEWAL

        Based on the experience of the CHINSHAN operating licenses renewal, the ROCAEC
issued a formal regulatory guideline for nuclear power plant operating license renewal in
February, 1990. Any operating license can be renewed only within the designed life, 40
years, of the facility. This guideline is not applicable for any plant life extension application
beyond the designed life.

       The first ten-year relicensing of KUOSHENG units 1 and 2 has started. The safety
assessment program for KUOSHENG unit 1 is in progress now, reports will be submitted to
the ROCAEC by the end of June 1991.
V.G    RESPONSES to ISSUES RAISED by the PUBLIC

      THE TEAM LEADER IINVIITED SEVERAL PERSONS BELIIEVED TO BE IINTERESTED IIN THE
       THE TEAM LEADER NV TED SEVERAL PERSONS BEL EVED TO BE NTERESTED N THE
PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IINTAIIWAN TO BRIING IISSUES TO THE ATTENTIIONOF THE
PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY N TA WAN TO BR NG SSUES TO THE ATTENT ON OF THE
TEAM THAT MIIGHT OTHERWIISE HAVE ESCAPED NOTIICE.. THERE WERE SEVERAL VALUABLE
TEAM THAT M GHT OTHERW SE HAVE ESCAPED NOT CE THERE WERE SEVERAL VALUABLE
RESPONSES N TH S APPEND X, A BR EF SUMMARY OF SEVERAL OF THESE S MADE TO THE
RESPONSES.. IIN THIISAPPENDIIX, A BRIIEFSUMMARY OF SEVERAL OF THESE IISMADE TO THE
EXTENT THAT THEY ARE UNDERSTOOD..
EXTENT THAT THEY ARE UNDERSTOOD
       V.G.1          The case of Mr Chan Ju-I.

        MR CHAN DEVELOPED A PERIICARDIIAL CYST WHIICH WAS FIIRST LOCATED BY A ROUTIINE
        MR CHAN DEVELOPED A PER CARD AL CYST WH CH WAS F RST LOCATED BY A ROUT NE
CHEST X RAY IINOCTOBER 1987.. HE HAD SURGERY ON NOVEMBER 20TH IINTHE SAME YEAR,,
 CHEST X RAY N OCTOBER 1987       HE HAD SURGERY ON NOVEMBER 20TH N THE SAME YEAR
AND HAS BEEN RELEASED AND IISBACK AT WORK.. THE TEAM ASKED FOR A DETAIILEDREPORT
 AND HAS BEEN RELEASED AND S BACK AT WORK       THE TEAM ASKED FOR A DETA LED REPORT
               NCE T HAD RECE VED A GREAT DEAL OF PUBL C NTEREST AND AROUSED
OF THE CASE SIINCE IITHAD RECEIIVEDA GREAT DEAL OF PUBLIIC IINTERESTAND AROUSED
 OF THE CASE S
CONSIIDERABLEPUBLIICCONCERN.. THE NOTES BELOW ARE THE CONCLUSIIONSOF THE TEAM ON
 CONS DERABLE PUBL C CONCERN THE NOTES BELOW ARE THE CONCLUS ONS OF THE TEAM ON
 TS' REV EW OF THE REPORTS
IITS'REVIIEWOF THE REPORTS..


        Mr Chan asked a reasonable question: "Could the cyst could have been caused by
industrial exposure, and in particular, radiation exposure, and could he could be regarded as
injured on duty?" He asked for workman's compensation and the case is still before the
courts. This case was studied by the Labor Council and the Atomic Energy Council of ROC.
Mr Chan had worked in a special building, cleaning slightly radioactive condenser tubes
preparatory to selling them for scrap. This was done on the site of the CHINSHAN power
plant at the location marked on the map of figure V.G.2. The building is no longer in use,
although it can not be dismantled, by order of the court. The TEAM visited the building and
was informed that the contamination and the radiation level on the surface of the tubes was
not high. A counter gave 1000 cpm at 1 meter, but there might also be a potential for
inhalation of powdered material. Mr Chan had a whole body count some time later, which
showed no unusual absorbed radioactivity.

       VETERANS GENERAL HOSPIITAL SOUGHT THE HELP OF TWO US PHYSIICIIANS,,DR
       VETERANS GENERAL HOSP TAL SOUGHT THE HELP OF TWO US PHYS C ANS DR
THOMAS A..LIINCOLN AND DR ROBERT C.. RIICKS,,WHO FURTHER EXAMIINED THE MEDIICAL
THOMAS A L NCOLN AND DR ROBERT C R CKS WHO FURTHER EXAM NED THE MED CAL
RECORD.. BOTH DR RIICKSAND DR LIINCOLNNOTED THAT PRECARDIIALCYSTS ARE NOT
RECORD BOTH DR R CKS AND DR L NCOLN NOTED THAT PRECARD AL CYSTS ARE NOT
NORMALLY ASSOC ATED W TH RAD ATION; ALTHOUGH THERE S A STRONG SUGGEST ON FROM
NORMALLY ASSOCIIATED WIITHRADIIATION;ALTHOUGH THERE IISA STRONG SUGGESTIION FROM
THE RAD ATION EFFECTS RESEARCH FOUNDAT ON RERF) N H ROSHIMA, THAT THE RATE OF
THE RADIIATIONEFFECTS RESEARCH FOUNDATIION ((RERF) IINHIIROSHIMA, THAT THE RATE OF
HEART PROBLEMS IISSOMEWHAT ELEVATED ((ALTHOUGH LESS THAN CANCER))AMONG THOSE
HEART PROBLEMS S SOMEWHAT ELEVATED ALTHOUGH LESS THAN CANCER AMONG THOSE
HEAV LY EXPOSED TO RAD ATION FROM THE H ROSHIMA AND NAGASAK EXPLOS ONS. BUT
HEAVIILYEXPOSED TO RADIIATION FROM THE HIIROSHIMAAND NAGASAKIIEXPLOSIIONS. BUT
PRECARD AL CYSTS ARE NOT SO L STED. ACCORD NGLY, EVEN F MR CHAN HAD BEEN
PRECARDIIALCYSTS ARE NOT SO LIISTED. ACCORDIINGLY,EVEN IIFMR CHAN HAD BEEN
EXPOSED TO RADIIATIONAT A HIIGH LEVEL,,ATTRIIBUTIONOF THE CYST TO RADIIATIONWOULD BE
EXPOSED TO RAD ATION AT A H GH LEVEL ATTR BUTION OF THE CYST TO RAD ATION WOULD BE
UNL KELY. MOREOVER MR CHAN'S RECORDED RAD ATION DOSE BOTH NTERNAL AND
UNLIIKELY. MOREOVER,,MR CHAN'S RECORDED RADIIATIONDOSE,,BOTH IINTERNALAND
EXTERNAL,, IISSMALL,,AND MUCH TOO SMALL,,ACCORDIING TO THE DATA FROM RERF TO
EXTERNAL S SMALL AND MUCH TOO SMALL ACCORD NG TO THE DATA FROM RERF TO
ATTR BUTE EVEN ANY KNOWN EFFECT OF RAD ATION.
ATTRIIBUTEEVEN ANY KNOWN EFFECT OF RADIIATION.


         If radiation were a known cause of precardial cysts one might legitimately question
the exposure measurements. If the measured radiation dose had been high, one might
speculate that an association of precardial cysts with radiation was being discovered for the
first time. However, neither is the case.

       ACCORDIINGLY,, FOR THESE TWO SEPARATE,, IINDEPENDENT,,REASONS,,ANY ATTRIIBUTIION
        ACCORD NGLY FOR THESE TWO SEPARATE NDEPENDENT REASONS ANY ATTR BUT ON
OF MR CHAN'S CYST TO RADIIATIONEXPOSURE IISUNWARRANTED.. HOWEVER,,DR RIICKSAND
OF MR CHAN'S CYST TO RAD ATION EXPOSURE S UNWARRANTED HOWEVER DR R CKS AND
DR LIINCOLN DIID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIIBIILIITY THAT OTHER OCCUPATIIONAL EXPOSURE HAD
DR L NCOLN D D NOT RULE OUT THE POSS B L TY THAT OTHER OCCUPAT ONAL EXPOSURE HAD
CAUSED THE CYST;;AND MENTIIONEDEXPLIICITLY THE POSSIIBILITY THAT SUCH CYSTS MIIGHTBE
CAUSED THE CYST AND MENT ONED EXPL CITLY THE POSS BILITY THAT SUCH CYSTS M GHT BE
CAUSED BY BERYLLIIUMEXPOSURE.. THE TEAM NOTES THAT BERYLLIIUM IISNOT USED IIN
CAUSED BY BERYLL UM EXPOSURE THE TEAM NOTES THAT BERYLL UM S NOT USED N
BWRS,,BUT MAKES NO OTHER COMMENT..
BWRS BUT MAKES NO OTHER COMMENT
       V.G.2 Radioactivity Releases at CHINSHAN in 1984 - 1986

        SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIIC MENTIIONED TO ONE OR MORE MEMBERS OF THE
        SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE PUBL C MENT ONED TO ONE OR MORE MEMBERS OF THE
TEAM THE UNUSUALLY LARGE RADIIOACTIIVIITY RELEASES AT CHIINSHAN IIN 1984 TO 1986,,
 TEAM THE UNUSUALLY LARGE RAD OACT V TY RELEASES AT CH NSHAN N 1984 TO 1986
 AND T WAS ALLEGED THAT THE RELEASES EXCEEDED APPL CABLE REGULATORY L MITS. THE
AND IITWAS ALLEGED THAT THE RELEASES EXCEEDED APPLIICABLEREGULATORY LIIMITS. THE
 TEAM RECE VED DOCUMENTAT ON AND A REPORT FROM TA P OWER ON TH S SSUE T CAN
TEAM RECEIIVED DOCUMENTATIION AND A REPORT FROM TAIIPOWER ON THIIS IISSUE.. IIT CAN
 BE SEEN THAT DUR NG ONE WEEK N JANUARY 4 OF THE 5 HP D MON TORS WERE NOPERABLE,
BE SEEN THAT DURIINGONE WEEK IINJANUARY,,4 OF THE 5 HPIIDMONIITORS WERE IINOPERABLE,
((THEY HAVE A COMMON POWER SUPPLY))AND SOME PAGES OF THE HEALTH PHYSIICS NOTEBOOK
  THEY HAVE A COMMON POWER SUPPLY AND SOME PAGES OF THE HEALTH PHYS CS NOTEBOOK
 WERE M SSING. PUTT NG "TWO AND TWO TOGETHER AND MAK NG F VE", AN NVESTIGATIVE
WERE MIISSING. PUTTIING "TWO AND TWO TOGETHER AND MAKIING FIIVE",AN IINVESTIGATIVE
 REPORTER ASKED THE FOLLOW NG QUEST ONS:
REPORTER ASKED THE FOLLOWIINGQUESTIIONS:


       - were the absence of the note book pages and the failure of the monitors correlated?
          F SO WAS T DEL BERATE ACT ON COVER UP BY THE RESPONS BLE TA P OWER
      --IIF SO,,WAS IIT DELIIBERATE ACTIION ((COVER--UP))BY THE RESPONSIIBLE TAIIPOWER
EMPLOYEE?
EMPLOYEE?
       - if so, was management involved with the supposed cover-up?

       THE TEAM BELIIEVES THAT THESE WERE REASONABLE QUESTIIONS,, WHIICH DESERVE A
       THE TEAM BEL EVES THAT THESE WERE REASONABLE QUEST ONS WH CH DESERVE A
POLIITEAND REASONED ANSWER..
POL TE AND REASONED ANSWER

        As discussed below, the average radiation exposure of the public was well below the
established guidelines, even for the hypothetical person at the site boundary. Nonetheless
this event illustrates many weaknesses in TAIPOWER management and operations that were
discussed elsewhere in the report. The TEAM therefore gives an account of the event as it
now seems to be understood.

       THE REACTORS AT CHIINSHAN ARE BOIILIING WATER REACTORS ((BWRS))IIN THESE
       THE REACTORS AT CH NSHAN ARE BO L NG WATER REACTORS BWRS N THESE
REACTORS STEAM S GENERATED N THE REACTOR TSELF. N THE EVENT OF FUEL ELEMENT
REACTORS,,STEAM IISGENERATED IIN THE REACTOR IITSELF. IIN THE EVENT OF FUEL ELEMENT
FA LURES, F SSION PRODUCT GASES W LL OIN THE STEAM AND BE ABLE TO C RCULATE
FAIILURES, FIISSIONPRODUCT GASES WIILLJJOIN THE STEAM AND BE ABLE TO CIIRCULATE
THROUGH THE STEAM TURB NE. THE STEAM GOES NTO THE MA N CONDENSER WHERE THERE S
THROUGH THE STEAM TURBIINE. THE STEAM GOES IINTO THE MAIINCONDENSER WHERE THERE IIS
               A R ENTERS THROUGH LEAKS AND THE A R, CARRY NG W TH T THE F SSION
A VACUUM.. AIIRENTERS THROUGH LEAKS,,AND THE AIIR,CARRYIINGWIITH IIT THE FIISSION
A VACUUM
PRODUCT GASES,,MUST BE CONTIINUOUSLYRELEASED IIN THE OFF GAS SYSTEM.. IIN THE OFF--GAS
PRODUCT GASES MUST BE CONT NUOUSLY RELEASED N THE OFF GAS SYSTEM N THE OFF GAS
SYSTEM,,ANY HYDROGEN IISRECOMBIINEDWIITHOXYGEN TO FORM WATER;; THE WATER IIS
SYSTEM ANY HYDROGEN S RECOMB NED W TH OXYGEN TO FORM WATER THE WATER S
TRAPPED IIN THE OFF--GASCONDENSER AND DRAIINEDTO A SUMP..THE GAS IISTHEN SENT TO A
TRAPPED N THE OFF GAS CONDENSER AND DRA NED TO A SUMP THE GAS S THEN SENT TO A
STACK AND D SCHARGED, W TH SOME VELOC TY, AT 240 METERS ABOVE SEA LEVEL THE
STACK AND DIISCHARGED, WIITHSOME VELOCIITY,AT 240 METERS ABOVE SEA LEVEL..THE
SCHEME S SHOWN N F GURE V G.1.
SCHEME IISSHOWN IIN FIIGUREV..G.1.


        According to TAIPOWER records, during 1984 - 1988 the fuel element failure rate
was acceptable for unit 2 (0.0005), there were, according to TAIPOWER, 117 gas release
events in two main groups. Those from the turbine building, caused by leakage of valves
and components, were confined to the controlled areas therein. However, there were
occasional large releases of radioactive gases from the off-gas system. These were
eventually located and attributed to faulty design in two respects:

        --THE IINCOMIING GAS SOMETIIMES HAD AN EXCESSIIVELY HIIGH FRACTIION OF HYDROGEN
          THE NCOM NG GAS SOMET MES HAD AN EXCESS VELY H GH FRACT ON OF HYDROGEN
GAS LEAD NG TO OCCAS ONAL EXPLOS ON, PROBABLY TECHN CALLY A DEFLAGRAT ON AND
GAS,, LEADIING TO OCCASIIONALEXPLOSIION,PROBABLY TECHNIICALLYA DEFLAGRATIIONAND
NOT A DETONAT ON, N THE P PING LEAD NG TO THE RECOMB NER PRESUMABLY DUE TO THE
NOT A DETONATIION, IIN THE PIIPING LEADIING TO THE RECOMBIINER((PRESUMABLYDUE TO THE
PRESENCE OF UNDES RED CATALYST N THE P PING.).
PRESENCE OF UNDESIIRED CATALYST IIN THE PIIPING.).


       - the condenser water sump had a cover which leaked gases to the off-gas building,
and from there to the site at ground level.

       THE GASES WERE PROBABLY NOBLE GASES,, KRYPTON AND XENON,,AND HEAVIIER THAN
       THE GASES WERE PROBABLY NOBLE GASES KRYPTON AND XENON AND HEAV ER THAN
A R. THERE ARE ANECDOTES FROM THE STAFF THAT RAD OACTIVITY DEPOS TED ON THE LEGS
AIIR. THERE ARE ANECDOTES FROM THE STAFF THAT RADIIOACTIVITYDEPOSIITEDON THE LEGS
OF THE R TROUSERS IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SOME OF THE SHORT LIVED DAUGHTERS OF
OF THEIIR TROUSERS..((ITSHOULD BE NOTED THAT SOME OF THE SHORT--LIVED DAUGHTERS OF
THE NOBLE GASES ARE CHEM CALLY ACT VE AND CAN OIN TO PART CLES. SUCH RAD OACTIVE
THE NOBLE GASES ARE CHEMIICALLYACTIIVEAND CAN JJOIN TO PARTIICLES. SUCH RADIIOACTIVE
PART CLES SOON DECAY ) AT N GHT, WHEN THE W ND WAS BLOW NG FROM THE LAND
PARTIICLESSOON DECAY..) AT NIIGHT, WHEN THE WIINDWAS BLOWIING FROM THE LAND
TOWARDS THE SEA,,((FROMSOUTH TO NORTH))RADIIOACTIVEGASES ENTERED THE GUARD HOUSE
TOWARDS THE SEA FROM SOUTH TO NORTH RAD OACTIVE GASES ENTERED THE GUARD HOUSE
WHERE THE RAD ATION MON TORS RECORDED H GH, BUT NOT DANGEROUSLY H GH, DOSES
WHERE THE RADIIATIONMONIITORSRECORDED HIIGH,BUT NOT DANGEROUSLY HIIGH,DOSES..
THESE WERE THE RECORDED DOSES THAT BROUGHT THE MATTER TO PUBLIIC ATTENTIION.. THE
THESE WERE THE RECORDED DOSES THAT BROUGHT THE MATTER TO PUBL C ATTENT ON THE
RELATIIVE LOCATIIONOF THE OFF--SITEGAS FACIILITYAND THE GUARD HOUSE CAN BE SEEN FROM
RELAT VE LOCAT ON OF THE OFF SITE GAS FAC LITY AND THE GUARD HOUSE CAN BE SEEN FROM
THE MAP OF F GURE V G.2.
THE MAP OF FIIGUREV..G.2.


        The noble gases released are not very important for public health. However, along
with the noble gases one expects a small amount of radioactive iodine, roughly in proportion,
although for escape from the sump, the iodine might be trapped in the water. Whereas the
noble gases are measured at one instant in time, iodine is measured by passing the gas
through some sort of filter, and averaging over a period up to a week. Unfortunately, it is not
easy to measure iodine routinely, and the TEAM knows of no measurements in the guard
house. However, there were routine iodine measurements in the off-gas building and in the
stack gas. During the TEAM's visit a graph was presented which showed (correctly) a
release of 15 Ci/yr mostly from unit 1 and therefore at ground level. It also purported to show
that CHINSHAN released 50 Ci in 1987. Both are much larger than is released from other
BWRs. After enquiry for consistency, the TEAM was informed that the large 1987 figure was
an error.

       THERE WERE PUBLIIC COMPLAIINTS ((THE TEAM WERE IINFORMED THAT THE
        THERE WERE PUBL C COMPLA NTS THE TEAM WERE NFORMED THAT THE
LEGIISLATUREWAS CONCERNED))OF RADIIOACTIVECONTAMIINATIONOF VEGETABLES.. THE
LEG SLATURE WAS CONCERNED OF RAD OACTIVE CONTAM NATION OF VEGETABLES        THE
TEAM HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIIND ANY DETAIILS AND SUCH CONTAMIINATIION SEEMS UNLIIKELY
TEAM HAS BEEN UNABLE TO F ND ANY DETA LS AND SUCH CONTAM NAT ON SEEMS UNL KELY
FOR TWO SEPARATE REASONS.. FIIRSTLY THE PRIINCIPALAIIRBORNERADIIOACTIVITYWAS NOBLE
FOR TWO SEPARATE REASONS F RSTLY THE PR NCIPAL A RBORNE RAD OACTIVITY WAS NOBLE
GASES WH CH, BE NG CHEM CALLY NACTIVE, WOULD NOT CONTAM NATE, AND SECONDLY THE
GASES WHIICH,BEIINGCHEMIICALLY IINACTIVE, WOULD NOT CONTAMIINATE,AND SECONDLY THE
HALF L VES ARE TOO SHORT TO MAKE AN MPORTANT CONTAM NATION.
HALF LIIVESARE TOO SHORT TO MAKE AN IIMPORTANTCONTAMIINATION.


        The Executive Yuan assigned a specific investigative team which submitted a report
dated September 23rd 1988. Even before this report was issued, TAIPOWER carried out
several actions to improve the situation. These include:

         ((A)) IINSTALLATIION OF A CHARCOAL ABSORPTIION BED IIN THE OFF--GAS SYSTEM TO DELAY
           A NSTALLAT ON OF A CHARCOAL ABSORPT ON BED N THE OFF GAS SYSTEM TO DELAY
         THE RELEASE UNTIIL THE ACTIIVITYHAD A CHANCE TO DECAY;;
          THE RELEASE UNT L THE ACT VITY HAD A CHANCE TO DECAY
 (b) connecting the airborne blower vent to the sump room to localize radioactivity;
((C))CLOSIING THE SUMP ROOM AIIR DUCT TO THE ROOF VENTS TO CONTAIIN RADIIOACTIIVIITY;;
  C CLOS NG THE SUMP ROOM A R DUCT TO THE ROOF VENTS TO CONTA N RAD OACT V TY
 (d) adding another radiation monitor.
((E))DIILUTIION OF THE HYDROGEN CONTENT FROM THE REACTOR BY MIIXIING WIITH AIIR
  E D LUT ON OF THE HYDROGEN CONTENT FROM THE REACTOR BY M X NG W TH A R
((RECYCLED))
  RECYCLED

         In the opinion of this TEAM, TAIPOWER was very slow in locating the source of
ground level releases which had gone on for many months. Otherwise these actions are
responsive to the problem. The TEAM is somewhat disturbed that the staff of CHINSHAN
do not have the crucial data for this event, which raised so much concern, "at their finger
tips". The fact that even 5 years later, an incorrect figure for iodine releases can be
presented, even briefly and in error, is disturbing. Nonetheless, figure V.G.3 shows a graph
of total iodine releases, stack plus off-gas building, which shows a praiseworthy reduction
since 1986. Although the first of these actions, installation of the charcoal bed would not have
prevented the ground level releases, it is nonetheless worthwhile. But this action was also
late (1986); a charcoal bed was installed on most BWRs in the USA during the late 1970s.
       THIIS CHARCOAL BED ENABLED A REDUCTIION IIN TOTAL EMIISSIIONS FROM OVER 16,,000
        TH S CHARCOAL BED ENABLED A REDUCT ON N TOTAL EM SS ONS FROM OVER 16 000
CURIIES IIN 1980,,1983,,AND 1984,,TO 721 CIIIIN 1990,,THEREBY MEETIING THE NEW STANDARD
CUR ES N 1980 1983 AND 1984 TO 721 C N 1990 THEREBY MEET NG THE NEW STANDARD
OF LESS THAN 16 000 C /YEAR SSUED N 1988 THESE EARL ER RELEASES D D NOT EXCEED
OF LESS THAN 16,,000CII/YEAR IISSUED IIN1988.. THESE EARLIIERRELEASES DIIDNOT EXCEED
ANY THEN--APPLICABLESTANDARD ((CONTRARY TO WHAT WAS SUGGESTED BY A MEMBER OF
ANY THEN APPLICABLE STANDARD CONTRARY TO WHAT WAS SUGGESTED BY A MEMBER OF
THE PUBL C), AND CONTR BUTED A M NUSCULE AMOUNT TO PUBL C HEALTH
THE PUBLIIC),AND CONTRIIBUTEDA MIINUSCULEAMOUNT TO PUBLIICHEALTH..


       At this time, over 5 years later, it is not possible for an overseas team to investigate
the specific questions raised by the investigative reporter and mentioned in the second
paragraph of this section. However, the effect upon the public health is independent of the
answers to those specific questions.

       THE MOST EXPOSED PEOPLE WERE TAIIPOWER EMPLOYEES.. THE CALCULATED
       THE MOST EXPOSED PEOPLE WERE TA POWER EMPLOYEES THE CALCULATED
 EXTERNAL DOSE TO THE MOST EXPOSED EMPLOYEES WAS 0 8 MAN REMS WH CH S SMALL
EXTERNAL DOSE TO THE MOST EXPOSED EMPLOYEES WAS 0..8MAN--REMS WHIICH IISSMALL
 COMPARED TO THE 800 MAN REMS/YR FOR ALL ACT VITIES AT THE S TE. N ADD TION, WHOLE
COMPARED TO THE 800 MAN--REMS/YR FOR ALL ACTIIVITIESAT THE SIITE. IIN ADDIITION,WHOLE
BODY COUNTIINGSUGGESTS THAT THERE WAS NO IIMPORTANTIINTERNALDOSE,,ALTHOUGH IIF
 BODY COUNT NG SUGGESTS THAT THERE WAS NO MPORTANT NTERNAL DOSE ALTHOUGH F
 THERE WAS A LONG T ME ELAPSED BETWEEN EXPOSURE AND THE COUNT NG, ANY RAD OACTIVE
THERE WAS A LONG TIIME ELAPSED BETWEEN EXPOSURE AND THE COUNTIING,ANY RADIIOACTIVE
 ODINE WOULD HAVE DECAYED THE TEAM KNOWS OF NO COMPLA NT BY A TA POWER
IIODINEWOULD HAVE DECAYED..THE TEAM KNOWS OF NO COMPLAIINTBY A TAIIPOWER
EMPLOYEE..
 EMPLOYEE

        However, the fact that this issue is over 5 years old and was brought to the TEAM's
attention more than once, suggests that TAIPOWER has not explained the issue to the public
well. This is an example of a serious failure of TAIPOWER to which we devoted the whole
of section III.S. Either of the losing of notebooks, or the loss of 80% of the HPID monitors
is enough to lose public confidence.
       V..G..3
       VG3           LOSS OF BORIIC ACIID
                     LOSS OF BOR C AC D

        It was a matter of public concern that on 13th April 1987, Boron was noticed to have
leaked from the SBLC storage tank, at KUOSHENG, leading to a low level of boron in the
tank. This is, in the TEAM's opinion a legitimate concern, since manual injection of boron
is an important safety procedure in a number of important accident sequences, and in
particular in an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS). If there were no possibility
of a manual injection of boron, the safety of a reactor might depend upon an accident that
could not easily be assessed.

       TA P OWER GAVE THE TEAM WHAT SEEMS A REASONABLE RESPONSE THE
       TAIIPOWER GAVE THE TEAM WHAT SEEMS A REASONABLE RESPONSE.. THE
ACCIIDENTIISCERTAIINLYSAFETY RELATED FOR THE REASONS NOTED ABOVE.. BUT IITDIIDNOT IIN
ACC DENT S CERTA NLY SAFETY RELATED FOR THE REASONS NOTED ABOVE BUT T D D NOT N
FACT COMPROMIISESAFETY FOR THREE IINDEPENDENTREASONS.. FIIRSTLY THE REACTOR WAS IIN
FACT COMPROM SE SAFETY FOR THREE NDEPENDENT REASONS F RSTLY THE REACTOR WAS N
A SHUT DOWN MODE AND THERE S NO NEED TO HAVE A MANUAL SHUT DOWN CAPAB LITY W TH
A SHUT DOWN MODE AND THERE IISNO NEED TO HAVE A MANUAL SHUT DOWN CAPABIILITY WIITH
THE SHUT DOWN RODS IIN PLACE ((EXCEPTPERHAPS TO BE USED IIFTHERE IISAN IINADVERTENT
THE SHUT DOWN RODS N PLACE EXCEPT PERHAPS TO BE USED F THERE S AN NADVERTENT
REMOVAL OF THESE RODS . SECONDLY THE TANK WAS NOT N FACT EMPT ED TO BELOW THE
REMOVAL OF THESE RODS)). SECONDLY,, THE TANK WAS NOT IIN FACT EMPTIIED TO BELOW THE
LEVEL WHERE THERE WAS ENOUGH BORON TO EFFECT A SHUTDOWN AND TH RDLY, THERE S,
LEVEL WHERE THERE WAS ENOUGH BORON TO EFFECT A SHUTDOWN,,AND THIIRDLY, THERE IIS,
DUR NG OPERAT ON, A SBLC TANK LOW LEVEL ALARM TO REM ND OPERATORS TO TAKE
DURIINGOPERATIION,A SBLC TANK LOW LEVEL ALARM TO REMIINDOPERATORS TO TAKE
APPROPR ATE ACT ONS. NONETHELESS TA POWER HAS TAKEN STEPS TO PREVENT A
APPROPRIIATEACTIIONS. NONETHELESS,,TAIIPOWERHAS TAKEN STEPS TO PREVENT A
REOCCURRENCE.. THE OUTLET VALVE OF THE SBLC STORAGE TANK WAS CHANGED TO A "KEY
REOCCURRENCE THE OUTLET VALVE OF THE SBLC STORAGE TANK WAS CHANGED TO A "KEY
LOCK" TYPE TO PREVENT NADVERTENT OPERAT ON W TH POSS BLE LEAKAGE AND DRA NAGE.
LOCK" TYPE TO PREVENT IINADVERTENTOPERATIIONWIITHPOSSIIBLE LEAKAGE AND DRAIINAGE.
THERE HAS BEEN NO RECURRENCE OF THIIS EVENT..
THERE HAS BEEN NO RECURRENCE OF TH S EVENT

        At our request, TAIPOWER calculated the effect on the overall accident frequency,
on the assumption that it occurred during normal operation.           The increase was 4 X
10 -7/reactor year, which is small, (but not negligible). This calculation seems to the TEAM
to be reasonable. However, a PRA during shut down has not yet been completed, so that the
TEAM has not complete confidence that this number properly reflects postulated scenarios
during shutdown.
       V.G.4 Radioactive Waste Discharges

       TWO CASES OF WHAT APPEAR TO BE IIMPROPER RADIIOACTIIVE WASTE DIISCHARGE WERE
       TWO CASES OF WHAT APPEAR TO BE MPROPER RAD OACT VE WASTE D SCHARGE WERE
BROUGHT TO THE TEAM'S ATTENT ON. ALTHOUGH WASTE D SCHARGE S MPORTANT, T DOES
BROUGHT TO THE TEAM'S ATTENTIION.ALTHOUGH WASTE DIISCHARGE IIS IIMPORTANT, IITDOES
NOT HAVE THE POTENT AL, N THE TEAM'S V EW TO HAVE A DRAMAT C MPACT UPON SAFETY
NOT HAVE THE POTENTIIAL, IIN THE TEAM'S VIIEW TO HAVE A DRAMATIIC IIMPACTUPON SAFETY,,
AND LEAD TO A MA OR ACC DENT. NONETHELESS THE TEAM ASKED TA POWER FOR
AND LEAD TO A MAJJORACCIIDENT.NONETHELESS,, THE TEAM ASKED TAIIPOWERFOR
DETA LS OF THESE NCIDENTS.
DETAIILSOF THESE IINCIDENTS.


       In the first, on 16th November 1987 at CHINSHAN, the waste monitor waste
discharge valve was temporarily isolated under a temporary jump application. Although
waste went out to sea during that period, the amount according to TAIPOWER was not in
excess of Technical Specifications.

       IIN THE SECOND,,AN IINSPECTOR AT KUOSHENG ON JULY 2ND 1987,,FOUND THAT THE
         N THE SECOND AN NSPECTOR AT KUOSHENG ON JULY 2ND 1987 FOUND THAT THE
    ATION D SCHARGE MON TOR WAS READ NG 9 500 CPM WHEREAS THE UPPER LEVEL TR P
RADIIATIONDIISCHARGEMONIITOR WAS READIING9,,500CPM WHEREAS THE UPPER LEVEL TRIIP
RAD
                                 THE TR P SETT NG WAS SET AT 12 000 CPM T APPEARS THAT
WAS SUPPOSED TO BE 468 CPM.. THE TRIIPSETTIING WAS SET AT 12,,000CPM.. IITAPPEARS THAT
WAS SUPPOSED TO BE 468 CPM
WAS DONE BECAUSE THE DETECTOR WAS CONTAM NATED. TH S WAS NOT THE PROPER
WAS DONE BECAUSE THE DETECTOR WAS CONTAMIINATED.THIIS WAS NOT THE PROPER
PROCEDURE CHANG NG THE SET PO NT REDUCES THE SENS TIVITY. THE DETECTOR SHOULD
PROCEDURE;;CHANGIING THE SET POIINTREDUCES THE SENSIITIVITY. THE DETECTOR SHOULD
HAVE BEEN CHANGED..
HAVE BEEN CHANGED

         Although this was an obvious, and admitted violation of technical specifications, the
effect on safety was negligible. According to TAIPOWER, samples taken next day showed
that the resultant radioactive concentrations were all less than the limit. However, the AEC,
in a letter to the TEAM state that "no record with regard to the amount of the release was
available at that time". Nonetheless, TAIPOWER put the set point into the list of items
checked on the daily patrol to prevent a reoccurrence.

         THE MOVIING OF A SET POIINT WAS CLEARLY A VIIOLATIION OF PROCEDURES.. WORSE
         THE MOV NG OF A SET PO NT WAS CLEARLY A V OLAT ON OF PROCEDURES WORSE
   LL, THERE WAS NO ENTRY N THE LOGBOOK ON WHEN T WAS DONE OR BY WHOM T
STIILL, THERE WAS NO ENTRY IIN THE LOGBOOK ON WHEN IITWAS DONE,,OR BY WHOM.. IIT
ST
SHOULD BE A SUB ECT FOR D SCIPLINARY ACT ON. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO SUCH RULE AT
SHOULD BE A SUBJJECTFOR DIISCIPLINARYACTIION. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO SUCH RULE AT
THE T ME, THE TEAM WAS NFORMED THAT AEC HAS NOW A RULE HOLD NG THE
THE TIIME, THE TEAM WAS IINFORMED THAT AEC HAS NOW A RULE HOLDIING THE
SUPER NTENDENT OF THE PLANT RESPONS BLE F A D SCIPLINARY ENQU RY FA LS TO F ND THE
SUPERIINTENDENTOF THE PLANT RESPONSIIBLE IIFA DIISCIPLINARYENQUIIRY FAIILS TO FIIND THE
REAL CULPR T. THE TEAM APPROVES TH S CHANGE WH CH S OVERDUE
REAL CULPRIIT. THE TEAM APPROVES THIISCHANGE,,WHIICH IISOVERDUE..
       V.G.5          An Operator/Inspector Argument.

       AT ABOUT 8..30 AM ON 29TH OCTOBER 1987,,JJUST AFTER A TYPHOON,,AN ARGUMENT
        AT ABOUT 8 30 AM ON 29TH OCTOBER 1987 UST AFTER A TYPHOON AN ARGUMENT
 TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THE TA POWER SH FT SUPERV SOR MR CH EN SAN LUN AND THE AEC
TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THE TAIIPOWERSHIIFTSUPERVIISORMR CHIIENSAN--LUNAND THE AEC
 NSPECTOR. THE NSPECTOR NOTED N H S BOOK THAT THE OPERATOR DOES NOT COOPERATE
IINSPECTOR. THE IINSPECTORNOTED IINHIISBOOK THAT THE OPERATOR DOES NOT COOPERATE
 AND S UNFR ENDLY.
AND IISUNFRIIENDLY.


        The TEAM notes that the shift supervisor has the duty and responsibility to operate
the plant, and/or to ensure a safe shut down. There may well be occasions when attending to
questions a superior or of an inspector would interfere with this duty. On such occasions he
should obviously say so clearly, firmly, but politely. At the same time, all station personnel
should be fully cooperative with AEC safety inspectors, or their independent safety
supervision is compromised.

       TA P OWER'S VERS ON OF THE NC DENT S NOT N COMPLETE AGREEMENT W TH THAT
       TAIIPOWER'S VERSIION OF THE IINCIIDENT IIS NOT IIN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WIITH THAT
OF THE AEC ACCORD NG TO THE AEC NSPECTOR, HE W THHELD H S REQUEST FOR 24 HOURS
OF THE AEC..ACCORDIINGTO THE AEC IINSPECTOR,HE WIITHHELDHIISREQUEST FOR 24 HOURS
BECAUSE THE CONTROL ROOM STAFF WERE VERY BUSY IT WAS THE AFTERMATH OF A
BECAUSE THE CONTROL ROOM STAFF WERE VERY BUSY ((IT WAS THE AFTERMATH OF A
TYPHOON . ON THE NEXT DAY THE OPERATOR REFUSED TO ALLOW H M TO XEROX A PAGE
TYPHOON)). ON THE NEXT DAY,, THE OPERATOR REFUSED TO ALLOW HIIM TO XEROX A PAGE
FROM THE LOGBOOK EVEN THOUGH HE WAS NOT BUSY..
FROM THE LOGBOOK EVEN THOUGH HE WAS NOT BUSY

        It appears that there was no independent investigation at the time, so that the rights
and wrongs of the issue cannot now be determined. However, after the event the station
superintendent went with the shift supervisor to the AEC office for an explanation, and issued
instructions to his staff to be fully cooperative, and immediately report any disagreement to
his supervisor.

       THIIS SEEMS TO BE AN IISOLATED EVENT WIITH NO REOCCURRENCE IIN TAIIPOWER..
       TH S SEEMS TO BE AN SOLATED EVENT W TH NO REOCCURRENCE N TA POWER
recommended in section IV.B.1.
Table here

								
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