Georgia Russia

Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies Annual 2004-4 AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS Esra HATİPOĞLU* Source: http://geography.about.com/library/cia/ncgeorgia.htm Introduction Ever since its independence in 1991, Georgia’s historic ties with Russia have complicated its search for an international identity. Because of this uneasy relationship, for more than a decade Georgia’s foreign policy has been moving back and forth between a strategy of distancing itself from the Russian sphere of influence while having a better relationship with the USA and Europe and a policy seeking, even if reluctantly, some sort of accommodation with Russia. * Assistant Professor Dr Esra Hatipoğlu is Deputy Director of the Middle East Studies Institute at Marmara University. AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH Thus, within this context, it would be fair to describe the tangled relations between Russia and Georgia as tense, delicate and vulnerable to all kinds of provocations. The whole range of thorny problems – namely, the existence of Russian military bases on Georgian territory, Moscow’s involvement in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian companies’ nearly total control over the Georgian energy sector, controversy over the energy transit routes from the Caspian Sea region, the war in Chechnya and Moscow’s suspicions concerning the Chechen fighters’ presence in the lawless Pankisi Gorge – continues to systematically poison the relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi. Russia views the South Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular as a geopolitically vital region. To exercise geo-strategic and economic control over Georgia – a key transit country – is the paramount objective of Moscow’s strategic planners. Thus Russia has been pursuing a combination of policies (imposition of a unilateral visa regime in December 2000, cutting off energy supplies and backtracking on commitments to withdraw Russia’s military bases from Georgia) to discourage Georgia’s pro-Western leanings (a desire to join NATO and the European Union, participation in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project and membership of the Georgia-Ukraine-UzbekistanAzerbaijan-Moldova (GUUAM) organisation, which is widely regarded in Moscow as an obstacle to its integrationist plans). When Vladimir Putin was elected Russia’s president in 2000, the Kremlin policy became increasingly focused on manipulating and controlling Georgia in order to force Tbilisi to toe a pro-Russian foreign-policy line. To this end, Moscow would resort not only to the threat of using raw force but to much subtler tools including political and economic blackmail. 174 Esra HATİPOĞLU I. Main Problematic Areas between Georgia and Russia As briefly explained in the introduction, there are various problems that continue to strain Russian-Georgian relations: • • • • • The existence of Russian military bases on Georgian territory Tension in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia The alleged presence of Chechen rebels in the Pankisi Gorge Russian companies’ monopoly of the Georgian energy sector, and The energy transit routes running across Georgia from the Caspian Sea region. We will examine each of these issues in turn. I.1. Russian Bases on Georgian Territory Russia agreed to the withdrawal of its four military bases in Georgia under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) summit agreement1 on the adoption of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),2 signed in Istanbul on 19 November 1999, and 1 OSCE Charter for European Security, http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/istachart99e.htm, Istanbul, November 1999. , 2 The CFE Treaty signed on November 19, 1990, imposed equal limits on the tanks, armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters that NATO and the former Warsaw Pact could possess between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. It aimed at preventing arms build-ups for surprise blitzkrieg-type offensives, the treaty employed a concentric-zone system that mandated smaller deployments of tanks, ACVs and artillery the closer one moved toward the frontline between the alliances. To guard against offensives designed to bypass central Europe, specific ‘flank zone’ limits restricted weapons stationed in northern and southern Europe. The treaty adaptation agreement on November 19, 1999 overhauled the outdated, Cold War-era structure of the original treaty. While proclaiming the adapted treaty will “enhance peace, security and stability throughout Europe,” President Clinton said he would not submit it for Senate approval until Russia complies with weapons ceilings set out in the revised treaty. Moscow, whose war in Chechnya has only magnified Russia’s perennial 175 AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH according to a Russian-Georgian statement in November 1994. The Vaziani and Gudauta bases were to be vacated by 1 July 2001, with further consultations to decide the dates for the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases. Russia evacuated the Vaziani and Gudauta bases in accordance with the CFE limits but did not withdraw from the other two, which Moscow currently maintains: Batumi (Ajaria) and Akhalkalaki (Samtskhe-Javakheti).3 The Georgian authorities demand that Russia evacuate its bases in accordance with the CFE Treaty while Russia argues that it has already reduced by several hundred units the heavy military hardware at its remaining bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki and that it needs 11 more years for complete withdrawal. Furthermore, there are two other groups of Russian military forces operating in Abkhazia and South Ossetia under the aegis of CIS peacekeeping operations and also some Russian troops based at Gyumri in Armenia. The main concerns about the Russian military presence in Georgia are, firstly, the possibility of Russian intervention and, secondly, a Russian tendency not to maintain its declared neutrality. The issue is still regarded as one of the main causes of friction between Russian and Georgia under President Saakashvili’s administration. As Igor non-compliance with CFE flank-zone limits, has said it will comply as soon as possible. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_11/cfeno99.asp?print, November 1999. Vladimir Mukhin, ‘Tension still Strong between Russia, Georgia’, http://therussiajournal.com/index.htm?obj=3985, December 9, 2000; ‘Situation with Russian Military Base in Gudauta can be Settled only Through Concessions from Georgia’, http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2001/07/03/9190.html, July 3, 2001; ‘Azerbaijani Defense Minister: Withdrawal of Russian Military Bases from Georgia Puts Caucasus under Threat’, http://www.rosbaltnews.com/2002/12/17/60751.html, December 17, 2002; ‘Colin Powell: Russia Has to Remove Military Bases from Georgia’, , http://www.rosbaltnews.com/2004/01/27/65454.html, January 26, 2004. 3 176 Esra HATİPOĞLU Torbakov mentioned in his article,4 “Moscow Views Military Withdrawal Issue as Litmus Test for Georgian Russian Relations”, Russia tends to see the base issue as a litmus test for the future of bilateral relations, while the Georgian side views it as a test of Russia’s sincerity in solving the other important problems between Russia and Georgia. This issue was one of the main items on the agenda when Saakashvili visited Russia in February 2004.5 Although little progress has been achieved, Saakashvili explained, “This issue is important to Georgia but we can’t allow it to darken our relations.” I.2. South Ossetia and Abkhazia The collapse of the Soviet Union has caused large-scale armed conflicts in a number of the newly independent states. Since each conflict in the region has its own causes, it is very difficult to generalize on the sources and driving forces of these conflicts. However, it is also very hard to analyse each individual conflict separately because many regional conflicts are closely interrelated and affect each other in different ways. Difficulty in the state formation process and complex frontier and territorial claims issues are the main factors contributing to the emergence of the conflicts. The existence of some common characteristics like the lack of experience and structures for independent government, lack of national armies, unresolved territorial and regional disputes and the presence of Russian armed forces in most of the regional countries complicate the conflict situation in the 4 Igor Torbakov, ‘Moscow Views Military Withdrawal Issue as Litmus Test for Georgian-Russian Relations’, http: //www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012804_pr_shtml, January 28, 2004. 5Sergei Blagov, ‘Saakashvili Makes Friends with Putin during Georgian Leader’s Moscow Visit’, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav021204_pr.shtml, February 12, 2004. 177 AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH region. The situation gets even more complicated if one takes into account Russia’s political and security interests, its desire for strategic dominance as well as the fate of the Russian diaspora in the region.6 The Ossetians joined Russia in 1774 and, in June 1920, South Ossetia declared its independence as a Soviet Republic. Georgia sent its army to crush what they saw as a South Ossetian uprising challenging the territorial integrity of Georgia. Russia protested this action as an intervention into South Ossetian internal affairs. The South Ossetians saw this as a denial of their right to selfdetermination, while the Georgians continue to view this as the Ossetians first attempt to seize Georgian territory and Russia’s first attempt to destabilise Georgia by encouraging South Ossetia to secede. In 1921, the Red Army invaded Georgia and annexed it. In 1922, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast within Georgia was declared with Tskhinvali as its capital city and it remained an Autonomous Oblast within Georgia under Soviet rule, having strong ties with the North Ossetian Autonomous Region in the Russian Federation.7 In September 1990, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast declared independence as the South Ossetian Democratic Soviet Republic, appealing to Russia to recognise it as an independent subject of the Soviet Union. When the election of the Georgian Supreme Council took place in October 1990, the South Ossetians boycotted it and held elections to their parliament in December 1990. However, the Georgian Supreme Council cancelled the results 6Teodor Shanin, ‘Ethnicity in the Soviet Union: Analytical Perceptions and Political Strategies’, Society for Comparative Study of Society and History, Vol. 31, No. 3, July 1989, p. 415; A..N. Yamskov, ‘Ethnic Conflict in the Transcaucasus’, Theory and Society, Vol. 20, No. 5, October 1991, pp. 634635; Vladimir Baranovsky, ‘Post-Soviet Conflict Heritage and Risks’, SIPRI Yearbook, 1993, p. 95, p. 131; Suzanne Goldenberg. Pride of Small Nations, London: Zed Publications, 1994, p. 4. 7 Harold Shukman (ed.). The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the Russian Revolution, N.Y.: Blackwell Reference Ltd., 1988, pp. 234-235. 178 Esra HATİPOĞLU of that election and voted to abolish the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast as a separate administrative unit within the Republic of Georgia. Following violent incidents in and around Tskhinvali, the Georgian parliament declared a state of emergency in the Tskhinvali and Java regions of South Ossetia on 12 December 1990. In the first days of 1991, the Supreme Council of Georgia passed a law forming the National Guard of Georgia. A few days later, Georgian troops entered Tskhinvali. In the spring of 1992 the fighting escalated, with Russian involvement. A cease-fire was agreed upon and in July 1992, a CIS peacekeeping operation began, consisting of a Joint Control Commission and joint CIS-Georgian-South Ossetian military patrols. The Georgians claimed that the Russian army helped and supplied the Ossetians several times during the conflict. The region’s status within Georgia is still unclear.8 One of the South Ossetian separatists’ initial demands was unification with the autonomous region of North Ossetia. There are two important aspects of the conflict that affect Georgia-Russia relations. The first has to do with the potential for South Ossetian independence and autonomy demands to spill over the border and create problems for Russia in North Ossetia. Russia is very concerned about a solution to this problem and has tried to slow down migration from South to North Ossetia by giving South Ossetians Russian citizenship. The introduction of a visa system with Georgia still allows the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to travel freely to Russia.9 The other 8 Stephen F. Jones, ‘Georgia’s Return from Chaos’, Current History, Vol. 95, No. 603, October 1996, p. 340; Elizabeth Fuller, ‘The Economy Continued to Improve and Politics to Stabilise but the Status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Remained as Unclear as Ever’, Transition, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 7, 1997, p. 82-83. Giorgi Kandelaki, ‘Abkhazia Row with Russia Deals New Blow to Georgia’s Shevardnadze’, 9 179 AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH aspect of the South Ossetian conflict is South Ossetia’s proximity to Chechnya and the Pankisi Gorge. The proximity of Georgian forces to South Ossetia and its capital Tskhinvali has created anxiety and tension in the region. Currently, Tbilisi and Tskhinvali have been in confrontation since the 1991-1992 conflict. Although there is no pact to define South Ossetia’s political relations with Tbilisi, the conflict was frozen until President Saakashvili announced that he would try to re-establish Georgia’s territorial integrity. When President Saakashvili wanted to repeat the Ajaria solution10 in South Ossetia by exerting economic pressure (Tbilisi took action to curtail the smuggling of Russian goods via South Ossetia to Georgia and extended humanitarian assistance to Ossetian villages, etc.) on the regional leadership during Summer 2004, an armed confrontation occurred between the two sides that resulted in the creation of a Joint Peacekeeping Force to keep the two sides apart. Russia got involved into the situation as well. Russia initially did this by using its influence within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to block Georgia from organising an international conference on the issue and by preventing the expansion of OSCE monitoring efforts in the region. Later, representatives from Russia and Georgia came together to form the Joint Control Commission. However, the South Ossetian problem remains a sticky issue between Georgia and Russia.11 http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/9ca65951ee22658ec125663300408599/437d78ac5c19706449256cc9 0018daff?OpenDocument, February 7, 2003; Igor Torbakov, ‘Russia Turning up Pressure on Georgia’, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav120103.shtml, December 1, 2003. 10 Irakly Areshidze, ‘Did Russia and Georgia Make http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav051904_pr.stml a Deal over Ossetia Ajaria?’, Talks’, 11 Jaba Devdariani, ‘Expectations Low for Georgia-South http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110404_pr.sthml 180 Esra HATİPOĞLU Unlike South Ossetia, Abkhazia held the status of an Autonomous Republic under Soviet rule and thus has a stronger sense of sovereignty and independence. Furthermore, the Abkhazian call for autonomy or separation from Georgia is not a post-independence issue. Abkhazia was incorporated into the Russian empire in 1810 as a protectorate and finally annexed in 1864. Many Abkhaz fled and many Russians and Georgians arrived in the years which followed. After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Abkhazia gained a measure of autonomy until Stalin incorporated it into Georgia in 1931. Georgian became the official language, and the Abkhaz language and cultural rights were suppressed. Many Georgians were settled there. The repression eased substantially after Khrushchev came to power in the Kremlin.12 The conflict in Abkhazia between the Abkhaz and the Georgians has continued for centuries with each group blaming each other for victimising and discriminating. The Abkhaz Supreme Soviet in 1990 attempted to upgrade the status of Abkhazia to a full Union Republic but the Georgian Parliament annulled this. When Georgia became independent, supporters of a break with Georgia in favour of independence and closer ties with Russia became more active. Tension rose and, in 1992, Georgia sent troops to enforce the status quo.13 In late 1993, Georgian troops were driven out amidst fierce fighting. Abkhazia declared independence early in 1994. It has never been recognised 12 Geoffrey Hosking. A History of the Soviet Union-1917-1991, London: Fontana Press, 1992, pp. 326-362. 13 ‘War in the Caucasus’, The World Today, Vol. 48, No. 12, December 1992, pp. 214-215; Ulrich Schmid, ‘Georgia after the Fall’, Swiss Review of World Affairs, July 1993, p. 10; Elizabeth Fuller, ‘Between Anarchy and Despotism’, Transition, February 15, 1995, pp. 64-65; 181 AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH and an economic embargo remains in force, and Abkhazia is isolated from all but Russia, which maintains a border crossing and has re-opened the railway line to Sukhumi. Russia has further infuriated Georgia by making it easy for Abkhazians to gain Russian citizenship. Russia does not recognise Abkhazia as an independent state but 75% of Abkhazia’s residents have been given Russian passports and receive Russian pensions, which also helps the region’s economic development. Analysts argue that Russia is keen to keep its foothold in Abkhazia to maintain leverage over Georgia and over the strategically important South Caucasus, especially while the USA is trying to expand its presence in the region. The Russian threat to halt all economic aid to Abkhazia (which depends largely on cash from Russia) – that slid into crisis when opposition leader Sergei Bagapsh won a presidential election in October 2004 – if political crisis in the region is not solved, is an important sign of Russian influence. Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Alexander Yakovenko, even indicated on 12 November 2004 that Russia could intervene in Abkhazia if the post-election violence in the region continued.14 The Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems seemed to be frozen until the President Saakashvili launched a drive to re-establish Georgian territorial integrity. The successful and relatively peaceful reintegration of Ajaria, the re-establishment of Tbilisi’s control over Ajaria and the forcing of Aslan Abashidze from power gave the Georgian President more hope and courage in dealing with other two renegade regions. 14 ‘Abkhazia Election Debacle Presents Russia with Difficult Choices’, , http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav102004_pr.shtml; John Mackedon, ‘Latest Developments in Abkhazia Hint at Russian Intervention’, , http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110104_pr.shtml, November 1, 2004; Liz Fuller, ‘Analysis: Abkhaz Standoff Turns Violent’, , http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp111204_pr.shtml; Sergei Blakov, ‘Abkhazia Crisis adds to Russia’s Political Headaches in the Caucasus’, , http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111504_pr.shtml, November 15, 2004. 182 Esra HATİPOĞLU However, recent developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have demonstrated once again that the Abkhazia and South Ossetia cases are very different from the Ajarian case. Currently, the most difficult issue that the Saakashvili administration (which came to power after the Rose Revolution that forced Eduard Shevardnadze from the Georgian presidency in November 2003) has to deal with in the near future will continue to be Georgia’s territorial integrity. Saakashvili appears determined to restore Tbilisi’s control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The government’s attempts in the summer of 2004 to apply the Ajarian solution in South Ossetia failed and even brought the two sides to the edge of armed confrontation and also created tension between Georgia and Russia. Thus, analysts argue, unless the USA gets more involved, the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts are unlikely to be solved any time soon. In this sense, the West has given strong support to Georgia during and after the Rose Revolution, but it is still not very clear whether the West will risk confrontation with Russia, which seeks to preserve the status quo and keep the Georgian conflicts ‘frozen.’15 I.3. The War in Chechnya and the Pankisi Gorge The Chechen conflict has long been a powerful irritant in GeorgiaRussia relations. Russia has continuously accused the Georgian leadership of letting military supplies to Chechnya pass through Georgia. Further, Russia claims, Tbilisi turns a blind eye to Chechen fighters setting up bases in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. 15 Jaba Devdariani, ‘Georgia Hunts for Friends but Comes up Short’, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092104a_pr.sthml, September 21, 2004; Eric A. Miller, ‘Georgia’s Rose Revolution: Momentum and Consolidation’, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112204a_pr.shtml, November 22, 2004. 183 AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH Russia says that it fears the spread of international terrorism into Georgia may pose a threat to the security of its southern borders and argues that it has the right to widen its search for the terrorists into Georgian territory. Thus Russia wanted to have a joint operation with Georgia against Chechen fighters in the Pankisi Gorge. Georgia continuously denied Russian accusations and claims that, in fact, the Russian military bases in the South Caucasus were mostly involved in the transfer of weapons into Chechnya, not the Georgian ones. Georgia has continuously rejected Russian requests to deploy Russian forces on the Georgian side of the border.16 At the beginning of the second military operation against Chechnya in 1999, Russia applied to the Georgian government for permission to use the Vaziani military airfield and other Russian bases in its operation against Chechnya. However, Georgia didn’t accept the proposal and answered that it favoured the deployment of international observers from both the UN and OSCE along the approximately 80km Chechen part of the Georgian-Russian border. In the summer of 2002, Russia once again threatened to send its troops into the Pankisi Gorge against Chechen rebels, arguing that Georgia was not able to do it. Then 1000 Georgian troops were deployed to the region in late August 2002 after a further escalation of tension between the two countries when Georgia accused Russian jets of bombing the Pankisi area. 16 ‘Georgia can’t handle Pankisi Gorge. Now it’s Russia’s Turn’, , http://english.pravda.ru/main/2002/09/26/37290.html, September 26, 2002; Valeri Khaburdzania, ‘Georgia’s Key Security Concerns: Pankisi and Abkhazia’, , http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/Program%20Briefs/vol9no1khazb.htm, January 30, 2003; ‘Georgian State Security Minister Refutes Al-Qaeda bases in Pankisi Gorge’, http://newsfromrussia.com/world/2003/05/07/46709.html, May 7, 2003 184 Esra HATİPOĞLU In September 2002, Putin argued that, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter (related with the right to self-defence), Russia may attack Georgia if Georgia failed to secure the border in question. However, when the two sides called a truce in October 2002, Georgia decided to extradite and arrest some Chechen fighters. Another meeting took place between Shevardnadze and Putin in March 2003. Starting from that date, Georgia seemed to re-establish its control over the region but the area still remains a haven for terrorists.17 This issue became one of the main points of discussion between Presidents Saakashvili and Putin during Saakashvili’s visit to Russia in February 2004, after his election as President in January 2004. During his visit, Saakashvili suggested to Putin that they join forces in enhancing security along the border and making it impenetrable to Chechen fighters. They agreed on the exchange of intelligence on terrorists. Although this was not the Georgian’s first offer of working together on the issue, it renewed hope of better relations. The Georgian-Russian rapprochement created some anxiety among the Chechen refugees in the Pankisi Gorge due to their feeling of increased insecurity. In the post-Beslan era, Russia’s talk of pre-emptive strikes against suspected terrorist bases in third countries once again scared Georgia. Tbilisi started looking for international allies who would support its position in the Pankisi Gorge. However, the Georgian government could not get clear support from the West, although major Western countries actively backed the Rose Revolution that catapulted Saakashvili into the presidential suite. I.4. Russian Companies’ Monopoly of the Georgian Energy Sector 17 Tracey German, ‘Faultline or Foothold? – Georgia’s Relations with Russia and the USA’, Conflict Studies Research Centre, January 2004, pp. 4-5. 185 AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH The Russian companies’ monopoly of Georgia’s energy sector causes Georgia serious concern. The Georgian government suspects that Russia is using the Georgian’s energy dependence as leverage to force Georgia to pursue pro-Russian policies. Russia’s cutting of natural gas supplies to Georgia on New Year day 2001 is the best example of this policy. Russian argues the periodic cuts are, however, in response to Georgia’s unpaid gas bills, though this may not be true in all cases. Concerning this issue, the appointment of Kakha Bendukidze – the former head of Russia’s largest manufacturing company, United Heavy Machinery – as Georgian economic minister in June 2004 should also be mentioned here. In his first declaration about his policy priorities, he specified the opening up of Georgia’s economy to competition and investment as his number one goal. This strategy has likely helped Russian companies, especially in the energy and transport sectors, to get involved even more intensively in Georgia’s economy. In the meantime, the Georgian Prime Minister, Zurab Zhvania, in order to encourage Russian investors, declared in May 2004 that advisors from the Russian Ministry of Economic Development would help Georgia prepare its tax code.18 In August 2003, RAO Unified Energy Systems, the Russian electricity monopoly, purchased a 75% stake in AES-Telasi, a joint venture that belongs to Georgia, from AES Silk Road. Aeroflot also had talks to buy the Georgian national airline, Airzena. During his meeting in July 2003 with then Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, the former US Secretary of State, James Baker, 18 Sergei Blagov, ‘To Secure Future, Georgia Banks on Russian http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav060304_pr.shtml, June 3, 2004. Business’, 186 Esra HATİPOĞLU expressed his country’s dissatisfaction over the presence in Georgia of Russian energy companies like Gazprom and UES.19 The danger of Georgia’s electric system’s dependence became obvious again on 18 August 2003, when disruption to a transmission line switched off the entire country. Government officials claimed sabotage. But opposition politicians accused President Eduard Shevardnadze of betraying his citizens by allowing Russian energy companies decisive influence over Georgia’s electricity supply. Russia’s electricity monopoly took a controlling interest in Georgia’s power plants on 6 August, a few weeks after a Moscow-based natural gas giant won the right to upgrade and manage pipelines through Georgia.20 However, there have been some attempts to re-balance this situation in Georgia. In September 2004, a proposal to restrict the selling of more than 25% of the total shares of any Georgian state-run facility to foreign stateowned companies was approved by the Parliamentary Committee on Sector Economics.21 The basic aim was to restrict the participation of particular companies, like the state-run Russian energy giants Gazprom and Unified Energy Systems, in the privatisation process, so as to avoid Georgia’s direct energy dependence on Russia. However, there were also serious concerns that this attempt would hinder the Economy Ministry’s broad privatisation program. 19 ‘Russia Resumes Energy Supplies to Georgia’, , http://english.pravda.ru/world/2003/08/19/49385.html, January 25, 2003; ‘UES not responsible for Georgia’s Energy Problems’, http://english.pravda.ru/world/2003/08/19/49385.html, August 19, 2003. Zeyno Baran, ‘Deals Give Russian Companies Influence over Georgia’s Energy Infrastructure’, 20 http://www.rosbaltnews.com/2003/07/07/63286.html, August 18, 2003. 21 Nino Khutsidze, ‘Barriers Proposed for Foreign State-Run Companies in Georgian Privatization’, Civil Georgia, September 25, 2004. 187 AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH The issue of Georgia’s dependence on Russia continues to be viewed differently by various experts both in Georgia and Russia. Some Georgian experts think that the main motivation for Russia’s involvement in Georgia is political rather than economic, intended to balance US influence in the country. On the other hand, some Russian experts argue that this is an inevitable price that Tbilisi has to pay to have Russian support in its efforts to protect the Georgia’s territorial integrity. I.5. The Export of Caspian Oil and Gas Another area of concern between Georgia and Russia is Georgia’s deviation from the Russian position with respect to the export of Caspian oil and gas. Georgia is already a participant in the US-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline that aims to reduce Russian influence in the region by bypassing Russia and diverting oil and, later, gas around Russia. Georgia is important because without its involvement (given that it is strategically located on the East-West energy corridor and has common borders with Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) none of the Western oil or gas pipelines can be realised.22 However, an interesting development took place during President Saakashvili’s visit to Russia on 10-12 February 2004. He argued that if Russia wants to build an oil pipeline through Georgia (passing from Novorossiysk, along the Black Sea Coast to Georgia via Abkhazia), Georgia will be ready to 22 Bülent Aras. The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey’s Position, London: Frank Cass, 2002, pp. 14, 33-34, 48; Ariel Cohen, ‘US Officials Warily Monitor Russian Policy Debate on Caucasus’, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav010904b_pr.shtml, January 9, 2004; Ariel Cohen, ‘Georgian Inauguration Complicates US-Russian Relations’, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012304a_pr.sthml, January 23, 2004. 188 Esra HATİPOĞLU support it.23 This proposal was important for various reasons. First, the pipeline would have to pass through the problematic area of Abkhazia and there would be a need for a pact to determine its status. Second, it would be a parallel line to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, which would likely please Russia as well. The response to the proposal from the Russian side remains vague. It seems that Russia now is not directly opposing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline as it did initially. Russia’s reaction and the sincerity of the Georgian proposal will be tested in the near future. II. Russia’s General Approach towards Former Soviet Republics An analysis of the main reasons and parameters of tension in Georgian-Russian relations would not be complete without comprehending the deep, underlying motives for Russia’s behaviour. The main force behind Russia’s behaviour towards the states which emerged on the geo-political territory of the ex-Soviet Union is the centuries-old imperial mentality of the Russians, particularly the mentality of the Russian political and military elite, who tend to ensure their country’s own national interests at the expense of those of the other states. Not only do negative psychological emotions determine Russian behaviour, but strategic geo-political considerations do also. These considerations are linked to the renewal of the old Empire’s military and industrial complex, the preservation of traditional demographic resources for the formation of the armed forces and keeping strategically important territories under Russian control. It is important to keep in mind that, in the current situation, the renewal of the empire for Russia, is a matter of national ambition. 23 Cory Welt, ‘A Georgian-Russian Pipeline: For Peace or http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030904_pr.shtml, March 9, 2004. Profit?’, 189 AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH An armed conflict between Georgia and Russia, the possibility of which can not be ruled out because of the strengthening of imperialistic tendencies in Russian foreign and military policies would have very negative consequences, which are not possible to predict now. Since its independence, Georgia’s foreign policy has been largely shaped by Russian interests in the region and its role as mediator in ethnic disputes within the country. Russia’s designation of the Transcaucasus as a zone vital influence explains its decision to intervene in Georgia’s internal affairs. On the other hand, the presence of ethno-political conflicts, political instability and the underdeveloped political institutions, weak economic structures, in conjunction with its economic dependence on Russia leaves Georgia -- even after the election of Saakashvili as president -- still very vulnerable to Russian pressure and manipulation. Conclusion Georgia’s Rose Revolution has forced Russia to re-examine its foreign policy towards its so called ‘Near Abroad.’ Concerning Georgia’s case, two main viewpoints currently preside in Russia: one holds that Russia does not stand to benefit from geo-political competition with the US in the Caucasus and Central Asia, thus it has to be more accommodating of its Near Abroad countries and should use its influence to promote rapprochement among Tbilisi, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The second viewpoint is that President Saakashvili is an opponent of Russia and thus Russia should do nothing to stabilise his administration. It seems that the Russia’s future stance on Georgia will be formulated through the interplay of these two views, opting at times for a more cooperative policy but always haunted by the spectre of the former empire. The Putin administration has already specified its intention to enhance its power 190 Esra HATİPOĞLU over the former Soviet area, thus it is obvious that Russia will continue to test the geopolitical loyalty of Georgia. In this context, it is also important for Georgia to get clear signals from the United States that it will remain committed to the region’s independent economic and political development, and will not let Russia manipulate former Soviet republics as it wishes. Furthermore, the new developments in Georgia have forced the Saakashvili administration to re-examine Georgia’s relations with Russia by taking into consideration various factors that previously shaped relations between the two countries. Under the current situation, while liking to play brinkmanship, President Saakashvili seems to favour of improved RussianGeorgian relations. Here the crucial question arises: how willing Saakashvili will be to rely on the West to help solve Georgia’s problems with Russia; whether he will be able to balance relations with the West and Russia; and how much the West will be willing to support Georgia at the expense of its relations with Russia. If we take into consideration the recent developments between the West, Georgia and Russia after the Beslan tragedy, it seems that the West is unlikely to throw its political – and much less, military – weight behind Tbilisi’s efforts to reach its strategic objectives. Thus, what will be decisive in terms of Georgia-Russia relations in the near future are mainly the political initiatives of the current administrations of both countries and the developments that will take place regionally in terms of both countries’ relations with the regional states like Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iran and those with the new regional actor, the USA. * 191 AFTER EMPIRE: GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN THE SOUTH * * 192