WW2

1



WORLD WAR II



I. Introduction



The seeds of World War II were planted at Versailles, the peace conference that ended the first world war. When Germany had

to pay reparations, accept the blame for starting the war, give over Germans to other nations, and have its territory divided by the Polish

Corridor, it would want to set all that right in the next generation. Another outcome of that war was that old regimes tumbled--Russia of

the czars, Austria-Hungary of the emperors, and Germany of the kaisers. In the twenty years between the two world wars, a new type

of king arose, the fascist dictator. By looking briefly at the rise of these new leaders, one can see the tension building for the next conflict.

i

The fasces, an axe surrounded by a bundle of rods that symbolized strength and unity, was carried by the ancient Romans.

Fascism adopted the fasces as an authority symbol of a strong state over its united people. Citizens were loyal to their leader, the one

ii

who took over the state to make them great. In Germany this system built the third empire, the Reich, which Adolf Hitler and the National

iii iv

Socialist German Workers' Party (the Nazis) controlled. The "Corporate State" of Benito Mussolini ran Italy. These fascist leaders

attracted a following by promising the national glory denied in the first war. At the top of the fascists was a dictator (Il Duce in Italy and

v vi

der Fuhrer in Germany). The fascists came to power with a dislike of intellectuals, a "seedy" start, and the support of businessmen.

In 1936, the Spanish Civil War began. The fascists, led by Francisco Franco, tried to overthrow the king, who was supported

by the loyalists, the Russians, and a few Americans (in the Abraham Lincoln brigade). German and Italian aid saved Franco, and the

revolt succeeded. The facts that the peasants supported Franco or that the Church and landowners opposed reforms were subverted to

the reality of Franco becoming dictator. Britain and France did not force a showdown. A million Spanish died in the conflict. During World

vii

War II, Franco was selfish and would not fight, so Spain remained neutral.

viii

After Vladimer Lenin died in 1924, Joseph Stalin gradually consolidated his power and became dictator in Russia. He was a

take charge, no-holds-barred type, and he used the secret police against his enemies. Stalin forced farmers on to

collectives--state-owned farms--and when these kulaks resisted, about two million were killed by the army, which then had to harvest

what little remained of the crops. The kulaks burned their crops and killed off about half of the livestock in Russia. Eventually, between

five and ten million people died during collectivization, partly because the army wasted part of the harvest, set quotas too high for the

collectives, and left little food behind for the people. Stalin set heavy taxes to build up heavy industry. He sent nonbelievers to the salt

mines in Siberia. In 1936, a supporter was murdered (perhaps on orders from Stalin), and Stalin purged about a fifth of the communist

party. Important enemies confessed under torture and at puppet trials before they were shot as traitors. The secret police did yeoman

service arresting other suspects of disloyalty. After many were shipped to Siberia, the Russians were afraid to be disloyal. Stalin

demanded that all the resources go into the building of the Russian state, and economic development accelerated remarkably during the

wars. A very clever German spy (Reinhard T. E. Heydrich) engineered purges of half of the leadership of the Red Army. Some 32 Nazi

ix

forgeries that were planted fooled Stalin into shooting or banishing 35,000 officers, leaving Russia unready for war with Germany.

The British prime minister during the war (not yet risen to power) was not really a dictator, only an arrogant aristocrat,

adventurous and ambitious. Winston Churchill had varied careers as a soldier, journalist, and member of Parliament. He was intelligent,

dignified, and liable to a swelled head. He predicted well and led ably, and Britain placed itself in his hands during the war. Churchill

x

spoke for a happy, undivided nation.

Hostilities built for nearly a decade before the world plunged into a second global conflict. In 1929, American exports were $7

billion (three times the prewar level) and overseas investments $17.2 billion, but the high American tariff kept Europe from earning the

dollars for repayment of its debt. When Europe called for forgiveness of the debt, America thought that it was ungrateful, but it defaulted,

anyway, after the Crash. In the 1930's, Russia modernized despite collectivization and the communist party purge (America finally

recognized the Russian communist government in 1933). Europe was at peace, and depression set in there, too. Facing $33 bil lion in

reparations, Germany only met payments to Britain and France by heavy borrowing from American banks. Although the Dawes

Commission reduced the size of the reparations, the loans created an American presence, while the tariff created a big problem for

German repayment. The German government allowed wild inflation to avoid repaying the debts, and there was a crash there in 1931.

Population growth fell off except in Germany and Italy, which encouraged large families. Refugees wandered across the continent--the

Jews and half a million loyalists after the Spanish strife ended. The fascists boasted about the superiority of their nation and race. They

were mildly embarrassed in 1936 at the Olympics in Germany. There the black American, Jesse Owens, from what Hitler viewed as an

inferior race, defeated the German favorites and won four gold medals. The fascists controlled official art and thought, and many artists

xi

and intellectuals left--Freud, Mann, Fermi, Einstein (the last two suggested the atomic bomb to Roosevelt).

Events marched on:

1931

xii

Japan took Manchuria from China. The United States did not recognize the acquisition (the Stimson Doctrine).

1933

Hitler became chancellor of Germany because the government feared the communists more than the Nazis. In America federal projects

xiii

supported artists and writers, some of whom were exiles from fascist nations.

1934

xiv

The Nazis assassinated the chancellor of Austria, and Hitler became a dictator. He began rearming despite the Versailles Treaty.

1935

Mussolini ordered the invasion of Ethiopia to build an Italian empire. Despite the plea of Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, the League of Nations

did nothing. The French were weak, the Americans isolated, the British alone, and peace was not defended. Hitler denounced the

xv

Versailles Treaty, withdrew from the League, and sent the military into the area along the Rhine.

1936

xvi

Stalin began his purge, and the Spanish Civil War started.

1937

Italy, Japan, and Germany joined forces. In the summer, Japan staged the "China Incident" and then attacked northern China. In

October, America remained isolated, but President Roosevelt spoke of a need to "Quarantine the aggressor." In December, the

xvii

Japanese struck the American gunboat Panay and three tankers, but it quickly apologized and paid reparations.

2



1938

Austrian Nazis rioted, and Germany annexed the country (Anschluss--union). This raised the hopes of some three million Sudetenland

Germans in Czechoslovakia, and Hitler demanded its cession. A conference at Munich matched Hitler and Mussolini against the leaders

from Britain and France. To keep the peace, the conference agreed to the cession; this was called "appeasement," Europe still hoping

xviii

for "Peace in our time." The submissive attitude merely encouraged Hitler, while Stalin, who was not invited, was enraged.

1939

In March, Hitler ran over the rest of Czechoslovakia. Britain and France mobilized. Italy took Albania. Stalin and Hitler signed a

non-aggression pact, agreeing to divide eastern Europe into German and Russian spheres of influence. Stalin hardly wished Russians

xix

to become cannon fodder again to the Germans, and half of Poland and the Baltic states was more than the West offered.

World War II was a conflict that engaged 57 nations and cost 45 million lives and $1,600 billion. 38 million of the dead were

xx

civilians, some six million of that Jews put to death in concentration camps. About 15 million Americans served, of whom about a million

xxi

became casualties (322,000 died). America spent about $350 billion on the war (nearly $200 billion of that was borrowed). By

comparison, 20 million Russians served, 7.5 million soldiers and 15 million civilians died, and 14 million were wounded. Germany lost

three million soldiers and five million civilians, and it spent $300 billion. America was isolated by the oceans, but Britain, Germany, and

Russia knew the enemy presence. American women went to their first war in the WACS, WAVES, or SPARS, and another six million

women took defense jobs doing things like welding ships and building airplanes. A million blacks served in uniform, and another million

xxii

found job opportunities in wartime industries.



II. Blitzkrieg

xxiii

On September 1, 1939, Hitler invaded Poland on the pretext of solving the problem of the Polish Corridor. Britain and France

xxiv

declared war on Germany two days later, and World War II began. The German battle strategy was "blitzkrieg," or lightning warfare,

xxv

a strategy of firepower and movement. The attack into Poland was a brilliant coordination of Stuka dive bombers and the panzers, and

a million men rushed into Poland. Meanwhile, 1,600 bombers struck cities and railroads, catching the Polish air force of 900 airplanes

on the ground, while the German navy caught the Polish fleet tied up at the dock and destroyed it. The Polish cavalry was mounted on

horses, and their lances did little to German armor. Britain and France declared war, but sent no aid as they expected an imminent attack

on their own territory. Poland was defeated in a month with a million Poles killed, wounded, or captured. It cost 10,000 German dead.

xxvi

Hitler kept the western half of Poland and gave the eastern half to Stalin, as they had earlier agreed in the non-aggression pact.

Meanwhile, Britain and France sat still expecting an attack, and when it did not follow for eight months, they were lulled into complacency,

xxvii

jeering at the phony war or "sitzkrieg."

Meantime, the Russians exploited the freedom of maneuver assured by the non-aggression pact to take over the Baltic states

xxviii

of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. In November, Russia demanded the cession of land from Finland, attacking when the Finns

xxix

refused. The Finnish ski troops, clad in white against the snow and able to ski quietly through the mountains, massacred the Russian

paratroops before they shucked their harnesses, and they ambushed all the Russian patrols. In at least one town, the Finns surrounded

two Russian divisions and killed 27,500 men, taking just 1,500 prisoners. The 300,000 Finns held off the million Russians for a half year,

xxx

but they finally wore down and surrendered in March, 1940.

Sitzkrieg ended on April 9, 1940, when the Germans invaded northward into Denmark and Norway, as the Germans needed

xxxi xxxii

them as air bases. Winston Churchill wanted to mine the Norwegian coast, but the Germans invaded before that was achieved.

While the British Royal Navy held the sea, the Luftwaffe kept the Royal Air Force (RAF, British) away. Norwegian traitors (the fifth column

or quislings after the betrayal of the defense minister, Vidkun Quisling) helped the Germans. Troops hidden in 370 German ships

presumed to be neutral and carrying cargo swarmed into the cities, and paratroops dropped on the interior. Losses were heavy on both

sides, and the Allies and Germans each lost about twenty ships. The king and some of the Norwegian army fled to Britain. Denmark

surrendered more quickly. Apparently, King Christian did not want to see his tiny army wiped out. He retired to his palace, emerging only

to wear the Star of David in support of Danish Jews and later in the war to marry. This courage saved many Danish Jews.

By May, the phony war was long gone. Eight months of preparation enabled German paratroops and panzers to crush Denmark,

Norway, Belgium, Holland, and soon they turned toward France. 117 German divisions were much better equipped and led. Britain and

France fought a defensive war to fend off the invasion of their countries, but this merely enhanced the effectiveness of blitzkrieg. The

xxxiii

Stukas, artillery, and armor punched holes in the Maginot Line, and then the German infantry rolled over the French army. The French

actually had more men and heavier tanks, but the Germans concentrated superior forces at the point of attack, punched through, and

kept going to the rear. While the French may have enjoyed the advantage of dominating more space, the German blitzkrieg negated it

by exploiting the advantage of time, outnumbering and overwhelming the enemy at a few points put under attack. If the French reacted,

it was too late to plug the gap.

The German invaders thrust the British and French defenders aside as they cut through them, and one group was backed up

against the English Channel where the Germans moved in for the kill. Hitler assigned the execution to the Luftwaffe to spare any further

xxxiv

loss of panzers, which he reserved for the Russian invasion. The British were blessed with terrible weather, which prevented the

Germans from bombing effectively. 850 vessels of all kinds sailed across the 20 miles from England and evacuated 340,000 men,

xxxv

leaving behind only 70,000 and the big guns. Hitler erred in not allowing the panzers to finish the job, for the RAF and the weather kept

the Luftwaffe away.

France now lay open. Panzers motored down roads, and when terrified refugees clogged highways, Messerschmitts strafed

xxxvi

them with their machine guns to open a path. Paris was declared an open city on June twelfth, and the Germans occupied it within

two days. The Germans took the rest of France in 17 days at the cost of 27,000 dead. The aged Marshall Henri Petain sued for an

armistice, and it was signed in the very same railroad car where Germany signed the peace pact at the end of the first war. Charles de

Gaulle fled to Britain, calling for continued resistance. Petain became the puppet head of Vichy France, the government which

collaborated with the Germans and gave up French Jews for the concentration camps. Germany intended to gain war materials from

France and to keep the French navy from helping Britain. When the British Royal Navy went to Algeria to get the French navy before the

Germans did, the French refused. The British attacked the French fleet and sunk part of the ships. The remaining vessels joined the Free

French. Britain still ruled the seas, but many French now backed the Vichy government because of the British naval assault.

The British prime minister whose policy of appeasement had not prevented war was replaced by Winston Churchill. He said that

3



he offered his country nothing but his "blood, toil, tears, and sweat." On July 16, 1940, Hitler ordered the invasion of Britain, Operation

Sea Lion, while he offered Britain peace in return for its recognition of German control of the continent. Britain did not waver. The channel

blocked the panzers, the Royal Navy barred any invasion, and the RAF's gallant Spitfires and Hurricanes shot down 100 German planes

a day during the heaviest fighting. The German navy had been mauled in Norway, it had no landing craft to transport troops to the

beaches, and it had little chance to start an invasion. Unless the Germans knocked out the RAF and the Royal Navy, an invasion was

likely to cost a million men. Moreover, at a time when all Europe had fallen to the Germans, the British had the irrepressible Churchill and

xxxvii

his growling, lisping voice of will, strength, and hope. Churchill had the British wage war for victory against terror and tyranny. And

xxxviii

they fought well.

The German navy had little chance against the superior British surface fleet. However, the Germans outnumbered the English

in submarines. Since Britain was dependent on the sea trade for food and raw materials, the Germans attacked there. A surface fleet

that included pocket battleships and a carrier struck at British merchant ships. The British navy sent twenty ships after the Graf Spee,

which had sunk nine ships. Although it had 11-inch to their 6 and 8-inch guns, the British finally wore it down and trapped it in a neutral

port. The ship was forced out to face its doom, and its captain soon scuttled her. With her sunk German naval plans which had been

more disruptive than dominating.

xxxix

A German invasion was impossible without air control, and the Luftwaffe had to attack the RAF and the navy. Only 650

British fighter planes stood ready at first to intercept the Luftwaffe in the battle for Britain. The Germans had no long range fighter planes

to protect the bombers on such raids. In August, the Luftwaffe bombed around the clock, flying 1,500 sorties a day. They struck airfields

xl

and radar stations, and the Luftwaffe thought that it had destroyed the RAF within three weeks. The invention of radar permitted the

British to intercept large enemy formations with a few airplanes, and this cut down on losses yet still disrupted the bombing missions.

When bombs "accidentally" hit London, Churchill retaliated by bombing Berlin, and Hitler switched the German bombing targets from

xli

airfields to cities. In the Battle of Britain, the British lost 1,960 fighters, but the Luftwaffe lost 2,700 planes, failed in its objective, and

xlii

forced the postponement of Operation Sea Lion. Britain held, although the Luftwaffe kept bombing cities, killing or wounding 100,000

civilians in the next year. The RAF bought the time to replace its lost planes and pilots. Churchill later said about the RAF pilots, "Never

xliii

in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few." It boggles the mind to understand Hitler's thinking. The British

had two factories that made the engines for their fighter planes and one factory that assembled the airplanes. Why did he not take out

xliv

those three factories, the radar stations, and the airfields so that Britain could not respond to German bombing raids?

Meanwhile, resistance groups were organized across occupied Europe, informed by the British Broadcasting Corporation

xlv

(BBC). Germany, Italy, and Russia squabbled over Eastern Europe. When the Italians invaded the Balkans and got in over their

xlvi

heads, the Germans took Greece and Yugoslavia in 1941, capturing a half million slav and Greek soldiers. Partisans turned to guerrilla

warfare and continued their resistance, with Marshall Tito in Yugoslavia especially effective (communist partisan leader). Rudolf Hess,

the Nazi number three man, took a plane one night and flew to Britain to arrange a peace which promised that the Germans would attack

communism and eradicate it. Hess did not tell the RAF, which shot him down, and a Scotch farmer armed with a pitchfork captured him.

Hitler had to be moving on, and he intended to invade Russia, even though he had unfinished business with Britain. He assumed that

when Russia quit, so would Britain. But the British had grown confident after Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain. Churchill told America,

"Give us the tools, and we will finish the job."

Hitler's next mistake was invading Russia. On June 22, 1941, three million Germans and their allies invaded Russia in three

xlvii

major thrusts along a 2,000-mile border. They intended this Operation Barbarossa to take Leningrad and Moscow and to secure the

Baltic and the Russian navy. The Luftwaffe destroyed 1,200 Russian planes by noon on the 22nd, and the Baltic air commander was

xlviii

ordered to Moscow and shot. By fall they killed two and a half million enemy soldiers and captured another 670,000 prisoners, 22,000

xlix

guns, 18,000 tanks, and 14,000 planes. When the Germans killed civilians and overextended their supply lines, the Russians reacted

l

angrily, inflicting 750,000 casualties on the Germans. In November the Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and

li

Stalingrad when the Russian winter hit (and temperatures of 40 degrees below zero). After their experience in Finland, the Russians

were ready for winter, but the Germans lacked winter clothes and lubricants for their vehicles and weapons. The next year with the spring

lii

thaw, the Germans headed southward into the oil fields of the Caucasus. Stalingrad (February, 1943) was a turning point in the war.

The besieged Russians mined buildings and sniped at the Germans. They killed 210,000 of the 300,000 Germans and took the rest

prisoner, of whom 5,000 survived to return home. The Germans elsewhere in Russia ran out of food and ammunition, too, and they lost

a massive tank battle at Kursk.



III. American Entry into the War



It is easy in hindsight to blame Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and America for being wholly unprepared for the second war. But

the seeds of that were really planted by the Woodrow Wilson rhetoric and idealism during World War I and at Versailles afterward.

Americans had willingly followed their president to the high ground, and they had fought to "make the world safe for democracy." But at

the end of the war they sensed that the world did not care, that it was politics as usual, and that they had won the war but lost the peace.

Their mood soon swung to cynicism. Americans soon rejected international involvement by staying out of the League of Nations, by

liii

erecting a tariff barrier against imports, and by limiting immigration through restrictive quotas.

liv

Even into the 1930's, America was an introvert, determined to remain neutral and isolated. The isolationism led to repudiation

of the League of Nations and to reversing the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine with the Good Neighbor Policy (this meant

lv

hands off Latin America). Wilson folly led to Roosevelt hesitation in mobilizing opinion. Gerald P. Nye and his Senate committee met

from 1934 to 1936, blaming bankers (for loaning $2 billion to the Allies by April, 1917) and the munitions industry ("merchants of death"

lvi

who did $3.2 billion in trade with France and Britain in 1916) for protecting their own selfish interests. Since these loans and the ships

carrying American passengers and munitions into the war zone were believed responsible for pushing America into the first war, these

lvii

were now forbidden by the Neutrality Acts (1935, 1936, 1937). When Japan attacked China in the summer of 1937, FDR responded

with a speech (October, 1937) about the need to "quarantine the aggressors," and the Neutrality Act (1937) permitted the sale of

munitions to belligerents should they pay cash and carry the goods in their own ships. In 1938, Germany annexed Austria after a staged

revolt there (the Anschluss) and obtained the cession of the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia (by the appeasement at Munich, which

lviii

America tolerated).

Then, in 1939, Germany occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia and allied itself with Italy (who invaded Albania). Finally, Congress

4



passed laws in June, 1939, enabling the stockpiling of strategic materials, creating the Defense Plant Corporation (DPC)--to construct

defense plants with Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) loans for the manufacture of military goods--and the preparing of

contracts along technical specifications. In August, Russia and Germany agreed in their non-aggression pact to divide Europe into

spheres of influence without fighting each other, and FDR appointed the War Resources Board (WRB) to evaluate industrial

lix

mobilization. The Industrial Mobilization Plan of the military recommended WRB to advise the Army and Navy Munitions Board.

Edward R. Stettinius, chairman of United States Steel, headed WRB, and the first director of the home front in two months time organized

lx

a report and disbanded, a trial balloon testing interests on Wall Street. World War II began with the German attack on Poland on

September 1, 1939, America announcing neutrality, although an arms embargo was soon lifted and a contract taken to manufacture

lxi lxii

4,700 airplanes for Britain and France. In September, 1939, 90% of Americans wished to avoid war, and 80% wished the Allies to win.

Despite rising demand for food and munitions, national income in 1939 had not recovered to 1929 levels, nine million were sti ll

lxiii

unemployed, and defense spending was but 1.4% of Gross National Product (GNP), some $1.24 billion. . Harry Woodring, the

Secretary of War and an incapable misfit, was outflanked in October by Louis A. Johnson, the assistant secretary. The national

commander of the American Legion, Johnson expected to succeed Woodring shortly. Johnson announced his plan that with war the

War Resources Board (WRB) should be empowered to manage mobilization. The WRB was to avoid the secretary of war by reporting

to Johnson, thus making him the head of mobilization. Johnson thus could review the plan for mobilization and supervise the Budget

Bureau, Natural Resources Planning Board, Office for Government Reports, and the Liaison Office for Personnel Management. FDR,

lxiv

however, stalled.

While isolationists may have feared a push into war, Europe had pretty much already fallen by summer, 1940, and America no

longer appeared so remote from the planes, tanks, and fifth columns. The question became how to manage the mobilization, organize

the military, and acquire the munitions. FDR feared leaving it to business leaders, but the assumption seemed that government could

not manage things as well, that socialization bred indifference. Government, accordingly, had to sign business to contracts, capitalize

reconversion, guarantee markets and earnings. The risk of inflation would necessitate price controls and rationing, and big business

lxv

would simply be left dominant in the postwar economy.

On May 16, 1940, FDR told Congress that America required 50,000 planes a year instead of the present 12,000, a 70% more

lxvi

warship tonnage for a two-ocean navy, and $900 million appropriated. FDR established the National Defense Advisory Commission

lxvii

(NDAC) based on a law from 1916; it lasted seven months. The Council of National Defense was cabinet officers. NDAC brought in

lxviii

William S. Knudsen (president of General Motors) as chairman, although he had very little authority. NDAC brought aboard some

dollar-a-year men who were experts in their fields--Knudsen in industrial production, Sidney Hillman of the Congress of Industrial

Organizations (CIO) for labor, Donald M. Nelson (Sears) to coordinate defense purchases, and others for prices, consumers, agriculture,

and transport. NDAC may have been organized to calm the fears of business that it faced high taxes and a deaf ear, but it was too weak

lxix

and ambivalent. In May, 1940, $2 billion was let in contracts, George C. Marshall was named as head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

two Republicans were brought into the cabinet--Henry L. Stimson (Secretary of War) and Frank Knox (Secretary of the Navy)--to broaden

lxx

the support of mobilization.

In June, 1940, FDR enlisted the scientists (actually, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics began in 1915) as the

National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) was established with Dr. Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution,

lxxi lxxii

presiding. NDRC coordinated military research and oversaw contracts let for technical needs. Shortly, California Institute of

Technology worked on rockets, Princeton on ballistics, and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution on underwater sound and

lxxiii

explosives. A letter from Albert Einstein to FDR in August concerning atomic energy led first to an advisory committee on uranium and

lxxiv

then on to the Manhattan Project. A reorganization in May, 1941, left James B. Conant, president of Harvard, over NDRC to set policy,

while Bush moved to the newly created Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) to supervise the grants for research at

lxxv

universities. They either encouraged, created or modified: radar, sonar, the proximity fuse, the bazooka, the blood plasma process,

the atomic bomb, antibiotics, flying suits, pressurizing B-29 cabins, and using microwaves to position bombers over targets. They also

lxxvi

obtained draft exemptions for 9,000 key people.

lxxvii

The direction which lay ahead was not clear for America in the summer of 1940, and only 35 per cent favored aid to Britain.

Begun in May of that year, the nonpartisan Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies under William A. White numbered 300

lxxviii

branches by July. Their poll showed that two-thirds of their sample believed that only aid to the Allies could prevent American

involvement in the war. In July, the America First Committee organized in reaction under people such as General Robert E. Wood (of

Sears) and Charles Lindbergh, but their brand of isolationism did not enlist labor, blacks, or intellectuals while communists and fascists

lxxix

joined up (they earned a sort of crackpot image). Drives were mounted for Britain, now fighting for survival, and some Americans

lxxx

enlisted. In fact, so many Texans flew with the Royal Canadian Air Force that British pilots renamed it the "Royal Texas Air Force." In

July, the Pan-American Conference signed a pact for common defense, and FDR asked Congress to appropriate about $4 billion for

defense. In August, the United States and Canada formed the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, and some national guard units went

lxxxi lxxxii

into federal service. FDR campaigned for a third term against Hitler, that his threat called for preparedness and aid to the Allies.

FDR never used the plan for mobilizing from the first war (the War Industries Board), and neither business nor military interfered with his

economic policies. Railroad cars were not built, rubber and brass were not stockpiled, defense appropriations were cut. Because FDR

knew that Americans favored neutrality and isolation, he was blasted by Wendell Willkie during the presidential campaign of 1940 for

lxxxiii

putting politics ahead of preparedness. However, after France fell, Congress agreed to make money available for defense and to

lxxxiv

enact the draft. In September, 1940, the Selective Service Act imposed conscription, and FDR sent fifty old destroyers to Britain in

return for leases to build military bases on British possessions in this hemisphere. Roosevelt claimed that it was a swell deal, for the

lxxxv

bases would guard America and the unneeded ships would protect Britain. At Christmas, 1940, America was divided and uncertain.

Nearly all of 1941 was required to recover from false starts and bad judgment. In January, FDR asked Congress for $11 billion

for defense, which the Office of Production Management (OPM) was founded to coordinate, Knudsen moving over to head it from the

lxxxvi

NDAC, which became extinct. A committee report in 1937 had recommended the Office of Emergency Management, and it was later

lxxxvii

put on paper as a sort of war presidency, the liaison between president and defense agencies; OPM was now put under it. Knudsen,

Director General of OPM, brought dollar-a-year men into his agency from General Motors, American Telephone & Telegraph, and Union

Pacific (Dollar-a-year men were on loan to the government while remaining on corporate payrolls. Government, it was thought, might

never have attracted the caliber of expertise had they been paid at the going rates in governmental service. The question of loyalty or

lxxxviii

conflict of interest, which might well concern us today, seemed not a problem then). Winston Churchill had asked for the tools to

5



lxxxix

finish the job. FDR said that the United States was unprepared for the task itself, that Britain needed more supplies than they could

xc

afford. Under the Lend-Lease Act (March, 1941), Congress soon appropriated $7 billion in vital materials for Britain ($50 billion total for

xci xcii

the Allies during the war). The American economy, at least, entered the war as the "arsenal of democracy." When Russia was later

xciii

invaded, even it received lend-lease to keep it in the war, a billion dollars worth by November. Cash and carry was long gone, for the

xciv

Allies could get munitions even after their money ran out. War production was contracted with industry, and the OPM officials

responsible for the task were soon criticized for favoritism, waste, red tape, and scandal. Also in March, 1941, the National Defense

Mediation Board (NDMB) was established to deter anticipated wage disputes that might hamper vital war production. Stiff bidding for raw

materials drove up their cost and required price regulation, which in April, 1941, became the domain of the Office of Price Administration

xcv

and Civilian Supply (OPACS). By now, the government had commandeered management, materials, and labor, and as prices rose, it

xcvi

put in controls to protect consumers. OPM was unequal to the task, for: (1) it had no priorities and neither determined needs,

purchased supplies, or let contracts; (2) it was short on steel, aluminum, rubber, machine tools, and refineries for 100-octane aviation

gasoline at a time of need for Britain, Russia, and America; (3) it required 120 days to process lend-lease orders; and (4) it was feuding

xcvii

in Washington with other agencies. Correctly, the Truman Committee--a Senate committee which spotted waste and

corruption--criticized cost-plus contracts, business tax breaks, the concentration by business on consumer products and the hoarding of

raw material inventories toward that end, the awarding of most defense contracts to big businesses and in few areas of the country, and

the poverty of work on industrial capacity or in coordination of policy (In December, 1940, Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers said

that half of the automobile production capacity was excess and could be converted to manufacturing airplanes. Aircraft production was

limited by shortages of materials and machine tools. By not building a new model car for 1941, the skilled mechanics would be freed to

build the needed machine tools. William S. Knudsen of NDAC agreed. However, no one acted; factories did not tool up. Finally, 38.7

xcviii

per cent of military production by automobile companies was of aircraft). After eight months of independent existence, OPM was

absorbed by the new Supply Priorities and Allocation Board (SPAB) under Donald M. Nelson, which failed in its own right by the end of

xcix

the year to untangle bottlenecks over raw materials. SPAB was supposed to set policy, OPM to run operations.

In 1941, FDR went slowly, afraid to get too far ahead of public opinion, for Americans wished to remain out of the war. In

January, he spoke to Congress about the moral order which aggression threatened and about upholding four freedoms--freedom from

c

want and fear, freedom of speech and expression--in asking for lend-lease. By April, two-thirds favored aid to Britain even at the risk of

ci

war. Over the summer, FDR declared a state of unlimited national emergency, occupied Greenland and Iceland, and froze Japanese

cii

assets in America after their occupation of French Indo-China. In August, FDR met Churchill aboard a British ship off Newfoundland,

ciii civ

and isolation ended. Their Atlantic Charter called for equal rights, the people's rights to self determination, and world security.

Trouble brewed when American convoys sailed into the war zones and when the naval patrols broadcast the locations of German ships

cv

to the British. By October, 1941, ten merchant ships were sunk, and 100 Americans had died. Two destroyers were also attacked, and

cvi

the Reuben James took another 100 men down with her. FDR soon ordered the navy to shoot back, and he asked Congress to arm

cvii cviii

merchant ships and to send lend-lease supplies to Russia. The war in the Atlantic was undeclared. British fliers trained in America,

cix

and enemy ships seized were handed over to the British. After the military received top priority in 1940, government financed new

plants and converted old ones. It conserved raw materials. Munitions production increased by 225 per cent in 1941, despite political

cx

bickering over economic mobilization. This trend employed more than five million workers by year's end, a million of them holding new

cxi

jobs and some women and blacks among their number. Military camps were boom towns. For instance, Camp Blanding, Florida

cxii cxiii

employed 20,000 workers at $3 million a month. Any debate ended with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Japan wanted the Dutch, British, and French colonies in Asia, and once they went to war in Europe, it set out to acquire those

cxiv

lands. Japan, the dominant power in Asia, saw America interfering in its sphere of influence. The United States held Pacific

possessions, too, and was allied with Australia and New Zealand, who were fighting the Axis Powers. Tokyo had aligned itself with

Germany and Italy. Roosevelt had earlier stopped the sale of scrap metal to Japan, and after the invasion of French Indo-China, the

United States froze Japanese assets in America (lest they go to support aggression) and ended oil shipments. When 90% of its oil supply

cxv

was cut off, Japan would surely seize the Dutch East Indies for its oil. America demanded that Japan leave China, and it sent aid to

China. A group of American pilots, the Flying Tigers, led by Claire Chennault, went to China where it flew P-40's under the Chinese flag

against the Japanese. The peace government in Japan fell from power, replaced by the warlords under General Hideki Tojo. These

warlords decided that the best way to establish a greater Japan was to destroy the American fleet in the Pacific which was stationed in

cxvi

Hawaii at Pearl Harbor.

Japanese diplomats were sent to Washington where they pretended to strive for peace (until an hour after the attack began on

cxvii

Pearl Harbor, according to FDR's address to Congress on December 8, 1941). Tojo actually ordered the attack on November 25,

1941, and a fleet of six aircraft carriers and surface support under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto sailed undetected across 3,500 miles of

cxviii

ocean to strike on December 7, 1941. The Japanese maintained radio silence (else the Americans, who had broken their codes with

cxix

"Magic," could have known their intentions). Early on the morning of December, 7, 1941, the six carriers launched 353 planes, and

they destroyed the Pacific Fleet in two hours--16 ships sank and others were damaged, six airfields were bombed and 400 planes on

cxx

them destroyed, 5,000 casualties inflicted--all at a cost of 29 planes, one submarine and five midget submarines, and about 100 dead.

cxxi

The United States declared war the next day, and Italy and Germany declared war on the United States on December 11th.

Meanwhile, the Japanese ran over Hong Kong, Malaya, the Philippines, Burma, China, and the Dutch East Indies. Douglas MacArthur

was ordered out of the Philippines, and 130,000 Americans and Filipinos (who ran out of ammunition and finally ate their mules)

cxxii

surrendered at Bataan and Corregidor, many of them dying on the infamous death march to a prison camp 85 miles away.



IV. The War on the Homefront



MOBILIZATION

"Mobilization" is organizing for war, a period when troops are called up and trained, when ships and tanks are manned and made

ready. But mobilization also involves the home front, particularly economic expansion: (1) building new plants and converting existing

capacity to war production; (2) planning for ways to schedule production, recruit labor, acquire raw materials, and arrange transportation,

cxxiii

and (3) controlling inflation through wage ceilings and bond drives and making distribution fair through price controls and rationing.

Since the American military, politicians, foreign policy, and businesses are not typically part of an organized team, they, too, must be

cxxiv

converted to war footing. Such "reckoning with people" is called politics and requires compromises and leadership. Mobilization

6



requires such direction to unite and energize the effort.

During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson led forcefully when he: (1) organized all resources through a draft board to tap

manpower, the Council of National Defense to control industry (through the War Industries Board), and other agencies for fuel, food, and

railroads; (2) financed the costs of defense largely through liberty loans and inflation (although the rich paid higher taxes ); and (3)

encouraged loyalty when public opinion and preparedness lagged, George Creel's Committee on Public Information setting the standard

for persuading a nation to hate. On the home front civilians bought Liberty bonds, planted Victory gardens, rolled bandages for the Red

Cross, and organized anti-vice committees near army camps. That mobilization succeeded was clear, for by the time of the Armistice,

a quarter of the Gross National Product (GNP) was for defense, and the national debt increased from $1 to $20 billion from 1915 to 1920.

cxxv

The pattern was set for mobilization in the second war.

While Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and the United States may well be blamed for being unprepared for the second war, the

seeds had been planted earlier by Woodrow Wilson. Americans fought the war to "make the world safe for democracy," only to learn that

the world did not seem to care. After the first war, America rejected the treaty and membership in the League of Nations, erected barriers

cxxvi

against imports and immigrants, and remained neutral and isolated in the 1920's and 1930's. The Senate committee led by Gerald

Nye accused bankers and "merchants of death" of selfishness, and ships carrying passengers and munitions into the war zone were

blamed for pushing America into the war. The neutrality acts of the mid 1930's forbade any repetition. Japan attacked China in 1937,

Germany annexed Austria in 1938, and Germany seized Czechoslovakia in 1939. America slowly moved to stockpile strategic materials

and to build defense plants but avoided war when Poland was attacked. Defense spending was but 1.4 per cent of GNP in 1939 ($1.24

billion). Europe had nearly fallen by summer, 1940, and America no longer seemed so remote. FDR ran against Hitler in 1940, but the

popular desire for neutrality mediated against much preparedness. After France fell, Congress finally enacted the draft. FDR exchanged

50 destroyers with Britain in return for bases on British possessions in this hemisphere. At Christmas, 1940, America was divided and

cxxvii

uncertain.

The key thing about American mobilization for World War II is that it somehow worked, but it is hard now to see why. The genius

of FDR was to recognize that mobilizing America depended on spontaneity and democracy rather than on government, and he put his

faith in a sort of unorganized momentum. Because FDR liked to tinker with things to see how they ran, mobilization operated more by

inertia than by blueprint. When he created agencies without clear authority, FDR often delegated responsibility to their administrators

but withheld the power to achieve goals. Accordingly, results fell short of expectations. When a department did not work, FDR began

a second, competing bureau without dissolving the first one because he figured that competition brought out the most effort from both

cxxviii

agencies. The unfortunate political appointees tended to become scapegoats.

The home front makes an interesting tale, at least a minor heroic epic. When the Dutch surrendered and America moved up to

nineteenth on the scale of world military power, it was a miracle that her mobilization kept Britain and Russia in the war and helped defeat

cxxix

the Axis. But there were costs associated with producing those 300,000 airplanes and 86,000 tanks. Geoffrey Perrett wrote that

cxxx

300,000 defense workers died and a million more were hurt in war plants, about as many American casualties as on the battlefield.

Moreover, many small businesses did not participate in the economic miracle, 112,000 Japanese-Americans were victims of mobilizing

cxxxi

public opinion, and groups such as women and blacks did not join fully in the effort to mobilize all the national resources.

ATHENS

In 1941, the front pages of the Athens Review included the war along with the usual news. Either a cartoon or a photograph with

a caption tapped from the wire emphasized the need for continued peace amidst the growing dangers of war or for unity and patriotism,

especially in support of defense preparedness. For instance, President Roosevelt was pictured calling for lend-lease aid for Britain, and

eight cartoons which followed explained the details. And, the Japanese threat was caricatured in six cartoons, often as a funny little man

with buck teeth and poor eyesight. War and national news before Pearl Harbor was decidedly more graphic than verbal, but fewer

cartoons appeared afterward in the newspaper, probably since readers could now imagine the war on their own and found little humor in

it. Whether these cartoons and pictures reflected public opinion or persuaded it, they tended toward some mobilization of hearts and

cxxxii

minds in Athens.

As was true elsewhere in America in 1941, Henderson County mobilized for an uncertain future. The local Texas National

Guard, an anti-tank unit of 73 men, had already been called up to serve for a year and was moved from Fair Park at Dallas to Camp Bowie

(Brownwood, Texas). News about them was front-page material. In their absence, a home guard unit with 61 of their elders was

organized as the Texas Defense Guard. Henderson County sent 141 men in the draft from November, 1940 to August, 1941. They were

frequently newsworthy as they went off--they were listed by name, their progress was often reported on, their letters from camp published.

The draft system and the Review grouped the draftees as either "white" or "colored." When some forty blacks volunteered in November

for the draft in the county, the army was unable to place them, driving the chairman of the draft board to write a letter begging the services

to take the men. Enlistments, promotions, and recruiting were also noted by the Review. In July, nearly 800 men from the county were

cxxxiii

in the military.

When volunteers departed in January, 1941, Henderson County draft board chairman J. P. Pickens addressed them and was

followed by board member W. E. Phillips who spoke about being called to the colors. Phillips expressed his opinion that the nation would

not go to war, but that it was wise to prepare just in case. That sort of early, tentative feeling characterized the mobilization in 1941. The

brickyard hired more workers in January because of defense orders (for example, a new steel plant at Houston needed 1,800 rail cars

of fire brick; by comparison, only 293 cars of tomatoes were shipped that season). Texas oil producers, according to their full-page

advertisements, could supply an additional 150 million barrels of oil a year for the war, even to manufacture new things like TNT. The

American Legion registered all veterans in February, helping to "survey defense assets." In September, the county United States

Department of Agriculture Defense Board asked farmers to expand food production in 1942 by 50% in vegetable production and by five

cxxxiv

times more peanuts (for fats and oils).

Draft registration requirements, unclear in the first place, changed continually. When Texas had met two-thirds of the quota for

the year by March, Pickens warned draft registrants not to quit their job or sell a car too soon, because many failed the physical. A May

release noted that deferments were granted to defense workers, an inducement to find an "essential" job, often for twice as m uch. The

draft quota was expected to increase in 1942. Men aged 28 and older were deferred in July, but all men aged 21 to 35 still had to register.

cxxxv

Marriage was no longer sufficient to avoid the draft by September.

Various other steps were taken toward preparedness. Defense bonds (priced from $17.50 to $750), netted $2,500 on the first

day in Athens and were advertised daily thereafter. A drive to collect aluminum pots and pans for the Office of Production Management

7

(OPM) was begun in June, managed by the Jaycees, and the Boy Scouts and a movie raised some 500 pounds. Henderson County civic

leaders and businessmen organized a county unit of the National Defense Council. Drives were also mounted to enlist contributions of

time and money for the United Service Organization (USO) and the Red Cross. The Aircraft Warning Service Council under chairman

J. P. Pickens was formed in August to staff some 15 civil defense posts in the county, each to enlist about 15 or 20 people. The Review

also frequently reported on military units as well as individuals who visited, or even passed through, town. For instance, the trainer that

made an emergency landing in a field and broke the landing gear had to be trucked back to San Antonio, which was news for nearly a

cxxxvi

week.

Some mobilization of opinion had surely occurred, as can be seen in the tempest over labor strikes in defense plants. The

Review believed that the main enemy was labor and not the Axis Powers. It printed a series of cartoons which became increasingly

pointed so that by November 19th, the labor unions at defense plants were called "racketeers." The local civic clubs sent petitions

condemning these strikes by letter and telegram to Texan representatives in Washington as well as to the Review. The main theme in

these messages was that while draftees suffered along at $21 a month and had no choice, the strikers were not doing their part in the

defense effort. FDR seemed to leave this for the National Defense Mediation Board, but Congressman Nat Patton wrote back fast and

hard, "...We can not see any reason to let these Communistic, low-down, fifth column, unpatriotic elements strike as they please, tying

up defense industry, stopping the flow of modern arms and equipment to our boys and spiking the very program for which we asked them

to make these sacrifices." When Martin Dies, the representative from Beaumont and chairman of the House Un-American Activities

Committee, visited Athens, he associated labor strikers with seven million members of a fifth column within America. An Office of

Production Management (OPM) official later rapped both defense industry and labor for selfishness, concluding that mass production for

cxxxvii

defense was still 100 days away.

On December 4, 1941, the Review editorial opposed entering the war and the third term for FDR. On December 8, following the

cxxxviii

attack on Pearl Harbor, the Review had limited information and reaction. The "defense" plants at Cross Roads and Trinidad were

thought vulnerable to sabotage by enemy agents (Texas Power and Light Company--TP&L--supplied power to several aircraft factories),

and Sheriff Jess Sweeten offered to deputize any additional guards who were needed. Concern was expressed over the safety of local

boys caught in the war zone. The way the Review saw it, America would win; the Japanese attacked to divert lend-lease aid from Britain

and Russia long enough for Germany to win in Europe, after which they expected to join together in an all-out war with America. On

December 9, the Review called upon readers to serve as air-raid and fire wardens, military police, radio operators. Reservists readied

themselves. One of them, Jimmy Davis said, "I don't want to fight, but now I feel like I should. I'm ready when my orders come. We have

to whip the Japs." In short order, OPM limited the sale of tires, the local Defense Council met several times, and it launched a new scrap

drive. A subsequent editorial complained that OPM officials wasted scarce copper, steel, and money when they duplicated TP&L lines

from Possum Kingdom dam. The Review began to give casualty reports for county men by month's end. The first man killed in action

cxxxix

was probably David Clark, Junior, who was 17 when he graduated from Trinidad High School the preceding spring. John L. DeWitt

cxl

was pictured after he claimed that Japanese planes were seen over San Francisco.

The home front in Henderson County mobilized for real early in 1942, just as it did elsewhere across America. Backbone of the

local effort was the Henderson County Civil Defense Council, which relayed directions from the Office of Civilian Defense. The Defense

Council: (1) pushed salvage efforts; (2) thought over how to call out the Defense Guard if needed; (3) appointed members to sit on the

Tire Rationing Board; (4) may have discussed how to certify training for child care workers; and (5) organized a county-wide blackout from

8:30 to 9:00 P. M. on January 23, 1942. OPM stopped all new car sales, tires were scarce, too, and both cars and tires were due to be

rationed. Well, the Review may have editorialized about getting back at Japan, about not hoarding scarce items, about slackers not doing

their part, but it reserved plenty of energy to label tire bootleggers as part of the fifth column and to tell horror stories about thefts of tires.

R. T. Craig, of the Tire Rationing Board, supervised the distribution of just nine tires for the whole county in May; retreads became

necessary. The blackout was a very serious air raid precaution, and the Review even showed readers the insignia patch that air-raid

cxli

wardens wore, lest any question their authority to order lights darkened.

Gathering momentum showed in little things. All trucks and buses in the state were surveyed for possible use in a "defense

emergency." Bond drives--"Buy defense stamps and bonds"--continued, and there were recruiting for the armed services, registration for

the draft, and registration of all aliens, too. The country went on war time (daylight savings time), and local businesses operated from 8:00

A. M. to 6:00 P. M. Sugar was rationed. Death notices of county boys appeared in the Review. When draft rules changed, the draft board

reclassified all men. J. P. Pickens, draft board chairman, warned men who wished to choose where they served to volunteer before they

were drafted. Once drafted, they could not be released by the draft board--it would never meet the quota and this would also be unfair

to other men who would have to be drafted earlier to fill the vacant slot. 1,500 men registered, many who were in the new brackets 20-21

cxlii

and 35-44, and married men were drafted. Gas stations paid a cent per pound for scrap rubber during the drive in the last half of June.

Two local-boys-made-good, Clint Murchison and Toddie Lee Wynne, began building a pipeline across Florida (the American Liberty

cxliii

Pipeline Company) where oil was not vulnerable to German submarines.

In the last half of 1942, the rules changed again on the draft, price ceilings, and tire rationing. Among others, drives continued

to collect rubber, sell bonds, and raise funds for the USO. 3,000 attended a patriotic rally, and 84 tons of rubber were collected in the

county. The theater advertised heroic-type war movies. Fewer cartoons and pictures about war appeared, as the Review had plenty of

local stories and needed less filler material. Athens must have gotten the war news from the radio, because the Review keyed on local

cxliv

events and local people.

Most of the words that young men facing the draft read in the Review had a definite patriotic, public relations flavor. The letters

from the war front that were printed seemed to always put the best face on things. No matter what they read in the local newspaper, Ernie

Pyle wrote that the experience once overseas was different. Soldiers felt tired and forgotten, cold and afraid, bored and lonely. Mainly,

they just wanted to get home, and they lived on their memories of it. They shared their family pictures with the others. "W hite Christmas"

cxlv

was the favorite song of the war, hardly the sort of over there marching song. Many families tried very hard to send a piece of home

over to their men. They wrote many letters, knitted them sweaters, and sent them some home cooking, which used much of the sugar

cxlvi

ration.

When draft registration extended to ages 18 to 20, about 1,000 more men from the county were added to the rolls. Beginning

in November, 1942, local women were recruited as well by the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. Women aged 21 to 45 who served in

cxlvii

support roles would release men for combat.

If people were still feeling their way in 1942, the reality of war sank in by 1943. Drives collected: (1) books for the army; (2) scrap,

8

tires, tin cans; (3) used household fats; and (4) money for the Red Cross, USO, and Victory Fund (the new battleship "Texas" required

$100 million). The Red Cross also recruited volunteers for sewing, made bandages at the library (2,000 one week), and helped individual

soldiers and families at critical moments. Recruiting went on for defense workers, such as the training course with the National Youth

Administration in Waco where girls received $10.80 a week plus room and board and were afterward placed in defense plants making

aircraft. The WAVES and SPARS campaigned to fill their ranks, too. Early in 1943, nearly 2,000 who were from the county were in the

cxlviii

armed services, the Review praising this as a leading percentage for Texas.

Clearly, the war occupied center stage. It shaped the climate of opinion and intensified feelings. Cautions were printed against

hoarding, about shortages in gas and tires, and about revealing the location of their men overseas (for fear that spies might learn

locations of ships and regiments). When a thief killed 12 hogs that ranged along the Trinity River, taking only the hams, Sheriff Jess

Sweeten went looking for the "saboteur." When Kiwanis met, several served on the Special War Committee. Coca-Cola advertisements

in the Review featured WAVES or a defense worker rolling up his sleeves, showing that patriots refreshed with five-cent Cokes. Full-page

messages called upon people to buy bonds or to pay only the legal price and not patronize black-market operators. Selective Service

cxlix

was tightening requirements on delinquents who should have registered.

Even the farming operations in the area were affected by the war. Across the land farm workers were deemed "essential" and

deferred from the draft, because food was needed for the military and lend-lease. Despite this, farm population fell in Henderson County,

as it did elsewhere, by some six million for the nation during the war. Since many of the men had left for defense plants or the military,

only the aged and some inexperienced city boys were available for farm labor. Women went into the fields. The farm labor shortage was

viewed as critical enough that when the WACs were recruiting, they advised that women in agriculture should remain on the farm.

Harvests, abundant thanks to good weather, drew hordes of women, children, braceros (Mexican workers), and prisoners-of-war. Spare

parts to keep machines running were scarce as well, and farmers had to improvise to make their machines work. Given fewer workers,

22% of the cultivated land in the country was shifted to pasture. More intensive use of machines and fertilizer on the remainder increased

output per acre and per worker, doubling farm income. Farmers in Texas especially tried to increase their peanut production for the war

cl

effort. The Farm Mobilization Committee supervised the Food for Freedom program for the county.

War brought another new thing to many American families--the income tax. The war was expensive, of course, and half of the

money spent on it was raised by tax collections during the war of $156 billion. Because of higher pay and overtime, the average earnings

doubled during the war. These increased earnings and lower exemptions shoved the number of taxpayers from seven to 42 million.

When the new taxpayers did not save enough to be able to pay their taxes, payroll withholding was begun. The Review assured readers

that it could explain income taxes to them so that they could file in only five minutes. The highest bracket for individuals was 94 per cent

cli

for the very rich, and businesses with heavy excess profits paid 90 per cent.

Mobilization actually peaked in 1942, although production lagged behind the drawing board. 1943 was the year that the war on

the home front was won. FDR set the priority on the manufacture of planes, aviation gas, and escort vessels. Factory and shipyard were

at full production, making, for example, 86,000 aircraft. The War Department claimed that during a week in January, 70,000 bombs and

27,000 machine guns were manufactured, part of the equipment that was coming out at about three-and-a-half times the rate of the year

clii

before. The railroads had pooled their lines and hauled twice the freight and three times the passengers as in 1940.

War not only mobilized the American economy but the lives of ordinary people as well, and many soon changed location,

occupation, and life style. About 12 million were in the armed services when it reached the maximum size, and these people plus about

cliii

another 15 million more moved closer to military bases or war jobs. So, nearly a fifth of the nation moved because of the war. When

the war heated the economy, GNP doubling to about $213 billion in 1945, the labor force expanded from about 56 million to nearly 65

cliv clv

million workers. 84% of the men over 14 either worked or joined the armed forces, and women went to work, too. War plants added

second and third shifts, increased their number of employees, and sometimes even hired back their retired workers. The average work

week lengthened from 37.7 to 46.6 hours. Because the towns with defense industry filled up, and little new home construction went on,

the housing shortages often forced these workers either to commute or to share beds on shifts. So many of their children crowded into

clvi

the schools, that some of them had to introduce shifts, too.

Those who shaped local public opinion began looking ahead in 1943. The Review commented on the draft of all men 18 to 37,

married or not. It was unwise to build up the military to 12 million men so quickly, for it would not be possible to equip or to transport such

a force. It would be better instead to send more food and arms to the Allies while a more measured mobilization continued. When J. P.

Pickens spoke at the Rotary Club on February 23, he said that: (1) businessmen had to contribute to the work for peace or it would never

be just or lasting if left to the politicians; (2) places must be found for veterans in business life upon their return; (3) no unions or other

racketeers should control postwar America; and (4) no silk or beef ought to be imported tariff free. A later editorial saw the need for

clvii

planning for after the war so that the county might absorb defense workers and veterans.

Full mobilization was surely achieved by 1944, it seemed to readers of the Review. 3,000 people from the county were away in

the military, and the newspaper chronicled their transfers, promotions, letters home, and deaths. The readers were led to anticipate

D-day and a postwar world, to deplore any stirring of the social pot such as outside interference in handling blacks. Really, they

clviii

mentioned very little about blacks, conscientious objectors, or the Japanese-Americans.

On the national scene the edge wore off. Earlier, people stayed home to sew, read books, and cook, or they went somewhere

to a movie or nightclub which required little gasoline. They stood in lines waiting at the bus stop, theater, and bank. But money was more

plentiful by now, and rationing less harsh. Shopping at the new kind of store, the supermarket, was more popular, victory gardening less

so. By the end of the year, defense plants experienced strikes and production fell off because workers left jobs in anticipation of peace.

In December, 1944, the Battle of the Bulge scared army brass into telling rumors about shell shortages and demanding that all men have

either to work or fight. In the election of 1944, voter polls and political action committees first appeared. The succession went to a senator

who investigated the war, and the health of FDR and his conduct of the war were not issues. FDR mainly chose Harry Truman to help

clix

him carry the future peace treaty through the Senate and not repeat the Wilson experience after the first war.

Small towns such as Athens and rural areas such as Henderson County exported people toward the war effort. Nationwide, 16

million left for military service, ten million of them drafted, and one in eight saw combat. When war mobilized the American economy, the

large part of defense contracts went to about a hundred companies. As scarce materials were allocated for war goods, many smaller

businesses dried up. Accordingly, many from rural Texas moved toward the shipyards or refineries on the Gulf Coast or, perhaps, toward

defense plants in larger cities such as North American in Dallas or Consolidated Aircraft in Fort Worth. But the war came to East Texas,

clx

too. At least 74 gold service stars showed in front windows of homes across Henderson County by the end of the war. These families

9

clxi

read telegrams which began "The War Department regrets to inform you that your son..."

Readers of the Review in 1945 saw many of the same sorts of accounts of the missing and wounded, notices of deaths and

medals earned, letters from prisoners-of-war, and drives for the Red Cross and war bonds. Shortages continued in tires, meat, lard, and

clxii

sugar. By February, a returning veteran could read about getting a loan under the GI Bill to start a business.

This story of mobilization in World War II tried to tell about ordinary people during the war. Mobilization mainly reached the home

front through the rationing board and the draft board, and this local control made it ever so much more effective. They participated in the

local civil defense as air-raid wardens. They conserved scarce resources and did not spread rumors. They stood ready to fight fires or

to nurse casualties. They served as OPA wardens. They donated 13 million pints of blood. From Henderson County, nearly a tenth of

the people served in the armed forces, and no evidence suggested that there were any conscientious objectors. Red tape so plagued

clxiii

war mobilization that "snafu" was invented, and those who broke all the rules, like Henry J. Kaiser, became the heroes. Some

accounts blamed generals or poor whites or politicians, but little evidence pointed to any alienation of popular support in Athens. The

clxiv

Review gushed with civic-club enthusiasm, and memories remain positive.



RATIONING

Besides the draft, nothing reached into more homes, drew as much newsprint, or had as many confusing explanations as

rationing. Because of mobilization for war, governmental spending moved from about $9 billion in 1939 to about $98.4 billion in 1945.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, expenditures ran about $2 billion a month on defense, and this climbed to $6 billion a month by November,

1943, when two-thirds of all goods produced were for the military. In 1942, a third of GNP went for defense, and 42 per cent of GNP went

clxv

to defense in 1944. The number of people in the armed services, meantime, rose from about 1.5 million in 1941 to about 12 million

by the end of the war. Consider that: (1) in 1940, just $2.2 billion was spent on defense out of a GNP of $100 billion; (2) that wartime

manufacturing output doubled to build the needed ships, tanks, and guns for the rapidly growing military; (3) that $50 billion in lend-lease

munitions and food was sent to Britain and Russia to keep them in the war. These efforts strained scarce resources in steel, aluminum,

clxvi

rubber, and copper.

How did scarcity influence wartime America? (1) Steel production rose only 8% from 1941 to 1944, and it was thus diverted from

civilian use. The Office of Civilian Supply estimated output for 1943 at 90 million tons, of which a mere quarter of a million tons would go

clxvii

to civilian durable goods. So, the Jaycees went out to farms looking for scrap metal. One could not easily buy a new car, stove, or

refrigerator. (2) Aluminum had been controlled by Aluminum Company of America, which acted to preserve the monopoly that it enjoyed

more than to meet war needs for such things as aircraft. In the long run, Kaiser and Reynolds began operations, but short-run

considerations led to drives such as the one described in the Review on July 22, 1941, where the Jaycees and Boy Scouts gathered some

clxviii

500 pounds from the Athens area. (3) Not much rubber was stockpiled before the war, and then Japan soon held 97% of world natural

rubber sources. Rubber was critical because each tank manufactured required a ton of it, each battleship 75 tons. Tires were rationed

and a national speed limit of 35 miles-per-hour was imposed--both of these measures were to save rubber--as were salvage efforts to

recover old tires. Stopgap effort notwithstanding, 450,000 tons of rubber were salvaged across the country. Later, scientists developed

the requisite chemicals to synthesize rubber from petroleum or grain alcohol (over which oil and farm blocs fought). A committee headed

by Bernard Baruch recommended rationing and a rubber czar. William Jeffers (from Union Pacific) became Rubber Director, the Defense

Plant Corporation funded $700 million into 51 new plants, and synthetic rubber rose from 8,000 tons in 1941 to nearly 800,000 tons in

clxix

1944. (4) Copper was another critical material, required with zinc for brass cartridges as well as for electrical wiring in tanks and

clxx

battleships. Gray pennies were issued to save on copper. Salvage operations collected tin cans to recover the copper. (5) Gasoline

was first rationed in August, 1941, the plan of Harold Ickes, Oil Coordinator for National Defense, to save tires. Gas stations closed at

7:00 P. M., and everyone, accordingly, filled up earlier, jeering at the government because they knew that gas was plentiful. When

shortfalls really did hit the East Coast, an angry public no longer tolerated shipments to Japan (one factor leading toward Pearl Harbor).

Moreover, oil companies and state governments fought rationing, which reduced their revenues. After America was at war, German

submarines sunk nearly 300 ships off the East Coast, many of them tankers carrying oil. The East used some 800,000 barrels daily,

which now had to be shipped by rail and simply required too much of the transportation resources. Soon, a 24-inch pipeline (that would

carry 335,000 barrels a day from Texas to the East) was allocated the steel by the War Production Board. But the public never was told

and so did not understand this situation, because the government decided that these facts would help the enemy. A ban on ple asure

driving flopped. Businesses converted from fuel oil to coal; thermostats in homes were set at sixty degrees during the winter unless the

family members were either very young or elderly. Saving rubber was critical, however, and soon windshields sported gas stamps. "A"

ration cards might buy four gallons a week, "B" cards were defense workers (who got enough to get to work), and "C" cards belonged to

clxxi

doctors or ministers who could buy any amount. (6) Beginning in 1942, other scarce things rationed included shoes, coffee, sugar,

meat, butter, and canned goods. Shoes were rationed at the rate of two pair per person a year because of military requirements. Silk

and nylon stockings were scarce, too, forcing fashionable girls into the use of rayons (which were not nearly as good), body makeup, or

painting a line down their legs where a stocking seam was supposed to be. Nylons, not that common as yet anyway, were sacrificed for

parachutes, and silk (which was not imported in any comparable quantity as before the war) was made into powder bags (the charge

which fired an artillery shell also burned up the bag and left no residue). The meat, needed for the military, too, was limited to two and

a half pounds per person a week. Canned goods were rationed to save the metal. Rationing and price ceilings also extended to

simplifying and standardizing many products from wax paper and paper bags to pumps and control valves. Fewer cigarettes were sold,

clxxii

and whiskey was unavailable by 1944.

Anyhow, some things got scarce during the war. Suddenly spending over $300 billion on national defense--the wartime GNP

doubled--created economic and social consequences. Since the idea was to win the war as fast as possible, and since speed was more

vital than cost, the cost-plus contract allowed the defense industry to get the needed workers by paying well, passing those costs and

enough to cover healthy profits on. Further, the military pretty well let their own contracts and purchased their own materials, and about

clxxiii

two-thirds of this production was exempt from any rationing or price guidelines. Scarcity bid up prices.

While economic rewards may have hastened war mobilization, they also threatened it. Apparently, the danger with rising prices

and wages lay in making weapons more expensive, management more difficult, and society less united. Energy would have to be

diverted to solve increased financing requirements and to lessen the unfairness of higher prices to those groups whose income would

not rise.

Inflation was the concern first to the National Defense Advisory Commission, then the Office of Price Administration and Civilian

10

Supply (OPACS), and finally the Office of Price Administration (OPA) after it split off from OPACS in August, 1941. Harry Hopkins (head

of lend-lease) had found and advanced the career of Leon Henderson, a politician appointed to run OPA. Henderson needed political

skills in battling for price ceilings and rationing, and OPA issued "General Max" in April, 1942 (General Maximum Price Regulations).

OPA was not always fair, but like the draft board, was under local control. 6,000 rationing boards reached into neighborhoods, managed

by men such as R. T. Craig in Athens. Customers used a stamp for rationed items, which dealers presented in turn to wholesalers to

restock shelves. Prices rose 29% from 1939 to 1945, but only 2% after 1943 when OPA froze prices. After Chester Bowles replaced

Henderson in 1943, OPA ran much better. Since OPA opposed the self interest of officials, profiteers, and customers, it was

clxxiv

unpopular.

From the dimensions of scarce resources and the efforts to control them, we turn to the public response. Bond drives

undertaken to raise money for the war also acted to cut buying power, thus relieving upward pressure on prices. Some 85 million

individuals bought $157 billion in bonds during eight loan drives, which raised about half the money that the government spent from 1941

clxxv

to 1945. When Kate Smith broadcast on the radio for 16 hours on September 21, 1943, she sold some $40 million in war bonds.

When the cruiser "Houston" was sunk in the Java Sea with 1,000 men lost, the city of Houston inducted 1,000 men and sold $87 million

in bonds, enough for a new "Houston" and crew, with the $50 million left over applied toward the new carrier "San Jacinto." Defense

clxxvi

stamps costing from ten cents to $5 could be bought, put in a book, and swapped for a bond when $17.50 was accumulated. Other

drives were also launched to conserve scarce resources and to salvage things like scrap metal, rubber tires, aluminum, paper, tin cans,

and fats. Household fats were collected on the home front to make soap, which was scarce, and for use in gunpowder, lubricants, and

clxxvii

synthetic rubber. Victory gardens were planted--maybe six million in April, 1942, and later some 20 million total--that raised about

clxxviii

30 or 40 per cent of all vegetables grown and amounted to eight million tons of food in 1943.

Mobilization on the home front may have caused some shortages but reasonably few consumer sacrifices. America, not

threatened like Russia and Britain, never mobilized like them. The standard of living was not impaired, and civilian consumption actually

increased. Even with the economic controls, businesses earned profits, and people were better off with more pay. Individuals could still

travel, although the buses and trains were always crowded after gas rationing began. Personal earnings doubled while prices rose only

29%. The liquid assets of individuals rose from $50 to $140 billion from the end of 1941 to the end of 1944. While many sacrificed

somewhat, others evaded rationing and price controls. For instance, they bought black market shoes for $7 that OPA priced at $5 or paid

clxxix

$1.25 a pound for ham, twice the OPA price.



V. World War II



After Pearl Harbor the United States joined the Allies as one of about 40 nations who fought about ten in the Axis Powers. The

Latin American countries, however, were not major participants in the war effort. The Allies had determined to focus mainly on Hitler first,

clxxx

as the greater danger, in the event of a two-front war.

The United States began mobilizing in earnest. Bonds were sold and taxes increased to raise money for the war. Under the

Office of War Mobilization and the War Production Board, American war industry produced: 300,000 aircraft, 76,000 ships, 18 million

rifles, 2.6 million machine guns, and 86,000 tanks during the war. Isolationism ended with Pearl Harbor, and when Hitler had invaded

clxxxi

Russia, Americans even backed sending $11 billion worth of lend-lease there during the war. A very sad outcome of the mobilization

of public opinion was the internment of the Japanese-Americans. In the hysteria following the attack on Pearl Harbor, about 110,000

Nisei, who lived mainly on the West Coast, were sent to guarded camps, to prevent any aid to the enemy during an invasion. Many of

clxxxii

them still served their country proudly. Six million women and a million blacks found wartime jobs, and 200,000 women and a million

clxxxiii

blacks joined the services. The Office of Price Administration rationed cars, tires, gas, sugar, coffee, meat, butter, and tobacco.

clxxxiv

When ceilings were put on the prices of goods, a black market began.

There was little to be pleased with early in 1942, for the Pacific fleet was lost at Pearl Harbor, the best general (Douglas

MacArthur) was beaten in the Philippines, and the enemy overran Europe. America hit back gamely. The first attack on Japan was struck

by the raid of Colonel James Doolittle on Tokyo. On April 18, 1942, the carrier Hornet sailed to within 670 miles of Tokyo and launched

16 B-25's. They bombed Tokyo, causing more psychological than actual damage, and then most of them ran out of fuel and crash-landed

clxxxv

in China. 71 of the 80 men manning the five-man B-25's returned. The raid is described in a book, Thirty Seconds over Tokyo.

By May, 1942, Japan controlled Southeast Asia, and there were only three aircraft carriers with which to harass them on the

clxxxvi

seas. At the first, the Japanese fliers were more experienced, and their airplanes, destroyers, and submarines were better. The

clxxxvii

Japanese tried to invade Australia but were blocked at the Battle of Coral Sea (May 7-8, 1942), and both sides lost two carriers.

clxxxviii

Yamamoto wanted to draw the American fleet out to fight, and he sailed for Hawaii (June, 1942) to invade. In the battle at Midway

Island, the Japanese lost four carriers, 300 airplanes, and 3,500 men to the American losses of one carrier, 150 planes, and 307 men.

The Japanese broke off the invasion for lack of air cover, and this Battle of Midway proved to be the turning point of the war in the Pacific,

clxxxix

for the Japanese lost their air supremacy and would henceforth be on the defensive. In August, 1942, the Japanese tried to take

Guadalcanal, from which they could have bombed the life line to Australia. The marines were landed and took a four by seven mile strip,

cxc

and they resisted the drive to shove them into the sea, inflicting 24,000 casualties at a cost of 3,000.

In March, 1943, American bombers sunk ten Japanese warships and eight transports carrying 7,000 men, and that further

crippled the Japanese navy. Through the use of island-hopping and aircraft carriers, the Americans pushed the Japanese back in the

Pacific theater. The Japanese stubbornly defended each stronghold, and it might have been too costly to root them out of eac h island.

"Island-hopping" consisted of taking just one island in a chain, building an air base on it, and cutting off the other island garrisons from

cxci

further support.

Hitler underestimated American mobilization for war and how much it could send. In what was called the Battle of the Atlantic,

the Germans tried to starve Britain and to keep American war materials from reaching the Allies. In 1941, the German submarines

(U-boats) sank 2.5 million tons of shipping, three times what the British could build. By fall, 1941, American ships were already on convoy

duty (out to Iceland where the British took over) and were shooting back at U-boats. In early 1942, the Germans sank 681 ships, far more

cxcii

than were constructed; 400 ships were lost in American water from January to June, 1942. The Allies needed badly to get lend-lease

materials to Russia to keep it in the war (one in four ships sank before reaching Russia). In early 1943, 106 U-boats in the Atlantic preyed

cxciii

in wolfpacks, and 15 of them sank some 108 ships. But some changes were made. American shipyards replaced the losses with

cxciv

liberty ships, and killer groups were assigned to getting U-boats. Through convoys, not one American soldier died at sea, and

11

submarines did not stop the troop transports from crossing the ocean. The Allies lost over 600 ships in 1942 but just 110 in 1943. During

cxcv

the war, submarines sank 2,575 Allied ships (about 14 million tons of shipping), and 781 of 820 German submarines were sunk.

Early in the war Italy tried to turn the Mediterranean into an Italian lake, while the British concentrated on their life line, the

Atlantic. Thus, the Italian navy was far stronger in the Mediterranean and their army larger in North Africa. 1940 began poorly for the

Italians when they attacked Malta, a tiny island where the British had an air base. They lost nine divisions there in the next half year.

When the Italians bogged down in North Africa, the German general Erwin Rommel was sent with panzers to secure the area. He took

cxcvi

heavy losses and was hard to reinforce and supply, for the submarines and the RAF sank a third of his ships. Rommel pushed the

British under Bernard Montgomery back nearly to the Suez Canal on his way to the oil fields of the Mideast, when (outnumbered in planes

cxcvii

and tanks) he was finally halted at El Alamein in October, 1942. It was the turning point of the war in North Africa, as afterward the

Allies drove out the Germans, inflicting 620,000 Axis losses. An American force under Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton landed in

North Africa, together with the Free French, and the Allies won out by the summer of 1943. Rommel was called home, and 250,000 Axis

troops had to surrender. The Allies would next invade Italy (rather than launch an assault on France) to relieve the pressure on the

cxcviii

Russians. Rommel had three divisions in North Africa, and the Germans had 250 divisions in Russia.

The Allies went on to attack Italy, what Churchill called Europe's "soft underbelly" (the continent was like an alligator). Stalin

demanded a second front to relieve some of the pressure from Russia, and he wanted an invasion in France. But Churchill wanted to

nibble around the periphery and draw down German resources (plus, Italy was weaker and Britain had vital interests to protect in the

Mideast and India). Italy managed to involve only seven of 61 divisions against the Allied invasion, suffered 640,000 troops captured,

and quit the war in July, 1943. When the Allies moved too slowly, the Germans occupied Italy, holding the line in the mountains at places

cxcix

like Monte Cassino. Anzio, a surprise amphibious assault behind German lines, was met with a savage reaction.

America did not enter this war to make the world safe for democracy but rather just to survive and before Japan and Germany

got so entrenched in their empires that they were impossible to root out. Likewise, the American soldier wanted just to survive. Ernie

Pyle was the best at telling about how the Americans felt cold, fear, loneliness, and boredom. The soldiers felt forgotten, and those on

the front did not take off their clothes or boots nor bathe, they slept on the ground outdoors, and they were fed boring rations and paid

cc

seldom. He was called everywhere the GI ("Government Issued"), because that was stamped on every piece of clothes and equipment

that he had. Usually drafted, the GI had not wanted to enter the war, did not want to fight, but once there, little doubted that he would win.

cci

The Americans were quickly trained and well equipped.

After the Battle of Britain the British began some night bombing over France and Germany. American bombers concentrated

ccii

on military targets such as oil depots, factories, and airfields rather than on the raids over cities. Bombing was vitally important in

reducing the enemy's ability to wage war. It destroyed several new German weapons before they were used effectively on a large scale.

The V-1, a pilotless aircraft which flew 400 miles-per-hour and carried a one-ton warhead, was used against British cities. About 2,400

hit London, killing 6,000 and destroying 75,000 buildings. Artillery and fighter planes knocked down the V-1. But the V-2 was a missile

which flew at 8,500 miles an hour for 190 miles, carrying a one-ton bomb, burned liquid oxygen, and could not be stopped. 517 of 1,403

cciii

V-2's hit London, killing 8,000 and causing massive civilian damage, although not much harm to the war effort. The Luftwaffe suffered,

for the attacks on factories, railroads, and oil depots reduced their resupply, and they lost many of their good planes and pilots. With fuel

scarce, pilot training was cut back, and the green pilots of 1944 were easier to knock down. While production for the panzers was

dispersed and near its previous level, the navy and Luftwaffe were nearly destroyed by the end of the war.

cciv

The advantage of air power was even more decisive in the Pacific. The aircraft carriers helped win back control of the skies,

and then the B-29's bombed all the military targets in Japan. The air force destroyed a million tons of Japanese shipping in 1944 and

ccv

afterward dropped the firebombs that burned the cities. Napalm or candied gasoline rushed forth from the bomb and burned. Four

days before Hiroshima, some 855 B-29's burned six cities down. This made rice and gasoline scarce by 1943 and prevented raw

materials from reaching Japan in 1944. The Japanese code, however, was to refuse to surrender.

The war effort began going badly in Germany, but the propaganda was so good that many believed that they were winning.

Germans later claimed that they had not known about the Jews, that the world was against Germany, and that they just defended

ccvi

themselves. The German secret police (the Gestapo or SS) ran the concentration camps. They also supervised seven million slave

laborers from captured lands and two million prisoners of war who worked in defense plants. Despite the bombing, they actually

increased production from prewar levels. The Germans mistreated the prisoners by working them, and two million Russian prisoners died

ccvii

after their capture.

The Allies were blocked when they invaded Italy (the soft underbelly) in 1943, and they now readied three million men in Britain

preparatory to opening a third front in France. The landing in Normandy (D-Day, June 6, 1944) was commanded by Dwight Eisenhower

who combined 6,483 ships, 12,000 planes, 1,500 tanks, 20,000 vehicles, and 175,000 men. The day previous, paratroops and gliders

landed behind the lines and scrambled German communications, confusing the enemy and blocking his reinforcements. The Germans

outnumbered the Allies by 4:1 but could not move for Allied air power (the Allies put up 5,000 planes, the Luftwaffe only 120). Actually,

Rommel had pillboxes and obstacles built on the beaches and wished to meet the attack there, but his superior ordered that the defense

be elastic, drop back, and then crush the invaders. Rommel was home visiting with his wife on her birthday, and Hitler was asleep and

heavily doped with barbiturates. There were five simultaneous attacks on five beaches, and by dark the Allies had 80 square miles of

France and 155,000 men ashore for only 10,000 casualties. Hitler ordered that his men hold at all costs, but the Germans were pushed

ccviii

back. By mid July, Rommel lost 97,000 men and 225 tanks, and he received neither replacements nor ammunition.

Certain high German officers then plotted to kill Hitler so that they could finish the war, unhindered by any more of his

ccix

intuitions. A time bomb was brought to a meeting (July 20, 1944) in a briefcase and placed six feet away from Hitler. Someone moved

the briefcase under the table and away from Hitler, and the explosion that killed four and wounded twenty left Hitler protected by the table

and wounded only in the arm. The Gestapo rounded up 15,000 suspects, and 5,000 were executed. The top plotters were hung on

ccx

meathooks naked and slowly strangled, the film of which was shown to all officers who might think of quitting the war.

The Allies took heavy losses in pushing the Germans back. For over a month, the invasion stalled until 2,500 bombers dropped

4,700 tons of explosive on ten square miles that held back progress. In December, a major German counterattack began, the Battle of

ccxi

the Bulge. Panzers burst through Allied lines and sped across France. English-speaking SS troops with American uniforms and

identity cards infiltrated American lines, cut communications, and killed soldiers. The Americans started asking each other where the

Yankees played and what their state capital was to solve the problem of whom to trust. The infiltrators were rounded up and shot, as they

were out of uniform. German soldiers captured in their proper uniforms were treated as prisoners-of-war. The panzers ran out of gas in

12

ten days, unable to reach any Allied fuel dumps. Allied planes destroyed the Germans, who retreated, having lost 220,000 men. Hitler

used up his remaining reserves in the Battle of the Bulge. This battle also saw the heroic defense of Bastogne, a key road and railroad

hub, by the 101st Airborne Division. The 18,000 Americans were cut off, surrounded by about 250,000 Germans, and were called upon

to surrender. Anthony McAuliffe, 46, the commanding officer, sent a one-word answer, "Nuts," and they held out until reinforcements

ccxii

arrived.

During the war Churchill, Stalin, and FDR met several times to plan strategy. At Yalta, they decided on how: to occupy and

resolve problems in Europe, to invade Japan, to recognize Chiang Kai-shek in China, and to start the United Nations. Stalin grabbed

land; de Gaulle was not invited. Russia was to have a sphere of influence in eastern Europe and to declare war on Japan. Germany

would be occupied jointly, and free elections would be held for all captured lands. Later, the Russians sat waiting across a river while the

Germans killed 200,000 Poles (who had risen up to help the Russians), thus eliminating future problems to the control of that country.

The Allies had 18 times as many planes and six times more men than the Germans. Russia established puppet governments over the

ccxiii

lands that it liberated in eastern Europe, and it rushed to get to Berlin first.

The Americans crossed the Rhine when the bridge at Remagen was not blown up. Soon, news of the concentration camps

where 10 million Jews and Russians died was known to the Allies. FDR died of a stroke on April 12, 1945, and Truman became the

president. On April 28, 1945, Mussolini and his mistress were killed by the communist partisans in Italy. Hitler feared a similar end.

When the Russians entered Berlin, Eva took poison (who he had recently married) as did the dog and the secretaries, and Hitler shot

himself. The SS burned the bodies on April 30th. On May 2, 1945, Berlin fell. Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945, and Victory in

ccxiv

Europe day (VE) was May 8th. 217 of 600 U-boats were scuttled.

ccxv

The war went badly for Japan in the Pacific. American submarines sunk 300 supply ships in 1943. By 1944, the Japanese

army was bogged down in China, idle but facing the Russians in Manchuria, and powerless to stop the Americans from closing in,

hopping from one island to the next. The Americans now had 613 warships, about 4,000 supply ships, 18,000 planes, and 100 carriers

in the Pacific. Japan could only hope that the Americans would sicken of the war. In June, 1944, a fleet of 535 American ships took the

Marianas, a base for raiding the Philippines and Japan. Three Japanese carriers and 300 planes were destroyed. In the Battle for Leyte

ccxvi

Gulf (the Philippines), the Americans had twice as many planes and ships, and they decimated the enemy fleet. But Japan did not

ccxvii

surrender, and it unveiled a new and fearsome weapon, the "kamikaze." The invasion continued, and the American navy kept enemy

reinforcements away by sinking the ships that carried them. Nearly half a million Japanese died in the attempt. Iwo Jima was taken for

20,000 men, and a famous picture was shot of a flag being placed atop a hill. The Americans built an airbase there for the coming raids

on Japan some 800 miles away. Whether or not the large rock was worth the cost, at least 25,000 men crash-landed there on return from

missions over Japan. Okinawa fell next, 350 miles from Japan and the jump-off point for the invasion. 68,000 GI's landed but could not

find the enemy for five days. Then the Japanese attacked. Planes hit the beaches, and 3,500 kamikazes attacked the nearby f leet.

ccxviii

100,000 Japanese died, with few surrendering, and there were 50,000 American casualties.

Japan braced for the invasion. Meanwhile, the Russians gathered to attack Manchuria, and Japan had to leave an army there

to meet the threat. B-29's burned cities with napalm attacks. After one raid on Tokyo, a high wind blew up a fire which wounded 125,000,

killed 80,000, and left a million homeless. Still, Japan did not surrender, despite the destruction of the military, the fuel, and the factories

with which she waged war. Only Kyoto, the holy city, and Nagasaki and Hiroshima were left undestroyed. President Truman had to

invade and occupy Japan, and this was supposed to cost a million American lives. Instead, he ordered the atomic bomb dropped. On

August 6th, a B-29 dropped a 9,000 pound bomb equal in power to 20,000 tons of TNT. The bomb destroyed Hiroshima, killing about

80,000 and wounding that many more. On August 9th, Nagasaki was bombed, killing 36,000 and injuring 60,000. Russia declared war

on the eighth and ran over Manchuria; America stood to destroy the islands completely. On August 10, 1945, Japan quit on condition that

Emperor Hirohito be retained. The Russians advanced more, killing 80,000 men and capturing 600,000. Victory in Japan Day (VJ) was

August 14th. The Americans occupied Japan, and surrender was received aboard the U.S.S. Missouri by Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo

ccxix

Bay on September 2nd.

After Germany surrendered, America took many of the scientists who knew most about atomic energy, while the Russians got

the younger ones who knew about the missiles. After Hiroshima, Stalin put five scientists to work on an atomic bomb for Russia, and the

Russians had the bomb three years later, mainly because an Englishmen gave them the secrets on how it worked. In 1952, the United

States developed the hydrogen bomb, and the Russians had it a year later. At Nuremburg the war crimes trials were held for Nazi

leaders, and a few were convicted and hung, certainly for crimes against humanity but also because they lost the war. Ten Japanese,

ccxx

including Hideki Tojo, the prime minister, were tried, convicted, and executed, too. Russia never allowed free elections in areas in

eastern Europe that it freed from German control. During the postwar period a Cold War sprung up between the United States and

Russia. In the Marshall Plan the United States helped rebuild Europe. The Truman Doctrine defended Greece and Turkey by sending

men and money to contain communism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established an alliance of western countries to

defend Europe against further communist expansion. Meanwhile, the Russians established puppet communist governments in their

satellite countries as well as signed military and economic pacts with them. Allied diplomacy created today's world.

Other results of World War II, or events that followed it, included the American occupation of Japan. A new constitution imposed

a democratic government upon Japan patterned after the American system. This document outlawed war and a large defense

department, and it also granted new freedoms to the people of the nation. Europe developed into two Europes--western and communist.

Germany was occupied in four sectors by the British who wanted to administer recovery, the Americans who wanted democracy and

denazification, the French who wished Germany weak, and the Russians who wanted reparations. The Russians took German factories

ccxxi

back to Russia until they were faced with starving Germans in their sector. If Russia's rise was the major outcome of the first war, then

China's rise was that of the second war. By 1949, Mao Tse-tung beat Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang (KMT or government party),

and China was ruled by a communist government. Chiang and the KMT fled to Taiwan where America protected them.



APPENDIX A



THE BLACK AMERICANS

ccxxii

At the start of the war, 77 per cent of the 13 million black Americans lived in the South. During the war nearly a million blacks

ccxxiii

moved from the South to the West and North, especially to the city. With the war, there were a million new jobs for blacks, about

13

ccxxiv

two-thirds of them for black women. Some 600,000 of these positions were in manufacturing and not the usual menial roles or

ccxxv

domestic service. A total of about two million blacks worked in defense plants by 1944 (including those who had worked before the

ccxxvi

war with the newly hired). A million and a quarter blacks joined unions by 1945, and this helped increase the earnings of the average

ccxxvii

black urban worker from about $400 a year to about $1,000. Black consciousness rose during the war, stimulated by some 150

black newspapers and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which grew from 50,000 to 450,000

ccxxviii

during the war.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, the master politician, took an extremely practical approach to the "Negro" question. His wife Eleanor had

commendable rapport with the black community, in a day when that was not so fashionable. However, her husband's public profile was

extremely low, because he was not much concerned about minorities, and because he needed the political backing of politicians from the

South. Should Eleanor ever provoke a reaction, Roosevelt could quickly cut away from her position by laughing that he could not control

ccxxix

her. Accordingly, the 1,150,000 blacks in the military served in segregated units, performing largely menial roles in service units,

ccxxx

under the command of white officers. Southern bases were ruled by the prevailing Jim Crow laws, and black troops were assigned

ccxxxi

separate facilities (even blood plasma was stored separately, although there was no difference and a black invented the process).

ccxxxii

The Roosevelt eye was on the war, and he disliked any boat-rocking which detracted from the war effort.

Blacks began moving in other ways, too. In June, 1941, A. Philip Randolph, union president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car

Porters, threatened a march of 50,000 on Washington to protest discrimination. Roosevelt only grudgingly established the Fair

Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), and he issued Executive Order 8802, which prohibited job discrimination in the government

ccxxxiii ccxxxiv

and in defense plants with war contracts. However, no contract was ever cancelled for lack of compliance. Henry Ford never

hired blacks to build B-24's at Willow Run and never lost the contract. One company, at least, did it right. Grumman, the aircraft

manufacturer, simply hired three black stars for the company basketball team. When the team did well, the way was smoothed for other

ccxxxv

black workers. Turnover and unrest were minimal.

ccxxxvi

When war mobilization drew workers to the cities, housing was in short supply, especially for blacks. In 1943, 242 racial

ccxxxvii

clashes erupted in 47 cities, often when blacks sought to enter neighborhoods which previously had been all white. Riots hit El Paso

ccxxxviii

and Port Arthur; two were killed and fifty hurt at Beaumont. 35 died in a riot in Detroit. During all this, the Federal Bureau of

ccxxxix

Investigation (FBI) kept watch on black newspapers, threatening to shrink their paper ration were racial grievances stressed. No

boat rocking...

ccxl

Despite a family income about half that of whites, the war brought economic benefits to blacks. Despite segregation in the

military (except when the Battle of the Bulge emergency made the army color blind for a while), black soldiers received technical

ccxli

training. And despite the riots when blacks moved to cities, urbanization meant jobs; blacks were three per cent of all workers in 1942

ccxlii ccxliii

and eight per cent in 1945. These things energized blacks, and they started reacting to discrimination. Activism rose with military

ccxliv

and union experiences, too, as blacks demanded that America stick to the goals of its war efforts. White Americans deplored riots,

ccxlv

but they awakened somewhat to black concerns. However limited in scope, the FEPC haltingly stepped toward civil rights and fair

ccxlvi ccxlvii

employment. The white primary ended in 1944.



APPENDIX B



LABOR



Labor was first the concern of the National Defense Advisory Commission (and Sidney Hillman) and then moved to the Office

ccxlviii

of Production Management. Next came the National Defense Mediation Board in March, 1941, which negotiated a no-strike pledge

with unions by year's end. Any dispute that interfered with war production might lead government to take over or cancel a contract.

ccxlix

Defense contracts still went to Ford and United States Steel, even after they had labor disputes. In January, 1942, Franklin D.

Roosevelt established the National War Labor Board (NWLB) under William H. Davis with the hope of settling all management-labor

ccl

disputes and keeping wages stable. Labor unrest was chided by Hillman but still led to strikes, government having little real policy save

ccli

the Roosevelt threats of firing or drafting strikers.

Companies opposed union recognition, equal pay for women, and fringe benefits. Workers wanted their wages to keep pace

cclii

with rising costs. Management tried to break the unions by getting the open shop in defense work. Unions resisted the no-strike

ccliii

pledge and loss of union seniority. After the cost of living rose by 15 per cent in a year and a half, the "Little Steel" formula allowed

ccliv

a 15 per cent increase for steel workers (May, 1942). Labor unrest rose in the coal mines (miners earned $40 a week) where John

cclv

L. Lewis wanted another dollar a day in wages and paid vacation days. A polite fiction of no wage increase (that still fattened pay

cclvi

envelopes) was preserved by introducing travel pay from portal to portal. When squabbling continued, the coal strikes led to

cclvii

government taking over the mines twice, dropping draft deferments for miners, and threatening to force miners into national s ervice.

In October, 1942, the Office of Economic Stabilization was established to coordinate the cost of living with purchasing power and

cclviii cclix

end unnecessary migration of labor. Prices stabilized in 1943, and no increases in wages were allowed afterward. Later, Sewell

L. Avery, the president of Montgomery Ward, fought with the NWLB and would not comply with the law on adjudicating labor disputes,

cclx

and the army took over the company and ran it for a time.

cclxi

While the unions disliked the NWLB, they fared well during the war. Union membership rose from 8.7 to 14.3 million from

cclxii cclxiii

1940 to 1945. While wages for the war rose only 24 per cent, earnings increased about 70 per cent because of overtime. This

cclxiv

happened because the average week worked increased from 37.7 hours to 46.6 hours.



APPENDIX C



THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS

cclxv

90% of the 112,000 Japanese-Americans lived on the West Coast, and three-fourths of them were under 25. Two-thirds of

cclxvi

the Japanese-Americans were born in America and were citizens. This second generation was called the Nisei, and their parents (the

cclxvii

Issei) were not citizens. The census of 1940 recorded the names and addresses of both the citizens and aliens, and the Alien

cclxviii

Registration Act (1940) required all aliens aged 14 or older to be fingerprinted and registered.

14

When the war began abroad, concern mounted over the possibility of a fifth column within and over the danger of sabotage.

Because these Japanese-Americans lived mainly on the West Coast (a strategic area where shipbuilding and aircraft production were

concentrated), and because they were assumed still loyal to the emperor of Japan, they were targeted in many minds as a suspect group

and, perhaps, inclined toward sabotage. For instance, the American Legion warned that the Japanese-Americans were disloyal. The

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) soon listed the names of all dangerous aliens. In cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence

(ONI), the FBI engaged in some sophisticated undercover work. They read the Japanese-American newspapers like Rafu Shimpo (Los

Angeles) and clipped out articles for their files. In March, 1941, an ONI officer got a local safecracker out of jail, and the two broke into

the Japanese consulate. They photographed maps and assorted lists of military installations, defense plants, harbors, dams, and power

stations. Thereafter, one spy was deported. The FBI, ONI, and army intelligence (G-2) now believed that the ring was broken, and no

cclxix

spies were left.

Enter Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, 61, short, balding, and excitable, the head of the Western Defense Command (eight

states in the West) and of the Fourth Army. DeWitt was awed by the disgrace of the commanders at Pearl Harbor after the Japanese

attack there. Frank Knox blamed spies and saboteurs for the successful attack. In January, 1942, the Roberts Commission put the

blame on spies and the officers commanding. DeWitt was determined not to be caught napping. Although no actual sabotage occurred,

he was persuaded by newspaper headlines, rumor, and hysteria. Walter Lippman, for instance, believed that the lack of overt acts

signaled that saboteurs were biding their time, and he recommended moving the Japanese-Americans away from defense plants on the

West Coast. The vegetable growers in Southern California, prejudiced against the Japanese-Americans for many years, joined the

outcry. The Japanese-Americans could finally be driven off, and their farms, which raised two-fifths of the vegetable crop, would go on

cclxx

the market at distress sale prices.

When four Japanese submarines briefly attacked coastal shipping, DeWitt pointed at "signaling" from shore. Actually, the

drivers of cars on coastal roads had not turned off their headlights during blackouts. He also thought that spies with a radio contacted

enemy submarines, but that proved to be poor work by the army. Rookies on radio interception equipment believed that broadca sts

originated on the American coast, but they really came from half way across the ocean or even Japan. One of the submarines tried

shelling a refinery close to Santa Barbara. A weather balloon over Los Angeles was fired on all one night. DeWitt claimed that the

cclxxi

Japanese launched an air raid on San Francisco.

DeWitt was charged with guarding all defense installations and plants, and he seemed unable to distinguish between

Japanese-Americans who were loyal or disloyal. He wanted a curfew and to move all Japanese-Americans from restricted zones, but

he had noting to show in court. A presidential proclamation about aline enemies justified raids to gather any guns, cameras, or radio

equipment. However, a roundup of 400 Japanese-American fishermen in February, 1942, near Los Angeles found neither radio, code,

nor plans. Meanwhile, countless meetings with state and local officials convinced DeWitt that he was correct, despite little evidence of

sabotage or necessity for removal. DeWitt echoed the fears of imminent invasion and sabotage in his public statements. People slept

in their clothes with the suitcases packed and flashlights handy. Persuaded by public opinion of the views, the army wanted evacuation

cclxxii

of the Japanese-Americans away from sensitive areas on the West Coast.

Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, authorized excluding any or all persons from military areas, as Roosevelt threw the

whole matter back to his secretary of war. In Public Law 503 (March 21, 1942) it became a felony if Japanese-Americans would not

remove. But Western states to the interior did not want them either, so on March 18, 1942, the military took responsibility together with

the War Relocation Authority (WRA). Despite the fact that neither attack nor invasion occurred, the military gave civilians an order and

held them without charge or hearing. Congress never declared martial law, and the president never suspended habeas corpus. The

military report upon which all this based was filled with lies, justifying internment as a military necessity. The report faked facts that led

to evacuation and detention. DeWitt knew it. The FBI later disproved any spying and the Federal Communications Commission any radio

broadcasts from the coast. Lawyers and officials later suppressed evidence when they handed on to the Supreme Court the military

report filled with lies. Subsequent reports never mentioned this. Not until 1983 did a commission acknowledge the injustice caused by

cclxxiii

hysteria, prejudice, and lack of leadership.

Truth and liberty fell in April and May, 1942. No charges were ever filed, except by people like Martin Dies of the House

Un-American Activities Committee. Subject first to a curfew and restriction on travel, the Japanese-Americans were ordered to report on

short notice to assembly centers. They mainly sacrificed their homes and businesses at low prices (the could not get insurance any

longer), and only about a fifth of their property loss due to the hasty evacuation was ever recovered. Those who were a sixteenth or more

Japanese were interned, sent to one of then "relocation centers" (internment camps). By August they were in camps run by the WRA

and guarded by the army. They were 900 days behind barbed wire, sort of like Leningrad. Curiously, 3,000 Germans, 85 Italians, and

3,100 Japanese were detained as dangerous enemy aliens, and over 110,000 Japanese-Americans were interned. Few communists or

socialists were arrested, either. In Hawaii only two of 150,000 Japanese-Americans were interned, because either a third of the

population was too much to intern, or scapegoats were not required. Neither Joe Di Maggio or his parents were interned, either. But most

cclxxiv

Nisei did not vote, and raising vegetables was probably not so vital to defense as baseball.

Milton S. Eisenhower, brother of the general, was chosen to head the W ar Relocation Authority but soon resigned. Within the

camps the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) supported the idea of internment camps for a time. They thought they could

prove that they were loyal, they would be good scouts for the national security, and they feared mob violence on the outside. The JACL

actually fingered Issei and Nisei sympathetic to Japan. The JACL must have somehow believed that they were detained for reasonable

cclxxv

cause rather than for ancestry.

Internment camps were located in remote areas. Families lived in barracks and used the community toilets, mess hall, and

showers. Barbed wire fence with watchtowers and armed guards surrounded them. Topaz in Utah had an annual temperature range of

-30 degrees to 106 degrees and rainfall of about 7-8 inches. Camp work paid from $12 to $19 a month. 4,300 went off to universities,

10,000 pulled sugar beets, and 17,000 moved to the Midwest by fall, 1942. The same military that wanted internment camps and turned

loyal citizens into angry prisoners next wanted to recruit in the camps. The California legislature, the newspapers, and the House

Un-American Activities Committee all opposed such coddling. However, some of those recruited were used as specialists in translating

and intelligence, and two all-Japanese units fought under Mark Clark in Italy. Remarkably, one was the most decorated unit, and only

cclxxvi

63 Japanese-Americans were convicted for resisting the draft. 17,000 served!

Although there was never an attack on the West Coast to justify military restrictions there, making the error was never admitted.

DeWitt was moved to another job. Release from the camps was very gradual, preventing public uproar. Elections in the fall, 1944,

15

dictated this, although the fear of Japanese retaliation against the American prisoners-of-war that they held was given as the main

reason. In December, 1944, the Supreme Court--the nonelected branch of government--permitted detention as an extension of war

powers but also ended internment, citing mistreatment where there were no charges. Seeing the writing on the wall, the army (a day

before) declared that the West was no longer a war zone. Upon release in January, 1945, many incidents of intolerance occurred.

cclxxvii

34,000 were detained until the end of the war.



APPENDIX D



THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY AND/OR YANKEE INGENUITY



Unready when war began overseas in 1939 and only slow to awaken, America fortunately faced no immediate threat and so was

cclxxviii

permitted the luxury of time to mobilize. Because they did not see enemy troops anywhere, Americans fought on imagination. This

vision changed America into the arsenal of democracy, blending a healthy mix of technical ability, creative organization, and respect for

profits.

In 1940, when war clouds were still elsewhere, Franklin D. Roosevelt called for production of 50,000 airplanes, 9,200 tanks, and

600 ships (also 50,000 trucks, 130,000 engines, 17,000 heavy guns, 25,000 light guns, 13,000 trench mortars, 300,000 machine guns,

cclxxix

1,700,000 rifles, and 33,000,000 cannon shells). But the bill facing Congress in June, 1940, called for six years to build 200 ships

for a two-ocean navy. By June, 1941, seven per cent of total production went to national defense; yet, by that time Britain was threatened,

France had fallen, and Russia was invaded. Things were sour by summer, 1941: war aims were fuzzy, national defense unorganized,

taxes were a mess, inflation stressed the country, and the draft was to expire. Lend-lease aid to Britain in 1941 amounted to $7 billion

cclxxx

appropriated by Congress but much less shipped.

There was little momentum behind mobilization. Why should the nation create a war economy while it was at peace? Especially,

the corporate managers and the dollar-a-year men working in governmental agencies dragged along. They wished to push existing plant

capacity to full production, maximizing current profits, rather than invest in additional capital expansion which would be both expensive

cclxxxi

now and unused at war's end. They feared excess capacity and the flooding of a postwar market.

Well, it was a valid point, if selfish, and it enabled the government to respond with an extremely effective, yet simple plan.

Government: (1) underwrote the capital expansion (for instance, financing through loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation

or the Defense Plant Corporation; the government built 85 per cent of war plant facilities); (2) guaranteed profits (often through cost-plus

contracts--which was only fair considering how much the military tinkered with models, making improvements after production began); (3)

offered accelerated depreciation which increased expenses on paper and allowed greater returns as taxes were reduced (capital

expansion might be written off in five years and either used for peacetime production at the end of the war or sold at a clear profit); and

(4) promised that any losses that resulted from unneeded plant expansions might be offset by a postwar refund of excess-profits

cclxxxii

taxes.

Well, the faucet turned on, and industry mobilized. After Pearl Harbor war plants changed to seven days a week and 24 hours

a day in their operations, and production workers hustled. Factories switched their products manufactured from shirts to mosquito

cclxxxiii

netting, model trains to bomb fuses, weather stripping to mortar shells, and kitchen sinks to cartridge casings. One plant converted

cclxxxiv

from spark plugs to .30 caliber Browning machine guns. The Chrysler Tank Arsenal was built where a corn field once stood outside

Detroit and soon built 100 tanks a week. Prisoners at San Quentin nearly rioted to be permitted to bid on a war contract; they built

cclxxxv

anti-submarine nets, while prisoners elsewhere manufactured bombs, patrol torpedo (PT) boats, and ammunition clips. The

Saginaw Steering Gear Division (General Motors), which knew nothing about Browning machine guns, signed a contract in June, 1940,

for 25,000 of them, because the regular munitions manufacturing was unequal to the task. The blueprints were handed over, cost was

estimated at $667 each, and a production site was chosen in November. By March, 1942, 28,000 Brownings were produced at an actual

cclxxxvi

cost of $141.44 each. Boeing in Seattle built B-17 bombers, and they increased their output by four times as much from 1942 to

cclxxxvii

1944 while decreasing the cost per B-17. Ford began manufacturing B-24 bombers at Willow Run, a new 67-acre factory outside

cclxxxviii

Detroit that produced at the peak a bomber an hour, some 8,685 for the war. Three other defense companies, for instance,

increased their sales from prewar levels by manufacturing goods for the military: from $2 to $60 million in fire extinguishers, from

$150,000 to $10 million in lights for planes and cars, and from $300,000 to $50 million in generators. There were hundreds l ike these

cclxxxix ccxc

three companies. Grumman, which made fighter planes, had sales of $19 million in 1940 and $390 million in 1943. Nine new

ccxci

shipyards were readied in spring, 1941, with 131 shipways.

Those apt at innovation spotted opportunities. (1) Henry J. Kaiser built Liberty ships. A sand and gravel man who made $10

million in profits in the years 1931 to 1936, Kaiser built the Boulder Dam after engineers concluded that it was not possible. Before the

war, he owned a cement plant and knew little about boats. Kaiser introduced techniques of using prefabricated parts into shipbuilding.

Workers cut, shaped, and joined a section before moving it to the keel and there assembling the ship. He got a cost-plus contract and

then borrowed against future income to finance his shipyards. He paid high wages, since these were being passed on, and hired the

workers that he wanted. He was able to schedule raw materials very closely. United States Steel and Bethlehem Steel were slow to

supply him with steel until Kaiser threatened to make his own. He borrowed $106 million from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation

to build his own plant (which he fully expected to acquire at the end of the war for ten cents on the dollar). Kaiser thus managed to have

government guarantee his financing, market, and profit! Using the prefabricated techniques, Kaiser workers required 355 days average

for a Liberty ship in 1941 and 56 days in 1942. In September, 1942, Kaiser built and delivered a ship in 14 days, and his shipyards

ccxcii

completed one a day in 1943. Kaiser deserved being dubbed "Sir Launchalot." (2) In New Orleans Andrew Jackson Higgins had built

$400,000 worth of shallow-draft speedboats in 1935. He acquired a large inventory of lumber before the war. In 1943, his company

ccxciii

produced and sold $120 million in landing craft and patrol torpedo (PT) boats. (3) Philip Wrigley (of chewing gum) did two brilliant

things. He first convinced the military that gum was essential--getting them to agree that it would relieve thirst, cleanse the mouth, and

substitute for smoking when that was not safe--and they, accordingly, packed one stick in each "K" combat ration. He learned that rubber

trees grew near the gum trees in South America from which he imported the raw material for gum. He had his men harvest the rubber,

ccxciv

too, and this got him the shipping priority which let him bring in the needed chicle.

Lest mobilization sound too rosy, suffice it to say, these changes were accompanied by growing pains, a few of which follow as

a sample. Mobilization was too often captive to business interests. For instance, Coke, tobacco, and chewing gum were termed

16

"essential" to the war effort. This gladdened the hearts of those businessmen, allowed Wrigley room aboard severely rationed ships to

ccxcv

import chicle, and deferred the draft for two million tobacco farm workers. Businesses often pursued self interest. Perhaps, half dealt

in black market activities, and the Office of Price Administration believed that 57 per cent violated price controls. Former General Motors

president William S. Knudsen, a dollar-a-year man, headed the War Resources Board that oversaw mobilization; meantime, General

ccxcvi

Motors received eight per cent of all federal expenditures during the war. Because of haste, war contracts were purchased dearly,

and incompetence was a major problem. Earlier model American tanks and planes were not as good as those that the enemy had. The

75-millimeter gun would not stop a Panzer (German tank) and was replaced by the 105. The early model fighter planes and torpedo

ccxcvii

bombers were easy prey for the Zero (Japanese fighter). At Willow Run, 100,000 workers either commuted an hour each way or

moved to an area with no houses. Beds were rented out at three shifts a day for $7 a week per person ("hot beds"). Bomber plant

employees named their factory "Willit Run?" Maybe, they doubted their B-24's would. In 1941, each bomber required 200,000 hours of

labor to produce, given the large number of unskilled workers (29 per cent were women and entirely new to riveting and such). However,

ccxcviii

by simplifying the tasks and by learning to do them, Willow Run reduced the hours required per bomber to 18,000 in 1945.

Ammunition was sometimes faulty as were fighter plane parts. A Kaiser tanker split in two and sank, which was later blamed on poor

quality steel sold to them by a United States Steel subsidiary (who faked the tests and passed the material on as premium grade). Kaiser

ccxcix

standards were low, but they delivered quickly, and most ships were likely to be sunk before requiring repairs.

Slowly, mobilization gathered momentum, and defense industry, the armed services, and the government agencies organized.

In the year and a half before Pearl Harbor, the army grew by six times to 1.5 million men and also tripled its' airplanes to 16,000. 100

military bases or posts were begun in a year. When Pearl Harbor happened, the army numbered 34 divisions and planned building 32

more during the next year, while the navy had 346 ships under construction. After 1941, production reached a merchant ship each day,

a warship every third day, and 2,500 airplanes a month. In December, 1941, a fourth of total production was for defense, and by June,

1942, it was nearly a half. Goals for 1942 were set at 60,000 planes, 45,000 tanks, and eight million tons of shipping; for 1943, the aims

ccc

were 125,000 planes, 75,000 tanks, and ten million tons of shipping.



APPENDIX E



WOMEN



Karen Anderson believed that the war changed some of the notions about what was suitable work for women and about what

ccci

they could do. Just before the war in 1939, when the median annual income for men was $962, women made $568, and only $246 if

cccii

the woman was not white. Many believed that women belonged at home. But when America entered the war, some women went to

work and for varied reasons. They were attracted by the high wages or forced by necessity, demonstrated patriotism or expressed

ccciii

independence, enjoyed a challenge or coped with anxiety, needed excitement or a sense of purpose, or they hated housework. Both

ccciv

industry and government recruited women workers.

cccv

Before the war, about 12 million women had jobs, accounting for nearly a fourth of the labor force. When the war created 13

cccvi

million jobs, about half were filled by women. By 1944, about 16 or 17 million women, or perhaps as many as 19 million, were working,

cccvii

some 36 per cent of the labor force. Of this increase of 47 per cent in female employment, about three-fourths were married and over

cccviii cccix

35 or were under 19. Five million women worked in war plants, two million of that in heavy industry. Female employment in

manufacturing increased by 141 per cent, from 22 per cent to 33 per cent of factory workers. Maids and waitresses traded their aprons

in for overalls, becoming riveters, welders, and machine operators. Clerks made $26.40 a week, while the assembly line paid $40 a

cccx

week. If these women were unaccustomed to work in machine shops and military plants, so were three and a half million teenagers

cccxi cccxii

who went to work there. Still, Rosie the Riveter was not typical, because about two-thirds of the women were homemakers.

Women employees changed factories. Management coped with new sorts of problems. For dermatitis, they found creams, and

they banned jewelry around machinery. They provided counselors for the tears and nurseries for the children. Washrooms were

cleaned. They also introduced cafeteria and rest periods as well as the taking of vitamins, physicals, and inoculations. However, the

cccxiii

biggest female complaint was not riveter's arm or ovaries but unequal treatment. Men made more, and women's wages lagged 40

cccxiv

per cent behind. For instance, highest pay in the shipyards was $22 a day for men and $7 for women, but most women earned $4.65

cccxv cccxvi

a day. The National War Labor Board called for equal pay in 1942.

cccxvii

The war-caused geographic and social mobility weakened social controls. Families were stressed when the father was away

cccxviii

and the mother worked. The children, latch-key or otherwise, were less supervised and more likely to get in trouble. Child care was

cccxix cccxx

often make-shift. Juvenile delinquency increased, especially among girls. The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported an

cccxxi

increase of 95 per cent in girls charged for morals violations. Problems were exacerbated by overcrowded cities and substandard

cccxxii cccxxiii

housing. Conflicts between parents and teens were too common.

The war bred shortages. Metal was saved for guns and not used in zippers, nylon was needed for parachutes not stockings,

and rubber was required to support the war effort instead of girdles (in which it was banned). The width and length of skirts was also

limited to save material, and changes were forbidden. Accordingly, skirts were described as slim, straight, knee length, and Spartan.

cccxxiv

Since shoes were rationed, one could buy only two pair a year.

cccxxv

It was basically understood that women would work only for the duration. When the time came, they would give the jobs

cccxxvi

back for the veterans. But for whatever their individual reasons, many women workers wished to stay on after the war. Some 98

per cent said so in a poll at one plant, and three-fourths might be taken as an average figure for defense work. Sad to say, the status of

women was little changed by their war participation, and, with the coming of peace, many were laid off or bumped into jobs that paid $28

a week instead of $44. To a degree, the sense of self worth and individuality fell victim, especially when common literature persuaded that

cccxxvii

women subordinate their needs and interests to those of their husbands.

During the war, movies about women placed them at war or in the defense plant. Women pictured themselves doing vital work,

and this validated female worth. Movies mobilized women to participate, if only in fantasy and opinion. Meantime, housewives listened

cccxxviii

to radio soap operas which placed women at home. Perhaps, this only reflected the program to different audiences--working girls

went to movies at night, housewives remained at home during the day. But maybe soap operas reflected reality and were better

predictions when America stood down from war mobilization.

17



i.George B. Tindall, America: A Narrative History (Second Edition, New York: W. W.

Norton & Company, 1988), p. 1160. John A. Garraty and Robert A. McCaughey, The American

Nation: A History of the United States (Sixth Edition, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,

1987), p. 797.



ii.Garraty, p. 797.



iii.Norman K. Risjord, America: A History of the United States (Second Edition,

Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 284. Born in Austria, the son

of a civil servant, Hitler read much on his own but failed admission to art or architecture

school. He loved debating issues at the coffeehouse. During the first war, Hitler

avoided the draft and then entered the German army in which he was gassed on the western

front and then served at a Russian prisoner-of-war camp. He hated Jews, threw tantrums,

suffered from nightmares and insomnia, and cared little about food, clothes, or women;

William L. Shirer, "How Hitler Rose to Power," The Reader's Digest (March, 1962), pp.

91-93; William L. Shirer, "Hitler on the March: The Years of Triumph," The Reader's

Digest (April, 1962), p. 255. He was a vegetarian; Cornelius Ryan, "The Longest Day,"

The Reader's Digest (June, 1959), p. 260. He used drugs; Heinz Linge, "The Private

Life of Adolf Hitler," The Reader's Digest (?, 1955), pp. 198, 200. He enjoyed swaying

large crowds with his speeches, and he wanted power; Joseph R. Conlin, The American

Past: A Survey of American History (Second Edition, San Diego: Harcourt, Brace,

Jovanovich, Publishers, 1987), p. 745. He repeated three ideas endlessly--remember

Versailles, throw out the Jews, and "Lebensraum" (living space for Germans in neighboring

countries); Tindall, p. 1161; Richard N. Current, T. Harry Williams, Frank Freidel,

Alan Brinkley, American History: A Survey (Seventh Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1987), p. 762. He told the lies that the Jews stabbed Germany in the back, lost the

war, and now controlled the country so often that he rode them into power. Hitler

was a magnetic speaker. He and the Nazis blamed inflation when they tried a putsch

at the beer hall in Munich (1923). They held a crowd at gunpoint all night, and at

dawn they marched on the city square where police fired on the mob. Hitler was arrested

and sent to prison for a half year where he wrote Mein Kampf, the Nazi Bible, containing

all his intentions; Shirer, "How Hitler Rose to Power," pp. 273-277; Conlin, p. 749.

The swastika--once known as the crooked cross and a sign that all was well to the

early Christians--was corrupted by the Nazis into a symbol of anti-semitism. From

1924, unemployed workers joined the Nazis, paraded about wearing brown shirts, and

became "stormtroopers." The Nazis won seats in the legislature until people found

out that they had no meal ticket for the starving. Businessmen paid off the Nazi debts

on the promise of hands off when they came to power; Shirer, "How Hitler Rose to Power,"

p. 285. The Nazis burned the national legislature in 1933, blaming it on the communists,

and in 1934, Hitler became dictator while his stormtroopers killed all his enemies.



iv.Conlin, p. 749. Italy lost face in the first war and gained little territory.

Mussolini attacked the socialists for the unrest after the war; Tindall, p. 1160.

He reached an audience through his newspaper, and he then formed the fascists who wore

black shirts at parades (to give the illusion of massive support). In October, 1922,

his fascist militia marched on Rome; Richard Collier, "The Last Days of Benito

Mussolini," The Reader's Digest (June, 1972), p. 257. This show of force and a rigged

election made Mussolini the prime minister. His secret police killed or arrested the

political opposition. The world was not alarmed, because the takeover seemed legal.



n

v.Conlin, p. 749. Winthrop D. Jordan and Leon F. Litwack, The United States (Sixth

Edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 1987), p. 668

spelled it "Fuehrer."



vi.Shirer, "How Hitler Rose to Power," p. 285.



vii.Conlin, p. 748. Tindall, pp. 1167, 1163. Current, p. 766.



viii.Too little bread and too much bloodshed led to a revolt in Russia against the

czar (1917). "Peace, bread, land" was the slogan of the Bolshevik Revolution. Lenin,

who controlled the soviets (workers' councils), signed a peace with Germany that took

Russia out of the war and preserved the communist takeover. Lenin used the secret

police against his enemies, still lost a free election, and took over anyhow.

18



Stalin was one of several to follow Lenin. Born a peasant in Georgia (he was

a Russian hill-billy), Stalin was educated by monks, the only career open to him, but

was thrown out for subversive activity. He was rejected from army service because

of a withered arm. He was a bank robber for the communists, expropriating funds for

the cause. He was extremely stubborn and cruel (he either killed his wife or drove

her to suicide). He built up the Russian army, and he loved to wear his marshall's

uniform.



ix.William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War (New York: Ballantine

Books, 1976).



x.C. P. Snow, "We Must Never Deny Our Gratitude: A Portrait of Winston Churchill,"

The Reader's Digest (May, 1963), p. 68.



xi.Garraty, pp. 797-798. Current, p. 760. Robert A. Divine, T. H. Breen, George

M. Fredrickson, R. Hal Williams, America: Past and Present (Second Edition, Glenview,

Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1987), pp. 779-780.



xii.Conlin, p. 746. Tindall, p. 1159.



xiii.Conlin, p. 745.



xiv.Conlin, p. 748. Tindall, pp. 1160-1161.



xv.Divine, p. 782. Tindall, p. 1162.



xvi.Tindall, p. 1162.



xvii.Tindall, pp. 1163, 1167-1168. Divine, p. 782. Current, p. 766.



xviii.Conlin, p. 748. Current, pp. 766-767. Tindall, p. 1164. Divine, p. 784.

Jordan, p. 670.



xix.Conlin, p. 748. Tindall, p. 1164. Divine, p. 784.



xx.Jordan, p. 664.



xxi.Jordan, pp. 678-680. Current, pp. 778, 789. Conlin, pp. 763, 758.



xxii.Divine, p. 797. Thomas A. Bailey and David M. Kennedy, The American Pageant:

A History of the Republic (Eighth Edition, Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and

Company, 1987), pp. 796-798.



xxiii.Tindall, p. 1164.



xxiv.Jordan, p. 671. Reinhard T. E. Heydrich thought up a ruse which gave a two-day

lead to the Germans; Stevenson, pp. 48-49. Jewish prisoners taken from a concentration

camp were dressed up in peasant costumes, drugged, and taken to a border village.

They were shot and left lying about the village; Shirer, "Hitler on the March: The

Years of Triumph," p. 282. After staging this incident, Hitler next claimed that the

Poles had attacked; Current, p. 767. He invited the foreign press in to see, and even

the New York Times reported "Poles attack;" Stevenson, pp. 48-49. The British and

French were pledged to support the territorial integrity of Poland, but they held off

any response for two days while they checked out what happened; Shirer, "Hitler on

the March: The Years of Triumph," p. 282. This deceit was sufficient to assure a German

victory; Stevenson, pp. 48-49.



xxv.Conlin, p. 751. There are but two advantages in war, time or space. Blitzkrieg

seized the advantage of time by concentrating a great deal of firepower at one point

19



or two along an enemy defensive perimeter, then struck it very hard before the enemy

could shift any men there. The Luftwaffe (the air force) bombed gaps in the enemy

positions, which artillery also targeted, and then the panzers (a mobile force of tanks,

halftracks, and mechanized infantry) punched hard. Once the line was breached, the

panzers kept going through and raced for the rear, spreading panic among the enemy.

The panzers poured through to the rear, and reserves joined the stream. While the

panzers raced on, the reserves mopped up any resistance on the enemy lines.



xxvi.Shirer, "Hitler on the March: The Years of Triumph," p. 285. The "Warsaw

Concerto," a piano piece, was written symbolizing the resistance of the Jewish ghetto

to Nazi takeover.



xxvii.Conlin, pp. 750-751.



xxviii.Conlin, p. 750.



xxix.Current, p. 767.



xxx.Current, p. 767. When the Russians lost 600,000 men in Finland, inflicting just

70,000 casualties, they were embarrassed. Stalin called home the generals and had

them shot. The Russians retrained, using the winter tactics of the Finns. Meantime,

Hitler laughed at the Russian bumbling in Finland, and he assumed that the Russians

were very weak. Later, the Russians used their experience to turn the tables on Germany.



xxxi.Tindall, p. 1170. If the British controlled the air space over Norway, Denmark,

and the seas surrounding, they could prevent German access to Swedish iron ore and

the ability to send submarines to sea; Peter Cremer, U-Boat Commander (New York: Jove

Books, 1986), p. 9. Moreover, the Germans secured their northern flank, gained an

area from which to bomb Britain, and could later menace the supplies sent to Russia.



xxxii.Cremer, p. 10.



xxxiii.Tindall, p. 1170.



xxxiv.Richard Collier, "The Sands of Dunkirk," The Reader's Digest (? 1961), p. 224.

Hitler assumed that the British were trapped at Dunkirk and could not leave, for the

Germans had mined the harbor. British spies, however, discovered that the German

magnetic mines were all oriented with the north pole pointing down. The British reversed

the polarity on all their ships' magnetic fields so that they actually repelled the

German mines; Peter Wright, Spy Catcher (New York: Viking, 1987), pp. 15-16.



xxxv.Collier, "The Sands of Dunkirk," p. 251. Jordan, p. 671. Tindall, p. 1170.

85% of the army was saved, although evacuations are defeats, and the British lost

over 200 ships and 177 planes; Collier, "The Sands of Dunkirk," p. 252.



xxxvi.Tindall, p. 1170.





xxxvii.Snow, p. 67. In an address broadcast on May 19, 1940, Churchill said:

We shall not flag or fail, we shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France,

we shall fight on the seas and oceans...we shall fight on the landing grounds,

we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills;

we shall never surrender. And even if...this island...were subjugated and

starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet,

would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the new world, with all

its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and liberation of the old.

Winston Churchill, Blood, Sweat, and Tears (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), p.

297.



xxxviii."Adversity," Stephenson mused, "suits the British. They like their roads

to be crooked, their trains slow, their phone lines crossed. In peace, they're in

20



permanent resistance to authority. In war, they breathe a sigh of relief at getting

back to normal. In solitude they feel happiest. In isolation they go back to being

Islanders;" Stevenson, p. 107.



xxxix.William L. Shirer, "Reaping the Whirlwind: The Last Days of the Third Reich,"

The Reader's Digest (May, 1962), p. 252.



xl.Shirer, "Reaping the Whirlwind: The Last Days of the Third Reich," p. 252. The

RAF planted plywood decoys on its landing strips, and these had within oil drums to

catch fire when they were strafed. German gun cameras recorded more kills than the

RAF had planes. Meanwhile, the real planes were hidden out in farmers' fields.



xli.Shirer, "Reaping the Whirlwind: The Last Days of the Third Reich," p. 254.



xlii.Len Deighton, Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain (New York:

Ballantine Books, 1977), p. 275.



xliii.Deighton, p. xx.



xliv.Deighton, pp. 196, 284, 267, 275.



xlv.The call sign was the beginning of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony--dot, dot,

dash--Morse code for "V," victory; Stevenson, p. 106.



xlvi.Tindall, pp. 1176-1177.



xlvii.Conlin, p. 752. Jordan, p. 673.



xlviii.Harrison E. Salisbury, "The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad," The Reader's

Digest (March, 1969), pp. 204-205.



xlix.Richard Sorge, a Russian spy, posed as a German journalist in Tokyo. He held

a Ph.D. in political science from Hamburg, fought with Germany in World War I, and

afterward became a Marxist. His strong articles on Japan got him in with both the

German and Japanese leaders. He accurately predicted a German attack on Russia for

grain, slave labor, and the reduction of the Soviet threat--that 170-190 divisions

would go after Leningrad, Moscow, and the Ukraine.

He was determining whether Japan would attack in Siberia once the Russians faced

Germans in the West. Sorge learned that Japan would have enough moving south and facing

the Americans, and Siberia was too cold. Half of the Russian forces were sent to Moscow

in time. (Sorge was caught in 1941 and hung in 1944); Gordon W. Prange, "Master Spy,"

The Reader's Digest (January, 1967), pp. 209-241.



l.Conlin, p. 751. The Russians had four times as many tanks.





li.Shirer, "Reaping the Whirlwind: The Last Days of the Third Reich," p. 271.Leningrad

was dead by January, 1942, in the midst of a 900-day siege. It had no electricity

or water, and sleds carried off maybe 3,000-4,000 corpses a day. Maybe, a half million

were evacuated, but 1.5 million died in Leningrad by 1944; Salisbury, (March, 1969),

p. 202; (April, 1969), pp. 245-246, 268, 275.



lii.Divine, p. 791.



liii.A. Russell Buchanan, The United States and World War II (New York: Harper & Row,

Publishers, 1964), I, p. xiii.



liv.Buchanan, I, p. xiii. Harold G. Vatter, The U.S. Economy in World War II (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 1.

21



lv.Tindall, p. 1150. Conlin, p. 746. Garraty, p. 796.



lvi.John M. Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War

II (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), p. 8. Vatter, p. 2. Jordan, p.

574. Current, p. 650. Risjord, p. 283. Conlin, p. 747.



lvii.Vatter, p. 4. Tindall, pp. 1152, 1164. Conlin, p. 747. Bailey, p. 777.

Businessmen were not very well thought of during the Depression, and it was easy to

blame them for American entry into the first war; Divine, p. 783. This time, the United

States was going to stay neutral; Conlin, p. 747.



lviii.Vatter, pp. 1, 4. Conlin, p. 747. Current, pp. 766-767. Tindall, p. 1167.

Risjord, p. 286.



lix.Vatter, pp. 4-8, 33. Buchanan, I, p. 136. Eliot Janeway, The Struggle for Survival:

A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1951), p. 46. Risjord, p. 286. Conlin, p. 750. This freed up Russia to attack Finland

and Germany to take Poland.



lx.Vatter, p. 33. Janeway, pp. 14, 54. Buchanan, I, p. 136. Richard Polenberg,

War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company,

1972), p. 6. Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: The American People,

1939-1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 68. Rexford G. Tugwell,

The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Garden City, New York:

Doubleday & Company, Incorporated, 1957), p. 505.



lxi.Vatter, p. 4.



lxii.Perrett, p. 17.



lxiii.Tugwell, pp. 504-505. Vatter, p. 3.



lxiv.Janeway, pp. 48, 53-54. Tugwell, pp. 505-506.



lxv.Polenberg, p. 6. Vatter, p. 5. Tugwell, pp. 507-508, 522.



lxvi.Vatter, pp. 5, 8. Tugwell, pp. 522-525.



lxvii.Polenberg, p. 7. Janeway, p. 15. Tugwell, p. 523.



lxviii.Tugwell, p. 523. Janeway, p. 114. Perrett, p. 70. Buchanan, I, p. 136.

Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production (New York:

Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), p. 82.





lxix.Vatter, pp. 34-35. Perrett, p. 69.



lxx.Tindall, p. 1171. Perrett, p. 42. Tugwell, pp. 525-526.



lxxi.Perrett, p. 111. Buchanan, I, p. 126.



lxxii.Perrett, p. 111. Neil A. Wynn, The Afro-American and the Second World War

(New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1975), pp. 12-13.



lxxiii.Perrett, p. 116. Buchanan, I, p. 126.



lxxiv.Vatter, p. 4. Janeway, p. 68. Paul F. Boller, Junior, and Ronald Story, A

More Perfect Union: Documents in U.S. History (Second Edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin

22



Company, 1988), p. 191.



lxxv.Perrett, p. 111. Buchanan, I, p. 127. Tindall, p. 1171. Jordan, p. 680. Bailey,

p. 801.



lxxvi.Buchanan, I, pp. 127-130. Tindall, p. 1191.



lxxvii.Perrett, p. 169.



lxxviii.Tindall, p. 1172. Perrett, pp. 58-59. Buchanan, I, p. 15.



lxxix.Perrett, p. 61. Tindall, p. 1172. Vatter, p. 3.



lxxx.Perrett, p. 64. Richard R. Lingeman, Don't You Know There's a War On? The American

Home Front, 1941-1945 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 21.



lxxxi.Tindall, pp. 1171-1172. Vatter, pp. 9, 5.



lxxxii.Tugwell, p. 532.



lxxxiii.Janeway, pp. 72, 95, 99, 104.



lxxxiv.Blum, p. 7.



lxxxv.Lingeman, p. 20. Buchanan, I, pp. 121, 17. Vatter, p. 5. Perrett, p. 130.

Garraty, pp. 803-804. Jordan, p. 672. Tindall, p. 1172. These destroyers were

submarine chasers, and 47 had been in mothballs for 18 years.



lxxxvi.Vatter, p. 10. Polenberg, p. 7. Janeway, p. 199. Buchanan, I, pp. 120,

136. Perrett, p. 74. Garraty, p. 809.



lxxxvii.Tugwell, p. 523. Buchanan, I, p. 136. Janeway, p. 46. Vatter, p. 10.



lxxxviii.Tugwell, p. 548. Lingeman, p. 102.



lxxxix.Perrett, p. 75.



xc.Blum, p. 6.



xci.Vatter, pp. 10, 3. Tindall, p. 1176. Bailey, p. 786. Divine, p. 787.



xcii.Buchanan, I, pp. 25-26. Divine, p. 787. Tindall, p. 1175. Lend-Lease was hardly

neutral, for it permitted the president to give or lend supplies to the Allies, thus

avoiding the hassles over repayment which plagued relations after the first war; Jordan,

p. 672. So, if you sent shoes to Russia and tanks to Britain for the duration, you

would surely want them back at the end of the war, right?



xciii.Perrett, p. 169. Garraty, p. 805.



xciv.Divine, p. 788. Tindall, p. 1175.



xcv.Tugwell, pp. 523-524. Polenberg, p. 7. Buchanan, I, p. 137. Vatter, pp. 10,

41.



xcvi.Buchanan, I, p. 137.



xcvii.Vatter, pp. 37-38. Janeway, pp. 260-264.

23



xcviii.Vatter, pp. 6, 12-13. Perrett, p. 83. Current, p. 784.



xcix.Polenberg, p. 7. Janeway, p. 15. Tugwell, p. 582. Conlin, p. 759. Vatter,

p. 36.



c.Perrett, pp. 75-76, 168. Blum, p. 6. Bailey, p. 795. Allan M. Winkler, The Politics

of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1978), p. 5.



ci.Perrett, p. 77.



cii.Vatter, pp. 5-6. Current, p. 771.



ciii.Perrett, p. 168.



civ.Winkler, p. 5. Bailey, p. 788. Tindall, p. 1177.



cv.Perrett, pp. 170, 77. Lingeman, p. 20. The Germans fired on several American

ships when they transmitted the locations of German submarines to the British; Current,

p. 770. Tindall, p. 1177.



cvi.Perrett, p. 171.



cvii.Vatter, p. 5. Tugwell, p. 582.



cviii.Lingeman, p. 20.



cix.Perrett, p. 77.



cx.Polenberg, p. 8.



cxi.Lingeman, p. 15. Janeway, p. 245.



cxii.Perrett, p. 85.



cxiii.Buchanan, I, p. 77.



cxiv.Risjord, p. 285. Divine, p. 788.



cxv.Jordan, pp. 665, 673. Divine, pp. 781, 789. Risjord, p. 292. Tindall, p. 1180.





cxvi.Garraty, p. 806. Current, p. 771.



cxvii.Boller, p. 188.



cxviii.Risjord, p. 293. Tindall, p. 1181. Gordon W. Prange, "Tora, Tora, Tora!"

The Reader's Digest (October, 1963), pp. 253-255. Yamamoto, who studied at Harvard

and served as military attache in Washington, opposed war with the United States, but

he was a samurai (who put duty first) and a Japanese nationalist (who was loyal to

the emperor and believed the Japanese were a chosen race). The emperor had pushed

diplomacy but was not able to prevent the move to war. Commander Minoru Genda, 36,

an air officer, planned the attack, using the carriers as the striking arm to cause

immediate paralysis, while the Americans thought that the battleships were the backbone

of a fleet. Spies had gotten the information on Pearl Harbor earlier, and, incredibly,

the United States knew about a possible sneak attack from intercepted messages which

had been decoded. Still, "Tora" (tiger) seemed a complete surprise; Prange, "Tora...,"

24



pp. 256-299.

The Americans blew several warnings of the impending strike by 353 Japanese

airplanes, regardless whether Washington sent proper warnings or commanders used them

adequately. The FBI intercepted a phone call to Tokyo the night before which included

information about planes, ships, weather, and searchlights. A minesweeper saw the

periscope of a midget submarine outside the harbor at 3:42 AM. A destroyer attacked

a submarine that it saw outside the harbor at 6:45 AM. Radar saw blips at 7 AM, and

the operator called the lieutenant. However, this was a new officer, who superiors

were off for the day and whose men were gone to breakfast. He reasoned that since

the radio station had stayed on the air playing records all night (to guide in a flight

of B-17's from California), these blips were merely the Americans and nothing to worry

about. When General George Marshall heard the Japanese diplomats breaking off

negotiations, he sent a message by radio to Pearl Harbor. He did not call. When there

was too much static, he sent a cable, but it was not delivered until after the attack

began; Walter Lord, "Five Missed Chances at Pearl Harbor," The Reader's Digest (December,

1957), pp. 42-45; Prange, "Tora...," p. 298.

Yamamoto, the architect of Pearl Harbor, 59, had earlier perfected the use of

the torpedo, night-fighting techniques, and had helped with the Zero. He liked poker

and baseball. Several years later the Americans intercepted a coded message that

Yamamoto should be flying over Bougainville in the Solomon Islands to inspect the front,

and he and his staff would fly in two bombers escorted by six Zeros. Was this a murder?

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz asked whether anyone could take his place, and the answer

was no. 18 P-38's flew low under radar for 300 miles, intercepted the two Betty bombers,

and shot them down (April 18, 1943). The story was not told because the brother of

one pilot was a prisoner held by the Japanese and because they did not want the Japanese

to change the code; Prange, "Tora...," (Nov., 1963), p. 324. Conlin, p. 767. Thomas

G. Lanphier, "I Shot Down Yamamoto," The Reader's Digest (December, 1966), pp. 82-87.





cxix.Jordan, p. 675. Either the Polish resistance stole a cipher machine (Enigma)

out of a wrecked German truck, or the company sold an earlier version of it during

the 1930's--maybe both (and maybe neither).



cxx.Prange, "Tora...," (Oct., 1963), p. 298, (Nov., 1963), p. 306. Lord, p. 42.

Current, p. 773. Conlin, p. 755 said that it was 15 ships and 188 planes. Jordan,

p. 675 said that it was 3,600 casualties. The Japanese goofed when they failed to

take out the submarine pens and the repair shops, because it was the submarines which

soon took the war to Japan and the undamaged machine shops which raised and repaired

the ships. Had the fleet been scared into putting to sea and had it been sunk in deep

water, the damage would have been irreparable; Boller, p. 189. The raid removed the

sole obstacle to Japanese expansion, and only luck had the three aircraft carriers

out at sea on training missions; Conlin, p. 755. Even with interception by radar and

breaking the code, the Americans were not ready; Risjord, p. 294. Prange, "Tora...,"

(Nov., 1963), p. 297. Lord, pp. 42-45.



cxxi.Jordan, p. 675. Divine, p. 790.





cxxii.Jordan, p. 681. Bailey, p. 802. About 1,000 of 10,000 died on the march,

and 5,000 more died in the camps; Conlin, p. 766. A few of the Americans caught in

the Philippines went underground with the Filipino guerrillas. Iliff David Richardson

ran a radio network, and he plotted the minefields by watching Japanese ships go through;

Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines (New York: Bantam Books,

Incorporated, 1980)--reprint of a 1945 edition.



cxxiii.Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945

(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1972), p. 5.



cxxiv.Eliot Janeway, The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization

in World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), pp. 1-2.



cxxv.David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 13-16, 24, 41-45, 77, 113-116, 124, 139, 160-165,

25



250. Ruthe Winegarten, Texas Women, A Pictorial History: From Indians to Astronauts

(Austin: Eakin Press, ?), p. 120.



cxxvi.A. Russell Buchanan, The United States and World War II (New York: Harper &

Row, Publishers, 1964), I, p. xiii. Harold G. Vatter, The U. S. Economy in World

War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 1.



cxxvii.Vatter, pp. 1-8, 33. George B. Tindall, America: A Narrative History (Second

Edition, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), pp. 1152, 1164. Rexford G. Tugwell,

The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Garden City, New York:

Doubleday & Company, Incorporated, 1957), pp. 504-505, 532. Janeway, pp. 95, 99, 104.

Richard R. Lingeman, Don't You Know There's a War On? The American Home Front, 1941-1945

(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 20. John M. Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics

and American Culture During World War II (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976),

p. 7.



cxxviii.Janeway, pp. 7-8, 14, 361. Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda:

The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978),

p. 19.



cxxix.Vatter, pp. 12-13. Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: The

American People, 1939-1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), pp.

399, 29.



cxxx.Perrett, p. 399.



cxxxi.Vatter, p. 59. Polenberg, p. 60.



cxxxii.Athens Daily Review, Jan. 2, 21, 22, 24, 28; Feb. 13, 14, 20, 28; April 16;

Aug. 4, 28; Sept. 10; Nov. 22, Dec. 2, 1941. Hereinafter cited ADR.



cxxxiii.ADR, January 1, 6, February 4, 22, April 18, 29, May 1, July 9, August 29,

November 8, December 9, 1941.



cxxxiv.ADR, January 23, 24, February 5, 17, March 3, July 1, 7, September 13, 1941.



cxxxv.ADR, March 3, 7, 13, April 3, May 2, 6, July 1, September 10, 1941. Tindall,

p. 1172. Perrett, p. 176.



cxxxvi.ADR, April 28, May 2, June 14, 21, July 9, 17, 22, August 21, 25, October

31, November 21, 1941. Airplanes required the virgin metal and not scrap; Bruce Catton,

The War Lords of Washington (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948), p. 78.





cxxxvii.ADR, February 6, March 4, 10, 31, April 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, May 1, November

3, 5, 19. Actually, the danger from labor strikes was never as dire as the Review

said, nor the Pentagon which stirred up the press. Even at their most active time,

strikes caused only a fourth as many days lost per year as did industrial accidents;

Lingeman, pp. 161, 143.



cxxxviii.ADR, December 4, 8, 1941. Events seen in historical perspective today

are ever much more clear than to those experiencing the actual events. News was

manipulated to conceal defeats and mistakes, and the public often did not know about

things as they happened. This clumsy management of the news, sometimes for good reasons

such as military security, later irritated the people but was less visible in the burst

of patriotism after Pearl Harbor. Early in the war, German submarines sunk some 300

American ships off the East Coast, and losses were heavy in the Pacific, too.

Unfortunately, no one told, and a sad consequence of this was that the oil tankers

sailing up the coast were outlined against the sky by lights coming from shore. However,

no one could miss the bodies and oil which washed up on beaches or the barbed-wire

barricades, spotlights, and armed guards stationed there. Gradually, coastal cities

26



undertook blackouts; Perrett, pp. 208-215, 237.

It was also believed helpful to the enemy to tell anything about the political

quarrels, rationing, or saboteurs; Winkler, pp. 48-58. In June, 1942, German submarines

landed four saboteurs in New York and four more in Florida. They carried explosives

and plans showing bridges and factories, and they were soon caught. When FDR learned

that the civil courts could only sentence them to a maximum of thirty years, he had

the eight tried by a military commission where a death sentence required only a two-thirds

vote. Six were shot; Polenberg, pp. 44-45. Buchanan, II, p. 324.

After Pearl Harbor recruiting stations were jammed, bond drives sold out quickly,

and rallies were held. "Defense" was out; now, it was "victory." The heightened

sense of community was never dampened by the fears of air raids, the blackouts, or

the radio stations going off the air (so that enemy bombers would be unable to home

in on the radio signal); Perrett, pp. 203-205. The radio stations spoke of the need

for sacrifice and cooperation, and they advertised bond drives, the USO, and military

recruitment; Polenberg, p. 136. Blum, p. 26. Some ten million joined in civil defense

as air-raid wardens and such; Wynn, pp. 12-13.

The war on the home front also reached into other media. Films showed the triumph

of good over evil, the victory of American values, as they stereotyped the enemy and

made Americans heroic; Perrett, p. 243. Blum, pp. 52, 64-67. Divine, p. 802. Joe

Palooka and Dick Tracy enlisted, while other comic figures helped on the home front,

buying bonds and conserving scarce resources; Susan M. Hartmann, The Home Front and

Beyond: American Women in the 1940s (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982), p. 190.



cxxxix.ADR, December 8, 9, 16, 17, 19, 23, 1941. Casualty reports and the locations

of troops were often censored from the news (until intelligence interception of enemy

messages showed that they knew), and programs by which any hidden message could be

transmitted were ended, too; Polenberg, p. 51.

This all began in September, 1939, with the Office of Government Reports. In

March, 1941, the Division of Information was created under the Office of Emergency

Management, and in spring, 1941, the Office of Civilian Defense was founded. The Office

of Facts and Figures started in October, 1941. This clearinghouse for "facts" did

not have to censor information, because the press cooperated with the theme of no

defeatism. In June, 1942, FDR replaced it with a new agency, the Office of War Information

(OWI). OWI was resented shortly by Congress, the press, and the public as a waste

of $30 million both for selling them the war and for looking down on them as if they

were children. OWI faced difficulty because the army and navy feared giving information

away, Nelson Rockefeller of the State Department liked to run Latin America all by

himself, and William G. Donovan collected data by using spies. (Donovan started as

Coordinator of Information in July, 1941, and was broken away when OWI began as the

head of the Office of Strategic Services, the spy agency and forerunner of the Central

Intelligence Agency.) This made the State Department and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) very jealous. Robert Sherwood headed the Foreign Information

Service, beginning in August, 1941, which created the Voice of America (radio station);

Winkler, pp. 1, 21-27, 31, 231. Perrett, p. 251. Tugwell, p. 601.

OWI aimed to help win the war by mobilizing public opinion. It would express

American ideals, drawing forth a cooperating spirit in the cause; Winkler, p. 1.

Polenberg, p. 132. OWI had Elmer Davis, the newsman, as the head, and he was but a

babe in the woods in the political infighting with the administration, Congress, and

the military; Winkler, pp. 1, 37. Tugwell believed that the dry wit of Davis punctured

enemy deceit with an exceedingly common touch. OWI also had Archibald MacLeish, whose

imagination made real the American dream, as well as Robert Sherwood in foreign fields;

Tugwell, p. 600.

During the first war George Creel's Committee on Public Information: (1) mobilized

opinion with effective speakers, posters, and pamphlets; (2) intensified hatred of

Germany; and (3) generated unrealistic hopes for the postwar world; Winkler, pp. 2-3.

Kennedy, pp. 53-54, 61. This propaganda provoked afterward an isolationist reaction.

People came to think that it was the British who persuaded America to enter the war.

Because FDR did not share the Wilson idealism--he saw the war not as fascism versus

democracy but rather just wanted to win the war--and because of the shadow cast by

Creel and British propaganda that Joseph Goebbels copied in his methods, OWI on the

home front mainly told about the war and world opinion; Winkler, pp. 4-6, 18-20.

Overseas, however, OWI was instrumental in propaganda in North Africa and Italy and

later in the leaflets and broadcasts spread to Germany; Winkler, pp. 118-120, 136.



cxl.ADR, December 12, 1941. The Review never mentioned the Japanese-Americans interned

during the war, except once in 1945, when it questioned whether the county might accept

27



30 or 40 of these families; Athens Weekly Review, January 18, 1945.



cxli.Athens Weekly Review, January 1, 8, 15, 22, February 19, May 14, 1942. Hereafter

cited AWR. Polenberg, p. 133.



cxlii.AWR, January 1, 8, 15, February 5, 19, June 18, 25, 1942. During the Vietnamese

conflict the lack of mobilization of the people behind the war effort was clearly evident,

and, perhaps, no where did this ambivalence show more clearly than in the issue of

the draft. That was not true for World War II. A common sense of danger had bred

hatred for Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese people; Polenberg, pp. 134-135. This

was channeled into a hunt for subversives (who might otherwise threaten to collapse

the country from within) by the Martin Dies led House Un-American Activities Committee,

the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the press; Perrett, pp. 87-88, 228. The FBI

tapped phones and fingerprinted defense workers; Perrett, p. 101. Tainted textbooks

and teachers were removed, sedition (that is, fascist ideas) was forbidden, and a loyalty

oath was required of some agency employees; Perrett, pp. 87-90, 106-108, 250. Aliens

were required to register, although 95 per cent received clearances when they wanted

to work in defense plants; Polenberg, p. 42. Perrett, p. 90. The feeling also focused

to exclude foreign influences like the Japanese-Americans or refugees. Sadly, in 1939,

907 Jewish people aboard the "St. Louis" were sent back to the Germany that they had

fled; Perrett, p. 96. Communists were convicted for holding opinions, reading pamphlets,

or collecting names on a petition; Perrett, pp. 91, 102. But the real mob persecution

was reserved for Jehovah's Witnesses; Perrett, pp. 91, 227.

Draft boards found peculiar types difficult to classify; Buchanan, II, p. 330.

Quakers, Mennonites, and Seventh-Day Adventists were conscientious objectors. 25,000

of them were noncombatants, often serving on the field as medics. This distinguished

them and earned no widespread hostility. Another 12,000 worked in Civilian Public

Service Camps, the old Civilian Conservation Corps camps, where they were sent away

from public attention. They emptied privies, swept roads, picked up litter, cut trails,

or dug ditches that they could then fill up. Another 100,000 either would not register

or claimed exemptions as conscientious objectors for political reasons. About a third

of one per cent of those liable to the draft, these men were sent to prison. The Jehovah's

Witnesses were the largest group among them; Buchanan, II, pp. 328-330. Polenberg,

pp. 55-59.

The courts protected the rights of Germans, communists, and conscientious

objectors. The nation, however, defended itself at the cost of the constitutional

rights of the Japanese-Americans with their "relocation" to internment camps; Buchanan,

II, pp. 325-327. There was not much violence against dissent; Polenberg, p. 60.





cxliii.AWR, June 18, 25, 1942.



cxliv.AWR, July 2, 9, 16, 1942.



cxlv.Perrett, p. 243. Blum, pp. 52, 64, 67. Lee G. Miller, The Story of Ernie

Pyle (New York: The Viking Press, 1950), p. 227. Pyle, a noted war correspondent,

was later killed near the end of the war and was widely mourned; AWR, April 26, 1945.



cxlvi.Lattie Anderson.



cxlvii.AWR, July 9, November 5, 1942.



cxlviii.AWR, January 7, 14, 21, February 11, 18, 25, March 4, April 15, December

16, 1943.



cxlix.AWR, January 7, 14, 21, February 5, October 7, 1943. Robert W. Woodruff of

Coca-Cola had difficulty importing the flavoring ingredients and with the sugar

shortages, but he reduced sugar content and sold bottles for a nickel so that the military

would carry it abroad. The world acquired a taste for Coke, the war enabling it to

position itself on worldwide markets; Blum, p. 107.



cl.Polenberg, pp. 22, 85. Lattie Anderson. AWR, March 4, January 7, 1943. Jordan,

28



p. 678. Buchanan, I, p. 141. Vatter, pp. 17, 114, 52-53.



cli.Buchanan, II, pp. 316-318. Perrett, pp. 401, 260-261. Hartmann, pp. 3-4. Divine,

p. 796. AWR, February 11, 1943.



clii.Blum, p. 6. Janeway, p. 318. Vatter, p. 29. Divine, p. 805. Buchanan, I,

p. 140. AWR, March 11, 1943. Polenberg, pp. 18-19. The problems associated with

allocating scarce resources to production were finally solved, letting manufacturing

double from $30 billion in 1942 to $60 billion in 1943; Janeway, p. 314.



cliii.Polenberg, p. 138. Bailey, p. xxiii. California grew by 34 per cent because

aircraft factories and shipyards were concentrated there, run by labor "pirates" like

Henry J. Kaiser. Detroit added half a million people; Wynn, p. 16. Vatter, pp. 18,

114. Finally, the government had to act to slow down the "unnecessary migration of

labor," and it thereafter let defense contracts with an eye on the available labor

in an area; Vatter, p. 81. Polenberg, p. 22.



cliv.Perrett, p. 401. Lingeman, p. 135. Wynn, pp. 12-13. Hartmann, p. 4.



clv.Perrett, p. 259. In April, 1942, FDR established the War Manpower Commission

(WMC) under Paul V. McNutt; Tugwell, p. 601. Vatter, p. 69. Buchanan, I, p. 127.

WMC allocated workers where they were needed (via draft exemptions); Jordan, p. 678.

Wynn, pp. 12-13. Hartmann, p. 2. Adding 15 million people to the labor force and

military during the war, especially with the tapping of the unemployed, the teens,

and women, created a state of flux wherein turnover was high and voluntary participation

sometimes fell short. The Selective Service came under WMC, and by January, 1943,

McNutt ordered people to "work or fight." Draft deferments were granted only when

jobs were essential until Congress intervened to rate married fathers higher; Polenberg,

pp. 20-22.



clvi.Vatter, p. 138. Hartmann, p. 6. Buchanan, I, p. 138.



clvii.AWR, February 18, March 4, December 30, 1943.



clviii.AWR, January 6, 1944.





clix.Perrett, pp. 238-240, 394-396. Blum, pp. 95-98. Tugwell, pp. 666-667. Janeway,

p. 18. Buchanan, II, pp. 334-335.



clx.Hartmann, p. 4. Lingeman, p. 65. Ernie Pyle, Brave Men (New York: Henry Holt

and Company, 1944), p. 83. AWR, August 23, 1945.



clxi.Lingeman, p. 72.



clxii.AWR, January 4, 18, February 1, April 26, 1945.



clxiii.Lingeman, pp. 62, 230. Polenberg, p. 133. Buchanan, I, p. 129. Catton,

p. 296. It began as S.N.A.F.U. or situation normal, all...



clxiv.Mobilization in the second war was like that in the first, except that FDR

did not have a rabble-rouser like George Creel. The war increased the size of government

from a million employees to 3.8 million, the national debt from $40 to $260 billion,

the power of the president, and the costs of war; Hartmann, pp. 2-3; Polenberg, pp.

240, 244. Perrett, pp. 250, 401. Buchanan, II, p. 316. Divine, p. 805.



clxv.Polenberg, p. 240. Blum, p. 91. Perrett, pp. 174, 301. Vatter, p. 19.



clxvi.Lingeman, p. 13. Polenberg, pp. 138, 13-14, 241. Vatter, pp. 114, 6, 30.

29



Perrett, pp. 401, 174. Hartmann, p. 4. Divine, p. 805.



clxvii.Vatter, p. 28. AWR, February 25, 1942.



clxviii.Perrett, p. 179. ADR, July 22, 1941.



clxix.Conlin, p. 760. Polenberg, pp. 14-18, 133. Janeway, pp. 343-344. Vatter,

p. 29. Divine, p. 796.



clxx.AWR, September 17, 1942. Perrett, p. 240.



clxxi.Perrett, pp. 133-134, 208, 211. Polenberg, pp. 16-19, 32. Janeway, p. 341.

Conlin, p. 760. Jane Enger.



clxxii.Vatter, p. 138. Hartmann, p. 3. Wynn, pp. 12-13. Polenberg, p. 32. Janeway,

p. 339. Jane Enger. AWR, February 25, March 4, 1943. Mrs. Max Lale, personal interview,

Nacogdoches, Texas, September 24, 1988.



clxxiii.Vatter, p. 103. Polenberg, pp. 9, 25, 218. Blum, p. 141. Tindall, p. 1191.



clxxiv.Tugwell, pp. 582, 597-600, 611-613. Polenberg, pp. 32, 240. Wynn, pp. 12-13.

Janeway, p. 199. Vatter, pp. 42, 89, 121. Buchanan, II, pp. 320-322. Hartmann,

p. 3. Current, p. 780. AWR, March 4, 1943. The consumer price index was said to

rise 47 per cent for the period; Lingeman, p. 125. Anyhow, there was inflation.



clxxv.Polenberg, p. 30. Tindall, p. 1192. Buchanan, II, pp. 316-318. Current,

p. 780. Divine, p. 796. Blum, p. 53. Perrett, p. 299.



clxxvi.Helen Chambers, personal interview, Athens, Texas, November 14, 1988. Perrett,

pp. 175, 231-235. AWR, January 14, 1943.



clxxvii.Conlin, p. 760. Perrett, p. 233. Lingeman, pp. 247-248. Jane Enger. Lattie

Anderson, personal interview, Athens, Texas, November 7, 1988.





clxxviii.Helen Chambers. Lattie Anderson. Perrett, pp. 231-235, 394. Conlin,

p. 761.



clxxix.Blum, pp. 91, 94, 97, 100. Lattie Anderson. Polenberg, p. 36. Vatter, pp.

20-21. Perrett, p. 401. Hartmann, p. 3.



clxxx.Conlin, p. 769.



clxxxi.Bailey, pp. 788, 790, 795. Jordan, p. 678 said that it was 71,000 ships.



clxxxii.Conlin, pp. 767-768. Divine, p. 799. Current, p. 783. Jordan, pp. 675-676.

World War II saw few arrested or bothered on the home front (as in the first

war)--the communists, socialists, Italians, Germans--except for the Nisei; Current,

p. 782. The Issei were born in Japan and were not citizens, but the Nisei were born

in America and were citizens; Divine, p. 799. Not directly invaded or threatened,

America mobilized almost at leisure and had to use imagination to picture enemies;

Divine, p. 801. Hollywood helped by doing films where good triumphed over evil, and

American values always won out; Divine, p. 802. Some eight Nazi saboteurs were landed

on Long Island and Florida in 1942, but they were soon betrayed by one of them to the

FBI. FDR appointed a military commission to try them for attempted sabotage against

war industry. Their defense was that they had committed no act, that all of them

volunteered to get out of Germany, and that they betrayed the mission. Two months

after they landed, they were convicted. Six were executed that very day, and the other

two received long prison terms. They were pardoned in 1948. No agents sent by the

30



Abwehr sabotaged anything, thanks to the FBI; Lawrence Elliott, "Hitler's Undercover

Invasion of the United States," The Reader's Digest (March, 1960), pp. 162-178.



clxxxiii.Bailey, pp. 797-798. Jordan, pp. 676-678. Divine, p. 797. Current, p.

781 said that 700,000 blacks served. They served in segregated units.



clxxxiv.Jordan, p. 678. Conlin, p. 762.



clxxxv.Jordan, p. 689.



clxxxvi.Edwin P. Hoyt, Guadalcanal (New York: Jove Publications, Incorporated, 1982),

p. 276. Hoyt said that American fliers and marines improved despite poor officers

at the top. The Japanese torpedo (24"), "Long Lance," was much better than the American

torpedo. It was oxygen-driven at 40 miles-per-hour to a range of 24.5 miles and accurate

and carried a 225-pound warhead; Russell Spurr, A Glorious Way to Die (New York: Bantam

Books, 1981), p. 33. The P-37 Brewster Buffalo was an easy victim of the Japanese

Zero at Pearl Harbor; Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikashi, Zero! The Story of Japan's

Air War in the Pacific: 1941-45 (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956), p. 42. "Zero"

was an American invention for the rising sun insignia; Conlin, p. 767.



clxxxvii.Jordan, p. 689. A. J. Barker, Midway: The Turning Point (New York: Ballantine

Books, Incorporated, 1971), p. 68 said that it was one carrier each. Anyhow, the battle

was fought between planes, and the Japanese lost 77, the Americans 66; Risjord, p.

298. Because they lost so many of their trained pilots, the Japanese left two carriers

home when they went the next month to Midway; Barker, p. 69.



clxxxviii.Barker, p. 40. Nimitz had only 121 planes, and 30 of those were Catalina

PBY's; Barker, p. 73. However, the Americans had broken the Japanese code, intercepted

the messages, and were waiting at Midway Island, the "unsinkable aircraft carrier"

with everything in the Pacific that would fly; Current, p. 774. While they had but

fifty ships to 165 of the enemy, the planes from Midway were the key. At 5 AM on June

4th, four Japanese carriers launched 108 planes some 180 miles out from Midway. American

planes intercepted and wrecked their mission but took losses. Meanwhile, a squadron

of slow-moving torpedo planes spotted the Japanese fleet but were shot down before

inflicting any damages; Divine, p. 795; Barker, pp. 90, 95-97. The victorious Japanese

returned to the carriers to refuel and rearm, and they were surprised by American dive

bombers about a half hour later; Tindall, p. 1188. Three Japanese carriers were sunk

then and one more on the next day; Conlin, p. 767.



clxxxix.Risjord, p. 298. Garraty, p. 817. Barker, p. 152. Current, p. 774. Conlin,

p. 767. Divine, p. 795. Barker, p. 152 said the Japanese lost 253 planes; Garraty,

p. 817 said 300.



cxc.Risjord, p. 298. Hoyt, Guadalcanal, pp. 275-276. There were about 60,000 Americans

there. The navy was beaten and pulled off, but the marines took Henderson Field and

hung on. The Japanese navy kept reinforcing the enemy troops. The American navy sank

seven troop transports. 24 ships on each side were destroyed, which the Japanese could

not replace; Jack Paar, "Pilgrimage to Guadalcanal," The Reader's Digest (October,

1962), pp. 284, 297. Hoyt, Guadalcanal, p. 276.



cxci.Tindall, p. 1214. Boller, p. 191. Jordan, p. 690.



cxcii.Risjord, p. 289. Tindall, p. 1189. The Germans started the war with 57

submarines and manufactured 20 a month by the end of 1941; Cremer, p. 16. Hitler might

have won the war had he had 1,000 submarines before he started fighting.



cxciii.Risjord, p. 296. The destroyer escort or corvette was built, an extremely

light, quick destroyer for convoy duty, which could get quickly over submerged submarines

and depth-bomb them. Long range sea planes (PBY) flew 16-hour missions around the

oceans to locate submarines. They were armed with radar and sonar (a listening device

that detected submarines under water), and they could warn a convoy of trouble in time

to avoid lurking submarines; Tindall, p. 1205. The Germans made their captains surface

31



and radio home every night, and so planes like the B-17's (flew 11-hour missions from

Britain) and B-24's (flew 16-hour missions from the United States) were handy in the

sky with radio detection equipment (also radar, sonar, and magnetic devices), and the

U-boats could not hide; Cremer, pp. 131, 133.



cxciv.Tindall, p. 1205. The hunter-killer groups had destroyer escorts, escort

carriers, and attack submarines. The tiny aircraft carriers hauled just 24 planes,

but they were very effective because submarines were blind, especially at night, to

attack from above. (If one knew from radio intercepts where a U-boat was and which

way it was going, then he could come up from behind to attack where the radio antenna

makes a blind spot on the radar screen.) Sinking enemy shipping got expensive to the

Germans. For instance, in May, 1943, 28 submarines sank 41 ships, but 41 U-boats were

lost, too; Cremer, pp. 2, 131.



cxcv.Tindall, p. 1205. Cremer, pp. 208-209. Toward the end of the war, the U-boats

did not return to base but were supplied by supply-tender submarines, the "milk cows."

The last model U-boat carried a long snorkel which let it run diesels at periscope

depth to charge its batteries (making it less vulnerable to discovery), and it could

remain submerged and run at 28 miles an hour for days on hydrogen peroxide (it could

stay deep, as it did not require oxygen, and it gave off no revealing bubbles and was

quiet and not detected by sonar); Cremer, pp. 180, 192.

71% of German submariners were casualties; Edwin p. Hoyt, Bowfin (New York: Van

Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1983), p. xiii.



cxcvi.Tindall, p. 1176. Virginia Cowles, The Phantom Major: The Story of David

Stirling and His Desert Command (New York: Ballantine Books, 1966), pp. 250-252 told

about a British commando unit that hit supplies, planes, and trucks.



cxcvii.Divine, p. 793. Rommel was very sick and Montgomery had intelligence intercepts

that laid out for him the German plans. On August 30, 1942, Rommel had 203 tanks and

Montgomery had 767 tanks and 181,000 mines. Rommel outflanked Montgomery and went

through the mines, but he ran low on gas. The British had laid for his ships and sank

four of the six bringing him gas. Rommel stopped and built a defense with 445,000

mines. In October, Rommel had 230 German and 330 lousy Italian tanks to Montgomery's

1,029 tanks and 195,000 men; David Irving, The Trail of the Fox (New York: Avon Books,

1977), pp. 245-262. The Axis lost 500 tanks and 120,000 men to the British 432 tanks

and 13,000 men.



cxcviii.Divine, pp. 793, 801. Garraty, p. 815. Current, p. 776. Irving, p. 345.



cxcix.Risjord, p. 298. Current, pp. 776-777. Tindall, p. 1207. Mussolini was removed

from office in July, 1943, and he was captured by the Allies but later rescued from

his mountain-top jail by raiding German commandoes. On April 28, 1945, Italian communist

partisans caught the fleeing Mussolini and his mistress, Cloretta Petacci, 33, shot

them and mutilated their bodies, and hung them naked from the girders of a bombed out

gas station; Collier, "The Last Days of Benito Mussolini," pp. 255-299.



cc.Jordan, p. 664. Lee G. Miller, The Story of Ernie Pyle (New York: The Viking Press,

1950), p. 227.



cci.Conlin, p. 758. Risjord, p. 294. Their monotonous diet was a ready focus of

GI humor. The A rations, possible only where refrigeration and cooking could be

accomplished, were not bad. But C rations and their famous ten meats--stew, spaghetti,

Spam (which many can still not eat again)--plus dehydrated eggs and vegetables were

not as tasty. K rations were bad, although they needed little preparation and nourished

the soldier. In areas behind the lines, the USO's (United Service Organization) sprang

up, giving GI's a place to have coffee, dances, and conversations away from the war.

Stars such as Bob Hope visited from Hollywood. Military police, the MP's, with their

white helmets and armbands became famous the world over, continually tring to keep

GI's out of trouble. The development of new drugs and quick methods of evacuation

gave wounded GI's much better chances of recovery and a return to the war than their

enemies. 30,000 Americans also served as spies and gathered intelligence around the

world, especially for the OSS, forerunner of the CIA. 700 correspondents were overseas

32



and writing columns for the people back home to keep up with the war. On D-Day, 450

newspaper men accompanied the invasion at Normandy. GI's were bored, lonely, afraid,

and dirty. They hoped to get the war over with and to return home alive. The book

Catch 22 is pretty much how it was for many soldiers. For fun, they tried to date

the local girls and drink the wine, built stills, concocted a brew from hair oil by

filtering it through bread and mixing it with grape juice, and wrote "Kilroy was here"

all over everywhere. No one knew who Kilroy ever was, either.



ccii.Tindall,p. 1208. When the American B-17's and B-24's flew at squadron strength

or better, they could defend themselves from enemy fighter attack and hence could fly

daytime bombing missions. The B-17's, for instance, carried 12 .50 caliber machine

guns each; Barker, p. 114. An enemy should expose himself to at least 12 machine guns

should he attack the B-17 formation. The bombardiers used the Norden bombsight (an

early version of the computer), which was so accurate as to let them brag about dropping

their bombs down a pickle barrel. The British had no such device and hence flew at

night when it was safe to fly lower altitudes (because fighter planes could not see

them); their leaders dropped incendiaries earlier, and the whole formation unloaded

when they saw fires below. When the Americans developed longer-range fighter planes

later in the war (the P-47 and P-51), they could fly air cover against the enemy fighter

planes. The lead bombers dropped loads of tin foil to jam the enemy's radar-directed

guns. Down low, the worry was artillery fire and flak (a bunch of shells fired up

that exploded at a predetermined altitude), but the Messerschmitt 109 (four 30mm machine

guns and three cannons) waited up high.

In 1943, a raid destroyed the Luftwaffe plant (at a cost of 66 planes) which

made ball bearings, a vital component in the Messerschmitt. This raid on Augsburg,

together with the bombing of the oil refineries at Hamburg, limited the ability of

the Luftwaffe to intercept the Allied bombers. Early in the war, the Luftwaffe had

experienced pilots that made bombing from above the flak really dangerous. The raid

on the Rumanian oil refineries at Ploesti in August, 1943, had left only 33 of 178

B-24's fit to fly again and inflicted only minor damage.





cciii.Conlin, p. 772. Buchanan, II, p. 381. Hitler assumed that the war would be

over by 1942 and, accordingly, never produced the atomic bomb, which would have taken

until after that. The V-2's carrying atomic warheads might have destroyed military

targets. Anyway, some of the German scientists withheld their information, the Allies

bombed the V-1 and V-2 launching sites, and it became too late. The Norwegian resistance

attacked the German heavy water plant in Norway several times (a favorite story line

on late-night movies), and other spies got data about the V-1 and V-2. Production

of the heavy water and the rockets was moved to Germany.

Stevenson, p.? said that the V-1's were misdirected by radio and disinformation

to hit outside London. Hitler might have targeted the staging areas and channel ports.

Hitler intended to drop 50,000 V-1's on London at 5,000 a month. Michel Hollard--45,

French, and a spy--went across the border in October, 1943, to get a blueprint of the

launching ramps for the V-1's. He had earlier worked on obtaining the locations of

divisions, airfields, batteries, and submarine bases. Thanks to his mission, bombers

knocked out 73 ramps in five weeks, and Hitler sent only about 2,500 V-1's; George

Kent, "The Man Who Saved London," The Reader's Digest (September, 1961), pp. 229-232.



cciv.While the Zero was superior early in the war, better American models were

developed. The Lockheed P-38 Lightning flew 2,000-mile missions at 400 miles-an-hour,

carried four .50 caliber machine guns and a 37 mm cannon, and knocked down ten Japanese

planes to each P-38 lost (it was also great in North Africa but terrible in Europe);

Martin Caidin, Fork-tailed Devil: The P-38 (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), pp.

75, 81, 22, 341-342. Mainly, the P-38 flew higher. The carrier-based Grumman F6F

Hellcat was both more heavily armed and faster than the Zero; Okumiya, pp. 161-164.

The B-29 flew 16-hour missions and dropped large payloads, and the P-51 was capable

of long-range fighter support.



ccv.Okumiya, pp. 4-5.



ccvi.When one says "Jew" and "concentration camp," you think of Anne Frank. There

was a young girl--emotional, strong-willed, a problem child, and a talker--who took

an interest in people. Her father, Otto, a banker, fled Germany for Holland (1933)

33



and started a spice business. After the invasion, eight Jews hid on the upper floor,

and the staff brought in food and literature. Anne started a diary filled with the

tensions, quarrels, and experiences of adolescence. They were caught in 1944--the

men went to Auschwitz, the women to Bergen-Belsen. Anne died at 15 in 1945, perhaps

of typhoid, as did her sister and mother. The secretary found the diary on the floor

and later gave it to Otto Frank. Two million copies were published and a play written.

In the play the father tells of the deaths and then picks up the diary to read, "In

spite of everything, I still believe that people are really good at heart;" Louis de

Jong, "The Girl Who Was Anne Frank, The Reader's Digest (October, 1957), pp. 115-120.



ccvii.Shirer, "Reaping the Whirlwind: The Last Days of the Third Reich," p. 279.



ccviii.Divine, p. 800. Jordan, p. 685. Irving, pp. 431, 445, 451, 491. Current,

p. 785. Ryan, "The Longest Day," (June, 1959), pp. 79-80, 245, (July, 1959), p. 241.

The Germans knew about the attack but thought themselves out of a quick reaction.

An actor who looked like Montgomery (who was a sure bet to be in on any invasion)

was on display in Egypt for the German spies to see; M. E. Clifton James, "I Was Monty's

Double," The Reader's Digest (?, 1954), pp. 189-208. Bogus radio transmissions were

sent to keep enemy intelligence people busy (and lead them to assume that the attack

was really elsewhere), and dummy ships and tents were set up for the Luftwaffe to

photograph. There was no warning by German radio intercepts, radar, or reconnaissance,

and no jamming or disinformation; Irving, p. 431. Hitler had to be in on any decision,

but he was not available.



ccix.Tindall, p. 1212. Remember, Hitler left the kill at Dunkirk to the Luftwaffe

rather than let the panzers finish the job, and he invaded Russia without winter clothes

or lubricants thinking that the war would be over soon there, too. Since he figured

that the war would be over by 1942, he had delayed production of late model airplanes

and the atomic bomb. It was the same with the V-2 rocket. Had he started the war

with 1,000 submarines... By 1944, the U-boats had a snorkel, the air tube which drew

in oxygen from the surface to let them run on diesels below, staying down out of sight;

Cremer, p. 180. The milch cows (the large supply tender submarines that carried fuel

and arms to sea so that attack submarines need not risk refitting in port and have

to cross shallow water in the Baltic) were too slow to submerge, so Allied bombers

tracked them with radar and sonar and eliminated them; Cremer, pp. 54, 62.

The research and development that produced the hydrogen peroxide submarines led

to the jet and rocket engines; Cremer, p. 192. Hitler delayed until 1944 the production

of the first jet, the Messerschmitt 262, a twin engine fighter which flew 540

miles-per-hour and could easily destroy the best American planes with its four cannon.

In fact, on March 18, 1945, 37 ME 262's shot down 18 B-17's and B-24's.

Frank Whittle had the British patent on a jet in 1930. Above 20,000 feet, the

air is too thin for the propeller to bite and piston engines to breathe. A fan rammed

compressed air in to where it was heated with burning fuel, and the gases were ejected.

In 1934, Hans von Ohain, 23, a German, thought of a jet engine and built a model.

Ernst Heinkel hired him. The Fuhrer saw the jet in 1939 (the He 178), but the Luftwaffe

ignored it. Whittle's plane, the E 28139, was out in 1940.

Hitler forbade all research and development projects lasting beyond one year,

as the war was to be over. Still, Willi Messerschmitt designed the ME 262, and it

first flew in July, 1942. At the end of the next year, Hitler wanted the jet to be

a bomber, and this delayed its availability by a year. The ME 262 flew 100 miles-per-hour

faster and higher than other planes, and it would climb faster.

Whittle was knighted in 1948, and he came in 1976 to the United States where

he taught at the naval academy. Von Ohain came, too, and taught at the University

of Dayton; Noel Vietmeyer, "They Created the Jet Age," The Reader's Digest (May, 1987),

pp. 162-166.



ccx.Shirer, "Reaping the Whirlwind: The Last Days of the Third Reich," p. 289. A

British plane strafed Rommel, and he was injured. Rommel was caught up in this

conspiracy. He wished to arrange an armistice in the West and concentrate on the

Russians. He did not know that Hitler was to be killed. Rommel was to head an interim

government. Given the choice of a trial for treason, Rommel took poison; Irving, pp.

500, 528-529.



ccxi.Jordan, p. 686.

34



ccxii.Divine, p. 801. Tindall, p. 1220. Conlin, p. 773. Fred MacKenzie, The Men

of Bastogne (New York: Charter Books, 1968), pp. 163-167.



ccxiii.Divine, pp. 801, 804. Tindall, p. 1223.



ccxiv.Current, pp. 785-786. Conlin, p. 777. Linge, pp. 190-194. Collier, "The

Last Days of Benito Mussolini," pp. 296-298. Jordan, p. 688.



ccxv.Richard H. O'Kane, Clear the Bridge: The War Patrols of the U.S.S. Tang (New

York: Bantam Books, Incorporated, 1977), pp. 466-467 said that 250 submarines mad patrols

for the United States, sinking 1,100 Japanese merchant ships (five million tons) and

200 warships (600,000 tons) at a cost of 52 submarines and six times the casualty rate

of the surface fleet.

Bobette Gugliotta, Pigboat 39: An American Sub Goes to War (Lexington: The

University Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. ? told about the old submarines--pigboats like

the S-39--which were better suited to reconnaissance and not attack. S-39 was a coastal

submarine, and it was old, loud, and broken down. It finally ran aground on a reef.

Edwin P. Hoyt, Bowfin, p. xiii claimed that 130 Japanese and 52 American submarines

were sunk.

Theodore Roscoe, Pig Boats (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 443 listed the

submarines lost as 781 German, 85 Italian, and 130 Japanese.

Zenji Orita with Joseph D. Harrington, I-Boat Captain (Canoga Park, California:

Major Books, 1976), pp. 17, 97, 207, 332 wrote that about 20 Japanese submarines carried

airplanes, of which one bombed Oregon. American submarines sunk a third of the Japanese

warships. They reported fleet movements and were much better used than the Japanese

submarines. After two years of torpedo duds, the Americans finally copied the German

torpedo. The Japanese lost 11 battleships, 21 carriers, 38 cruisers, 135 destroyers,

and 134 submarines.



ccxvi.Tindall, p. 1215. Conlin, p. 776. Risjord, p. 303.



ccxvii.Conlin, p. 776. Jordan, p. 691. "Kamikaze" means divine wind, for the storm

that blew away the invasion of Kublai Khan; Tindall, p. 1219. The kamikaze combined

a young pilot who was to die for the emperor, an old plane, and a 550-pound bomb.

These suicide planes tried to crash into American ships, and, in all, they killed 15,000

men and sank 300 ships. Fighter planes could shoot down the kamikazes, but once they

broke through to dive on a ship, they were hard to stop. Radar-directed guns swung

the whole battery on one plane, and another might dive in from the opposite direction.

Spurr, pp. 99, 124 said that to be a kamikaze was to be a god and pay a debt

to the emperor. Under the Shinto religion, the Bushido code called one to duty. The

kamikaze pilots were mostly studious, devoted boys and not sake-doped fanatics.

Rikihei Inoguchi, Tadashi Nakajima, Roger Pineau, The Divine Wind: Japan's

Kamikaze Force in World War II (New York: Bantam Books, 1978), p. 204 wrote that these

crash attacks resulted when the conventional tactics failed because of outdated planes

and green pilots. They were going to fly mission and be sacrificed anyway.



ccxviii.Current, p. 787. Bailey, p. 813. Conlin, p. 776. Spurr, pp. 26, 33, 97-98,

308 told about the Yamato, the largest Japanese battleship at 72,000 tons. It had

three triple 18.1" turrets (each weighed 2,730 tons or as much as a destroyer) that

fired 1.5 ton warheads 22.5 miles. It also had 98 machine guns and 24 5" antiaircraft

guns. It was sent on a last banzai (to save face) off Okinawa to hit transports and

spread panic. The attack on April 7, 1945 lost 4,200, while the Americans lost ten

planes and 12 men. The Yamato took hits from 16 torpedoes, 18 heavy bombs, and 1.5

million .50 caliber bullets. It sank.



ccxix.Risjord, p. 304. Current, pp. 787-789. Conlin, p. 776, 749. Jordan, p. 692.

Tindall, p. 1230. Boller, p. 195. Conlin, p. 776 said that 85,000 died in the fires

at Tokyo; Conlin, p. 780 said that 100,000 died at Hiroshima.

Enrico Fermi and Albert Einstein warned about atomic fission in 1939. There

was a controlled reaction at Christmas, 1942, at the University of Chicago. $2 billion

was funded to the Manhattan Project, and the bomb was tested July 16, 1945. Truman

gave the Japanese a deadline; Current, pp. 788-789; Divine, p. 805.

35



ccxx.Barker, p. 152.



ccxxi.Tindall, p. 1222.



ccxxii.Neil A. Wynn, The Afro-American and the Second World War (New

York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1975), pp. 19, 8.



ccxxiii.Harold G. Vatter, The U. S. Economy in World War II (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 127. Robert A. Divine

et al., America: Past and Present (Second Edition, Glenview,

Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1987), p. 798. 700,000 moved

to the city, according to John M. Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics

and American Culture During World War II (New York: Harcourt, Brace,

Jovanovich, 1976), p. 200; 1.5 million, according to Susan M.

Hartmann, The Home Front and Beyond: American Women in the 1940s

(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982), p. 5.



ccxxiv.Wynn, p. 56. Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United

States, 1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1972),

p. 116.



ccxxv.Vatter, p. 127.



ccxxvi.George B. Tindall, America: A Narrative History (Second

Edition, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), p. 1197.



ccxxvii.Wynn, pp. 57-58.



ccxxviii.Wynn, p. 19. Hartmann, p. 5.



ccxxix.Peter Irons, Justice at War (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1983), p. 57. Wynn, p. 19.



ccxxx.Blum, p. 184. Divine, p. 797. Vatter, p. 127. Wynn, p. 30.



ccxxxi.Vatter, p. 132.



ccxxxii.Wynn, p. 113.



ccxxxiii.Blum, p. 188. Wynn, pp. 45-46. Polenberg, p. 105. Vatter,

p. 132.



ccxxxiv.Vatter, p. 132.



ccxxxv.Richard R. Lingeman, Don't You Know There's a War On? The

American Home Front, 1941-1945 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970),

pp. 111, 141.



ccxxxvi.Vatter, p. 131.



ccxxxvii.Wynn, p. 68.



ccxxxviii.Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: The

American People, 1939-1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin

36



Press, 1973), pp. 313-314.



ccxxxix.Perrett, p. 311.



ccxl.Wynn, pp. 45, 88. Black income averaged 41% of white in 1939,

61% in 1950; Hartmann, p. 5.



ccxli.Vatter, pp. 132, 134.



ccxlii.Polenberg, p. 116.



ccxliii.Wynn, p. 88.



ccxliv.Vatter, p. 131.



ccxlv.Wynn, p. 113.



ccxlvi.Vatter, p. 149.



ccxlvii.Hartmann, p. 5.





ccxlviii.Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: The

American People, 1939-1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin

Press, 1973), p. 177. Harold G. Vatter, The U. S. Economy in World

War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 44.



ccxlix.Vatter, pp. 46, 78. Perrett, p. 177.



ccl.Vatter, p. 78. Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United

States, 1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1972),

p. 25. A. Russell Buchanan, The United States and World War II ((New

York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964), I, p. 139. Rexford G. Tugwell,

The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt

(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Incorporated, 1957),

p. 600.



ccli.Perrett, pp. 177, 183, 266.



cclii.Vatter, pp. 79, 120-121.



ccliii.Perrett, p. 183. Vatter, p. 45.



ccliv.Perrett, p. 265. Polenberg, p. 26.



cclv.Perrett, pp. 306, 185. Polenberg, p. 170.



cclvi.Vatter, p. 79.



cclvii.Vatter, pp. 120-121.



cclviii.Vatter, p. 81.



cclix.Polenberg, p. 27. Vatter, p. 121.

37



cclx.Vatter, pp. 170-175. Buchanan, I, p. 139. Tugwell, pp. 666-667.



cclxi.Polenberg, p. 240.



cclxii.Vatter, p. 120.

cclxiii.Polenberg, p. 27.



cclxiv.Buchanan, I, p. 138.



cclxv.Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States,

1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1972), pp. 60-61.

Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps: North American Japanese in the

United States and Canada during World War II (Revised Edition,

Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company,

Incorporated, 1981), pp. xv, 104.



cclxvi.Richard E. Lingeman, Don't You Know There's a War On? The

American Home Front, 1941-1945 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970),

p. 335. Daniels, p. 104. Polenberg, p. 60.





cclxvii.Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: The

American People, 1939-1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin

Press, 1973), p. 217. Polenberg, p. 61. Daniels, p. 6.



cclxviii.Peter Irons, Justice at War (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1983), p. 33. Daniels, p. 27.



cclxix.Daniels, p. 27. Irons, pp. x, 147, 22-23. Perrett, p. 217.



cclxx.Perrett, pp. 216-220. Irons, pp. 25-27, 40, 60. Daniels,

p. 33. Supposedly arrows placed on the ground directed Japanese

planes toward Pearl Harbor, but the only one on a roof in California

was on the Warner studio which said "Lockheed thataway;" Lingeman,

pp. 335, 337.



cclxxi.Irons, pp. 27, 35, 281-282. Perrett, pp. 222, 216.



cclxxii.Irons, pp. 33-37, 147, 40-44. Perrett, p. 218-221, 232.

Daniels, p. 72. Polenberg, p. 64.



cclxxiii.Lingeman, pp. 337, 335. Irons, pp. 48, 58, 68-71, 146,

160, ix-x, 281-282, 292, 362. Susan M. Hartmann, The Home Front

and Beyond: American Women in the 1940s (Boston: Twayne Publishers,

1982), p. 4.



cclxxiv.Perrett, pp. 223-225, 230. Irons, pp. 74-75. Polenberg,

pp. 60-66. Harold G. Vatter, The U.S. Economy in World War II (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 135. Daniels, pp. 92,

73-75. Neil A. Wynn, The Afro-American and the Second World War

(New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1975), p. 17. Lingeman, p.

332. Richard N. Current, T. Harry Williams, Frank Freidel, Alan

Brinkley, American History: A Survey (Seventh Edition, New York:

38



Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), p. 782. John M. Blum, V Was for Victory:

Politics and American Culture During World War II (New York: Harcourt,

Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), p. 157. There was no anti-German hysteria.

When Mexican workers moved into industrial jobs in Los Angeles

("braceros" were all right doing stoop labor in the fields), a

four-day riot in 1943 pitted sailors against those wearing zoot suits

(Mexicans); Wynn, p. 18. Lingeman, pp. 332-334.



cclxxv.Vatter, p. 135. Irons, pp. 72, 79-80. Daniels, pp. 91, 134.



cclxxvi.Lingeman, pp. 339, 341-342. Daniels, pp. 97, 100-110, 118,

127, 145-152.



cclxxvii.Daniels, pp. 153-157, 162, 193. Lingeman, pp. 341-342, 144.



cclxxviii.Robert A. Divine et al., America: Past and Present (Second

Edition, Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1987),

p. 801.



cclxxix.Eliot Janeway, The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of

Economic Mobilization in World War II (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1951), p. 244.





cclxxx.Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: The

American People, 1939-1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin

Press, 1973), pp. 36, 167-170, 195. Harold G. Vatter, The U. S.

Economy in World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985),

pp. 10, 3.



cclxxxi.Vatter, pp. 24-25. Perrett, p. 173.



cclxxxii.Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States,

1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1972), pp. 12-13.

Perrett, pp. 12, 262. Winthrop D. Jordan and Leon F. Litwack, The

United States (Sixth Edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:

Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 1987), p. 678.



cclxxxiii.Perrett, p. 255. Polenberg, p. 12.



cclxxxiv.Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of

American War Production (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,

1946), p. 56.



cclxxxv.Perrett, pp. 175, 255, 259.



cclxxxvi.Janeway, pp. 213-214.



cclxxxvii.Karen Anderson, Wartime Women: Sex Roles, Family

Relations, and the Status of Women During World War II (Westport,

Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 63.



cclxxxviii.Perrett, p. 303. Divine, p. 795.

39



cclxxxix.John M. Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and American

Culture During World War II (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,

1976), p. 110.



ccxc.Richard R. Lingeman, Don't You Know There's a War On? The

American Home Front, 1941-1945 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970),

p. 141.



ccxci.Janeway, p. 246.



ccxcii.Joseph R. Conlin, The American Past: A Survey of American

History (Second Edition, San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,

Publishers, 1987), pp. 759-760. Thomas A. Bailey and David M.

Kennedy, The American Pageant: A History of the Republic (Eighth

Edition, Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1987),

p. 795. Divine, p. 795. Janeway, pp. 250-252. Blum, pp. 112-115.

Perrett, p. 258.



ccxciii.Blum, p. 111.



ccxciv.Blum, pp. 107-108.



ccxcv.Perrett, p. 256. Polenberg, p. 22. Blum, pp. 107-108.



ccxcvi.Perrett, p. 303. Conlin, p. 759.





ccxcvii.Perrett, pp. 261-262. Vatter, p. 23. Nelson, p. 56.



ccxcviii.Blum, p. 103. Perrett, p. 303. Lingeman, p. 109. Anderson,

p. 63. Willow Run had a high turnover of employees because of Henry

Ford. He located away from Detroit because of unions. When factories

hired in Detroit, workers did not stay at Willow Run. Ford hired

women but would not hire blacks; Lingeman, pp. 109-111.



ccxcix.Janeway, p. 251. Perrett, pp. 301-302.



ccc.Perrett, pp. 194-195, 255, 270.



ccci.Karen Anderson, Wartime Women: Sex Roles, Family Relations,

and the Status of Women During World War II (Westport, Connecticut:

Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 3.



cccii.Susan M. Hartmann, The Home Front and Beyond: American Women

in the 1940s (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982), p. 19.



ccciii.Karen Anderson, pp. 4, 28.



ccciv.A Boeing poster read:

The Fortresses

and the men who fly them

are fighting for you

your home

all the things you hold dear

40



Are you doing your part?

The War Manpower Commission asked employers to hire the women; Karen

Anderson, pp. 28, 30.



cccv.Karen Anderson, pp. 45-54. Neil A. Wynn, The Afro-American

and the Second World War (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1975),

p. 17. Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States,

1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1972), p. 146.



cccvi.Hartmann, p. 56.



cccvii.Wynn, p. 17. Polenberg, p. 146. Karen Anderson, pp. 4, 45-54.

John M. Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During

World War II (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), p. 91.

Eliot Janeway, The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic

Mobilization in World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951),

p. 332. Harold G. Vatter, The U. S. Economy in World War II (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 17-19. Robert A. Divine

et al., America: Past and Present (Second Edition, Glenview,

Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1987), p. 797. Winthrop D.

Jordan and Leon F. Litwack, The United States (Sixth Edition,

Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 1987),

p. 678.



cccviii.Karen Anderson, pp. 4-5.





cccix.Wynn, p. 17. Jordan, p. 678. For example, the war saw an

increase in female employment in manufacturing in Detroit from 46,800

to 215,000. 20 per cent of aircraft employees there were women.

Seattle manufacturing jobs went from 11 per cent to 33 per cent female,

including 16 per cent of shipbuilding and 47 per cent of Boeing

employees; Karen Anderson, pp. 31-32.



cccx.Karen Anderson, pp. 6, 33.



cccxi.Janeway, p. 332.



cccxii.Karen Anderson, p. 10. Janeway, p. 332. Rosie was one of

a pair--one shot a rivet; the other "bucked" it or flattened it from

the opposite side.



cccxiii.Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: The

American People, 1939-1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin

Press, 1973), p. 344.



cccxiv.Wynn, p. 17.



cccxv.Perrett, p. 344.



cccxvi.Karen Anderson, p. 6.



cccxvii.Hartmann, p. 180.

41



cccxviii.Polenberg, pp. 140-148. Divine, p. 797.



cccxix.Vatter, p. 138. Karen Anderson, p. 7.



cccxx.Perrett, p. 241. Karen Anderson, p. 96.



cccxxi.Karen Anderson, p. 106.



cccxxii.Perrett, p. 241. Blum, p. 94. Vatter, pp. 114, 138.



cccxxiii.Vatter, p. 114.



cccxxiv.Hartmann, p. 196.



cccxxv.Hartmann, p. 23.



cccxxvi.Vatter, p. 114.



cccxxvii.Karen Anderson, pp. 162-163, 173-175.



cccxxviii.Hartmann, pp. 191, 197.