Docstoc

Written Evidence to the Transport Committee's Inquiry into the

Document Sample
Written Evidence to the Transport Committee's Inquiry into the Powered By Docstoc
					     Written Evidence from the Association of North East Councils (HSR 121)
Introduction

1.     This Evidence is submitted by the Association of North East Councils (ANEC), the
       representative body for local government in the North East. It encompasses all 12 local
       authorities throughout Northumberland, Tyne and Wear, Durham and the Tees Valley, on
       issues of concern to them and the communities they serve.

Summary of Main Points of Our Evidence

2.     There is strong support from local authority leaders and elected mayors in the North East for
       HSR which offers a once in a generation opportunity to transform the economic geography
       of the UK, support sustainable growth and international competitiveness and to rebalance the
       economy in line with Government policy. However, it is essential that a new HSR network is
       developed in such a way as to maximise opportunities across the UK from the beginning, to
       ensure that the whole nation benefits. There are compelling economic arguments for the
       North East to be part of a HSR network and failure to be connected from the start will
       undoubtedly have a detrimental impact on the North East economy.

3.     It is also essential that high speed lines should form part of a coherent strategy for the
       wider national rail network. The development of a high speed network needs to be
       considered, not in isolation, but should form one important part of the long term strategy for
       rail in the UK. Investment in high speed should not come at the expense of conventional
       rail. Since the planned high speed network is predicated on having a limited number of
       stopping points, it will be essential for the North East to ensure that improvements in local
       connectivity are planned and implemented in parallel to, or in advance of, HSR
       development such that the whole of the North East can share the benefits. It is vital that
       such complementary rail and public transport improvements are considered now and
       committed within other rail investment programmes within the next two years, to align
       with the next Spending Review periods and new rail franchises. The potential to generate
       localised economic development by the introduction of new stations that meet the needs of
       HSR services and customers better than existing stations should not be underestimated.

4.     High speed fits well within national, regional and local transport policy objectives to
       improve connections between our key centres, supporting economic growth and reducing
       carbon emissions. The North East’s location, relative to UK and European markets, means
       the North East regards air services and high speed rail as being complementary rather
       than competitive. The North East has consistently argued for the importance of good air, rail,
       road and sea connections in the context of overall improvements to transport infrastructure
       that support economic growth and competitiveness, and HSR is an important element of such
       infrastructure.

5.     The business case for the HSR network is based around improving journey times between
       significant centres. Research and experience from other European countries demonstrates
       that to maximise the capacity of high speed, there needs to be relatively large centres
       of population and activity along the entire route. The Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP)
       areas around Leeds, Sheffield, Tees Valley and Tyne and Wear, and Derby/Nottingham/
       Leicester have a combined population of 9.1 million to connect with Scotland, London and the
       West Midlands. An east coast route therefore makes economic and financial sense from
       the outset, with the wider economic benefits of this route totalling £4.2 billion.

6.     ANEC’s response to the main headings within the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry is
       outlined as follows.



Main Arguments For and Against HSR
7.    The North East is committed to building a competitive and dynamic economy and HSR can
      play a key strategic role in delivering this vision. In addition to delivering unprecedented
      improvements in rail capacity and connectivity, significant economic benefits will accrue as a
      HSR connection transforms the area’s economic geography. Consequently, ANEC believes
      that there is a strong case for HSR, with the main arguments in favour being ones of capacity,
      connectivity, speed and economic benefit.

8.    Growth in rail demand has been significant over the past decade across the UK, and in the
      North East. Passenger numbers on the East Coast Main Line increased by 36% up to
      2007/08 1 , whilst on the local networks, there has been an average increase of 58% in
      passenger numbers at stations across the Tees Valley since 2000 2 . Despite the recent
      economic climate, passenger numbers have continued to rise, and this trend will continue.

9.    Through its Route Utilisation Strategy process and as part of its New Line Programme work,
      Network Rail has identified that, even with incremental enhancements, forecast growth in
      passenger demand is such that each of the north-south main lines – the West Coast Main
      Line (WCML), the Midland Main Line (MML) and the East Coast Main Line (ECML) – will
      reach their effective capacity for long distance services in the 2020s 3 . Additional capacity on
      these corridors is vital for the UK economy.

10.   Increasing the capacity of the rail network to meet forecast demand using the existing routes,
      over and above the recently announced incremental improvements that we welcome, is
      predicted to give a poor rate of return 4 . More importantly, a large scale online upgrade would
      be extremely disruptive to existing services during construction and have an adverse impact
      on passenger numbers. This would have a damaging effect on the North East economy at a
      time when we are seeking to nurture sustainable long term growth and moving from recession
      to recovery.

11.   The preferred way to address future capacity issues is by constructing new routes. Such an
      approach has a secondary benefit that is even more important to those areas without a direct
      connection to the ECML at present, capacity would be released on the existing network
      through the transfer of services to a new line. This released capacity can be used to support
      growth in commuter services, as well as strengthen existing linkages and create new
      connections between LEP areas in the North, and between the North and the rest of the UK,
      bringing economic benefits of around £0.8 billion to the eastern side of the UK 5 . Changes to
      the ECML timetable could facilitate improved frequencies from London to Bradford, Halifax,
      Harrogate, Hull, Sunderland, or the introduction of wholly new trains to the Tees Valley,
      Huddersfield, Grimsby or Scarborough. Released capacity can also be used to accommodate
      growing freight traffic, an important element of the North East’s economy.

12.   In supporting the construction of a new route, it is important to ensure that this provides the
      speed of connection between the major centres that people and business require. Reduced
      journey times benefit all travellers – for business travellers, less time spent travelling means
      that more time can be spent in productive work; for non-business travellers, there is a less
      direct economic benefit, but new markets can be encouraged, such as tourism. In 2008, the
      North East was the only region outside London to increase its visitor numbers 6 .

13.   Both capacity and speed improvements support the most important argument for HSR with
      resultant benefits to the economy. Improvements to the availability and speed of rail
      connections with the rest of the UK will benefit the economy of the North East in two ways.
      Firstly, it will make the existing economy more productive and provide economic benefits to
      non-business users and secondly, it creates the opportunity to support the further economic
      growth and regeneration of the North East and the re-balancing of the economy. It is
      estimated that HSR could result in a £3.1 billion productivity increase for the North
      East 7 .

14.   Potentially much more significant than the productivity and traditional economic
      benefits is the transformational impact that HSR can have on the size of the economy
      of the North. By effectively bringing the LEP areas of the North closer to Scotland,
      London and the West Midlands, HSR will affect where economic activity takes place.
                                           8
                                               .

15.    The main arguments against HSR would appear to relate to the cost and environmental
       impacts of the proposals.

16.    The supporting evidence for HS2 shows that the cost of building a new rail line between
       London and the West Midlands that would operate at maximum speeds currently found on the
       national network would be only 9% less than building a line that can operate at high speeds 9 .
       Hence, the marginal cost of building a high speed line is small, whilst the benefits are much
       greater.

17.    In terms of environmental impact, any project of this type will have environmental impacts, but
       the evidence presented 10 demonstrates how these impacts will be minimised during
       construction and operation. It is important to achieve a sense of balance between localised
       impacts and a project that is of such importance to the UK economy.

Fit with Government’s Transport Policy Objectives

18.    The Department for Transport’s (DfT) stated vision is “for a transport system that is an engine
       for economic growth but one that is also greener and safer and improves quality of life in our
       communities” 11 . HSR presents a real opportunity to revolutionise the economy by bringing
       places and people closer together, with national and international markets, in line with the first
       part of this vision. It also presents the opportunity to achieve the wider Government ambition
       to “create a fairer and more balanced economy” 12 .

19.    To support the re-balancing of the economy, there is a need to enhance the connectivity
       within and between the North’s LEP areas. Current transport links between many of the large
       centres are often relatively weak, with slow journey times being a common characteristic.
       Whilst the importance of connections to London was stressed above, almost 60% of the
       productivity benefits forecast for the North East from HSR result from improved connections
       to other UK centres outside London including South Yorkshire, the East Midlands and
       Birmingham 13 .

20.    Given the North East’s geographical location, inter-urban connectivity is paramount to the
       well-being of the economy, and the North East has consistently argued for the importance of
       good air, rail, road and sea connections in the context of overall improvements to transport
       infrastructure that support economic growth and competitiveness. Recent announcements
       regarding the roads investment programme 14 has seen the postponement of the A1 upgrade
       to motorway standard between Leeming and Barton, and the focus of investment on the
       strategic road network has moved towards congestion management. Therefore, rail offers the
       preferred means of improving inter-urban connectivity, although there is still a need for
       investment in improving capacity in the North East’s strategic road network.

21.    The North East’s location, relative to UK and European markets, means we regard air
       services and HSR as being complementary rather than competitive. Newcastle
       International and Durham Tees Valley Airports play a major role in supporting the
       competitiveness of existing business in the region, including knowledge based and global
       industries in chemicals, steel and engineering/architectural design, which rely on scheduled
       services providing direct links to key markets. To achieve its potential, the North East needs
       both modes, as well as continued investment in our ports. It is also essential that high speed
       lines should form part of a coherent strategy for the wider national rail network. The
       development of a high speed network needs to be considered, not in isolation, but needs to
       form one important part of the long term strategy for rail in the UK.
22.   Investment in high speed should not come at the expense of the conventional rail
      network. The announcement of the Intercity Express Programme new rolling stock, means
      that it is necessary to continue to invest in conventional rail in order to address capacity
      constraints on the ECML. Since the planned high speed network is predicated on having a
      limited number of stopping points, it will be essential to ensure that improvements in local
      connectivity are planned and implemented in parallel to, or in advance of, HSR development
      such that the whole of the North East can share the benefits.

23.   It is vital that such complementary improvements are considered now and committed within
      other rail investment programmes within the next two years. For example, in the North East,
      proposals have been developed to a relatively advanced stage for Darlington and Newcastle
      stations, and the re-opening of the Leamside Line, all of which will have capacity benefits for
      the ECML/HSR network, and could be included within the scope of the project with minimal
      additional cost. ANEC strongly suggests that HS2 Ltd engage with regional partners
      during the latter part of 2011 to examine such opportunities now, such that they can be
      included where appropriate in the December 2011 report to Government of route
      options for the wider network, as well as specifications for the next relevant rail
      franchises.

24.   In terms of environmental considerations, HSR is thought to be broadly carbon neutral in
                                15
      absolute emissions terms . However, given the increased demand generated by HSR,
      carbon emissions per trip will be lower with HSR, and so fit with national, regional and local
      policy objectives.

Business Case

25.   The business case and economic appraisal presented by Government follows standard DfT
      methodology and HM Treasury’s Green Book. Whilst there continues to be some misgivings
      about how this process is applied to public transport schemes in particular, it appears valid for
      giving a relative comparison between options.

26.   It is appropriate that demand forecasts have been revised since the publication of the
      previous Government’s proposals 16 to reflect recent economic conditions and changes to
      Government policy in relation to the third runway at Heathrow Airport.

27.   One important point to note is that the business case has been developed from assumed
      service patterns, the one for the wider ‘Y’ network being included as Figure A2 17 . This service
      pattern includes a peak hour frequency of 18 trains per hour (tph) using the HSR network
      between London and Birmingham, with six of these services serving the eastern side of the
      UK. No high speed line elsewhere in the world currently operates at a frequency of more than
      12tph – the planned 18tph frequency is to be delivered by a new signalling system to be
      developed by the time of opening.

28.   Given that well over 60% of the benefits of the wider HSR network accrue to the
      eastern side of the UK 18 , it is vital that, should the 18tph frequency not be achievable in
      practice, the frequency of East Coast services is maintained. If not, there is a risk of
      implementing a project that creates an economic imbalance across the North.

29.   The relatively poor business case of the alternative of investing exclusively in the existing
      network has been outlined previously, and we would have significant concerns about
      managing demand for rail travel through other means such as increased pricing. Having
      articulated how important fast and reliable rail links are to the economy of the North East,
      pursuing a policy that increases rail fares in real terms to manage demand such that it does
      not exceed the available capacity, would have a significantly detrimental impact on the North
      East economy. Using fare increases to reduce rail travel numbers could also disadvantage
      the North East in respect of increased levels of carbon taxation.

30.   In terms of learning lessons from other major projects, experience of such large infrastructure
      projects in the North East has suggested that having private sector involvement in the
      detailed design and implementation process, aligned to minimum direct Government
      interference, has driven value through the construction process.

Strategic Route

31.   As one of the benefits of HSR is journey time reductions, it is important to achieve a balance
      between serving as many key centres as possible, without compromising the benefits of
      speed. Recent DfT policy has concentrated on defining a strategic national network based
      around the ten cities with the largest centres of population and major international
      gateways 19 . For consistency, it would seem sensible to use similar criteria when examining
      possible station locations, bearing in mind that not all locations will be served directly or with
      city centre stations.

32.   We strongly support the principle of the Y network proposed for HSR in that it creates
      opportunities on both sides of the Pennines. It is critical that the North East is linked to high
      speed rail infrastructure and investment in the UK, in the context of the compelling economic
      arguments already outlined. Achievement of the North East’s ambitions to be a world leader
      in the low carbon economy and to maximise its strengths and assets in areas including digital
      and creative media, process and chemical industries, healthcare and life sciences, is
      significantly dependent upon North East being linked into a high speed network. The potential
      to generate localised economic development by the introduction of new stations that meet the
      needs of HSR services and customers better than existing stations should not be
      underestimated.

33.   Whilst the North East recognises a need to develop the network in phases, an approach
      where one route is developed in advance of the other will create imbalanced economic growth
      and exacerbate regional disparities. It is clear that development of a high speed network will
      give an early economic advantage to those areas connected first and so it is critical that the
      North East is connected from the start, in order to make the most of the opportunities HSR
      presents. Otherwise, this would potentially send a signal to investors which will be difficult to
      turn back from and could result in creating lop-sided growth in the UK.

34.   Research and experience from other European countries demonstrates that to maximise the
      capacity of high speed, there needs to be relatively large centres of population and activity
      along the entire route, such as that offered by an eastern route. The LEP areas around
      Leeds, Sheffield, Tees Valley and Tyne and Wear, and Derby/Nottingham/ Leicester have a
      combined population of 9.1 million to connect with the Scotland, London and the West
      Midlands. An east coast route therefore makes economic and financial sense from the
                                                                                   20
      outset, with the wider economic benefits of this route totalling £4.2 billion .

35.   The evidence is strong that additional capacity between London and the West Midlands to
      relieve the southern sections of the WCML should be the first stage in developing a national
      network. However, beyond this, there is little published evidence to support the notion
      that the remainder of the national network should start from Birmingham and work
      northwards. As the first phase of HS2 will include a connection to the WCML, and a
      connection to the MML could benefit the East Midlands and South Yorkshire, there is an
      argument on equity as well as economic grounds that the next investment should concentrate
      on linking Scotland, the North East and the rest of Yorkshire into the HSR network.

Economic Rebalancing and Equity

36.   HSR offers a once in a generation opportunity to transform the economic geography of the
      UK, support sustainable growth and international competitiveness, and gives a strong
      opportunity to rebalance the economy in line with Government policy. However, it is essential
      that a new HSR network is developed in such a way as to maximise opportunities across the
      UK from the beginning, to ensure that whole nation benefits.

37.   In addition to conventional transport benefits, the eastern leg of the Y network is
      forecast to contribute some £2.6 billion in productivity benefits 21 . Although the majority
      of the benefits are through productivity benefits in producer services, all major sectors of the
         economy show predicted productivity benefits. The North East has significantly higher
         benefits through productivity benefits in manufacturing, one of the sectors leading the UK in
         its current recovery.

38.      On a per capita basis, GVA in the North is 80% of the South East 22 . Whilst manufacturing in
         the North remains an important part of the economy and the service sector has been growing,
         the North has a greater than average proportion of workers in public sector employment – for
         example, 25% in the North East compared with 17% in the South East 23 . As a proportion of
         people available for work, unemployment at 8.6% is notably greater in the North than in the
         South East where it is 6.1% 24 . Therefore, if the economy is to be rebalanced, it is vital that
         HSR serves the whole of the North of the UK.

39.      Recent research on the line between Cologne and Frankfurt has shown that that towns
         connected to a new high speed line saw their GDP rise by at least 2.7% compared to
         adjacent towns not on the route 25 . This was based on the results from two towns (Limburg
         and Montabaur) that were included on the high speed route due to lobbying by regional
         government and not because their economies were particularly powerful or expanding. The
         study also found that increased market access through HSR rail has a direct correlation with a
         rise in GDP – for each 1% increase in market access, there is a 0.25% rise in GDP. The
         economic growth associated with HSR came before the line entered into service, as
         businesses and individuals changed their economic behaviour in anticipation of the arrival of
         HSR, ensuring an early realisation of benefits.

40.      As noted above, to maximise the benefits of HSR, there needs to be detailed consideration
         given to how the released capacity on the existing networks could be utilised. The DfT has
         indicated, for example, that the implementation of HSR between London and the West
         Midlands could allow up to 12tph from London to serve Milton Keynes. Whilst there will be
         some sense in providing additional commuter services into and out of London, the real
         opportunity to spread the benefits of HSR by using spare capacity to provide other towns and
         cities with a direct service to London and to enhance links between LEP areas outside
         London.

41.      There also needs to be an immediate review of how local and regional networks connect into
         the HSR network, as improvements in advance of HSR to these networks and services can
         not only support the realisation of the predicted benefits, but bring additional passengers to
         the service over and above that predicted. The international evidence is that integrating HSR
         with the local transport networks further increases the area over which the benefits of HSR
                 26
         are felt .

Impact

42.      Previous comments have addressed the issue of carbon emissions and the possible
         environmental impacts of HSR, as well as the need to minimise any disruption to the existing
         network during construction.

43.      In terms of freight, just as there is an opportunity to use released capacity on the ECML and
         other main lines for passenger services, so the same is also true for freight services, and a
         part of the North East’s plan for economic recovery includes the development of the two major
         ports in the North East; Tees and Hartlepool and Port of Tyne. Both of these have proposals
         to expand, and so it is vital that onward connections by rail are possible to minimise additional
         lorry miles. To illustrate the point about complementary investment, some £2.4 million will be
         invested in the Tees Valley’s rail network over the next two years to allow the passage of
         larger containers and support the expansion of Teesport.




Conclusion
44.           There is strong support from local authority and business leaders for HSR in the North East.
              The North East occupies a special place in the rail industry’s history as the birthplace of the
              modern railway. For the region to compete effectively in the 21st century, it is vital that the
              North East continues to play its full part in the rail industry’s future, particularly the
              development of HSR and the connecting rail infrastructure required to maximise the
              transformational benefits that HSR can bring.

     May 2011
               

                                                            
1
    East Coast Route Utilisation Strategy, Network Rail, February 2008.

2
    Transport Monitoring Report, Tees Valley Unlimited, July 2010.

3
    Network RUS – Scenarios and Long Distance Forecasts, Network Rail, June 2009.

4
    High Speed Rail Strategic Alternatives Study – Strategic Alternatives to the Proposed ‘Y’ Network, Atkins, February 2011.

5
    High Speed Rail Eastern Network Partnership – Technical Business Case Work, Arup, May 2011.

6
    High Speed North East, ANEC, October 2009.

7
    Because Transport Matters, Atkins, 2008.

8
    High Speed Rail: International Comparisons, Steer Davies Gleave, 2004.

9
    High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Department for Transport, February 2011.

10
     HS2 London to the West Midlands: Appraisal of Sustainability, Booz & Co and Temple, February 2011.

11
     http://www.dft.gov.uk/about/vision

12
     Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s Potential, HM Government, October 2010.

13
     ibid, Arup, May 2011.

14
     http://nds.coi.gov.uk/clientmicrosite/Content/Detail.aspx?ClientId=202&NewsAreaId=2&ReleaseID=416118&SubjectId=36

15
     ibid, Department for Transport, February 2011.

16
     High Speed Rail Summary, Department for Transport, March 2010.

17
     Economic Case for HS2: The Y Network and London – West Midlands, Department for Transport, February 2011.

18
     ibid, Arup, May 2011.

19
     Delivering a Sustainable Transport System Main Report, Department for Transport, November 2008.

20
     ibid, Arup, May 2011.

21
     ibid, Arup, May 2011.

22
     Office for National Statistics, Regional Gross Value Added, NUTS1 GVA (1989-2009) Data (Table 1).

23
     Public Sector Employment and Expenditure by Region, House of Common Library, July 2010.

24
     Office for National Statistics, Regional Labour Market Statistics February 2011, (Table S1).

25
  From Periphery to Core: Economic Adjustments to High Speed Rail, Gabriel M Ahlfeldt (LSE) and Arne Feddersen
(University of Hamburg), September 2010.

26
     High Speed Trains and the Development and Regeneration of Cities, Greengauge21, 2006.
                       Written evidence from Warwick District Council (HSR 122) 

1. Overview 
     
1.1. This statement does not prejudice the formal response of Warwick District Council to the 
      Government consultation, which will be submitted before the close of the consultation (31st July 
      2011). 
 
1.2. Warwick District Council is aligned with and in complete agreement with the full submission 
      made by the 51m Group of Authorities to the Transport Select Committee.  Warwick District 
      Council does not believe that the business case stacks up and therefore cannot support the 
      route suggested by Government.  It is considered that the current proposal is not in the best 
      interests of the UK as a whole in terms of the benefits claimed in the business case. We also 
      consider that the current proposal is therefore inappropriate given that the economic and 
      environmental benefits are not at all credible. 
 
1.3. We do not believe that all the other alternatives to achieve the transport capacity, regeneration 
      and environmental benefits have been fully explored by the Government and with in excess of 
      £30 billion proposed to be invested, we owe it to the nation to ensure that these are fully 
      explored. 
 
1.4. For all these reasons Warwick District Council is of the view that the case for the HS2 scheme 
      does not begin to be made out. The Committee is asked to request that the DfT undertake a 
      fundamental reappraisal. 

2. Impact 
     
      In relation to part 2 of Question 6 regarding Impact, Warwick District Council would like to offer 
      the following: 
       
2.1. Warwick District Council believes that the High Speed 2 (HS2) proposal will cause considerable 
      environmental  damage  both  in  the  short  term,  during  construction,  and  in  the  longer  term, 
      once operational, and throughout its life. 
       
2.2. Warwick District has a very high quality built and natural environment and is concerned at the 
      prospect  of  this  being  damaged  irretrievably  by  an  eagerness  to  proceed  with  a  project  that 
      appears  to  be  flawed  with  regard  to  its  economic  justification  and  by  a  measurable  lack  of 
      detailed environmental information needed to underpin the overall cost/ benefit analysis within 
      the business case. 
       
2.3. The appraisal of sustainability (AoS) includes a series of objectives against which the proposals 
      are measured, with scores ranging from highly unsupportive through to highly supportive. No 
      aspect of HS2 scores positively in the AoS for its environmental impacts, and whilst this is not 
      uncommon  at  an  early  stage  for  any  major  development  project  (since  it  indicates  where 
      mitigation  is  most  required),  HS2  has  not  suggested  any  mitigation  measures  but  rather 
      allocated  an  amount  of  funding  for  future  investigations  within  the  business  case.  Given  that 
      individuals  and  groups  are  currently  being  asked  to  submit  mitigation  proposals  for 
     consideration  by  the  Government  it  follows  that  it  is  not  possible  to  make  an  informed 
     conclusion  with  regard  to  the  both  the  environmental  and  economic  costs  and  related  wider 
     impacts of the HS2 proposal. 
      
2.4. This  is  further  compounded  as  HS2  Ltd  has  recognised  the  EU  and  UK  legislation  to  protect 
     listed sites and species. However HS2 Ltd has only used part of the data that is readily available 
     without any detailed survey work. Only data on Birmingham and London’s Local Wildlife Sites 
     (LWS) has been used despite Warwickshire’s being publicly available since the summer of 2010. 
     This is considered to be a substantial flaw in the project that will have further negative effects 
     on  the  business  rationale.  The  proposed  route  is  well  populated  with  European,  national  and 
     county important species and sites (none of which are appraised in this report). 
      
2.5. It should also be noted that Warwick District is also blessed with many Heritage assets, some of 
     which  are  under  threat  from  the  HS2  proposal  (for  example  Stoneleigh  Abbey  and  the 
     associated historic parkland). It is a fact that the HS2 proposal will not be able to mitigate the 
     impact  on  such  features  as  their  setting  and  intrinsic  value  will  be  changed  considerably.    It 
     should  be  recognised  that  it  is  beyond  question  that  such  impacts  will  not  be  measurable  in 
     terms  of  a  monetary  sum  within  the  business  case;  however  they  represent  a  real 
     environmental cost. 
      
2.6. To conclude we would therefore offer our opinion that the impact of the environmental costs 
     and benefits has not been accounted for correctly and as a consequence of this the overall 
     business case must therefore be inaccurate / flawed. 

 

May 2011 

 

 

 
                          Written evidence from PTEG (HSR 123)


1.   Introduction
1.1. pteg represents the six Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) in England which between
     them serve more than eleven million people in Tyne and Wear (‘Nexus’), West Yorkshire
     (‘Metro’), South Yorkshire, Greater Manchester, Merseyside (‘Merseytravel’) and the West
     Midlands (‘Centro’). Leicester City Council, Nottingham City Council, Transport for London
     (TfL) and Strathclyde Partnership for Transport (SPT) are associate members of pteg,
     though this response does not represent their views. The PTEs plan, procure, provide and
     promote public transport in some of Britain’s largest city regions, with the aim of providing
     integrated public transport networks accessible to all.
1.2. pteg welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Committee’s inquiry into this important topic
     and would be willing to appear before the Select Committee, should the Committee wish us
     to expand on any of the points made in this response. Our response focuses on the key
     issues for the city regions and addresses the relevant questions from the Committee only.

2.   The city regions need High Speed Rail
2.1. pteg support the development of a High Speed Rail (HSR) network for the UK. We support
     the government’s view that this is ‘a once in a generation opportunity to transform the way
     we travel in Britain’ 1 .
2.2. We believe that there is a pressing need to better connect the major urban centres of the UK,
     in particular those in the North and the Midlands, with London and, critically, with each other.
     Alongside improvements to the ‘classic’ network, HSR offers the potential to dramatically
     improve connectivity of key city centres, thereby opening up new opportunities for business
     growth, extended labour markets and wider economic benefits associated with tourism and
     leisure markets.
2.3. Our support for HSR is therefore based on two core, inter-related arguments – economic and
     regeneration impacts; and capacity benefits.
     Economic and Regeneration Impacts
2.4. HSR will reshape and rebalance the economic geography of Britain, closing the gap between
     the South East and the rest of the country over the longer term. On a per capita basis, GVA
     in the city regions is lower than that of the South East – e.g. the North is 80% of the South
     East 2 . While manufacturing in the North and West Midlands remains an important part of the
     economy, and the service sector has been growing strongly, there are greater than average
     proportions of public sector employment – for example, 25% in the North East compared with
     17% in the South East 3 . As a proportion of people available for work, unemployment is
     persistently higher in the North and Midlands than in the South East 4 .
2.5. To support the re-balancing of the economy, there is a need to enhance the connectivity
     within and between the city regions; between the North and the rest of the country (London
     and the South East in particular); and to and from international gateways, including Heathrow
     Airport and the Channel Tunnel 5 . Growing city region economies will also generate greater
     demand for travel 6 between them as their economies become more interconnected.
2.6. As the economies of our city regions grow and restructure north-south links, particularly to
     London, will become more important over time in economic terms. London is a World City
     and global financial hub and as such offers financial, legal and other services essential to
     businesses in the North and West Midlands. Economic growth in these areas will increase
     demand for the internationally renowned services that London offers, not diminish it. On top
     of this, by virtue of its size and wealth London and the South East is the largest domestic
     market for our businesses and, of course, as the nation’s capital it is the home of
     government 7 .
2.7. HSR has the potential to radically transform the economies not just of the major cities, but
     also of the surrounding connected areas, extending its advantages beyond the places that it
     directly serves. Therefore ensuring that HSR is properly integrated into the classic rail and
     other public transport networks will mean that the maximum number of people benefit from
     the advantages of the network, reducing journey times for business and leisure.
2.8. For example, the economic benefits of HSR, combined with enhancements to the existing rail
     network, demonstrated that the West Midlands would benefit from an additional 22,000 jobs;
     generating £1.5bn GVA benefits and, with the attraction of higher value business sectors, an
     increase in average wages of £300 per annum 8 .
      Capacity
2.9. Evidence from the rail industry shows that additional rail capacity is needed to prevent
     overcrowding on rail services in the future (i.e. that demand for long distance travel will
     increase by 70%; and regional rail services double by 2034 9 ). Without this additional
     capacity, travel conditions will decline, overcrowding will increase and services are likely to
     become more expensive, damaging the economic prospects of our cities and the country’s
     economic competitiveness.
2.10. HSR will provide the best value for money solution to the capacity challenge as new railway
      lines deliver a step-change in capacity and reliability that cannot be matched by upgrading
      the existing rail network. HSR will release substantial capacity on the existing rail network for
      additional local and commuter services and for an increase in rail freight.
2.11. Research has identified the potential capacity benefits of HS2 route and demonstrated the
      potential for substantial improvements to capacity, stating that:
      ‘Services to most of the stations along the route can be transformed: frequencies typically
      doubled, connections dramatically improved and in some cases, quicker journeys too.
      Irritating limitations on the commuter peak timetable will become history.’ 10
2.12. We might expect to see similar gains from the properly planned implementation north of
      Birmingham of the two legs of the Y network to Leeds and Manchester.

3.    High Speed Rail: Key Issues
      What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?
3.1. Our core arguments for supporting High Speed Rail are set out above.
      How does HSR fit with the Government's transport policy objectives?
3.2. The government’s high level objectives relate to long-term and sustainable economic growth,
     rebalancing the economy and carbon reduction – HSR clearly fits with these high level
     objectives, albeit over the long term.
3.3. Making the link between major projects such as HSR and local transport will be important.
     This is recognised at a high level in the government’s Local Transport White Paper 11 . We
     believe that HSR and the White Paper’s objective of ‘making public transport more
     attractive 12 go hand-in-hand; that it is important for HSR to be seen in the context of ‘end-to-
     end’ journeys; and that it therefore remains vital to continue to invest in local transport
     schemes that allow the free flow of people out of HSR stations in a sustainable way.
3.4. We also believe that there is a need to strengthen the supporting policy framework to deliver
     HSR. The government is due to produce a National Policy Statement (NPS) on transport
     networks, which will set out the strategic context for major transport infrastructure. We
     believe that this NPS should provide the strategic framework that sets out transport’s role in
     promoting sustainable economic growth and regional balance. The NPS needs to sit
     alongside the National Infrastructure Plan 13 so that clear links are made to the delivery of
     national policy objectives, as set out in NPS, and which would include HSR.
      HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective
      compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending
      programmes, including those for the strategic road network?
3.5. We believe that improved inter-urban connectivity has significant economic benefits and is a
     worthwhile policy objective in this regard. This does not reduce the importance of other
     transport policy objectives, in particular the spending programmes within city regions.
3.6. We note the government’s conclusion that ‘the road network cannot offer an effective
     solution’ and that ‘the unreliability and delay caused by congestion in cities… make road
     travel an unattractive option for the journeys into city centres which are seeing the highest
     levels of demand growth on the rail network’ 14 , and therefore we would question whether
     investment of a similar order in the strategic road network could achieve the same outcomes
     as HSR.
      Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for
      the 'classic' network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and
      rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?
3.7. HSR should be treated as a national project whose significance stretches far beyond its
     transport role and therefore funding for it should fall outside of the normal spending limits for
     classic rail, in which case the impact on the classic network would be limited. By way of
     example, the funding for CrossRail has been allocated as a distinct line of funding from
     government and we believe that funding for HSR should follow this approach.
3.8. To extract the maximum benefits from HSR, there is a need to continue to invest in and
     upgrade ‘classic’ rail services. For example, in the short to medium term there is a continued
     need to address the capacity constraints on the existing network, including rolling out
     electrification and major infrastructure schemes, such as the Northern Hub.
3.9. It is essential that HSR is placed within the context of a long term strategy for the
     enhancement of the longer distance rail links between city regions. This needs to establish
     an affordable and value for money programme of enhancements to the West Coast Main
     Line, Midland Main Line and East Coast Main Line in advance of HSR, and ultimately to
     complement a HSR network. Also needed is a strategy to enhance the transpennine routes
     which may not be part of the national HSR, but which evidence demonstrates are so
     important to the economy of the entire North.
3.10. Additionally we believe that HSR increases the need for complementary measures to
      maximise the benefits – a key concern for us is that local transport, including local rail
      services, can be properly integrated so that when HSR services arrive at our city centres, we
      have adequate and sustainable means of distributing passengers to their final destinations.
      A key objective in this regard is therefore the devolution of local rail services to PTEs which
      will help integrate rail more effectively and, potentially, unlock mainline station capacity
      through the wider implementation of light rail conversions and tram-train 15 .
3.11. If funding for HSR comes from within existing rail funding sources then it will have a major
      negative impact on other rail investment, particularly for the North and Midlands, which
      already suffer from under-investment in terms of rail expenditure.
      Business case
      How robust are the assumptions and methodology?
3.12. At present the DfT business case does not fully reflect the business case benefits that
      accumulate the further north the HSR network is extended. The development of a HSR
      network through the reduced journey times allows for transformational economic change and
      benefit to the north of England and Scotland. The benefits of this transformational change
      have not been quantified in the DfT’s appraisal which means the total benefits already
      calculated are likely to be conservative. Furthermore, the experience of European and other
      countries in the development of HSR networks suggests that there are significant
      transformational benefits to regional economies (see Lille in France as a good example).
3.13. Additionally, the current business case understates the demand for services. The future
      patronage forecasts used by HS2 for growth on the rail network appear to be conservative
      when compared to historical and actual passenger growth. The demand forecasting work
      undertaken by HS2 Ltd uses an estimate of underlying growth in rail demand of 3.4% per
      annum across the entire UK rail network, and a net 1.5% per annum growth for HS2
      passengers by 2043.
3.14. The key drivers of rail patronage growth include increased economic and population growth.
      Future growth levels of both are projected to be in broad alignment with historical trends
      meaning that unless the rail industry introduces policy tools such as pricing to reduce
      demand, future rail demand is likely to be consistent with historical growth levels.
3.15. Therefore, the future growth outlined by HS2 needs to be assessed against actual and
      historical growth in rail travel demand (rather than the estimate above). Table 1 outlines
      growth in long distance rail journeys from London 1999/00-2009/10:

             Table 3. Historical Growth Long Distance Rail Travel 16
             London to     Total Growth                 Ave. Annual Growth Rate
             Manchester 70%                             5.4%
             Birmingham 58%                             4.7%
             Liverpool     41%                          3.5%
             Glasgow       23%                          2.1%

3.16. Furthermore, if a more dynamic approach to modelling the interaction between changes in
      accessibility and land use were employed (reflecting changes in the location and mix of
      businesses in an area as a result of improved transport connections) this would represent a
      more realistic estimate of the economic impact of HS2. The Department for Transport have
      assumed no changes to land use will occur as a result of HS2, which is not consistent with
      international case studies of HSR which prove otherwise.
      What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for
      example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?
3.17. There are worthwhile and value for money proposals for increasing north-south rail capacity
      on the existing main lines and these should be pursued. However, the capacity increment
      that such enhancements will bring is finite and not sufficient to meet the needs of the our
      economies if they are to grow to their full potential. Any further capacity increases would be
      highly disruptive to implement (e.g. the experience of the West Coast Route Modernisation
      programme), as well as being very costly.
3.18. The most cost effective way to provide the north-south capacity that is required is to build
      new railway lines. The extra benefits that come from operating this new capacity at high
      speed transforms the economic and productivity benefits that the new capacity will deliver.
      Building a new conventional speed line would save around 9% of the cost of HS2 but would
      deliver only two thirds of the benefits and is therefore not considered to be a credible
      alternative to HS2.
      What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail
      travel, for example by price?
3.19. Managing demand through pricing for longer distance rail travel will have a negative impact
      on the economy through discouraging economic activity and business; the environment
      through increased demand for motorway travel and domestic aviation; and quality of life
      through increased congestion, noise, and additional land take for extra road space. Whilst
      pricing clearly has a role in spreading demand for rail to encourage better utilisation of
      capacity, any choking off of inter-city rail demand by pricing would, in our view, be a
      retrograde step for the our economies.
      The strategic route
      Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y
      configuration the right choice?
3.20. There is a need for a national HSR network that connects the major cities of the UK together.
      The Y network therefore represents a good starting point, but further connections are
      required to Newcastle and Scotland, as well as connecting other major centres such as
      Liverpool. A possible network is set out in Greengauge 21’s ‘Fast Forward’ strategy 17 .
3.21. There is also a need to ensure that the proposed Y shape has sufficient capacity to ensure
      that future demand from all parts of the country can be accommodated to facilitate not only
      inter-city links, but also connectivity to Heathrow and also HS1 to mainland Europe.
      Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London
      northwards?
3.22. Whilst it is inevitable that a national HSR network will need to be delivered in phases given
      the complexity of the task, it is important that the full network is delivered at the earliest
      possible timescale. We believe that there should be a firm commitment to the whole of the
      network – either through provision in the Hybrid Bill or through the National Policy Statement
      on transport networks. It is particularly important that both legs of the ‘Y’ to Manchester and
      Leeds are delivered in parallel to avoid any economic imbalances.
3.23. The option to build more than one section of route in parallel has not been fully explored
      within the strategy. Given that the benefits of HSR are about rebalancing the economy and
      that there are huge wider economic benefits to be had by bringing northern cities closer to
      other city regions and London, there is a strong argument for beginning construction of HSR
      simultaneously in London and the north, although there is clearly a cost to this (financially
      and procedurally). It may be that there is scope to develop sections in parallel over the life of
      the project, particularly if there is an improvement to the macro-economic context.
      Economic rebalancing and equity
      What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge
      the north-south economic divide?
3.24. See the section above on economic impact.
      To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of
      supporting local and regional regeneration?
3.25. There are clear benefits in making sure that the full HSR network extends to all the major
      urban centres to ensure that they are effectively connected. As stated above, we believe
      that the Y network represents a good starting point.
      Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?
3.26. City centre locations near to HSR stations will be the primary beneficiaries. Research by
      KPMG 18 illustrates how public transport accessibility to the city centres can make a critical
      contribution to higher productivity and wages, job creation and direct foreign investment.
      They argue that rail plays a crucial role in supporting the shift of economic activity towards
      the densest and most productive locations and sectors of the economy.
3.27. These findings are echoed by the analysis of the Northern Hub in Manchester 19 and the
      Centre for Cities 20 report on agglomeration and growth in the Leeds City Region. These
      reports agree that public transport schemes improving city centre accessibility can generate
      wider economic benefits corresponding to 20-25% of total benefits, which are not currently
      taken into account by the Department for Transport.
      How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including
      local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution
      and bear risks appropriately?
3.28. We believe that it is fair that those who benefit from HSR should contribute towards its cost if
      the appropriate financial regulations and tools are in place. For example, if local authorities
      are allowed to keep the additional business rates generated through HSR (using
      mechanisms such as Tax Increment Financing) then these areas should contribute towards
      appropriate HSR infrastructure, such as stations. However, if government captures the
      additional uplift in tax raised through HSR, then it is appropriate that the government and
      major private sector developers pay for HSR.



May 2011
References

1
 Department for Transport, ‘High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future Consultation Summary’ Feb
2011, p3
2
  Calculations based on - Office for National Statistics, Regional Gross Value Added, NUTS1 GVA
(1989-2009) Data (Table 1). GVA is defined as Headline Workplace Based GVA for 2009 (provisional
estimates). North is defined as the Government Office Regions of Yorkshire and The Humber, The
North West and the North East. The South East is defined as the Government Office Region of the
South East.
3
 Table 1, Public Sector Employment and Expenditure by Region, House of Common Library, July
2010
4
 Calculations based on - Office for National Statistics, Regional Labour Market Statistics February
2011, (Table S1).
5
  The need to improve links within and between city regions, between the North and the South and to
and from international gateways was identified in the Northern Way’s March 2007 Strategic Direction
for Transport and then reaffirmed in the Northern Way’s September 2007 Short, Medium and Long
Term Transport Priorities.
6
    See Transport Demand in the North, The Northern Way, March 2010
7
 For a fuller discussion of the North’s position in the national economy see the Northern Way
commissioned report Northern Connection: Assessing the Comparative Economic Performance and
Prospects of Northern England Institute for Political and Economic Governance, University of
Manchester and Centre for Urban Policy Studies, University of Manchester January 2008
    8
      Centro Commissioned Report by KPMG “High Speed Rail and supporting investments in
    the West Midlands Consequences for employment and economic growth”


9
    Network Rail, ATOC and RFOA ‘Planning Ahead 2010’, 2010
10
        Greengauge 21, ‘Capturing the benefits of HS2 on existing lines’, 2011, p5
11
 Department for Transport, ‘Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon: Making Sustainable Local Transport
Happen’ Jan 2011
12
        Ibid
13
        HMT, National Infrastructure Plan, 2010
14
  Department for Transport, ‘High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future Consultation Summary’
Feb 2011, p8
15
   See ‘Rail Cities in the 21st Century: the case for devolution’, pteg, 2010
http://www.pteg.net/NR/rdonlyres/F5FB1E6E-EF2F-4EAD-B9D2-
E4A235544B51/0/Railvisionfinalforwebsml.pdf
16
        Network Rail (draft) West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy
17
        Greengauge21, ‘Fast Forward: A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain’, Sept 2009
18
 KPMG. ‘Value for money in tackling overcrowding on northern city rail services’. Report to the
Northern PTEs, 2010
19
   The Northern Way, ‘Manchester Hub Phase 2 - Transport Modelling and Benefit Assessment’, 2009
http://www.thenorthernway.co.uk/document.asp?id=718
20
  Centre for Cities, ‘The case for better transport investment: Agglomeration and growth in the Leeds
City Region’, 2007 http://www.centreforcities.org/assets/files/pdfs/071127LeedsPaperFINAL.pdf
            Written evidence from Crossrail Limited (HSR 124)


Crossrail Limited (‘CRL’) welcomes the opportunity to respond to the
Transport Committee’s call for evidence regarding the strategic case for High
Speed Rail.

CRL is charged with delivering the Crossrail Programme – a new east-west
high-frequency, metro railway through London from Maidenhead to Shenfield
and Abbey Wood. Crossrail is due to begin passenger operations in late 2018.

CRL’s interest in High Speed Rail is limited to the interface between the new
Crossrail Depot at Old Oak Common and the proposed High Speed 2 station
at Old Oak Common and we wish to draw the Committee’s attention to the
following points:

   1. The Crossrail Programme does not include provision of any station
      facilities at Old Oak Common. However, the Government’s HS2 plans
      propose a station at Old Oak Common to enable interchange with
      Crossrail and other rail services. Any change to the Crossrail scope
      would need to be instructed to CRL by the Crossrail Sponsors
      (Transport for London and the Department for Transport). The funding
      of any change would also be a matter for the Crossrail Sponsors.

   2. HS2 Limited has confirmed to CRL that a proposed station at Old Oak
      Common will not encroach on the Crossrail depot and will not
      adversely impact upon depot operations. HS2 Ltd is working on the
      basis that access to the Crossrail depot is required at all times, should
      HS2 be constructed. Any change to this position will have an adverse
      impact as the Crossrail depot at Old Oak Common is critical to the
      future operation of Crossrail services.



   3. CRL has recently appointed a shortlist of potential suppliers to bid for
      the design, build and finance of the 60 trains and the related depot and
      maintenance facilities to be based at Old Oak Common - it is
      anticipated that tenders will be invited to submit bids in late 2011 with a
      view to awarding a contract in late 2013.

   4. Commercial development proposals at Old Oak Common are a matter
      for the local authority, the London Borough of Hammersmith and
      Fulham.

CRL would be happy to provide further clarifications should you wish.

May 2011
      Written evidence from The Highlands & Islands Transport Partnership (HSR 125)


The Highlands & Islands Transport Partnership (HITRANS) is a statutory body
covering all forms of public transport in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland
encompassing not only road, rail, sea and air travel, but also cycling and walking.
HITRANS, working with its five constituent Councils, is charged with supporting the
Scottish Government in delivering the National Transport Strategy and developing and
delivering a strategy and promoting improvements to the transport services and
infrastructure network that serve the region. The organisation takes an integrated and
inclusive approach by consulting with the local communities and companies to achieve its
objective of “enhancing the region’s viability by improving the interconnectivity of the
whole region to strategic services and destinations”.
HITRANS is responsible for an area that holds many of the assets critical to Scotland’s
future prosperity. It covers just under half of Scotland’s land mass but with only 410,000
residents – less than 10% of Scotland’s population. It includes over 80 island
communities, of which 20 or so are served by air transport. The major challenge to
maximising the effectiveness of the region is to improve its accessibility both internally and
externally, to the rest of the UK and increasingly to international markets.
HITRANS welcomes the opportunity to respond to this call for written evidence from The
Transport Committee as part of its inquiry into the strategic case for High Speed Rail. The
Partnership offers the following input into the Review.


1.   What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

1.1 The main arguments for HSR are; economic growth and a balanced economy, rail capacity and
     Journey times and the environment.

1.2 Economic growth and re-distribution of wealth; The positive link between economic growth and
     transport connectivity has been long established. Experience in other countries has shown that
     HSR stimulates economic growth outwith the Capital City such as for Lille in France and will
     therefore re-balance the national economy and reduce the current north-south divide. Improved
     accessibility to the north of England and Scotland will in addition provide opportunities for growth
     as a whole in the UK economy.

1.3 Rail capacity; The West Coast RUS concluded that the southern end of this line would soon run
     out of capacity to cater for expected growth and the only effective way to deal with this scenario
     would be to build an additional line. The East Coast and the Midland Main Line would also in due
     course experience a similar situation. The construction of HS2 would then release capacity on
     existing main lines, in particular the West Coast, which will cater for additional local rail services
     and freight.

1.4 Reduced end-to-end journey time; This is a more important benefit and opportunity for North of
     England and in particular Scotland where rail still has a relatively low share of the inter-city travel
     market and where only HSR can facilitate a step change in modal share from air to rail for longer
     distance travel whilst at the same time enhancing UK regional connectivity as part of a more
     sustainable UK economic growth strategy.

1.5 Environment; Increased capacity and significantly reduced journey times will stimulate transfer
     from car and air to rail. Rail is the only mode with the realistic potential to transport large volumes
     of passengers over long distances between UK cities and regions in a sustainable manner, in
     particular with an increasing proportion of the primary energy being renewable.

2.   How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

     HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to
     other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road
     network?

2.1 The objectives and potential benefits of HSR go well beyond improving inter-urban connectivity by
     improving overall network capacity and enhancing regional connectivity by reducing journey times.
     Other objectives that will be met through HSR would be to redistribute wealth and enhance
     regional prosperity by reducing real and perceived peripherality within the UK and to make
     transport more sustainable, in line with Government Climate Change objectives.

2.2 Whilst some of these objectives could be met in part by investing in other transport modes, when
     compared with roads, rail is in particular more environmentally sustainable (air quality, energy use,
     land use) and is best suited for travel between and to access regional-centres

     Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’
     network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around
     major cities?

2.3 There are already significant ‘high-cost’ rail projects under construction, in particular London
     Crossrail (approx. £15 billion over around 7 years) and Thameslink (approx. £5.5 billion over
     around 8 years) and it does not appear than these schemes have affected funding for the general
     ‘classic’ network.

2.4 These two schemes will be very close to completion by the time construction would start on the
     proposed HSR between London and Birmingham in around 2016. At an approx. cost of £17 billion
     over 10 years, the peak expenditure on the London-Birmingham HSR and subsequent phasings
     should be no higher than for Crossrail alone, never mind the combined peak expenditure of the two
     London projects

2.5 There is already commitment to invest in a significant number of classic rail projects, such as Great
     Western Main Line electrification, Intercity Express Train Replacement Programme (IEP) and
     significant further enhancements to the East and West Coast Main Lines (e.g. Hitchin and Stafford
     flyovers)

2.6 The development of a comprehensive and regionally inclusive HSR network, which extends to the
     north of England and Scotland, must be viewed as a UK Treasury priority, with commitment to
     development of a HSR network which delivers comparable “step change” journey time, capacity
     and connectivity benefits for all of the regions, including Scotland.

     What are the implications for domestic aviation?
2.7 In 2009, approximately 8.8 million out of the 13.2 million domestic UK Mainland air passenger
     journeys were between the main cities that it is anticipated will eventually be directly served by a
     UK HSR Network (London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds,
     Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow). With significantly faster rail journeys, there should be a major
     shift from air to a much more sustainable rail travel mode.

2.8 Out of the 8.8 million air journeys, as many as 6.7 million either start or finish in Edinburgh or
     Glasgow demonstrating the much more significant modal change potential that exists in extending
     the full HSR network to Scotland. It is, therefore, imperative that the construction of a high speed
     rail network also includes new lines across the Border, delivering journey time improvements
     comparable with those proposed between Leeds/Manchester/Birmingham and London. Under the
     current “Y network” proposals journey time improvements between Edinburgh/Glasgow and
     London are roughly half those for Birmingham/Manchester/Leeds to London, potentially worsening
     relative peripherality for the northern parts of the UK and failing to fully capture the economic and
     environmental benefits that HSR offers.

2.9 The 2009 rail market share of the Edinburgh/Glasgow to London rail/air market was around 20%
     with rail journey times of typically 4hrs 30 mins. For the Newcastle to London rail/air market, rail
     held around 60%, with a rail journey time of around 3 hrs and for Manchester-London journeys, rail
     held around 76% of the rail/air market with a typical rail journey time of around 2 hrs 10 mins. For
     the Leeds to London air/rail market, rail held more than 95% of the market, with a typical rail
     journey time of 2 hrs 15 mins.

2.10 A 30 mins reduction in journey time (which should be achieved with high speed rail between
     London and West Midlands), could therefore see a shift from air to rail of nearly 1.5 million of
     today’s long-distance passenger journeys. This should increase to more than 3 million with the
     extension of the network to Leeds and Manchester when it must be assumed that domestic flights
     between Manchester/Leeds/ Newcastle and London will end. It is acknowledged however that
     modal split is also affected by other factors such as frequency and fares and ease of airport
     access.

2.11 3.8 million out of the 8.8 million air journeys quoted above are to or from London Heathrow so
     there should be significant scope to redirect valuable take-off and landing slots to other routes.
     Some of these Heathrow slots should go to domestic air routes that do not directly benefit from
     High Speed Rail, such as Aberdeen and Inverness which will not directly gain from the HSR
     network due to their geographical peripherality, so that these cities and their surrounding regions
     do not ‘fall behind’ in respect of London and international connectivity.

3.   Business case
    How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts,
    fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost
    revenue on the ‘classic’ network?

3.1 A number of fairly in-depth studies have been undertaken into a UK High Speed rail Network in
    addition to the HS2 study, in particular the following three major studies:-

    1.   Atkins study (on behalf of SRA), later updated for the Government in 2008

    2.   Network Rail ‘New Lines’ study (2009)

    3.   Greengauge21’Fast Forward’ study (2009)

3.2 The studies looked at different HSR solutions and had different objectives behind their proposals.
    However, there were common strands such as the need for and benefits of a comprehensive UK
    north-south network linking in the major cities from London to Edinburgh and Glasgow. They all
    showed positive cases for a HSR network with benefit/cost ratios in the region of 2 – 3.5 and costs
    and passenger forecasts comparable with those found in the HS2 study.

3.3 A recent argument is that assumptions on time spent on trains is ‘un-productive’ has overestimated
    the benefits of HSR. A recent study by Greengauge21 (where time spent on train would be
    regarded as ‘working-time’) did however show that the opposite was the case (although only
    marginally so). Passengers transferred from car and air would gain more productive time than in
    the original estimate and this would outweigh the ‘over-estimate’ (in the original study) of working
    time gained by passengers transferred from classic train services.. It could also be argued that
    HSR will create a better working environment than current rail services and also that there will be a
    limit as to how long it is reasonably practical to work on a train.

3.4 The study by HS2 surprisingly did not include Edinburgh – London services in its modelling and
    business case for the London – Birmingham/Lichfield High Speed Line although the Edinburgh –
    London market is around 30% greater than the Glasgow – London market . Edinburgh – London
    Services via the West Coast and HS2 would be around 30 mins faster than existing services (as
    for Glasgow services) so by including Edinburgh – London services should make the business
    case even stronger.

    What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the
    West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

3.5 Upgrading the West Coast Main Line could only be limited in scope in respect of capacity and the
    Network Rail RUS concluded that the only longer-term capacity solution would be to construct a
    new line between London and West Midlands.

3.6 The most recent upgrading of the West Coast Main Line also saw significant added costs in terms
    of disruption to services and reduced capacity during construction. Adding these costs to the actual
    upgrading cost of around £9 billion (the most recent cost estimate) for a scheme that will give less
    incremental capacity than a new line, it is almost certain that such an upgrade will not be better
    value than a new line.
3.7 A new conventional line (restricted to 125 mph) would largely resolve the capacity issue but would
     not enhance journey-times and would therefore be much more limited in benefits to North of
     England and Scotland where journey times become increasingly more important. Without the
     journey-time savings, there will not be such a significant shift to rail from the less environmentally
     sustainable modes of car and air. Greengauge21 has also shown that the cost of a conventional
     line is only marginally cheaper than a High Speed line. In summary, the potential regional and UK
     economic and environmental benefits would be significantly diminished compared to HSR.

     What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by
     price?

3.8 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would push passengers back
     onto less sustainable modes such as car or air, or journeys would not be undertaken in the first
     place which would be damaging in overall socio-economic terms.

3.9 There must also be doubts if price alone could realistically manage to reduce demand sufficiently
     to avoid investing in additional capacity. Regulated fares are already the highest in Europe and
     increasing these fares much further in real terms could make rail travel only affordable by the more
     well-off in society, contrary to wider equality and social inclusion objectives.

     What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new
     high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

3.10 Construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a reasonably good
     track record in terms of time and budget, e.g. HS1 and the recent Airdrie-Bathgate project. There
     will also be a large number of European High Speed projects that have a good record in this
     respect.

4.   The strategic route case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

     The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham
     International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations?

4.1 The most important issue for high speed rail is that stations are well located to serve the key UK
     cities and major centres of population and, through excellent connections with regional rail
     networks, their surrounding regions. Rail is the most efficient mode in respect of land use to access
     city centres where this can be achieved, and without city-centre termini the advantage of high
     speed rail will be eroded.

4.2 Station locations outwith city centres will depend on local circumstances but should on average be
     located at not less than 100 mile intervals along the line. As a general principle HSR services
     should only stop at key city or regional hubs, with limited stopping patterns aimed at maximising
     achievement of the over-arching economic, environmental and regional connectivity objectives and
     benefits of the project.
4.3 Stations should only be provided where demand is predominantly for long distance rail travel. The
     temptation to add stations to cater for high volumes of shorter journeys such as commuting, must
     be resisted on the basis that such a strategy would erode the benefits of HSR.

     Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the
     right choice?

4.4 Most studies have demonstrated that a UK network including London, Birmingham, Manchester,
     East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow derives greatest benefit and
     offers best value. These should be considered as the core cities for a north-south high speed
     network, which could be expanded by a western network. The UK Government’s proposed “y-
     network” supports this scenario but needs to be extended to Scotland.

     Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

4.5 No. It is accepted that phase 1 of the HSR network should be the London-Birmingham section. It
     is the most capacity constrained section on the West Coast Main Line and is probably also the
     most complicated section to plan and construct. Furthermore, the link between Birmingham and
     London is accepted as being crucial to the future development of a more extensive UK HSR
     network. Should the London – Birmingham section be rejected, it is highly unlikely that a national
     network will ever materialise.

4.6 However, the proposition that future phases should be constructed moving northwards from
     London is challenged. The most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the
     English-Scottish border.     In addition, as indicated above, various studies have confirmed that
     extension of an HSR network to Scotland will deliver significantly greater economic and
     environmental benefits.       Consequently detailed consideration should be given to starting
     construction of northern sections at a much earlier stage rather than as “last legs”, with cross-
     Border sections being potentially progressed alongside, or possibly earlier than, sections between
     Leeds/Manchester and Birmingham.

4.7 In particular, the UK Government should show greater commitment to plan the future network
     beyond Manchester and Leeds in recognition of the benefits the completed HSR national network,
     including Scotland, will achieve.

     The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of
     Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

4.8 The link to HS1 must be part of phase 1 due to technical issues but will also cater for the current
     West Midlands-Europe market.

5.   Economic rebalancing and equity

     What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south
     economic divide?

5.1 European experience has shown that most regions directly connected to the high speed network
     experience higher economic growth and there is no reason why this should not be the case for the
    UK. A Greengauge21 report also found that areas of Kent experienced rapid growth following the
    construction of HS1.

5.2 The 2009 Greengauge21 study also found that regional economic benefits from a ‘full’ HSR
    network between London and Glasgow/Edinburgh would amount to around £80 billion and would
    be widely distributed but with Central Scotland, the North West and the South East benefitting
    most.

    To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and
    regional regeneration?

5.3 The most important element of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity between the main
    centres of population in the UK and in particular connectivity with London. By serving City Centres,
    high speed rail will indirectly support regional regeneration.

    Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

5.4 A Greengauge21 study advised that the business case for high speed rail was robust when based
    on current fare levels for long-distance rail travel and would cater for both business and leisure
    travel. Furthermore, the release of capacity on the existing network will also benefit other travellers
    and commuters in particular, as well as users of rail-freight. As such, all socio-economic groups
    currently using rail would benefit if fares do not rise. If fares rise then this will result in negative
    impacts on lower social groupings..

5.5 The majority of the population of the UK enjoys reasonable good links with the Cities that will be
    directly served by a future HSR network extending to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Many cities along
    the HSR corridors will also experience improved connectivity by increased service levels on the
    classic network.

5.6 However, it must be recognised there will be areas that will benefit significantly less such as the
    Northern half of Scotland, Wales, the South West of England and Northern Ireland and transport
    investment in these areas should be identified to reverse their relative decline (such as rail
    electrification programmes or, for the north of Scotland, improved air connectivity) and ensure a fair
    distribution of benefits.

    How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and
    business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the
    Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

5.7 There may be examples from other countries with HSR that could be used as models and there
    may also be lessons learned from London Crossrail project

5.8 A UK HSR Network will ‘replace’ current classic rail links that form part of TEN so support should
    be sought from TEN-T and other relevant EU budgets.
6.    Impact

     What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation
     and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

6.1 HSR has considerably lower carbon footprint than car and air and also matches that of classic rail
     when the higher capacity of HSR trains are taken into account. If it can be assumed that the
     primary energy source is non-fossil the carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction
     completion) should be relatively very small.

     Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the
     business case?

6.2 It could perhaps be argued that studies have erred on the ‘safe’ side so that overall environmental
     benefits have not been fully expressed.

     What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network?

6.3 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line which is
     the busiest rail freight corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by rail freight services so the
     impact on freight by HSR should be very positive.

     How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction, particularly
     during the rebuilding of Euston?

6.4 Experience from the St Pancras redevelopment indicates that this should be manageable.
     Disruption could also be reduced through service changes/ improvements to some of the existing
     local services terminating at Euston. For example, some local services on the West Coast Main
     Line as far out as Northampton could be incorporated into the Crossrail network through a
     connection in the Willesden/Old Oak Common area, extending planned Crossrail services from the
     East that would otherwise terminate at Old Oak Common. This could take away up to 7 train
     arrivals/departures per hour from Euston Station.



May 2011
 
         Written evidence from  Conserve the Chilterns and Countryside (HSR 126) 
 
     1. Summary 
           
1.1  Conserve  the  Chilterns  and  Countryside  (CCC)  is  a  group  of  residents  based  close  to  HS2 
Ltd’s preferred route for the high speed rail link.  We seek to protect the interests of those living 
around and between Amersham, Chesham and Wendover. 
 
1.2 We believe that the UK should continue to develop a modern, efficient transport system and 
that  high  speed  rail  may  have  a  part  to  play  in  this,  but  only  if  a  robust  business  case  can  be 
made  for  it.    We  are  concerned  that  the  government  has  overstated  its  case  for  High  Speed  2 
(HS2);  underestimated  its  impact  on  the  environment,  especially  in  the  Chilterns  Area  of 
Outstanding  Natural Beauty (AONB); and ignored the case  for alternative  routes with  a better 
business case or a lower environmental impact. 
 
1.3  In  this  submission  we  focus  on  one  such  alternative  route  which  runs  via  a  new  hub  just 
north of Heathrow airport.  In examining this alternative we stress that we are not advocates for 
the  route  or  for  HS2,  but  believe  that  a  fuller  examination  of  the  alternative  routes  should  be 
undertaken and the results made available as part of the consultation process.  If necessary, the 
government’s consultation should be delayed to allow this to happen. 
 
     2. Conserve the Chilterns and Countryside 
 
2.1 Conserve the Chilterns and Countryside is committed to protecting the Chilterns AONB. We 
are a non‐profit based organisation funded by its founding members and public donations. We 
are  committed  to  rational  discussion  and  debate  on  the  location  of  HS2,  and  its  value  to  the 
national infrastructure and economy.  
 
2.2  CCC  believes  that  if  HS2  is  to  proceed,  it  must  be  on  the  basis  of  a  robust  economic  case, 
delivered in a way that spreads the benefits of HS2 to communities along the route, and offer the 
best protection possible to the Chilterns countryside. In detail, the criteria we are calling on the 
government to ensure are met are as follows: 
 
2.3 Economic 

    •  A  full  economic  cost/benefit  analysis  should  be  carried  out  by  the  government  to 
       demonstrate there are concrete advantages to be had from HS2 
    • HS2  must  have  a  central  London  terminal,  with  a  direct  link  to  Heathrow,  Crossrail  and, 
       via HS1, to the Continent 
    • The government must make a commitment that over time the high speed network will link 
       the continent, via HS1 and HS2, to the north of England and Scotland 
        
2.4 Environmental 

    •  Full environmental mitigation must be put in place along the entire route, but particularly 
       in the Chilterns AONB 
    • The route should also follow existing major transport corridors or travel through tunnels, 
       wherever possible 
    • The line must traverse the shortest viable route across the Chilterns 
        
2.5 Community 



                                                          
 
       •  The  government  needs  to  provide  viable  and  tangible  benefits  to  communities  along  the 
          route, including javelin services for nearby towns 
     • There must be robust planning that makes provisions and commitments to reducing visual, 
          traffic and noise impact during construction 
     • Unlike  the  previous  administration,  the  government  must  ensure  communities  play  a 
          leading role in the consultation 
           
2.6  In  our  submission  to  the  Transport  Select  Committee  we  will  be  concentrating  on  the 
strategic  route,  namely  why  we  believe  HS2  must  directly  connect  to  Heathrow  in  the  first 
stages of its construction, and also touch upon the environmental issues surrounding HS2 which 
are threatening our nation’s precious AONB. 
 
     3. The Objectives of High Speed Rail 
           
3.1  All  too  often  the  UK’s  major  infrastructure  projects  have  been  short‐sighted  and  pushed 
through  to  navigate  the  planning  system  more  easily  and  to  appease  opposition.  The  huge 
detrimental effect is that many places have been left with sub‐standard national infrastructure 
which the tax payer has had to pay to upgrade subsequently and users have been left to suffer 
the impacts of poor planning and unreliable services.   
 
3.2 We are currently seeing this very problem with the long term upgrade works taking place on 
the  M25.  Experts  warned  all  along  that  this  project  would  require  more  lanes  and  could  have 
been incorporated at the time of initial construction with no extra impact on road users and at a 
fraction of the multi‐billion pound cost the country is now incurring during a period of austerity. 
 
3.3  CCC  believes  that  the  government’s  current  proposals  for  HS2  are,  at  best,  a  compromise 
that  cannot  possibly  achieve  its  full  potential  nor  deliver  its  full  benefit.  CCC  urges  the 
government  to  look  at  alternative  options  and  not  build  a  line  that  threatens  to  be  a  white 
elephant that will not meet the full objectives set out for a successful HS2. 
 
3.4  The  previous  government,  the  current  government  and  HS2  Ltd  have  consistently  set  out 
key objectives for HS2 1 .  These objectives included the following criteria 2 : 
 
     • A Heathrow International station – this must provide an interchange between HS2, HS1, 
          the Great Western Main Line (GWML) and Crossrail with convenient access to Heathrow 
     • Increase passenger capacity 
     • A freight capability – taking freight off the roads 
     • Modal shift from car to rail 
     • Modal shift from air to rail 
           
3.5 CCC believes that the preferred route chosen for the current public consultation fails to meet 
these  objectives  and  that  alternative  options  must  be  looked  at  if  the  government’s  objectives 
are to be met, as demonstrated below: 
 
 
     • A Heathrow International station 
 

                                                            
1
   P. Hammond letter to B.  Briscoe “remit for work” 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131112903/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highs
peedrail/hs2remit/remiths2june2010.pdf 
2 Objectives and remit for HS2 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/55864 

 

                                                                
 
3.6  Independent  engineering  firm  Arup  has  designed  both  the  Heathrow  hub  option  and  the 
current  route  the  government  are  consulting  on.    It  is  noteworthy  that  Arup  has  shown  a 
preference  for  the  route  via  Heathrow,  but  we  understand  that  they  are  now  contractually 
prevented by HS2 Ltd from promoting the Heathrow alternative. 
           
3.7 The current plans do not allow for the seamless integration of transport modes required to 
maximise  the  benefits  and  revenue  of  HS2.    While  current  plans  do  incorporate  HS1,  HS2,  the 
GWML, Crossrail and Heathrow  airport, they  are not to be found at  a central hub.  A  properly 
integrated hub would achieve this, as well as the added benefits of freight distribution, a coach 
and bus station and close links to the M25 and M4.   
           
3.8  Any  suggestions  that  an  Old  Oak  Common  interchange  or  a  spur/loop  is  the  answer  is 
perhaps  best  dismissed  by  quoting  Guillaume  Pepy,  Chairman  of  SNCF.  In  May  2009  he  said: 
“We  have  more  than  12  years  of  experience  and  are  fully  confident  in  the  value  of  an  easy 
connection between TGV and plane. The commercial success of TGV is due to the fact that Roissy is 
a through station. There must be a seamless connection between rail and air.” 3   As the Bow Group 
has  declared  any  “non  direct  HSR  link  with  Heathrow,  represented  by  a  loop  or  spur,  would 
represent  folly  in  Britain’s  ambition  to  develop  a  truly  integrated  transport  policy.” 4     The  Bow 
Group’s  report  was  endorsed  by  Lord  Heseltine,  who  promoted  the  change  to  the  original 
Channel Tunnel Rail link in the 1980s. 
           
3.9  There  have  been  some  concerns  that  a  Heathrow  hub  route  alignment  would  result  in  a 
significant increase to journey times.  However, for a non‐stop train from Euston to Birmingham 
City Centre, the route via Heathrow hub will take just three minutes longer than the alternative 
using  HS2  Ltd’s  preferred  route,  according  to  train  performance  modelling  of  journey  times 
carried out by Arup 5 .  This is a small increase that is mitigated when offset against the benefits 
of a fully integrated transport network, less environmental damage and reduction in cost of the 
spur  option.  Furthermore,  the  increase  in  journey  times  is  almost  negligible  when  put  in  the 
context  of  overall  time  savings  expected  on  the  entire  high  speed  network  from  phase  two  to 
Manchester and Leeds and beyond. 
 
3.10  If  a  hub  at  Heathrow  is  not  built,  the  UK  will  be  the  only  country  with  a  high  speed  rail 
network not incorporated with its major airport.  The success of a high speed rail network is, in 
part, dependent on its integration with air travel.  Air passengers will not use a rail service in 
any great numbers if the interchange is not simple and direct. 
 
3.11 The government has tried to tackle this by incorporating a future spur or loop to the line 
connecting to Heathrow.  Yet the designers of the preferred option concede that doing so would 
“compromise the ability of rail services to compete with domestic and short haul air services” 6 
largely making any spur/loop redundant and a vast waste of money. 
 
3.12 Heathrow is one of Europe’s most difficult airports to reach. If an integrated, effective and 
long  term  solution  is  not  sought,  Britain  risks  losing  many  potential  passengers  and  business 
opportunities to other European hubs. 
           

                                                            
3 Transport Times conference, London May 2009 
4 http://www.bowgroup.org/files/bowgroup/The_Right_Track_PDF.pdf 
5 Arup’s submission to Lord Mawhinney’s review 

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highs
peedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_4.pdf 
6 Arup submission to HS2 Ltd. Full report 

http://www.arup.com/News/2010_04_April/~/media/Files/PDF/News_and_Press/2010_04_April/091
210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx 

                                                                
 
3.13 In summary, a hub would tackle many of the problems the High Speed network should look 
to  tackle  and  that  the  current  preferred  route  ignores.  It  provides  exceptional  connectivity 
between classic and high speed rail services and between domestic road and rail services at a 
single interchange; significantly improves rail access to Heathrow for many UK cities; improves 
productivity  by  reducing  journey  times  for  business  trips  to Heathrow;  improves  reliability  of 
journeys  by  rail  to  Heathrow;  improves  access  to  international  markets  for  businesses, 
including  the  growing  markets  of  China  and  India;  attracts  international  firms  to  locate  and 
invest in the regions; releases short  haul  air slots at Heathrow; improves access to the rest  of 
the  country  for  international  tourists  visiting;  improves  access  to  Heathrow  for  the  West  and 
North  of  the  UK;  improves  local  air  quality  and  reduces  both  carbon  emissions  and  noise 
pollution; and increases farebox revenues – which provides a far more sound financing model 
for HS2 than current proposals.  CCC fails to understand why this is not being considered more 
seriously by the government and HS2 Ltd. 
 
     • Increase passenger capacity 
             
3.14 The government has a poor record when it comes to predicting passenger numbers on new 
rail  lines.  Government  figures  on  capacity  for  the  consultation  route  on  HS2  have  inevitably 
come under great scrutiny from a number of sources.  A line that only links central London and 
Birmingham is not maximising the potential benefits and use of the service.  In order to achieve 
its potential, a line must be linked with Heathrow to allow passengers to access the airport from 
the West and North, to promote a modal shift from car to rail and also from air to rail, and to 
link up in a highly integrated hub. 
             
3.15  The main advantages of a Heathrow hub would be to link a rail station, airport terminal, 
coach  and  bus  station,  freight  distribution  terminal,  a  connection  for  HS1,  HS2,  the  Great 
Western Mainline, Crossrail and the M25 all in one place.  The current proposal simply cannot 
match this potential to maximise capacity. 
 
     • A freight capability 
 
3.16 While current proposals may be able to incorporate a freight capability, alternative options 
such  as  a  hub  based  at  Heathrow  would  create  the  potential  for  high  value  freight  to  be 
conveyed  more  quickly  between  continental  Europe  and  areas  around  London,  the  south  of 
England  and  the  Midlands.    In  the  same  way,  it  also  brings  the  UK’s  major  centres  –  areas  of 
economic activity – closer together, increasing opportunities for productivity gains and trade in 
a way the government’s current plans fail to do.  Furthermore, by allowing a high proportion of 
lorry journeys to be moved to rail, there are significant environmental benefits. 
 
     • Modal shift from car to rail 
 
3.17  According  to  Arup’s  figures,  a  Heathrow  Hub  will  increase  public  access  to  Heathrow  by 
21% and take 10‐20 million cars off the road.  In turn, combined with the modal shift of air to 
rail (see  below), this will reduce carbon  emissions by  between  500,000  and 800,000 tonnes a 
year. 7    
             
     • Modal shift from air to rail 
 


                                                            
7 Arup submission to HS2 Ltd. Full report 

http://www.arup.com/News/2010_04_April/~/media/Files/PDF/News_and_Press/2010_04_April/091
210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx 

                                                                
 
3.18  According  to  Arup’s  figures,  a  Heathrow  Hub  will  shift  between  92,000  and  150,000 
passengers from air to rail. 8 
 
3.19  The  Rail  Minister,  Theresa  Villiers,  has  said  that  high  speed  rail  was  a  "viable  and 
attractive"  alternative  to  short  haul  flights 9   and  would  reduce  road  congestion,  generate 
economic  benefits  and  improve  transport  links  without  the  "considerable"  environmental 
penalties of a third runway.   
 
3.20 The government has cancelled the proposed third runway at Heathrow and therefore it is a 
key objective for high speed rail to take both cars off the road and passengers off planes; their 
current proposals will simply fail to achieve this with anywhere near the degree of success that 
a Heathrow hub option or other alternatives could offer.   
 
3.21 Does the current plan deliver the government’s desired outcomes? 
 
3.21.1 While the construction of a Heathrow hub and other alternative options would not incur 
any significant extra financial costs to construction – particularly if a spur or loop option is to be 
built  –  the  huge  benefits  of  integration  on  capacity,  road  to  rail  and  air  to  rail  modal  shifts, 
increased  freight  and  other  opportunities  vastly  outweigh  the  current  proposals  to  maximise 
benefits.    Furthermore,  these  more  efficient  solutions  would  increase  passenger  numbers  and 
therefore revenue, making the economic case for the project far more sound.  For example, for 
passengers travelling from the west of England to Heathrow, initial estimates indicate journey 
time savings with a present value at government discount rate of £640m 10 . 
 
3.21.2  The  Prime  Minister,  David  Cameron,  cited  his  own  particular  objective  for  HS2  back  in 
November 2010.  He told journalists that “If we think about governments of all colours, they have 
all failed – over 50 years – to deal with the North­South divide. With high­speed rail we have a real 
chance  of  cracking  it.” 11     CCC  believes  that  high  speed  rail  cannot  tackle  a  North‐South  divide 
effectively unless its use and potential is maximised.  Providing the people of Manchester, Leeds 
and  Edinburgh  with  a  direct  link  to  the  UK’s  only  international  hub  airport  through  a  truly 
integrated  transport  interchange  is  a  far  more  effective  solution  than  the  current  preferred 
route. Alternative routes must be fully considered otherwise the government risks choosing the 
wrong route for Britain’s second high speed railway. 
           
     4. Protecting the Chilterns 
           
4.1 One of CCC’s greatest concerns about HS2 is that it severely threatens the unspoilt beauty of 
the  Chiltern’s  AONB.  We  are  insisting  that  the  government  gives  more  consideration  to  the 
environmental  impacts  of  high  speed  rail  and,  if  HS2  proceeds,  offers  full  environmental 
mitigation where possible. 
 
4.2  We  recognise  that  the  government  has  already  taken  steps  to  reduce  the  environmental 
impact of HS2 in the Chilterns, for example by lowering the vertical alignment to reduce noise 

                                                            
8 Arup submission to HS2 Ltd. Full report 

http://www.arup.com/News/2010_04_April/~/media/Files/PDF/News_and_Press/2010_04_April/091
210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx 
9 Conservative party conference 2008 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/manchester/content/articles/2008/09/29/290908_hi_speed_rail_feature.shtml 
10 Arup submission to HS2 Ltd. Full report 

http://www.arup.com/News/2010_04_April/~/media/Files/PDF/News_and_Press/2010_04_April/091
210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx 
11 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/road‐and‐rail‐transport/8158342/David‐Cameron‐high‐

speed‐rail‐link‐will‐go‐ahead.html 

                                                                
 
and visual intrusion.  However, in our view this does not go far enough. Ideally the route would 
be diverted around the AONB or, failing that, would not follow the widest route through it.  Yet, 
even if the current preferred route were endorsed, we believe the route should be carried in a 
tunnel  under  the  entire  width  of  the  AONB.  Such  a  move  would  greatly  reduce  the 
environmental  impact  and  reduce  the  construction  impact  in  the  Chilterns,  not  least  from  the 
reduced level of spoil to be removed.   
 
4.3  Whilst  we  accept  that  every  route  option  will  cause  some  damage  to  the  environment,  we 
are disappointed that other routes which offer more environmental mitigation have been given 
less  consideration  by  the  government.  According  to  the  evidence 12   given  by  Arup  to  Lord 
Mawhinney  for  his  review,  the  Heathrow  hub  proposal  would  be  far  less  environmentally 
damaging  and  impact  less  upon  the  Chiltern’s  AONB.  Additionally,  the  noise  pollution  in 
residential  areas  would  be  reduced,  which  would  be  a  great  relief  for  homeowners  in  the 
Chilterns area. 
 
4.4  Furthermore,  if  HS2  linked  directly  to  Heathrow  it  would  achieve  the  greatest  shift  from 
road and air travel to rail, and would also traverse the narrowest part of the Chilterns – one of 
the criteria we are insisting upon if HS2 goes ahead. It must also be noted that if HS2 were to 
follow  the  Heathrow  hub  route  option  and  provide  greater  environmental  mitigation  than  the 
current  preferred  route  offers,  the  economic  case  would  be  improved.  According  to  Arup’s 
figures 13 , a direct alignment to Heathrow would cost £400m less than the least expensive loop 
or  spur  alignment,  and  would  avoid  the  blight  and  costly  duplication  associated  with  such 
options.  
 
4.5  CCC  is  calling  on  the  government  to  further  consider  the  environmental  impact  that  the 
current proposed HS2 route would have, to acknowledge the greater environmental mitigation 
that the main alternative route offers, and to shift the current preferred route accordingly. 
 
     5. Conclusions 
          
5.1 The Chilterns AONB is a beautiful, unspoilt landscape, which the government has a duty to 
protect.  The current plans for HS2 do not pay sufficient attention to this duty, the business case 
is poorly argued, and too little attention has been paid to alternative routes.  The government 
should withdraw its existing proposals and consider a full range of alternatives. 

May 2011




                                                            
12 Arup’s submission to Lord Mawhinney’s review 

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highsp
eedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_4.pdf  
13
    Arup’s submission to Lord Mawhinney’s review 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highsp
eedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_4.pdf 

                                                                
 
              Written evidence from Leeds City Region (HSR 127)

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?
There are a number of arguments for HSR. These are:
Economic
There is a strong economic case for enhancing the capacity and performance of the
north-south intercity network. The benefits are particularly important in re-balancing
the economy.

The Government's own analysis shows that HSR would deliver economic benefits
worth £44 billion over 60 years. These benefits are conservative. Work undertaken
by Northern Way 1 has demonstrated around £6 billion worth of agglomeration
benefits. Work undertaken by Leeds and Sheffield city regions 2 shows over £2 billion
worth of wider economic benefits to the two city regions alone.

The development of a high speed rail network in the UK with significantly quicker
journey times will also help to address the challenges of global competitiveness of
the UK. Other countries are developing high speed rail networks. HSR will support
transformational economic change across the UK and in particular the north of
England. This will help to achieve the Governments objective of rebalancing the
economy. These transformational benefits have not been quantified in the DfT’s
appraisal which means the published benefits are conservative. Furthermore, the
experience of European and other countries in the development of HSR networks
suggests that there are significant transformational benefits to regional economies
(see Lille in France as a good example).

There is also the issue of global competitiveness of the UK. Other countries are
developing high speed rail networks as the solution to meet the lower carbon mobility
needs of their modern economies. The UK risks being left behind if it decides not to
go down this path.


Providing additional rail capacity
Evidence 3 shows that the classic network will run out of capacity within the next ten
years which will limit the potential for economic growth. The development of a high
speed rail network not only addresses the capacity problem on existing classic rail
networks, but through the reduced journey times allowed by high speed rail, enables
transformational economic change and benefit to the UK and in particular the north
of England.

1
    http://northernwaytransportcompact.com/North_South_Connectivity.html
2
 http://www.wymetro.com/NR/rdonlyres/47DE8EB2-132A-4BBF-8AA4-
F0FE4B3D6E9C/0/EconomicCase_HighSpeedRail2.pdf
3
    www.networkrail.co.uk
The ‘freeing-up’ of capacity on the classic rail network will provide capacity to provide
new and better inter urban services on the East Coast, Midland and West Coast
Main Lines to centres not served by HSR as well as being able to accommodate
additional freight movements by rail.


Lower carbon mobility
The evidence suggests that demand for mobility will continue to rise over the next
decades 4 . Should this demand be met by provision of additional capacity on the road
network, carbon emissions and other harmful environmental impacts are likely to
increase, congestion will worsen and quality of life for a large number of areas will
worsen. If the UK is to meet its carbon reduction targets but at the same time enable
economic prosperity and growth, then a solution to meet future demands for mobility
is needed. HSR offers a solution to both of these challenges.


2. How does HSR fit with the Government's transport policy
objectives?
    •   The government’s high level transport objectives relate to economic growth,
        rebalancing the economy and carbon reduction – HSR fits with both of these
        high level objectives, albeit over the long term
    •   The Local Transport White Paper envisages more sustainable local transport
        – the link between high level/ national projects such as HSR and local
        transport is not yet well-made
    •   Investment will be needed in existing main railway lines to enable new and
        improved services between important centres not served by HSR, and to
        facilitate in rail freight traffic.
    •   HSR stations will have significant impacts on local transport networks and
        there needs to be an effective policy framework to make the link. Investment
        in city region transport systems will be crucial in order to ensure a high level of
        accessibility to HSR, and to distribute the benefits as widely as possible.
    •   The National Policy Statement on transport networks has yet to be published
        – this is now urgently required


2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does
that objective compare in importance to other transport policy
objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic
road network?
Inter-urban connectivity is extremely important to modern city region economies.
Bringing labour markets and economic centres closer together has been shown to
deliver significant economic benefits 5 through agglomeration. Indeed, the Leeds City

4
  Tight, MR;Bristow, AL;Pridmore, AM;May, AD What is a sustainable level of CO2 emissions from
transport activity in the UK in 2050? Transport Policy, 3, 12, 235-244, 2005
5
  http://northernwaytransportcompact.com/Transport_the_Economy.html
Region Transport Strategy 6 emphasises the importance of improved connectivity to
other city regions, including London, Birmingham, the East Midlands, Sheffield and
to Manchester.
This does not however negate the importance of other transport policy objectives
and spending programmes such as within city regions. Lower carbon connectivity
within city regions is also extremely important from an economic, quality of life and
carbon reduction perspective.
Evidence from city region studies shows that typically 70-80% of all journeys are
within city regions. Therefore, more effective integrated city region transport
networks and systems will support agglomeration and economic growth, and
contribute towards the Government’s low carbon agenda.


2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on
HSR on funding for the 'classic' network, for example in relation to
investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around
major cities?
HSR is a national, strategic, economic intervention that is critical to a sustainable
competitive economic future of the UK economy. It will help close the north-south
economic divide and rebalance the economy. It should be therefore be funded with
this in mind and not be at the expense of the current rail spending on services and
infrastructure enhancements on the classic network such as on the East Coast
mainline, Transpennine and other City Region rail networks which are desperately
needed in the interim/short term.


2.3       What are the implications for domestic aviation?
The Leeds City Region has already lost direct air links to London Heathrow and also
recently to London Gatwick. Whilst total numbers on these routes were relatively
small in comparison to inter-city rail travel to/from Leeds City Region, the Heathrow
route in particular was important as an inter-lining hub for long haul business and
leisure travel. As a result, Amsterdam Schiphol is now the City Region’s inter-lining
hub, effectively transferring domestic aviation to international aviation for inter-lining
from Leeds City Region. A fast high speed rail link from the City Region to London
Heathrow would enable “inter-lining” again via Heathrow, however this time via a
lower carbon mode.
 




6
    http://www.leedscityregion.gov.uk/content.aspx?id=230
3. Business case
3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology - for example,
on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs,
economic assumptions (e.g. about the value of time) and the impact of
lost revenue on the 'classic' network?
As previously mentioned, the economic benefits are likely to be understated as the
transformational benefit that HSR would bring to the North’s city region economies
has not been fully accounted for using existing appraisal methodology. Evidence
from our own economic analysis has been accepted previously by HS2 Limited and
used in making the case for investment in a “Y” shaped network.


3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in
other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or
building a new conventional line?
The experience of the West Coast Route Modernisation programme shows that in
addition to the huge disruption to passengers of upgrading existing lines and the
resulting negative impact on revenue, the cost of upgrading existing lines to similar
standards would be hugely expensive. In addition, it has provided a medium / long
term solution and the West Coast Main Line is predicted to be at capacity again in
less than 15 years.


3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of
managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?
Managing demand through pricing for longer distance rail travel will have a negative
impact on the economy through discouraging economic activity and business, the
environment through an increase in carbon and other harmful emissions due to
increased demand for motorway travel and domestic aviation, and quality of life
through increased congestion, noise, and additional land take for extra road space.
Whilst pricing clearly has a role for spreading demand for rail to encourage better
utilisation of capacity, any choking off of inter-city rail demand by pricing would be a
retrograde step for the Leeds City Region economy, and the Government’s efforts to
rebalance the economy.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major
transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on
time and to budget?
No comment
 
4. The strategic route
4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston,
Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon
Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be
used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?
No comment
 

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network?
Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?
    •   There is a need for the development of a national HSR network that connects
        the major cities together.
    •   The Y network represents a good starting point, but further connections are
        required to the Tees Valley, Tyne and Wear and Scotland. There is also a
        need to ensure that the proposed Y shape has sufficient capacity to ensure
        that future demand from all parts of the country can be accommodated to
        facilitate not only inter-city links, but also connectivity to Heathrow and also
        HS1 to mainland Europe.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving
from London northwards?
    •   Whilst it is inevitable that a national high speed rail network will need to be
        delivered in phases, it is important that the full network is delivered at the
        earliest possible timescale. Legislation for the Leeds and Manchester legs
        should be brought forward at the earliest possible opportunity. There should
        be a firm commitment to the whole of the network – either through provision in
        the Hybrid Bill or through the National Policy Statement on transport networks.
        A clear plan for delivery with an indicative programme will give confidence on
        wider investment decisions in the economy, and enable alignment with other
        strategic policies.


    •   It is particularly important that both legs of the ‘Y’ to Manchester and Leeds
        are delivered in parallel to avoid any economic imbalances. The eastern part
        of the proposed national high speed rail network will deliver greater economic
        benefits than the western part. Previous work undertaken by HS2 Ltd has
        estimated that the eastern route between Birmingham and Leeds has a higher
        BCR (5.6:1) compared with the western route between Birmingham and
        Manchester (2.6:1). The Eastern route would deliver greater wider economic
        impacts than the western route, with those being £2.5bn and £2.1bn
        respectively.


    •   Given that the benefits of HSR are about rebalancing the economy and that
        there are huge wider economic benefits to be had by bringing northern cities
        closer to other city regions and London, there is a strong argument for
        beginning construction of HSR simultaneously in London and the north.
          Critically, the Government should include in its plans for the first phase of
          HS2, a connection from HS2 to the Midland Main Line (which itself should be
          electrified). This would allow cities along the eastern leg to benefit from the
          initial phase of HS2 and would begin to help further those economic linkages
          that are vitally important to the Leeds City Region economy.

4.4       The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct
link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?
Given what has already been said about the importance of inter-lining at the
Heathrow hub to the Leeds City Region economy, it would be preferable to have a
direct link to Heathrow from Leeds City Region via an electrified Midland Main Line
and HS2 as part of the first phase,
 


5. Economic rebalancing and equity
 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic
regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide?
This has largely been covered in previous sections through the citing of evidence
based work produced by The Northern Way and Leeds and Sheffield City Regions
on the economic case for HSR and the importance to northern city region
economies.
The Leeds City Region has, jointly with a number of other City Regions along the
proposed eastern alignment of the Y, commissioned further work to strengthen the
evidence base that supports the case for high speed rail along the eastern
alignment. This work will be published shortly, however it confirms the significant
economic benefits to the eastern city regions due to HSR, as well as to Birmingham
and London.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by
the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?
 Investment in city region transport networks and systems will be vital to ensure a
high level of accessibility to HSR, and to distribute the benefits as widely as possible.
More effective integrated city region transport systems will support agglomeration
and economic growth, and contribute towards the Government’s low carbon agenda.
The shape of the network needs to help deliver objectives around promoting
economic growth, helping to reduce carbon emissions and improving quality of life,
from a national strategic perspective. Governments have long sought to close the
economic divide between the north and south of England, and despite some
progress, have so far not succeeded. HSR provides a huge opportunity to do this
and so the proposed Y shape is considered critical by the Leeds City Region.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from
HSR?
      •   City centre locations and associated business and employment near to HSR
          stations will be the primary beneficiaries, though there are also other
        beneficiaries such as leisure travellers. Evidence 7 produced for the Leeds and
        Sheffield City Regions suggests that the sector to benefit most from HSR in
        the Leeds City Region is that of “Producer Services” i.e. business and
        financial services. This is to be expected given the importance of this sector to
        the Leeds City Region economy.
    •   The benefits of HSR can be extended by improving connectivity into city
        centres by investing in local transport to maximise the potential of HSR,


5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of
HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an
appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should
the Government seek support from the EU's TEN-T programme?
No comment.


6. Impact
 6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions?
How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR
to reduce carbon?
Two of the Government’s main policy objectives are economic growth and carbon
reduction. One way of supporting economic growth is bringing people, businesses
and economic centres closer together through faster and improved transport
connectivity. However, if this is done by increasing inter-city road travel or domestic
aviation, then future carbon emissions will not be minimised. High speed rail offers a
solution to help to achieve both of these objectives.
It should also be noted that by freeing up the existing classic rail network up to other
traffic such as freight, carbon emission reduction from other economic activities is
also enabled.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to
noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?
No comment.
 

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the 'classic'
network?
Additional rail capacity should be freed up on the East Coast, Midland and West
Coast Main Lines for freight. This would be extremely positive for the Leeds City
Region in terms of the future role of logistics in its economy. Rail freight distribution
centres in the City Region are situated at Wakefield Europort and Stourton in Leeds.
Network Rail’s Strategic Freight Network programme will mean that the rail network

7
 http://www.wymetro.com/NR/rdonlyres/47DE8EB2-132A-4BBF-8AA4-
F0FE4B3D6E9C/0/EconomicCase_HighSpeedRail2.pdf
to these freight centres will soon be gauge enhanced. Improved rail capacity on the
national rail lines connected to these freight centres by the development of HSR will
further facilitate growth in rail freight to/from the City Region freight centres which will
help support and create logistics jobs in Leeds City Region, on the back of lower
carbon transport activity.
 

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the 'classic'
network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of
Euston?
No comment.
 
May 2011 
 
 
 
                                Written evidence from Eurostar (HSR 128)


    Introduction

1. Eurostar is the high-speed train service linking the UK to destinations across France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
   Germany and Switzerland. We have been operating since 14 November 1994 and have since carried around 115
   million passengers, doubling the size of the market for travel between London and Paris in the process.

2. Since September 2010 Eurostar has been a single British-registered company, Eurostar International Limited
   (EIL), having previously been an unincorporated joint partnership between the British, French and Belgian
   railways. As well as helping to streamline decision-making and reduce unit costs, this will better equip us to meet
   the challenge of increased competition arising from the new Open Access framework. We also believe it will help
   us more effectively expand our own operations, as we seek to broaden our reach across the UK, regional France,
   and further into continental Europe

3. Our first step as a new company has been to announce a £700m investment in our rolling stock, with the
   purchase of ten new train-sets and the refurbishment of our existing fleet. Built to a bespoke specification, the
   new Eurostar e320 trains will be ‘interoperable’, meaning that they can operate across the European high speed
   rail (HSR) network, and provide direct services between London and a range of city centre destinations
   throughout Europe.

4. We aim to become the leading travel experience in Europe, substantially increasing the number of connecting
   passengers to destinations beyond Brussels, Lille and Paris by 2015. At the same time, we want to maintain our
   leadership on the London-Paris route, which will be central to our success in the future.

5. Eurostar supports the Government’s plans to expand the country’s HSR network and, as the only operator
   currently running international HSR services in the UK, has a number of substantive points to make in response to
   the Committee’s inquiry. We have only responded to those questions where we have felt able to put forward a
   view based on our experience as a HSR operator.

    The main arguments for high speed rail

    Increasing capacity

6. High speed rail represents the most effective means to introduce additional capacity to the national transport
   system. It is noteworthy that the original business case for France’s first high speed line from Paris to Lyon
   included the benefits of capacity released on conventional lines, by transferring intercity trains to the new line.

7. Additional capacity will soon become necessary in the UK. For example, the West Coast Main Line – despite being
   upgraded at great expense and disruption – will again encounter capacity constraints by the middle of the next
   decade. Investment in new infrastructure in the form of HSR will restore capacity on existing railway lines, for the
   benefit of local stopping services and freight movements, and deliver a step-change in reliability. This cannot be
   matched by upgrading the existing rail network.

8. Capacity improvements, combined with a dramatic shortening of journey times for medium- and long-distances
   journeys, will result in significant modal shift to HSR from carbon-intensive car and air travel. This will not only
   release capacity on motorways but bring with it considerable environmental benefits and will be crucial to
   meeting the ambition of the European Commission, as stated in its recently published White Paper, to see a “50%
   shift of medium distance intercity passenger and freight journeys from road to rail and waterborne transport”.

    Environmental benefits

9. Through the 2008 Climate Change Act, the UK government has signed up to ambitious carbon reductions targets
   of 34% by 2020 and 80% by 2050. The UK Committee on Climate Change has also recently recommended an
   interim target for 2030 of 60% reduction with an adjustment to the 2020 target, raising it to 37%. At the time of
   writing, the Government has not yet decided whether to accept the recommendations of the Committee. In
    parallel, the European Commission’s recent White Paper on Transport sets out steps to achieve a 60% reduction
    in transport emissions across Europe by 2050. As the transport sector is responsible for approximately 29% of
    European carbon emissions, it has a significant role to play in helping the UK to meet its own carbon reduction
    targets. Within the sector, delivering modal shift to lower carbon forms of transport such as HSR is clearly critical
    in meeting the proposed 60% target.

10. Travel by HSR produces only one-third of the carbon emissions of car travel and one-quarter the emissions of an
    equivalent trip by air, taking into account the average loadings typically achieved on each mode. For example, a
    typical Eurostar journey between London and Paris or Brussels generates around a tenth of the amount of the
    greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2) generated by the equivalent short haul flight.

11. The shift of passengers from short-haul air to high speed rail within the first year of operating on HS1 resulted in
    a combined passenger saving in excess of 40,000 tonnes of CO2. Investment in HSR will therefore make possible
    a lowering of emissions from the transport sector at a time of increased public awareness and acceptance of the
    effects of damaging CO2 emissions on climate change.

12. These benefits will further increase in the future as HSR becomes more environmentally efficient and as the UK
    electricity supply becomes less carbon intensive. The UK electricity supply is currently amongst the least
    environmentally friendly in Europe in terms of CO2 emissions per kW hour of electricity generated. It is certainly
    the most carbon intensive electricity supply on Eurostar’s network, with grid averages for France and Belgium
    having approximately a fifth and a half, respectively, of the carbon intensity of UK generation.

    Journey times

13. High Speed 1 was the first new mainline railway for 100 years, with the principal practical effects having been to
    reduce the journey times between the centres of London and Paris/Brussels [fig.1] These faster services, as well
    as the convenience of city centre to city centre travel, have resulted in both significant modal shift and a stimulus
    to business and leisure activity.

    fig.1

                                     Nov 94                    Sep 03                     Nov 07
                                                               (opening of CTRL 1,        (completion of HS1)
                                                               first part of HS1)
            London-Paris             2h 55m                    2h 35m                     2h 15m
            London-Brussels          3h 15m                    2h 20m                     1h 51m
            London-Lille             2h 05m                    1h 40m                     1h 20m


14. A further principal attraction of HSR to passengers is reliability. Because HSR lines are purpose built, they offer
    much higher reliability and punctuality than is possible on conventional lines. The presence of often older
    equipment and a mixture of different train types mean that any delays that occur on conventional lines are often
    compounded. In contrast, the average delay per train due to infrastructure problems of any reason (including
    weather) on HS1 since it opened is less than ten seconds per train.

15. The problem of regular weekend disruptions because of maintenance or renewals also barely exists for HSR lines.
    The greater spacing between tracks necessary for high speed operation – a wider ‘six foot’ in railway parlance –
    means that relaying and maintenance works can be routinely carried out on one line with the other still fully open
    with reversible working.


    Economic impact

16. France’s TGV network provides a number of examples of the economic impact of HSR. Lille is such an example.
    The city has been transformed by its location on the crossroads of the northern TGV networks, with direct links to
    Paris, Brussels and London. 20 years ago, it was struggling with around 40% unemployment resulting from the
    decline in its traditional engineering and mining industries. The TGV has given Lille residents access to new job
    opportunities in Paris and Brussels, with significant commuting flows to both, and encouraged new businesses to
    locate there because of its superb accessibility. The line has also enabled tourism to flourish in the city, further
    fueling the local economy and creating new jobs in the area. Unemployment is now around 11%, only a couple of
    percent above the national average.

17. Eurostar believes that similar benefits could flow from the construction of a London to Birmingham high speed
    line and the extension further north of the UK’s high speed network.

18. The establishment of high speed rail services between London and Paris has also had a major impact on the
    economies and geographies of those two cities. London is now France’s sixth city in terms of population with over
    300,000 French nationals now living and working in London. Many companies exchange personnel weekly
    between their Paris and London offices, and some service both capitals from a single office - in both cases
    boosting productivity and extending markets. It is also well known that the volume of tourism between the two
    cities has expanded enormously – with the market for French visitors to London virtually created by Eurostar.

19. Moreover, according to London & Continental Railways (the builders of HS1), since the construction of the line,
    there has been £10bn worth of development and investment committed around St Pancras International/Kings
    Cross, Stratford and Ebbsfleet stations. Although not all of this development is attributable to HS1, the line has
    undoubtedly played a major role in encouraging this investment.

    How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

    HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in
    importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the
    strategic road network?

20. Of all the potential options available, HSR is the only one capable of offering a step change in the reduction of
    journey times, and therefore improved accessibility between key cities and regions. Building a new motorway
    would not directly reduce inter-regional journey times, because maximum speeds would still be the same as on
    existing motorways. If anything, motorway speed limits may be reduced in future - as they already have been in
    Spain – in order to improve fuel consumption and reduce dependence on imported oil. Likewise, domestic air
    services are already largely at their practical limit in terms of aircraft speed, and therefore journey times. This
    leaves HSR as the only mode which would materially reduce passenger journey times on an inter-regional basis,
    and therefore achieve the desired strategic improvement in accessibility.

    Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’
    network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and
    around major cities?

21. It is important that the Government maintains adequate investment in the existing rail network, including - as
    achieved in France with great success – allowing for the integration of existing lines with new HSR lines. The
    Government has already demonstrated its commitment through the allocation of hundreds of millions of pounds
    of investment in the classic rail network. Eurostar supports the ring-fencing of funding for HS2 away from the
    main DfT budget.

    What are the implications for domestic aviation?

22. The construction of a HSR network should result in a decrease in domestic air journeys. The introduction of an
    HSR line between Brussels and Paris, for example, has virtually eliminated commercial flights between those two
    cities. This will, in turn, release airport capacity for long-haul flights and better enable Heathrow to preserve and
    build upon its status as a global aviation hub.
    Business case

    What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by
    upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?
23. Alternatives to the construction of the national HSR network, such as upgrading the West Coast Main Line or
    building new conventional lines, whilst resulting in new capacity, would lead to considerable disruption during the
    period of construction without a concomitant improvement to journey times, punctuality or reliability. There is
    considerable evidence to support this, including research carried out by Atkins for the Department for Transport
    in 2009 and 2010 and for the Strategic Rail Authority in 2003, Network Rail’s New Lines Programme and
    Greengauge 21’s Fast Forward research programme in 2009.

    What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any
    new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

24. Despite the complexity of that programme, HS1 and its associated projects serve as a good model for what future
    schemes can achieve. The £5.8bn project to build the UK’s first high speed rail line was achieved on time and
    within budget. In this respect, it is one of the country’s most successful major infrastructure projects in recent
    years, and provides an excellent example of UK engineering excellence.

    The strategic route

    The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham
    International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria
    should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

25. HSR makes possible fast city-centre to city-centre journey times. It is self-evident that the more intermediate
    stations there are along a HSR line, the longer the length of the journey. As noted in a number of key studies on
    high speed rail 1 , reducing the overall speeds by stops at smaller intermediate towns can reduce the benefits for
    major cities without achieving sufficiently large compensating gains for the smaller centres. Examination of
    existing high speed networks in other countries reveals that most trains run between the capital and the major
    target city, with very few intermediate stops.

26. Where intermediate stations have been built on the French high speed lines – such as at Le Creusot - thus
    building up its role as a local centre of activity, the expected development around the station has failed to
    materialise and has deterred the construction of further intermediate stations.

27. Although careful planning in some areas – for example, at Aix-en-Provence – has sometimes been able to
    generate new development around an intermediate station, we consider that investment in the classic network,
    which would ensure that these areas can link to the major HSR hubs, would represent a better use of funding

    The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part
    of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

28. Eurostar welcomes the proposal to connect HS1 to a HSR network from London northwards. This will offer more
    and more customers the potential of connecting to continental destinations via HSR. It will also help achieve the
    ambition recently articulated in the EU’s Transport White Paper to complete a European high-speed rail network
    by 2050. At the end of 2009, Europe had over 6214km of HSR lines on which trains could run at speeds in excess
    of 250km/h. By contrast, the UK currently only has 109km miles of HSR line.

29. The opening of the European rail network to competition under the EU Open Access framework will present
    passengers with greater choice in terms of both operators and destinations. The construction of a HSR line to
    Birmingham and northwards will enable more UK citizens to benefit from direct rail connections to Continental
    Europe, and for those regions to forge economic links with mainland Europe.

    Economic rebalancing and equity




    1
     Troin, J-F (1997) Rail et aménagement du territoire – des heritages aux nouveaux défis Edisud, Aix-
    en-Provence, p.84; Vickerman, R (1997) High speed rail in Europe: experiences and issues for further
    development The Annals of Regional Science;
    What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-
    south economic divide?

30. As mentioned above, Eurostar has observed at close hand the economic benefits that HSR has brought to Lille.
    During the 1980s, post-manufacturing dislocation resulted in high unemployment and economic depression in the
    city. Since the introduction of HSR in the 1990s, however, Lille has been transformed into the crossroads of
    Europe’s HSR network, becoming France’s third most powerful financial, commercial and industrial centre.

31. Cities such as Marseille, Lyon and others in France have also benefited from the steady extension of the TGV
    network. Economic growth has been much more evenly distributed across France, with consequent less growth
    pressure on Paris as a capital. By contrast, much of the UK’s economic and population growth has been
    concentrated in London and the South East, with strong, and still growing, pressure on housing and infrastructure
    as a result

32. Faster transport links between cities will boost regional business activity in the regions. They will help spread the
    economic halo effect around London and the south-east to areas in the Midlands, the North and the cities in
    Scotland. Improved business growth in regional cities will speed regeneration in run-down areas, and promote
    leisure travel to such destinations.

    To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local
    and regional regeneration?

33. As indicated above, the construction of intermediate stations can reduce the benefits of HSR for major cities
    through the extension of journey times without achieving sufficiently large compensating gains for those smaller
    centres. Investing in the classic network to ensure excellent regional links into HSR hubs represents a sounder
    use of funding. This will enable regions to not only benefit from released capacity on the classic network but also
    from geographical and economic centres being brought closer together.

    Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

34. All rail users including low socio-economic groups will benefit from extra capacity on the classic network. For
    example in 2010, ticket sales at our lead-in fare of £69/€88 together with youth, disabled and senior tickets
    represented a significant proportion of overall ticket sales.

    Impact

    What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from
    aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

35. The UIC has recently published interim findings in a technical report which demonstrates that the European
    railway sector has reduced CO2 emissions by a total of 38% between 1990 – 2009. Although this figure is
    representative of the entire European rail industry, it is in stark contrast to the expected rise in emissions from
    domestic aviation which has a negative impact on the UK contraction and convergence targets.

36. Independent research commissioned by Eurostar and conducted by Paul Watkiss Associates and AEA Technology
    Environment, determined that a return journey by Eurostar between London and Paris or London and Brussels
    generates one-tenth of the CO2 of the same journey by air. The shift of passengers from short-haul air to high
    speed rail within the first year alone of operating on HS1 resulted in a combined passenger saving in excess of
    40,000 tonnes of CO2.

37. Carbon savings will also result as modal shift takes place from road and short haul air journeys to HSR. For
    example, on the London to Paris/Brussels route, Eurostar now has an 80 percent market share of the journeys
    made. Since the opening of HS1, Eurostar has observed a significant modal shift from air to rail, as passengers
    grow accustomed to the speed and ease of HSR travel.

38. A study commissioned by Eurostar in 2006 shows high speed rail’s market share between a whole range of city
    pairs in Europe, plotting market share against journey time. The clear rule of thumb is that where the rail city
    centre to city centre journey time is reduced to three hours or less, rail succeeds in attracting a clear majority of
    the travel markets, and takes an overwhelming share where journey times are reduced below two hours. The
    large majority of potential British city pairs, particularly those with a significant domestic aviation service
    currently, fall comfortably into this range. Following the Ash cloud crisis in April 2010, Eurostar commissioned
    independent research which showed that 43% of respondents would be happy to travel by train for up to six
    hours.

39. The environmental benefits of HSR will be further accentuated as supply chains become increasingly low carbon.
    Our experience has shown that business travelers are already switching to a less carbon intensive form of travel.
    More and more corporations and many smaller companies are having to report their CO2 emissions, and are
    consequently looking to reduce their environmental impacts. Our Tread Lightly carbon reduction programme was
    thus elaborated in response to demands from corporate customers who wanted to be able to quantify the carbon
    savings they were making by switching from plane to train.

40. As mentioned above, these environmental benefits will only improve in the future, as HSR travel becomes more
    environmentally efficient. Electric trains can be switched to even lower-carbon sources of electricity as soon as
    these become available under the Government’s commitments to derive 20% of the UK’s electricity supply from
    renewable sources by 2020. This is unlike aircraft and road vehicles, which are likely to remain largely wedded to
    fossil fuels for the foreseeable future.


May 2011
     Written evidence from Local Government Yorkshire and Humber (HSR 129)



Local Government Yorkshire and Humber (LGYH) is pleased to submit this
response to help inform the Transport Select Committee’s inquiry into the
Government’s proposals for a national high speed rail network. The
network put forward in the DfT consultation would significantly reduce
journey times to London from Yorkshire and Humber, helping to make the
region a more attractive place to do business. This in turn could help to
transform and rebalance the economy, making the north more prosperous
and reducing the gap that exists between it and the South East.
The Leeds and Sheffield City Regions are currently leading work as part of
the Eastern Network Partnership (in conjunction with the North East,
Derby, and Nottingham councils) to provide further technical evidence to
inform their response to the Government’s consultation. We would urge
the Committee to ensure that this Eastern Network Partnership be fully
consulted in the course of this inquiry.
This response sets out the main messages from local government in
Yorkshire and Humber on the importance of high speed rail in supporting
future economic success.

1. The Business Case For High Speed Rail
Fast, high quality, efficient inter-city transport links are essential to
supporting economic growth and business activities. Without continuing
investment into the rail network people’s ability to do business will be
reduced; as many north-south lines, including the East Coast, West Coast
and Midland Main Lines are already operating at close to capacity and are
projected to be at capacity in the future. This will require additional
investment to provide further capacity to meet projected future demand.
The current journey times between some of largest cities in the country
are slow and of poor quality by rail. For example, it takes 115 minutes to
travel between Leeds and Nottingham, a distance of only 70 miles,
meaning that the average speed is just 36mph. By enhancing the
performance of such networks, rail would become a more attractive mode
of transport in comparison with the use of the car. Furthermore, this could
help to facilitate trade and business linkages between these cities and
their wider economic geographies, helping to rebalance the country’s
economy.
Without investment in rail infrastructure there is a significant risk that the
UK could be left behind other countries that have chosen to prioritise
improving the capacity and performance of their own infrastructure. The
significant economic benefits that have been created in places such as
Lille illustrate how investing in the rail network can act as a catalyst for
regeneration, when combined with appropriate land use and economic
development policies. This significant potential to help regenerate the
economic geographies across Yorkshire and Humber – such as the Leeds
and Sheffield City Regions, as well as the wider North Yorkshire and
Humber sub-regions - makes a very strong case for investments to
improve the capacity and performance of Britain’s inter-city rail network.

2. The Strategic Route Required for High Speed Rail
The “Y” high speed rail network, as proposed by Government, has the
potential to transform the shape of the national economy, helping to
rebalance it through the growth of the north of England. This would
connect some of the country’s largest cities and the nature of high speed
rail means that the more people connected the greater the economic
benefits that would be generated.
From a Yorkshire and Humber perspective, stations in the Leeds and
Sheffield City Regions would connect more than four million people and
two million jobs located within these functional economic areas. This could
help the two city regions to become increasingly integrated, as journey
times would be significantly reduced between them. For Yorkshire and
Humber, therefore, high speed rail is both important in terms of providing
reduced journey times to London and by reducing journey times between
the some of the other largest cities in the country. This proposed eastern
leg of the “Y” would help to create, in effect, a single economic zone
encompassing the East Midlands and the Leeds and Sheffield City
Regions, which would have a combined population of 6.7 million people
and three million jobs.
Research undertaken by the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions has
demonstrated that the proposed “Y” network would generate significantly
more economic benefits than the previous alternative route of the
“Reverse S”. This showed that the “Y” would generate wider economic
impacts of £2.3 billion, whilst the “S” would generate only £0.4 billion 1 .
In the long-term, high speed rail would provide the best solution for
enhancing rail capacity and performance between Yorkshire and Humber
and London. However, as the current plans show, HSR will not connect to
this region until 2032/33 and it is of fundamental importance to continue
to invest in improving the performance of existing rail lines in the short to
medium term. This investment will be vital to places such as Doncaster
and York, which do not feature as direct HSR stations under current
proposals and, therefore, will continue to rely on existing lines after the
commencement of high speed rail services to Yorkshire and Humber.
We therefore believe that there is a very strong economic case for the “Y”
network. The Benefit to Cost Ratios (BCR) published by HS2 in March
2010 showed that the benefits of high speed were significantly increased
when it was extended to from London-to-Birmingham to Yorkshire and
Humber, via the East Midlands. Consequently, we strongly support the “Y”
network proposed and also call for a clear commitment of simultaneous
investment in the existing rail network, which will be of vital importance
to wider Yorkshire Humber and rebalancing the UK economy.




1
 Arup and Volterra (2010) The Economic Case for High Speed Rail to Leeds City Region and Sheffield City
Region, on behalf of SYPTE and Metro
3. How the Route Should Be Delivered
Whilst we recognise the need to phase delivery, high speed rail services
and routes should be progressed to the Sheffield and Leeds City Regions
and beyond as soon as possible, to create growth and jobs. There could
be a significant east-west imbalance created in the economy of the north
of England if the route to Manchester was progressed in advance of a
route to Leeds for example. Data published by HS2 in March 2010 showed
that the Benefits to Cost Ratio of the extension to Leeds were, in fact,
double that of the extension to Manchester. We therefore believe that the
link to Leeds via Sheffield should be delivered at the same time, if not in
advance of, the link to Manchester, due to the strength of the economic
case for the link.
The current consultation proposes, as part of phase 1 of HS2, to link
directly to the West Coast Main Line to provide onward services to
Manchester. Similarly, we believe that the Government must ensure a
rapid and effective connection to the Midland Main Line (potentially in the
Tamworth area) at the earliest time to allow high speed trains to run to
Sheffield and Leeds, thereby increasing the overall benefits of HS2.
The onward connection proposed in the consultation to the North East and
Scotland is particularly important to Yorkshire and Humber due to the
economic linkages that currently exist between the two regions. Similarly,
the opportunity to have significantly improved connectivity to the
international gateways of Heathrow Airport and HS1 would help to
improve the region’s international linkages and trade relationships.
This onward connection to the North East, via the East Coast Main Line is
also of further importance as it will provide York and thus North Yorkshire
with a link to high speed services. Ensuring that this connection is fully
incorporated into the network is therefore a top priority for Yorkshire and
Humber.

4. The Need for Simultaneous Investment in the Wider Rail
Network
We recognise that the delivery of high speed rail to the north is a long-
term project, with the connection to Leeds City Region estimated to open
in 2032/33. Improvements to existing routes are therefore vital to deliver
the benefits from improved performance in the short to medium term.
Existing proposals to upgrade and electrify the Midland Main Line, East
Coast Main Line, Transpennine, Leeds-Sheffield and Leeds–York links can
deliver substantial benefits, in some cases at modest costs. These
improvements will also be of vital importance to ensuring that those
places in Yorkshire and Humber not directly served by high speed rail can
benefit through more direct services on the existing classic lines when
high speed services commence.
As high speed will only serve a limited number of places directly in the
City Regions, in terms of specific station locations, there is an urgent need
for improvements to existing local and regional rail routes and services, to
improve access to high speed stations and maximising the benefits
provided. Ensuring that people can connect by public transport to the
stations in Leeds and South Yorkshire will be of vital importance in
ensuring that the opportunities created by high speed are spread
throughout the city regions and beyond.
We therefore believe that high speed rail needs to form a part of an
integrated strategy for the rail network. In order to maximise the benefits
of high speed in Yorkshire and Humber it will be particularly important to
consider how to make best use of the capacity released on existing lines
to benefit the places in the region that will not be directly served by high
speed rail.
May 2011
                              Written evidence from the Six statutory Scottish Regional
                                             Transport Partnerships (HSR 130)


       Hi Trans         Highland and Islands Strategic Transport Partnership
       Nestrans         North East of Scotland Transport Partnership
       SPT              Strathclyde Partnership for Transport
       SEStran          South East of Scotland Transport Partnership
       Tactran          Tay and Central Transport Partnership
       ZetTrans         Shetland Transport Partnership


1.   What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

1.1 The main arguments for HSR are; Economic growth and a balanced economy, Rail Capacity and Journey times and the
     Environment.

1.2 Economic growth and re-distribution of wealth; The positive link between economic growth and transport connectivity has
     been long established. Experience in other countries has shown that HSR stimulates economic growth outwith the
     Capital City such as for Lille in France and will therefore re-balance the national economy and reduce the current north-
     south divide. Improved accessibility to the north of England and Scotland will in addition provide opportunities for growth
     as a whole in the UK economy.

1.3 Rail capacity; The West Coast RUS concluded that the southern end of this line would soon run out of capacity to cater
     for expected growth and the only effective way to deal with this scenario would be to build an additional line. The East
     Coast and the Midland Main Line would also in due course experience a similar situation. The construction of HS2 would
     then release capacity on existing main lines, in particular the West Coast, which will cater for additional local rail services
     and freight.

1.4 Reduced End-to-End Journey time; This is a more important benefit for North of England and in particular Scotland
     where rail still has a relatively low share of the inter-city travel market and where only HSR can facilitate a step change in
     modal share from air to rail whilst at the same time enhancing UK regional connectivity as part of a sustainable economic
     growth strategy.

1.5 Environment; Increased capacity and significantly reduced journey times will stimulate transfer from car and air to rail.
     Rail is the only mode with the realistic potential to transport large volumes of passengers over long distances between
     UK cities and regions in a sustainable manner, in particular with an increasing proportion of the primary energy being
     renewable.

2.   How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

     HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to
     other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

2.1 The objectives of HSR go well beyond improving inter-urban connectivity through improving overall network capacity and
     enhancing regional connectivity by reducing journey times. Other objectives that will be met through HSR would be to
     redistribute wealth and enhance regional prosperity by reducing real and perceived peripherality within the UK and to
     make transport more sustainable, in line with Government Climate Change objectives.

2.2 Some of these objectives could be met in part by investing in other transport modes but when compared with roads, rail
     is in particular more environmentally sustainable (air quality, energy use, land use) and is best suited for travel between
     and to access city-centres.

     Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network,
     for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

2.3 There are already significant ‘high-cost’ rail projects under construction, in particular London Cross Rail (approx. £15
     billion over around 7 years) and Thameslink (approx. £5.5 billion over around 8 years) and it does not appear than these
     schemes have affected funding for the general ‘classic’ network.

2.4 These two schemes will be very close to completion by the time construction would start on the proposed HSR between
     London and Birmingham in around 2016. At an approx. cost of £17 billion over 10 years, the peak expenditure on the
     London-Birmingham HSR should be no higher than for Crossrail alone, never mind the combined peak expenditure of
     the two London projects.

2.5 There is already commitment to invest in a significant number of classic rail projects, such as Great Western Main Line
     electrification, Intercity Express Train Replacement Programme (IEP) and significant further enhancements to the East
     and West Coast Main Lines (e.g. Hitchins and Stafford flyovers)

     What are the implications for domestic aviation?

2.6 In 2009, approximately 8.8 million domestic UK Mainland air passenger journeys were undertaken between the main
     cities that it is anticipated will eventually be directly served by a UK HSR Network (London, Birmingham, Manchester,
     Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow). With significantly faster rail journeys,
     there should be a major shift from air to a much more sustainable rail travel mode.

2.7 Out of the 8.8 million air journeys, as many as 6.7 million either start or finishes in Edinburgh or Glasgow demonstrating
     the much more significant modal change potential that exists in extending the full HSR network to Scotland. It is
     therefore imperative that the construction of a high speed rail network also includes new lines across the Border.

2.8 The 2009 rail market share of the Edinburgh/Glasgow to London rail/air market was around 20% with rail journey times
     of typically 4hrs 30 mins. For the Newcastle to London rail/air market, rail held around 60%, with a rail journey time of
     around 3 hrs and for Manchester-London journeys, rail held around 76% of the rail/air market with a typical rail journey
     time of around 2 hrs 10 mins. For the Leeds to London air/rail market, rail held more than 95% of the market, with a
     typical rail journey time of 2 hrs 15 mins.

2.9 A 30 mins reduction in journey time (which should be achieved with high speed rail between London and West
     Midlands), could therefore see a shift from air to rail of nearly 1.5 million of today’s long-distance passenger journeys.
     This should increase to more than 3 million with the extension of the network to Leeds and Manchester when it must be
     assumed that domestic flights between Manchester/Leeds/Newcastle and London will end. It is acknowledged however
     that modal split is also affected by other factors such as frequency and fares and ease of airport access.

2.10 In addition, there would also be significant growth in the total long-distance travel market beyond what took place in 2009
     so the overall transfer from rail to air with the introduction of a future high speed rail network will be considerably higher.
2.11 3.8 million out of the 8.8 million air journeys quoted above are to or from London Heathrow so there should be significant
     scope to redirect valuable take-off and landing slots to other routes. Some of these Heathrow slots should go to domestic
     air routes that do not directly benefit from High Speed Rail, such as Aberdeen and Inverness which will not directly gain
     from the HSR network due to their geographical peripherality, so that these cities and surrounding regions do not ‘fall
     behind’ in respect of London connectivity.

3.   Business case

     How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare
     levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the
     ‘classic’ network?

3.1 A number of fairly in-depth studies have been undertaken into a UK High Speed rail Network in addition to the HS2
     study, in particular the following three major studies:-

     1.   Atkins study (on behalf of SRA), later updated for the Government in 2008

     2.   Network Rail ‘New Lines’ study (2009)

     3.   Greengauge21’Fast Forward’ study (2009)

3.2 The studies looked at different HSR solutions and had different objectives behind their proposals. However, there were
     common strands such as a north-south network linking in the major cities from London to Edinburgh and Glasgow. They
     all showed positive cases for a HSR network with benefit/cost ratios in the region of 2 – 3.5 and costs and passenger
     forecasts comparable with those found in the HS2 study.

3.3 A recent argument is that assumptions on time spent on trains is ‘un-productive’ has overestimated the benefits of HSR.
     A recent study by Greengauge21 (where time spent on train would be regarded as ‘working-time’) did however show that
     the opposite was the case (although only marginally so). Passengers transferred from car and air would gain more
     productive time than in the original estimate and this would outweigh the ‘over-estimate’ (in the original study) of working
     time gained by passengers transferred from classic train services.. It could also be argued that HSR will create a better
     working environment than current rail services and also that there will be a limit as to how long it is reasonably practical
     to work on a train.

3.4 The study by HS2 surprisingly did not include Edinburgh – London services in its modelling and business case for the
     London – Birmingham/Litchfield High Speed Line although the Edinburgh – London market is around 30% greater than
     the Glasgow – London market . Edinburgh – London Services via the West Coast and HS2 would be around 30 mins
     faster than existing services (as for Glasgow services) so by including Edinburgh – London services should make the
     business case even stronger.

     What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the
     West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

3.5 Upgrading the West Coast Main Line could only be limited in scope in respect of capacity and the Network Rail RUS
     concluded that the only longer-term capacity solution would be to construct a new line between London and West
     Midlands.
3.6 The most recent upgrading of the West Coast Main Line also saw significant added costs in terms of disruption to
     services and reduced capacity during construction. Adding these costs to the actual upgrading cost of around £9 billion
     (the most recent cost estimate) for a scheme that will give less incremental capacity than a new line, it is almost certain
     that such an upgrade will not be better value than a new line.

3.7 A new conventional line (restricted to 125 mph) would largely resolve the capacity issue but would not enhance journey-
     times and would therefore be much more limited in benefits to North of England and Central Scotland where journey
     times become increasingly more important. Without the journey-time savings, there will not be such a significant shift to
     rail from the less environmentally sustainable modes of car and air. Greengauge21 has also shown that the cost of a
     conventional line is only marginally cheaper than a High Speed line. In summary, the potential regional and UK
     economic and environmental benefits would be significantly diminished compared to investment in HSR.

     What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by
     price?

3.8 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would push passengers back onto less sustainable
     modes such as car or air, or journeys would not be undertaken in the first place which would be damaging in overall
     socio-economic terms.

3.9 There must also be doubts if price alone could realistically manage to reduce demand sufficiently to avoid investing in
     additional capacity. Regulated fares are already the highest in Europe and increasing these fares much further in real
     terms could make rail travel only affordable by the more well-off in society, contrary to wider equality and social inclusion
     objectives.

     What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high
     speed lines are built on time and to budget?

3.10 Construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a reasonably good track record in terms of
     time and budget, e.g. HS1 and the recent Airdrie-Bathgate project. There will also be a large number of European High
     Speed projects that have a good record in this respect.

4.   The strategic route

     The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham
     International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be
     used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

4.1 The most important issue for high speed rail is that stations are well located to serve the key UK cities and major centres
     of population and, through excellent connections with regional rail networks, their surrounding regions. Rail is the most
     efficient mode in respect of land use to access city centres where this can be achieved and without city-centre termini
     the advantage of high speed rail will be seriously eroded.

4.2 Station locations outwith city centres will depend on local circumstances but the general rule of thumb should be that not
     all services will necessary stop at non-city-centre stations and that in general, distances between stops should not be
     less than hundred miles or so.
4.3 Stations should only be provided where there is sufficient demand for long distance rail travel. The temptation to add
     stations to cater for high volumes of shorter journeys such as commuting, must be resisted on the basis that such a
     strategy would erode the benefits of HSR.

     Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right
     choice?

4.4 Most studies have demonstrated that a UK network that includes London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East
     Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow derives greatest benefits and offers best value. These
     should be considered as the core cities for a north-south high speed network (which could be expanded by a western
     network). The UK Government’s proposed y-network supports this scenario but needs to be extended to Scotland.

     Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

4.5 The UK Government has decided that phase 1 of the HSR network should be the London-Birmingham section. It is the
     most capacity constrained section on the West Coast Main Line and it is probably also the most complicated section to
     plan and construct. Furthermore, the link between Birmingham and London is accepted as being crucial to the future
     development of a more extensive UK HSR network. So should the London – Birmingham section be rejected, it is highly
     unlikely that a national network will ever materialise.

4.6 However, the proposition that future phases should be constructed moving northwards from London is fundamentally
     challenged. The most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the English-Scottish border. In
     addition, as indicated above, various studies have confirmed that extension of an HSR network to Scotland will deliver
     significantly greater economic and environmental benefits. Consequently, detailed consideration should be given to
     starting construction of northern sections at a much earlier stage rather than as “last legs”, with cross-border sections
     being potentially progressed alongside, or possibly earlier than, sections between Birmingham and Leeds/Manchester..

4.7 In particular, the Government should show greater commitment to plan the future network beyond Manchester and
     Leeds in recognition of the benefits the completed HSR national network, including Scotland, will achieve.

     The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of
     Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

4.8 The link to HS1 must be part of phase 1 due to technical issues but will also cater for the current West Midlands-Europe
     market.

4.9 The Heathrow market will to a large extent be catered for through the Old Oak Commons interchange as part of phase 1
     so it is reasonable that further expenditure on this link should come later. However, the Heathrow link should be built in a
     way so that High Speed Trains for Heathrow from the north can continue on the classic network south of London to also
     serve important destinations such as Gatwick Airport and south coast cities.

5.   Economic rebalancing and equity

     What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south
     economic divide?
5.1 European experience has shown that most cities directly connected to the high speed network experience higher
     economic growth and there is no reason why this should not be the case for the UK. A Greengauge21 report also found
     that areas of Kent experienced rapid growth following the construction of HS1.

5.2 The 2009 Greengauge21 study also found that Regional economic benefits from a ‘full’ HSR network between London
     and Glasgow/Edinburgh would amount to around £80 billion and would be widely distributed but with Central Scotland,
     the North West and the South East benefitting most.

     To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and
     regional regeneration?

5.3 The most important element of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity between the main centres of population
     in the UK and in particular connectivity with London. By serving City Centres, high speed rail will indirectly support
     regional regeneration.

     Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

5.4 A Greengauge21 study advised that the business case for high speed rail was robust when based on current fare levels
     for long-distance rail travel and would cater for both business and leisure travel. Furthermore, the release of capacity on
     the existing network will also benefit other travellers and commuters in particular, as well as users of rail-freight. As such,
     all socio-economic groups would benefit.

5.5 The majority of the population of the UK enjoys reasonable good links with the Cities that will be directly served by a
     future HSR network extending to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Many cities will also experience improved connectivity by
     increased service levels on the classic network so most of the UK will benefit from HSR.

5.6 However, it must be recognised there will be areas that will benefit significantly less such as the Northern half of
     Scotland, Wales and the South West of England and Northern Ireland. Transport investment in these areas should be
     identified to reverse their relative decline (such as rail electrification programmes or, for the north of Scotland, improved
     air connectivity) to ensure a fair distribution of benefits.

     How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and
     business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the
     Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

5.7 There may be examples from other countries with HSR that could be used as models and there may also be lessons
     learned from London Crossrail project

5.8 A UK HSR Network will ‘replace’ current classic rail links that form part of TEN so support should be sought from TEN-T
     and other relevant EU budgets.

6.    Impact

     What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and
     roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

6.1 HSR has considerably lower carbon footprint than car and air and also matches that of classic rail when the higher
     capacity of HSR trains are taken into account. If it can be assumed that the primary energy source is renewable, the
     carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction completion) should be relatively very small.
     Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business
     case?

6.2 It could perhaps be argued that studies have erred on the ‘safe’ side so that overall environmental benefits have not
     been fully expressed.

     What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network?

6.3 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line which is the busiest rail freight
     corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by rail freight services so the impact on freight services by HSR should be
     very positive.

     How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction, particularly
     during the rebuilding of Euston?

6.4 Experience from the St Pancras redevelopment indicates that this should be manageable. Disruption could also be
     reduced through service changes/ improvements to some of the existing local services terminating at Euston. For
     example, some local services on the West Coast Main Line as far out as Northampton could be incorporated into the
     Crossrail network through a connection in the Willesden/Old Oak Commons area, extending planned Crossrail services
     from the East that would otherwise terminate at Old Oaks Commons. This could take away up to 7 train
     arrivals/departures per hour from Euston Station.



     May 2011
                      Written evidence from Heathrow Airport Limited (HSR 131)

1. Heathrow Airport Limited (HAL) welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the Transport
Committee’s inquiry into the strategic case for high speed rail. We have a particular interest in the
Government’s plans for a new high speed rail network given the proposal to provide a direct link to
Heathrow Airport.

2. We have previously submitted detailed evidence on the issue of Heathrow and high speed rail to
the Mawhinney Review in 2010. Our submissions may prove useful further reading in this context
and are attached as appendices to this evidence. Subsequent to the Mawhinney Review, HAL and
its airlines carried out an extensive evaluation of a number of options for connecting Heathrow to
the high speed network. Whilst no overall option has been established as a preferred location for a
high speed station at Heathrow, it is clear that a direct and effective connection is a pre-requisite
for achieving air/rail substitution. The proposed link from Old Oak Common will not achieve the
mode shift Government is looking for. It is important to note that while we recognise the potential
national strategic value of connecting Heathrow directly into the high speed rail network – i.e. to
deliver Government objectives on mode shift and carbon savings - our commercial evaluation of
the various options showed a limited investment case from a Heathrow perspective.

3. In summarising our evidence below, we consider that there is a strong case for a new high
speed rail network serving the UK’s principal cities and international gateways. High speed rail has
the potential to create a properly integrated transport system, ensuring that the UK can compete
more effectively with its European counterparts in terms of connectivity and its ability to deliver
economic growth. Linking high speed rail to Heathrow Airport will be a key component of any
network providing the opportunity to achieve Government objectives for increasing public transport
mode share, reducing carbon emissions, improving productivity and making more efficient use of
Heathrow’s capacity. However, the proposal to provide a direct link to Heathrow as part of the
second phase of the network means that the Government’s objectives will not be fully realised for
at least another 20 years.

Response to Inquiry questions:

Question 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?

4. As the operator of the UK’s only hub airport, we believe there are a number of key arguments in
favour of a high speed rail network that is directly connected to Heathrow:

   •   An integrated transport system would offer improved international connectivity
       across the UK. The UK’s transport system is lagging behind that of its European
       counterparts to the point that congestion, delay, overcrowding and costly travel are the
       norm on many parts of the transport network. High speed rail provides an opportunity to
       deliver a properly integrated transport system, with a new high speed rail network at its
       core, and Heathrow’s global connections a key component of that system.

       European experience demonstrates what can be achieved through effective integration of
       high speed rail with air travel and underlines the support in the recently published EU
       Transport White Paper to complete a European-wide high speed rail network that is
       connected to all core network airports. With a direct high speed rail connection, and
       integration into the wider transport networks serving the airport, Heathrow’s extensive
       international route network will be complemented with a range of domestic destinations
       served by rail, thereby sharing the benefits of international connectivity more widely across
       the UK. This improved national and international connectivity will enhance the UK’s
       international competitiveness and Heathrow’s contribution to the UK economy.

•      An integrated transport system would deliver significant economic benefits. In our
       second submission to the Lord Mawhinney Review 1 , we identified the likely value of the
       international connectivity benefits from a high speed rail link to Manchester and Leeds (i.e.
       assuming the full Y network). Expressed as in increase in Gross Value Added over 60
       years, our analysis showed that a high speed network would offer benefits of approximately
       £9bn in Present Value terms, where this provided for a direct connection at Heathrow. This
       illustrates the beneficial effect of improved connectivity on UK productivity, an effect that
       would only increase as the network is potentially extended further north and linked to HS1.
       Our analysis also identified, however, that a sub-optimal connection to Heathrow via Old
       Oak Common would result in a reduction of those benefits by some £2.4bn.

•      An integrated transport system would promote air/rail substitution. From an aviation
       perspective, there are five critical success factors to achieving air/rail substitution:
                  The passenger experience should feel like an air-to-air interchange;
                  The frequency of rail service should align with airline schedules;
                  There should be wide transport connectivity with a good range of destinations
                  served;
                  There should be ease of interchange and efficient movement to/from airport
                  terminals;
                  Effective baggage management solutions.

       By combining the range of domestic destinations served by high speed rail with the range of
       international destinations served by Heathrow, providing the right frequency of service and
       making the change between the modes attractive, then it is more likely that the traveller
       from cities such as Manchester or Glasgow will chose to use a high speed train to reach
       London or connect with an international long haul flight at Heathrow, rather than a short
       haul flight to connect to an international long haul flight at a European airport.

•      An integrated transport system would help reduce carbon emissions. Domestic and
       short-haul air travel produces more carbon per passenger kilometre than long-haul and
       approximately five times as much as high speed rail. By offering a more sustainable
       alternative to domestic and short-haul air travel, high speed rail could promote modal shift
       from air to rail where it is linked directly and conveniently into the UK’s only hub airport at
       Heathrow. Integrating Heathrow directly into the high speed network could therefore bring
       significant carbon reductions that increase as the network is expanded northwards. It
       follows that the sooner Heathrow is integrated into the high speed network and it expands
       northwards the greater the cumulative carbon reduction benefits that can be achieved. The
       potential level of carbon reduction is considered further under Question 6.




1
    High Speed Rail Access to Heathrow: BAA 2nd Submission to Lord Mawhinney’s Review (see Appendix 2)
   •   High speed rail would help restore regional links back into Heathrow. Heathrow’s
       capacity constraints have resulted in the withdrawal of many domestic services to the
       airport. In the last 20 years there has been a 300% increase in journeys from UK regional
       airports to European hubs to connect to onward long-haul flights, coupled with a 25%
       decline in similar connections to Heathrow. In 1991, Heathrow served 23 UK airports. In
       2011 that number had dropped to just six. In contrast, Amsterdam Schiphol Airport now
       serves 21 UK destinations and Paris Charles de Gaulle 14. Integrating Heathrow into the
       UK high speed rail network would help attract these passengers back to Heathrow, bringing
       both economic and environmental benefits through improved domestic connectivity and a
       reduction in domestic and short-haul flights.


Question 2: How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

iii. What are the implications for domestic aviation?

5. In our second submission to the Lord Mawhinney Review (attached as an appendix), we
explored in detail the addressable market share of high-speed rail if a link was built into Heathrow
Airport. By connecting the proposed high speed line to Heathrow there is the potential to reduce
both domestic and short-haul aviation through modal shift from air to rail. Our analysis identified
three journey types that would present an opportunity for air/rail substitution:
    • flights from UK regions to Heathrow for passengers flying direct to London;
    • flights from UK regions wishing to transfer to one of Heathrow’s long-haul services; and
    • flights from the UK regions to European hub airports where passengers are wishing to
        transfer to long-haul services that could otherwise be taken from Heathrow.

6. For each journey type our analysis considered 3 scenarios:
    1) A maximum case, where all air journeys where substituted,
    2) A likely “integrated” case, where Heathrow has an “on” or “near” airport connection, and
    3) A likely “non-integrated” case, where the connection was via Old Oak Common or similar.
7. The results are summarised below, in terms of journeys substituted in 2030 assuming the Y
route to Manchester and Leeds.

Reduction in air traffic movements, 2030
                                                                    Scenario
                                                Maximum                  Likely              Likely
                                                                     (integrated)       (non-integrated)
                                             annual air traffic    annual air traffic    annual air traffic
                                            movements saved       movements saved       movements saved
 Heathrow passengers bound directly for
                                                 18,000                 6,000                6,000
 London
 Passengers transferring via Heathrow
                                                 11,000                3-4,000                1000
 Passengers transferring via a European
                                                 62,000               29-35,000              13,000
 hub (or other London hub)
 Total (Y network)                               91,000               38-45,000              20,000

8. A direct connection at Heathrow into the high-speed rail network therefore has the potential to
substitute around 38,000-45,000 flights across the UK. Significantly fewer flights are converted with
an ‘off-airport’ connection since passengers translate the additional transfer to the airport into a
‘penalty’ that reflects their anxiety over the reliability and frequency of the transfer, lack of
familiarity with the interchange, managing their luggage and the additional journey time to complete
the journey. The issue of direct high speed rail services to the airport rather than a remote
interchange, such as that at Old Oak Common, is therefore a significant factor in achieving air/rail
substitution.

9. Heathrow would be able to accommodate the additional passengers re-routed from the
European hubs with only a minor increase in aircraft load factors. Moreover, an extension of the
high speed rail network to Scotland would further increase the potential for air/rail substitution.

10. In terms of how the impact of high speed rail on domestic aviation fits with the Government’s
transport policy objectives, we comment as follows:

      •   The continued decline in connections between UK regional airports and Heathrow as a
          direct result of capacity constraints, coupled with the significant increase in flights from UK
          regional airports to European hubs, has had a damaging effect on Heathrow’s position as
          an international hub and on the UK’s international competitiveness. The Government
          recognises the value of Heathrow’s hub status to the UK and is supportive of a continuation
          of that role. An integrated air/rail transport solution would improve connectivity to the airport
          and help to reverse the weakening of Heathrow’s hub role. It will not however provide any
          substantial relief from the capacity shortfall facing Heathrow in the light of forecast demand.

      •   High speed rail, if extended as far as Scotland, would help improve regional access to
          London and Heathrow, particularly in light of diminishing domestic air services from the
          northern regions and Scotland and the subsequent adverse impacts on regional economic
          development. The economic and connectivity benefits of domestic air services are well
          understood but it is generally acknowledged that improvements in rail services can reduce
          demand for domestic air travel.

      •   In addition to improving economic competitiveness through enhanced connectivity, a high
          speed network could offer an attractive and more sustainable alternative to domestic air
          travel. With domestic air travel’s inclusion within UK carbon emissions, and with those
          emissions set to rise over time, high speed rail could help the UK work to reverse this
          increase and reduce carbon emissions from domestic aviation. The Department for
          Transport’s recently published consultation 2 on high speed rail confirms that the largest
          element of carbon reduction from the first phase of the high speed network could come
          from modal shift from aviation generated by improved journey times to the North and
          Scotland. We would emphasise, however, that a successful mode shift from aviation will
          generally require a journey time of less than 3.5 hours, as well as, among other things, an
          efficient and seamless connection. An interim connection at Old Oak Common during the
          first phase will not maximise the potential for modal shift.

      •   Mode shift from both air and road to rail would contribute to increasing the proportion of
          passengers travelling to airports by public transport.




  2
      High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation February 2011, DfT
11. At a broader level, implementation of high speed rail in the UK would accord with proposals in
the recently published EU Transport White Paper 3 to complete a European high speed rail network
by 2050, to connect all core network airports to high speed rail, and to encourage better modal
choices for intermediate travel from greater integration of modal networks. The Commission’s
accompanying Staff Working Document 4 confirms that part of the answer to meeting the demand
for air travel will be high speed rail which offers a suitable alternative to short haul and feeder
flights, freeing up capacity for long haul routes, but this will require much more effective integration
between the two modes to ensure the seamless transition of passengers.


Question 3: Business Case

iv. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to
ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

12. The protracted Terminal 5 planning application and demise of recent major airport projects
illustrates the need for the Government to ensure that large infrastructure projects, such as high
speed rail, benefit from a robust, joined-up and supportive long-term policy framework. The
politicisation of high speed rail must be avoided in favour of cross-party support and robust
ministerial sponsorship that can be translated into a policy framework that includes the National
Infrastructure Plan. This will be necessary in getting the hybrid bill successfully through Parliament,
and, equally, in securing the necessary long-term sponsorship and funding certainty for a project of
this scale. The constraints on public sector funding will require the Government to consider and
exploit all potential funding mechanisms to ensure high speed rail becomes a reality, including EU
TEN-T funding.

13. At a more detailed level, the Government must ensure that the case for high speed rail is
supported by clear and thorough evidence of need and economic benefits in the context of social
and environmental constraints.

Question 4: The Strategic Route:

ii. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y
configuration the right choice?

14. We support high speed rail serving those cities where it is likely to achieve air/rail substitution
and subsequent carbon reduction benefits, including where this provides for a fully integrated
transport network. This includes those cities already identified in the proposed Y configuration as
well as a potential future extension of the network to Scotland, but could also include further
connections to key cities to the south and west of Heathrow and London, such as Southampton,
Cardiff and Bristol. Such a configuration could provide extensive north-south and east-west
connectivity and promote substantial carbon savings.




   3
     White Paper - Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource
   efficient transport system, EC, 2011
   4
     Commission Staff Working Document – Accompanying the White Paper, EC, 2011.
iii. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London
northwards?

15. The potential carbon and connectivity benefits from air/rail substitution and a wider integrated
transport system will not be fully realised until Heathrow is properly connected into a high speed
network that links directly to those key cities where there is potential for high speed rail to
substitute for domestic and short-haul aviation. Our response to question iv below considers this
further.

iv. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow
only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

16. The Government has made it clear that one of its main objectives in building HS2 is to reduce
domestic flights in the UK. It has also been acknowledged that the development of a high speed
rail network has been a key factor in its proposed policy not to support additional runways at
London's airports and that this sets a clear justification for any network to be linked to Heathrow
and integrated with the European high speed network via HS1.

17. The Department for Transport’s recently published consultation on high speed rail notes, in
particular, that:
         •   The strategic case for linking a UK high speed rail network to Heathrow is compelling;
         •   Future patterns of economic activity are likely to depend increasingly on international
             connectivity;
         •   High speed rail is well-suited to delivering an alternative mode of travel to domestic and
             short-haul flying;
         •   A direct link to Heathrow would transform the accessibility of the airport from the
             Midlands and the North and would generate valuable economic opportunities for these
             regions making them more attractive locations for investment;
         •   A direct link would also contribute to Heathrow’s future development as a multi-modal
             transport hub, further boosting demand for high speed rail access to and from the
             airport. This position would be enhanced with wider integration into the existing transport
             network;
         •   The largest proportion of carbon reductions associated with the London to West
             Midlands high speed line (Phase 1) would come from a modal shift from aviation as a
             result of improved journey times to the north and Scotland.
18. The Secretary of State has also commented 5 that switching domestic and short-haul European
traffic from air to rail over the medium term will be an important part of the solution to delivering a
sustainable Heathrow, ensuring that it can remain an important, national hub.

19. A spur to Heathrow, however, is currently proposed during the second phase of the network,
and unlikely to be operational until 2032 at the very earliest. The Government has to accept that on
these timings, its objectives for encouraging mode shift and reducing domestic flights will not be
fully achieved for at least another twenty years.


   5
       HC 359 Transcript, Question 34, 26th July 2010
Question 5: Economic Rebalancing & Equity

iv. Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

20. Yes. The Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) are a planned set of interconnected road,
rail, air and water transport networks designed to serve the entire continent of Europe. The aim of
TEN-T is to benefit all European citizens by creating more efficient and environmentally friendly
transport, while reinforcing economic and social cohesion across the continent at the same time.

21. The European Commission's TEN-T programme oversees the networks and allocates financial
support towards the development of important transport infrastructure projects across Europe. The
UK successfully applied for TEN-T funding as part of the HS1 project. We believe high speed rail
fulfils TEN-T objectives and it would make sense for the UK to take advantage of any additional funds
that may be available through the European Commission.


Question 6: Impact

i. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift
from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

22. As set out above, our second submission to the Mawhinney Review considered the
addressable market share of high speed rail in the event that it is connected to Heathrow. In the
same way that analysis considered the impact of various airport connections on domestic and
short-haul aviation, it also considered the consequential impact on global carbon emissions. The
results of that analysis are set out in the table below.




Reduction in global aviation emissions
                                                                 Scenario
                                                Maximum               Likely            Likely
                                                                  (integrated)     (non-integrated)
                                             CO2 saved per       CO2 saved per      CO2 saved per
                                            annum (Ktonnes)     annum (Ktonnes)    annum (Ktonnes)
 Heathrow passengers bound directly for
                                                   90                28-30                31
 London
 Passengers transferring via Heathrow
                                                   54                13-18                3
 Passengers transferring via a European
                                                  378               185-216               84
 hub (or other London hub)
 Total (Y network)                                522               226-262              118

23. Taking into account the factors that affect modal choice, and assuming an integrated “on” or
“near” airport connection, the analysis indicates that the most likely carbon saving in this scenario
will be around 226 – 262kt per annum. This is around double the carbon savings that would be
achieved from an “off” airport connection, such as that at Old Oak Common.
24. The results demonstrate that fully integrating Heathrow into the high speed network brings
significant carbon reductions and is critically dependent on a seamless and direct airport
connection. Carbon reductions will increase as the network is expanded northwards and the UK
grid decarbonizes. It follows that the sooner Heathrow is directly linked to the network and it
expands northwards, the greater the cumulative carbon reduction benefits that can be achieved.


25. We hope this evidence has been helpful in setting out our overall support for high speed rail, as
well as the importance of ensuring that Heathrow Airport is properly integrated into the high speed
rail network to ensure that the Government’s sustainability and transport objectives can be
achieved at the earliest opportunity. Should you require any clarification, please do not hesitate to
contact me.


May 2011
           Written evidence from William Summers (HSR 132)



The government appears to be hell bent on pushing through the building of
a high speed rail link in an effort to keep up with other members of the
EEC.

1. We do not have the area of land to support such a major infrastructure
   project as is available in other EEC countries.

2. We have no need for the project nor, certainly not at the moment, the
   money to finance it.

3. The business case for it is not viable, wild assumptions have been made
   to try to justify it.

4. If there were a need for increased capacity, which is by no means
   certain then alternatives exist which would be far less expensive.

5. HSR is not environmentally friendly using far more CO2 than existing
   modes of travel.

6. The government, on behalf of the Nation, declared the Chilterns an Area
   of OUTSTANDING national beauty. Intrusive building is only allowed if
   there is an overwhelming need, no alternative exists and all other
   avenues of solving the problem explored. These criteria have not been
   met.

May 2011
                                                                                                
                                                                                                



                Written evidence from the Northern Way (HSR 133)



Summary

This submission sets out the Northern Way Transport Compact’s evidence on high speed
rail. The Northern Way was the public and private sector partnership funded by the three
Northern RDAs that promoted the North’s productivity and output growth and closed at the
end of March 2011.
The Northern Way Transport Compact has concluded that:
   •   Set in the context of a national rail investment strategy, high speed rail will bring
       substantial and worthwhile transformational economic benefits to the North and to the
       nation.
   •   The Government’s benefit assessment is conservative and that, in reality, benefits
       will be significantly greater than the £44bn calculated for the Y shaped network.
   •   Agglomeration benefits at over £6bn are an important part of the Government’s
       benefits assessment. The Northern Way’s evidence is that proportionally, the North’s
       economy will receive a greater agglomeration uplift than that in London and the
       South East.
   •   High speed rail will create the circumstances to accelerate the North’s economic
       growth and will help rebalance the economy North South.
   •   While the Government has not quantified the impacts of high speed rail on the size of
       the economy measured by Gross Value Added, the Northern Way’s assessment is
       that these could be a multiple of the £44bn in economic benefits quantified to date.
   •   The greatest economic benefits come from a network approach that brings major
       cities closer together and spreads prosperity across regions.
   •   A north-south high speed rail network that serves both sides of the Pennines is
       needed. The proposal for a Y-shaped network substantially meets this need.
   •   The North’s economy will benefit from direct high speed rail services to Central
       London and Heathrow and a network with a direct link to HS1 and the Channel
       Tunnel, both provided by the Government’s Y-shaped network.
   •   The greatest economic gains will come from serving city centres, linked with
       complementary economic development and land use master planning and
       strengthening of local transport networks.
   •   HS2, the high speed line from London to the West Midlands should be the first phase
       of the national network.
   •   Progressing the eastern and western limbs of the Y-shaped network in parallel, with
       completion in 2032/33 as the Government suggests in its consultation, will help
       minimise any competitive disadvantage between regions.
   •   To provide benefits to the east side of the Pennines in 2026 the Government should
       consider a link between HS2 and the Midland Main Line enabling access from
                                                                                                    
                                                                                                    


         Yorkshire and the Humber and the North East to London Euston and to destinations
         served by the proposed station at Old Oak Common, including Heathrow.
     •   The Government should consider the case and timing of extensions of the Y shaped
         network north of Leeds and Manchester to serve the North East and Scotland directly
         by new lines, as further developments of the national high speed rail network.
     •   A faster, modern electrified route is needed across the Pennines – the key route in
         the North that will not benefit directly from the Government’s high speed rail
         proposals. This would build on the benefits to the North of the Northern Hub Strategy
         which must be delivered as a priority, in full by 2019.
     •   There also remains a pressing need for medium term investment in the existing
         classic north south main lines – the East Coast Main Line, Midland Main Line and
         West Coast Main Line – pending the completion of the Y shaped high speed rail
         network in 2032/33.


          The Northern Way Transport Compact
1.        This submission sets out the Northern Way Transport Compact’s evidence and
          position on high speed rail which it has developed over the last five years.
2.        The Northern Way was the public and private sector partnership funded by the
          three Northern RDAs that closed at the end of March 2011. The Northern Way
          Transport Compact’s remit has been the identification of the transport priorities that
          will maximise the North’s economic growth whilst minimising the impact on the
          environment. As part of its work, the Transport Compact has helped the North
          establish a broad consensus around the case for high speed rail.
3.        As described by the Independent Evaluation of the Northern Way (April 2011), the
          Northern Way Transport Compact has “coordinated across a range of partners in
          the North, providing a forum for discussion of evidence versus parochial interests
          and allowing transport experts to talk to politicians.” The Independent Evaluation
          also concluded that the Transport Compact has “produced a clear and consistent
          approach to influencing transport policy and was arguably the star performer of the
          Northern Way with demonstrable benefits.....The influencing and advocacy on
          transport was built on the evidence base, focusing on the links between transport
          and economic development in the North.” The Independent Evaluation further
          concludes that “the lesson for the North going forward would be to ensure that
          there is a body which exists to enable the agreement of a joint position on priorities
          for investment in transport schemes – this consensus is valued by government.
          This needs to be achieved in a relatively short timeframe otherwise opportunities
          for future transport investment in the North will pass by.”
          The Strategic Direction for Transport
4.        The Northern Way Transport Compact’s Strategic Direction for Transport is an
          evidence-based assessment of the most appropriate transport interventions that
          will promote productivity gain, while at the same time seeking to protect and
          enhance the North’s natural and built environment, and contributing to the nation’s
          commitments regarding climate change. Looking over 20 to 30 years, it sits above
          the level of individual priority schemes and projects. The Strategic Direction sets
                                                                                                
                                                                                                


     out the types of interventions which will have the greatest productivity impact, as
     well as where in the North those interventions will have the greatest impact.
5.   A key conclusion of the Strategic Direction for Transport is that a balanced
     investment strategy is needed that considers transport links within and between the
     North’s city regions, and between the North and the rest of the country, especially
     central London and Heathrow.
     The Northern Way’s Short, Medium and Long Term Transport Priorities
6.   Having established the Strategic Direction for Transport, the Northern Way
     Transport Compact then identified Short, Medium and Long Term Transport
     Priorities. The prioritisation work shows that while the transport proposals being
     pursued by stakeholders across the North will make worthwhile contributions to
     productivity growth, taken together they do not allow the Strategic Direction for
     Transport to be met. Consequently, if the North’s productivity growth is to be
     maximised a number of the “Strategic Delivery Gaps” need to be addressed. The
     Transport Compact identified strategic delivery gaps for the rail network, the road
     network and associated with network integration. The rail gaps are the Northern
     Hub (the strategy to transform rail in the North), rail gauge enhancements for multi-
     modal container traffic, a rail rolling stock strategy and strategies for trans-Pennine
     and north-south rail (including high speed rail). The road gaps relate to the need for
     a long term strategy to keep the strategic road network moving and a north-wide
     approach to behavioural change. For network integration the strategic gaps relate
     to pan-Northern smart ticketing and strategic park and ride.

     THE STRATEGIC CASE FOR HIGH SPEED RAIL

     1. What are the arguments for High Speed Rail?
7.   High speed rail is a once in a generation opportunity to transform the economic
     prospects of the North. Work published by the Northern Way in March
     2011(Transforming Our Economy and Our Connectivity: High Speed Rail for the
     North - Issues and Evidence in Response to the Government’s High Speed Rail
     Consultation available at www.thenorthernwaytansportcompact.com) identifies that
     the case for high speed rail to serve the North is straightforward. This is because:

     a) Links between the North and the World City functions in London (as well as links
     between the North’s city regions) are of fundamental importance to the Northern
     economy and its productivity.
     b) North south links, particularly to London, will become more, not less, important
     over time. There is no question that new north-south capacity will be needed, only
     when it is required and what form it should take.
     c) The existing road and rail networks linking the north and south have finite
     capacity and they will become increasingly congested and journeys will become
     extended and more unreliable. There is no prospect of any significant increase in
     north-south road capacity. The future strategy for the motorway network is
     focussed on managing congestion.
     d) Air links between the North and London are increasingly under threat. Now only
     Manchester and Newcastle airports have links with Heathrow. Constrained capacity
     at Heathrow will amplify the commercial pressures on these links in coming years.
     e) There are worthwhile and value for money proposals for increasing north-south
                                                                                               
                                                                                               


      rail capacity on the existing main lines and these should be pursued. However, the
      capacity increment that such enhancements will bring is finite and not sufficient to
      meet the needs of the North’s economy if it is to grow to its full potential. Any
      further capacity increases would be highly disruptive to implement, as well as being
      very costly.
      f) The most cost effective way to provide the north-south capacity that the North
      requires is to build new railway lines. The extra benefits that come from operating
      this new capacity at high speed transform the economic and productivity benefits
      that the new capacity will deliver.
      g) If high speed rail is judged not worth proceeding with, the consequence will be
      demand well in excess of capacity. This will inevitably lead to ever increasing real-
      term fare increases as a demand management tool, to the economic detriment of
      the North.
      2. How does High Speed Rail fit with the Government’s transport policy
      objectives?
8.    Speaking in Shipley at the end of May in his first major speech as Prime Minister,
      David Cameron identified the Coalition Government’s goal of rebalancing the
      economy away from the heavy reliance on the South East, and through the growth
      of private sector businesses.
9.    As set out in written evidence and debated at an oral session of the Transport
      Select Committee’s Transport and the Economy Inquiry, the Northern Way
      Transport Compact’s evidence shows that what is needed to foster the North’s
      economic growth is a balanced approach that looks at the connectivity needs of
      travel within city regions and the links between the North’s city regions. Also
      important are links between the North and London with its World City functions, and
      international connectivity via gateways within the North and elsewhere in the
      country including Heathrow. Enhancing connectivity within city regions is focused
      on expanding labour supply across functional labour markets. Improving the
      connectivity between city regions facilitates the movement of goods, business to
      business links and allows the expansion of labour markets, most notably for
      entrepreneurial high level skills. International connectivity facilitates trade.
10.   The Northern Way Transport Compact has been mindful of the time taken to
      develop significant transport interventions, the importance of bringing forward
      investment proposals in a timely manner and the importance of the development of
      long term plans as well as the phased delivery of transport priorities in the short
      and medium term. The Northern Way Transport Compact’s priorities align with the
      5 year control periods (2009-2014, 2014-2019 and 2019 and beyond) and have to
      date received substantial backing by Government. The Transport Compact’s
      Priorities for the North’s Strategic Networks involve:

      2009-2014: Additional Rail Rolling Stock; North West rail electrification
      (committed); start of work on Northern Hub delivery (committed); rail gauge
      enhancement of the routes from Doncaster to the West Midlands and Doncaster to
      Edinburgh and Glasgow) and linking in the Tees, Tyne and Humber Ports
      (committed except for linking in the Humber Ports); Managed Motorway projects on
      key congested sections in the North (committed).
      2014-2019: Further rail rolling stock; completion of the Northern Hub Strategy;
      electrification and gauge enhancement between Manchester, Leeds and York;
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                 


      interim improvements to the East Coast, Midland and West Coast Main Lines
      pending high speed rail; gauge enhancement between Doncaster and the Humber
      Ports; further Managed Motorway investment and targeted improvements to road
      access to the Ports of Immingham, Hull and Liverpool.
      2019 and beyond: Further rail rolling stock; delivery of the Y shaped high speed
      rail network; and longer term solutions to the management of motorway congestion
      (including consideration of the role of charging).
11.   A widely held criticism of the previous Government’s 2007 Rail White Paper has
      been that it lacked clear medium and long term components. This needs to be fully
      addressed when the Coalition Government publishes its high speed rail strategy at
      the end of 2011 and its Transport White Paper and High Level Output Statement in
      summer 2012.
      3. Business case
12.   Nationally, the number of trips made by rail is now higher than at any time in
      peacetime since the 1920s. The last ten years have seen strong, sustained growth
      in long distance rail travel. Notably, and in contrast to traffic on the national
      motorway network and domestic and international air travel, long distance rail travel
      continued to grow through the recession.
13.   Past investment has not kept pace with the growth in demand. If new capacity is
      not provided and demand is constrained, it is evident that the North’s economy will
      suffer. Expanding the capacity of the road network to provide for the growth in
      north-south demand would be prohibitively expensive and environmentally
      unacceptable. Air travel is not a viable alternative. Greater north-south rail capacity
      is needed to support and facilitate the growth and re-structuring of the North’s
      economy. Upgrading existing lines would be expensive and very disruptive over a
      long period, as well as offering only a limited capacity increase. The optimal way to
      increase the capacity of the north south rail network is by building new lines.
14.   Faster journeys by high speed rail will support the growth of the North’s economy in
      two ways:

      a) It will make the existing economy more productive and provide economic
      benefits to non-business users;
      b) It creates the opportunity to support the further economic growth and
      regeneration of the North and the re-balancing of the economy from the South and
      away from the public sector.
15.   If high speed rail is judged not worth proceeding with, the consequence will be
      demand well in excess of capacity. This will inevitably lead to ever increasing real-
      term fare increases as a demand management tool, to the economic detriment of
      the North.
      4. The Strategic Route
16.   The Government’s proposal for a Y-shaped national network substantially meets
      the Northern Way Transport Compact’s evidence-based position that there is a
      need for a north south high speed rail network that serves both sides of the
      Pennines. In addition, the Northern Way Transport Compact has also considered it
      clear that any national network will be implemented in phases. The case for the
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                 


      London to West Midlands line being the first phase of the national network,
      followed rapidly by the full build out of the Y shaped network, is overwhelming.
17.   The Northern Way Transport Compact has however also concluded that:

      a) There remain opportunities both to increase the economic and productivity
      benefits that high speed rail will bring to the North, as well as to bring forward the
      date when these benefits will be enjoyed. These need to be explored as the
      Government develops its end of year strategy and include a link between the HS2
      and the Midland Main Line in order to provide benefits in 2026 to the east side of
      the Pennines at that date.
      b) Further work is warranted to examine the case for northward extension of the
      dedicated high speed network beyond Manchester towards Glasgow and beyond
      Leeds towards Newcastle and Edinburgh.
18.   In regard to Heathrow, the Northern Way Transport Compact agreed with the
      conclusions of the Mawhinney Review and the Government about the timing of
      serving Heathrow Airport directly and that passive provision for a high speed link to
      Heathrow should therefore be constructed as part of the first phase.
19.   Intermediate destinations between London and Birmingham would be best served
      by development of services using capacity freed up on the West Coast Main Line.
      5. Economic rebalancing and equity
20.   The Northern economy is underperforming when compared with the more
      prosperous regions in the South. On a per capita basis, Gross Value Added in the
      North is 80% of the South East.
21.   As the North’s economy grows and as it restructures, north-south links, particularly
      to London will become more, not less important over time in economic terms.
      London is a World City and global financial hub and as such offers financial, legal
      and other services essential to businesses in the North. Economic growth in the
      North will increase demand to access the internationally renowned services that
      London offers, not diminish it. On top of this, by virtue of its size and wealth London
      and the South East is the largest domestic market for the North’s businesses and,
      of course, as the nation’s capital it is the home of government.
22.   The Northern Way Transport Compact has identified that a north-south high speed
      rail network serving both sides of the Pennines has the potential to generate
      agglomeration benefits through linking the northern city region economies. In
      analysis pre-dating the Government’s identification of the Y-shaped network as its
      preferred way forward and for a more extensive network, these agglomeration
      impacts are valued at £13bn PV, (using the Department for Transport’s current
      methodology). Of this £13bn, £5bn is in the North of England. Proportionally, the
      North’s economy receives a greater uplift than that in London and the South East.
23.   Work looking at agglomeration impacts has also been undertaken by 4NW, the
      former local authority leaders’ board for the North West as well as by a consortium
      of the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions. This work also identifies substantial
      agglomeration benefits for the North. For the preferred Y-shaped network, analysis
      for 4NW identifies that it would result in productivity benefits of £1bn a year by
      2030, of which 20% would accrue to the North West. The work for the Leeds and
      Sheffield city regions identifies that a high speed link between the two city regions
                                                                                              
                                                                                              


      and London could deliver productivity gains of at least £1.2bn PV to the two city
      regions.
24.   The Department for Transport’s own assessment is also that high speed rail will
      generate substantial agglomeration benefits. Around 15% of the economic benefits
      that HS2, the line from London to the West Midlands, will generate are associated
      from agglomeration and a further 5% from addressing imperfect competition.
      Together wider impacts result in £4bn PV worth of benefits. Looking at the Y-
      shaped network, this figure increases to £6.3bn in total.
25.   When considering Department for Transport’s figure, it is important to note that for
      their assessment of the wider impacts of the lines beyond the West Midlands to
      Leeds and Manchester, they have used a ‘rule of thumb’ approach and
      consequently have adopted a very prudent assumption on the size of the benefits.
      Evidence from the Northern Way, 4NW and the Yorkshire authorities all suggests
      that full application of the wider impacts methodology would result in the Y
      returning substantially greater wider impacts than currently conservatively
      assessed by the Department for Transport.
26.   However, the principal benefit of high speed rail identified by stakeholders across
      the North and by the Government is that it will also stimulate a change in the
      structure of the economy and that it will increase Gross Value Added (GVA). Such
      transformational changes will happen because high speed rail will support and
      facilitate growth of employment in the most productive locations (which are in and
      around city centres). It will also support employment growth in the most productive
      sectors of the economy. These GVA benefits do not form part of HS2 Ltd’s value
      for money assessment.
27.   Techniques to quantify the impacts of transport investments such as high speed rail
      on the size of the economy are in their infancy. Given the Northern Way Transport
      Compact identified the criticality of transport connectivity to the North’s economic
      growth and the important potential impacts of GVA analysis on funding availability
      and scheme prioritisation, we commissioned the Institute for Transport Studies
      (ITS) at the University of Leeds to review the methods that have been developed to
      assess the GVA impacts of transport investment. A Northern Way sponsored study
      by the Spatial Economic Research Centre at the London School of Economics has
      also modelled the GVA uplift of rail journey time improvements.
28.   Collectively, the Northern Way Transport Compact’s review of work that has been
      done to look at the impacts of major transport investments suggests that GVA
      benefits could be up to three times the size of welfare benefits assessed in a
      conventional cost benefit appraisal. For this potential to be realised, the Northern
      Way Transport Compact has acknowledged that further investments may be
      needed which could be in complementary transport enhancements, for example to
      local public transport networks serving a high speed rail station or it could be in
      sites and premises or skills and training. This evidence is further demonstration of
      the transformational potential of high speed rail.
      6. Other Impacts
29.   By relieving the capacity constrained classic north south main lines (the West
      Coast Main Line, Midland Main Line, and East Coast Main Line) the Y shaped high
      speed rail network will deliver benefits for the north’s economy by creating the
                                                                                                
                                                                                                


       opportunity to enhance local commuter and inter-regional services and to release
       additional capacity for growth of rail freight.
30.    High speed rail will also contribute to meeting the nation’s obligations to reduce
       carbon emissions. Analysis by ATOC for Greengauge 21 shows that with load
       factors similar to those currently experienced on the Eurostar services between
       London and Paris and London and Brussels, high speed rail already has lower
       carbon emissions per passenger mile than existing inter-city trains, domestic
       aviation or cars. High speed rail’s per passenger mile emissions will fall further as
       technological advancement (e.g. use of lighter materials in train construction, more
       efficient motive power) will lower per passenger mile emissions. The progressive
       de-carbonisation of electricity generation will also reduce further high speed rail’s
       carbon emissions per passenger mile. When considering carbon emissions, high
       speed rail currently has and will maintain a clear advantage over alternative modes.
May 2011
     Written evidence from the London Borough of Camden (HSR 134)



Whilst the Transport Select Committee will be examining specific issues as
set out in the terms of reference there are a number of significant concerns
that Camden will be making representation on in our response to the HS2
consultation undertaken by DfT. These will be forwarded to the Select
Committee before 29 July 2011 and the committee is urged to give this
detailed assessment full consideration.

4 - The Strategic Route
The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak
Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these
the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case
for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

1.   Euston – The proposed main terminus of HS2 is at Euston which was
     selected by HS2 Ltd following their assessment of 27 locations across
     London including Paddington, Kings Cross, St Pancras, Old Oak
     Common, Stratford and Liverpool Street. The HS2 Ltd requirements for a
     terminus included the provision of sufficient space for 10 high speed
     platforms, access and dispersal areas, good public transport links and
     minimal impact on surrounding area. .HS2 Ltd has not provided sufficient
     detail or justification as to why alternative locations for the terminus were
     discounted. As a result, there is currently insufficient evidence to take an
     informed view as to whether Euston is the most appropriate location for
     that terminus.

2.   It should be noted that prior to HS2 proposals, TfL and Network Rail
     were working on options to redevelop Euston station to address the
     existing overcrowding within the station. It is likely that a project to
     provide additional station capacity would have increased the station
     footprint (but to a significantly lesser extent than HS2 propose and only
     to the south). The HS2 proposals at Euston would mean demolition of
     existing buildings (between 190 and 350 Council homes), loss of
     designated open space, and major construction disruptions over many
     years. These impacts are clearly significant and of great concern for
     affected communities and businesses.

3.   The HS2 proposals would lead to all platforms and train lines at Euston
     to be lowered to below ground level and the ground level would become
     a large area for development (approximately 65% the size of King’s
     Cross Central). Should the project go ahead HS2 future proposals would
     need to include space to re-provide homes for people displaced, provide
     new homes, employment opportunities, shops and new open space.
4.   Whilst the principle of providing a central London terminus for HS2 may
     have passenger benefits, there is currently insufficient evidence to take
     an informed view as to whether Euston is the most appropriate location
     for that terminus or that the benefits would outweigh the significant
     negative impacts on the local community. Should HS2 go ahead, there
     are a number of issues that will need to be addressed, such as re-
     provision of housing and designated open space.

5.   A further important issue would be the onward distribution of HS2
     passengers potentially coming into Euston. Analysis undertaken as part
     of developing the Central London Transport Plan shows that whilst
     additional capacity is currently being provided on the transport network
     this will soon be absorbed by the increased demand as a result of
     population and employment growth and consequently there will still be
     significant pressure points on the network. Therefore how the onward
     journeys are going to be accommodated and any upgrades funded, is a
     key consideration as to whether Euston is the right location for the HS2
     terminus. Potential solutions that could accommodate the likely future
     demand at Euston would be the implementation of Crossrail 2 (Chelsea
     – Hackney line) and the DLR extension between Bank and Euston to
     address the effective dispersal of passengers. These need to included in
     and funded from any business case associated with High Speed rail at
     Euston before any decision to proceed is made.

6.   Old Oak Common – The case for Old Oak Common as a terminus
     would remove the need for significant demolition and disruption at
     Euston as well as reducing the overall project costs significantly. The
     Council recognises that TfL have undertaken assessments that highlight
     concerns about Crossrail having sufficient capacity to cope with the extra
     passenger demand from HS2 between Old Oak Common, Paddington
     and Central London. Further consideration is required by TfL and HS2
     Ltd to resolve if Old Oak Common would be an appropriate terminus for
     HS2.

7.   The option for an intermediate station at Old Oak Common provides an
     opportunity to provide good connections to the High Speed and classic
     rail network without the need for some passengers to use Euston, the
     Underground or other rail termini. The HS2 proposals would see services
     on both First Great Western and Heathrow Express stopping at Old Oak
     Common providing direct connections to Heathrow and the west. An Old
     Oak Common station would help to reduce crowding at Paddington and
     Euston. The station is also proposed to have an interchange with
     Crossrail and the North London Line which has further benefits for
     passengers and congestion relief on the Underground.

8.   There are some concerns that providing a station at Old Oak Common
     would detract from the case to increase the use of Stratford International
     for High Speed services. However, Stratford station does not provide the
     same connectivity or congestion relief for passengers to/from the west of
     London.
9.   There is a good case for an intermediate and interchange station at Old
     Oak Common and there should be further consideration by TfL and HS2
     Ltd to resolve if Old Oak Common would be an appropriate terminus for
     HS2.

Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London
northwards?

10. The existing West Coast Main Line (WCML) serving Birmingham and
    Manchester is already overcrowded despite recent major enhancements.
    The overwhelming existing passenger demand is from and to London
    rather than between other regional cities. Therefore there is a clear logic
    to build the network in stages starting in London to relieve the pressure
    on the WCML.

11. It is vital that if the proposals were to go ahead that the construction
    phasing does not result in any significant periods of line closures as
    these local services provide essential transport links for people to access
    employment and local services. In addition the construction phases,
    should HS2 proceed, need to be co-ordinated with other upgrade /
    maintenance works to the transport infrastructure, such as the
    underground upgrades, so that a level of service to all areas is
    maintained throughout.

The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to
Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

12. HS2 / HS1 link – The council is concerned about the proposal by HS2 to
    connect HS1 via the North London Line (NLL). The current proposal
    would have a single track tunnel from Old Oak Common and then use
    track on the NLL. This could impact on capacity and services on the NLL
    which may need to be reduced to accommodate high speed trains.

13. The NLL has seen considerable investment in recent years to upgrade
    capacity and reliability on the line. The recent upgrade to rolling stock
    and infrastructure has contributed to significant extra demand which is
    forecast to increase. There are concerns about the impact on
    constraining future capacity enhancements to the NLL. There is concern
    about the impact of the proposed link on the NLL service patterns and
    the degree of alteration which would be needed to the existing NLL to
    allow the operation of High Speed trains. This could involve bridge or
    tunnel widening or additional track side infrastructure. The impact of
    these proposals on Camden's other transports networks ( e.g. the
    strategic route network, footpaths, cycle paths, bus services) and
    development sites (e.g Hawley wharf) and open spaces adjacent to the
    line is not currently clear and needs to be incorporated into any proper
    assessment of the HS1 link.

14. Analysis undertaken by London Rail shows that with the existing
    infrastructure only one high speed train per hour would be able to use
     this link. However, the current proposal by HS2 is to allow 3 trains per
     hour to connect to HS1 at substantial cost. The issues are:
     •     There is no detail on the demand analysis for through running
           trains. The analysis needs to clearly demonstrate the benefits of
           such a direct link outweigh the costs and impacts on the local
           community.
     •     Lack of consideration of a link that would not impact on the NLL and
           allow HS2 and HS1 to link to a wider domestic high speed network
           in the future.
       • Providing the HS2/HS1 link via a single track on the NLL provides
           no resilience in the network and alternative options should be
           considered that provides a resilient network and provides a network
           to future standards.
     •     Further technical details are needed on the link to fully understand
           its impacts including: its alignment, specifications and impact on
           bridges and structures.       It is understood that HS2 Ltd are
           undertaking further work on how this link would be delivered.
           However, this it is understood that this level of detail will not be
           available before the closing date for the public consultation
           responses.

15. The council’s preference is that if the proposals were to go ahead that a
    link between HS1 and HS2 is provided that is able to cope with future
    passenger demand and to enable a more comprehensive High Speed
    network in the future. As part of this the it is essential that businesses
    cases for additional network investment, both on existing networks (e.g.
    reinstate plans to extend 4 tracks to Camden Road) and the possible
    Crossrail 2 and DLR extension from Bank to Euston are considered
    alongside HS2, not in isolation. In the absence of this the HS proposal
    will have significant negative impacts.

16. In addition agencies such as Central Government, GLA, London
    Councils and London Boroughs will need to work together to understand
    the wider development of the UK’s and London transport network to
    maximise the network benefits of HS2 not just for High Sped Rail. For
    example improvements to local and inter-regional services should be
    delivered at the same time as creating a HS2 / HS1 link.

17. Heathrow link - There is a clear rationale for providing an interchange to
    Heathrow via Old Oak Common rather than a direct link on HS2. These
    issues are as follows:
    •    A station at Heathrow would increase journey times for all through
         passengers
    •    The Old Oak Common interchange would enable HS2 to connect
         with the Heathrow Express and Crossrail which would be high
         frequency and provide a relatively fast journey time at a significantly
         reduced cost than a direct HS2 link.
    •    An additional station at Old Oak Common would relieve the
         pressure on Euston as not all passengers on HS2 would go into
         central London
     •    Those passengers who are most likely to transfer to high speed rail
          from air are unlikely to be influenced by how HS2 serves Heathrow
          (i.e. Heathrow is not a destination in itself)
     •    It is not certain that passengers who currently fly from regional
          airports to Heathrow in order to transfer to long haul flights would
          necessarily switch to high speed rail for this part of their journey. In
          addition, given that HS2 is already planned to serve Birmingham
          International the case for connecting Heathrow Airport is far from
          clear.

18. In future the case for a direct link from HS2 to Heathrow as part of phase
    2 may be greater, however, at this time it is understood that the HS2
    Ltd’s modelling results for phase 2 are not available. Therefore there
    remains a case to include passive provision for such a link as part of a
    later phase.

5 Economic Rebalancing and equity
How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR
(including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate
financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government
seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

19. If the HS2 project progresses it should be primarily funded by the
    Government using private finance initiative from a combination of long-
    term train operating contracts and maintenance contracts in a similar
    method to that used to finance HS1. A significant portion of the funding
    for the project should also be sought from Europe as HS2 would be a
    key element of an efficient trans-European transport network which is a
    key element in the relaunched Lisbon strategy for competitiveness and
    employment in Europe. If Europe is to fulfill its economic and social
    potential, it is essential to build the missing links and remove the
    bottlenecks in our transport infrastructure, as well as to ensure the
    sustainability of our transport networks into the future. Funding from
    fares is also a likely to be a key element of the financing package.

20. Camden has strong concerns about the Government introducing a
    development tariff similar to the Crossrail levy. Current experience shows
    that the Crossrail levy is already impacting on our ability to provide
    affordable homes which is a major concern for the Council for many
    years to come. A similar levy for HS2 would severely restrict our ability to
    address the affordable homes issue over the longer term which would
    have negative impacts on London’s residents and workforce. In addition,
    the funding of HS2 is likely to draw funding away from other transport
    improvements e.g. investment in tube and station upgrades.

21. Other suggestions for financing HS2 should include additional passenger
    aviation taxes on short haul flights covered by High Speed Rail. This
    would have the added benefit of encouraging a greater shift to HS1 and
    HS2 thereby increasing their profitability.
22. It is vital that the funding for HS2 adequately takes into account the
    required investment in the area most impacted by the changed Euston
    Station, and in the wider impacts upon the London transport system –
    including local public realm and walking and cycling links. In transport
    terms this infrastructure need would include ensuring that all related
    public transport infrastructure projects are fully funded by any High
    Speed rail proposal.

6. Impact
23. Overall impact of high speed rail on carbon emissions – There is no
     definitive information on the environmental case for or against HS2 that
     assesses environmental impacts on HS2 against business as usual or
     alternative transport options, taking account of all whole life cost impacts
     and benefits. Therefore further, detailed analysis taking into account all
     of the factors needs to be completed. Therefore at this stage the case
     does not appear to be made.

24. Impact on existing services at Euston during construction – HS2
    proposes to undertake the redevelopment of Euston in phases to
    minimise disruption to existing services and passengers and to keep the
    station operating. As a result, the proposal is to extend the station to the
    west initially to provide temporary platforms for the existing services to
    operate whilst the remaining platforms and new station were constructed.
    A similar phased approach was taken to the construction at St Pancras
    which broadly worked well. Camden would want to see details of the
    construction programme, as currently there is no indication of how the
    work would be phased and for how much of the 7 – 8 year programme
    services to and from Euston will be impacted. Camden would want to
    ensure that passengers and residents are not adversely affected during
    construction.

25. During the construction phase and in the longer term there are concerns
    about the impact of HS2 on the ‘classic’ services between Watford and
    Euston. Should the project progress, there would need to be a high
    degree of confidence that there would be no significant negative impacts
    on these suburban services as they provide vital transport links. In
    addition there are links to the underground network as if these
    overground services were not provided these passengers would be
    displaced onto the underground network, which is already operating at
    capacity.

26. Whilst the terms of reference for the Transport Select Committee
    specifically ask a question regarding the level of disruption during the
    construction of HS2 there are potential longer term impacts on services
    operating to and from Euston as a result of HS2 proposals. A potential
    negative consequence of the HS2 proposal is that the overall capacity at
    Euston and on the approach for WCML services will be reduced. The
    potential for conflict between trains arriving and departing could increase
    resulting in delay and reduced reliability.
27. Impact on the Euston area. The construction of the proposed Euston
    Station will mean significant negative impacts on the lives of residents
    and the viability of businesses in the Euston Area. This threatens the
    overall functioning of Euston as a place and the potential blight arising
    from the proposals will stymie investment prior to and during
    construction. This will be to the detriment of the communities in and
    around the proposed station.

Conclusion
28. Camden opposes the HS2 and the terminus at Euston Station. There
    would be negative impacts on residents including the loss of peoples
    homes, businesses and communities in the area. The proposals are not
    justified in transport or impact terms. There is also inadequate
    information to explain how an unacceptable impact on the existing public
    transport network would be addressed. Given this lack of evidence and
    the scale of the negative impacts in the Euston area the case for to
    terminating the High Speed line here is not made. In addition long-term
    projects of this type carry a risk of planning blight, Euston and the
    surrounding area would be negatively impacted.

29. The proposal from HS2 Ltd does not provide adequate detail or a full
    comparison of the alternatives which include expanding and enhancing
    the existing rail network on an incremental basis. A proper assessment
    of the costs and benefits of upgrading the West Coast Mainline should
    be undertaken which includes
   • Optimising existing capacity by converting some first class carriages to
      standard class at peak times.
   • Operating longer trains, without major infrastructure expenditure
   • Infrastructure modifications to selected bottlenecks to increase
      frequencies.
   • Investment into platform lengthening, track reconfiguration and
      additional platforms where required.

30. Were high speed rail to progress as currently proposed then Camden
    would need to be convinced that the following needs are addressed at no
    cost to the Council.

     •   The replacement of and an increase in the number of affordable
         homes which are currently proposed to be demolished;
     •   An improvement in the quality of homes re-provided;
     •   The funding of all infrastructure upgrades required as a result of HS2
     •   Re-provision of open space;
     •   Funding to improve impacted schools;
     •   Funding for resident support during process, such as West Euston
         Partnership model;
     •   A large number of apprenticeships and jobs created for local people.

May 2011
             Written evidence from Leeds City Council (HSR 135)



1     Summary

1.1   Leeds City Council welcomes the Committee’s inquiry into the Government’s
      proposals for High Speed Rail.

1.2   The proposals for a high speed rail network are considered to offer major
      economic benefits for Leeds and the Leeds city region which represents 5%
      of the overall UK economy as well as opportunities to address the growing
      pressure on the classic rail network especially the East Coast Main Line. As
      such the Council supports the “Y” shaped network as proposed.

1.3   It is considered that the development of a high speed network will offer the
      one-off opportunity for a transformational change to the rail network, including
      connectivity to international networks, in a way which does not seem feasible
      for the classic network. However, parallel investment in the classic network to
      meet demand and develop services during the likely 20 year plus period in
      which the network to Leeds is developed should be strongly encouraged.

1.4   The timing and delivery of the network are critical matters and the City Council
      believes that it is essential that the proposed routes to the North should be
      developed in parallel so as to maximise the overall benefit to the Northern
      economy.


2     The City Council’s position on high speed rail

2.1   Leeds City Council is presently considering the implications of the
      Government’s proposed strategy for high speed rail prior to providing a full
      response in line with the deadline set by the Secretary of State for Transport.
      At this stage in the development of the high speed rail proposals the Council
      is continuing to work with a range of partners and potential stakeholders in
      the high speed rail project to develop a greater understanding of the detailed
      impacts of the proposals. This includes the West Yorkshire Integrated
      Transport Authority; the Leeds city region authorities; the Core Cities Group of
      England’s eight largest cities; and the High Speed Rail Eastern Network
      Partnership.

2.2   Leeds Metropolitan District sits at the heart of the 11 local authority areas
      which together form the Leeds City Region and forms basis for the Leeds City
      Region Local Enterprise Partnership. Leeds’ population of 800,000 makes up
      over a quarter of the city region population of nearly 3 million and the city
      contributes around 35% to the overall city region economy of £51 billion GVA,
      which represents 5% of the overall UK economy. Transport is therefore a vital
      part of maintaining a competitive economy.
2.3   The LCR is host to a number of major businesses and outside London, Leeds
      is the primary financial and business services centre employing 95,000 people
      in Knowledge Intensive Businesses. As well as this the City Region has
      significant strengths in existing and emerging sectors, particularly
      environmental sciences, electrical and optical equipment, bioscience, health
      and medical research, and digital and creative industries and the highest
      concentration of universities outside of London, and one of the largest clusters
      in Europe, providing over 36,000 graduates per year. Some 36% of the
      research produced by these higher education institutions is deemed world
      class and 10% is deemed world leading. National and international transport
      links are therefore critical to the success of Leeds and the City Region.


2.4   The City Council therefore supports the proposals for high speed rail and the
      proposals for a “Y” shaped network and welcomes the inclusion of Leeds in
      the proposed network.

3     Choice of Route

3.1   It is the City Council’s view that the “Y” shaped network offers the optimal and
      future proof solution for providing the basis for a network that can properly
      serve the North of England. By passing to the East and West it enables the
      route to become accessible to the majority of the population of England and
      as well as Leeds brings the East Midlands and South Yorkshire directly within
      the catchment of the network. This option also allows, in a way which the
      alternative reverse “S” shaped network did not, for the North East of England
      and Scotland to share in the benefits of the network initially through a direct
      connection into the classic East Coast route and with the potential to extend
      the high speed route. This also preserves options for longer term incremental
      development of the high speed network as well as ensuring that the network
      is less London focussed by catering better for intermediate “cross-country”
      journeys.

3.2   The decision to include provision for links to Heathrow Airport and directly to
      join the High Speed One route to the Channel Tunnel are also to be
      welcomed. It is considered that these additions to the route will improve its
      usefulness by the potential it offers for rail-air interchange and for the
      connectivity into the European high speed rail network. Having recognised
      this opportunity it is important as the project develops to formulate realistic
      plans for capture the benefits of this link to connect the North to Europe with
      direct services.

4     The case for high speed rail

4.1   The case for major investment in the UK rail network is considered to remain
      very strong with a continuing growing demand for rail travel both for local
      journeys and for longer distance travel that is generated by a modern
      economy and lifestyles which place a high value on good mobility. The
      completion of the first high speed line (HS1) from London to the Channel
      Tunnel has underlined the need to extend UK connectivity into the wider
      international high speed networks that have been spreading across Europe
      for several decades.


4.2   Improving journey speeds and hence connectivity alongside the release of
      capacity on the classic network is the main driver for the creation of a high
      speed network. The initial forecast journey times Leeds to London which
      knock off around one hour (or 60%) from the present journey time will be
      transformational in comparison to previous route modernisations. What is
      also significant is the much improved connectivity from Leeds to Birmingham
      and the West Midlands where present journey times would be halved. These
      changes will have a major impact on connectivity to Leeds and are considered
      to justify the choice of 360 kph network with the ultimate potential for 400 kph.

4.3   In terms of economic benefits the Government’s own analysis shows that the
      proposed “Y” shaped network delivers an estimated £44 billion of economic
      benefits over 60 years. Work for the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions
      indicates potential wider economic benefits over £2 billion and the Northern
      Way has estimated the economic agglomeration benefits to North at over £6
      billion. Sustaining strong and growing economies in the face of international
      competition and climate change requires a new approach to long distance
      travel.

4.4   The creation of a new network rather than further route modernisation will
      deliver the transformational change needed for the UK’s railways. Whilst it
      may be possible to increase the capacity of the existing main line routes
      serving the North, Yorkshire and the Humber and the East Midlands, the
      completion of the West Coast Main Line modernisation programme at a cost
      of nearly £9 billion and a timescale of 9 year to completion shows the very
      significant costs incurred by the “on-line” route improvements. Although this
      route has created new capacity forecasts suggesting that by the 2020’s this
      will have been used up. Similarly whilst maximum speeds of 125 mph have
      enabled journey time improvements, this has only delivered top speeds which
      have been the norm on significant lengths of the East Coast and Great
      Western main lines for several decades.

4.5   The West Coast Main Line modernisation illustrates that modernising live
      railways, often on historic alignments passing through heavily built up areas
      is a major and disruptive undertaking carrying significant management and
      operational costs. It is also difficult to significantly future proof classic routes
      for further development, for example in terms of increasing train speeds. This
      suggests that without a major step change of approach a transformational
      approach to the country’s inter-city networks is going to become increasingly
      more difficult. Therefore the City Council believes that the proposals for a
      purpose built high speed rail network are a one-off opportunity for the UK rail
      network to brought to a standard that matches those routes already
      established in Europe.

4.6   The City Council sees an urgent need to plan for tackling deficiencies in the
      existing “classic” rail network. For example on the East Coast Main Line the
      rolling stock is between 20 and 30 years old and an infrastructure that has
      seen a fraction of the investment made in the West Coast Main Line and
      similar could also be said of the Midland Main Line. Therefore the Council is
      firmly of the view that the development and progression of High Speed Rail
      proposals ultimately should provide for a durable and flexible “once and for
      all” solution. But in the meantime this should not be at the expense of this
      much needed investment in the classic routes, such as the Intercity Express
      Project to modernise the train fleet and investments in line speed and capacity
      enhancements.

4.7   High speed rail, by ‘freeing-up’ capacity on the classic rail network, will
      provide opportunities to utilise their capacity to provide better services for
      centres not served by the new routes. This additional capacity should also
      enable greater provision to be made for growing the role of rail freight.

4.8   What is less well quantified in the present work and will need to be
      understood better from experience elsewhere is the undoubted potential for
      transformational change to those centres through which the route will pass.
      Again the City Council recognises this potential opportunity and is working to
      understand what it will mean for th city and city region.


5     Timing of High Speed Rail
5.1   Whilst costs, logistics and industry capacity may well make it inevitable that a
      national high speed rail network will need to be delivered in phases, it is
      important that the full network is delivered at the earliest possible timescale
      and that every step is taken to minimise the time between the opening of the
      Birmingham route and completion of the wider network. In this regard it is
      particularly important that both legs of the ‘Y’ to Manchester and Leeds are
      delivered in parallel to ensure the economic and transformational advantages
      expected to be brought about by the arrival of high speed route can be
      shared. In this regard it is noted that previous work by HS2 indicated a
      potentially higher benefit cost ratio for the Eastern leg which suggests a
      strong case for the early progression of this section of route.

5.2   Leeds City Council at its Full Council Meeting on 6th April 2011, recognised
      the critical importance of the timing of project’s delivery when the following
      resolution was passed:


            That this Council expresses concern that the Government’s proposed
            hybrid bill relating to High Speed Rail will only adopt legal and planning
            powers for a route from London to the West Midlands. This Council
            therefore calls on the Government to reaffirm its commitment to
            bringing the social, economic and environmental benefits of High
            Speed Rail to Leeds by expanding the detail of the upcoming hybrid bill
            to include a framework for the north of England.
5.3   Since the full high-speed network is not expected to be completed until
      2032/33 it is important that investment in the classic network continues in the
      short to medium term. Such investment will not only sustain vital inter-city
      services on the East Coast main line but will also allow the continued
      development of regional and city region rail networks in order that the benefits
      of high speed rail for the classic network can be realised across the widest
      possible area. It is considered especially important that good connectivity
      from centres not on the high speed network is provided and that therefore
      modernisation of local rail networks alongside or ahead of the project is very
      important. There as well as the East Coast route investment in the key Trans-
      Pennine routes (both via Huddersfield and also the Calder Vale –
      Bradford/Halifax -Line) and local networks in West Yorkshire will be important
      to ensuring the widest possible inclusion of communities in the benefits of
      high speed rail.


      May 2011
                                                                                                      




                                    Written evidence from Passenger Focus (HSR 136)


        Introduction
1.      Passenger Focus 1 , the independent national rail consumer watchdog, welcomes the
        opportunity to respond to the Committee’s inquiry into High Speed Rail. Our response
        takes a passenger centric approach to HS2 and concentrates on the impact of the
        scheme on passengers rather than the economic and technical analysis behind the
        business case.

        The case for capacity
2.      As part of its input into the original High Level Output Statement (HLOS) Passenger
        Focus commissioned research 2 into passenger priorities for improvement. Around 4000
        passengers were asked to rank 30 different aspects of rail travel. The top ten priorities
        for improvement – in order of importance – were as follows:


                 Rank                           Rail Service Attribute (30 in total)


                       1     Price of train tickets offer excellent value for money
                       2     Sufficient train services at times I use the train
                       3     At least 19 out of 20 trains arrive on time
                       4     Passengers are always able to get a seat on the train

                       5     Company keeps passengers informed if train delays
                       6     Maximum queue time no more than 2 mins to purchase
                             tickets
                       7     Information on train times/platforms accurate and
                             available
                       8     Trains are consistently well maintained/in excellent
                             condition
                       9     Seating area on the train is very comfortable
                     10      Passengers experience a high level of security on the train




3.      In January/February 2011, Passenger Focus carried out new research throughout the
        West Coast Mainline franchise operating area to identify what passengers wanted the
        new franchise (beginning April 2012) to deliver. Just under 4500 passengers were
        asked to rank different aspects of rail travel. The table below shows the top ten
        priorities for the train company as a whole. It also shows the relative importance of each


                                                            
1
     Passenger Focus is the operating name of the Rail Passengers Council. 
2
    Rail Passengers’ Priorities for Improvements, Passenger Focus, April 2007.
                                                                                                        



        attribute – the higher the score the greater priority passengers assign to that service
        aspect, with scores over 125 being particularly important.


                                                                    Priorities for    Priorities for
                                                                   improvement:      improvement:
       Virgin Trains (Whole TOC)                                     rank order          indices
       Value for money for price of ticket                               1                246
       Punctuality / reliability of the train                            2                203
       Being able to get a seat on the train                             3                187
       Length of time the journey was scheduled to take
       (speed)                                                           4                139
       Upkeep/repair and cleanliness of the train                        5                108
       Frequency of trains for this route                                6                96
       Provision of information during times of disruption               7                76
       Personal security while on board the train                        8                70
       Personal security at the station                                  9                 59
       Ease of buying a ticket                                           10                57


4.      Both our national and TOC specific research show the importance of the ‘core product’
        itself – i.e. an affordable, reliable, frequent service with passengers being able to get a
        seat. Capacity is clearly one of the top priorities for improvement among existing
        passengers and, we believe, one of the major challenges facing rail in the coming years.

5.      Network Rail’s ‘New Lines’ study 3 looked at how best to solve the problem of growing
        demand for rail travel on the routes between Britain’s cities. It looked at four main travel
        corridors:
        • London to Yorkshire, the North East and Scotland (e.g. Leeds, Newcastle,
           Edinburgh)
        • London to the East Midlands (e.g. Leicester, Sheffield)
        • London to West Midlands, North West and Scotland (e.g. Birmingham, Manchester,
           Glasgow)
        • London to the West (e.g. Bristol, Cardiff)

6.      This study found that, despite all the investment to date, the route that will be become
        full first (by 2020) is the corridor to Birmingham and the North West. It recommended
        that the best solution was the building of a new railway line.




                                                            
3
   Meeting the capacity challenge: The case for new lines. Network Rail 
http://www.networkrail.co.uk/documents/About%20us/New%20Lines%20Programme/5886_NewLineStudy_s
ynopsis.pdf 
 
                                                                                                        



7.      The Route Utilisation Strategy (RUS) for the West Coast Main Line reached similar
        conclusions on demand growth on the route. It concluded that the route is nearly full to
        capacity and is already experiencing crowding – something that would only get worse as
        demand grew. For example, passenger demand for travel between London and
        Manchester was forecast to grow by as much as 61 per cent 4 . It recommended that a
        “continued programme of investment is essential to deal with the expected increase in
        passenger numbers and to help create a climate that allows the economy to grow and
        flourish.”

8.      DfT’s own analysis 5 also gives priority to the main north-south inter-city routes out of
        London, beginning with the West Coast Main Line.

9.      We believe that all these studies firmly establish the need for additional capacity and for
        this to focus, at least initially, on the West Coast route. There has been much debate
        about whether this could be delivered by upgrading existing infrastructure or whether it
        requires a new line and, moreover, whether any new line would need to be high-speed.
        From Passenger Focus’s perspective it is the provision of additional capacity that is the
        key priority – the other decisions being driven more in terms of identifying the most
        efficient and beneficial mode of delivery.

10. To this end existing studies on how to deliver this additional capacity are consistent.
    Network Rail’s new line study advocated a new line should be built and said that the
    strongest and best business case was made by making this new line capable of carrying
    high-speed trains. Likewise DfT’s consultation document concludes that conventional
    speed lines would not offer the same value for money as high speed rail and would not
    be significantly cheaper to construct and operate.

11. Passenger Focus agrees with the conclusions regarding the need for a new line, not
    least given the difficulties of modernising an existing line. Passengers know from hard
    earned experience that this will just mean a decade of disruption and engineering
    possessions while, for its part, the industry will lose valuable revenue at weekends and
    Bank Holidays. Virgin, for instance, has reported significant growth in demand in
    weekend travel since modernisation work ceased. The question of speed is, as
    mentioned, less of an issue for us and we must be guided by the detailed analysis
    provided by the experts which indicates that the best all round business case is
    achieved by building the new route with high speed capabilities.

         Capturing the passenger benefits
12. A new railway line also provides a once-in-a-generation chance to improve services –
         not just in terms of additional capacity in its own right but by rationalising services on
         existing routes. Passenger Focus believes that this aspect has not always come across
         in the debate on the merits of the proposed High Speed line - the perception being that
         unless it stops in ‘my area’ it brings no benefit whereas in fact it may allow the existing
                                                            
4
     West Coast Route Utilisation Strategy consultation. Network Rail. 2010. 
5
     High Speed Rail : Investing in Britain’s Future. DfT. February 2011  
                                                                                                     



    conventional line to provide a better all round service (e.g. in terms of greater regional or
    local connectivity). We believe, however, that any debate on what to do with capacity
    released on conventional lines must be based on what passengers want from their
    railway. We are keen that these questions are explored further and will be working with
    Network Rail and the DfT on research designed to establish passengers’ priorities.

14. We have also consistently argued that any new line must not divert funding and
    attention from ‘today’s’ railway. Getting a seat can already pose a problem for many
    passengers travelling during peak times on busy lines. Recent announcements on new
    trains and improved infrastructure are very welcome and it is important that these be
    introduced as quickly and efficiently as possible. Longer term it will be important to
    ensure that spending on the new line does not squeeze out additional investment in the
    rest of the network.

    Demand Management
15. The Transport Committee asks about the pros and cons of managing demand for rail
    travel through price rather than supply. There are many within the rail industry who
    argue that the best way of boosting revenue from fares is to simply put them up; and
    that removing fare regulation and moving to airline style pricing models allows better
    utilisation of capacity (particularly during the ‘shoulder peak’ period). We believe this
    misses two fundamental issues: rail passengers are often ‘captive consumers’ and
    railways are not airlines.

16. There are a number of groups for whom the train is effectively a monopoly service.
    People travelling into central London often have no practical option but to take the train
    because some parking restrictions and congestion in London make it extremely difficult
    to drive. There are many people (e.g. elderly people) who might feel unable to drive
    longer distances and so the train is their only practical option. Similarly many have no
    access to a car, often because they cannot afford the fixed costs of owning a car.

17. The presence of many consumers unable to respond to by switching supplier
    (constrained consumers) means that train companies can maximise their profits by
    setting their fares at a higher level than if the market consisted only of consumers with
    other options. Where competition within an industry is insufficient to control price then it
    is important that the market is regulated to stop captive consumers being exploited.

18. In a truly competitive market, new companies can enter a market and compete with
    existing suppliers, providing a brake on existing suppliers’ ability to increase prices. In
    the case of rail, it is rare for new suppliers to enter the market – on most routes the train
    company is a monopoly provider of rail services. Sometimes it is argued that road is an
    adequate competitor. However on many longer distance flows, rail is substantially
    quicker so the train company only faces competition from an inferior product. So this is
    not a market where supply can expand to meet demand.
                                                                                                    



19. In addition research by Passenger Focus in 2009 6 showed that Great Britain benefits
    from some of the most frequent services in Europe. The benefits of this are lost if you
    are tied to a specific train. Turn-up-and-go frequencies do not align themselves well to
    airline style book-ahead restrictions. Not everyone is able, or wants, to plan their precise
    train journey weeks or days in advance.

20. Another element identified by the research was the high price passengers pay for
    flexibility in their travel plans. Our European comparison showed that long distance
    travel in Britain can be cheaper than anywhere else, but in return passengers have zero
    flexibility – the ticket is for one train, and one train only. At the other end of the
    spectrum, the price of complete flexibility is very high compared with other countries.
    The price of flexibility is high – up to 10 times higher than the cheapest ‘one train only’
    ticket on some routes.

21. Flexibility was also an issue raised in research 7 among business passengers. The high
    price of flexibility within the ticketing structure, for example to allow for a meeting that
    overruns by 30 minutes, was cited as a particular problem for businesses.


        May 2011




                                                            
6
     Fares and Ticketing Study. Passenger Focus. 2009  
7
     Employers’ business travel needs from rail. Passenger Focus. February 2009. 
 
      Written evidence from ABTA – The Travel Association (HSR 137) 


1.      ABTA – The Travel Association was founded in 1950 - and is the leading
travel trade association in the UK, with over 1,400 members. Our members range
from small, specialist tour operators and independent travel agencies through to
publicly listed companies and household names, from call centres to internet
booking services to high street shops. ABTA members sell millions of
independent arrangements for travel both overseas and in the UK.

2.  We welcome the opportunity to contribute to your inquiry. We have
commented on points of principle and not on the detailed route.

Summary

3.     ABTA supports the proposed high speed rail network. However, we
believe this should complement additional airport capacity in the South East and
not be a substitute. We also feel there needs to be an integrated transport
system with seamless interchanges to international gateways and networks and
that the Government should commit to both phases from the outset with onward
extension to Scotland.

General

4.     ABTA has long supported additional runway capacity in the South East,
particularly at Heathrow and Gatwick, to allow for long-term growth. We were
very concerned at the Government’s announcement ruling out further runways at
Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted and its intention to make these airports better
and not bigger.

5.     ABTA believes that high speed rail will not solve Heathrow’s chronic
capacity constraints. The short-haul air market represents a relatively small
proportion of Heathrow’s total flights and passenger numbers. The airport serves
a small number of destinations in Scotland, Northern England and continental
Europe where there is some form of viable rail alternative available from central
London. HS1 between London and Paris and Brussels has reduced the number
of passengers flying between those destinations and London, but it has not
replaced the routes entirely. Many of Heathrow’s domestic passengers are
transferring to flights to other destinations from Heathrow. Further, unless there is
a direct link to the airport allowing passengers a seamless interchange, there is
no incentive to switch to rail from air. Rail is never going to be able to serve long-
haul destinations, and even for short-haul routes, rail will always be more limited
than in continental Europe because we are an island nation. Building a high
speed rail link is not an alternative to increasing runway capacity.

6.    To be noted that additional runway capacity will be paid by private funding
whereas HS2 will largely be paid for from the public purse.

Strategic Route
7.       ABTA strongly believes that the Government should commit to building the
full network to Leeds and Manchester from the outset, so that HS2 is not simply a
trunk route from London to Birmingham. Without this further extension, the case
for HSR becomes weaker given that it is the relieving of congestion on existing
rail lines to Manchester and Leeds that form a key element of the business case.
Without links to Manchester and Leeds, the degree to which HSR could help
reduce emissions from domestic air travel will be further limited.

8.     We also believe the Government should give early consideration to
onward extension to Scotland given the potential economic benefits created by
increasing connectivity within the UK.

9.    We feel that HS2 needs to be an integrated transport system with
seamless interchanges to international gateways and networks. This includes
HS1, Heathrow and Birmingham airports.

10.    It is not sufficient that Heathrow is connected by a spur link from Old Oak
Common. Unless there is a seamless interchange, passengers will not be
inclined to use HSR and will continue to fly in order to transfer to onward flights.

Environmental Impact

11.     HS2 Ltd themselves say that this project is at best carbon neutral. They
predict that 65% of passengers will either transfer from existing rail services, with
faster trains inevitably increasing carbon emissions, or are additional incremental
journeys as a result of faster trains which will also increase emissions.

12.   It is crucial that the environmental impact of a HSR network is fully
understood and plays a positive role in helping the UK meet its 2050 greenhouse
gas emissions reductions target.


13.   Thank you for taking our comments into consideration. We would welcome
the opportunity to contribute further or expand upon any of the above points.


16 May 2011
     Written evidence from Passenger Transport Networks (HSR 138)


Preamble and summary
1.   Jonathan Tyler joined British Rail as a Traffic Apprentice in 1962. His career path has
been from operations through demand modelling to BR-sponsored university lecturer and
then to independent-minded consultancy in a range of transport work. Since 2000 he has
specialised in making the case for the importance of integrated strategic timetabling,
drawing in particular on Swiss methodology and software for case-studies in Britain. Most
recently he was invited by Greengauge 21 to design a joint timetable for HS2 and the West
Coast Main Line in order to illustrate the opportunities for new services on the latter that
would be afforded by building HS2. He has also contributed to the service-planning
aspects of several other HS2 studies. It is this involvement in the technical debate that has
prompted the concerns expressed in this submission.
2.   The thrust of the submission is that the planning process for new high-speed railways is
too fragmented, based too much on bold assertions and too little on wide-ranging analysis,
and too high-level and thus lacking in crucial detail to have yet made a convincing case for
building HS2 in the form presently proposed. Attention is drawn to a troubling disconnect
between the frequency of services that is being promised and what can credibly be delivered.
However this is emphatically not an argument against HS2 in principle, and certainly not an
argument against the construction of any new lengths of railway. Rather it is a plea for a
more rigorous, extensive and realistic approach, for taking longer to examine the options but
in the end reaching sounder decisions, probably including a more even spread of benefits
across the regions, cities and towns of Britain. The paper restricts itself to responding to
selected questions in the Committee’s Inquiry; the author is aware of similar submissions that
provide more depth on some of the issues raised here. Full references and additional detail
appear in endnotes [p.8].


Introduction
3.   According to the consultation document the Government’s vision is “a truly national
high speed rail network for the whole of Britain” 1 . That is a desirable objective, but no
specification of its structure, other than of the ‘Y’ sub-network, has been published.
Instead there seem to be unquantified assertions, generalised aspirations, ill-defined
commitments and neglected collateral effects. No obvious mechanism exists for resolving
the contradictions, and they provide fodder for those who wish to block the proposals for
quite other reasons. In particular, no serious timetabling has been undertaken, despite the
fact that the timetable is the essential basis on which a railway, of its nature, must be
specified and operated.


Defining a national network
4.  I take ‘national network’ to mean one that provides every urban centre with a
reasonably equal quality of service commensurate with its geography and size,
supplemented by suburban railways and bus connections. Only such a network – going
beyond a few big-city links – is capable of meeting future demands for travel by a mode
that is inherently sustainable in a world where reducing carbon emissions and dependence
on increasingly expensive oil is imperative. Britain is some way from that ideal, since
service standards vary greatly, rail’s modal share varies greatly in consequence and
governments, unlike those of some other European countries, have never concerned
themselves with defining a programme to improve the situation 2 . For the reasons outlined
in this paper the adopted scheme for High Speed Rail does not provide a remedy either.


Why we are where we are
5.   Before discussing the problems it is as well to try to explain how we have got into this
situation. The overriding factors appear to be division of responsibility and differing aims.
6.   The Department for Transport [DfT] manages the passenger franchises as largely
separate units and with predominantly financial objectives. Improvements to the
infrastructure, however welcome, are not explicitly influenced by seeking to meet national
standards of service and inter-urban connectivity. The commitment to build new high-
speed lines seems instead to be driven by broad assumptions rather than by a detailed
analysis of where the country most needs capacity and accelerations. And local
governments have only a fragmented and reactive involvement, often, as in the case of
HS2, over-influenced by a determination to win a slice of the action.
7.   Responsibility for developing the proposals has been devolved by DfT to High Speed
Two Ltd [HS2 Ltd]. That is not in itself an issue, but HS2 Ltd’s approach is. It is clear that
the company is driven by the prospect of building the world’s most advanced high-speed
railway, at the cutting edge of technology and with dreams of exports. Whether that is
sensible or appropriate in a crowded island with dense development, relatively short
distances between urban centres and already-fast timings (at least on London routes) has
not been convincingly established.
8.  Network Rail has the herculean task of managing and improving the ‘classic’ network
and securing expansion of its capacity. Nonetheless, in public at least, it appears semi-
detached from the planning of HS2, despite the substantial implications of future inter-
running between HS2 and classic lines. In the same way Crossrail, another distinct entity,
does not seem to have had much involvement in HS2’s plans for the interchange at Old
Oak Common.
9.   Train operating companies mostly have short franchises that render them uninterested
in the long-term evolution of services in their territory, and their responses to demand are
determined more by the imperative of profit than by any sense of building a public
network. They have contributed little to the high-speed debate.
10. Finally, consultants engaged to develop schemes are obliged to follow the
specifications of their clients and to maintain secrecy (out of concern for property values),
with the result that no national debate can be held until detailed proposals are ready, by
which time it is too late for the community to have a proper conversation about the
purposes and characteristics of new railways.


                                                                                                 2
The fault lines in the current proposals
Confused strategies, poor forecasts and muddled economics
11. Government documents repeatedly emphasise the economic importance of faster
inter-city railway services, but it is curious how little analysis is presented of what the real
needs are if business travel is the primary motive. Instead, without discussing the mix of
business, commuting and leisure generators of travel (the last has sub-categories of
varying social benefit), the argument tends to shift to the allegedly serious impending
shortfall in capacity 3 . However this case is flawed. It pays too little attention to
weaknesses in pricing tactics, to the economic implications of the disparity between peak
and off-peak volumes and to the scope for relieving the problems (much sooner than HS2
could do) by lengthening and redesigning trains, by comparatively modest infrastructure
works and by a thorough review of over-cautious operating practices 4 .
12. Three particular features are of concern. One is that classical economic arguments in
favour of widening employment markets (to the point, for example, of encouraging mass
commuting between Milton Keynes and London and the growth of Birmingham <>
London commuting) will increasingly be tempered by resource and carbon constraints.
Such travel may even be greatly curtailed. The second is that a significant element of the
statistical evidence of overcrowding comes from operating companies who have an
interest in talking up the problem and the accuracy of whose data is not publicly tested.
And third, the Government’s normal economic rigour should be applied to questioning
whether the very high cost of alleviating the peak of the peak out of Euston on Friday
evenings can be justified.


Maximum speed
13. HS2 Ltd has specified a railway with a maximum speed of 400 km/h. That is beyond
the range of 300 to 360 km/h that is presently typical of new lines and trains. Given the
disproportionate increase in energy consumption as speed increases and the effect of very
high speed on route geometry one would have expected more open and deliberate
analysis of the costs and benefits of options for, say, 300, 350 and 400 km/h. For example,
between Birmingham and London running at 300 km/h would add only about five minutes
to the 400 km/h schedule of 49 minutes: it is not intuitively obvious that that would make
much difference to rail’s ability to capture traffic 5 .


Station location
14. The consultation paper emphasises the role of the railway in serving city centres 6 . This
has been a fundamental tenet of the design of railways throughout their history, and it has
become normal European practice where high-speed services have been introduced.
Moreover, likely trends make central stations critical: the new thinking on place-making
clearly indicates this, while building ex-urban stations that principally depend on cars for
access would be socially inequitable and (at best) unwise in terms of sustainability.


                                                                                                   3
15. Yet the present proposals refer imprecisely to what appear to be ‘parkway’ stations for
South Yorkshire and the East Midlands. Equally, the service specifications suggest that the
preoccupation with fast services between major centres has led to the omission of calls at
places such as Carlisle (a railhead serving a huge area) and Stoke-on-Trent (desperately in
need of regeneration).


Connections with the ‘classic’ railway
16. Closely associated with the economic-geography, access, land-use and resource
factors in favour of central stations is the question of connections with regional and local
public transport networks. These focus on main stations since their own primary function
is to serve the concentrated activity of city centres and since that optimises their links with
longer-distance services. If the links are broken because high-speed trains serve separate
stations then swathes of the population will be denied a share in the benefits from what is
likely to be a Government-funded project. A two-tier system of access to fast transits
would be economically detrimental.
17. HS2 Ltd has adopted a seemingly cavalier approach to the impacts of its proposals on
some users (notably those from Coventry 7 ) and on operation of the classic network. For
example, just north of the junction between HS2 and the West Coast Main Line [WCML]
near Lichfield lies one of the latter’s critical constraints, namely the flat junction at Colwich
and a two-track section in a four-track railway. It is proposed to add a significant number
of extra services, at least during phase one: it is not that they cannot be accommodated,
rather that to do so will have a material, yet barely acknowledged 8 , effect on the entire
WCML (and hence the national) timetable.
18. Similarly, HS2 Ltd holds out the prospect of connections between its trains and
Heathrow Express and long-distance services on the Great Western Main Line [GWML] at a
multi-function interchange at Old Oak Common in west London. The Heathrow case
derives from the assumed need to include the airport in the high-speed scheme and is
more persuasive than the idea of a direct spur [on which see ¶24-25]. The longer-distance
case is arguable, since the territory that could benefit is quite limited. GWML is already
operating close to its limits, and even when the pending electrification and resignalling
add capacity that will quickly be absorbed by indigenous growth. Apparently unaware of
this, HS2 does not appreciate that stopping just the Heathrow trains would remove the
performance buffer and outer-suburban paths, while the only practicable timetable
including stops in GW services would require every train to call (because that, and twin
platforms, is the only way to maintain a smooth flow). This would lead to costly works and
cause an unacceptable loss of time for GW travellers, relative to marginal gains to
interchangers.


Incoherent timetabling of HS2 services
19. Incoherence in timetabling is also evident in questions about how HS2 itself would
work. No evidence has been published about the effect on headways of intermediate
stops at Birmingham Interchange and Old Oak Common, apart from unspecific statements
about track geometry. Operation of a very frequent service imposes particular
                                                                                                    4
requirements on the design of the new Euston, yet turnround and platform-reoccupation
times seem optimistic, and it is doubtful whether space exists for the grade-separation that
may be essential to avoid conflicts at the ‘throat’. And published summaries of the
proposed services are disjointed. We discuss the links to HS1 and Heathrow and the
matter of the total number of paths in separate sections below; here we draw attention to
issues concerning the pattern of services and the treatment of particular places.
20. Carlisle and Stoke-on-Trent were mentioned above. The descriptions of the modelling
hardly refer to how sub-regional centres will be linked to the core network. No strategy
has been set for through running or systematically-planned connections to serve places
such as Wakefield, Huddersfield, Rotherham, Chesterfield, Derby, Motherwell, Bolton and
Wolverhampton, and no data has been proffered on the share of total demand and
potential economic benefits that such places represent or on whether HS2 trains could be
adequately loaded without their traffic.
21. Diagrams outline possible services between provincial centres on the two arms of the
‘Y’ route 9 , but those on the eastern arm are meaningless so long as the location of the
stations is unknown (greenfield sites would have negligible value for intra-regional
journeys) and those on the western arm raise difficulties in serving Macclesfield, Stoke and
Wolverhampton which in turn affect the working of WCML in ways that are being ignored.
And it is very odd timetabling to suggest that all four Birmingham trains, none of the
Manchester trains and one random Leeds train will call at Birmingham Interchange.


Links to HS1 and London Heathrow Airport
22. The Government believes that HS2 should be connected with HS1 (the line from
London St Pancras to the Channel Tunnel and the continental railway network) in order
that through trains can operate between British and key European cities. The cost of such
a link (including border controls at regional stations) would be considerable, its operation
would be extremely difficult (it has not been shown that it is even feasible to timetable HS
trains along a section of high-frequency urban line), and it would import into the working
of HS2 just the kind of perturbation that HS2 Ltd, when specifying frequencies, has said
must be avoided. In any case, the pattern of services could not possibly offer particularly
attractive frequencies in competition with direct air services.
23. The initial evaluation of demand for through services demonstrated that they could
not be justified and proposed a local connection between Euston and St Pancras (which
would not entail any greater inconvenience than travellers endure at airports). The
Government has chosen instead merely to assert the need for the link 10 , abetted by parts
of the railway promotion lobby that fantasise about romantic international expresses but
hardly analyse the market.
24. A similar situation exists in respect of the proposed link to Heathrow. Several
evaluations have found against it on the grounds of demand relative to the cost and to the
practical difficulties of securing an effective service without degrading the London offer –
the prime purpose of HS2. However the idea of a link is powerful if one buys into belief in
an ever-expanding global economy without noting the probability that the very
environmental constraints that are used to justify transfers to rail are likely to curtail

                                                                                               5
aviation, especially business trips for which video conferencing is a viable substitute and
the marginal leisure trips which cannot conceivably provide an economic rationale for
public expenditure on so expensive a new piece of railway.
25. The plan for an interchange with Crossrail (but not Heathrow Express [see ¶18]) is a
plausible alternative with other strong arguments in its favour (though it does depend on
acceptance of the westerly route though the Chilterns), but this is seen only as an interim
measure (at great cost), partly on the basis of the government’s visceral objection to
interchanging 11 . That is not a convincing foundation for serious transport planning.


The capacity of HS2 : aspirations, paths and the urgent need for realism
26. Given the Government’s presentation of HS2 as a national project and given the
strong sense in the regions (especially in Scotland and northern England) that they should
obtain early and tangible benefits from this huge investment it is entirely understandable
that many aspirations are being expressed for inclusion in the pattern of high-speed
services. At the same time HS2 Ltd has uncritically bought into the story about capacity
promulgated by Network Rail and Virgin Trains and thus extrapolated current WCML
services to 2026 and HS2 without sufficient analysis of priorities. The result is an
extraordinary muddle that threatens the credibility of the entire scheme. The issues are
summarised in the table overleaf (note that the numbers of paths are for the peak period,
since that is what matters most when planning the timetable).
27. A railway has a finite capacity that depends on the layout and speed of the route, the
design of signalling, its operational rules, the acceleration, braking capability and stopping
patterns of the trains and the mix of these characteristics. As a general rule, the more
homogeneous the services the more trains can be operated. High-speed lines tend to
have this property, but conversely headways must be wide enough to secure safe
separation between trains in the event of a serious incident. At present no high-speed line
anywhere in the world runs at more than 14 trains/hour 12 . Advances in signalling may raise
this to 16 as a peak-period maximum, with some performance risks accepted and if fewer
paths are used off-peak to provide a recovery margin.
28. HS2 Ltd believes that 18 trains/hour may eventually be feasible, but many railway
people see this as supremely optimistic, dependent on far-from-proven technology and
thus an unsound base for planning: it would be irresponsible to raise expectations and rest
calculations of benefit on unachievable scenarios. Moreover, it is expressly admitted that,
while 18/hour allows for everyday, unavoidable perturbations within the high-speed
system, it would by that same token only be practicable in circumstances where the system
has been largely quarantined from the more troubled conditions on the classic railway.
The fact that that may not be realised for many years and may be undesirable, for reasons
argued earlier, thus strengthens the case for caution.
29. However HS2 Ltd now envisages 18 for the Y network without explaining why it thinks
that will be achievable by the opening of phase 2 13 . The proposed distribution of paths is
shown in the first column of the table. Broadly the plan is to run four Birmingham services,
six on the eastern arm of the Y and eight on the western arm. A strange note is then
appended: “Further work is being done to determine which of the above services might

                                                                                              6
serve Heathrow and which might run on to mainland Europe”. That is more than a
technical matter of ‘further work’ ! It is absolutely fundamental to the concept and
objectives of HS2.
30. Column 2 sets out a specification that combines the aspirations expressed around the
country with an outline evaluation of the ideal frequencies required to make the services
attractive in terms of convenience (assuming continued availability for the majority of
travellers of the ever-flexible car). The total is an impossible 27 to 30, including provision
for HS1 and Heathrow trains. Something must give, and an optimistic maximum scheme is
presented in column 3. This cuts Edinburgh and Glasgow to alternate-hour trains each,
removes a Newcastle service, sharply trims the Yorkshire, East Midlands and North West
patterns and reduces both HS1 and Heathrow to a thin provision of only 2 trains/hour
each. Column 4 removes two more paths to bring the total to an altogether more rational
planning maximum of 16 trains/hour.


   Frequency of HS2 services under a range of scenarios [trains /
   ho r]
                                              1                                  2                                         3                         4                      5                     6                        7
                                  Appraisal of the Y Network




                                                                                                                                                                                                                with portion working but
                    scenarios                                                                                                              trimmed to 16 trains/h
                                    Figure A2 in Economic




                                                                                                                                                                                         with portion working
                                                                                                     aspirations trimmed




                                                                                                                                                                    no Heathrow or HS1




                                                                                                                                                                                                                  no Heathrow or HS1
                                                                                 ideal frequencies
                                                               aspirations and




                                                                                                                           to 18 trans/h




                                                                                                                                                                         services




                                                                                                                                                                                                                        services
    routes


   rest of Britain <> LONDON
   Edinburgh                                   -                                 1                                    0.5                      0.5                          1
                                                                                                                                                                                                  1                        1
   Glasgow                                    2                                  1                                    0.5                      0.5                          1
   Newcastle ... York                         2                         1-2                                                -                          -                      -                     -                        -
   Leeds                                      2                                  2                                         1                         1                      1
   Sheffield                                                                     2                                         2                         1                      2                     2                        3
                                              2
   Nottingham                                                                    2                                         1                         1                      1
   Manchester                                 4                         3-4                                                3                         3                      3
   Liverpool                                  2                                  2                                         1                         1                      2                     3                        4
   other North West                            -                        1-2                                                1                          -                     1
   Birmingham                                 4                                  4                                         4                         4                      4                     4                        4
   spare                                       -                                 -                                         -                          -                      -                    2                        2
   rest of Britain <> HEATHROW
   Manchester                                                                    1                                         1                         1                       -
                                                                                                                                                                                                  1                         -
   other North West                                                              1                                         -                          -                      -
   Leeds … East Midlands                                                         1                                         -                          -                      -                    1                         -
   Birmingham                                                                    1                                         1                         1                       -
   rest of Britain <> HS1
   Scotland                                                                 0.5                                            -                          -                      -                     -                        -

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           7
   Newcastle … Leeds                                0.5        -        -        -        -         -
   Manchester                                        1         1        1        -        1         -
   other North West                                 0.5        -        -        -                  -
   East Midlands                                    0.5        -        -        -        1         -
   Birmingham                                        1         1        1        -                  -
   TOTAL                                   18       27 –      18       16       16       16        14
   ‘0.5’ = service in alternate hours; figures in columns 6 and 7 are for combined trains (ie. x2 for
31. At that point it must be asked whether the listed HS1 and Heathrow services would
offer sufficient flexibility to attract travellers who have the alternative options of either
direct flights or a relatively simple interchange along the Euston Road. Operationally too
the need to provide connections would impinge on timetable planning. And above all the
frequency could not justify the cost of constructing the two links while the unavoidable
loss of Euston services would undermine the economics of HS2, with consequences
probably spreading back to the capacity that it was supposed to release on WCML. The
inescapable conclusion is that links to HS1 and Heathrow cannot be justified and should be
removed from the Government’s proposals. They are simply not credible.
32. The outcome of achieving clarity on this issue is shown in column 5, where the freed
paths are redistributed to give a more appropriate domestic network: these are the
services timed in detail in the Greengauge exercise in proposals wholly integrated with
other services on WCML 14 .
33. There is one possible source of relief, but it is another sign of the confusion
surrounding pathing that statements differ and practical proposals are absent. HS2 Ltd
proposes that the Birmingham <> London trains should be composed of two 200-metre
sets, and the stations are to be designed to accommodate 400-metre trains. Yet the trains
working through from and to the classic railway would be formed of single 200-metre sets
(presumably total separation might allow coupled units for Leeds and Manchester
eventually, but not for other places). This would represent substantial under-utilisation of
capacity.
34. The solution of course is to run separate sets between provincial centres and locations
in the Midlands where they would couple to run over the core HS2 section – and divide on
the return 15 . The practice is commonplace with German and French high-speed trains,
which seem to manage it effectively. The suspicion must be that HS2 Ltd is so committed
to achieving the fastest possible times between major centres that it has lost sight of
practical service-planning. Joining and splitting does require time for the technical
operation, a performance margin and one or two stations on the existing railway rebuilt to
handle 400-metre trains, but it would bring with it great gains in connectivity and
frequency and more effective use of the new capacity.
35. The implications are shown in the last two columns of the table. It could be used to
retain two trains/hour for both HS1 and Heathrow, but it would be better (column 7) to
maintain a worthwhile frequency on each Y arm and to run only 14 trains/hour. Natural
locations for joining and splitting are Derby and Stafford. Crucially, pursuing this concept
implies closer integration between the old and the new systems than HS2 Ltd might wish –
but with large potential benefits – and it would predicate comprehensive timetabling of
the whole network.

                                                                                                        8
36. Finally a point must be made about regulation and competition. The analysis of
possible distributions of paths assumes a planned railway (because a complex system
demonstrably depends for its optimal functioning on planning). If multiple operators are
granted access by a regulator to compete for the most lucrative markets it is certain that
services for the less lucrative markets will be cut back, to the detriment of an even
spreading of benefits. The ambiguity in government policy on this matter must soon be
resolved. It should be noted that a service planned by a public-interest agency does not
exclude its delivery by a range of contracted parties.


What should now be done ?
37. The strategic objectives of HS2 are in disarray. Timetable planning on the existing
network is not in good shape, as the East Coast saga has shown 16 . Awkward interfaces
between plans across the country are becoming more evident, and none so much as those
between HS2 and the classic railway. It has not been proven conclusively that the capacity
shortfall on WCML merits a huge single project that cannot deliver benefits for fifteen
years, in preference to enlarging the programme of smaller, more immediate incremental
projects across the country, particularly ones that might appreciably lift rail’s very low
modal share. And timetabling is emphatically not some secondary technical activity that
can be undertaken long after large projects have been designed.
38. In my view, what is needed is a process that (a) starts with a matrix of flows by all
modes and models future demand under a range of scenarios; (b) sets targets for modal
shares driven by environmental (eg. carbon-reduction) as well as economic factors; (c)
derives a national timetable plan to meet the forecast demand, within a framework of
standards and free of historical and institutional preconceptions; and (d) draws up a
national rail infrastructure plan to enable the planned services to run in an operationally
efficient manner. Such a process might well generate a case for new lines, including even
something akin to the current proposal, but they would be embedded in a coherent plan
for the benefit of the country as a whole. The tools and the data exist for such an exercise
– and to undertake it would bring Britain into line with Switzerland, whose much admired
public transport network has been built through applying broadly this methodology over
the last thirty years and which already enjoys a vision for the next twenty.


May 2011




1
    Department for Transport [DfT] (2011 - February). High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. Consultation. This
quote [at p.28] comes from the May 2010 Programme for Government.
2
    For one of countless examples see: Abbott, S (2011). A lament for Lincoln. Modern Railways, May, pp. 69-73.
3
    For example, the consultation document [op.cit., pp. 9-10] slips from generalisations about economic growth and
competitiveness into an uncritical discussion about capacity, for which high-speed lines may, or may not, be the solution.
The too-easily-forgotten Eddington Transport Study [Department for Transport (2006)] concluded [Volume 2, ¶2.18] that
“average rail journey times between major UK urban areas are close to that [sic] of other European countries, with
journeys between London and other UK major cities performing particularly well relative to journeys from other European




                                                                                                                         9
capitals”. In its advice to Government [Executive Summary, ¶1.50-1.52] it placed the emphasis on the density of transport
demand rather than on high speed. The genesis of the present proposals lies in the former but has been taken over by
the latter. The report is archived at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://
www.dft.gov.uk/adobepdf/187604/206711/executivesummary.pdf and ~ /206711/volume2.pdf.
4
     Some safety rules are unnecessarily restrictive, some timing margins are longer than they need be in order to protect
Network Rail’s performance record, and on some sections more trains could probably be run in peak periods by trading
off the advantage of more seats against occasional risks to punctuality.
5
     Author’s estimate from the published diagrams [www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/proposedroute/maps/].
Comparisons between current and high-speed journey-times must be transparent with regard to recovery margins: the
latter are probably being quoted with modest allowances whereas the former are inflated by the malign effects of the
prevailing performance regime.
6
     “Inter-city rail links have an unrivalled capacity to enable rapid and direct journeys between central business districts”
[op.cit., ¶1.32]; HS2 Ltd’s “demand-led” approach indicated “city centre station locations with high quality onward
transport links” [¶4.6].
7
     It described its future London service of one train/hour (rather than three) as ‘residual’ [DfT (2009). High Speed Rail:
London to the West Midlands and Beyond. HS2 Technical Appendix, Appendix 2, p.17].
8
     “It is assumed that some infrastructure/signalling works have taken place in the Stafford area to alleviate this known
capacity constraint” [ibid, ¶2.20]. Any project would be complex, environmentally fraught and very costly.
9
     DfT (2011 - February). Economic Case for HS2: The Y Network and London – West Midlands. Figure A2, p.61.
10
     Compare the two appraisals: DfT (2010). High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and Beyond. A Report to
Government by High Speed Two Limited*, §3.8, and ¶3.24-3.33 of the Consultation document [op.cit].
*
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/hs2report/pdf/chapt
er3d.pdf.
11
     The Secretary of State is reported to have said "Lug your heavy bags down a couple of escalators along 600m of
corridor and then change trains at a wet suburban station somewhere in north west London. That is not an option"
[http://www.estatesgazette.com/blogs/jackie-sadek/2010/08/transport-sec-chops-down-old-oak-high-speed-2.html].
12
     As far as this author is aware. The Tokaido Line runs at 14 trains/hour in the morning peak into Tokyo. There are
plans for 15/hour in France after 2020.
13
     See the figure referenced at endnote 9. The original specification was 14 trains/hour in the peak (10 off-peak) with
“an ultimate capacity of 18” [see endnote 7, Appendix 1, ¶2.3.2].
14
     Greengauge21 (2011). High-speed rail: capturing the benefits of HS2 on existing lines. The present author designed
the timetable summarised in this report; a detailed technical report will shortly be available. See:
www.greengauge21.net/wp-content/uploads/Capturing-the-benefits-update.pdf.
15
     The consultation document refers rather casually to portion working for Heathrow services [op.cit., p.66], and two
associated Factsheets mention coupled running, but no other reference is known. See:
http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hs2-trains_0.pdf and ~ files/connecting-to-
heathrow_0.pdf.
16
      See: Tyler, J (2010). How not to write a timetable. Modern Railways, November, pp. 64-66.




                                                                                                                                 10
 Written evidence from Jonathan Tyler, Passenger Transport Networks (HSR 138A)



                The maximum capacity of HS2 and the priorities for its use

In written evidence to the Commons Select Committee Inquiry into High Speed Rail [HSR
138] I drew attention to the confusion surrounding the capacity and timetabling of HS2.
Having listened to the session of oral evidence on 21 June and checked the (uncorrected)
transcript I am alarmed at how unappreciated this fundamental issue is. It urgently needs
rigorous examination.

Several witnesses before the Committee quite rightly emphasised their concern that the
plans for HS2 both lack a strategic context and are not based on any substantive timetable
planning. This is nowhere more apparent than in the rather loose expressions of
aspirations for services. And if those cannot be realised then the business case will be
undermined.

The maximum number of trains/hour on any high-speed railway is 14 (into Tokyo in the
morning peak on the original Tokaido Line). I note the categoric statement of Pierre
Messulam from SNCF [Q84] that the maximum feasible capacity of a high-speed railway is
16 trains/hour. No one has persuasively demonstrated that that can be exceeded, which
makes HS2 Ltd’s assumption of 18 seem exceptionally optimistic.

In order to relieve the capacity shortfall on the West Coast Main Line (accepting here that a
shortfall will exist and that a new railway is the appropriate solution) the minimum
requirement for London paths in a peak hour on the ‘Y’ network is as follows:

     Scotland                            1

     Manchester                          3

     Liverpool                           1

     other North West                    1

     Yorkshire and East Midlands         3

     Birmingham                          3

These numbers are based on current patterns, likely growth and reasonable aspirations.
They also represent frequencies that would be credible in market terms and broadly
adequate relative to the construction costs of a high-speed line.

The total number of paths is 12. However, HS2 Ltd envisages 4 Birmingham trains/hour in
the peak, while the draft WCML Route Utilisation Strategy raised the foreseeable need for
4 Manchester trains. It is improbable that there would not be similar requirements on the
other routes, and only 3/hour on the eastern arm of the Y is a bare minimum that would
diminish any hope of significant relief of the East Coast and Midland Main Lines.

This leads to the inescapable conclusion that the maximum capacity of 16 trains/hour will
be fully utilised by London services. It follows, given present assumptions, that no capacity
will be available for independent through services to HS1, the Channel Tunnel and Europe,
or for direct services to Heathrow Airport.

For each of these routes the minimum pattern to provide attractive options for travellers
and to justify the (high) cost of construction of the links would be 2 trains/hour. Four
paths could be taken from the London totals outlined above, but only if the HS2 and classic
timetables for the routes concerned were to be integrated more intimately than has so far
been suggested in order to offer an excellent overall service, albeit with many connections
rather than through trains. This solution would however become increasingly difficult if
the HS1 and Heathrow frequencies were raised to the more desirable 3/hour each and
infeasible for any greater number.

An alternative approach would be to adopt ‘portion working’, ie. to run trains coupled
together over the common and busiest sections. Since the line will be engineered to take
2 x 200m trains and since it will optimise the technical arrangements for (un)coupling its
practicability is not in question. However the many issues that would need resolution do
not appear to have been addressed:

       locations for (un)coupling must be identified and designed (and may not lie on HS2
       itself);

       the best combinations of services must be carefully considered;

       even with optimal operational arrangements (un)coupling takes time;

       portion working can transfer disruption from one section to the wider network; and

       interaction between HS1 and HS2, in planning and in real time, will be problematic
       (it could for example cause a reduction in paths/hour in order to allow for
       operational delays).

In sum, portion working might help to resolve the conundrum of how HS2 can serve the
London market and the Europe market and the Heathrow market, but this can only be
established if the present specifications are revisited and if a comprehensive strategic-
timetabling and infrastructure-planning exercise is undertaken. Even then it is difficult to
see how the more optimistic forecasts of demand for all three markets are compatible with
a two-track railway limited to 16 trains/hour.

There is potentially a similar incompatibility between the aspirations for inter-regional
(non-London) services on the two arms of the ’Y’ and the capacity of the route between
their junction near Lichfield and the delta junction at Water Orton.
Finally it must be stressed that this assessment assumes strong central planning of the
utilisation of capacity, albeit with delivery possibly in the hands of more than one operator.
If on-track competition between operators were to be introduced (as is now envisaged on
HS1 and assumed in certain quarters for HS2) then the matter of priorities would become
even more intractable.


Jonathan Tyler designed what is to date the only integrated timetable for HS2 and WCML. This was
commissioned by Greengauge 21 ** and was the work referred to by Professor Nash in his evidence on 21
June [Q21].

** see http://www.greengauge21.net/publications/capturing-the-benefits-of-hs2-on-existing-lines/

25 Jun 2011
                                 Written evidence from SEStran (HSR 139)

1.   What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

1.1 The main arguments for HSR are; Economy, Rail Capacity and Journey times and the
     Environment.

1.2 Economy and re-distribution of wealth; The positive link between economic growth and transport
     connectivity has been long established. Experience in other countries has shown that HSR
     stimulates economic growth outwith the Capital City such as for Lille in France and will therefore
     re-balance the national economy and reduce the current north-south divide

1.3 Rail capacity; The West Coast RUS concluded that the southern end of this line would soon run
     out of capacity to cater for expected growth and the only effective way to deal with this scenario
     would be to build an additional line. The East Coast and the Midland Main Line would also in due
     course experience a similar situation. The construction of HS2 would then release capacity on
     existing main lines, in particular the West Coast, which will cater for additional local rail services
     and freight.

1.4 Reduced End-to-End Journey time; This is a more important benefit for North of England and in
     particular Scotland where rail still has a relatively low share of the inter-city travel market and
     where only HSR can facilitate a step change in modal share from air to rail and safeguard long-
     term connectivity.

1.5 Environment; Increased capacity and reduced journey times will stimulate transfer from car and air
     to rail. Rail is the only mode with the realistic potential to transport large volumes of passengers
     over long distances between city centres in a sustainable manner, in particular with an increasing
     proportion of the primary energy being renewable.

2.   How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

     HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to
     other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

2.1 The objectives of HSR go well beyond improving inter-urban connectivity through improved
     capacity and reduced journey time. Other objectives that will be met through HSR would be to
     enhance and redistribute wealth and to make transport more sustainable.

2.2 Some of these objectives could be met by investing in other transport modes but when compared
     with roads, rail is in particular more environmentally sustainable (air quality, energy use, land use)
     and is best suited for travel between and to access city-centres.

     Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network,
     for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

2.3 There are already significant ‘high-cost’ rail projects under construction, in particular London Cross
     Rail (approx. £15 billion over around 7 years) and Thameslink (approx. £5.5 billion over around 8
    years) and it does not appear than these schemes have affected funding for the general ‘classic’
    network.

2.4 These two schemes will be very close to completion by the time construction would start on the
    proposed HSR between London and Birmingham in around 2016. At an approx. cost of £17 billion
    over 10 years, the peak expenditure on the London-Birmingham HSR should be no higher than for
    Crossrail alone, never mind the combined peak expenditure of the two London projects.

2.5 There is already commitment to invest in a significant number of classic rail projects, such as Great
    Western Main Line electrification, Intercity Express Train Replacement Programme (IEP) and
    significant further enhancements to the East and West Coast Main Lines (e.g. Hitchins and
    Stafford flyovers)

    What are the implications for domestic aviation?

2.6 In 2009, approximately 8.8 million out of the 13.2 million domestic UK Mainland air passenger
    journeys were between the main cities that it is anticipated will eventually be directly served by a
    UK HSR Network (London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds,
    Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow). With significantly faster rail journeys, there should be a major
    shift from air to a much more sustainable rail travel mode.

2.7 However, out of the 8.8 million air journeys, as many as 6.7 million either start or finishes in
    Edinburgh or Glasgow so in order to make a significant modal change, it is imperative that in the
    longer term, the construction of a high speed rail network also includes new lines across the
    Border.

2.8 The 2009 rail market share of the Edinburgh/Glasgow to London rail/air market was around 20%
    with rail journey times of typically 4hrs 30 mins. For the Newcastle to London rail/air market, rail
    held around 60%, with a rail journey time of around 3 hrs and for Manchester-London journeys, rail
    held around 76% of the rail/air market with a typical rail journey time of around 2 hrs 10 mins. For
    the Leeds to London air/rail market, rail held more than 95% of the market, with a typical rail
    journey time of 2 hrs 15 mins.

2.9 A 30 mins reduction in journey time (which should be achieved with high speed rail between
    London and West Midlands), could therefore see a shift from air to rail of nearly 1.5 million of
    today’s long-distance passenger journeys. This should increase to more than 3 million with the
    extension of the network to Leeds and Manchester when it must be assumed that domestic flights
    between Manchester/Leeds/ Newcastle and London will end. It is acknowledged however that
    modal split is also affected by other factors such as frequency and fares and ease of airport
    access.

2.10 In addition, there would also be significant growth in the total long-distance travel market so the
    overall transfer from rail to air with the introduction of a high speed rail network will be considerably
    higher.
2.11 3.8 million out of the 8.8 million air journeys quoted above are to or from London Heathrow so
     there should be significant scope to release valuable take-off and landing slots to other routes.
     Some of these Heathrow slots should go to domestic air routes that do not directly benefit from
     High Speed Rail, such as Aberdeen and Inverness, so that these cities do not ‘fall behind’ in
     respect of London connectivity.

3.   Business case

     How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare
     levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the
     ‘classic’ network?

3.1 A number of fairly in-depth studies have been undertaken into a UK High Speed rail Network in
     addition to the HS2 study, in particular the following three major studies:-

     1.   Atkins study (on behalf of SRA), later updated for the Government in 2008

     2.   Network Rail ‘New Lines’ study (2009)

     3.   Greengauge21’Fast Forward’ study (2009)

3.2 The studies looked at different HSR solutions and had different objectives behind their proposals.
     However, there were common strands such as a north-south network linking in the major cities
     between London and as far as Edinburgh and Glasgow. They all showed positive cases for a HSR
     network with benefit/cost ratios in the region of 2 – 3.5 and costs and passenger forecasts
     comparable with those found in the HS2 study.

3.3 A recent argument is that assumptions on time spent on trains is ‘un-productive’ has overestimated
     the benefits of HSR. A recent study by Greengauge21 (where time spent on train would be
     regarded as ‘working-time’) did however show that the opposite was the case (although only
     marginally so). Passengers transferred from car and air would gain more productive time than in
     the original estimate and this would outweigh the ‘over-estimate’ (in the original study) of working
     time gained by passengers transferred from classic train services.. It could also be argued that
     HSR will create a better working environment than current rail services and also that there will be a
     limit as to how long it is reasonably practical to work on a train.

3.4 The study by HS2 surprisingly did not include Edinburgh – London services in its modelling and
     business case for the London – Birmingham/Litchfield High Speed Line although the Edinburgh –
     London market is around 30% greater than the Glasgow – London market . Edinburgh – London
     Services via the West Coast and HS2 would be around 30 mins faster than existing services (as
     for Glasgow services) so by including Edinburgh – London services should make the business
     case even stronger.

     What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the
     West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?
3.5 Upgrading the West Coast Main Line could only be limited in scope in respect of capacity and the
     Network Rail RUS concluded that the only longer-term capacity solution would be to construct a
     new line between London and West Midlands.

3.6 The most recent upgrading of the West Coast Main Line also saw significant added costs in terms
     of disruption to services and reduced capacity during construction. Adding these costs to the actual
     upgrading cost of around £9 billion (the most recent cost estimate) for a scheme that will give less
     incremental capacity than a new line, it is almost certain that such an upgrade will not be better
     value than a new line.

3.7 A new conventional line (restricted to 125 mph) would largely resolve the capacity issue but would
     not enhance journey-times and would therefore be much more limited in benefits to North of
     England and Scotland where journey times become increasingly more important. Without the
     journey-time savings, there will not be such a significant shift to rail from the less environmentally
     sustainable modes of car and air. Greengauge21 has also shown that the cost of a conventional
     line is only marginally cheaper than a High Speed line.

     What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by
     price?

3.8 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would push passengers back
     onto less sustainable modes such as car or air, or journeys would not be undertaken in the first
     place which would be damaging in overall socio-economic terms.

3.9 There must also be doubts if price alone could realistically manage to reduce demand sufficiently
     to avoid investing in additional capacity. Regulated fares are already the highest in Europe and
     increasing these fares much further in real terms could make rail travel only affordable by the more
     well-off in society.

     What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high
     speed lines are built on time and to budget?

3.10 Construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a reasonably good
     track record in terms of time and budget, e.g. HS1 and the recent Airdrie-Bathgate budget. There
     will also be a large number of European High Speed projects that have a good record in this
     respect.

4.   The strategic route

     The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham
     International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be
     used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

4.1 The most important issue for high speed rail is that stations serve the city centre. Rail is the most
     efficient mode in respect of land use to access city centres and without city-centre termini the
     advantage of high speed rail will be seriously eroded.
4.2 Station locations outwith city centres will depend on local circumstances but the general rule of
     thumb should be that not all services will necessary stop at non-city-centre stations.

4.3 Additional stations should only be provided where there is sufficient demand for long distance rail
     travel. The temptation would be to add stations to cater for high volumes of shorter journeys such
     as commuting, but that would soon erode the benefits of HSR.

     Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right
     choice?

4.4 Most studies have considered wider networks that include London, Birmingham, Manchester, East
     Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow. These should be considered as
     the core cities for a north-south high speed network (which could be expanded by a western
     network). The y-network would fit in well with this scenario.

     Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

4.5 Pragmatically it makes perfect sense to start the HSR network with the London-Birmingham
     section. It is the most capacity constrained section on the West Coast Main Line and it is probably
     also the most complicated section to plan and construct. Furthermore, the link to London is the
     most essential element of a national HSR network so should the London – Birmingham section be
     rejected, it is unlikely that a national network will ever materialise.

4.6 However, future phases do not necessarily have to be in a consecutive northwards order. The
     most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the English-Scottish border so
     serious consideration should be given to start construction of northern sections at an earlier stage
     rather as the last legs.

4.7 In particular, the Government should show greater commitment to plan the future network beyond
     Manchester and Leeds so that the longer term benefits of a national network become clearer.

     The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of
     Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

4.8 The link to HS1 must be part of phase 1 due to technical issues but will also cater for the current
     West Midlands-Europe market.

4.9 The Heathrow market will to a large extent be catered for through the Old Oak Commons
     interchange as part of phase 1 so it is reasonable that further expenditure on this link should come
     later. However, the Heathrow link should be built in a way so that High Speed Trains for Heathrow
     from the north can continue on the classic network south of London to also serve important
     destinations such as Gatwick Airport and south coast cities.

5.   Economic rebalancing and equity

     What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south
     economic divide?
5.1 European experience has shown that most cities directly connected to the high speed network
     experience higher economic growth and there is no reason why this should not be the case for the
     UK. A Greengauge21 report also found that areas of Kent experienced rapid growth following the
     construction of HS1.

5.2 The 2009 Greengauge21 study also found that Regional economic benefits from a ‘full’ HSR
     network between London and Glasgow/Edinburgh would amount to around £80 billion and would
     be widely distributed but with Scotland, the North West and the South East benefitting most.

     To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and
     regional regeneration?

5.3 The most important element of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity between the main
     centres of population in the UK and in particular connectivity with London. By serving City Centres,
     high speed rail will indirectly support regional regeneration.

     Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

5.4 A Greengauge21 study advised that the business case for high speed rail was robust when based
     on current fare levels for long-distance rail travel and would cater for both business and leisure
     travel. Furthermore, the release of capacity on the existing network will also benefit other travellers
     and commuters in particular. As such, all socio-economic groups would benefit from HSR.

5.5 The majority of the population of the UK enjoys reasonable good links with the Cities that will be
     directly served by a future HSR network extending as far north to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Many
     cities will also experience improve connectivity by increased service levels on the classic network
     so most of the UK will benefit from HSR.

5.6 However, it must be recognised there will areas that will benefit less such as North of Scotland,
     Wales and the South West of England and transport investment in these areas should be identified
     (such as rail electrification programmes or, for the north of Scotland, improved air connectivity) to
     ensure a fair distribution of benefits.

     How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and
     business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the
     Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

5.7 There may be examples from other countries with HSR that could be used as models and there
     may also be lessons learned from London Crossrail project

5.8 A UK HSR Network will ‘replace’ current classic rail links that form part of TEN so support should
     be sought from relevant EU budgets.

6.    Impact

     What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and
     roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?
6.1 HSR has considerably lower carbon footprint than car and air and also matches that of classic rail
    when the higher capacity of HSR trains are taken into account. If it can be assumed that the
    primary energy source is renewable, the carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction
    completion) should be negligible.

    Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business
    case?

6.2 It could perhaps be argued that studies have erred on the ‘safe’ side so that overall environmental
    benefits have not been exaggerated.

    What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network?

6.3 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line which is
    the busiest rail freight corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by rail freight services so the
    impact on freight services by HSR should be very positive.

    How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction, particularly
    during the rebuilding of Euston?

6.4 Experience from the St Pancras redevelopment should indicate that this should be manageable.
    Disruption could also be reduced through service changes/ improvements to some of the existing
    local services terminating at Euston. For example, some local services on the West Coast Main
    Line as far out as Northampton could be incorporated into the Crossrail network through a
    connection in the Willesden/Old Oak Commons area, extending planned Crossrail services from
    the East that would otherwise terminate at Old Oaks Commons. This could take away up to 7 train
    arrivals/departures per hour from Euston Station.

May 2011
Written evidence from the Campaign to Protect Rural England (HSR 140)


Key points

•   Although many people and organisations make strident and sometimes
    simplistic claims that High Speed Rail (HSR) will or will not result in certain
    outcomes, whether economic, environmental or social, the evidence shows that
    the impacts would depend hugely on policies in other areas and external
    factors, not least the future price of oil.

•   Just as decarbonising energy use will require using more electricity, even if
    total energy use could be reduced, CPRE believes decarbonising transport will
    require using rail for a many more trips, even assuming the overall distance
    travelled could be reduced.

•   Other countries, such as France and South Korea, have set out long term
    transport plans to rebalance their transport systems in favour of rail and to
    secure significant modal shift of passenger and freight trips. We believe that a
    major shift away from road and air would be particularly appropriate for this
    densely populated country and lead to more efficient use of land, thereby
    protecting the countryside.

•   CPRE believes it needs to be understood that High Speed Rail (HSR) can mean
    building new lines (High Speed Lines - HSLs) or it can mean upgrading and
    prioritising long distance passenger services on existing lines.

•   Alternatives to HS2, such as Rail Package 2A, would mean a focus on the ‘wrong
    type of capacity’, increasing seat numbers on existing services rather than
    overall number of train paths. By prioritising long distance passenger services,
    the potential to increase and increase local passenger and freight services on
    lines that are already congested could be severely limited.

•   Problems with the Government’s current case for High Speed 2 (HS2) and
    particular impacts of the currently preferred route do not mean that the
    principle of a new HSL – as opposed to the detail of the preferred route –
    between London and Birmingham is wrong.

•   We need to be realistic about the limits of trying to model precisely the long
    term impacts of profound changes to transport networks.

Recommendations

•   CPRE believes that a new national rail plan is needed: the 2007 Strategic Rail
    White Paper failed to set out long term strategy and has been overtaken by
    events, while the post-McNulty review paper the DfT plans to publish in
    November will only focus on governance and structure of the rail industry.

•   As well as providing for interconnectivity between HS2 and the existing rail
    network, such a plan should set out long-term ambitions to upgrade the
    regional rail network, including rural branch lines, to ensure that the benefits
    of investment are not focused only on the stations that would be served by HS2.
•   The draft National Networks National Policy Statement due for publication by
    the end of 2011 should contain new policies to lock in the benefits resulting
    from HS2 freeing up space on roads and runways. Without such policies, HS2 is
    unlikely to reduce carbon emissions or improve the overall reliability of our
    transport networks.

•   A more transparent approach to judging the benefits of transport investment is
    needed – rather than trying to pretend the future can be predict accurately,
    appraisal should judge proposals against different future scenarios. Better
    balancing of and communication about trade-offs between incommensurable
    impacts are needed, rather than trying to simplify benefits into monetary
    measures.

•   It is concerning that the current consultation is constrained by a very tight
    timetable: given the scale of the investment proposed a slight delay to allow
    time to improve the route could be justified. A completely different approach
    to route development and public participation is needed for phase 2 (north of
    Birmingham). The French approach of a structured public debate before any
    route proposal has been developed in detail has much to commend it and
    should be trialled.

•   It is unsatisfactory that the route’s precise impacts on countryside still remain
    unclear. The DfT should work with national and local organisations to ensure
    that the potential impacts of this type of infrastructure are better understood
    and addressed. Funding for community engagement should be considered.

•   The location of stations needs to be planned better: CPRE is concerned that
    there has not been a two-way process between land use and transport
    considerations. In particular, new airport and parkway stations should be
    avoided.


Introduction

1. We welcome the opportunity to submit evidence to the Transport Committee
on High Speed Rail. Although CPRE commented in the 1970s on the abortive
Channel Tunnel and rail link proposal, it was during the planning of the Channel
Tunnel in the 1980s and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link in the 1990s that CPRE
established its expertise in relation to the planning of large rail infrastructure,
including the involvement of local communities. The combination of our national
policy work and our local reach through branches and our parish council members
allows us to understand the big picture as well as local details.

2. With new High Speed Lines (HSLs) returning to the agenda, CPRE has taken a
leading role again. In 2008 we drew up Five Tests for Sustainable High Speed Rail 1
(HSR), which won the support of other NGOs and think tanks, such as the Bow
Group. Recognising that the impacts of HSR can vary depending on a wide range of
factors, these called to: protect the local environment; tackle climate change and
minimise energy needs; shift existing trips rather than generate new ones; improve
local transport, and integrate with planning and regional regeneration.


1
 Contained in CPRE, Getting Back on Track, which was updated in February 2011, available
at: www.cpre.org.uk/resources/transport/item/download/379
3. Last year we published Getting Back on Track, a referenced research report
looking at HSR as well as the broader issues surrounding it. This written evidence
should be read in conjunction with that report. At the start of this year we created
the Right Lines Charter 2 that sets out four principles ‘for doing High Speed Rail
well’, relating to the need for national strategy, testing the options, public
participation and minimising adverse impacts. Ten leading national NGOs and one
regional NGO have now signed up to the Charter and we have met with the
Secretary of State for Transport to urge him to meet its principles.

i). What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

4. When discussing HSR, it is important to differentiate building new lines from
upgrading services on existing lines. The development of HSR in the post-war
period prioritised long-distance passenger trains over other services and led to
local stations being closed on our main lines. Adding additional tracks, whether
parallel or on separate alignments (such as by reopening disused railways) can
allow many local communities to reclaim these railways so they can be used for
local services again and increases the potential for rail to take lorries off our roads.

5. An argument against a new line is that rail growth has been greater for local
trips than long distance ones. The problem with that argument is that only by
separating very high frequency, high speed services from existing tracks between
Euston and Rugby will there be enough capacity for sufficient additional local
services. This is particularly the case for new routes that would connect different
rail lines and open up sub-regions, such as Aylesbury – Milton Keynes –
Northampton.

6. A truly national High Speed Rail strategy would mean improving existing lines
as well as building sections of new HSLs. CPRE is concerned that the Government’s
consultation focuses narrowly on a new HSR network and fails to set out a coherent
vision for the rest of the rail network. Many arguments against HS2 are perhaps
better conceived as arguments against this limited approach and vision.

ii) How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

7. The previous government planned a White Paper for 2012 as the culmination of
its Delivering a Sustainable Transport Strategy (DaSTS) process. Since its election,
the Government’s focus on transport has been cutting the deficit and delivering
HS2. The previous DaSTS policy seems to have fallen out of favour so there is no
wider set of transport objectives or indeed any proposal to create any new strategy
in the Departmental business plan. Indeed CPRE is concerned that there seems to
be an aversion to long term planning within the Government.

8. Other countries believe that taking a long term view is essential for their
competitiveness and environmental commitments. For example, at the start of
2011 France published a draft of its long term National Transport Infrastructure
Plan, a key commitment of its Grenelle Environmental Law of 2008. Almost two-
thirds of investment is proposed for rail, a fifth for urban public transport and a
tenth for waterways.



2
  Available at: www.cpre.org.uk/what-we-do/transport/rail/update/item/1683-a-charter-
for-high-speed-rail
9. Groups such as the RAC Foundation suggest that as 89% of UK trips made on
roads, a similar proportion of investment should go to roads. This misses the
fundamental point that there are compelling arguments to change the way we
travel and shift a much greater proportion of trips to rail. In its recent White
Paper 3 , the European Commission called for the majority of medium-distance
passenger to go by rail and the majority of freight to go by rail or water by 2050.
Countries such as South Korea are aiming for a rapid shift to rail, an increase in
passenger trips from 16% in 2008 to 27% in 2020 and freight increase from 8% to
19% 4 .

10. Just as decarbonising energy use will require using more electricity, even if
total energy use could be reduced, so decarbonising transport will require using
electrified rail for a many more trips, even assuming the overall distance travelled
could be reduced. Both energy and transport sectors in the UK have suffered from
a lack of clarity and ambition from the Government in recent years and this makes
it less attractive for the private sector to invest. Were the Government to be more
ambitious for the share of trips made by rail and state clear objectives for future
modal shares, companies bidding for rail franchises would have the confidence to
propose greater investment, for example to upgrade or reopen branch lines that
could feed main lines.

iii) Business case

11. As business cases currently attempt to predict sixty years into the future, they
are extremely sensitive to even small changes in assumptions. CPRE has undertaken
analysis of the methodology for decades and has a fundamental disagreement with
it. Rather than trying to predict the future and then provide accordingly, we should
work out strategic objectives then plan what measures we need to achieve them. If
we want business as usual – that is to say increasing congestion, increased carbon
emissions from transport, land hungry patterns of development and car or lorry
being the only practical option for many journeys then meeting predicted future
trends could be a credible option.

12. We believe that a different course is needed for a more prosperous future.
According to French experience, although existing modelling methods can cope
with marginal changes, profound changes to transport networks, such as new High
Speed Lines, cannot be modelled accurately, due to impacts to economic
geography, such as where people live or work.

13. We do not believe that simply relying on further upgrades the West Coast Main
Line is a credible option, if there is to be significant modal shift to rail.
Unfortunately the assessment of alternatives to HS2 focused on seats on long
distance services and not the total capacity of the railways to have more services,
including new freight and local passenger services. It failed to factor in the
infrastructure needs of new local passenger or rail freight services.

14. Controlling rail travel by price even more than at present would have severe
economic, social and environmental outcomes. Although arguments have been


3
   European Commission, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a
competitive and resource efficient transport system, 2011 available at:
  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0144:FIN:EN:PDF
4
  Railway Gazette, National plan to put cities 90 min apart, April 2011
made that rail travel is only for the rich, demand management by increasing peak
ticket prices further would make it harder for poorer people to travel by rail.

iv) The strategic route

15. The primary purpose of phase 1 of HS2 - the London to Birmingham/Lichfield
route – should be viewed as a bypass line to separate out high frequency non-
stopping long distance services other trains on congested lines. It is this separation
that means HS2 would offer much more capacity than similar expenditure on
upgrading existing lines.

16. Additional stations would require significant lengths of four tracks to enable
stopping trains to decelerate without holding others up. This would significantly
increase land take and impact on the countryside. It would therefore be much
better to plan for make better use of capacity freed up on existing lines, including
reopening rural rail stations.

17. The Old Oak Common Interchange would transform local and intercity rail
connectivity while a direct link to HS1 would be essential to improve connectivity
between regional cities and the continent: CPRE supports both as being crucial for
delivering modal shift.

18. On the other hand, the proposals for a direct link into Heathrow we believe are
fundamentally wrong: the Mawhinney Review did not find a positive case for such a
link, only that there could only be a case after phase 1. Demand is unlikely to
justify frequent HSR services to Heathrow, while the paths needed for these would
reduce the number of cities that served by HS2 trains to and from London. A
Heathrow spur or loop line could have a devastating impact on West London and
the green spaces within it and close to its edge. It could cause significant blight.

19. CPRE has very serious concerns about out of town parkway stations, and the
proposals for a Birmingham Interchange station in the Green Belt illustrate them
well 5 . International evidence shows such stations do not assist regional
regeneration, meaning that their environment and financial costs cannot be
justified.

20. No study has been produced as to what the best options are for improving rail
connectivity and capacity north of Birmingham. New HSLs are not necessarily the
best option here and CPRE believes it is seriously inappropriate that detailed design
of very high speed routes is being carried out by HS2 Ltd at this stage. There needs
to be a wide-ranging public debate informed by evidence to decide how best to
improve the north’s transport and prioritise between long distance and local
services. Further north, line speed improvements and passing loops on existing
lines may be a better priority for investment, particularly as they could be
delivered in the shorter rather than longer term.

v) Economic rebalancing and equity

21. It is very easy to travel abroad and be impressed by a trip on a shiny new high
speed train train. It is much harder to learn about and understand the wider public
consultation, transport and spatial planning as well as economic development

5
 See CPRE West Midlands leaflet on HSR impacts on the region, 2011:
www.cprewm.org.uk/hsr%20leaflet%20final%20Mar11.doc
strategies that other countries have used to try to ensure that HSLs are successful
in achieving their strategic objectives.

22. It is the location of the stations that will dictate where the regeneration
benefits of HS2 are felt. The evidence shows that stations need to be located in
densely developed areas with excellent public transport connections, if benefits
are to be spread across a region. In addition, there needs to be joined up spatial
planning and development policies. This means the location of stations being
influenced by land use and regeneration issues – a two-way process – rather than
just expecting local authorities to plan around stations imposed in the wrong place.

23. Out of town parkway and airport stations should be avoided as these do not
support regeneration. If there are to be any such stations, then their cost should be
paid for by local business interests rather than the public. In terms of planning, the
danger at the moment is that with the abolition of the regional tier of planning
there are only Local Enterprise Partnerships to fill the gap. These are only just
starting up and being made up of business interests are unrepresentative of local
communities and do not include wider social or environmental concerns within
their responsibilities.

vi) Impact

24. The carbon impact of HS2 depends significantly on the price of oil and other
transport policies: even if it does result in substantial modal shift from road or air,
the capacity freed up on roads or runways could be simply reused by new trips. For
aviation these could be long haul rather than short haul and so would increase the
rate of climate change. A further complication is that the capacity freed up on the
existing rail network could be used to reduce carbon emissions from transport
significantly by increasing rail freight and local passenger services. Given the
enormous amount of uncertainty, the claims made by some about HS2’s precise
carbon impact should be given little weight.

25. Many of the environmental costs of HS2 are not monetisable, for example to
the impacts to landscape, tranquillity, biodiversity and heritage. Furthermore it
will be impossible to quantify many of the impacts until detailed design of HS2 and
associated mitigation has been carried out. It is very disappointing that the DfT has
failed to give the public accurate and simple information at this stage of the
consultation about the likely impacts of HS2, given how little flexibility over the
route it seems prepared to consider. This needs to be urgently rectified.

26. The emphasis in the business case and DfT press releases has been on the
monetised impacts as these can be expressed easily in figures of billions of pounds
worth of benefits. It is of great concern to CPRE that this has meant that the wider
environmental costs have been marginalised in the decision making process.
Decisions on schemes of this magnitude will require detailed trade-offs between
factors that are incommensurable, something the DfT seems to accept in its April
2011 guidance on business cases. How it proposes to explain this in its
communications to the public remains to be seen.

May 2011
                 Written evidence from T.H.Effendowicz (HSR 141)


The current economic difficulties in which the country finds itself make it imperative
to review the Government's proposals for the HS2 line. Britain needs a new, fast
railway that would bring considerable economic benefits to the whole country but the
HS2 project has started from the wrong premise. The terms of reference for the
project laid down by the previous Government and extended by the present one place
undue emphasis on benefits likely to flow to Heathrow from the project, and
overemphasise the role of Birmingham as compared with other major cities. The
company created to carry out the project, HS2 Ltd., followed their terms of reference
rigidly and therefore did not explore alternatives which would favour the country as a
whole.

Heathrow, as HS2 Ltd. recognized, has two predominant roles, as London's origin
and destination airport accounting for 80% of its traffic, and as an international
transfer hub. Quoting HS2 Ltd's own conclusions, only 1000 passengers per day from
the whole rest of the country would be likely to utilise Heathrow, equivalent in
numbers to a single daily train load on the High Speed Railway. As for Birmingham,
the cost of providing it with a 250mph railway line would be £17bn and the city
would have to wait for it until 2026. This ignores the fact that the existing Chiltern
Railways could develop a slightly more modest 125mph line between London and
Birmingham within 4-5 years at a cost of £5bn or less, using established noise
corridors.

HS2 Ltd. examined superficially a route running parallel to the M1, but at some
distance from it, and turned it down as non-viable. They did not, however, attempt to
run it along the present Ml noise corridor which had all the problems of proximity to
houses, terrain difficulties and disturbance to water supplies ironed out when the M1
was built. Motorway noise corridors are regularly used on the Continent for High
Speed Railway routes, as indeed is the case with UK's own HS1. It is fully practical
to build HS2 in close proximity to the Ml and M6, adding just 8km (4%) to the length
of the route and to the time taken for the journey from Birmingham to London, i.e. 51
minutes instead of 49. This route might even turn out to be cheaper to construct than
the one proposed by HS2 Ltd. Do we really wish to damage the beauty of the
Chilterns and risk serious harm to Chilterns' and London's water supply for the sake
of shortening the Birmingham to London journey by 2 minutes ?

The benefits of these proposals therefore are :

•   Birmingham could obtain a semi-fast route to London, connecting to Crossrail at
    Paddington on the way to Heathrow, some 10 years before HS2 is completed and
    for £5bn or less instead of £17bn. The Chiltern Railway line could even be
    extended the full distance from Birmingham to Heathrow if passenger volumes
    would justify doing so.

•   A very costly development of the Old Oak Common site could be avoided.

•   Directing the line by the shortest route from Euston to the M1 corridor would
    make for appreciably shorter tunnels through London.
•   HS2 would run through established noise corridors and would not damage
    aquifers.

•   Birmingham would still in time get its HS2 connection but, by then, the main
    value of this would consist in connecting the city direct to the Continent via the
    HS2/HS1 junction.

•   The HS2 route would probably pass close to Rugby, in a straight line for
    Manchester, a little farther east than in HS2 Ltd's previously published plans but
    closer to the dividing point of the planned Y shape, making it easier to reach the
    large conurbations on the eastern side of the Pennines.

•   Finally, and of interest to counties on both the western and eastern routes, it is
     feasible to have intermediate stops at hubs such as Milton Keynes/Northampton,
     Rugby/Coventry,         Stoke/Stafford        and      East     Midlands          (for
     Leicester/Derby/Nottingham), by adopting a system of alternate trains — express
     ones and marginally slower stopping ones.

One might legitimately ask why has the Coalition Government not looked in depth at
this and other options that could potentially provide high speed rail connectivity to
more Midlands and Northern cities than is possible with the current proposal.
                   Written evidence from B Bedford (HSR 142)




 1. I understand that your Transport Committee has decided to hold an (tvnquiry into
    the strategic case for High Speed Rail (HS2). I am writing to you because my
    concern is that the building of this railway will not provide the economic growth
    so desperately needed by this country.
 2. I think economic growth can occur only if there is a perceived demand which a
    service or industry can satisfy at a competitive price. An exampe is the demand
    for Jaguar Land Rover vehicles which are perceived as good quality and good
    value in many overseas markets. Hence, this Indian owned company is
    proposing to invest in both increased production and also in an increased number
    of designs. In general, British manufacurers are failing to compete against
    foreign rivals due, in part, to their products not being-well designed or
    competitively priced but also due to the loss of workforce skills which are very
    difficult to regenerate. They also find it difficult to obtain bank loans with which
    to improve their performance and expand. The construction of HS2 would not
    improve this situation. Indeed, HS2 Ltd admit as much in their Tables 47, 48 and
    50 in Appendix 3 of their Socio-economic Report, where they admit that a total of
    157,000 sq metres of industrial area would be lost at the proposed three stations
    between London and Birmingham leading to less employment in the
    manufacturing sector, so vital to this country's recovery.

 3. This country is in a dire financial state. The Chancellor hopes to eliminate our
    monthly borrowing requirement by 2015 but our debt will still be around £1.4
    trillion which will be a monumental hurdle for future generations to tackle.
    Therefore, any project which will not add significantly to economic growth but will
    add to our debt should not be pursued. I view the construction of HS2 as a
    project which should not be progressed.
 4. It is instructive to consider the experiences of Continental countries, who have
    built High Speed Lines. Both France and Spain, after writing off their construction
    costs, have highly successful lines, aided by the inhibiting influence on air travel
    which security processes provide. In both countries their rail systems had
    suffered years of decline so that they were unable to compete with either rail or
    airtravel.
 5. However, demand forecasting has failed in a staggering 84% of High Speed
    projects (New Engineer 3/3/11). The Dutch High Speed Line is facing bankrupcy
    after only a year in service because some of the trains have only 15% of their
    seats occupied. Closer to home the traffic forecasts for the Channel Tunnel Rail
    link were so inaccurate that the operator, London & Continental, became
    insolvent in May 2009. The London & Continental Railway forecast that passenger
    numbers would reach 21.4 million a year by 2004. However, by 2009 they had
    reached only 7.3 million. Even in the U.SA. and China there are doubts whether
    demand will support their construction costs.



6. It should be remembered that British Rail introduced into service trains capable of
    travelling at 125 mph long before other European countries considerered building
    high speed lines. The average speeds, calculated from published timetables,
    achieved by continental high speed lines are given in the following table:

                                                             Average Speed
                                                              mph
                     St Pancreas to Brussels                   114
                     St Pancreas to Paris                      120
                     Paris to Lyon                             120
                     Paris to Tours                            118
                      Paris to Nice                             108
                      Berlin to Hamburg                         105
                      Madrid to Seville                         118
                                        Average Speed           113

   These figures suggest that the maximum speed achieved by continental high
   speed trains are much the same as UK Long distance trains. They are not
   operating pioneering high speed lines which HS2 Ltd suggest.
7. The recent upgrade of the West Coast Line and the introduction of Pendolino
    tilting carriages has enabled trains to travel for longer distances at 125 mph and
    has brought Glasgow to be only 4 hour 10 minutes from London. It has also
    produced a line capable of 1000 extra services a week and a 70% increase in
    freight capacity. However, HS2 Ltd has reported continued overcrowding on this
    line which, they admit is essentially at peak times. Perhaps the inhibiting factor
    against using longer trains and where necessay longer platforms is the 'access
    charge' which is levied on train companies and which is proportional to the
    number of carriages comprising a train. These charges will impinge on the profit
    that a company can make.
8. Train Operator East Coast has announced that on 22nd May, their new timetable
   will provide 3,000,000 additional seats per year, 19 new sevices per weekday and
   faster journey times for millions of passengers. They cite the return of the 'Flying
   Scotsman' express which will travel from Edinburgh to Kings Cross in 4 hours
   including a stop at Newcastle.
9. I think the cost of constructing HS2 to save approximately 30 minutes journey
    time to both Glasgow and Edinburgh is money not well spent.
10. There appears to be an assumption by HS2 Ltd that this proposed line would be
    entirely reliable. The utopian situation has yet to be achieved in mechanical
    mechanisms or electrical systems. Nevertherless, they are proposing to transfer
    long distance services from the East and West Coast from day one. Surely a
    failure for whatever reason that brought a train to an unscheduled stop would be
    catastrophic.
11. In reviewing the Business Case, I consider that the crucial monetary values given
    under Transport User Benefits are too high because:


          a) business will increasingly use video and other technology as an
         alternative to travelling to meetings
           b)       Working from home will increase for office workers as the
          technology becomes more generally available
           c)       Leisure travellers tend to use the cheapest mode of travel because
          time may not be a significant factor
          d) Quantifying in monetary terms the redevelopment of stations as a
         benefit to passengers is a step too far. For example, HS2 Ltd has
         concluded that the re-design of Euston Station would deliver benefits of
         between £900 million - £1.5 billion to passengers.

  All the above assumptions are vital to the production of the Benefit Cost Ratio
   (BCR) and if demand is lower than HS2 Ltd computer modelling suggests, then
  revenue will be lower and the B.C.R would be on a knife edge. I have pointed out
  earlier in this letter that demand forecasting has failed more that it has worked.

12.The heading of Chapter 2, Page 42 of the February 2011 Consultation is entitled
   'The Case for National High Speed Rail Network'. However, the author confines
   his comments to London and the major conurbations of the Midlands and the
   North. He makes no mention of the fact that the combined population of South
   Wales and South Western Englan is over six million people - more than Scotland
   and similar to the major conurbations of Northern England - yet these regions
   appear to be forgotten in the HS2 coverage proposed by HS2 Ltd.


May 2011
TU




            Written evidence from Steve Rodrick (HSR 143)

What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

A national transport plan

1.     It is essential that the UK prepares a national transport strategy to identify
       what the country’s transport needs are and how investment and timing
       priorities should be set. The commitment of so much money to high-speed
       rail in the absence of a national context for investment in all forms of
       transport is premature. The plan prepared not so long ago by Rod Edington
       is a good starting point. It would also help to settle those who believe that
       high speed rail is a political vanity project. In the absence of any thorough
       justification it’s a label that will stick.


High Speed Rail will significantly increase carbon emissions

2.     Based on published information it clear that HS2 will lead to significantly
       increased carbon emissions. Despite best efforts to de-carbonise the national
       grid, fossil fuel generated energy will remain a significant component of
       generating capacity for many decades. The significantly higher energy
       demands of high speed rail will increase directly carbon emissions compared
       to classic rail. The proposal to offset this by attracting air passengers and for
       airlines to both subsequently withdraw those flights but not replace them
       with flights to other destinations, is not credible. The aviation industry is
       almost certain to use those valuable slots to replace those withdrawn short-
       haul flights with long haul, especially from the London airports. This will
       lead directly to significantly increased emissions. For example, a long haul
       flight to the far east will cause emissions ten times that of a UK domestic
       flight.

4.     The combination, in addition to the embedded carbon in construction of high
       speed 2 and the stated aspiration of Birmingham Airport to increase its
       passenger throughput by 9 million passengers per year if a Birmingham
       Parkway station is built, mean HS2 should not be allowed to proceed. It
       should be a basic principle of major government investment that it will
       provide a significant contribution to meeting UK carbon reduction targets.

The opportunity costs of investing in high speed rail will be significant.

5.     There are more pressing transport needs which would provide better value
       for money and greater improvements to services used by more people over a
       wider geographic area. Improvements to the existing rail network, bus
       services (have we forgotten more people use buses than trains), the quality of
       the road network, cycle lanes, shared space initiatives footpath enhancements
       would provide more benefits to more people at lower cost. In so doing the
       economy would benefit to a greater extent in the short and long term and
       carbon emission reductions achieved. The extraordinary improvement in the
       emissions performance of cars should be noticed and welcomed. It is
       conceivable that in time they prove to be the lowest polluting form of travel.


Does high speed rail really stimulates economic regeneration ?

6.     The evidence that high speed rail stimulates economic development is weak.
       It seems is largely confined to an area within close proximity to the stations
       themselves. The city centres of Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, Liverpool,
       Glasgow and Edinburgh have been successfully regenerated in recent years.
       The economic problems of these cities do not lie in their centres. There is no
       evidence that the more peripheral areas benefit. The oft quoted example of
       Lille is misleading. Lille enjoys a unique location in Europe. It is notable that
       unemployment in Lille, always higher than the French average, has risen
       faster than the French average despite its central position in a European
       network.

We already have high speed rail

7.     Claims that that UK “will be left behind” lack any rationale that is pure
       politicking trying to justify expenditure which would fail any reasonable
       value for money test. In comparison with countries with high speed rail, the
       journey times between our main cities is shorter - they are trying to catch up
       with the UK. The more important time is that from door to door rather than
       station to station. In this context the modest time savings achieved by HS2 are
       even less impressive.

8.     The Government has failed to explain that there are several definitions of
       high speed rail. Perhaps to the surprise of most, many of our existing routes
       capable of operating services at 200 kph can already be considered as high
       speed. Surely it is a higher ambition to provide most of the country with a
       high speed network by upgrading all intercity routes than just a few cities
       with a very high speed line.

IT reduces the need to travel

9.     The advance of communications IT in recent years has been very impressive
       enabling instant communication whilst on the move and increasingly
       displacing the need to travel. IT makes it possible to work nearly anywhere
       at any time. This has much reduced the imperative to get a journey over with
       as quickly as possible. Arguably some journeys provide a working
       environment better than in an office, rendering the reading of reports, for
       example, more achievable than in a busy office environment. Faster journey
       times are more likely to bring social (i.e. getting home to put the kids to bed)
       rather than work time benefits.

10.    It is interesting to note that in no other form of travel is there a desire for
       much greater speed. It is not clear, therefore, why it should matter so much
       for rail travel. Certainty, punctuality and value for money are all more
       important to the traveller.
Reducing the Need to Travel - Reducing the demand for long distance travel

11.   Except for a few instances nobody travels for its own sake - it entails a time
      and monetary cost. Better still, not to travel at all unless there is an overriding
      reason to do so. With advances in technology and awareness of the costs,
      most businesses will increasingly reduce the need for their staff to travel - a
      pattern already becoming well established. For most people improvements to
      short journeys in and around where they live and work will have greater
      value. Building a few hundred kilometres of high speed rail in 20 years time
      may contribute a small amount to national pride but will do little for most
      people. It is a fair bet the majority of the population will never use it. Making
      a difference to the journeys that most people do most days will have a far
      greater value to society and the economy. In this respect the UK often
      compares badly to our counterparts.

Congestion and Crowding

12.   The media and HS2 Ltd would have us believe that all inter-city trains,
      especially on those on the West Coast Main line, are crowded to bursting
      point. However, the reality is very different with very few trains full and
      passengers left to stand. It is interesting to read that HS2 Ltd anticipate that
      HS2 services will have higher load factors than current services.

13.   The challenge is to prevent the crowding from happening without having to
      build an entirely new line - surely the worst of all options. A good start will
      be to reduce the need to travel in the first place. The obvious options then are:
       Make trains longer.
       Have fewer first class and more standard class carriages.
       Do what you can to increase the speed of existing services.
       Introduce reservation only trains for peak hours - that will happen
          anyway with HS2.
       Change pricing policy to even out demand.

14.   As so many employers are switching to flexible work patterns the traditional
      rush hours will increasingly become a thing of the past. The scope to work at
      home will also reduce the need for so many people to travel into the city
      centres in the first place.

3. Business case
15.   The forecasts for the numbers of passengers who will use High Speed 2 do
      not seem to be realistic. It is impossible to understand why, unless the
      population increase dramatically, so many more people would want to travel
      between Birmingham and London on a daily basis, especially for leisure trips.
      No explanation is provided by HS2 Ltd on the motivation for such journeys.
      The forecasts can only have been prepared by desk based statisticians and not
      based on research which actually asked people what sort of transport
      improvements they wanted.
16.   The estimated costs of HS2 are vast. But it is a reasonable expectation that the
      costs will exceed those given now. This looks like an extremely complicated
      project and many unexpected problems will arise. Other factors will, no
      doubt, intervene and eventuality the costs will rise. As the Government will
      have made such deep, long term and irreversible commitments there will be
      no turning back and High Speed rail will gobble up yet more scarce funds.
      Such a prospect fills most taxpayers with dread - it looks like yet another debt
      we will load onto the next generation. A more sensible strategy would be an
      incremental one, which provides more flexibility and lower risk.

4. The strategic route
17.   This proposed route will create yet another London centric transport network
      - with the added bonus of even more preferential treatment for Heathrow. A
      more imaginative approach would be to build the last leg to London. I have
      no doubt those captains of industry who routinely sign letters calling for yet
      more public funding to be spent on projects which suit a small number of
      large corporations would be filled with dread.

18.   As someone who lived in the north of England and Scotland for 30 years it is
      hard to see how saving 40 minutes on a long journey makes any difference at
      all. A day trip from Glasgow to London is still impossibility unless you fly.
      The door to door time will barely changed. Saving a few minutes will
      probably be welcomed but it won’t suddenly trigger great economic activity.
      High speed IT might, but not a train.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity
19.   HS2 will almost certainly generate more economic activity in London than
      anywhere else. It is difficult to see Londoners making their way to the
      provinces is equal numbers as those travelling to the capital. The result,
      economic activity gravitates to London again. Ironically the majority of tickets
      will be bought by those in the midlands and north, draining billions of
      pounds from the regional economies.

20.   I have read of Chambers of Commerce in northern cities saying HS2 is
      essential for their well being, but I have yet to hear any of them explain or
      give a real example of how it would make any difference in practice. As is so
      often the case, the prospect of a shiny new toy largely paid for by someone
      else is seductive, and those easily seduced lose their grip on reality.

6. Impact
21.   As the energy needed to move an object multiplies by the square of its speed,
      trains travelling at 400 kph will use 4 times that of a train travelling at 200
      kph. As HS2 plans to transport 4 times as many passengers as currently use
      those routes this means that HS2 services will use up to 16 times that of
      comparable services now (assuming broadly similar seating capacity) . That is
      a lot of extra energy and carbon dioxide. I believe that HS2 hopes to balance
      those emissions by “ending domestic aviation”. Presumably that really means
       London to Glasgow and Edinburgh. It is hard to see why passengers would
       entirely abandon planes when the HS2 save so little time. However, even if
       they did, do we really expect airlines to keep those valuable landing and take
       off slots free? Those airlines flying out of Gatwick and Heathrow will be
       falling over themselves to replace domestic flights with one to the far east
       presumably, as the main growth market. That means each cancelled UK
       flight will be replaced by one which emits about ten times as much carbon.

22.    The next effect of these two HS2 induced impacts is a truly massive increase
       in carbon emissions. The law of unintended consequences makes an entrance!
       Yet another argument for improving the existing railways so we can all
       benefit, and concentring on those local journeys which genuinely need to be
       improved.

23.    A look into the crystal ball also suggests that IT will play a far larger part in
       our lives than those planning this expensive railway, using taxpayer’s cash,
       are willing to accept.

Do we really want to trash the countryside?

24.    The British care about nothing more that the countryside. We have long lost
       the art of building beautifully. With the best of intentions the cutters of
       budgets and aesthetically blind will turn this into yet another eyesore.

June 2011
                    Written evidence from Transport Futures (HSR 144)


Supporting the UK economy, regional growth and prosperity

•   High Speed Rail (HSR) offers a once in a generation opportunity to transform the
    economic geography of the UK, supporting sustainable growth and international
    competitiveness.
•   HSR is essential to the future prosperity and sustainability of the UK; high quality, speedy
    and effective transport links will bring the opportunity for a more equal distribution of
    economic activity and wealth between regions. It will strengthen the economy and create
    jobs.
•   It is a vital element in achieving the government’s objective for a “transport system that is
    an engine for economic growth, but one that is also greener and safer and improves
    quality of life in our communities.”
•   The government should commit to the delivery of a comprehensive UK high speed
    network which includes Scotland and the North East, thereby maximising the economic
    and environmental benefits to the whole UK. Both axes of the ‘Y’ shaped network should
    progress in parallel to ensure equitable distribution of economic benefits.
•   HSR will improve transport connections between UK regions and Europe, reducing
    peripherality, increasing trading opportunities and boosting tourism.
•   Several studies, including the government’s own HS2 study, have demonstrated a good
    business case for high speed rail.
•   Just the first stage of the high speed network, between London and Birmingham, is
    forecast by HS2 Ltd to contribute £44bn in benefits to the UK economy.

Providing additional capacity on Britain’s rail network, allowing more freight on rail
and improved local services.

•   Increasing demand for rail travel cannot be met by further enhancements to the existing
    north south lines and the only effective solution will be to build additional lines. High
    speed lines cost little more than conventional lines, yet bring significantly more benefit in
    terms of greatly reduced journey times.
•   By increasing capacity on the whole network, opportunities will be created to allow a
    significant expansion of freight on rail to support industry and improve rail links to ports.
•   Local rail services can be enhanced to attract more journeys from car.

A more environmentally friendly means of transport

•   Overall, HSR will provide a more sustainable form of transport for high volumes of people
    in terms of carbon emissions and air quality,
•   Early extension of new HSR lines to the north of England and Scotland will deliver
    significant additional economic and environmental benefits to the whole of the UK
    through transfer of passengers from air to rail, with corresponding carbon reduction
    benefits.
•   HSR can be an integral feature of a “virtual hub” between London and regional airports,
    reducing the need for costly new airport infrastructure, whilst rebalancing capacity to
    protect essential air connectivity with London and Europe for peripheral regions not
    directly connected to the high speed rail network.
1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?

1.1     There are three principal arguments for High Speed Rail (HSR) and why it is essential
to the future prosperity and sustainability of the UK. For this to be achieved fully, the
Government should commit to the completion of a full network extending beyond the current
proposals to include Scotland and the North East.

1.2    Supporting the UK economy, regional growth and prosperity

1.2.1 HSR will strengthen the economy and create jobs. It has a crucial part to play in
spreading economic activity and growth across all regions of the UK. At present, the UK
economy is dominated by London and the South East and it is important that steps are taken
to close the present north south economic divide and enable all regions to benefit from the
world status of London. It is generally recognised that the economy is over-reliant on
financial and service industries and a reshaping of the national economy to encourage
manufacturing industry will require a high standard transport system if the UK is to be able to
compete effectively on the world stage. Moreover, tourism is a key industry in the economy
of the country and high speed rail will provide stimulation for this sector also, helping to
attract European visitors to areas further north, to Scotland and the North East of England.

1.2.2 The positive link between economic growth and transport connectivity has been long
established. High quality, speedy and effective transport links will bring the opportunity for a
more equal distribution of economic activity and wealth between regions. The proposed Y
shaped high speed corridor will spread the economic prosperity of London and the south
east to the regions further north with the full benefits being achieved when the network
reaches the North East and Scotland. This is an opportunity to close the economic gap and
provide a strong basis for international competitiveness across the whole UK.

1.2.3 Just the first stage of the high speed network, between London and Birmingham, is
forecast by HS2 Ltd to contribute £44bn in benefits to the UK economy.

1.3    To meet the need for additional capacity on Britain’s rail network, allowing
more freight on rail and improved local services.

1.3.1 Demand for inter-city rail journeys is currently running at 5% pa. Forecasts indicate
that the West Coast Main Line will reach its full capacity in 2024. The East Coast and the
Midland Main Line will also reach capacity in the next ten years. As costs increase for road
and air travel, rail is likely to become more attractive as a cost effective means of travel. This
increasing demand can not be met by further enhancements to the existing north south lines
and the only effective solution will be to build an additional line. In addition, capacity
problems on parallel inter-regional motorways like M1 and M6 are already evident and the
costs and environmental impacts of addressing these through provision of additional highway
capacity far exceed those of providing for equivalent volumes on HSR.

1.3.2 Through the provision of new lines to increase the overall capacity of the rail network,
opportunities will be created to use released capacity on existing lines. This will allow a
significant expansion of freight on rail and for enhancements to local rail services. It will also
create opportunities for more cross country journeys.

1.4    A more environmentally friendly means of transport

1.4.1 High speed rail will provide for high volumes of movement with reduced carbon
impact per passenger than either road or air. Extending the HSR network to the north of
England and Scotland generates much more substantial economic and environmental
benefits through more significant transfer of passengers from air to rail, with corresponding
carbon reduction benefits.

1.4.2 In addition, through the release of capacity on the classic network, opportunities will
be created for higher frequency local services, thus offering a frequency of rail service which
will encourage people out of cars for commuting and shorter distance journeys. Greater use
of the network for freight will also lead to significantly reduced carbon emissions. Freight on
rail produces 70% less carbon dioxide emissions than the equivalent road journey.

1.4.3 Overall, HSR will provide a more sustainable form of transport for high volumes of
people in terms of carbon emissions and air quality, with a manageable physical
environmental impact considerably less than for equivalent major highway construction.


2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

2.1     HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective
compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes,
including those for the strategic road network?

2.1.1 The government’s vision is for a “transport system that is an engine for economic
growth, but one that is also greener and safer and improves quality of life in our
communities.”

2.1.2 High speed rail will provide for efficient connections between the UK’s major cities
and regions, with lower carbon impact per passenger than alternatives by road or air. This
meets the policy objectives set out above, by enhancing wealth generally and rebalancing
the economy through significant distribution of growth. Whilst some of these objectives could
be met by investing in other transport modes, focusing on the switch to rail-based transport
will mean that the underlying transport networks need for this growth will in overall terms (air
quality, energy use, land use), be more sustainable when compared with roads.
Furthermore, rail, in particular is best suited for travel between, and to access, city-centres.

2.1.3 In addition, by providing additional capacity on the key north south corridor,
opportunities to encourage greater use of rail for freight transport will become more
achievable and contribute to the objective set out in the EU Transport White paper published
in March. This sets out a target for 30% of road freight over 300 km to shift to other modes
such as rail or waterborne transport by 2030, and more than 50% by 2050, to combat climate
change. The White Paper also sets out a target for the majority of medium-distance
passenger transport to go by rail by 2050, which again can only be achieved in the UK if
additional capacity is created on the network to allow both longer distance and local rail
journeys to increase.

2.1.4 To meet these goals set out in the White Paper will require appropriate infrastructure
to be developed, with high speed rail as a fundamental feature of the national and European
level TENS-T networks. This will provide for the required passenger growth and encourage
transfer from other modes; the capacity released on the traditional network will allow a
significant expansion of freight on rail to meet these targets.

2.1.5 Whilst roads will continue to be important for many journeys and new construction
may be justified in some particular locations, future investment in roads should largely
concentrate on maintaining the existing network. Future capacity for both passengers and
freight should be met by higher levels of investment in the rail network, linked to an
integrated public transport system at a local level.
2.2      Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding
for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling
stock capacity in and around major cities?

2.2.1 At the moment, two expensive rail projects are under construction in the London area,
Crossrail (£15bn) and Thameslink (£5.5bn). Funding for these would appear to be
independent of general funding for the rail network. Other major rail schemes in the pipeline
are electrification projects with new rolling stock on the Great Western Main Line and in
Manchester-Liverpool-Preston area of the North West; Manchester Northern Hub, significant
further enhancements to the East Coast Main Line and Intercity Express Train Replacement
Programme are also being pursued. The Secretary of State has provided reassurances that
these schemes will not affect funding for HS2.

2.2.2 Most of these schemes will be substantially complete by the time construction is
expected to start on the first phase of HS2 in 2016. At an approximate cost of £17bn over 10
years, this is little more than for Cross Rail alone, so it can be expected that a future
programme of regional schemes could be funded if resources are maintained at the same
level as at present. However, the planning for such schemes needs to happen in the short
term, to align with spending decisions and new franchises. Assuming commitment for and
completion of these current major schemes, the development of a comprehensive HSR
network, connecting London and the north of England and Scotland should be the UK
government’s top rail infrastructure planning and investment priority.

2.2.3 The development of a high speed network present an opportunity to explore how
many of the suburban and underground lines in London and the South East could be altered
to maximise their connectivity, for example connecting the West London Line to the station at
Old Oak Common, and the development of Crossrail 2 to relieve overcrowding at Euston.
Consideration should be taken over the coming two investment periods (‘control periods’) of
how funding for ‘classic’ rail can be targeted to maximise the benefits of HSR and mitigate
any burdens it may introduce.

2.3    What are the implications for domestic aviation?

2.3.1 HSR is best suited for journeys of up to 3 hours (about 900km), for which the train
can beat air and car trip time. When traveling less than about 650km by air, the process of
checking in and going through security screening at airports, as well as the journey to the
airport, makes the total air journey time longer than by HSR.

2.3.2 In 2009, around 66% of domestic UK mainland passenger journeys by air were
between the main cities that will eventually be directly served by the high speed rail network
(London, Birmingham, Manchester, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh
and Glasgow). With a full HSR network in place, there is the potential for rail journey times to
be reduced to be more competitive with air.

2.3.3 In Europe, air travel has been all but eliminated on a number of inter-city routes such
as Paris to Lyon. Eurostar now has around 80% of the market between London and Paris
and Brussels.

2.3.4 Similar effects are likely to be seen in some areas of the UK domestic air market,
where a major shift from air to high speed rail is likely to happen. However, the impact of the
first and second phase of the Y network is not likely to reduce domestic air travel by a
significant amount. Only when the high speed network reaches Edinburgh and Glasgow is
further significant modal shift from rail to air likely to take place.
2.3.5 Nevertheless, the trend away from domestic flights will lead to the release of some
take-off and landing slots at major airports like London, Manchester and Edinburgh; this will
ease airport congestion and reduce the pressure to provide additional runway capacity. It
will also provide opportunities to enhance flights to London and Europe from domestic
markets which will benefit less directly from HSR, for example northern parts of Scotland. It is
essential that a proportion of released slots at London “hub” airports are protected for
domestic flights to/from these more peripheral regions of the UK.

2.3.6 For the more peripheral of areas of the UK, air services and high speed rail services
will be complementary rather than competitive to provide the most appropriate connections to
UK and European markets; HSR is an important element of a comprehensive package of
transport measures, including air and sea to support economic growth and competitiveness.
2.3.7 High speed rail can play a vital part in creating a “virtual hub” airport serving London
and the regions, as suggested in the DfT “Developing a Sustainable Framework for UK
Aviation: Scoping Document” published in March 2011. For example, with a high speed rail
link between Birmingham and central London, Birmingham Airport can become a viable
airport for London. Heathrow will be accessible via Old Oak Common and with a link to the
West London line, connections to Gatwick would also be enhanced. In a similar way, with a
link between HS1 and HS2, Manston Airport in Kent, which has one of the longest runways
in Europe and the capacity to accommodate up to 6 million passengers per annum by 2033,
could be developed as a part of a “virtual hub.”

3. Business case

3.1    How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger
forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the
value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network?

3.1.1 Prior to the report by HS2 Ltd, published in 2010, several independent studies have
been undertaken into HSR. W S Atkins undertook a study on behalf of the then Strategic Rail
Authority in 2001, which was updated for the government in 2008. In 2009, Network Rail
undertook a study into capacity issues and Greengauge 21 also published a study into HSR
possibilities. Although the brief for these studies varied, a number of common themes
emerged and all studies recommended high speed rail connections between London,
Birmingham and points north. All proposals have shown a positive cost: benefit ratio, similar
to the conclusions of HS2 Ltd. Further work has been done on the value of time by
Greengauge 21 to test the robustness of assumptions made. Taken together, all this work
underlines a consistently strong business case for high speed rail.

3.1.2 Furthermore, work by Greengauge 21 for Transport Scotland demonstrated that the
business case is considerably enhanced if the network is extended to Scotland. Also,
inclusion of additional markets which could be served as a result of high speed trains running
through to the existing network would also enhance the business case.

3.1.3 Any loss of revenue on the classic network should be compensated through currently
suppressed trips as a result of less frequent or more crowded services and increase in
demand as local trips are encouraged to transfer from other modes.

3.2   What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for
example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

3.2.1 There would seem to be little advantage in constructing new conventional lines, given
that the cost would not be significantly less than for a high speed route and that the benefits
of time reductions, and hence a more attractive service, would not be achieved.
3.2.2 In terms of choice of route, opportunities for further upgrading the key West Coast
Main Line (WCML) line are deemed to be limited in engineering terms and in any case would
lead to major works and realignments at existing stations. Many intermediate stations would
require rebuilding or bypassing and further upgrade would be difficult, expensive and
environmentally intrusive. It is also worth noting that none of this could be achieved without
very major disruption to existing services, at a significant cost to the economy.

3.2.3 Even if all this could be managed, the end result would be a mixed use railway,
without the same potential for increasing freight traffic. In the light of all this, the Network Rail
RUS concluded that the only longer-term capacity solution would be to construct a new line
between London and West Midlands.

3.2.4 Previous attempts to increase speeds to 140 mph (225 km/h) on existing tracks on both
the east and west coast main lines have failed, partly because of track alignment and that trains
which travel above 125 mph (201 km/h) are considered to require in-cab signaling for safety
reasons.

3.3      What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail
travel, for example by price?

3.3.1 Managing demand could only be achieved by limiting capacity or by raising prices.
The only argument in favour of this approach would be to reduce capital investment in the
railways by central government. This would lead to hidden costs for the economy and restrict
economic activity, further concentrating economic activity in the London area to the detriment
of the wider UK economy.

3.3.2 Regulated fares in the UK are already the highest in Europe. Attempting to manage
demand through the fare box would not encourage passengers to transfer from car or air;
indeed it would be likely to have the counter effect and increase demand for these modes. In
addition to raising costs for businesses, it would also be socially regressive, making rail travel
the preserve of the better-off.

3.4    What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to
ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

3.4.1 HS1 was satisfactorily delivered on time and on-budget and there is no reason to
assume that further high speed projects should not be efficiently delivered either. Experience
from European High Speed rail line construction would also support a confident approach to
this.

3.4.2 Conversely, recent work to enhance the WCML suggests that work on existing busy
lines can be a recipe for severe disruption to services and time and cost overruns.

4. The strategic route

4.1     The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common,
Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible
locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate
stations?

4.1.1 The value of high speed rail is in providing good city centre to city centre
communication. Spacing of stations should not be so close as to reduce the benefits of
higher speeds. From European experience, spacing of around at least 100 miles is desirable.
This would tend to rule out intermediate stops on the London to Birmingham route.
4.1.2 It is essential however, that stops are only provided where there is a verifiable
demand for longer distance journeys. Any station locations outside city centres should be
determined by the need to provide access particular facilities such as airports or to provide a
major interchange point serving a wider hinterland.

4.2    Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y
configuration the right choice?

4.2.1 All the HSR studies have considered an eventual network to link London and HS1 with,
Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Edinburgh and
Glasgow to the north. The Y choice provides a basis to include all these points, although
Transport Futures believes strongly that a commitment should be given now to include the North
East and Scotland directly in the overall network. It is also important to ensure that both axes of
the ‘Y’ are committed to and progress in parallel. To do otherwise would lead to a serious
imbalance in economic development in the northern regions and it is not considered economically
justifiable for one part to proceed before the other.
4.2.2 There is also the potential for significant service improvements to destinations beyond the
high-speed network using high-speed trains that can also operate on conventional lines. As the
network develops in the medium term, direct services could potentially be introduced using both
high speed and conventional lines. This approach of using high speed lines and conventional
lines has been an important part of the success of the French TGV network and has been key to
the phased expansion of that network over time. With successful operation of this type of service
in UK, it is also possible to envisage the eventual development of more high-speed lines (e.g. to
the West and South Wales) later in the century.

4.3   Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London
northwards?

4.3.1 The most pressing capacity issues are in the corridors leading into London, especially
on the WCML. The greatest initial capacity benefit therefore will be achieved by constructing
the London to Birmingham section first. However, the country will only fully realise the wider
economic and environmental benefits of HSR when it extends to Manchester and Leeds and
beyond to include the North East and Scotland. This is when the journey time savings and
full economic and environmental benefits to the regions and the whole of eth UK generally
will be fully achieved.

4.3.2 Current proposals for the Y network will reduce journey times from Birmingham to
London by 50%; a roughly 45% cut from Leeds and Manchester, but only 23% from
Scotland. Hence Scotland will be disadvantaged and remain relatively more peripheral to
London and Europe unless it is included in the high speed network.

4.3.3 Consideration should therefore be given to phasing of extensions further north
depending on a combination of capacity issues and potential maximum speeds on existing
lines. What is important is that the government should set out a clear commitment to
implement a network beyond Manchester and Leeds, to include the North East and Scotland.
During these phases, earlier benefits can be achieved by constructing the elements of the
new lines according to where greatest speed benefits can be obtained, which might mean
construction from the northern end as well as sections in the middle.

4.3.4 HSR offers a once in a generation opportunity to transform the economic geography
of the UK to support sustainable growth and international competiveness. However, it is
essential that a new HSR network is developed in such a way as to maximise opportunities
across the UK from the beginning, to ensure that the whole nation benefits.
4.4   The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to
Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

4.4.1 If UK regions are to derive full benefit from HSR, it is essential that a link to HS1 Is
provided in the first stage. This will avoid disruption in the London area and additional costs
which would be incurred if this were to be left until later. Providing through services to
Europe from the UK regions will be a key factor in shifting passengers from air to rail and
greatly assist business interaction with European markets.

4.4.2 Previous proposals to run Eurostar services northwards via a link built to the WCML
did not materialise, partly as a result of such services being limited to international
passengers. A way round such restrictions should be found to create a much more viable
network of services, offering through services to destinations such as Brussels and Paris and
interchange to a wide range of European destinations. International services on the mainland
of Europe cater for both domestic and cross-border passengers and restricting services in
the UK only to international passengers will lead to less effective services into mainland
Europe.

4.4.3 In the first phase, travel to Heathrow can be facilitated relatively easily via a station at Old
Oak Common and it seems reasonable that a direct connection to Heathrow should be developed
later. At that stage, consideration should be given to providing onward links from Heathrow to
points further south and to Gatwick and how a new link to Heathrow can be incorporated into lines
to the west in order to link high speed rail opportunities in this direction also. .

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

5.1     What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge
the north south economic divide?

5.1.1 The economic benefits of high speed rail are already apparent in other countries
where there is clear evidence that it stimulates economic growth away from the capital. In
Spain and France, the still expanding TGV networks have brought large scale change to
centres such as Zaragoza in Spain and Lyons and Lille in France. In the latter case, a
declining post industrial city with high levels of unemployment has been transformed into the
France’s third financial, commercial and industrial centre. It is these sorts of benefits that we
need to see in UK regional cities, especially in areas of current economic disadvantage in the
north of England and Scotland.

5.1.2 Within the UK, HS1 has stimulated development in the Ashford area and in the
Gravesend/Dartford area centred on the HS1 station at Ebbsfleet.

5.1.3 This experience, both in the UK and abroad, helps to give confidence about the
beneficial effects of high speed rail in spreading economic wealth to the areas served by the
network.

5.2    To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of
supporting local and regional regeneration?

5.2.1 As indicated earlier, facilitating regional regeneration should be one of the key
objectives of high speed rail. The network should seek to improve connections to as many
key centres in the regions as possible. It has already been noted that levels of economic
activity and wealth need to be spread more fairly between regions in the UK and the HSR
network will have a major role to play in improving accessibility to the northern regions, North
Wales and Scotland.
5.2.2 Over the last thirty years, the economy of London and the south east has prospered at the
expense other UK regions; in many areas of the north, there is an over reliance on public sector
employment. The world class status of London and its proximity to mainland Europe has meant
that other regions have not shared the prosperity of the European economic corridor stretching
broadly from London to Milan. In transport terms, regions on the “wrong” side of London are at a
significant disadvantage, which can be remedied by linking HS1 to HS2 and other strategic main
lines to permit through passenger and freight services to mainland Europe, hence reducing the
disadvantage of peripherality.
5.2.3 The current proposals for a Y shaped network would provide good connections to
most of the major city centres in the East and West Midlands, North West, Yorkshire and
Humber. Nevertheless, the need to link in the North East and Scotland must be included, as
well as the potential to provide new freight routes using the classic network. Areas which
could benefit from such an approach include Northern Ireland, by improving freight links to
key west coast ports such as Holyhead, Liverpool, Heysham and Stranraer. It will also be
important to use the associated benefits of HSR for freight to enhance connections to these
and other ports for global and European trade, including East Coast ports such as Tees and
Hartlepool, Tyne, Hull and Felixstowe, with the overall aim of minimising lorry miles.

5.3    Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

5.3.1 Potentially, by increasing overall network capacity, most regions of the UK should
derive either direct or indirect benefits from a high speed rail network. Clearly, the main direct
benefits will accrue to those regions directly serviced, but the benefit can be extended by
linking high speed lines with the classic network in a way which maximises possibilities for
longer distance services; the release of capacity on the existing network will also benefit
more local journeys; for example, a much more frequent commuter service into London will
be achievable on both the West Coast mainline from Rugby southwards and on the Chiltern
Line for services from Warwickshire and Buckinghamshire into Marylebone. With the
completion of later phases, local services on other lines will also benefit, for example,
services on the East Coast Main line from Peterborough into Kings Cross.

5.3.2 A Greengauge21 study has advised that the business case for high speed rail is
sufficiently robust when based on current fare levels for long-distance rail travel. If these
levels are retained in real terms, services will cater for both business and leisure travel and
hence be as inclusive as the current rail network. With increased capacity on high speed
trains themselves, business travellers’ needs for working on the train could be
accommodated through premium fares commensurate with facilities offered.

5.4     How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local
authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks
appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

5.4.1 It is appropriate for the private sector, where it directly benefits from new
infrastructure, to contribute to its development. Opportunities will exist for private sector
contributions to key stations if they are also linked with new developments in the immediate
vicinity and a mechanism should be devised to ensure contributions can be secured from
those interests that will particularly benefit from high speed rail and the location of new
stations. However lessons should be learnt from the introduction of the Mayoral CIL
(Community Infrastructure Levy) in London, where from 2012 schemes across the city will be
charged whether or not they directly benefit. This arrangement could impact on the viability of
some developments, including that of much needed housing.
5.4.2 Scope should also exist for attracting European funding as the HSR network will form part
of the Trans European Network. The latest European Transport White Paper sets out a target to
shift the majority of medium haul passenger travel to high speed rail by 2050.

6. Impact

6.1      What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal
shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

6.1.1 HSR has considerably lower carbon impact per passenger than either car or air
travel. As power sources are progressively moved towards renewable resources, the carbon
footprint from HSR operations will be reduced further.

6.2   Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly
accounted for in the business case?

6.2.1   Given the academic challenges in doing this, we believe this to be generally the case.

6.2.2 Environmental benefits associated with high speed rail are mainly linked to carbon
reductions and air quality, not only by more efficient propulsion per passenger for HSR itself
compared with air or car, but also in the potential to reduce demands for short haul air and
car based trips. It could be argued that as the full potential of this has not yet been scoped
out, the environmental benefits may have been hitherto underestimated.

6.2.3 The DfT has made great efforts to ensure that the environmental impact in the
sensitive landscape area of the Chilterns is minimised, both from the visual perspective and
from the noise emitted. . In reality, as demonstrated on HS1 through Kent and indeed in
other countries, the impact of a high speed railway, both visually and in terms of noise, can
be reduced through careful choice of alignment and mitigating features and is considerably
less than that of a three-lane motorway such as the M1 or M40. Motorways are yesterday’s
solution to dealing with demand for transport and in overall terms, high speed rail will provide
for high volume travel demands in a more environmentally friendly way. The careful planning
that went into HS1 in Kent in this respect confirms that it is possible to construct a high speed
railway without unacceptable environmental consequences.

6.3     What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network?

6.3.1 As alluded to earlier, release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the
West Coast Main Line, already the key artery for freight in the UK, will lead to growth in rail
freight services. The full potential for this does not seem to have been thoroughly scoped and
will require supporting infrastructure and feeder services to be fully effective. Attention will
need to be given to the location of freight transfer facilities to maximise the potential benefits
of this.

6.4    How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during
construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

6.4.1 Clearly, a project of this magnitude cannot be delivered without some disruption and
careful planning will be required to ensure that this is the least possible. In the case of
Euston, similar circumstances at St Pancras with the Thameslink services and Midlands Line
indicate that this should be manageable. Where possible, disruption could be reduced by
diverting some services onto other suburban lines in the London area, for example via Old
Oak Common and Cross Rail. Elsewhere, the advantage is that the route will be new-build
and the only rail disruption should be the construction of connections back into the existing
network.

May 2011
                              Written evidence from Atkins Ltd (HSR 145)

Atkins has been involved in the debates over High Speed Rail (HSR) since its original study for the
former Strategic Rail Authority between 2001 and 2003. In 2008, we produced an independent
research paper 1 which set out the ongoing case for investment in HSR in the UK. We have
subsequently provided advice to the Department for Transport (DfT) and High Speed 2 (HS2 Ltd) on
demand modelling and economic appraisal for HSR options, as well as investigating alternative
options to HSR.
We stress that this submission is an independent assessment of the issues raised by the transport
select committee. It is not based on – and does not represent – any work or advice given to either DfT
or HS2 Ltd.

1. WHAT ARE THE MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST HSR?
1.1.    We strongly believe that HSR is the most effective way to provide capacity to the UK transport
        system in a way that encourages sustainable economic development and maximises efficiency
        of the overall transport network. In particular:
               -    HSR provides a step change in the capacity of the rail network by removing the
                    fastest services from the network and making space for more regional and local
                    passenger services and freight trains. This capacity is needed to address the
                    ongoing growth in both long-distance and commuter travel by rail.
               -    The reduction in journey times between London and the main economic centres of
                    Scotland, the North and Midlands will provide huge economic benefits that no other
                    major transport scheme could provide. The majority of economic benefits from the
                    scheme will be accrued by residents and businesses outside London.
               -    The development of HSR stations and hubs can act as a focus for sustainable
                    economic development in those areas, and encourage local transport networks to
                    feed the hubs and increase accessibility of local employment opportunities.
1.2.    We also recognise that HSR is a huge infrastructure project, which needs to be planned
        carefully, both to minimise the impact on local communities affected by construction and
        operation of new lines, and maximise the benefits of the investment in a new HSR network.
2. HOW DOES HSR FIT WITH GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES?

2.1.    Importance of inter-urban connectivity: Although inter-urban trips make up only a small
        proportion of total travel in the UK, their impact on the transport network is large. Statistics from
        the National Transport Survey in 2009 showed that around 40% of car kms on the road network
        were associated with trips over 25 miles, with that figure rising to 75% of passenger kms being
        trips over 25 miles on the rail network. In other words, t strain on the transport network comes
        from catering for longer-distance journeys.
2.2.    However, inter-urban and local connectivity are closely inter-related, particularly for rail and
        HSR. For HSR to be successful, the stations on the network need to be easily accessible –
        local connectivity is vital. In turn, development of rail and HSR hubs encourages local transport
        networks to develop around those hubs, creating a potentially symbiotic relationship.
2.3.    From an economic perspective, inter-urban and local connectivity also complement each other.
        While inter-urban connectivity increases accessibility to markets for businesses, local
        connectivity is often more effective at increasing accessibility to skilled workforce, It would be
        misleading to describe either local or inter-urban connectivity as more important than the other.
2.4.    Impact of HSR on funding for “classic” network: Because of the national scale of
        developing a HSR network across the UK, it is vital that investment in the existing rail network
        and services is not affected. To a certain extent, the High Level Output Specification (HLOS)
        process set up by the previous government provides a framework which requires the rail
        industry to ensure investment is targeted appropriately and fairly through setting targets on
        capacity, safety and reliability across the network.

1
    “Because Transport Matters: High Speed Rail”, Atkins 2008
2.5.   Implications for domestic aviation: The UK domestic aviation market is highly competitive,
       and has historically competed with rail on both journey time and price. Recent research
       conducted by ATOC 2 suggests that rail has started to regain market share, at least partly due
       to improved rail services on the West Coast Main Line (WCML) route.
2.6.   If fully completed, international research 3 suggests that mode share for HSR on the main
       Scotland to London routes could be up to 75%. It is unlikely that HSR would completely
       eliminate domestic aviation unless there was significant additional regulation imposed on
       domestic aviation. For example, while Eurostar enjoys a high mode share (around 70%) on the
       London to Paris route, three airlines fly 28 flights a day each way between the two cities. For
       many areas around the two cities, airports are still more accessible than the HS1 terminal at St
       Pancras.
3. BUSINESS CASE

3.1.   Business case methodology: Atkins has assisted HS2 Ltd with development of its passenger
       forecasts, estimates of modal shift and calculation of economic benefits, all of which are
       consistent with government guidance and international best practice. We provide the following
       comments in two areas raised by the Inquiry:
              -   Forecasts of passenger growth through to 2030 and beyond are inherently
                  uncertain, but are vital to understand what the likely value for money of HSR would
                  be, and, critically, ensure any scheme is designed with enough capacity to cater for
                  the expected passengers. While HS2 forecasts of 95% growth in passengers over
                  100 miles from 2008 to 2043, we understand that passenger growth since 2008 on
                                                                                4
                  the current Virgin franchise has been between 20% to 30% - i.e. already a quarter
                  of the total forecast growth to 2043 in just two years.
              -   Estimates of economic benefits associated with time savings are consistent with
                  central Government guidance and are designed to allow meaningful comparison
                  between different public investments. For each individual project, the standard
                  methodology will necessarily over-estimate in some areas and under-estimate in
                  others. For example, although there may be some use of productive travel time on
                  high speed trains – which may reduce the value of overall time savings for business
                  users – equally the methodology underestimates the productive time savings of
                  those switching from car or air to HSR, and the overall generally higher value of
                  time for business travellers who make long-distance trips.
3.2.   Alternatives to HSR: Atkins was also appointed by DfT to undertake a study of potential
       alternatives to HSR, to increase capacity on the London to Birmingham corridor, through road
       and rail enhancement schemes. An independent challenge team developed realistic alternative
       schemes for providing more capacity on the route. We found that some of the upgrade
       packages – particularly a medium scale upgrade of the WCML route (“Package 2”) 5 – could
       offer value for money, although it would not provide the scale of capacity benefits or economic
       benefits that HS2 offers.
3.3.   However, it would be wrong to interpret the analysis as showing that conventional rail upgrades
       offer better value for money than a high speed rail network for several reasons:
3.4.   First, while Package 2 does provide additional capacity on the WCML route, HS2 would provide
       capacity relief on the parallel Midland Main Line (MML) and East Coast Main Line (ECML)
       routes as well through the eastern branch of the “Y” network. Only very minor capacity
       enhancements could be provided on those routes in a cost-effective way because of the mix of
       commuter and long-distance services. Furthermore, if passenger growth continued, it is unlikely

2
  ATOC Press release 05/04/2011: Shift from air to rail heralds ‘turning point’ in how people travel
between UK’s main cities
3
  “Competition and interaction between rail and air, part 2: time series analysis in Sweden”, Anna-Ida
Lundberg, Bo-Lennart Nelldal, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Department for Transport &
Logistics, KTH Railway Group (2011)
4
  Office of Rail Regulation's National Rail Trends Yearbook 2010
5
  “High Speed 2 Strategic Alternatives Study: London to West Midlands Rail Alternatives – Update of
Economic Appraisal”, Atkins, February 2011.
        that further capacity enhancements on the WCML could be undertaken in a cost-effective
        manner, and little of the additional capacity would be available during peak hours when it is
        most needed.
3.5.    Second, the business case for HS2 focuses solely on the changes to long-distance services
        from Euston as a result of HS2 services being introduced. The development of a separate HSR
        network provides a step-change in the availability of spare capacity on the existing network to
        provide new inter-regional services (for example, Manchester Airport to Milton Keynes) that the
        limited capacity upgrades of existing routes either fails to provide or even removes as the
        intensity of use of the existing network increases.
3.6.    Finally, HSR provides much greater network resilience, as the intensity of use of the expanded
        UK rail network is correspondingly reduced. Beyond improvements in service reliability, the
        availability of a new rail corridor would ameliorate the impact of temporary closure of any of the
        main trunk north-south routes due to major incidents.
3.7.    Managing rail demand: There are other ways of managing rail demand, principally by either
        increasing fares on crowded services and routes or restricting ticket availability. In either case,
        the impact will be to encourage further travel by road or air. Since around a half of long-
        distance rail trips are made for leisure purposes, increasing rail fares to manage demand would
        affect the less well-off disproportionately,
3.8.    Beyond the problems of increased congestion and pollution, this would also reduce the benefits
        of businesses locating in areas easily accessible by public transport, making sustainable
        economic development more difficult. In the long-term, developing a high speed rail network
        provides a more efficient rail network and actually reduces the ongoing operating cost per
        passenger km across the system, allowing additional capacity for regional and local trips to
        provided more cheaply.
3.9.    Lessons from other major projects: The successful completion of HS1 into St Pancras
        contrasts heavily with the huge problems associated with the WCML upgrades started by
        Railtrack and taken forward by Network Rail. We believe the key lessons to take on board are:
               -   Reducing and managing interfaces with the existing network effectively, including
                   planning carefully to mitigate impacts on passengers. We believe work on the
                   Thameslink Programme by Network Rail has demonstrated how this can be
                   achieved even on a heavily used rail line;
               -   Staged construction and development of the HSR network, reducing risk exposure
                   to all parties and allowing early provision of benefits where possible. This was
                   achieved on HS1 through construction of an early section reducing journey times
                   into Waterloo International, and providing revenue streams to support further
                   construction work; and
               -   At an early stage, robust external challenge by potential contractors of proposals,
                   including technical and design standards, to drive down costs, eliminate any
                   unnecessarily high specifications and improve deliverability.
4. THE STRATEGIC ROUTE

4.1.    Station locations: The reports by HS2 have shown that there may be a case for an
        intermediate station between London and Birmingham – possibly up to £2bn present value (PV)
                                                                               6
        in user benefits and £1bn PV in revenue, depending on station location . This level of benefits
        and revenues would outweigh the costs of any station or services. However, in turn, stopping
        HS2 services at an intermediate station would have detrimental effects on a similar scale on
        passengers travelling between London and the North, and would reduce overall line capacity.
4.2.    We agree with HS2’s assessment that, in the long term, the disbenefits of an intermediate
        station to longer-distance passengers would outweigh the benefits for users of that station. This
        situation would only change if capacity on the line, either because long-distance patronage was
        much below forecast or if a second HSR route into London was developed which diverted HSR
        services to the East Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East away from HS2.


6
    “HS2 Demand Model Analysis”, February 2010, Table 6.2b
4.3.   The strategic locations for new stations in the West Midlands provide access to central
       Birmingham as well as accessibility by car from a large area of the West Midlands. We stress
       the importance of providing effective interchange with existing stations at New Street and
       International.
4.4.   At present, the spur line into Birmingham is planned to be operated as a self-contained HSR
       route. The government should examine whether this section of route, which would neither be
       intensively used by HSR services nor operated at full high speed for significant lengths, could
       be developed as a conventional line, to allow more long-distance high speed services to be
       released from the existing crowded corridors in the West Midlands area. We also stress the
       importance of physical connections from the HSR station in central Birmingham to the existing
       rail network, to allow HSR services to continue south from Birmingham to the South and South
       West.
4.5.   In London, Euston is by far the most appropriate central London location for a high speed rail
       station, from an engineering, economic and planning perspective. The case for a station at Old
       Oak Common is largely driven by providing access to a much wider catchment area via
       Crossrail, particularly from the East and West of London, and alleviating pressure on the
       Underground network at Euston station. However, we regard provision of this station as adding
       incremental value to the scheme, rather than an essential component.
4.6.   Shape of proposed network: The “Y” network proposed by HS2 has significant strategic
       advantages, by using the additional capacity between Birmingham and London to benefit both
       the East and West Midlands, and both Yorkshire and the North West. This configuration also
       gives an opportunity to extend beyond Leeds and Manchester to Edinburgh / Glasgow via a
       west coast route, and to Newcastle via an east coast route, linking London by HSR with the
       largest core urban areas.
4.7.   Depending on the level of passenger growth and on technical views of the effective capacity a
       new HSR line, there remain doubts as to whether a single route into London would be sufficient
       to provide HSR service to all major urban centres. At present, a combined total of 19 long-
       distance services (serving markets more than 100 miles from London) operate every hour on
       the WCML, ECML and MML routes, rising to 22 services in peak hours.
4.8.   If only a single HSR route into London were to be provided, then inevitably some major urban
       centres more than 100 miles from London would not have direct HSR services, although they
       would continue to be served by residual services on the existing network. We note that there
       are currently four HSR lines from Paris, each of which carry about 8-12 TGV services an hour
       to both “online” and “offline” urban centres, and believe that it is likely there is a case for
       developing two separate high speed rail lines into London from the north, providing direct HSR
       services to many more regional centres. If sufficient capacity is provided, we believe there is a
       strong case for connecting as many cities as possible to the HSR network, through using HS2
       as a “trunk” route, and accessing smaller stations on the existing network, as is the case on the
       German and French high speed rail networks.
4.9.   We stress that the “Y” network does allow a further leg into London to be built, probably from
       the East Midlands, at a later stage. It is important that any route through the East Midlands is
       planned to facilitate a suitable second HSR route direct to London to be provided subsequently.
       It may also be worth examining whether a more direct connection from the main East Midlands
       centres to the main HS2 route to London further south of Birmingham could provide faster
       journey times to London from more centres in the East Midlands.
4.10. We also recommend further examination of the relative merits of extending the “Y” network to
      Glasgow and Edinburgh via Newcastle, rather than a western route via the Lake District.
4.11. Staging: The first stage of the high speed network in the UK should be from London to the
      Birmingham and the Midlands, as this section would provide the greatest relief to the most
      heavily used sections of the UK long distance rail network and offer reduced travel times for the
      highest number of passengers and freight services.
4.12. However, there may be a case for considering completion of other regional sections of high
      speed rail at an earlier stage, to provide a greater spread of benefits across the UK. For
      example, early completion of a HSR route between Sheffield and Leeds, in conjunction with
      electrification / upgrade of the Midland Main Line route and a simple connection to the HS2
        route near Lichfield, could provide reduced journey times from London to Derby (55min from
        1h33min), Sheffield (1h20min from 2h07mins) and Leeds (1h40min from 2h15mins). Journey
        times from Birmingham to the same areas would be similarly reduced, for example to Leeds by
        up to 45 minutes.
4.13. In turn, capacity could be released on the Midland Main Line and East Coast Main Line routes
      for more services from Nottingham, York, Newcastle and Edinburgh to London in advance of
      completion of high speed rail to those areas. Further sections of HSR route in other locations,
      such as between Newcastle and York, could also reduce journey times between London Kings
      Cross and Newcastle / Edinburgh in advance of connection to the London to Birmingham leg of
      the network.
4.14. Links to HS1 and Heathrow Airport: Until completion of a more extensive HSR network
      across the UK, which could be capable of accepting standard European high speed train sets,
      the prospects of extending HS1 services north onto HS2 are relatively limited - only
      Birmingham would be available during Phase 1. The connection between the two lines should
      only be built at an early stage if there are significant construction savings by doing so.
4.15. The phasing of any link to Heathrow is more complicated, and needs to be planned in
      conjunction with a wider strategy of medium and long-distance rail access to Heathrow. If any
      major new rail infrastructure to access Heathrow is built, it should be developed and designed
      in a way that facilitates rail access from other areas, including South West England and South
      Wales.
4.16. We note that the vast majority of Heathrow travellers, even those from outside London, come
      from areas which would not be directly served by HS2 services. As such, we recommend that
      links to any new Heathrow rail infrastructure are provided to the existing Chiltern, WCML, MML
      and ECML routes, allowing areas not on the HSR route, particularly closer to London, to benefit
      from connections to Heathrow.
4.17. Finally, we note that extending HSR services from HS1 at St Pancras through to Heathrow
      Airport would have the potential to reduce demand for short-haul flights from Heathrow to Paris,
      Brussels and Amsterdam. When combined with potential government intervention on
      prioritisation of flight slots at Heathrow and through-ticketing on HSR services, this could allow
      complete removal of some short haul flights at the airport.
5. ECONOMIC REBALANCING AND EQUITY

5.1.    Economic regeneration: The extent to which HSR can assist in economic regeneration is
        heavily influenced by station location and the willingness / ability of individual cities to adapt
        their economic, land-use and transport policies around a new HSR hub. There is inevitably
        controversy and differing views on whether HSR provides net increases in inward investment in
        particular areas, or only diverts investment towards the HS2 hub and away from areas less
        well-served. We recommend this is examined further to ensure that cities and towns not
        currently proposed to be served by the HS2 network are not adversely affected.
                                  7
5.2.    Figures produced by HS2 demonstrate that the majority of the economic benefits from high
        speed rail would accrue to residents and businesses outside London and the South East. While
        transport investment on its own cannot eliminate the north-south economic divide, the faster
        journey times between regional centres and London provide a significant incentive for
        businesses to locate significant skilled capability in regional centres, while still being able to
        maintain contact with the huge international base of potential customers in London and the
        South East.
5.3.    We are not aware of any estimates of figures of job creation in individual areas which would be
        served by HSR. We emphasise again the need for local economic development and transport
        planning to be shaped around the increased inter-urban accessibility provided by HS2,
        including review of potential job creation for individual business sectors for each location. The
        benefits of HS2 come from joining up economic development and transport policies, not just
        from faster journey times.



7
    “HS2 Demand Model Analysis”, February 2010, Table 10.4
5.4.   Decisions on network shape: The development of a new HSR network is a national planning
       decision. The overall shape of the network has to be guided by transport and economic
       development priorities at a national level, reflecting the significant investment by the
       government.
5.5.   Decisions on how individual cities and towns would be served after completion of HS2 should
       take local economic development needs into account. We stress that there are a number of
       options of how centres can be served, whether by dedicated stations on the HSR line itself, by
       services running off the HSR line and onto the existing network to serve multiple stations, or by
       improved long-distance services making use of released capacity on the existing network.
       These decisions should take into account development plans and priorities in the surrounding
       areas.
5.6.   Distribution of benefits: The majority of benefits from HSR accrue to areas outside London,
       as described in HS2 reports and other research on HSR. This is principally due to the fact that
       more long-distance trips are made by residents and employees of firms based outside London
       and the South East.
5.7.   Different socio-economic groups will benefit from HS2 in different ways: while long-distance
       trips are generally made by higher income groups, the released capacity on the existing
       network will primarily benefit those making shorter commuting trips and inter-regional trips,
       improving accessibility to employment opportunities for many communities.
5.8.   Contributions from major beneficiaries: It is important that areas and businesses which
       benefit from HS2 contribute appropriately to the costs of the scheme. At the same time, higher
       local contributions may act against the aim of encouraging economic regeneration – a key
       objective of the HS2 scheme in the first place. However, it would be appropriate to require cities
       and towns to ensure transport and economic development policies maximise the impact of
       central government investment in HSR in their areas, and for businesses to contribute towards
       provision of other enabling infrastructure.
6. IMPACT

6.1.   Impact on carbon emissions: Estimating the net impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions is
       not straightforward, and depends on a complex balance between the higher energy
       consumption of HSR compared to conventional rail, the energy mix used in electricity
       generation in the UK, and the amount of modal shift achieved by HSR.
6.2.   For HSR to contribute towards a significant reduction in carbon emissions, it needs to
       encourage modal shift to rail not just from air – which makes up a relatively small proportion of
       transport-related carbon emissions in the UK – but also from car, particularly for shorter, urban
       car journeys on congested roads. It is vital that the planning of HS2 is not just around
       introduction of new, faster, long-distance rail services, but also about improving local and
       regional rail services to provide an attractive alternative to commuting by car. This also
       reinforces the “step change” advantage of developing a HSR network that piecemeal upgrades
       of the existing network cannot achieve.
6.3.   Constructing a new line to operate at lower speeds might result in lower ongoing energy
       consumption for the rail network, but the much lower levels of mode shift achieved would mean
       that associated reductions in carbon emissions for air and car would be greatly reduced
       compared to HSR.
6.4.   Environmental costs and benefits: We do not have any specific comments on the
       methodology used to calculate environmental costs and benefits in the HS2 business case.
       From a technical perspective we note that it is difficult to provide a quantified comparison
       between the environmental benefits at national and regional levels, and the disbenefits at local
       levels caused by construction of the route and operation of HSR services. We recommend a
       focus on assessing what appropriate levels of mitigation against local environmental disbenefits
       should be.
6.5.   Impact on freight services: Again, we emphasise that the key advantage of HSR is the step-
       change release in capacity across the network. The current rail network is particularly
       constrained in peak periods, with extremely limited opportunities for freight services to operate
       due to the density of passenger train operation and the need to maintain overall rail network
       service reliability. HSR will provide much greater flexibility to operate freight services
       throughout the day and reduce vulnerability of freight service operation to closures of the
       “classic” rail network for maintenance and upgrade work.
6.6.   We emphasise again the need to develop an overall strategy for how the existing rail network –
       particularly the WCML route – can be used to provide maximum benefits for passenger and
       freight users from the released capacity.
6.7.   Disruption during construction: The recent work to upgrade the WCML route demonstrated
       the massive disruption that reconstruction of the rail network can cause, and is one of the main
       advantages of HS2 over further capacity enhancements on the WCML and other routes. The
       published HS2 proposals provide an outline plan of the areas and timings of how the existing
       rail network will be affected by HS2 construction. We note that the existing network will be
       affected not just around Euston, but also on the Great Western Main Line through the
       construction of the proposed Old Oak Common interchange.
6.8.   While the staged approach at Euston, making best use of the much larger site for the final
       station, will alleviate disruption to passengers, we believe there is merit in looking at whether
       some services could be diverted into Paddington, using some of the capacity released by
       Crossrail, to alleviate disruption to passengers during works at Euston.




       May 2011
           Written evidence from the Campaign to Protect Rural England,
                         Warwickshire Branch (HSR 146)


High Speed 2 is the wrong type of high speed railway. What is needed is a realistic, economic and
practical approach which upgrades the best of our existing major routes and adds new sections of
line where necessary and environmentally feasible.

The High Speed 2 proposal is a very costly separate, segregated railway with different standards,
unable to be used by any trains than those specially built. It would serve just four cities, bypass
several others, and seems orientated to serve airports rather than places where people live and work.

There has been no public consultation on the principle of this concept compared to other approaches
to upgrading the country’s main railway network.

CPRE supports the development and improvement of our railways, so that taking the train becomes a
better way to travel than car or plane where possible. But the exacting engineering specification of
HS2 - trains capable of speeds of 250 mph - mean that an acceptable alignment through the
Warwickshire countryside is virtually impossible. In addition to the high speeds, the tracks will need
to be wider apart and tunnels larger than on conventional railways. So very high speed lines are more
expensive to construct and have a greater impact on the local environment.

“Nature abhors a straight line”, wrote William Kent, the C18th landscape gardener who inspired
Capability Brown. An almost straight railway line across 35 miles of Warwickshire countryside with
its gentle hills, ancient woodlands and patchwork of fields will conflict with the whole character and
patina of our landscape, which has evolved over many centuries. The deep cuttings, high banks and
bridges across wide river valleys, and the loss of some houses (even a complete small village in the
first draft of the route) will do serious damage to the County.

There has been no public consultation on the design requirements. If the same speed as on the new
line through Kent to the Channel Tunnel, 185 mph, is adopted, a line can be more curved, a mix of
new and existing lines could be used and the county’s most beautiful countryside would be avoided.

CPRE has set out five tests against which we believe that high-speed rail proposals in England
should be judged. These have the objective of ensuring that new high-speed lines support sustainable
development, respect environmental limits and will assist and not conflict with the sound planning of
the areas it serves or crosses. They are to:

   1.   Protect the environment, by for example using existing transport corridors
   2.   Tackle climate change and minimise energy needs
   3.   Shift existing trips rather than generate new ones
   4.   Improve local transport
   5.   Integrate with planning and regional regeneration

These tests are not met by High Speed 2.

   1. Existing transport corridors are not to be used at all
   2. The energy consumption is high. 50% more energy will be required to run HS2’s proposed
      250 mph trains than the existing Eurostar London-Paris trains use
   3. There are no commercial flights from Birmingham to London to be switched to rail; instead
      the scheme would generate wholly new travel and lead to longer journeys as it enables more
      distant destinations to be reached in the same time
   4. The new line as so far proposed would have no links with local transport and no effective
      interchange with other rail services
   5. The line would not serve areas needing economic development – in the West Midlands
      Nuneaton, North Coventry, or the Black Country

Actual needs on the rail system

The most burdened inter-city main line is the West Coast Main Line between Euston and Rugby, and
between Coventry and Birmingham. The 10-mile length between Rugby and Coventry is suitable for
high speed and has adequate capacity. North of Rugby to Manchester and Liverpool, the Trent
Valley line, which runs through northern Warwickshire, has considerable spare capacity following 4-
tracking of the 2-track section in 2004-08. The need for more capacity is south of Rugby.

Widening the Coventry-Birmingham line from 2 to 4 tracks is stated by Centro (West Midlands
Passenger Transport Executive) to be needed whether HS2 is built or not. The mix of fast and local
trains on this line cannot be handled without separate tracks for the intensive stopping service that
Centro wishes to offer. With 4 tracks between Coventry and Birmingham, high-speed trains could
use the line and serve Birmingham International as now.

A new central Birmingham station at Curzon Street would be of great benefit. But the HS2 Ltd
proposal, a terminal station solely used by its segregated service, is the wrong type. Other services
would have to continue to use the congested New Street station, which the current concourse-level
reconstruction will not enlarge. The Arup proposal for a through ‘Grand Central’ station at Curzon
Street remains wholly feasible and should be recommended for appraisal now. It would:
    • provide for the full length of high-speed trains that international standards specify (400 m)
    • create a national rail interchange for movements across the country, to the standard of the
        most modern European stations (such as Berlin Hauptbahnhof)
    • facilitate direct interchange between high-speed trains, regional express services,
        Birmingham suburban lines, and the city’s tram system at one station
    • enable London-Birmingham high-speed trains to continue to Sandwell & Dudley,
        Wolverhampton, and (with electrification) Telford and Shrewsbury; they would not have to
        turn back at Curzon Street as would the trains proposed by HS2 Ltd.

CPRE Warwickshire believes that the Transport Committee should recommend:

- reconsideration of the type of high-speed railway represented by the HS2 Ltd proposal
- national public consultation over the next year on:
       • The type of high-speed rail that the UK should have – a separate railway (as in Spain and
           as proposed by HS2 Ltd) or additions to the existing network (as in Germany, Belgium,
           Switzerland, Italy)
       • The design standards of any new lines – speed, curvature, loading gauge
       • The scope for the existing major railway routes, or parts of them, to act as high-speed
           lines for speeds above 125 mph (200 kph)
       • What part in the future rail network should be played by new lines
       • The provision of separate tracks, and where necessary routes, for freight

May 2011
           Written evidence from Great Missenden Stop HS2 (HSR 147)




Introduction

1.    Great Missenden Stop HS2 is the umbrella organisation for communities in the
      Misbourne valley in the very heart of the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural
      Beauty (AONB). This includes the villages of Little Missenden, Great Missenden,
      Ballinger, South Heath, Heath End and the larger settlement of Prestwood, a
      population totalling well over 10,000.

2.    In this submission, we avoid any discussion of the local impacts of the HS2
      preferred route as that lies outside the scope of this inquiry. We would however
      like to extend an invitation to members of the select committee to visit Great
      Missenden in due course so that members can have an opportunity to discuss
      the many outstanding issues relating to the Government’s preferred route and in
      the absence of a full Environmental Impact Assessment.

3.    Great Missenden Stop HS2 would respectfully remind the Transport Select
      Committee of the Public Accounts Committee’s observations of November last
      year that:
      ‘The unique and complex structure of the rail industry makes it inherently
      cumbersome and expensive, and provides little external challenge to its
      vested interest in its own growth. The Department should conduct a
      fundamental review of the rail industry's structure, to ensure better accountability
      and value for money, with the aim of reducing conflicts of interest, aligning efforts
      on maximising efficiency, and restraining the tendency to seek solutions
      through growth.’ This should form part of the Transport Select Committee’s
      considerations.

Question 1
‘What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?”


4.     The committee’s starting point should be consideration of how the term ‘High
      Speed Rail’ is defined. Great Missenden Stop HS2’s understanding is that for
      newly constructed lines, ‘high speed’ is a minimum of 140 miles per hour. The
      Campaign to Protect Rural England points out that:
      ‘While High Speed 1, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, was designed for 300km/h
      (186mph), HS2 is proposed to cater for very high speeds of 400km/h (250mph).
      No services in Europe currently operate faster than 330km/h.’ (Campaign to
      Protect Rural England, August 2010, High Speed 2 Statement )


      Speed is key here because it determines the design of the route and the amount
      of energy required, both of which are of huge environmental significance.

5.    It is also noted that the Inquiry is into the strategic case for High Speed Rail,
      although this is not defined, rather than the specific case for High Speed 2. GM
      Stop HS2 believes strongly that it is possible to support the strategic case for
      “high speed rail” as defined as a minimum speed of 140mph, without endorsing
      HS2.

6.    Indeed, we take the view that it is crucial that the two ie HS2 and “high speed
      rail” remain distinct. This is because the HS2 proposals envisage an ultra-high-
      speed not high speed line with trains travelling at 225 - 250 miles per hour - well
      above the defined minimums and in excess of the European average for high
      speed rail. There are specific issues relating to the proposal of a dedicated line
      capable of accommodating those speeds. To quote the CPRE again:

             ”400km/h was chosen as the maximum track speed [for HS2] – without
             any consultation – as it was believed to the maximum speed possible for
             track based trains…. ‘Lines designed for very high speeds have to be
             very straight, making it harder to fit them in with the landscape and avoid
             sensitive areas. In addition a bigger gap between tracks is needed, while
             tunnels must be wider to allow trains to pass safely. So very high speed
             lines are considerably more expensive to construct and have a greater
             impact on the local environment.…very high speeds mean… much more
             energy is needed for propulsion. For example, a train travelling at
             360km/h requires 50% more energy than one travelling at 300km/h. Very
             high speed rail would only save a couple of minutes for most trips at huge
             cost financially and to the local environment.’ (Campaign to Protect Rural
             England, August 2010, High Speed 2 Statement)”.

Question 2
‘How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?’

7.    Question 2.1 asks:

             ”HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that
             objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and
             spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?”

      We note that a significant plank of the Department for Transport’s policy has
      been omitted - the travel reduction strategy.

8.    The travel reduction strategy was announced by Mr Hammond last autumn. In a
      speech on Sustainable Transport at the START Summit on 14 September he
      said:

             ‘But you might be surprised to know that the most innovative change we
             have made in the Department for Transport in the last four months is to
             introduce a portfolio responsibility for “non-travel”.

      Promoting alternatives to travel is a key part of the sustainability agenda. And
      although it has not traditionally been thought of as a transport responsibility, I
      have decided that we should integrate it into our transport agenda. So my
      colleague, Norman Baker, is working with colleagues at DCMS, in BIS and in
      other Departments to look at reducing the demand for travel, particularly for
      business.
      Encouraging home working; promoting the use of high-speed broadband for both
      business and leisure purposes and encouraging the uptake of video
      conferencing as an alternative to long-distance travel.

      No, it is not the mission of the Department for Transport to stop people travelling,
      but unnecessary travel is expensive in environmental and financial terms
      and, if we can help businesses to understand the opportunities to operate
      efficiently with a need for less travel, we will be advancing both their
      agendas and our own.’ (Rt Hon Philip Hammond, IBM START Conference)

9.     Hence alternatives to travel should be considered as one of the transport policy
      objectives. This is particularly the case with High Speed Rail since Mr Hammond
      specifies video-conferencing as an alternative to long-distance travel.

10.   We recognise that firm evidence of the take-up of business broadband as an
      alternative to travel is limited because it is happening so rapidly. Nonetheless
      the National Statistics Office’s latest report, published in November 2010, states
      that

             ”…the largest businesses continued to lead the way with adoption of new
             technology. However, smaller businesses were closing the gap with
             increasing numbers using broadband and mobile Internet, developing
             websites and using the Internet to interact with public authorities…Just
             over 91 per cent of businesses had Internet access in 2009, with 87.4 per
             cent connecting via a broadband connection.” (Office for National
             Statistics, 26 November 2010, E-commerce and ICT activity 2009,
             Statistical Bulletin).

11.    In addition, the Government itself is investing in video-conferencing equipment -
      for example in the Welsh Office - to reduce travel and so cut costs and increase
      efficiency.

      It is now possible for businesses that do not have their own facilities to rent
      video-conferencing facilities for specific meetings through companies like Regus,
      which provides serviced office accommodation. Travel companies are now
      offering ‘video-travel’ packages as an alternative to arranging business trips.

12.   These changes offer the likelihood of a reduction in demand for business travel
      which should be taken into account when projecting long distance rail passenger
      demand into the future.

Question 5.1
What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help
bridge the north-south economic divide?

13.   The Government claims that one of the major benefits of HS2 is that faster
      journey times will reduce the North-South divide, but it is more likely that regional
      disparity will increase as business investment and leisure travel is drawn to the
      capital.
14.   Far from boosting regional employment during construction, the department for
      Transport’s new business case suggests that 70% of the jobs created by high
      speed rail will be in London. In addition, outside the immediate urban centres
      served by HS2, it is likely that the wider regions will suffer as investment and jobs
      are sucked away from towns and cities off the route, reflecting the experience in
      France for example.


Question 6
What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions?

15.   We agree with Friends of the Earth and other environmental organizations, that
      at best the impact of HS2 on reducing UK carbon emissions will be negligible and
      that at a time of austerity the Government should be prioritizing upgrading our
      existing rail network and other genuinely sustainable transport alternatives.

16.   Although Ministers have largely dropped the “green” justification for HS2 in
      recent months, carbon emission reductions are still a claimed benefit of the
      scheme, in part because of the promised reduction in domestic air travel that the
      Department suggests will follow once the Y section of the route is complete.
      The first stage of the scheme will have no such benefits as there are no domestic
      flights between London and Birmingham. We would submit however that HS2 is
      likely to lead to significantly increased emissions due to its energy demands as
      noted in paragraph 7 above.

17.   The danger with HS2 specifically (as opposed to more incremental improvements
      to deliver “high speed rail”) is that it will actually lead to an increase in domestic
      air travel emissions, as Birmingham airport expands significantly to take
      advantage of the reduced train time to central London and Heathrow airport
      runway slots are used instead for more carbon intensive long haul flights. The
      only way in which this could be avoided, if HSR is really intended to form part of
      a strategic solution to long-term transport carbon emission reductions, would be
      to retire the domestic flight slots altogether.

18.   The vast majority of emissions from UK domestic passenger transport, come not
      from domestic air travel, diesel train services or long distance commuting at all
      but from short car journeys. HS2 and HSR will not provide a low carbon
      alternative for these trips of typically less than 5 miles and where the Committee
      on Climate Change has pointed out that comparatively small investments in car
      journey alternatives deliver significantly greater carbon emission reductions.

May 2011
                      Written evidence from Star Alliance Services (HSR 148)


Star Alliance is the largest global airline alliance, carrying more than 600 million passengers each year on a
fleet of over 4,000 aircraft, with annual revenues in excess of $150 billion. Our member airlines control one
third of slots at Heathrow, one of Star Alliance’s main global hubs. We therefore have a keen interest in the
Committee’s important Inquiry.

Star Alliance believes that there are a number of key principles to be considered in the relationship between
Heathrow, HS2 and also classic rail. We are pleased to provide this response to some of the questions posed
by the Inquiry.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

Taking Europe as an example, our experience is that the European Commission’s transport policy and
member country transport strategies are well aligned in adopting an integrated, intermodal approach. These
policies provide seamless connectivity between air and rail, providing an important argument for HSR by, for
example, allowing the most appropriate modal choice for each journey, reducing the environmental impact of
air travel by allowing rail access to airports, and releasing scarce capacity at slot constrained airports for long
haul flights.

Star Alliance is concerned that the current consultation proposals on HS2 adopt a different approach, treating
aviation and HSR in isolation, and with Heathrow served only by a remote rail interchange for at least the first
phase of HS2. In our view, this does not assist either the argument or business case for HSR and, when
considered alongside other constraints on Heathrow, puts the UK’s competitive position at risk.


2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

    3. What are the implications for domestic aviation?

Heathrow has seen a steady decline in domestic destinations served, and the frequencies of those services
that remain. In the absence of a rail alternative, this makes access from the regions to the UK’s only
international airport more difficult, directly affecting the UK’s competitiveness.

HSR could improve access to Heathrow, which would benefit the UK economy as a whole and strengthen
Heathrow’s hub operations by enlarging its currently very limited, (principally London and the South East),
catchment.

HSR could also potentially allow some domestic flights to be replaced by rail. However, with domestic flights
accounting for only 6% of Heathrow’s capacity, this would be unlikely to provide significant additional capacity.
The majority of domestic destinations currently served from Heathrow would not be connected by HSR until
phase 2 of HS2 and journey times, even by HSR, may not be competitive with air.

However, as discussed below, we do see potential for HSR to compete for interline traffic with short haul
flights between some UK region’s and European hub airports.




3. Business case

    1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts,
       modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time)
       and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network?
HS2’s business case appears to be flawed in its assumptions of Heathrow demand. This is significant as it
has informed their decisions on the HS2 route, leading to the original proposal to bypass Heathrow altogether
and the more recent decision to serve Heathrow via a spur, as a second phase of HS2, (with possible
extension to form a loop as a third phase).

HS2 Ltd’s have assumed that improving rail access to Heathrow has no effect on the airport’s geographic
markets and the size of demand within those markets. This appears to misunderstand the reality of airport
markets. For example, Birmingham, although only 100 miles from Heathrow, currently generates very few
Heathrow passengers. Whilst it is possible to drive to the airport, the UK’s congested road network makes
journey times unreliable. Rail access is also difficult, requiring a change of train in London, and a cross-
London journey by Underground, and another change onto Heathrow Express or the Piccadilly Line.
Research, and our experience, clearly shows that even one interchange in an airport access journey acts as a
significant disincentive to choosing rail.

Birmingham therefore largely relies on short haul flights to European hub airports to access global markets.
This is attractive to those airlines and airports seeking to attract transfer traffic and strengthen their hub
operations at European hubs such as Charles de Gaulle, Schiphol and Frankfurt. It also weakens Heathrow’s
hub operations through reliance on smaller, less well connected markets.

Birmingham, and other UK regions without domestic flights to Heathrow, are also placed at an economic
disadvantage in only being able to access global markets by short haul flights and interlining at European
hubs. This increases overall journey times, with infrequent connections to hubs without Heathrow’s high levels
of connectivity and frequency. it also reinforces market perceptions of UK’s regions peripheral location within
Europe.

If HS2 served Heathrow directly this would provide very short journey times, avoiding interchange penalties,
and providing access to Heathrow’s global route network and high frequencies. It would also remove the
interchange penalty associated with current access journeys, and the proposal for a remote interchange at
Old Oak Common.

Taking the example of Birmingham, we would expect to see passengers choosing to travel by HSR to interline
through Heathrow, instead of taking short haul flights to European hubs. With a high frequency of HSR
services, and recognizing Heathrow’s unrivalled service frequency and connectivity, we would also expect
overall journey times from the regions to be reduced compared to interlining through European hubs,
benefiting UK plc.

European experience clearly demonstrates that improving rail access increases an airports catchment area.
For example, Frankfurt airport’s direct high speed rail connection has brought much of Germany closer to the
nation’s hub airport, with almost 20% of air passengers now travelling over long distances to and from the
airport by high speed train. This allows German regions to be internationally competitive, with direct access to
the global route network and frequency that only a hub airport can provide. Improved accessibility also
increases competition between airports, driving up standards and keeping costs competitive.

We would therefore expect an integrated, high frequency HSR service to expand Heathrow’s catchment. HS2
Ltd’s demand modelling, and the decision that HS2 should bypass Heathrow, therefore requires
reassessment.

4. The strategic route

    4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only
       as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

As currently proposed, Heathrow will be reliant on a branch line connection with HS2 via a remote interchange
at Old Oak Common until the 2030’s. We do not believe this is acceptable, particularly when Heathrow’s short
term competitive position is threatened by the UK’s approach to aviation tax, uncompetitive user charges and
lack of capacity.
We would also urge Government to reconsider their proposals for a spur under phase 2 of HS2. Whilst this
removes the interchange penalty that is unavoidable with the Old Oak Common interchange, a spur is likely to
be served by a relatively infrequent service of trains compared to the main HS2 route between London and
the north.

The current consultation does not include any detail of, or request comment on, the proposed spur or loop to
Heathrow. We welcome Government’s revised remit to HS2 Ltd, which has at least highlighted the flaws in
the Old Oak Common interchange. However, it is not credible to proceed in isolation with significant decisions
on a first phase of HS2 without considering how best to serve Heathrow, at least cost, with the least
environmental impact and with the greatest overall benefits.

Heathrow’s airlines and BAA have confirmed that a remote interchange is the least acceptable way of
connecting HS2 and Heathrow.

Our analysis also concludes that a spur or loop have inherent disadvantages – they are costly to build and to
operate, require two interchange stations at Old Oak Common, (for Crossrail) and Heathrow, and provide a
much lower frequency service than a station on a through line. Airlines recognize the resulting service
frequency penalty as having a significant effect on demand, comparable to an interchange penalty.

European experience, (Charles de Gaulle, Schiphol and Frankfurt), clearly demonstrates the benefits of HSR
directly serving hub airports on through lines, not spurs or loops. Brussels, which has been restricted to
access over a spur, is now reconfiguring its rail infrastructure at considerable cost to allow through HSR
services. A direct connection between rail and air has also been proven to assist the business case for high
speed rail. It also reduces cost and environmental factors, as it requires less route mileage, and only one
interchange station.

We believe that proper assessment of an alternative HS2 route is therefore essential. This should assume an
HS2 route at or near Heathrow, serving an “on-airport” interchange and providing a one seat ride to the airport
from a range of destinations via HSR and classic rail.

We would make the important point that an “on-airport” station does not have to be located within the existing
airport boundary, if this results in an unacceptable deviation of the HS2 alignment, significant journey time
penalties for non-airport passengers or a significant cost penalty due to the inevitable challenges of major
construction in, or under, the operational airfield.

Recognising that Heathrow occupies the smallest site area of any major international airport, and the
dispersed nature of Heathrow’s terminals, sites outside the existing airport boundary should be explored,
particularly if this allows better connectivity and alignment with HS2, the existing rail network – particularly the
Great Western Main Line – and the local motorway network.

The over-riding objective is not necessarily to minimise the distance between train and plane, but to balance
journey time, seamless connectivity and costs, in order to achieve the best possible passenger experience
and least environmental impact.

An integrated, intermodal solution, (along the lines of Arup’s Heathrow Hub proposal), could also release
valuable space within the airfield, allowing more space for larger aircraft, improving operational efficiency and
resilience, improving air quality and enhancing the passenger experience.

We recognise that Government policy has the objective of a better, not bigger Heathrow. However, the reality
is that Heathrow’s passenger numbers are likely to significantly increase as the economy recovers, even with
a two runway airport and without breaching current planning limits. This is outside of Government influence as
market forces – in part influenced by changes in BAA’s airport user charges – leads to airlines replacing small
aircraft on short haul flights with larger aircraft serving long haul routes. We would argue that this, within a
supportive and realistic policy framework, can provide significant, if not essential, benefits to the UK economy.

Without an integrated approach to improve Heathrow’s surface access, such growth could have significant
local impacts on road congestion and local air quality. It could also accelerate the UK’s regions competitive
disadvantage as domestic connectivity declines. In the worst case, it could herald the start of Heathrow’s, and
the UK’s, decline as an internationally competitive hub.

We therefore believe that there is an urgent need for an integrated, intermodal, affordable and deliverable
transport strategy to secure a sustainable future for Heathrow.


5. Economic rebalancing and equity

    4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local
       authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks
       appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

Government has made clear that Heathrow’s users would be expected to make a financial contribution to the
cost of a spur or loop. The comparatively small benefits that could be provided by a limited service over a spur
are disproportionate to the very high cost of infrastructure that is, by the nature of a spur or loop, only of
benefit to airport users.

It is also not clear whether HS2 services would be required to operate on an entirely commercial basis. If that
is indeed the case, we doubt whether Heathrow, although a major traffic generator, could provide the very
large numbers of passengers necessary to provide a commercial return on services to a wide range of
destinations, operating at a frequency high enough to overcome any service frequency penalty and justifying
use of train paths on the main HS2 route, (since each Heathrow service would take up a path that could
otherwise be used for London or European services).

There is a significant risk that, if a first phase of HS2 is built as currently envisaged, a spur, or even more
expensive loop, may not then follow, as a result of funding and/or the lack of a credible business case. In
either case, Heathrow, the country’s only hub airport and the busiest international airport in the world, would
be relegated to a remote HS2 interchange at Old Oak Common.

We therefore conclude as follows:
    •   It is essential that HS2 and Heathrow are fully integrated as part of an affordable and deliverable
        intermodal strategy. Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam all provide precedents for this approach;
    •   Heathrow’s need for much improved surface access should not be solely focused on HS2, but as part
        of an integrated approach that includes early surface access improvements through seamless
        connectivity with Crossrail and classic Great Western Main Line services from the Thames Valley,
        Wales, the West and South West;
    •   Heathrow requires an ‘”on-airport” station on the direct high speed route in the first phase of HS2, not
        a remote interchange at Oak Common, nor a spur or loop, in order to provide the required range and
        frequency of services necessary to achieve modal shift, improve market access, and maintain
        Heathrow’s international competitiveness;
    •   An “on-airport” station does not have to be located within the existing airport boundary, if this results
        in an unacceptable deviation of the HS2 alignment or a significant cost penalty, and if an alternative
        site provides better overall connectivity and benefits.

We trust these comments are helpful and would welcome the opportunity to assist the Inquiry in any way
that the Committee may feel appropriate.

May 2011
           Written evidence from Socialist Environment and Resources
                         Association Scotland (HSR 149)


The Socialist Environment and Resources Association Scotland (SERA Scotland)
campaigns for our sustainable environment, economy and society. A transport system
both environmentally friendly and inclusive in economic terms is a priority. High
Speed Rail has particular implications for Scotland. SERA Scotland aims to meet the
Parliamentary Committee’s request for concise responses. Several millions of pounds
have been expended by the Department for Transport (DfT) and related studies on the
High Speed Rail (HSR) project. It is beyond the means of our voluntary group to
analyse completely the DfT study findings. However, further details could be
provided if specifically requested. This response follows, as requested, the format
proposed in the consultation.


1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?

That Britain’s South – North railway system, in particular the West Coast Main Line
(WCML), is already almost at capacity and unable to cope with demand. Additional
tracks are the only solution. Tinkering with the already full WCML in the late 1990’s
was a financial disaster. Additional tracks have to be built to modern standards
without low speed restrictions but not necessarily to the very high speeds proposed.

Present railfreight demand is very much suppressed by the large subsidy lavished on
the road haulage sector. Transfer of more freight from road to rail would make a more
significant reduction in CO2 emissions. The other aims of economic regeneration and
CO2 reduction by a switch from air travel are less clear.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

   1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective
      compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending
      programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

HSR is designed, but only amongst other objectives, to improve inter-urban
connectivity. HSR is only fully justified taking into account these other objectives
such as increased capacity for regional and local passenger services and railfreight
services. Increased railway capacity in terms of additional tracks is an important
investment for the future and more important than even further expansion of the
strategic road network. Investment in the road network should be changed to the
objective of safer, more environmentally friendly roads designed so as not to increase
the overall level of road traffic any further.

   2. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on
      funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to
      increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

HSR must justify its investment and not reduce the effectiveness of the rest of the rail
system. This will be the duty of the Government and the Rail Businesses. It will take
into account that an objective of HSR is to free capacity on the rest of the system.
Some evidence from other countries is that their “classic” rail operations have become
very much downgraded with the advent of their HSR. This must not happen in
Britain. It should, however, be noted that a great proportion of the passenger
overcrowding repeatedly emphasised in the DfT Study is due to lack of rolling stock
and the fixed formation train design. Outside the S.E. England Commuter belt few
trains are operating at maximum length and the recent DfT design for new inter-city
trains are for short length fixed formations.

   3. What are the implications for domestic aviation?

Nothing to which aviation cannot adapt. The bulk of domestic aviation susceptible to
HSR has already been lost to the 125mph railway (but not in Scotland). Aviation’s
challenges are future fuel prices, security and being brought into the tax regime. HSR
may give aviation advantages in higher value longer flights.

3. Business case

   1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on
      passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic
      assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the
      ‘classic’ network?

The assumptions and methodology cannot be robust. The variables and timescales
take us all too far into the unknown. The DfT Study has, however, investigated as
thoroughly as possible and used all the advised methodologies and procedures. These,
in theory, allow comparison with other investment options but, even since the study
was undertaken, some of these methodologies have been discredited or changed. The
essential point is to use strategic “common sense”. Any HSR must be sufficiently
flexible to be a future asset under the almost certainly changing World conditions of
next 60 years and at an affordable cost.

The secondary point of the financial effect on the “Classic” system is a very
significant detail. The DfT Study includes large cost savings for the classic system but
this response did not find quantification of reduction in income (it must have been
quantified). The concern is that these main lines were working and earning at almost
full capacity which may be diluted with some diversion to HSR. It is generally
assumed that the “Inter-city” services provided the lion’s share of profitable income.
This is not necessarily true as the 1990’s WCML Renewal was a financial disaster.
The DfT Study appears to concentrate on the generally correct view that there is
suppressed demand on the existing main lines which will be satisfied on introduction
of HSR. There is the issue of the Classic Lines beyond the proposed phases of HSR
and if these are not yet at capacity then HSR will increase their demand and earnings.

   2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways,
      for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new
      conventional line?

This is THE most important question and depends on what is meant by
“conventional”. It is clear that additional tracks are essential. The existing WCML
cannot be tinkered with any more. The 1990’s attempt to renew the very busy railway
while trains were running was a disaster. It must not be tried again. The other main
lines can and should be improved but would still provide insufficient capacity.
Additional semi-independent tracks are essential but at what speed? There can be little
doubt that a reliable, comprehensive 100mph railway system would meet better all the
objectives except competition with motorways and airlines. Environmentalists are
concerned about the negative effects (particularly energy consumption) of the 225
mph design and it is understood Network Rail expressed concerns about the increased
costs of maintenance at these speeds. Energy demand is approximately proportional to
the square of the speed and at some speed HSR will have no energy advantage over
air travel. SERA Scotland believes a sustained 155mph is possibly the best
compromise with much lower CO2 emissions and costs although it is appreciated that
track alignments should allow for higher speeds. These 155mph speeds, if sustained,
should be competitive with air between Central Scotland and London. Even 225mph
would not be competitive with air between Northern Scotland and London. The train
at 125mph has effectively already captured the airline market between London and
Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Yorkshire and even Newcastle. The DfT Study
should review the design speed. Its findings are that the very high speed would divert
more traffic at higher fares giving a better business case. This depends on assumptions
such as “Load Factor” which is a difficult assumption and, in any case, is supposedly
already at a maximum south of Newcastle and Lancashire. Should an assumed
business case take precedence over an environmental case?

The other view is that for the 225mph design proven equipment is available “off the
peg” from overseas. This is not exactly true because of loading gauge restrictions but
there is a concern about designing a “British” solution. It is understood that in France
and China, leaders in HSR, a lowering of maximum speeds is under way because of
high running costs.

What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail
travel, for example by price?

The railway is already doing this, fares are too high and complex, and it is damaging
our environment and social and economic inclusion.

What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to
ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

Careful consideration by Government, designers and practical, experienced
contractors and operators such as Network Rail. Many large projects are built on time
and budget, and, if this is the implication, it is not just some rail projects which go
over budget. The DfT Study costings include large “optimisation” costs which are
unhelpful and effectively a “fiddle factor”. One important point is that any statutory
acts for HSR must include all the margins needed for construction works, not just the
final product, and comprehensive site investigation is essential prior to costing .

4. The strategic route

1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak
   Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these
There is concern about the Phase 1 Route through the “greenfield” Chilterns. This is
chosen primarily because it is cheaper to construct through undeveloped countryside
rather than along an existing corridor. There is something environmentally wrong
with this even if the same decision has been taken in the past for routing motorways.
A route along the existing WCML/M1 Corridor would be preferred, even at higher
cost, but not intertwined with the existing WCML tracks. The DfT Study has put a lot
of consideration into this decision and we appreciate the dilemma. There are many
other advantages and disadvantages in following the developed WCML/M1 corridor
but space in this response does not allow a repetition of the arguments.

There is no justification for a station between Old Oak and Birmingham International.

It is felt Euston is the right terminal but although Old Oak Common is a very clever
intervention to meet the new Government’s changed specification it does have other
implications and it has to be asked if it should be either Old Oak OR Euston rather
than Old Oak and Euston. The Birmingham City terminal should be at New Street but
the difficulties are understood and a Curzon Street Terminal is unlikely to affect
Scottish interests but where will HSR trains from the North terminate in Birmingham?

2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed
   Y configuration the right choice?

All the northern cities should be served one way or another. Serious thought should be
given to Glasgow, Edinburgh and Carlisle and this may be included in the December
2011 announcements? The ‘Y’ proposal is correct, notwithstanding the preference for
the ‘Y’ to follow the existing transport corridor. The previous view of a sinusoidal
route through the middle of practically every northern city was completely impractical
and counter-productive. It should be appreciated that with a maximum capacity of 15
trains per hour on HSR compared to all the longer distance departures from the four
north London terminals then a single HSR will be insufficient and that a “Kings
Cross” route more direct to Yorkshire will be required at some future date. However,
the ‘Y’ branch to Yorkshire would be fully utilised on just NE to SW services.

3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London
   northwards?

It cannot be done in any other way although the main justifications given, diversion
from airlines and freeing capacity, cannot be achieved until Central Scotland is
included. Effective air diversion has already been achieved from Lancashire and
Yorkshire southwards. It is Scotland to the South, including Manchester, where the
gains are to be made. SERA Scotland also suggests that, given financial uncertainties,
the big terminal constructions at Euston and Curzon Street (and even Old Oak) should
be phased later while capacity and speed gains are made on the main part of the route
at an earlier stage. Initial use of existing terminals has been a feature of British, and
many other, HSR proposals. The Chiltern route may preclude this but the other British
practice of chipping away at costs will surely re-visit this aspect of phasing.
Note that Network Rail’s WCML Rail Utilisation Strategy suggests only minor
journey time reductions to Scotland within the early phases of HS2 compared to
“conventional” trains with a similar reduced number of station stops.

4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to
   Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

Yes, and for the clear reasons given in the DfT Study

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

   1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help
      bridge the north-south economic divide?

The DfT Study tries hard to find evidence but is not convincing. As is the case with
motorways an individual change in transport tends to move development around with
some locations more advantaged, others disadvantaged and just a slight overall
improvement. The suggestion that a new terminal will “create” 400 new jobs cannot
be justified any more than a new supermarket would create 400 truly additional jobs.
Jobs are gained and jobs are lost. Safeguarding our transport system against oil price
rise and availability is important for the North-South divide but if motorway and
airline services ever become unaffordable then HSR, in contrast to conventional rail,
would become less of a priority.

The actual construction work would be a welcome improvement to employment with
expenditure mainly retained within Britain, unlike the purchase of foreign built trains.
Apparently, according to industry sources, Britain is so far behind with HSR
technology that we cannot teach China anything.

   2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the
      desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

In contrast to the above response HSR can advantage and disadvantage local and
regional economies and this has to be thought out. However, the main objectives of
HSR, environment, capacity and possibly commercial return, should not be lost in
attempts to serve all markets by primary HSR services. There is a well founded
concern that existing centres will lose good train services and that on the “classic”
lines HSR extended services will be pre-eminent and squeeze off local passenger and
freight train services. A further study by DfT is due to report in December 2011.

Throughout the DfT Study there is continuous mention of “releasing capacity” on
classic lines by-passed by HSR but there is no guarantee that previous services will
actually be replaced by local/regional services. In particular, the DfT Study mentions
many times the City of Lille in Northern France where a declining industrial city
campaigned and won a HSR line through the city centre with a station served by HSR
trains. There is not, however, a single mention of a British “Lille” in the DfT Study.
In fact the inference is that potential “Lilles” will be bypassed and that cities such as
Carlisle will not be on the eventual HSR system at all.
   3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

Considering the thorough detail in the DfT study this subject is not well treated. Some
locations will gain a competitive advantage but there must be an absolute commitment
to having a second and third tier of train services which will connect into HSR
services and fill gaps left by HSR lines. The faster and more segregated a HSR service
is then the more likely premium fares and supplements will be charged. This is not
made clear in the Study. If not properly guaranteed then less wealthy people will lose
out on HSR, especially for short notice travel and it is often the least wealthy who
cannot take advantage of loss-leader advance fares. Additionally, without safeguards,
people may have to have a car to access HSR services both adversely affecting poorer
people and damaging the environment. These are dangers which must be addressed.

How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including
local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution
and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s
TEN-T programme?

While all funding streams should be assessed we do not recall, for example,
motorway building being funded by local businesses and local authorities. This is
essentially a duty for railway Businesses and Government (including Scottish
Government). Local authorities can help by co-operation on planning and roads
issues. Professional planning can save a lot of money and time. We imagine that at
this very moment planning authorities somewhere are granting consent for adverse
development on previous and potential railway land or insisting that rail projects in
their area fund incidental road improvements.

6. Impact

   1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much
      modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce
      carbon?

The DfT Study gives a wide range of CO2 savings or increases, depending on
assumptions, with which SERA Scotland concurs. It seems that most divertable
domestic air travel from Lancashire/Yorkshire southwards has already been diverted.
For CO2 a compromise on speed is essential. SERA Scotland suggests 155mph but
that is arguable. Secondly, the diversion of heavy freight from road haulage is an
essential element. Road haulage should pay more of its true costs and there should be
no further increase in the size of lorries operating on the public street. Additionally,
HSR must not be an incentive for people to drive long distances to major park and
ride terminals. A comprehensive second and third tier train service (as well as
integrated buses) is essential to connect with HSR and fill gaps left by HSR.

The advantage of railways is the ability to run on electricity. CO2 emissions depend
on the method of electricity generation but the trend, fully supported by SERA, is
towards renewable low CO2 modes of generation. One eccentric concept is that, as
HSR is new then its electricity must be drawn from the marginal pool and therefore
coal generated. This should be dismissed. Another is that of “embedded” CO2 which
the DfT Study considers. As railways last for a century or more and as all rails are
inevitably recycled it is difficult to see railways being worse than the alternatives.

A particular issue for CO2 comparison is load factor and this is essential in making
CO2 comparisons between different modes. Presently the conventional main lines are
at very high load factors (according to DfT Study) and it is difficult to see how
occupancy could be raised further. To do so would require practically all travel to be
booked in advance which would be counter-productive. People would just go by car
instead. Flexible length train formations would help load factors.

   2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly
      accounted for in the business case?

Probably not despite good attempts by the DfT Study. Environment aspects always
have to be considered both in and outside the business case. While noise is important
it can be overstated. The author of this response lives next to the WCML which
operates 24/24 (HSR is proposed to operate 18/24). This community does not appear
affected by the train noise and, in reality, people try to build new houses right next to
the railway. When planning consent has been withheld they have gone to appeal and
won. It is the change of circumstances which gets people upset not the actual noise
itself. Existing transport corridors should be prioritised for HSR.

   3. What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network?

Beneficial where capacity is released but very problematical should HSR trains be
prioritised beyond the new HSR line limits, in particular the lines to Scotland where
HSR extended trains may conflict with freight and local passenger services. DfT is to
report later in the year and Scottish Government should take active interest.

   4. How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during
      construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

A lot less than previous WCML disruption. Euston will probably be reviewed with the
possibility of a deeper low deck, shorter HSR trains (but longer than at present) or
even abandoning Euston in favour of an Old Oak Common Terminal. A practical
review should be made by Network Rail.

Summary Points

An additional double track between London and Scotland is essential for capacity.
Design speed should be commensurate with objectives and not the highest attainable.
The existing WCML cannot be modified again to increase speed/capacity
A long term investment, HSR should be capable of mixed use in future if required.
The ‘Y’ route strategy is supported, an additional east HSR may be needed in future
The main route should follow the WCML/M1 route corridor if practicable.
The HSR case for CO2 reduction is not clear cut.
The HSR case for total economic regeneration is not clear cut.
HSR would provide some protection against increased oil prices and shortages.
HSR may advantage and disadvantage different areas.
It is essential that local train services connect into or fill gaps left by HSR.
Long distance car driving to HSR terminals should be discouraged.
Fares must not exclude less wealthy sectors of society.
Phasing of construction and design is unavoidable
Terminals may be phased later after new line capacity is commissioned
Issues with connection to Scotland should be addressed
Issues with remaining and by-passed ”Classic” lines are under consideration.
Statutory actions should include all land needed for construction
Site investigation is an essential, not an add-on.
Connections to HS1 and Heathrow are correctly phased. Heathrow to be reviewed?



May 2011
                    Written evidence from Heathrow Hub Ltd (HSR 150)


           Introduction

       1. This submission is made by Steven Costello, a Director of Heathrow Hub Ltd, the
          company that has developed and promoted the Heathrow Hub project to date.

       2. The Select Committee asks a specific question on the proposed HS2 strategic route
          that is directly relevant to Heathrow – “The Government proposes … a direct link to
          Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Is that the right decision?”

       3. The Committee may consider that this raises a wider issue – whether the current
          HS2 proposal adopts a strategic, intermodal approach, that includes not only
          Heathrow but also the existing and proposed classic rail network, or if it takes too
          narrow a view of transport and economic issues.

       4. This is particularly important in the absence of the National Policy Statement on
          national networks, which HS2 Ltd. considered was required in order to allow their
          proposals to be assessed 1 and the lack of any aviation industry representation on
          HS2 Ltd’s Challenge Groups. 2

           HS2 and Heathrow

       5. Following their cancellation of support for a third runway at Heathrow, the
          Government’s current consultation includes medium and long term options for an
          interchange between HS2 and Heathrow.

       6. Meanwhile, Heathrow faces short term challenges in surface access, 3 air quality, 4
               and efficient airport operations, 5 as a result of forecast passenger growth from ca.
               66mppa in 2009 to 90-95mppa by 2030, 6 (within the existing constraints of a two
               runway airport, segregated operations and the legal cap on ATM’s).
                                                            
1
 “The National Policy Statement on national networks … will set the context in which HS2 will be considered” –
para. 1.2.10, High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by High
Speed Two Ltd. December 2009
2
    page 34, ibid

3
  “Even without a third runway, absolute numbers requiring surface access to Heathrow will increase dramatically
over the next 20 years. In 2001/2, around 27mppa used cars and taxis to access Heathrow. By 2015/20, and
assuming a 40% sustainable surface access target has been achieved, this figure will be around 40mppa” -
Heathrow Expansion, The London Assembly’s response to BAA’s consultation on the Interim Masterplan for
Heathrow, London Assembly 2003
 
4
 “Compliance … with EU air quality limits…. will require measures to reduce emissions from aviation and other
sources, including road traffic, which is a significant contributor” – Adding Capacity at Heathrow, Mayor of London
2008
5
  “Heathrow remains constrained by runway capacity. Only larger airplanes using the same finite number of slots
… represent potential increased pax until a third runway is built” – Airports UK Pre-sale Report, BAA Funding,
Fitch Ratings, Global Infrastructure and Private Finance 2008
6
  “Heathrow Airport could reach a passenger throughput that exceeds 90 million passengers per annum with
Terminal 5 (paragraph 8.6.3 of the Terminal 5 Main Report)” - Heathrow Airport Interim Masterplan, BAA 2005
       7. Historically, the UK has not adopted an integrated, intermodal approach to transport
          planning. HS2 Ltd. appears to have continued this approach, for example, by failing
          to address their remit 7 to consider wider transport issues outside of a narrow HS2
          corridor between London and Birmingham. 8

       8. There would appear to be clear benefits in an alternative approach, taking an
          integrated view of HS2, Heathrow, the classic rail network and Crossrail. Such an
          approach would also align with EC Transport Policy.

       9. For example, better surface access by rail is essential to accommodate Heathrow’s
          growth without increasing road congestion and worsening air quality, (which already
          exceeds legal limits). It would also strengthen Heathrow’s competitive position as an
          international hub against other, better connected, European airports with greater
          runway capacity. Securing Heathrow’s future is of vital importance to the UK
          economy.

       10. HS2 and the classic rail network would in turn benefit from additional, and high value,
           demand from airport passengers.

              Heathrow Hub

       11. The Heathrow Hub proposal was developed prior to Government policy support for
           High Speed Rail, and proposes a different solution to connecting Heathrow and HS2.

       12. There appears to be a growing consensus that Old Oak Common, some 12km from
           Heathrow, does not provide a satisfactory solution to linking Heathrow, the world’s
           busiest international airport and UK’s only hub, to the UK and Europe’s High Speed
           Rail network.

       13. Government therefore intends to consult at a later date on a spur to Heathrow as a
           second phase of HS2, (with the future possibility of extending the spur to form a
           loop). This would continue the legacy approach of diverting transport corridors into
           the airport, (for example the M4 spur and Heathrow Express/Connect).

       14. Heathrow Hub adopts a different approach. It provides a new airport entry point
           located directly on the existing road and rail network, with a major intermodal
           interchange on the Great Western Main Line (GWML), Crossrail and the M25, (a
           short distance north of its junction with the M4), on a readily developable,
           unconstrained site less than 4km from Heathrow Terminal 5 – similar to the distance
           between T5 and the new T2.

       15. The proposed site was selected following analysis of a large number of alternatives,
               (including some within Heathrow’s existing site boundary), as providing the optimum
               range of benefits at an affordable cost, allowing phased delivery and a significant
               private funding contribution.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
7
 “The key car modal shift gain is likely to be in respect of access to Heathrow from London, the west and
Thames Valley, facilitated by the Heathrow interchange (and local rail enhancements)” - Letter from Sir David
                             th
Rowlands to Lord Adonis, 13 February 2009

8
 “It is important to note that the model does not analyse the potential market to Heathrow from areas to the west.
This means for instance that the model does not forecast the demand to Heathrow from (for example) Reading
using a London Interchange Station connected to the GWML” – p.25 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd.
February 2010
       16. Heathrow Hub would provide seamless connections, within a single interchange,
           between;

                             Rail, with a new railway station directly located on the GWML, served by
                             Crossrail, regional and inter-city rail services, and the potential to extend any
                             future Airtrack-type scheme, and the Piccadilly Line, to connect with the
                             interchange and GWML services;

                             High speed rail, directly connecting Heathrow with the UK and mainland
                             Europe.

                             Road, with direct access to the interchange from the M25 motorway, just
                             north of its junction with the M4;

                             Air, providing an airport processor, (passenger terminal), able to
                             accommodate forecast passenger growth, and co-located with the railway
                             station. Fast airside transit and baggage links between the processor and
                             satellites, located within the existing airport campus, would allow the Hub to
                             function as an “on-airport” terminal.

       17. The passenger experience would be transformed, with a high frequency “one seat”
           ride by GWML, Crossrail and HS2 services to the Hub, direct and seamless access
           to check-in facilities above the station platforms, and an airside transit journey time of
           only 3.5 minutes to T5A or 6 minutes to T2A.

       18. The Government’s current consultation proposal includes the Hub as one of three
           alternative sites, for a Heathrow interchange on a spur from HS2, 9 (the other sites
           being west of T5, and north of the airport close to Bath Road). Of these, only the Hub
           provides the potential for seamless connectivity between HS2, Heathrow and classic
           rail, (and the UK motorway network).

       19. This connectivity would generate significant modal shift from road to rail, providing,
           for the first time, rail access to Heathrow from much of the UK. The resulting
           passenger demand would justify an airport terminal co-located with the railway
           station. 10

       20. Heathrow would be served by all trains 11 on the GWML/Crossrail transport corridor,
           providing an incomparable service frequency to a wide range of destinations. This
           would generate greater modal shift from road to rail than, say, a Western Connection,
           which would continue the approach of diverting services from a limited range of
           destinations into the airport. This form of connection would have inherent
           interchange, service frequency and journey time penalties, providing significant
                                                            
9
    Connecting to Heathrow, DfT Factsheet 2011

10
    “Overall, by 2030 the presently untapped market from which the interchange could induce traffic to shift to rail
contains up to 36m road journeys and 10m air journeys per year” - Improving Rail Connectivity to Heathrow -
Implications for the Development of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA/Arup October 2009
11
   The provision of through lines would however allow non-stopping services to pass through the station at line
speed if required.
              disincentives to long distance passengers who, for example, would be required to
              change at, say, Reading or Maidenhead onto slow, all-station Crossrail services.

       21. The Government’s commitment to a direct connection between HS2 and Heathrow is
           to be welcomed. However, a spur or loop also has inherent service frequency
           penalties. Although the consultation provides no detail on service frequency and
           calling pattern, (indeed making no allowance at all for Heathrow services), a spur
           would inevitably have far fewer and less frequent services compared to an
           interchange on a direct HS2 route via Heathrow.

       22. A spur also damages HS2’s business case – every Heathrow service would take one
           12
              or more paths that would otherwise be used by a London train. The consultation
           proposes that Heathrow services would be split and joined, presumably at
           Birmingham Interchange. This recognises the challenge of providing high capacity
           services at a high enough frequency to attract passengers, whilst reliant solely on
           airport generated demand. Such services would also suffer a journey time penalty to
           allow trains to be split and joined, (and provide adequate timetabled resilience to
           ensure reliability and the most efficient use of HS2 train paths).

       23. As the consultation has no detail of the proposed spur or service pattern, it is not
           clear how demand and journey time analysis, in particular HS2 Ltd’s monetised
           values of journey time savings, 13 might impact on the business case for a spur.

       24. The Government’s proposal would also mean Heathrow being reliant on a sub-
           standard, remote interchange at Old Oak Common, (at a time when European hubs
           are competing on ease of access and intermodality with high speed rail), for at least
           20 years – assuming that a spur is in fact eventually found to be viable, fundable and
           deliverable.

       25. European experience is clear in demonstrating the benefit of airports and High Speed
           Rail being seamlessly connected by interchanges located on through lines as
           Heathrow Hub proposes.

       26. Locating additional terminal capacity outside the existing congested, constrained
           airport boundary would also provide benefits to Heathrow’s operational efficiency. By
           allowing space to be released within the airport for the larger aircraft that will
           generate growth in passenger numbers, it enables a better passenger experience,
           improved resilience and shorter taxiing distances, benefiting air quality.

       27. BAA and Arup’s joint submission to HS2 Ltd. 14 noted the significant potential demand
           for an integrated Heathrow/HS2 interchange, as well as the need for the airport to be
                                                            
12
   “In the case of a spur solution, one complete train path into London would be lost by every train serving and
terminating at Heathrow via the spur” –p.49 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010

13
   “Early tests suggested that reducing journey times by one minute would provide benefits of around £300-600m
on a fully utilised high speed line” – p.17, HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010
14
   “Overall, by 2030 the presently untapped market from which the interchange could induce traffic to shift to rail
contains up to 36m road journeys and 10m air journeys per year” - Improving Rail Connectivity to Heathrow -
Implications for the Development of the Heathrow International Interchange, BAA/Arup October 2009 
              served by high speed services running directly to the airport, (or to an interchange
              located as close as possible to it). It also confirmed that the interchange should be
              located on a site that provided maximum opportunity for the phased development of
              air terminal facilities co-located with both high speed and conventional rail platforms.
              The submission also considered that it was essential for the interchange design and
              location to reduce rail journey times from the West in order to attract journeys that
              would otherwise be made by car or taxi.

       28. Having reviewed the HS2 consultation material, Heathrow Hub appears to provide a
           number of benefits compared to Government’s current proposal;

                             - Heathrow would be served by the first phase of HS2, rather than relying on
                             a sub-standard remote interchange at Old Oak Common until at least 2033,
                             and avoiding the risk that a spur or loop is not constructed;

                             - Heathrow would have more space for aircraft, allowing a more efficient
                             layout for operations, reducing the airport’s environmental impacts and
                             improving the passenger experience;

                             - HS2’s business case is improved by connecting to Heathrow, the UK’s
                             single largest traffic generator;

                             - Heathrow Hub provides both GWML/Crossrail and Heathrow interchange on
                             a single site, reducing costs compared to the separate interchanges required
                             under Government’s proposals;

                             - The cost of constructing Heathrow Hub, on an unconstrained greenfield site,
                             is likely to be lower than an Old Oak Common interchange, which requires a
                             sub-surface station to be constructed around the operational railway and
                             proposed Crossrail depot, assumes relocation of the existing Heathrow
                             Express depot and is likely to need local road improvement and/or
                             environmental measures to mitigate impacts on the local community;

                             - The cost of a direct route via Heathrow, using Government’s own figures, is
                             likely to be no more, and may be significantly less, than the combined cost of
                             a spur and the first phase of HS2 when all costs associated with a spur are
                             included;

                             - The environmental impacts of a through route are likely to be lower than a
                             spur route, and its associated land-hungry, delta junction with the main HS2
                             route. Both the spur and junction would be located within the Green Belt and
                             Colne Valley Regional Park. (An indication of the visual impact is provided by
                             the images in the HS2 Engineering Study). 15 Tunnelling part of the spur
                             would mitigate some impacts, albeit with implications for cost, although it is
                             likely that the junction itself would be either at grade or elevated to meet the
                             main HS2 route at that point;

                             - Omitting Old Oak Common allows faster (non-stop) journey times between
                             London and Birmingham;


                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
15
  p.112 – 121, Delta junction visualisation, Route Engineering Study Final Report: A Report for HS2, Arup
December 2009
                             - The consultation proposes a route that crosses the widest part of the
                             Chilterns AONB. 16 In contrast, an alignment via Heathrow allows the option of
                             a more southerly alignment for HS2, across the narrowest part of the
                             Chilterns AONB, possibly following the M40 motorway corridor, (assuming
                             some compromise on design speed over this part of the route), reducing
                             HS2’s environmental impact and the need for very costly mitigation
                             measures;

                             - A connection between HS2 and Brunel’s GWML high speed alignment
                             allows pososble through running, bringing early benefits to Wales, the west
                             and south west;

                             - The cost to the public purse would be reduced by significant private sector
                             funding.


              HS2 Ltd’s analysis of Heathrow

       29. There appear to be a number of flaws in the way HS2 Ltd. have carried out their
           demand modelling and route option analysis in relation to Heathrow.

       30. Referring to demand modelling, HS2 Ltd. note that Heathrow’s catchment is limited to
           London and part of the South East. However, this appears not to recognise that this
           is simply a consequence of the airport currently lacking rail access from anywhere
           other than central London. Hence, HS2 Ltd. have mistakenly assumed that, contrary
           to European experience, Heathrow’s market would remain unchanged with HS2 17 -
           even if HS2 provided direct rail services, and very attractive journey times, from
           areas currently outside Heathrow’s catchment, 18 (eg; Birmingham). 19

       31. This flawed assumption has been compounded by a significant error in HS2 Ltd’s
           journey time calculations - the original assumption that an HS2 route via Heathrow
           would incur a 9 minute penalty was, subsequently and apparently at a very late
           stage, corrected to a 3 minute penalty. This assumes particular significance in view
           of the importance of journey time savings to HS2 Ltd’s business case.

       32. These early assumptions appear to have been fundamental in the decision to adopt
           an HS2 route that bypassed Heathrow.

       33. Whilst the Coalition Government’s revised remit for HS2 to connect with Heathrow is
           welcome, it is not clear whether HS2 Ltd’s original fundamental assumptions have
           been revisited in order to develop the current proposal for a spur or loop, or whether
           the current proposal has simply been retrofitted to an otherwise unchanged HS2
           alignment.
                                                            
16
   para. 3.5.17 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd,
December 2009
17
   “Catchment areas for HS2 rail trips contain less than10% of the air passengers accessing Heathrow” - p.8,
HS2 Airport Demand Model, SKM February 2010

18
 “This model assumes that HS2 will not increase the total number of passengers accessing Heathrow” - p.52
HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010

19
   “The market for access to Heathrow declines rapidly with distance. Journeys to and from Birmingham account
for just 270,000 trips each year” para. 3.3.8 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A
Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009
       34. Whilst there have been recent amendments to HS2 Ltd’s modelling following
           cancellation of a third runway, 20 it is not clear whether the full implications of this for
           HS2 demand have been modelled. 21

              HS2 Ltd’s analysis of Heathrow Hub

       35. In addition to these general concerns, there appear to be a number of specific issues,
           concerning the way in which Heathrow Hub has been appraised in the decision
           making process.

              Heathrow Hub site constraints

       36. In their description of Heathrow Hub, 22 HS2 Ltd. correctly state that “the Eastern
           edge of the site is in the River Colne floodplain.” (Much of the area to the north and
           west of Heathrow lies in the Colne Valley floodplain, including land to the west of T5).

       37. HS2 Ltd. concludes that “any station at Iver would have a major adverse
           environmental impact with over 50% being within the Colne floodplain with potential
           to disturb riparian habitat. There would be serious floodplain impacts which would be
           difficult to mitigate.” 23

       38. In fact, the proposed Heathrow Hub site is largely outside the floodplain, and
           extensive technical work has been carried out on an engineered solution to ensure
           that the proposals would have no adverse impact on the functional floodplain.

       39. This form of engineered solution is confirmed as being acceptable to HS2’s
           environmental consultants with respect to HS2’s own preferred route, where it is
           stated that “in total the HS2 preferred route passes across 17km of the highest risk
           flood areas. Scheme design here would be critical to ensuring that impacts are
           effectively managed and avoided.” 24

       40. In addition, HS2’s route design assumes that “surface routes across flood plain or
           other land at highest risk of flooding (Flood zone 3) are on viaduct to ensure their
           protection and to minimise loss of flood storage and impacts on flood water flows”, 25
           as also proposed for the relatively small area of the Heathrow Hub station platforms,
           adjoining, and at the same level as, the existing GWML, which runs at high level
           across the flood plain in this location.

                                                            
20
  Modelling and Appraisal Updates and their impact on the HS2 Business Case, A Report for HS2 Ltd, Atkins
April 2011

21
   “A third runway at Heathrow is included in our central case. If this were not constructed, there might be
additional demand for long distance rail trips as pricing and capacity constraints reduce the number of domestic
air trips” – para. 4.4.12 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by
HS2 Ltd, December 2009
22
   p. 87 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd,
December 2009
23
   para. 3.3.30 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd,
December 2009

24
     p.14 Booz & Temple, Appraisal of Sustainability: A report for HS2, Non technical Summary, December 2009
25
     p. 8 Booz & Temple, Appraisal of Sustainability: A report for HS2, Non technical Summary, December 2009
              Heathrow Hub and Heathrow Airport

       41. In their description of Heathrow Hub, 26 HS2 Ltd. correctly state that “the proposal
           envisages that an airport terminal would be integrated with the Hub station, (initially
           illustrated with a capacity for 30 million passengers per annum). The station and air
           terminal would be linked to the rest of the airport with a fast and frequent, automated
           people mover and baggage systems. Arup estimates that the journey time from the
           Hub to T5 would be 3.5 minutes and 6 minutes to the Central Terminal Area.”

       42. However, HS2 Ltd. elsewhere give various, conflicting descriptions that appear to
           omit any consideration of the proposed “on-airport” interchange location, airside
           passenger transit and baggage links with the existing airport campus and the
           connectivity provided between the GWML, Crossrail and – potentially – the Piccadilly
           Line. References variously note, for example “a site close to the airport, near Iver,
           from which all terminals could be served by a people mover,” 27 “and “an Iver station
           … 8-9 minutes off-airport whichever terminal was being used.” 28

       43. Clearly these assumptions fundamentally differ from, and lack the benefits of, an “on-
           airport” interchange, with HS2 Ltd instead assuming that “a station at Iver would have
           connections to GWML and potentially to a parkway. However – whilst a link to the
           airport could be established – it is unlikely to have any connectivity equivalent to a
           station on the airport. Similarly this is unlikely to have connections to the Piccadilly
           line or Heathrow Express, and only limited Crossrail services.” 29

       44. These assumptions are critical to the modelling carried out by HS2 Ltd, since “the
           (Heathrow) station is designed as a modelling construct. It assumes the station is
           located at Heathrow CTA with cross platform conections to Crossrail and Piccadilly
           Lines. In practice a Heathrow station is unlikely to deliver all of these connections.” 30

       45. The Government’s March 2010 Command Paper on High Speed Rail adds that “a
           proposal has been made, which HS2 has considered, for a station outside the current
           airport boundary at Iver” 31 and that the site is “divided from the airport by a “heavily
           built up area.” There is, in fact, no such heavily built up area, or indeed any
           significant existing development, between the proposed Hub site and Heathrow’s
           boundary.

       46. In the debate that followed the Governments statement on the Command Paper,
           Lord Adonis responded to the Opposition’s support for “a new integrated Heathrow
           rail hub along the lines of the plan put forward by engineering firm, Arup" by stating
           that “it is vital to understand that the proposal put forward by Arup is not for a station
           at Heathrow but at Iver, well outside the boundaries of Heathrow, some two and a
                                                            
26
  p. 87 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd,
December 2009

27
  para. 3.3.13 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd,
December 2009

28
  para. 3.3.37 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd,
December 2009

29
     p.48, HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010

30
     p 57 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010

31
     Para 7.6 High Speed Rail, Command Paper March 2010
              half miles away on green belt and in a flood plain. If they do not even understand that
              their own proposal for what they call an at-airport station is not at Heathrow but two
              and a half miles away involving a transit journey for every passenger to get to any
              terminal, and on green belt in a flood plain, then they have not even begun to engage
              with the reality of the issues. I am not even sure that the noble Baroness understands
              that that is the policy of her own party. 32

       47. The current consultation describes “an interchange near Iver in Buckinghamshire
           with a light rail link to Heathrow. Routing the line via this site shared many of the
           disadvantages of a direct Heathrow route without offering the benefits of an on-
           airport station” 33

       48. In view of the inaccurate nature of these statements, it is of concern that the
           Heathrow Hub proposal, and in particular the proposal for a co-located airport
           terminal and railway station, which together provide an “on-airport” station and
           interchange, has not been properly evaluated. There must be doubt as to whether
           the “Iver” site that appears to form the basis for HS2’s evaluation is, or has similar
           characteristics to, the Heathrow Hub proposal.

       49. The Command Paper also notes that “the dispersed nature of Heathrow’s terminal
           facilities means that there is no clearly optimal location for a high speed rail station”
           34
              This assumes that the current dispersed terminal layout represents an optimal
           situation. In fact, the current situation is a historic legacy and there would be
           significant benefits, recognised by the airport operator and airlines, in an integrated
           approach to HS2 and Heathrow, providing the catalyst for fewer terminal facilities and
           enabling a more efficient airport with reduced environmental impacts.

              Heathrow Hub and HS2 journey time

       50. HS2 Ltd’s analysis, which led to fundamental decisions being made on the HS2
           route, concluded that “an interchange station would add 9 minutes at Heathrow. (The
           main HS2 report states the penalty for stopping trains at Heathrow is 7 minutes. This
           difference is due to late engineering work which has suggested that our early
           estimates of the journey were overstated by 2 minutes. We have not in the time
           available re-run the model with this revised journey time and the results presented in
           this chapter are on the basis of a 9 minute journey time” 35

       51. The current consultation reiterates that “longer journey times would reduce the
           benefits of an alternative route via Heathrow,” 36 reflecting the emphasis on journey
           time savings in HS2’s business case.

       52. However, the journey time penalty is clarified in the same document as being
           marginal, “estimated to be around three to four minutes slower than the
           recommended Route 3, depending on the location of the interchange at Heathrow,”


                                                            
32
     Column 355 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldhansrd/text/100311-0003.htm

33
     p.25 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011

34
     para 7.5 High Speed Rail, Command Paper March 2010

35
     p 56 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010
36
     para.5.9 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011
              37
                and “the additional route length would entail a longer journey time between London
                                                                               38
              and the West Midlands of 3 minutes for non-stopping services.”

              Heathrow Hub and HS2 route

       53. The consultation claims that “this route (“Route 1.5 via Heathrow”) … is similar in
           concept to the route identified by Arup for its “Heathrow Hub” proposal.” 39 However,
           there are very significant differences between the route proposed in connection with
           the Hub and that assumed by HS2 Ltd, which might be expected to seriously affect
           its assessment.

       54. For example, the consultation refers to the route “passing close to Fulmer on a low
           viaduct across the river valley”, 40 and which “would pass through” - by implication,
           on the surface- “the Grade II Langley Park and Black Park Country Park”. 41 The
           route associated with Heathrow Hub did not include such environmentally damaging
           proposals, but these assumptions presumably contributed to the conclusion that this
           route, “although it would have less impact on the Chilterns AONB, would adversely
           affect other sensitive areas.” 42

       55. However, there is conflicting reference to a tunnelled alignment west of the M25,
           which would presumably avoid these impacts, (albeit at an increased cost). There is
           also stated to be a speed constraint due to a sharp curve west of the Heathrow
           interchange. This presumably affects journey time assumptions, but does not
           accurately reflect the route design associated with Heathrow Hub. 43

       56. Route 1.5 appears not to have been assessed in the same way, or to the same level
           of detail, as other options. 44

              Heathrow Hub connectivity

       57. HS2 Ltd’s assumptions do not accurately represent the connectivity that the Hub
           would provide.

       58. Examples include placing the “Iver” station on a loop or spur, rather than on the main
                                                 45                                                       46
              high speed route,                       assuming no platforms for international services,        and a far

                                                            
37
     para.68, p.137 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011

38
     p.66 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future, Consultation, DfT February 2011

39
     p.136 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future” DfT February 2011

40
     p.136 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future” – DfT February 2011  

41
     p.137 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future” – DfT February 2011  

42
     p.86 and 131 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future” – DfT February 2011 

43
  “West of the M25 and the station throat, the alignments would dip down to a tunnel portal. On the approach to
the tunnel portal, … the horizontal alignment would restrict speeds to 130kph” – page 216 Route Engineering
Study Final Report – A Report for HS2, Arup December 2009

44
  “This route has not been the subject of a detailed Appraisal of Sustainability as it was decided not to pursue it
on the basis of additional cost and journey times. A high level assessment of this route indicated that while it
would have a lesser impact on the landscape of the Chilterns, it would affect other sensitive areas” – para.39, p.
131 “High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future” – DfT February 2011
              more limited service pattern - in particular, omitting the regional and international
              services and some long distance domestic services, and including a more limited
                                                                              47
              interchange with Crossrail services, than actually proposed.
               
              Heathrow Hub and HS2 cost

       59. HS2 Ltd. appears to have assumed an underground station, 48 specifically noted as
           “not the “Arup Hub” but a below ground box with tracks at – 10m (below ground
           level)” 49

       60. This has very significant cost implications, as Heathrow Hub proposes a surface
           station, at the same level as the existing GWML.

              Heathrow Hub and HS2 Cost Benefit analysis

       61. HS2 Ltd’s analysis of the costs and benefits of connecting to Heathrow appears to
              consider the full incremental cost of connecting the preferred HS2 route with a spur
              or loop to the Iver Interchange (or other Heathrow locations). However, their analysis
              only credits the Iver Interchange with some of the benefits it would generate. It omits
              those passengers on the Great Western corridor who would want to access
              Heathrow itself. The demand analysis also omits any demand from, for example,
              GWML passengers who might interchange at Heathrow onto international services to
                       50
              Europe.

       62. These omissions are specifically noted. For example, “we have not sought to model
              and analyse the benefits of improved connectivity to Heathrow generally through, for
                                                  51
              instance, improved western access” and “it is important to note that the model
              does not analyse the potential market to Heathrow from areas to the west. This
              means for instance that the model does not forecast the demand to Heathrow from,

                                                                                                                                                                                         
45
  A through route via Iver is dismissed primarily on grounds of cost, and analysis showing that “the majority of
HS2 passengers would want to go to central London rather than to Heathrow” para.3.3.4 High Speed Rail,
London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009

46
  “Iver – it would comprise 10 platforms (4 high speed platforms, 4 GWML platforms on the fast lines and 2
GWML platforms on the relief lines “– para, 3.3.30 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A
Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009

47
  “We assume that one train in three would stop at Heathrow. This allows around an hourly service from
Heathrow to most destinations” – para. 3.3.23 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A
Report to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009
48
   “Iver – cut and cover box” – para. 3.3.30 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report
to Government by HS2 Ltd, December 2009
49
  “It would be a below ground box, with tracks at -10m probably beneath green field site. It would not be the
“Arup Hub” which would offer a much wider range of connectional opportunities at a much greater cost” - p.316,
Route Engineering Study Final Report – A Report for HS2, Arup December 2009

50
   para 9.3.6 of HS2 Demand Model Analysis, March 2010 sets out market segments not considered for the HS1
connection. It also omits any reference to the potential for high speed rail services to compete with flights from
international airports on the Great Western corridor (e.g. Bristol, Southampton, Exeter and Cardiff). para. 9.2.5
indicates that HS2 Ltd’s base case for modelling demand for international services includes a 40 minute
interchange penalty for transferring between Euston and St. Pancras in London, assuming no direct connection
between HS2 and HS1
51
   para.3.3.46 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd,
December 2009
           for example, Reading using a London Interchange station connected to the GWML”
           52



       63. HS2 Ltd. acknowledges that “a Heathrow station does improve journey times for
           passengers travelling to Heathrow and transferring to/from HS2 to/from locations to
           the west and south west of London. Our model will understate some of the benefits
           (of a Heathrow station) since it is designed to focus on HS2 passengers” 53

       64. However, HS2’s analysis of demand for an “Iver station” explicitly confirms its
           exclusion of any potential demand for access to the airport or HS1 from cities
                                                                                                         54
           including; Bristol, Cardiff, Reading, Oxford, Slough, Southampton and others.

       65. This appears contrary to Lord Adonis’s remit to HS2 Ltd, which stressed the
           importance of co-ordinating work to address Western access to Heathrow and
                                          55
           proposals for high speed rail.

           Heathrow Hub and HS2 dispersal

       66. HS2 Ltd’s report to Government concludes that “few, if any, London-bound
           passengers would interchange onto Crossrail at Heathrow since it is too distant from
                                                             56
           London and the frequency would not be attractive”

       67. However, this appears to disregard the potential, most recently proposed in Network
           Rail’s draft London and South East Route Utilisation Study, 57 to recast GWML
           services, potentially incorporating Heathrow Express services into Crossrail, Such
           initiatives, as part of what appears to be a desirable integrated approach to HS2 and
           the classic network, could allow a much higher frequency of Crossrail trains serving
           the Hub, with limited stop services reducing journey times to central London
           destinations.

           Conclusion

       68. In view of the above, it is apparent that the Heathrow Hub proposal has not been fully
               and properly assessed in HS2 Ltd’s option appraisals that determined the proposed
               route. It is also clear that “this option (a route directly serving Heathrow) was
               developed later than the other alternatives,” 58 and “after the submission of HS2 Ltd’s
                                                            
52
     p.25 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010

53
     p.57 HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010

54
   Page 58 of HS2 Demand Model Analysis, HS2 Ltd. February 2010 states “this suggests that a through station
at Heathrow is not attractive for the purposes of HS2. Our model does not, though, have the capability to
investigate the benefits of improved connectivity between the airport and passengers in the South East and
South West through, for instance, improved connections to the GWML and other rail links such as Airtrack which
could be delivered without the need for HS2 to serve a Heathrow station.”

55
  “As you will be aware, the Department is working with BAA and Network Rail to consider conventional rail
access to Heathrow, including schemes to improve connections from Heathrow to Reading and other stations on
the Great Western Main Line. It will be important to ensure appropriate coordination between this work and the
development of proposals by HS2 - Letter from Lord Adonis to Sir David Rowlands, 9th March 2009

56
  para.3.3.33 High Speed Rail, London to the West Midlands and Beyond, A Report to Government by HS2 Ltd,
December 2009

57
     London and South East Route Utilisation Study, Draft for Consultation, Network Rail December 2010
58
     Alternative Routes Considered, Route 1.5 via Heathrow, DfT Factsheet 2011
              report, published in March 2010, to provide a route option for serving Heathrow via a
              through route.” 59

       69. Heathrow Hub provides the direct four way connection between Heathrow, HS2, the
           GWML and Crossrail that was originally specified by Government, 60 and provides far
           greater benefits, at less cost and with less environmental impact compared to the
           current consultation proposals.

       70. Although we believe this proposal provides greater benefits than any other option of
           which we are aware, our primary concern is to ensure that the UK makes the right
           choices in these critical – and costly - strategic transport decisions.

       71. The decisions made to date by HS2 Ltd. and Government appear fundamentally
           flawed in their narrow focus on questionable demand and appraisal methodology,
           rather than a wider consideration of national transport and economic issues drawing
           on European experience of connections between high speed rail and airports.

       72. In particular, any proposal that HS2 should bypass Heathrow, one of the UK’s most
           important economic assets, and which provides the country with a critical competitive
           advantage that should not be taken for granted, must be rigorously tested.

       73. Similarly, whilst the current proposal for an HS1/2 link is to be welcomed, it appears
           short sighted to downgrade what will undoubtedly become a vital umbilical link
           between the UK and Europe to a single track, slow speed connection.

       74. Arup’s promotion, during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, of an alternative alignment
           to British Rail’s Channel Tunnel Rail Link, now HS1, always envisaged that this link
           would be the first stage of an eventual UK high speed network, with a London station
           designed to allow later extension north and west. It is unfortunate that political issues
           did not allow this foresight to be carried through to implementation, (although Arup
           were successful in at least securing a connection from St Pancras to the North
           London line). St. Pancras provides a splendid gateway, but if, as originally
           envisaged, London’s HS1 station had been designed to allow HS2 to be easily
           connected to the rest of the UK, many of the current difficulties in linking HS1 and
           HS2 could be avoided.

       75. Strategic foresight is as important in considering the link between HS1 and HS2 as
           the interchange between HS2 and Heathrow. It will be a lost opportunity if flawed
           strategic decisions are made at this critical stage of HS2’s planning.

       76. It is hoped that the Select Committee will find this contribution helpful in their
           important and timely Inquiry.


16th May 2011




                                                                                                                                                                                         
59
     p.136 High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future” DfT February 2011

60
  “A Heathrow International Hub station on the Great Western line to provide a direct four way interchange
between the airport, the new north-south line, existing Great Western rail services and Crossrail, into the heart of
London” - Secretary of State for Transport, 15th January 2009
Further written evidence from Heathrow Hub Ltd. (HSR 150A)




1 1980/1990’s –We’ve been here before

The Channel Tunnel rail link debate had many similarities with HS2, with
vocal and well informed opposition to what were seen as British Rail’s poorly
conceived proposals, in particular their failure to properly consider
environmental impacts.
“The revolt that followed (British Rail’s announcement of the original proposed
route for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link) shook the Tory party to the core. A
revolutionary mob in waxed green jackets is enough to bring any Home
Counties MP out in a rash” - Plight at the End of the Tunnel - Sunday Times
magazine, May 6th 1990

The lessons of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (now called HS1) suggest that
high speed rail in the UK should;

   -   Form part of a wider integrated transport & economic strategy;
   -   Avoid the railwayman’s solution of a point to point line in isolation;
   -   Connect with the existing rail network and provide local transport
       benefits to areas affected by new lines;
   -   Minimise the length of route crossing Areas of Outstanding Natural
       Beauty (AONB);
   -   Adopt a design speed allowing an alignment that can follow topography
       and is twinned (where possible) with existing motorway corridors to
       minimise environmental impacts.
HS1 crosses the narrowest part of Kent’s AONB, (shown in green on the
above map), and closely follows the M20 and M2 motorway corridors for
much of its length.

2       2009 – Cross-party consensus on HS2 & Heathrow
The political consensus that recently developed on high speed rail
recognized, (despite fundamental differences over a third runway),
Heathrow’s importance to the whole of the UK;

    -   UK’s only hub, and world’s busiest international airport;
    -   Directly responsible for 1% of UK GDP;
    -   Vital to UK’s international competitiveness, serving seven out of the top
        ten business routes in the world;
    -   UK’s single largest traffic generator and single site employer;
    -   Forecast to grow, (despite Government’s policy objective of a “better,
        not bigger” Heathrow), from 66mppa currently to ca. 95mppa by 2030
        (with two runways, within 480,000 ATM cap, and outside statutory
        control) as capacity constraints lead to airlines introducing larger
        aircraft.

A number of wider issues were also recognized as relevant to consideration of
HS2 and Heathrow;

    -   Heathrow’s environmental impacts are unacceptable, (and in terms of
        air quality, illegal), even at current traffic levels. Better rail access is
        essential to prevent these having even greater impacts as Heathrow
        grows;
    -   Heathrow’s passenger experience and operational efficiency compares
        poorly against other major airports;
    -   Better access from the regions to the UK’s only hub is vital to regional
        economic competitiveness by providing access to global markets and
        increasing customer choice. This assumes increasing significance as
        airlines take commercial decisions to abandon domestic UK routes
        from Heathrow;
    -   High speed rail could replace some short haul flights, releasing
        valuable airport capacity and/or improving resilience.
                                                   




    GWML




A clear consensus therefore emerged on the need for a direct connection
between Heathrow and HS2;

“A Conservative Government will support proposals along the lines of the plan
put forward by engineering firm, Arup, for a new Heathrow rail hub. This would
link Heathrow terminals directly into the main rail network and the lines to
Reading, Oxford, Bristol, Plymouth, Cardiff, Swansea, Cheltenham and
Southampton, greatly improving public transport links to the airport”-
Conservative Party Rail Review 2009

“I think that it (Heathrow Hub) is an attractive idea. It’s vital that we have an
integrated approach to planning new rail capacity and any new airport
capacity that’s also required”- Lord Adonis, Sunday Times 4th Jan 2009

“I see a strong case for (high speed rail) approaching London via a Heathrow
international hub station on the Great Western line, to provide a direct four-
way interchange between the airport, the new north-south line, existing Great
Western rail services and Crossrail” – Geoff Hoon, 15th Jan 2009

3      2009 – HS2 Ltd ignored consensus

Despite this consensus, the route that HS2 Ltd. developed during 2009
bypassed Heathrow. The then Secretary of State’s statement, prior to HS2
Ltd. starting work, made clear that this route was to some extent pre-
determined;

“Our proposals on the (Heathrow) hub are for a site much closer to West
London at the junction of the existing Great Western line and the proposed
Crossrail line. A Heathrow hub would not necessarily have to be placed close
to Heathrow” – Geoff Hoon, 15th Jan 2009
The proposal that HS2 should bypass Heathrow reflected various
assumptions and decisions by HS2 Ltd;

   -   An assumption that Heathrow’s existing (very limited) market
       catchment would be unchanged by better rail access;
   -   Analysis that a route via Heathrow would incur a 9 minute journey time
       penalty compared to a more direct route between London and
       Birmingham – (subsequently corrected to 3 minutes after route
       decisions had been made);
   -   Journey time savings prioritised over intermodal and environmental
       considerations (including statutory designation of Chilterns AONB);
   -   No aviation industry representation on any of HS2 Ltd’s Challenge
       Groups;
   -   Little or no weight given to effect of interchange penalty on airport
       passengers travelling by rail;
   -   Government’s remit to consider better rail access to Heathrow from the
       Thames Valley and the west not considered;
   -   Pre-conception of remote Heathrow interchange at Old Oak Common;

The proposal to provide the Heathrow interchange at Old Oak Common,
some 12km from the airport, was subsequently criticised by the Coalition
Government’s Secretary of State in oral evidence to the Transport Select
Committee;

(The connection between HS2 and Heathrow) “cannot be lug your heavy bags
down a couple of escalators, along 600 metres of corridor and then change
trains at a wet, suburban station somewhere in north west London. That is not
an option” – Philip Hammond, 26th July 2010.
4     2010 – HS2 Ltd revised proposal for Heathrow spur
The Coalition Government’s revised remit required HS2 Ltd. to “undertake
additional work to develop route options for a direct high speed link to
Heathrow” – Letter from Philip Hammond to HS2 Ltd, 11th June 2010

This may have been expected to result in a fundamental reappraisal of the
HS2 route. However, a Heathrow spur was instead proposed, to be retrofitted
to an otherwise unchanged route alignment in a second phase of HS2,
(perhaps by 2033), with the capability of extension to form a loop at an even
later stage.




This requires significant duplicate route mileage, as can be seen from the
initial spur alignment options published to date by HS2 Ltd.
The scale, impact and land requirements (in London’s Green Belt) of a grade
separated junction between a spur and the main HS2 route is indicated by
HS2 Ltd’s published images of the similar junction at Water Orton, where the
Birmingham spur is proposed to join the main HS2 route.




The proposed approach to serving Heathrow has other fundamental
problems;

   -   Heathrow would, prior to any future phase 2 of HS2, be relegated to a
       branch line connection with HS2 at Old Oak Common, perhaps for as
       long as 20 years or more, despite Government stating this “is not an
       option” and Heathrow’s forecast growth during that period;
-   If, as proposed in Network Rail’s London & South East Route
    Utilisation Study, Heathrow Express’s access rights are not renewed
    on termination in 2023, Heathrow would be reliant on slow, stopping
    Crossrail services from central London;
-   A spur, in a second phase of HS2, is dependent on consistent political
    and financial support over an unprecedented period and a second
    Hybrid Bill. If, as Lord Adonis fears, events conspire to affect the
    programme and/or funding, Heathrow could be permanently relegated
    to a branch line connection served by stopping trains;
-   A spur, and its grade separated junctions with the main HS2 route,
    would be both costly and environmentally damaging;
-   Two separate, and expensive, stations are required to provide HS2’s
    interchanges with Crossrail and Heathrow;
-   Government’s view is that the beneficiaries of a spur, airlines and
    airport users, would be required to make a significant financial
    contribution to its cost. However, it is unlikely that a viable business
    case can be made, since a 2tph service (in each direction), providing
    the minimum service frequency necessary for time sensitive airport
    passengers, would provide ca. 4400 seats per hour - the equivalent of
    ten fully loaded A380’s every hour between Heathrow and UK regional
    cities served by HS2. Although Heathrow is a major, and growing,
    traffic generator, it is unlikely that airport traffic alone can support a
    viable business case for capacity on this scale. (The inevitable
    inefficiencies of trains serving airport demand alone is shown by
    Heathrow Express, which achieves only 30% utilisation in the morning
    peak);
-   Alternatively, if Government did provide a financial contribution to the
    cost of a spur, this could lead to State Aid challenges from other
    airports;
-   Whilst the economic case for HS2, (which assumes a very high
    frequency service of 18tph in each direction), includes the benefits of a
    spur to Heathrow, the service plans that have been published do not
    include any capacity for Heathrow services or indicate which services
    would be diverted to serve the spur instead of Euston;
-   Services over a spur would need to decelerate from, and accelerate to,
    linespeed in negotiating the slow speed turnouts when diverging from
    and joining the main HS2 route. Each Heathrow service would
    therefore take more than one HS2 path, further reducing capacity on
    the through line for services to and from Euston;
-   A spur perpetuates the lack of connectivity between Heathrow and
    GWML classic/Crossrail services;
-   A spur also continues the legacy approach of fragmented planning of
    air and rail infrastructure at a critical tipping point for Heathrow’s future
    competitiveness;
-   Delaying a Heathrow spur to a later phase of HS2 places Heathrow at
    a competitive disadvantage, since through running of high speed rail
    services between the UK regions and continental Europe provides
    European hubs with direct rail access to the UK market without a
    reciprocal benefit to Heathrow;
Whilst the recent public consultation lacks detail, it does appear that, if or
when eventually completed, the spur would not provide a chord to the East,
preventing air-rail substitution of European short haul flights, or access to
Heathrow from European markets.

A spur therefore appears to conflict with European policy, as set out in the
Commission’s 2011 Transport White Paper;

“Intermodality with rail must produce significant capacity gains by transforming
competition between rail and air into complementarity between the two
modes, with high speed train connections between cities. We can no longer
think of maintaining air links to destinations for where there is a competitive
high-speed rail alternative. In this way, capacity could be transferred to routes
where no high-speed rail service exists”

The inherent flaws in a spur have also been recognised by DfT and others;

“The interchange with Heathrow should be considered as through services will
not be able to run from all points, both because demand would not be
sufficient and because every Heathrow train would take a path on the new
line” - New Line Capacity Study, DfT 2007

“To be attractive for airline passengers who might reasonably need to catch a
specific departing flight, the service frequency needs to be at least one per
hour. Even on our assumption that we can serve more than one city with a
single train, (which depends on the structure of the HSR network), many of
the flows, (Scotland, Manchester/Liverpool, Sheffield/Leeds/Newcastle,
Birmingham and Bristol/Cardiff), do not have a viable flow” – High Speed Rail
Development Programme 2008/09, Strategic Choices, MVA/Systra

Government’s recent consultation on HS2 recognized the importance of an
integrated approach to Heathrow and HS2 but any detail of the proposed
spur/loop will be the subject of a separate future consultation. This risks
flawed decisions being taken on phase 1 of HS2.
European experience clearly demonstrates that hub airports should be
located on through lines rather than spurs or loops.

5     2010 – HS2 Ltd ignored European precedents
European examples of air/rail interchanges clearly demonstrate the benefits of
airports located on directly on through high speed lines. The inherent
inefficiencies of a spur are repeated in a loop, with Lord Mawhinney’s 2010
report noting that “a loop of high speed railway had been built to serve
Cologne/Bonn airport but this had added 15 minutes to the rail journey time
and as a result the loop was little used”.




Amsterdam Schiphol

“For Schiphol, landside accessibility is of essential importance. The
construction of the HSL South line will place Schiphol on the European HSL
high-speed rail network. The HSL will extend Schiphol’s catchment area
towards Antwerp and Brussels” - Long term vision for Schiphol Group 2009
Paris Charles de Gaulle (Roissy)

“We have more than 12 years of experience in the value of an easy
connection between TGV and plane. The commercial success of TGV is due
to the fact that Roissy Is a through station. Roissy is progressively working
like a hub with many rail/air connections but also numerous rail/rail
connections" - Guillaume Pepy, Chairman SNCF
Frankfurt

“Long distance trains doubled (surface access) market share between 1998
and 2000, and since 2004 high speed long distance services have carried
more passengers than local services. 19% of originating passengers used
high speed services (174 services/day) in 2009, and this is projected to
increase to 30% by 2015” - Frankfurt Intraplan 2010
Brussels Zaventem

Zaventem has historically been served by a spur, as proposed by HS2 Ltd. for
Heathrow. Significantly, work is now nearing completion on “conversion of the
existing underground terminus station (from a spur) to a through station,
crucial for the development of Brussels airport” - Infrabel Mobility Projects
2009


6     The solution - HS2 direct route via Heathrow
There is therefore a compelling case for HS2 to follow European precedents
of a through airport station served by the main HS2 route, not a spur or loop,
and which also provides seamless interchange with classic rail services.
This approach has been widely endorsed;

“Services (with a Heathrow interchange located on the through HS2 line) will
have high load factors because they are connecting a number of different
markets. Their usage is not dependent on the single market at Heathrow, and
their load factors and overall economics will be attractive, in a way that far
fewer services would do if they were just to serve Heathrow on a spur” – The
Heathrow Opportunity, Greengauge 21 2010

“For rail to be a viable alternative to the aircraft, and to the car to get to/from
the airport, airports, certainly the main one, must have a station on the line,
not a spur from it. With currently over 40 million non-transfer passengers a
year needing to travel to/from it, it is hard to understand how a ‘city’ like
Heathrow might be bypassed” – Dr Moshe Givoni, Oxford University
Transport Studies Unit, The House Magazine, 31st Jan. 2011

“The solution will require consolidation of demand by serving Heathrow by
trains that also serve other markets, by placing Heathrow as an intermediate
station (on a through line)” - High Speed Rail Development Programme
2008/09 MVA/Systra

Importantly, there are little or no adverse cost and journey time impacts for a
HS2 route via Heathrow compared to the current proposal of a route
bypassing Heathrow.



7      Comparison of alternative HS2 routes
There is no justification for HS2 to bypass Heathrow when a route via the
airport is less costly than the current HS2 proposals, and has, at worst, a
marginal impact on journey times for non-airport passengers.

Cost




A route via Heathrow allows an Old Oak Common interchange to be omitted,
(providing very substantial cost savings), since Heathrow Hub provides both a
GWML/Crossrail and airport interchange on a single site.

This aligns with HS2 Ltd’s most recent (2011) Modelling and Appraisal, which
shows an Old Oak Common interchange adversely affecting HS2’s business
case, and Greengauge 21’s current view that the case for an Old Oak
Common interchange should now be reassessed.
Using Governments cost estimates, a route via Heathrow is therefore less
expensive than HS2 Ltd’s proposed route bypassing Heathrow and a later,
retrofitted spur.
The cost saving is increased when the potential private sector funding of the
Heathrow/HS2 interchange is taken into account.

Journey time




An HS2 route via Heathrow incurs marginal time penalties, which are
outweighed by the wider environmental and economic benefits that the route
provides. In any case, HS2’s Strategic Challenge Group, (in their meeting of
1st September 2009), noted that;

“There was evidence to suggest demand did not change drastically between
60 and 45 minutes, and so an intermediate station which added a 10 minute
penalty to a 45 minute journey may not erode too much demand”

For non-stop services between London and the north, a route via Heathrow is
in fact faster since Heathrow Hub, unlike Old Oak Common, allows non-stop
services to pass at line speed.




8    Comparison of alternative airport interchanges on HS2
route via Heathrow
An HS2 route via Heathrow can serve the airport by an interchange located
either “at airport”, (within the existing airport boundary), or “near” the airport.
Both options are supported by Heathrow’s airlines at this stage;

“Airlines are of the strong view that the strategic route for HSR must be fully
integrated with an en-route station at or near Heathrow” – London Heathrow
Airport Consultative Committee to the Transport Select Committee HS2
Inquiry, May 2011

“The HS2 main line should run at or near the airport to maximise frequency
and include a Heathrow HS2 station that offers a seamless transfer for
passengers and baggage … and becomes a fully integrated multi-modal
transport hub … in the first phase of HS2” – IATA/London Heathrow Airport
Consultative Committee/Heathrow Airline Operators Committee submission to
HS2 consultation, July 2011

Option 1 – HS2 interchange “at” existing airport (T5 or Central Terminal Area)




An “at airport” interchange requires the HS2 route to be aligned through the
existing Heathrow airport campus. This presents significant challenges;

   -   Requires lengthy, slow speed deviation in HS2 route;
   -   Extensive tunneling required;
   -   Environmental impact of surface sections of route;
   -   High cost and risk due to construction in live airport environment;
   -   Disruption to airport operations during construction;
   -   No connectivity between HS2 and GWML services;
   -   Potential competition issue if interchange location (eg; T5) exacerbates
       competitive inequality between airline facilities;

In addition, an “at airport” interchange would not provide seamless
connectivity between air and rail. A T5 location would be a considerable
distance west of the terminal itself, whilst a location in the congested Central
Terminal Area would be similarly remote from terminals themselves. A CTA
location would also incur significant disruption, risk and cost penalties due to
the need to avoid existing Hex, LUL, baggage, pedestrian and vehicle tunnels
(as well as a safeguarded route for future APM’s between terminals).

An indirect interchange between rail and air has a similar effect to rail/rail
interchange penalties;

“The attractiveness of air-rail links is certainly inhibited when passengers have
to transfer to a second mode of transport in order to reach their terminal
because the railway station is not integrated into the terminal building” -
Potential and Limitations of Air-rail Links, Andreas Eichinger und Andreas
Knorr, IWIM, Universität Bremen 2004

Heathrow option 2 – HS2 interchange “near” existing airport (Heathrow Hub)




Routeing HS2 close to Heathrow, with an airport interchange (Heathrow Hub)
located both on the GWML/Crossrail, (and M25 motorway), provides a
number of benefits;

   -   Requires minimal deviation in HS2’s route between London and
       Birmingham;
   -   Is less costly than the current preferred route;
   -   Has little/no impact on London to Birmingham journey times;
   -   Increases rail demand and assists HS2’s business case;
   -   Provides a direct connection between Heathrow, HS2, Crossrail and
       the classic rail network in the first phase of HS2;
   -   Provides wider benefits to the Thames Valley, West and South West,
       and South Wales;
   -   Enables air/rail substitution, providing additional airport capacity and
       resilience;
    -   Assists modal shift from road to rail, reducing Heathrow’s
        environmental impacts;
    -   Releases space for aircraft within the existing airport, improving
        operational efficiency and resilience, and reducing environmental
        impacts;
    -   Airport terminal co-located with station provides passenger check-in
        facilities at an “on-airport” facility, allowing seamless interchange
        between modes and improving Heathrow’s passenger experience;
    -   Transit times reduced by seamless passenger and baggage links
        between Hub and terminals/satellites within the existing airport;
    -   Reduces cost, risk and disruption of developing passenger processing
        and aircraft facilities necessary for Heathrow’s forecast growth;
    -   Supports vital hub operations by expanding Heathrow’s catchment;
    -   Assists UK regional competitiveness through improved access to
        global markets;
    -   Allows a less damaging – and potentially cheaper – route for HS2
        through London and the Chilterns;
    -   Enables private sector funding;
    -   Futureproofs connectivity between Heathrow and any future Thames
        Gateway airport
    -   Prevents Heathrow from becoming a “stranded asset”

The benefits of such a “near airport” option are recognised by Star Alliance,
the world’s largest airline alliance with extensive global experience of air/rail
interchanges;

“We would make the important point that an “on-airport” (high speed rail)
station does not have to be located within the existing airport boundary, if this
results in an unacceptable deviation of the HS2 alignment, significant journey
time penalties for non-airport passengers or a significant cost penalty due to
the inevitable challenges of major construction in, or under, the operational
airfield. Recognising that Heathrow occupies the smallest site area of any
major international airport, and the dispersed nature of Heathrow’s terminals,
sites outside the existing airport boundary should be explored, particularly if
this allows better connectivity and alignment with HS2, the existing rail
network – particularly the Great Western Main Line – and the local motorway
network” - Star Alliance submission to Transport Select Committee HS2
Inquiry, May 2011




9       The solution – Other benefits of Heathrow Hub

HS2 and the Chilterns

An HS2 route via Heathrow allows an alternative, more southerly alignment
through the Chilterns AONB. This allows HS2 to cross the narrowest part of
the AONB, (rather than the widest as currently proposed). Alternatively,
following the example of HS1, HS2 could be twinned with the existing M40
corridor.




                       




Whilst an alignment following or close to the M40 corridor would require a
much lower design speed, the route crosses only 12km of AONB.

Significantly, HS2 Ltd’s Strategic Challenge Group noted, (in their meeting of
23rd April 2009);

“Evidence suggested that the benefits of further improving journey times
beneath a 60 minute threshold were marginal (and) if the line was to be
engineered for 300kph or faster, it may nonetheless not be too damaging (to
the business case) if in places the line operated at a slightly lower speed”

DB’s experience of constructing new high speed lines in environmentally
sensitive areas also demonstrates that compromising design speed to reduce
environmental impacts (and energy use) has significant capital cost benefits.




HS2 and London
An HS2 route via Heathrow would extend the tunnel currently proposed
between Euston and Old Oak Common further west, beneath the GWML
following the precedent of HS1 below the North London Line. This (shown
dotted on the plan above) avoids the environmental impact of a surface route
through the London suburbs.

Experience from HS1 suggests that tunnelling through urban areas can be
cost effective when all costs, including environmental mitigation, of alternative
surface routes are taken into account. As a tunnel is currently proposed from
Euston to Old Oak Common, the establishment costs, including acquisition of
Tunnel Boring Machines, are required in any case.
Alternatively, HS2 could take over the current GWML corridor, with existing
GW services diverted to a new classic line, partly in tunnel, and making use of
the redundant rail corridor via Greenford. This could be constructed in
advance of HS2, reducing disruption during GW electrification and Crossrail
construction.

HS2 and the UK’s transport network

Heathrow Hub would provide a step change in rail connectivity, with benefits
extending far beyond airport passengers.
For example, “Javelin” high speed regional services from Kent and the
Thames Gateway could be extended to Basingstoke, Oxford and Reading,
(making best use of GWML electrification).

Such connectivity would enable significant modal shift from road to rail, and
increase rail revenues;

“The potential demand for rail services at Heathrow is likely to make it the
biggest railway station in the UK if appropriate infrastructure was provided” -
Adding Capacity at Heathrow Airport, response to consultation by Transport
Studies Unit, University of Oxford 2008

At a wider regional and national level, Heathrow Hub facilitates an integrated,
intermodal approach to transport network planning.




Heathrow Hub allows a phased development, with early benefits in advance
of HS2 to support Heathrow’s forecast growth whilst reducing the airports
environmental impacts and supporting the UK’s economic competitiveness.
Phase 1 provides a GWML/Crossrail Heathrow interchange, developed and
funded entirely within the private sector.

Conclusion

The principle of a direct HS2 route via Heathrow, and the specific features of
Heathrow Hub, has been widely endorsed;

“A Conservative Government will support proposals along the lines of the plan
put forward by Arup, for a new Heathrow rail hub. This would link Heathrow
terminals directly into the main rail, greatly improving public transport links to
the airport” - Conservative Party Rail Review 2009

“A non-direct high speed link with Heathrow, represented by a loop or spur,
would represent folly in Britain’s ambition to develop a truly integrated
transport policy” - Lord Heseltine, Bow Group meeting 20th January 2010

“Only an HS2 alignment via a Heathrow interchange located on the GWML as
close as possible to the airport, providing direct connections between high
speed rail, classic rail, Crossrail, the motorway network and Heathrow can
provide the connectivity that the UK requires” - Conservative Transport Group
2011
“The Deputy First Minister, Ieuan Wyn Jones, has already placed on record
our support for a Heathrow Hub linked to the (electrified) Great Western
Mainline” - Welsh Assembly

“A direct western link between Heathrow airport and the Great Western Main
Line would enable passengers from Wales access into Heathrow, rather than
first having to go out to London and then come back” - Mark Hopwood,
Managing Director, First Great Western

 “Unite believes there are advantages in constructing a new rail hub station on
the Great Western Line as proposed by Arup” - Unite the Union

“HS2 should be directly linked to Heathrow through the construction of an on-
airport interchange station connecting with the Great Western Main Line,
Crossrail, Airtrack and potentially Chiltern services” - SEEDA

We are grateful for the opportunity to provide this additional evidence to the
Committee’s important Inquiry and would be pleased to provide any further
information that may be required.

30 August 2011
                      Written evidence from Jeff Travers (HSR 151)


This written submission provides evidence relating to the HS2 proposed strategic route at the
London end

My name is Jeffrey Travers I am an architect and have extensive experience of design and
contract administration of rail projects. I was detuty to the director ot the newly privatised
British Rail Architects Department (NDDA) the designers of Ashford Internation Station for
HS1. I took over from Alastair Lansley OBE when he became project architect for St Pancras
International Station. I was also architect on Waterloo Jubilee Line Station.I was also project
architect for Croydon Tramlink though the architectural work was limited to tram stops and a
large depot.

My evidence is as follows
At the HS2 Euston roadshow I queried why Old Oak Station was not proposed as the main
London terminus for HS2 in view of the space constraints of Euston (aswell as the
tunnelling difficulties and disruption to existing homes and services in getting the line
through to Euston). I was told by HS2 senior staff that there was insufficient space at Old
Oak Common for a terminal. I checked the consultation documentation and found that
although there appeared to be plenty of space, most of this space was earmarked for a 17
track depot for Crossrail adjacent to the proposed HS2 station. I returned to the roadshow the
next day and asked senior engineers from Arup why the proposed Crossrail Depot was
located at Old Oak Station. They told me that they had argued with Crossrail that the depot
should be relocated so the HS2 Old Oak Station could be the terminus but Crossrail insisted
on going ahead with the design tender for the Old Oak Depot because otherwise they would
not meet their contract obligations. Arup engineers said that the Old Oak site was potentially
the best connected site in the country for such a terminus and they were very disappointed
that they were forced to expand Euston with all its difficulties.
They said the Crossrail depot would only last a few years once the commercial value of the
depot site was realised

We all agreed that this is no way to make strategic decisions.

May 2011
                   Written evidence from the Taxpayers’ Alliance (HSR 152)

Summary


       The TaxPayers’ Alliance (TPA) strongly believes that the Government’s proposed new
       high speed rail line (HS2) represents poor value for money and the project should be
       cancelled. Our position is that incremental investments in transport infrastructure,
       particularly in roads and commuter rail, would be a better priority for scarce resources.
       At the same time, with long term pressures on the public finances it is difficult to justify
       spending so much on a project that will predominantly benefit high earners.
       The business case is based on assumptions that are hard to justify and subject to three
       key flaws. Despite these flawed assumptions, the cost benefit produced still does not
       match the usual standard required for road projects, for example:
               -   Forecasts for growth in demand are almost certainly overstated.
               -   Zero passenger productivity during a journey is assumed.
               -   An unrealistic comparator is used that ignores likely improvements on the
                   West Coast Main Line if HS2 does not go ahead.
       Many towns and cities will receive a worse service if HS2 goes ahead on the basis
       planned. Avoiding that would require additional subsidies and further weaken the
       business case.
       Claims that the programme will create jobs are, in context, unimpressive for the scale
       of the spending planned.

This document will set out the TPA position on this project and then look at the business
case; towns and cities likely to see worse capacity as a result of the project; and claims on
jobs. It will then conclude by discussing other countries and why “me too HS2” has a poor
financial record.

Priorities

The TaxPayers’ Alliance is not hostile to infrastructure investment in itself. In our report
with the Institute of Directors – How to save £50 billion: Reducing spending for sustainable
public finances – we largely avoided cuts in investment expenditure, and instead focused on
government consumption. We did so because the Government had “already set out plans
radically to reduce net investment” and “transport and energy infrastructure should be the
last items to cut”. 1




1
    http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/50bil.pdf
Our view is that the priority for scarce resources should be maximising additional capacity
for every pound spent, to ease overcrowding with scarce resources. Opinion polling
suggests that reducing cost, congestion and overcrowding is the public’s priority for
investment in the transport network. 2

In our Manifesto ahead of the last election – intended to be a benchmark whoever formed
the next Government – we included this item: 3

        “Refocus transport spending on high use commuter rail and roads

        Despite motorists facing excessive taxation, far more is spent on railways
        per passenger kilometre. Resources should be focused where they will do
        the most to ease congestion. Approve a third runway at Heathrow.”

While there is a need for greater capacity on the West Coast Main Line, that can be
addressed more effectively through incremental improvements. The case for high speed
rail inherently depends upon prioritising greater speed, and the case for HS2 depends upon
prioritising greater speed on the already fast West Coast Main Line. We do not think that is
appropriate. While RP2 is not a perfect alternative, something along those lines would offer
better value in our view.

The business case for high speed rail relies upon business passengers in particular having a
high income, as that increases the value of time saved with quicker journeys. More
broadly, research shows that nearly half (47%) of long distance rail journeys in Britain are
made by people from households in the top income quintile:




2
  http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/transport-and-the-election-survey-rac-foundation-2010-toplines-and-
trends.pdf
3
  http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/TPAmanifesto.pdf
With long term pressures on the public finances, spending so much on a project benefitting
a relatively small number of fortunate passengers is hard to justify.

Business Case

The business case for high speed rail is problematic on a number of grounds, which have
been explored in a TPA report by senior railway executive Chris Stokes, High Speed Rail. 4
The issues have subsequently been updated on our website and in research by other
groups like the HS2 Action Alliance, 5 after the updated business case was published for the
Department for Transport consultation, so only a basic summary will be provided here.
There are three principle issues:

    Forecasts for growth in demand are almost certainly overstated. While the assumed
    rate of growth is more moderate in the consultation business case it is projected even
    further into the future. That is clearly unreliable with a fixed elasticity model.
    Zero passenger productivity during a journey is assumed. The consultation document
    claims that the business case is robust to this issue as the new line will reduce
    overcrowding. With a more realistic comparator that is not the case though, as
    alternatives like RP2 will do more to reduce overcrowding.


4
 http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/highspeedrail.pdf
5
 http://www.hs2aa.org/index.php/news/publications/category/11-business-case-post-consultation-launch-post-
2822011?download=41%3Areview-of-the-consultation-business-case-for-hs2-v19-5-may-2011
    An unrealistic comparator is used that ignores likely improvements if HS2 does not go
    ahead.     It assumes there are no improvements for 30 years, even ignoring
    developments already planned by operators. It is important to compare to practical
    alternatives that can double capacity over time and deliver alternatives before 2026,
    rather than assuming that without HS2 the network is left in stasis.

Overestimating future demand, in particular, is endemic for major rail projects both in
Britain and elsewhere in the world. Research by Danish academics in 2006 6 states:

        “for nine out of ten rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated;
        average overestimation is 106%”

Eurostar has captured the lion’s share of London – Paris passenger journeys but the market
is near saturation, and its passenger numbers in 2009 where 37% of the forecast for 2006.
Manchester – London can be expected to show a similar pattern; there has been rapid
growth since the dramatic service improvements in 2008, mostly at the expense of air. But
this is a step change over three/four years, not a straight line ever upwards. Rail is also
already dominant in the markets from Leeds and Birmingham to central London, so DfT’s
forecasts are only credible if there is evidence that there will be a step change growth in
the demand for travel on these corridors; this has not happened for London – Paris.

DfT told the Public Accounts Committee that they would not repeat those mistakes, made
with HS1:

        “next time it considered undertaking a major transport project, it would
        factor more severe downside assumptions into its business case analysis”.

But it is clear that this has not been done for HS2.

In April 2010, the rating agency Fitch looked at high speed rail projects. To quote from the
report:

        “Historically, the agency has observed that the assessment of rail demand
        has displayed a significant optimism bias, particularly for Greenfield
        projects”; and

        “Rail projects are often high profile. This exposes them to “political
        entrepreneur syndrome” where the public authorities overestimate the
        benefits of the project to get it approved for the purpose of political gain”

6
  Inaccuracy in Traffic Forecasts. Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K. Skamris Holm and Søren L. Buhl, Department of Development of
Planning, Aalborg University
 Despite these assumptions HS2 still produces a cost-benefit ratio below that required for
 other transport projects, particularly roads.

 Capacity

 Another research note for the TPA by Chris Stokes looked at the towns and cities that
 would see a worse service. 7 Here is a summary of some that lose out in the first phase.

Table 1: Impact of HS2 Phase 1
 Station                                                      Impact
 Milton Keynes, Northampton                                   Potential doubling of commuter capacity from around
                                                              2016 not taken forward in advance of HS2
 Coventry                                                     Frequency reduced from 3 to 1 train per hour from
                                                              2026, with journey times extended by 10 minutes, as
                                                              trains stop at Rugby, Milton Keynes and Watford
                                                              Junction
 West Midlands suburban network via Birmingham                Implications for connections with the West Midlands
 New Street                                                   suburban network - Frequency reduced from 3 to 1
                                                              train per hour from 2026, with journey times
                                                              extended by 10 minutes, as trains stop at Rugby,
                                                              Milton Keynes and Watford Junction.

 Sandwell, Dudley and Wolverhampton                           Journey times extended by 10 minutes

 Shrewsbury, Wrexham and mid Wales                            Journey time for connecting services from
                                                              Wolverhampton and Birmingham New street
                                                              increased by 10 minutes, and Frequency from
                                                              Birmingham New Street reduced from 3 to 1 trains an
                                                              hour.


 Stoke-on Trent                                               No high speed service proposed. Frequency reduced
                                                              from 2 to 1 train per hour. Average journey time
                                                              lengthened slightly

 Manchester, Stockport                                        A reduction in overall capacity on the route, from
                                                              1,767 seats to 1,650 seats per hour, despite Network
                                                              Rail’s forecasts that this route would have the highest
                                                              growth. 8


 And those that lose out in the second phase: the construction of the “Y”.




 7
  http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/hs2capacity.pdf
 8
  This assumes 550 seats for HS2 units, as set out in the consultation documentation, and 589 seats for 11 car Pendolino
 sets.
Table 2: Impact of HS2 Phase 2
 Station                                               Impact
 Wellingborough, Kettering, Corby, Market Harborough   Electrification, journey time reductions and increased
                                                       capacity not taken forward in advance of HS2 (2032-
                                                       33 at the earliest)
 Leicester                                             Electrification, journey time reductions and increased
                                                       capacity not taken forward in advance of HS2 (2032-
                                                       33 at the earliest)
                                                       Service frequency and journey times likely to
                                                       deteriorate on completion of Phase 2 – Leicester
                                                       currently has four trains an hour, two non-stop
 Loughborough                                          Electrification, journey time reductions and increased
                                                       capacity not taken forward in advance of HS2
                                                       Service frequency and journey times likely to
                                                       deteriorate on completion of Phase 2 – Loughborough
                                                       currently has two trains an hour, one non-stop from
                                                       Leicester
 Nottingham, Derby, Sheffield                          Electrification, journey time reductions and increased
                                                       capacity not taken forward in advance of HS2
                                                       Reduced frequency and increased journey times for
                                                       existing city centre stations
                                                       Loss of local transport interchange
 Chesterfield                                          Electrification, journey time reductions and increased
                                                       capacity not taken forward in advance of HS2
                                                       Service frequency and journey times likely to
                                                       deteriorate on completion of Phase 2 – Chesterfield
                                                       currently has two trains an hour, non-stop between
                                                       Leicester and London

 Peterborough                                          Service frequency likely to deteriorate on completion
                                                       of Phase 2 – Peterborough typically has three/four
                                                       fast trains an hour.

 Doncaster, Wakefield                                  Service frequency and journey times likely to
                                                       deteriorate on completion of Phase 2

 York, Durham, Darlington and Newcastle                HS2 documentation shows two High Speed trains an
                                                       hour - no capacity increase on the present service

 Berwick on Tweed                                      HS2 documentation shows no High Speed trains
                                                       North of Newcastle

 Edinburgh                                             HS2 documentation shows no High Speed trains to
                                                       Edinburgh via Carlisle or Newcastle


 It is also worth noting that the new line will put significant pressure on certain existing
 choke points in the network. For example, far more passengers will terminate in Euston
 and its connections to the London Underground are likely to be unable to cope with the
 additional demand. Even with upgrades to the station, it is unlikely that the London
transport network will be able to cope with the amount of traffic being directed to Euston.
Southbound Victoria line trains are already particularly overcrowded.

The Government have responded to our report, but their claims have been misleading. In a
Westminster Hall debate on 31st March 2011, Theresa Villiers effectively promised that there
would be no service cuts on the existing network once HS2 is built. In response to a speech
by Dan Byles MP, in which he said Coventry would see its fast trains to London cut from
three to one an hour, she responded:

        “This is simply not true. There are some indicative forecasts in the HS2
        analysis about how services might be configured in the future. The reality is
        that Coventry is going to enjoy frequent fast services”

But the documentation is clear. 9 The HS2 Business Case is based on an assumption that
Coventry will only have one train an hour, which will be slower because of additional stops.
If all the Birmingham passengers are on HS2, it would be extraordinary if the present 20
minute frequency continued, just for Coventry passengers. The HS2 business case includes
a total saving of £5.4 billion for reductions to existing services.

Philip Hammond told the Daily Telegraph on 1st April that:

        “Our proposed new high speed rail network would free up a huge amount
        of space on the current railways for more trains to operate. Building a
        whole new line would create scope for people who live on the current lines
        to have more frequent services that are less crowded – I would also hope
        that this additional competition could mean cheaper fares as well”

This is apparently very attractive. But the existing services are generally good, so faced with
a choice of using HS2 to get to Birmingham in 49 minutes or paying half price to go on the
existing trains in 82 minutes, many people will save money and take a bit longer, especially
when they arrive at a station in the heart of the city, with good public transport
connections. They already do this in Kent, where the “Javelin” high speed services to towns
like Chatham are embarrassingly empty, and passengers continue to use the cheaper,
slower alternatives.

These “promises” from Theresa Villiers and Phillip Hammond would have a major impact on
the already poor financial case for HS2. Extra capacity and competition would certainly drive
fares right down. But the published financial details assume no competition on routes


9
  HS2 Technical Appendix, March 2010. Appendix 2, Page 23
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/techni
calappendix/pdf/report.pdf
served by HS2, and fares going up at RPI + 3% for the next three years and RPI + 1% for
every subsequent year until 2033, a 36% increase above inflation. The overall additional
revenue included in the HS2 business case 10 is £27.2 billion (Net Present Value over 60
years). Unfettered competition will undoubtedly halve this, probably more, so we can
assume it drops to £13.6 billion. And promises of “no service cuts” wipe out a £5.4 billion
cost saving. Adjusting the total evaluation for these changes increases the net cost of the
project to the taxpayer to £36.1 billion, much higher than the £30.4 billion capital cost.

If this really happened, it might be good news for the minority of the population who use
rail and travel on this route, enjoying overcapacity and cheap fares. But it would represent
an appalling cost to the taxpayer. A much more likely outcome is that existing services will
be cut; fares on HS2 will be priced at a premium; and, as with Kent, fares across large parts
of the network will be raised as well to plug the financial black hole created by HS2.

Jobs

An increasing number of major projects are promoted on the basis that they will create
jobs. The number of jobs claimed can be impressive, such as the purported 40,000 jobs
that will be created by a new high speed rail line – cited in the Department for Transport
consultation document. 11 But they can be very misleading. There are two issues:

       The estimate of jobs created may be inaccurate in itself. For example, the estimate of
       jobs created by HS2 may be based on overly optimistic demand assumptions, like the
       wider estimate of costs and benefits.
       There are opportunity costs to any major investment, in the form of foregone
       opportunities to make other investments. Any investment on the scale of the £17 billion
       the Government plans to spend on the London to Birmingham high speed link would
       create jobs. But if that investment is not made, other investments, elsewhere in the
       public or private sectors, could lead to greater gains in employment.

In our research note on jobs, we assumed that the 40,000 jobs estimate is accurate. There
are a number of reservations about that figure though:

       9,000 of the jobs are in construction, and therefore likely to prove impermanent.
       Regeneration benefits may well come primarily from shifting economic activity around
       the country. Jobs created may therefore not represent higher employment, but come at
       the expense of fewer jobs elsewhere.



10
      Economic Case for HS2 February 2011 Page 12
11
     Available here: http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsr-consultation.pdf
The second concern is particularly critical, as the Financial Times put it in a leader, 28
February 2011:

           “To govern is to choose. Would the benefits of a shiny new high-speed line
           outweigh the less visible but valuable things that could be done with the
           limited funds available?”

To test whether high speed rail is an efficient way of promoting employment, we can use a
method deployed by two recent studies, which assessed the opportunity costs of major
investments in the energy sector.

The paper Study of the effects on employment of public aid to renewable energy sources, 12
produced by a team led by Dr. Gabriel Calzada Álvarez at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
in Spain, pioneered an attempt to understand this issue by comparing the capital stock per
worker across the broader economy with the cost per worker of investment in renewable
energy sources.

There has been criticism of that paper, but that criticism has mostly argued either that the
estimate of jobs created by renewable energy support was wrong (Dr. Calzada used an
estimate produced by a European Commission initiative) or that a better measure would be
to look at the amount of employment produced for every dollar of investment in different
sources of energy (which is obviously inappropriate when projects entail significantly
increasing investment in a sector not previously promoted primarily as a source of
employment). In the case of HS2, the estimate of jobs created comes from the Department
for Transport.

It was followed up by a study by Luciano Lavecchia and Carlo Stagnaro for the Istituto
Bruno Leoni in Italy. 13 The researchers in that study summed up what the results imply:

           “The only scope, and we dare to say the only result, of our study is to show
           that green investments are an ineffective policy for job creation.”

To produce a similar estimate for HS2, the first step is to calculate capital stock per worker
in the broader economy. The Office for National Statistics put the total net capital stock of
the UK – the total cost (at current prices) of replacing all capital assets in their current
condition – at £3.182 trillion in 2009. 14 They also recorded the total number of workforce
jobs at nearly 31 million. 15 That implies net capital stock per worker of £102,655.


12
     Available in English here: http://www.juandemariana.org/pdf/090327-employment-public-aid-renewable.pdf
13
     Available in English here: http://brunoleonimedia.servingfreedom.net/WP/WP-Green_Jobs-May2010.pdf
14
     Office for National Statistics Capital Stocks, Capital Consumption and Non-Financial Balance Sheets, 2 August 2010
15
     Office for National Statistics DYDC: UK Workforce Jobs SA : Total (thousands)
By contrast, the proposed high speed rail line from London to Birmingham is expected to
cost £17.8 billion and create 40,500 jobs – 9,000 in construction; 1,500 in operations and
maintenance; and 30,000 from wider economic regeneration. That is nearly £440,000 per
worker.

Calculation     Wider Economy                                    Amount
A               Net capital stock, 2009                                      £3,182,000,000,000
B               Employment, 2009                                                     30,997,000
C (A/B)         Capital stock per job                                                  £102,655
                HS2 - London to Birmingham
D               Cost                                                            £17,800,000,000
E               Jobs created claim                                                       40,500
F (D/E)         Cost per job                                                           £439,506
                Comparison
G (D/C)         HS2 opportunity cost, jobs                                             173,396
H (G/E)         Ratio, opportunity cost/jobs created                                       4.3


For every one job supposedly created by HS2, we could expect four jobs to be created in
the wider economy for the same amount of money.

The fact that the wider economy generates more than four times as many jobs for every
pound in capital stock suggests high speed rail is a deeply inefficient generator of new
employment, and there is a significant opportunity cost to investing in it. High speed rail is
capital intensive, not labour intensive, and for the Government to promote it as a means to
increase employment is misleading.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the case for the new high speed rail line has not been made and, given
constraints on spending and the likely distributional impact, HS2 should be cancelled.

It is often argued that Britain needs to adopt high speed rail to compete with other
countries making similar investments. However there are increasing signs that countries
investing in HS2 have seen poor value:

    Schemes taken forward as PPP projects such as in Taiwan and the Netherlands risk
    bankruptcy and have required government bailouts.
    High speed rail has been largely abandoned in the United States as state governors
    were concerned about the long term costs.
       Charles Lane recently wrote in the Washington Post that the Ministry responsible for
       high speed rail in China has $271 billion in debt and the Minister has been arrested for
       embezzling on a substantial scale. 16

It is increasingly clear that international adoption of high speed rail constitutes “me too
HS2”. Taken up as a visible signal of political commitment to growth and development, it
substitutes for more effective but less prestigious investments and proves extremely poor
value.    Britain should avoid making the same mistake and focus on incremental
infrastructure improvements.

May 2011




16
     http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-train-wreck/2011/04/21/AFqjRWRE_story.html
           Written evidence from HS2 Action Alliance (HSR 153)

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

HS2 (and probably HSR in general) offers ‘poor’ value for money in the UK because:

      Benefits rely upon an exaggerated value of journey time savings, as time on trains is not
      wasted (section 3.2), this also has implications for DfT’s system of valuation (section 4)
      Demand modelling has substantially overestimated rail demand growth (section 3.4)
      Use of an unrealistic ‘do minimum’ case causes HS2 to have artificial benefits (section 3.5)
•     Failure to consider competition overestimates revenues and understates overall costs

Improving the existing rail network is a better alternative (section 3.6):

      Alternatives can deliver all the forecast demand required
      It is cheaper and better value for money
      It can be implemented in stages and quickly when required, avoiding crowding and the risk
      of over-provision from relying on long term forecasts

Technical uncertainty (section 3.3) with HS2:

      DfT do not acknowledge or explore issues of deliverability of the Y ‘stem’ train frequencies
      No adjustments are made to the forecast benefits to reflect the risk of undeliverability
      Capacity on HS2 trains running on the classic network is insufficient to carry forecast traffic

Specification and route (section 4) choices

      Journey time savings being worth much less removes the rationale for very high speed,
      with the trade-off between the benefits and disadvantages of speed needing reappraisal
      Route selection and station decisions are similarly in need of revisiting

Environment (section 6)

      Carbon impacts are higher than DfT suggest in particular because of the re-use of runway
      capacity and the carbon intensity of the electricity generation HSR requires.
      High speed is destructive of the countryside as it departs from existing transport corridors
      HS2 can have only a limited impact on domestic aviation, as it is relevant only for the
      London – Scottish lowlands routes
      HS2 cannot successfully compete with short-haul European services, as the market is too
      small for trains to provide a service frequency that can match smaller capacity aircraft.

Priority

      HSR should not be a UK priority as we already have fast frequent intercity rail services 1 ,
      and HSR time savings do not provide the step change typical of overseas HSR experience
      HSR is a curious target for subsidy, as it encourages additional travel and is regressive
      because the affluent are the main users of long distance rail (section 5)

HSR is unlikely to rebalance the economy:

      Faster connections between the regions and London are, on balance, more likely to favour
      the economic development of London over the regions (section 5)



1
    ‘Evidence that UK already has a fast national railway network’ HS2AA January 2011
It is not practicable to discuss all these topics in this submission. A fuller discussion can be
found at ‘Review of February 2011 consultation business case for HS2’, HS2AA, May 2011.

3. Business case

3.1 Robustness of assumptions and methodology:

There are a number of serious methodological errors and omissions in DfT’s assessment of
HS2. When these are corrected, the economic case for HS2 disappears, with both the London
to West Midland phase and the full “Y” network becoming poor value for money (with benefits
less than the subsidy required). Annex 1 provides a reworking of the benefit cost ratios (BCR).

DfT’s assessment of HS2 is a form of social cost benefit analysis. It is not a commercial
business case, and accepts that HS2 requires a subsidy. The revenues generated involve
substantial abstraction from the existing network revenues (as most passengers are expected
to transfer), resulting in the incremental revenue unable to cover the cost of the investment.

This means that economic and welfare benefits are needed to justify the subsidy. In the case
of HS2, for the full “Y” £44bn of social benefits are claimed against a subsidy of £17bn.
However there are serious issues with:

    The value given to the journey time savings from higher speeds, and the consequence this
    has for the best approach to HSR
    The technical delivery of the service pattern and the absence of any mention of this issue,
    or its implications in the case for HS2
    The level of rail travel forecast and the manner in which this forecast was derived
    The failure to develop a best alternative to HS2, and use of an unrealistic ‘do minimum’ that
    implies there is no real alternative to HS2 and artificially inflates its benefits
    Ignoring competition with the existing rail network.

3.2 Benefits

The largest benefits of HSR are on-board journey time savings: 40% (£18bn) of HS2’s £44bn.

Productivity: DfT’s benefits appraisal framework ignores that mobile technology is
transforming the productive potential of travelling on trains. This is important as £14bn of the
£44bn (see Annex 1) relates to the productivity benefit of reducing journey times: DfT assume
that every minute taken off the journey time creates an extra minute of productive time.

The process of time on trains becoming productive (and more enjoyable) is an on-going one.
Currently there are weaknesses in radio coverage (that reduce efficiency), and while market
penetration has proceeded beyond early adopters, it is not complete especially for mobile
internet and ultra portable systems. But when considering the benefits of a project starting
more than 15 years hence, it would be expected that all travellers would have access to such
advanced technology as they need to be able to spend their time effectively.

Of course not all time on trains is or will ever be fully productive. People need to find there
seats, unpack, pack up again and get ready to disembark. But journey time savings do not
effect such unproductive time, rather the duration of the time in the middle.

Some business travellers on long distance trains also use their time to take refreshments, a cup
of coffee or a meal. Such time is not productive, but reducing the journey time does not

generate productive time unless the coffee or meal is forgone.
DfT correctly observe that the value of time should not be altered in isolation 2 , and there are
consequential adjustments that need to be made. What is required is an extensive re-think on
the values of time saving and the costs of crowding from those settled a decade ago on even
older data. It is clear that crowding can result in rendering time unproductive and materially
less enjoyable, hence crowding values should be changed.

However DfT are mistaken about the specific implications of these changes for HS2:

    HS2 only appears to relieve crowding against an unrealistic comparator. It has no crowding
    benefits compared with the best alternative which is its proper comparator (see section 3.5)
    Adjusting the value of time for journey time reductions also has serious implications on
    decisions about how fast high speed railways should be designed to go, and the trade offs
    inherent in this and route choices. This is discussed at section 4.
    DfT suggest that modal transfer from air and car would restore the benefits, as those
    swapping would gain productive time. But air will shortly have facilities for full use of mobile
    technologies 3 . And for car, the 7% of HS2 passengers transferring from car could not
    possibly off-set the loss of benefit from the others. DfT’s methodology (with some logic)
    attributes new rail passengers with half the value of benefits of existing rail passengers
    swapping from classic rail to HS2. This implies the new passengers gain no value from
    productivity, if HS2 has no productivity benefit over classic rail.
    DfT offer an alternative defence. They claim that decisions made by business travellers
    maximise their overall productivity and reveal the value business travellers actually place
    on time savings. They claim this indicates even higher values for time savings. But such
    decisions may reveal many things quite unrelated to productivity: business travellers
    generally do not bear the cost of their travel and so their choices may be driven by other
    motives than business efficiency. Their decisions may relate to matters of minor personal
    convenience or prestige, and reflect the extent to which business travel is managed within
    their organisation. It is hardly reasonable to base a £30bn investment on speculation on
    what business travellers’ choices may or may not reveal without any systematic analysis.

DfT’s case for HS2 relies on valuing time savings in a manner that is now outdated. They have
failed to appreciate that it makes a material difference to how they should assess HSR.

It is not satisfactory to justify public subsidy on a benefit that there can be no confidence will
exist when HS2 commences services. DfT cannot rely on an increasingly outdated view of how
people can work or on speculation that time savings may yet be highly valuable if assessed in
some other as yet undeveloped manner. This is an issue for any high speed railway that needs
to be justified on productivity and welfare benefits.

Unit value: DfT use a value of business time that relates to 10 year old data. The earnings
relate to a very high point in the earnings distribution, equivalent to about £70,000/a in 2009. It
                                                                                       4
is 40% more than the figure for car drivers and 96% higher than for car passengers . DfT
escalate the value of business time by the expected increase in real earnings throughout the
appraisal period, and so assume that business travel remains the preserve of the earnings elite.

Given that long distance rail travel has increased by 60% since 2000, and the forecasts for HS2
project a further quadrupling (against a population increase of only 22%), DfT expect about a
six-fold increase in business demand over when the original data was collected.

The major increase in the use of rail for long distance business trips means it is not credible
that all the journeys could be made by such elite earners. Nor is the rail earnings differential
above car drivers credible given that this growth will mainly be by modal shift from cars. If we
assume that the relative earnings of rail business travellers reduce to the average (mean) of


2
  ‘Economic Case for HS2’ February 2011, section 7.3.3, page 51
3
   See Sunday Times article 27 March 2011 (In Gear) The breakthrough is in providing connectivity
without interfering with, or dependence on, ground based transmitters
4
  Webtag Unit 3.5.6, Table 1, based on 1999-2001 NTS data.
‘managers and senior official’ this reduces earnings by a third, but this figure is still in the top
decile of earnings 5 .

This in itself would materially reduce expected benefits (by £7bn out of £44bn as it affects all
time savings and reliability benefits, see Annex 1), but many of these benefits are also subject
to downward adjustments for other reasons.

3.3 Technical deliverability

The service pattern assumed for the “Y” Network requires running 18 trains/hr on the Y ‘stem’
(London West Midlands section) in the peak, but:
    No services to Heathrow or running onto HS1 have been included in the 18 train paths
    18 is problematic as it seems that with existing technology 15 trains/hr is the maximum 6 .

If some of these services cannot be run, then the assumed passenger numbers, revenue and
social benefits (including reliability) will be unobtainable. If new technology needs developing
rather than buying standard equipment, then the costs may prove higher.

This is unsatisfactory in several respects:

    Risk: no consideration is given to the risk to delivery or discount applied to the potential
    benefits. No sensitivity tests reveal what happens if the Y is limited to 15 trains/hr

    Solutions: DfT have presented no evidence that it will be technically achievable. There is a
    report 7 suggesting that HS2 Ltd do not expect that there will be a technical solution, so that
    the projected benefits will only be obtainable at the cost of building another HSR line.

    The issue has been known for a long time eg work for Greengauge21 drew attention to it in
    2009 8 . The March 2010 documentation 9 and Autumn 2010 Technical seminars both
    acknowledged that new technology would be required. But the May/June 2010 workshops
    (attended by DfT, HS2 Ltd and technical experts) concluded

    ‘So, the better approach, as anticipated by HS2 Ltd, would be to presume that there will need to be a
    second north-south high-speed line in due course and plan accordingly. While this creates a fresh set
    of planning challenges, it has a demonstrable business case, and resolves the problems associated
    with the thinking in Cm 7827.’

    A suggested solution was that HS2 trains would operate under computer control, but it was
    recognised that this is unlikely to be viable given the interfaces with the existing network
    (that HS2 would have).

    Misinformed: despite the previous documents the public consultation materials contain no
    reference to these technical uncertainties. Indeed DfT suggest 10 the opposite:

    ‘Any new high speed lines would also be based on proven European standards, technology and
    practices, reducing the risk of unanticipated technical problems.’

Heathrow spur: The decision in December 2010 to include a spur to Heathrow further worsens
the line capacity problem, because Heathrow services would need to take the paths of some of
the 18 services in the “Y” specification, and the junctions will also reduce capacity




5
  ASHE April 2009 survey.
6
  ‘High Speed Two Interfaces’ Greengauge 21, July 2010, section 4a, page 6 (obtained under FOI)
7
  ‘High Speed Two Interactions’ Greengauge 21, July 2010, section4a, page6
8
  ‘Fast Forward A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain’ 2009, Appendix B, Sections2.4-2.6
9
  ‘HS2 Technical Annex’ HS2 Ltd, December 2009, section 2.3.2, page 6
10
   ‘High Speed Rail – Investing in Britain’s Future’ DfT, February 2011, section 2.46 page 51
Phase 1: The London-West Midlands phase of HS2 is not so reliant on new technology, with
only 14 trains/hr in the peak, albeit within this 14 none are included for services onto HS1 and
through to the Continent. However, with a benefit cost ratio of only 1.6 (or 2.0 with Wider
Economic Impacts (WEI)) and the same vulnerability to benefit, demand and comparator
issues, a case for Phase 1 alone is not sustainable. On DfT’s own re-working of the economic
analysis of the alternatives of upgrading the WCML, ‘Rail Package 2’ (RP2) has a better benefit
cost ratio 1.9 (without WEI) – and DfT acknowledge that this underestimates its benefits.

Reliability: HS2 is assumed to deliver improved reliability, contributing almost £6bn of the
£44bn benefits (see Annex 1), as each minute of improvement is taken to be worth 3 minutes of
on-board journey time 11 . A self contained new railway running trains of the same type is
expected to achieve high levels of reliability. However, HS2 is not an isolated railway, as
classic compatible trains are planned to run services from the classic network with mixed traffic,
where it can be expected to experience delays. Because HS2’s service pattern requires
intensive usage, with no proposed means of isolating itself, it can be expected to import
unreliability. This makes the claimed reliability improvements unrealistic.

Insufficient capacity on classic network: the HS2 trains that will run onto the classic network will
have fewer seats than those they replace, and hence be incapable of handling the increased
growth. It is understood there are difficulties in how to run more than one train per hour to
Scotland. HS2 is therefore unlikely to be capable of carrying the passengers forecast for it.

3.4 Demand

DfT forecast rail growth doubling on WCML by 2043 (102% increase over 2008, an annual
growth rate of 2%) to just over trebling with the HS2 uplift (219%).

But their approach to demand forecasting is unsound because:

     Link between wealth and travel decoupled: DfT assume a relationship between economic
     growth and long distance domestic travel for 35 years into the future, despite evidence that
     the relationship has already weakened, if not expired entirely (see Figure 1)
     Sensitivities: DfT fail to show that the investment in HSR is robust to a lesser or less
     enduring linkage with economic growth – including not following their own (webtag 3.15.4)
     guidance on conducting sensitivities that would have shown the fragility of the case for HS2
     Outdated model: DfT continue to employ a version of the forecasting model that
     exaggerates growth in longer distance journeys, failing to adopt their own draft guidance,
     the latest version of the model, or heed the results of research that they commissioned that
     show that their approach on this specific issue (use of a distance addition) is now wrong
     Long term 35yr forecast: DfT use the forecasting model to predict rail demand over far too
     long a period in order to ‘justify’ a demand increase (a ‘doubling’) that they determined
     independently. If they had retained the 25 year cut off they used in their own 2010 forecast,
     then their own analysis shows HS2 would be ‘poor’ value for money (ie BCR below 1)
     HS2 uplift: this depends on journey time relationships from the rail model that pre-date
     making time on trains productive, and hence over values reducing journey times.

Link between wealth and domestic travel: DfT assume a continued link over the 35 years
that they forecast demand increases. This is surprising as there is already evidence that for
both domestic travel (as in Figure 1) and long distance domestic travel that this linkage has
weakened and may have ended. This decoupling of economic growth and domestic travel has
                                                 12
also been observed in other European countries .



11
  ‘HS2 Demand Model Analysis’, February 2010, section 3.4
12
  See Transport at the Crossroads’ EEA Report 3/2009, for decoupling in Europe using Eurostat data,
and ‘The Prospects for Inter-Urban Travel Demand’, Y. Crozet — Discussion Paper 2009-14 —
OECD/ITF, 2009, section 2.2
                                                                                                                                                           13
Figure 1: Travelling time, trips and distances per person (compared with real GVA/capita

                                                                                                                            250      GVA/capita
                                                                                                                                     (YBGT)



                                                                                                                            200




                                                                                                                            150




                                                                                                                            100




The trips per person have been constant (see Figure 2), but the DfT forecast assumes the over
100 mile trips (pink line) will increase from 7 to 9.5 by 2043 (by 36%).
 Figure 2: Long distance travel per person (NTS0307)


                     25



                     20
   trips per annum




                     15
                                                                                                                                          Over 50 miles
                                                                                                                                          50 – 100 miles
                                                                                                                                          Over 100 miles
                     10



                      5



                      0
                          1995-97 1998-            2001        2002       2003           2004   2005   2006   2007   2008     2009
                                  2000


Demand has grown with population. However, population growth has been and is forecast to
be relatively small (22% to 2043), explaining only a fifth of DfT’s rail forecast (of 102% to 2043).

With overall long distance demand showing saturation, rail has grown strongly since
privatisation in the mid 1990s. But this needs to be put in context:

                          While rail demand grew strongly from 1995, there was no growth from the early 1950s to
                          the mid-1990s at all
                          There are specific reasons that favoured rail growth (increased investment, improved
                          services, airline style pricing and mobile technology making time on board more useful and
                          enjoyable). But rail’s modal share cannot expand indefinitely
                     Figure 3: Long term rail growth

                     80

                     70
                                                                          2008 -35 years

                     60
 passenger km (bn)




                     50

                     40

                     30

                     20

                     10

                      0
                         52
                         54
                         56
                         58
                         60
                         62
                         64
                         66
                         68
                         70
                         72
                         74
                         76
                         78
                         80
                         82
                         84
                         86
                         88
                         90
                         92
                         93
                         95
                         97
                         99
                         01
                         03
                         05

                     20 07
                          p
                       09
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       19
                       20
                       20
                       20
                       20




                      Source: Transport Statistics of GB, 2010 release, Table TSGB0101




In this situation, at minimum DfT should be concerned that a major investment such as HSR is
robust to the possibility that long distance travel demand will cease growing with the economy
much earlier than 2043. In fact they fail to even consider the lesser gearing of demand on



13
                     Based on analysis by Dr Metz based on NTS 2008 Table 2.1 with GVA/capita trend added
economic growth that is required by their own guidance 14 . What DfT do show is that should
demand stop growing at 2033, the subsidy exceeds the benefits.

Out dated rail model: DfT used an old version (PDFHv4.1) in which the ‘income elasticity’
factors forecast longer rail journeys to grow more quickly than shorter ones. National Rail
Trends data in fact shows the reverse: the average long distance rail journey is now 16%
shorter than in 1995. PDFHv4.1 also has larger values for journeys to London than those
originating in London. For 1% more income, people in Birmingham are expected to spend
2.48% more on travel to London, whereas in Glasgow it is 2.80% more. This issue is
recognised as a problem:

     DfT issued Draft Guidance (but still to be adopted) which imposes a cap (at 2.5%)
     The current model, v5.0, which was adopted in August 2009, removes the distance factor
     eg an elasticity of 1.9% applies to both journeys, but the HS2 forecast still used PDFHv4.1.

The recent research (for DfT and others) has now confirmed that no distance addition is
appropriate for longer rail journeys 15 , yet it has still been used to produce the DfT forecast.

Sensitivities: It has already been noted that DfT require in their webtag guidance that different
elasticities be used as a sensitivity test. These are substantially lower than not just v4.1 but
also the latest PDFHv5.0 values. These tests were not conducted 16

Projecting demand increases too long: The demand model used is inherently best suited to
making short to medium term rail forecasts. This is because it is a fixed elasticity model that
assumes people spend ever increasing proportions of income on travel. It is normal to cap the
period to reflect market saturation. The use of a 35 year growth period is hard to reconcile with:
     DfT’s normal horizon for growth increases of 2026 17 ie 18 yrs (2008-2026)
     Sir Rod Eddington’s view that a 10 year period was long enough 18 .
     Network Rail who see a cap as essential 19 , although express concerns about using PDFH
     for long term forecasts. PDFH was calibrated during a period of rapid rail growth, and has
     been amended five times to reflect behavioural changes
     DfT who used a 25 year period (to 2033) for their March 2010 forecast, justified on the HS2
     completion date, rather than the capabilities of the model 20 . Given the cap concerns the
     ‘background growth’ (not induced demand), and the project’s completion date does not
     effect the durability of the current elasticities 21 , this extension is difficult to understand
     If rail growth is considered over the preceding 35 years (ie from 1974, see Figure 3), only
     the last 15 years show any growth in rail travel at all.
In fact DfT admit that they do not use the demand model to forecast demand, but to estimate
how long it would take to double 22 .



14
   Webtag unit 3.15.4 (section 6.1.1 page 7), states the alternative elasticities to be used for sensitivities
15
   The findings of research by Oxera and Arup were publicly presented at Transport Economists Group in
February 2011 (by Oxera, Arup and DfT)
16
   The fact that Webtag 3.15.4 sensitivities were not used was confirmed by HS2 Ltd (Mark Weiner 12
May 2011), although an FOI response (received 16 May 2011) said they did not hold the information
17
   Webtag unit 3.13.1 Section 3.3. DfT August 2007. It says central case should cap growth at 2026
18
   ‘Inter Urban Rail Forecasts’ section 3.17. Whilst the trends may be a consistent basis for forecasting
forward through time, they do not account for saturation of demand in the rail market, and as such,
confidence in such an uncapped forecasting procedure must reduce considerably for forecasts beyond
2016.’ Eddington, 2006
19
   ‘Network Route Utilisation Strategy: Scenarios and Long Distance Forecasts’ Network Rail, June 2009,
Section 4.2 page 30; and also Section 5.2 page 34
20
   ‘HS2 Demand Model Analysis’, HS2 Ltd, February 2010, section 3.2.6 page 31
21
    HS2 Ltd state the limits purpose as ‘…proxy for market maturity and the long term lack of certainty in
the forecasting methodology..’ HS2 Demand Model Analysis’ HS2 Ltd, Feb. 2010, section 3.2.6, page 31
22
   ‘Economic Case for HS2’ February 2011, section 3.2.9 page 14
‘ ……..For our earlier work we capped growth of rail demand in 2033, at a level of demand in the WCML
corridor that is slightly more than double current levels. With the lower current GDP forecasts, this cap
would now be hit later, in 2043.’

The ‘doubling’ in demand has been preserved, despite it having no basis in the 2011 analysis.

DfT do consider the effect of growth finishing earlier (albeit in the context of it stopping both
later and earlier than 2043), and say that growth is needed until 2034 before Phase 1 has
benefits greater than the subsidy. So if DfT simply reused the same 25yr cut-off as in the 2010
forecast (ie 2033) they would have concluded that HS2 is ‘poor’ value for money (BCR under1).

Induced travel: HSR is expected to induce additional travel and modal shift because journey
times are shorter. The uplift forecast (for HS2 (Phase 1) represents a 54% increase over those
transferring from classic rail. This is likely to be overestimated:

     PDFHv4.1 is used to make the forecast, and it is based on journey time relationships that
     pre-date the new technologies making time on trains more productive
     DfT say that there was a 36% increase in demand for an average 34 minute reduction in
     journey time 23 for WCML. HS2 journey time saving will be on average smaller for the first
     phase of HS2. WCML could only partly reflect the reducing value of journey time savings.
     Even 36% is therefore a high estimate of uplift.

An ‘indicative revised forecast’. Tables showing the consequences of adjusting the demand
forecast to be based on more realistic assumptions are included at Annex 1. For demand we
assume PDFH5.0 income elasticities, demand growth capped at 25 years (2033), and the same
level of uplift from HS2’s shorter journey times as that reported for WCML by DfT (36%).

This produces an ‘indicative demand forecast’ of 81% increase over 2008 for WCML for 2033
and staying at this level (compared to DfT’s 209% for 2043). Annex 1 col 8 shows this reduces
the BCR for the full “Y” to just 1.0 (including WEI), and less for phase 1.

3.5 Comparison basis

The ‘do minimum’ comparator assumes no improvement in capacity or services beyond those
already committed 24 . It is unsuited as a basis against which HS2 can be assessed:

     There is no pretence that the ‘do minimum’ case is realistic, the forecast demand growth
     could not be sustained without capacity development. Demand is forecast without regard
     to supply, with the result that the capacity of the ‘do minimum’ case is insufficient 25 .
     The £5.1bn benefits from relieving the high levels of crowding in the ‘do minimum’ case are
     entirely artificial and result from its unrealistic nature (which is recognised by HS2 Ltd 26 ),
     with realistic alternatives having lower crowding than HS2 (as discussed at section 3.6)
     Proper assessment needs to be based on comparing HS2 with the best alternative.
     DfT failed to develop a best alternative, making no attempt to produce an optimised case 27




23
   ‘Demand for Long Distance Travel’ April 2011,section 6.19 page 16 (the 36% relates to 2006 to 2009)
24
   On WCML this involves extending part of fleet to 11 car, 4 new sets and IEP. It however excludes
Evergreen 3, that reduces the Birmingham London journey time on Chiltern Railways, that will win
business from WCML, delaying the requirement for any additional WCML capacity
25
   ‘Baseline Forecasting Report: A Report for HS2’, Atkins, February 2010, section 2.64, page 19.
‘…….Do Minimum matrices for rail (and road) are estimated by uplifting constrained (i.e. ex-post /
observed) 2007/8 demand for exogenous influences only, with no attempt to estimate levels of underlying
unconstrained demand, or the effects of changes in supply/congestion occurring after 2007.
26
   Baseline Forecasting Report: A Report for HS2’, Atkins, February 2010, section 2.64, page 19
27
   DfT conceded that Rail Package 2 had not been optimised, but that it was irrelevant because it provided
insufficient capacity, 20 September 2010 (letter Jonathon Mitchell to Bruce Weston)
    Using a ‘do minimum’ case for reference may be reasonable for short lead time projects, where
    little else may happen in the timeframe. But to assume that the railway network will be
    effectively unchanged for a period of over 30 years is unreasonable and unrealistic. It also
    implies ignoring all the opportunities for improvements that extensive renewals would offer.

    Comparison with the best alternative potentially increases some benefits because of how DfT
    value the benefits from induced demand. But this effect is diminished by the reduction in value
    of journey time savings and the questionable basis for anticipating reliability improvements.

    3.6 Alternatives

    DfT fail to properly consider the alternatives to a new railway, making no attempt to produce the
    best options that match demand in terms of quantum and when it occurs and at minimum cost.

    The best alternative to the London-West Midlands phase that was developed (RP2) has been
    repeatedly misrepresented 28 , although it produces all the capacity needed (151% on DfT’s
    numbers over the 2008 base) and with a better benefit cost ratio.

    In fact it is possible to develop a better alternative than RP2, which requires less work on the
    track and is considerably cheaper. Similar low cost solutions are available for the Midland Main
    Line and ECML, which make up the suite of alternatives to the full “Y” network.

    The table is based on work by Chris Stokes’ 29 that develops best alternatives to HS2 for
    WCML, Midland Mainline and ECML. The table below gives the case for WCML (ie against the
    London-West Midlands phase of HS2). It shows that greatly more capacity is provided than is
    required on DfT’s demand forecasts (with a 102% increase to 2043), through various rolling
    stock changes, and minimal investment in infrastructure.

    Best alternative for WCML


Interventions                    Daily    Daily          % increase above   Comments
                                 trains   standard       2008 base
                                          class
                                          seats          Standard   total
                                                         class

Train investment with no/little infrastructure investment
HS2 2008 Base                              59298                            Base used by DfT for evaluation of HS2.
                                                                            Predates full WCML upgrade timetable.
Current timetable                 286      81924            38%      36%    Includes Voyager services (30 daily)
                                                    30
Evergreen 3                       [68]    [28900]                           Committed scheme – complete in 2011
                                                                            Illustrative numbers –excluded from totals
Committed lengthening             286      105924           79%      63%    Committed scheme – implemented from 2012
project
December 2013 additional          306      113769           92%      75%    Additional hourly off-peak train each way
services
First class reconfiguration       306      134379           127%     84%    One car converted from first to standard
12 car sets (except Liverpool)    306      166908           181%     121%   Major physical constraints at Liverpool
Infrastructure investment
Additional services               336      184326           211%     144%   30 additional daily trains following investment
                                                                            to relieve pinchpoints




    28
       Review of February 2011 Consultation Business Case, May 2011, HS2AA section 5
    29
       Chris Stokes, former SRA director and independent rail consultant
    30
       Illustrative Evergreen 3 figures assume Chiltern trains currently 4 car class 168 units (275 seats),
    lengthened to 6 car class 168 (425 seats)
Eddington 31 referred extensively to the advantages of improving existing infrastructure noting

‘… Upgrading rolling stock and lengthening trains on congested rail links, combined with changes to
timetables to increase frequency can significantly increase the effective capacity of existing rail lines.
Evidence of illustrative interventions to increase variable capacity on inter-urban links into London by
investing in new rolling stock, for example, suggests strong returns are possible from well-targeted
interventions, with wider BCRs ranging between 1 and 13 and costs between £50 and £500 million but
more typically between1 and 3.28. The higher returns are largely driven by the ability to add variable
capacity with minimal infrastructure requirements…..

The main advantages of the upgrade approach are:

      Crowding: because of the incremental character and short lead times, upgrades can be
      made that prevent serious crowding from developing. It has been repeatedly asserted that
      WCML will be full by 2020 – only upgrading the existing services can address this problem.

      HS2 has a loading factor of 58% which is higher than DfT’s own RP2 alternative (52%) or
      the best alternative shown in the table (also 52%).
      With a new recognition that crowding may stop time on trains being productive (or
      enjoyable) – rather than being a minor annoyance as DfT currently assess it – the benefits
      of preventing crowding are much more important.
      Cost: the best alternative described above is considerably cheaper than HS2, with an
      infrastructure cost of £2bn instead of £18bn for the first phase of HS2. It is likely that
      demand to 2043 could be entirely satisfied by rolling stock measures avoiding the need for
      infrastructure investment.
      Value for money: most of the additional capacity is achieved through more rolling stock and
      extra seats per train. It is likely that the changes could be made on a fully commercial basis,
      where the additional fares will pay for the investment. If a subsidy is required it is likely to
      have a very high benefit cost ratio
       Fast and Incremental: upgrades remove the risk associated with needing to forecast
       demand for long periods as upgrades can be done in stages and relatively quickly
       Capacity: Despite assertions to the contrary, upgrades of the existing network have
       massive potential to increase capacity (as shown in the table above). These increases are
       larger than that DfT’s forecast for demand to 2043 (102%). This means that upgrades can
       meet capacity requirements for at least the next 35 years, on DfT’s forecasts. With more
       realistic forecasts they would meet demand indefinitely
       Connectivity: Unlike new HSR, the existing long distance rail network is highly integrated
       with local transport. This is a major advantage over HSR, as parkway stations have little or
       no existing connectivity with public transport, new city centre station like Birmingham
       Curzon Street are also remote from the existing transport hubs, while connection into the
       existing networks are highly disruptive, as with the approach into London and the rebuilding
       of Euston Station needed for HS2.

       Unlike HS2, uprating the existing network does not bypass many major cities, with a
       resultant worsening of their rail services. Despite statements implying the contrary, the
       case for HS2 involves £5.4bn saving from reducing existing rail services. The effect of
       most passengers migrating to HSR creates spare capacity (because existing services will
       reduce), but any additional local services would be likely to require additional subsidy.
       Disruption: despite assertions to the contrary, the best alternative would result in very little
       disruption. Even RP2 which is more reliant on infrastructure improvements than the best
       alternative, would be far less disruptive than HS2
      Environmental impact: upgrades are environmentally preferable, the lower speeds give rise
      to lower carbon emissions, they follow existing rail corridors and so do not require the
      sacrifice of an AONB or tranquil countryside.


31
     Eddington Transport Study, December 2006Volume 3, page 207, 4.164
The disadvantages that are often cited:

       Less benefits: the journey time savings will be less than HSR, but they are also
       considerably over valued. It is suggested it will achieve less modal shift from air However,
       HS2 is unlikely to result in much shift, as the only domestic routes susceptible to switching
       are the London – Scottish lowlands routes. There are no air services between London and
       Birmingham and Leeds. Rail already has 79% of the Manchester market, HS2’s journey
       times for 2033 to Newcastle will not improve on the fastest train to London in the summer
       2011 timetable. It is unlikely that the lowlands of Scotland will have sufficient traffic to
       represent as large a shift as DfT predict (equivalent to 95% of the Heathrow/Scottish
       lowlands market for phase 1 and double for the full Y) especially as the market is declining.
       Worse reliability: DfT strongly emphasise that continued increases in services on the
       existing rail network will result in deterioration in reliability. Lengthening trains is unlikely to
       have such an effect, and addressing pinch points tends to improve journey times and
       improve reliability. The evidence is that as the railway has become busier, reliability has
       actually been improving since Hatfield, with Network Rail hailing the Public Performance
       Measure exceeding 90% for 2009, reaching the highest level achieved.

       Not practical: RP2 has been said not to be practical, as it involves intensive all day
       operations, rather than just peak. This is an unsatisfactory argument as:
       o   RP2 was developed for the 2010 White Paper by Atkins and timetabled by Robert
           Watson Associates, both reputable consultancies, and signed off by DfT
       o   RP2 was again included in the February 2011 consultation materials as the WCML
           element of the upgrade alternative to HS2 Scenario B, which indicates that DfT
           continue to believe it is a viable option.

3.7 Lessons learned from previous projects.

WCML Route Modernisation Project was originally specified to deliver a new signalling system
that allowed higher speeds, more capacity, and lower costs than conventional signalling. It
eliminated lineside signalling equipment and was to use a yet to be developed radio controlled
moving block signalling system. The new system has still yet to be developed, and the route
modernisation had to be successively respecified and de-scoped, eventually being completed
with conventional signalling and a lower top speed than originally intended.

The delivery of the “Y” Network service specification requires 18 trains/hr in the peak. The
specification has no trains available for Heathrow or HS1, which requires either more train
paths or fewer London services. 18 trains/hr is apparently not achievable with current
technology, as HS2 Ltd admit. It seems that HS2 Ltd believe that it will be achievable with new
technology, although expert advise seems to be that HS2 should not in prudence be assumed
                                   32
capable of more than 15 trains/hr . If HS2 needs to be de-scoped, even on DfT’s assessment,
the “Y” Network would not be viable.

The Eddington Transport Study 33 2006 noted

‘ history has shown that for large-scale infrastructure projects that rely on emerging technological
solutions, costs tend to increase by an order of magnitude against original estimates     ‘


4. The strategic route;

DfT’s failure to adjust their evaluation framework to recognise that time on long distance trains
has been becoming useful is important in the context of specification. While greater speeds
bring shorter journey times, they also bring disadvantages:



32
     ‘High Speed 2 Interfaces’ Greengauge21, July 2010, section 4a, page 6
33
      Eddington Transport Study, December 2006, Volume 3, page 109, 4.173
     Higher capital costs
     Higher energy consumption (and carbon emissions)
     Higher maintenance costs
     Inability to follow existing transport corridors (greatly increase the adverse effect on
     landscape and local impacts)
     Greater noise pollution

The decision on the optimal speed is therefore the result of a trade-off between the benefits
from journey time savings and the adverse impacts. If the value of any given level of journey
time saving is substantially reduced, the best balance is likely to favour a lower speed. To
illustrate, if there are no productivity benefits from the reduced journey time, and all travellers
value journey time savings at half the level leisure travellers did before their time became more
useful, the time saving is worth only about 15% of its previous value 34 .

While revaluing time savings does not necessarily change the preferred speed, the substantial
reduction in value calls into question decisions made on the previous basis. It also invalidates
the route selection process that HS2 Ltd have operated, as this too involves trading-off journey
time savings against other factors. The likely effect of a revised approach is:

     To prefer a speed specification more able to conform to existing transport corridors
     Make station stops more attractive
     Make uprating existing infrastructure more attractive, as the inability to deliver large journey
     time savings becomes a smaller consideration

Case for HSR: Without a high value of time savings for social benefits, the case for a subsidy
to build a HSR is likely to be weak. While this does not affect a commercial case, a commercial
case for a HSR is unlikely to work in the UK, due to the existing fast and frequent train services
that would compete. While it is conceivable that a case for a new railway could be made on
the grounds of capacity, in practice there are plentiful opportunities to increase the capacity of
the existing infrastructure at much lower cost, effectively for the indefinite future.

Building from London: Building HS2 in stages from London is likely to be best in that it
services the greatest potential demand first. However, as the work on a possible Maglev study
showed 35 , this is likely to direct the economic benefits to London and South East, compared to
building from the north first.

Connections to Heathrow and HS1: There is insufficient demand to justify frequent rail
services to Europe, without which HS2 could not successfully compete against air (which with
small planes can have frequent flights that are near to full). This position is demonstrated by
HS2 Ltd work of 2010, summarised and extended in the work for 51M work (by Chris Stokes)

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

While strong claims have been made about the benefits of HSR in stimulating regional
economies, there is no good evidence that HSR will help bridge the North South divide.

HSR supporters (eg Greengauge 21) have commissioned studies that purport to demonstrate
large economic benefits for the regions 36 . However the methodology has problems that cause




34
   Using 2009 values from ‘Technical Seminar QA77483’ HS2 Ltd, 2010.
35
   ‘UK Ultraspeed Evidence to the Eddington Review’ part of ‘UK Ultraspeed Factbook | Expanded 2nd
Edition, October 2006’, page 120
36
   for example, ‘High Speed Rail in Britain Consequences for employment and economic growth’, KPMG,
2009, and ‘High Speed Rail Consequences for employment and economic growth’, KPMG, March 2010
the results to be overstated, according to a review 37 by leading academics in this area. Similar
criticism of the methodology were raised in a review of the literature on the economic impacts of
HSR by Professor Tomaney 38 .

It seems that the balance of evidence suggests that improving north south connections tends to
favour London and the South East, because of the draw of London and its greater efficiency in
financial services. To quote the Tomaney work:

‘Overall, the report suggests that the impacts of high speed rail investments on local and regional
development are ambiguous at best and negative at worst. It is very difficult to find unambiguous evidence
in support of the contentions that are being made by the government about the potential impacts of HS2
on the cities and regions of the UK.’

This was also the conclusion of the Eddington Transport Study 39 after extensive review and
discussion that ‘…..The evidence for transformational benefits is at best unproven. ..’

As there is only weak evidence of benefits, regeneration should be a secondary consideration
in route selection. If the objective is to achieve regeneration, addressing the primary
impediments to growth – eg lack of skills, will be more relevant. If the objective is to achieve
regeneration through transport, local and intra-regional schemes that improve the efficiency of
local economies would be more attractive.

Locations and socio-economic groups benefiting: The places most likely to benefit are
London and the South East as HSR will giving improved access to Midlands and Northern
markets for financial services. The evidence suggests:

                     Station sites and their immediate vicinity are likely to benefit from redevelopment because
                     they will become attractive as retail and office locations. This is demonstrated by the work
                     done for HS2 Ltd
                     DfT figures state of the 30,000 new jobs around stations, 73% are in London. It seems
                     generally accepted that such jobs are mainly relocations rather than net additions, with the
                     gains balanced by losses in the station’s hinterland
                     HS2 Ltd’s demand model implies leisure trips to London will outweigh those starting in
                     London – tourism can therefore be expected to benefit London rather than the regions.

In regard to the potential beneficiaries, the main beneficiaries will be the traveller or their
employer. Assuming that HS2 users will be similar to the long distance rail users of today, the
travellers will be predominantly drawn from the most affluent sections of society (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Long distance rail trips by household income

                  6.00


                  5.00


                  4.00
 trips per year




                  3.00


                  2.00


                  1.00


                  0.00
                               £10,740              £17,590               £26,460              £38,700               £70,420

                                                                    income quintile
                         Source: 'Modelling Long-Distance Travel in the UK', Charlene Rohr, James Fox, Andrew Daly, Bhanu Patruni,
                         Sunil Patil, Flavia Tsang. RAND Europe, NTS 2002/5, income data 2005/6 ONS




37
   ‘Review of methodologies to assess transport’s impacts on the size of the economy’, James Laird and
Peter Mackie (ITS), September 2010.
38
   ‘The Local and Regional Impacts of High Speed Rail in the UK: A Review of the Evidence’, John
Tomaney, Pedro Marques and Penny Marshall, April 2011.
39
   Eddington Transport Study, December 2006 Volume 3, page 133, 1.33
However, the productivity benefits to business would be modest, because business travellers
can be expected to be fully productive on long distance trains well before HS2 is built, so the
reduced journey times would not represent a productivity benefit. But businesses whose
employees travel on HS2 would benefit from the fares being below the full cost.

Beneficiaries contributing to costs: The issue of getting beneficiaries to contribute to costs,
thus reducing the burden on tax payers who will not benefit directly, is appealing. The
presumption that there are large benefits that will, without special measures, arise as significant
windfall gains to specific groups is incorrect, if those benefiting from the line’s construction and
supply of the trains and equipment are excluded.

Even local authorities benefiting from the new stations may suffer counterbalancing detriment,
as the new shopping centres and offices will draw jobs from nearby but less favoured locations
rather than generate truly additional jobs.

An effective means of making those who benefit contribute more would be to charge higher
fares. But, while premium fares might get those gaining the benefit to contribute more to the
cost, it would further concentrate users into the higher income groups. Additionally, this may
worsen the overall economics, with high speed trains quite empty and the competing classic
services retained to carry those unwilling to pay higher prices.

6. Impact

Are the environmental costs and benefits correctly accounted? The NATA framework
quantifies those costs and benefits suited to be monetised and includes them in the calculation
of the benefit cost ratio – other dimensions are assessed but not reduced to a money value.

For HS2 there are several unsatisfactory features in the accounting of environmental impacts:

       Despite the assumption that runway capacity will be constrained for London, the carbon
       consequences of re-use of freed-up runway capacity is not assessed or included in the
       quantified assessment – this greatly understates the potential for increasing emissions
       The potential reduction of aircraft emissions is unchanged from the White Paper
       assessment, despite fewer passengers transferring from air to HS2 and despite (by
       implication) some of air’s demand being suppressed demand
       The emissions from electricity generation are stated to be the annual all generation
       average, despite HS2’s electricity requirements being day time and peak
       The spoil calculations greatly underestimate the volumes of spoil 40 excavated from tunnels
       and cuttings in the Chilterns, causing construction traffic to be similarly underestimated.




40
     By 18 times according to Steve Roderick, Chief Officer of the Chiltern Conservation Board
Annex 1: Economic summary tables


Adjusted DfT results for London –West Midlands (Phase 1): revisions to benefits
only, demand only and effect of revising both
All £bn NPV at 2009 prices           DfT Feb 2011 (Phase 1)            Revisions to benefits          Revised      Revisions
                                                                       only ( see basis in            demand       combined
                                                                       table below)                   only
              Col 1                     2           3          4          5         6         7                8            9
                                     Busin-     Leisure/    Total      Busin    Leisure/ Total         Total        Total
                                     ess        commut                 ess      commut
1.1 Rail journey time saving            5.7        1.7          7.3       0.4        0.8      1.2       4.5            0.7
1.2 Improved reliability                1.8        0.5          2.3       1.2        0.5      1.7       1.4            1.0
1.3 Reduced crowding                    0.7        1.9          2.6       0          0            0     1.6            0
1.4 Waiting time                        1.4        1.4          2.8       0.9        1.4      2.3       1.7            1.4
1.5 Other impacts eg access             0.3        0.4          0.6       0.2        0.4      0.6       0.4            0.3
2. Road decongestion                    1.2        0.6          1.8       1.2        0.6      1.8       1.1            1.1
3. HS1 link                                                     0.4                           0.4       0.2            0.2
Total transport user                   11.1        6.4         17.9       3.9        3.7      8.0      10.9            4.9
Reduced tax                                                    -1.3                          -1.3       -0.8           -0.8
Net transport benefits                                         16.6                           6.7      10.1            4.1
4.1 WEI - agglomeration                                         3.0                           3.0       3.0            3.0
4.2 WEI – imperfect competition                                 1.0                           0.2       0.6            0.1
Total WEI                                                       4.0                           3.2       3.6            3.1
Total net benefits incl WEI                                    20.6                           9.9      13.7            7.2
Additional revenue                                             13.7                          13.7       8.4            8.4
Capital and operating cost                                     24.0                          24.0       24.0          24.0
Net subsidy                                                    10.3                          10.3       15.6          15.6
Benefit cost ratio (excl WEI)                                   1.6                           0.6       0.6            0.3
Benefit cost ratio (incl WEI)                                   2.0                           1.0       0.9            0.5


Basis of revisions to benefits (col 5 – 7), to demand (col 8) and combined effect (col 9)
1.1: Business: productivity gain from shorter on-board journey time reduced to zero. Time savings valued at the
adjusted leisure value. Leisure: time savings value is halved to reflect the usefulness of on-board time
Business time unit value is reduced by one third to reflect less elite nature of rail business travellers with the major
increases in business volumes. Affects items 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5 and 4.2
1.2: Reliability benefits for phase 2 assumed to be halved due to issues about achievability of 18 trains/hr. No
adjustment is made to phase 1 (when 14 trains/hr)
1.3: Crowding benefit removed: realistic comparator of uprating WCML eg RP2 is less crowded than HS2
1.4: Waiting time is not reduced although a realistic comparator would have higher train frequency than ‘do minimum’,
as RP2 does.
4.2: This item reduces automatically as valued at 10% of all business time savings and reliability benefits
Benefit adjustments (col 5-7): DfT demand forecast unchanged (ie +209% increase); effect of applying revisions to
basis of benefits is pro rata to DfT demand for all items except 1.6, 4.1 and costs
Demand adjustments: (col 8): DfT benefits basis unchanged; uses an ‘indicative revised forecast’ of 81% increase
over 2008 base (incl. *background growth and **HS2 uplift), instead of DfT forecast of + 209%
Revisions combined (9): the effect of revising the basis of both DfT benefits and DfT demand forecast.


*‘Background growth’: 38% at 2033 and remaining at this level (compared with DfT 102% at 2043); based on PDFHv5.0
income elasticities; DfT 2011 annual growth rate capped at 2033. **With HS2 uplift: 38% is increased to 81% (with HS2
uplift) at 2033 and remaining at this level (compared with DfT 209% at 2043); based on WCML uplift of 36%
Adjusted DfT results for full “Y” network: revisions to benefits only, demand
only and effects of revising both


All £bn NPV at 2009 prices        DfT Feb 2011 (full “Y”)      Revisions to benefits       Revised      Revisions
                                                               only ( see basis in         demand       combined
                                                               table below)                only
              Col 1                 2         3         4        5        6        7                8            9
                                  Busine   Leisure/   Total    Busin   Leisure/ Total       Total        Total
                                  ss       commut              ess     commut
1.1 Rail journey time saving       14.1      4.3        18.4     0.9       2.2     3.1      11.2            1.9
1.2 Improved reliability            4.4      1.3         5.7     1.5       0.6     2.1       3.5            1.3
1.3 Reduced crowding                1.5      3.6         5.1     0         0           0     3.1            0
1.4 Waiting time                    2.0      2.0         4.0     1.3       2.0     3.3       2.4            2.0
1.5 Other impacts eg access         0.5      0.6         1.2     0.4       0.6     1.0       0.7            0.6
1.6 Released capacity benefits                           1.3                       1.3       1.3            1.3
2. Road decongestion                2.7      1.3         4.0     2.7       1.3     4.0       2.4            2.4
3. HS1 link                                              0.4                       0.4       0.2            0.2
Total transport user               25.2     13.1        39.9     8.3       7.3    15.1      24.9            9.7
Reduced tax                                             -2.7                      -2.7       -1.6           -1.6
Net transport benefits                                  37.3                      12.5      23.3            8.1
4.1 WEI - agglomeration                                  4.1                       4.1       4.1            4.1
4.2 WEI – imperfect competition                          2.4                       0.8       1.3            0.4
Total WEI                                                6.5                       4.9       5.4            4.5
Total net benefits incl WEI                             43.8                      17.3      28.7           12.6
Additional revenue                                      27.2                      27.2      16.6           16.6
Capital and operating cost                              44.3                      44.3      44.3           44.3
Net subsidy                                             17.1                      17.1      27.7           27.7
Benefit cost ratio (excl WEI)                            2.2                       0.7       0.8            0.3
Benefit cost ratio (incl WEI)                            2.6                       1.0       1.0            0.5



May 2011
               Further written evidence from HS2 Action Alliance (HSR 153A)

1. Introduction

This document is submitted as supplementary evidence to the Transport Select Committee’s
inquiry on High Speed Rail by HS2 Action Alliance.

Its purpose is to clarify the basis on which the Government and some supporters of HS2 have
been contending that:

    WCML will be full within a decade
    WCML will be completely overcrowded by 2022, and
    The means of increasing capacity will be exhausted.

These statements relate to contentions made by Network Rail, but this note explains that they
are not consistent with the actual forecasts made by Network Rail.

2. Summary

Network Rail (NR) have made recent statements about when WCML will be full which are
currently being taken out of context. These statements refer to

    Within 6 to 10 years, but this statement to the Transport Select Committee was simply
    based on the past increases of 10%/a continuing (which no one expects, least of all NR’s
    own forecasts, or HS2 Ltd’s); using NR’s own forecast suggests more like in 38 years time
    Effectively full by 2024, but this statement was based on NR’s Draft RUS and assumes no
    other improvements are made, not even those they identify eg running an extra off peak
    service, and seem to ignore their own evidence on actual levels of overcrowding (that
    indicates about 5% overcrowding weekdays by 2024)

The above does not provide robust evidence on which Philip Hammond can state the WCML will
be ‘completely overcrowded by 2022’, or statements by Theresa Villiers that it will be full within a
decade, or the position being quoted by Prof Begg (on his Yes to HSR website) that it will be full
within 6 to 10 years.

Statements are being taken out of context, and are used to suggest there is no other option than
HS2.

3. Evidence

3.1 Government statements

Philip Hammond, Theresa Villiers 1 and Alison Munro have all been stating that WCML will be
full in around a decade. Most recently they rely on statements made by David Higgins (Network
Rail’s Chief Executive) to the Transport Select Committee. But his statement (that WCML would
be full in 10 years, or even 6 to 10 years) involves a projection that no-one, including NR, would
say is realistic. His words have been taken completely out of context.

Prior to that they rely on statements Higgins made when the HS2 consultation was announced.

3.2 Network Rail forecast

What NR actually forecast in the December 2010 draft RUS for WCML is reasonably in line with
the current forecasts for WCML made for HS2 Ltd.


1
 Villiers in Westminster Hall debate on HS2 (March2011); Hammond on Central ITV debate (19 May
2011); Hammond on statement to the house (20 December 2010); Alison Munro on radio (11 April2011);
Prof Begg on Yes to HSR website 4 April 2011).
Figure 1 shows the growth they forecast. If average growth is about 45% to 2024/5, this gives
2.5% per annum – so that demand doubles in 28 years (HS2 forecast has demand doubling in
35 years).

However, the Draft WCML RUS had the forecasts done prior to the fares revision of RPI+3% for
3 years, so forecasts that included this factor should be lower to some extent.

Figure 1: Network Rail: Draft WCML RUS, page 69




3.3 Network Rail statements

David Higgins was reported as follows in welcolming the HS2 consultation (28 February 2011,
on NR’s web site):

‘David Higgins, Network Rail chief executive, said: "HS2 is a vital infrastructure project of
national importance. It will be a hugely significant enhancement to the national rail network and
will unlock tremendous capacity to tackle, what will be by 2024, critical overcrowding on the
West Coast Main Line.

"The West Coast Main Line is Britain’s busiest and most economically vital rail artery. It will be
completely full by 2024 with no more space to accommodate the continued predicted growth in
both passenger and freight traffic. A new high-speed line to Birmingham and the North West is
essential both to release much needed capacity on the existing line for more freight and
commuter services, but also in creating the vital transport links we need to help Britain’s
economy thrive." ‘

This announcement is supported by reference to the Draft WCML RUS, with up to 61% growth
(3.5% per annum) in passenger numbers between Manchester and London for 2024. This is
the highest growth for London and other city pairs (see figure above), and the highest growth
scenario. This leads to the modest levels of crowding shown in Figure 4.6 (from the Draft RUS).

NR forecast that 12% 2 of the long distance high speed trains will have some standing in some
point of their journey by 2024 (although how this aligns with Figure 4.6 is unclear). But NR see
running an additional off-peak service (making use of spare capacity in the time table) as


2
    Draft RUS WCML, Network Rail, December 2010, page 7
addressing this issue. This can be achieved with the then existing rolling stock, and so has little
cost. Interestingly they do not see a business case for lengthening the rest of the Pendolino
fleet to 11 car, or for the Voyager fleet for services to North Wales.

However, it should be noted that the business cases developed by NR are on the DfT basis that
time savings are very valuable (assuming every minutes of time saving is a minute of additional
productive time) and relieving crowding has little value as time is unproductive in any event.
The business case for reducing crowding should be much stronger when DfT’s approach is
corrected and crowding is taken to have a much higher productivity related cost.

Curiously NR in the Draft RUS entirely dismiss the option of extending trains, claiming that after
the re-timetabling:

‘……thereafter the WCML, particularly at the southern end of the route is effectively full and
subsequent additional capacity could only be provided by exceptionally expensive infrastructure
solutions. 3

This is odd, as lengthening trains is normally the cheapest means of creating more capacity,
and is identified by Network Rail as the next course of action to adopt after exhausting timetable
changes 4 . With only the Pendolino partly lengthened to 11-car, there are options of lengthening
the rest of the Pendolinos, lengthening the Voyagers and selectively lengthening some
Pendolinos to 12-car.

NR also do not actually consider means of increasing capacity through infrastructure solutions
either, simply claiming that:

‘ Further, more expensive, incremental capacity improvements have not been considered in
detail as Network Rail, High Speed Two Limited and the DfT have already examined this,
concluding that a new line is the preferred strategy. 5 ’

The Draft RUS provides the government with some quotes clearly stating that WCML will be full
by 2024, however, this is reliant on a ‘do nothing’ view of future interventions. NR actually
identify how crowding can be addressed through running an extra train off peak. They dismiss
the options of train lengthening (possible for both Pendolinos and Voyagers) as lacking business
cases. Their consideration of options is clearly constrained by the perceived imminence of HS2
and is not evidence that options to increase capacity on WCML do not exist..

2.4 Transport Select Committee evidence

David Higgins’ statement to the Transport Select Committee (1 March 2011) is frequently
quoted by the government, and also by Professor Begg on the Yes to HSR website. The
following is an extract of the oral evidence that David Higgins gave to the Transport Select
Committee. 6

‘With West Coast, it has been a tremendous success. £10 billion upgrading West Coast means
that now that franchise is having customer growth of over 10% per annum. At Christmas it was
up by 20% year on year. That West Coast line, within 10 years at the absolute maximum, and
probably six years, will be at capacity, and that is with additional carriages included in the area.
We can look at other tactical interventions in that line to put more capacity in there, but in the
end it comes down to capacity: we will, across a number of key parts of our network, run out of
capacity.
Q25 Mr Leech: How many years do you predict that it would be-
David Higgins: Six to 10 years.


3
  Network Rail op cit, Section 6.5 page 118
4
  Network Rail op cit, section 6.2 page 113
5
  Network Rail op cit, page 89
6
  Transport Select Committee 1 March 2011: David Higgins, NR Chief Executive
Q26 Chair: Is that six to 10 years from when it runs out of capacity?
David Higgins: From today. If it keeps growing at the rate it is going today, and if petrol prices
keep going in the way they are going, then in 10 years’ time West Coast will be at capacity.’

The statement was not therefore based on NR’s forecast but simply the recent past (that reflects
the effect of the much improved services from the Route Modernisation being completed)
continuing.

The recent past of WCML reflects the upgrade that has resulted in massive reductions in
generalised journey times from faster journeys, more frequent services and higher reliability. No
one expects the uplift from these changes to continue to drive demand increases that are out of
line with ‘background growth’.

The information can however be used to calculate the point at which NR believe it will be full –
on the basis of 6yrs (minimum) and 10 years (maximum) at 10%/a this represents between 77%
and 159% growth.

Table 1: using forecasts to calculate maximum and minimum period until WCML is full

 NR maximum period to reaching capacity               increase            ‘at capacity’
 NR statement          10%/a for 10 years                     159%               2021
 NR RUS forecast       2.5%/a for 38 years                    156%               2049
 HS2 Ltd forecast      2.02%/a for 47 years                   156%               2058
 NR minimum period to reaching capacity
 NR statement          10%/a for 6 years                         77%             2017
 NR RUS forecast       2.5%/a for 23 years                       76%             2034
 HS2 Ltd forecast      2.02%/a for 28 years                      75%             2039



Table 1 shows the results

    Max period: It would take 38 years for WCML to be full using the average forecast growth
    from NR’s Draft WCML RUS and 47 years on HS2 Ltd’s WCML forecast growth rate

    Min period: It would take 23 years for WCML to be full using the average forecast growth
    from NR’s Draft WCML RUS and 28 years on HS2 Ltd’s WCML forecast growth rate

The answer probably lies somewhere between the two results. Based on HS2 Ltd’s forecast this
would be between 28 and 47 years

2.5 Crowding evidence

Figure 2 is from the Draft RUS and the section on crowding. The right hand side (future
capacity) gives the levels of crowding expected with the new rolling stock to be introduced in
2012. The level of trains with some standing are modest (about 5%) – no doubt largely
reflecting the first trains eligible for regulated saver fares in the evening (as now). It is not clear
how this figure fits with the 12% of services to and from Euston having some standing at some
stage.

The higher levels of crowding on the Wales services (green bars, 2nd from the right) have the
highest crowding. These services are run by the Voyagers, for which no new rolling stock is
being acquired, although more Voyagers could be obtained allowing more trains to be made up
of two 5-car units (for example).
Figure 2: Network Rail: Draft WCML RUS (page 71)




Philip Hammond, on this evidence, has some difficulty in saying that services will be ‘completely
overcrowded by 2022’, as he did on the recent Central ITV debate (19 May 2011).

Conclusion

It is convenient for Government and Professor Begg that Higgins made his statement about how
long WCML might take to reach capacity, but the unqualified way it is being used or quoted is
misleading – as what he said is a ‘what if’ type of statement, rather than NR’s own proper
forecast.

Similar statements in the Draft WCML RUS appear to apply to 2024 but actually using Network
Rail’s forecasts, but these relate to the situation if nothing is done. NR actually identify a low
cost solution.

That 5% (or 12%?) of long distance trains will have some standing in 2024 without any further
increases in capacity beyond that committed for 2012 is poor evidence that WCML will be
‘completely overcrowded by 2022’ as stated by Philip Hammond.

3 June 2011
          Further written evidence from HS2 Action Alliance HSR 153B)


            Letter from HS2 Action Alliance to Oxera Consulting Limited



Oxera review of the business case for HS2

I am writing in connection with the Independent Review that you conducted for the
Transport Select Committee. We found it most helpful and were pleased that it
covered several of the points that we ourselves have raised concerns about. I
thought it might also be useful to identify some other points that were not
covered in your review but we feel have a strong bearing on the economic case
for HS2. Our purpose is simply to expose the key issues.

Alternatives

As you observe, HS2 is not compared against the strategic alternatives but a 'do
minimum' case. However, you do not mention that the strategic alternatives
developed for DfT are suboptimal, and other more cost effective solutions exist
(some were even mentioned by Atkins but not pursued (for example in Rail
Package 1 that concerned longer trains)).

An indication of the unsuitability of the options considered by DfT is that of the
load factor. If we use the WCML 2007/8 base and HS2 as a point of reference,
these have load factors of 57% and 58%. In contrast, WCML, MML and ECML
have load factors in Scenario B of 51%, 28% and 43% respectively. Given the
strategic alternatives are composed of a number of separately implementable
elements, the strategic alternatives create large quantities of spare capacity.
Scenario B also contains some counter-intuitive elements, for example the
electrification of MML but also electrifying and upgrading the track between
Retford and Sheffield (not currently an ECML service at all).

There are also some important differences in approach in DfT's assessment of HS2
and the strategic alternative that favour HS2:
      • The strategic alternatives are assumed to be implemented in their entirety for
          a single date, not implemented incrementally as demand requires. Had
          the strategic alternatives been assessed implemented as required this would
          greatly improve their economics — in both preventing the build up of
          crowding and the creation of capacity and cost before it is required. This
          is not even consistent with how rolling stock for HS2 is assumed to be
          acquired to match the build up of demand1.

           The key current crowding issue on WCML is on the Milton Keynes and
            Northampton commuter trains. This could be addressed by the
            Ledburn Junction work and new fast commuter trains in five to six
            years, (an element of Rail Package 2 and Scenario B) yet DfT
            assume that these works would not be done to 2026.

1
    ‘A Summary of Changes to the HS2 Economic Case’ April 2011, Section 2.1.1, page 6
      Rail Package 2 contains a number of costs for infrastructure works
       equally required for HS2 but excluded from the HS2 costing, for
       example the platform and approach works at Manchester (needed for
       4 trains/hr running for RP2 but assumed to occur as part of the
       Northern Hub works for HS2 that also runs 4 trains per hour).

      It might also be noted that the rolling stock and running costs for
       the strategic alternatives are treated as subject to the same
       optimism bias as HS2 — despite the costs of operating the existing
       lines and being precisely known and additional Pendolino stock still
       being in the process of delivery. In contrast HS2 Ltd state that new
       technology on train control and braking is needed, and the exact
       scope of works is understood in far less detail.

      The April 2011 reworking of the economics of Rail Package 2 was
       even against a different base case from HS2 that caused benefits to
       be underestimated — despite producing this reworking on the
       pretext of bringing it onto the same basis as HS2!

The 51 M submission to the Select Committee details a considerably
superior approach to alternatives. For example for WCML, the approach is
to do the lowest cost alternatives first — ie changing the balance in
provision of first and standard class accommodation (practicable without
revenue loss due to the low occupancy of first class), lengthening the fleet in
stages to 12-car (except for services to Liverpool). 12-car operation was
explored and found practicable in the work done by Atkins for the 2010
White Paper, but not used in Rail Package 2 or Scenario B (despite the
explicit recognition that it could have been). Because these elements could
be implemented in phase with demand growth, they should be commercially
viable and have no subsidy requirement. The commuter issue would also
be addressed
early.

Failing to develop the best alternatives and to compare HS2 against them has
resulted in a grossly flattering economic assessment of HS2. In particular,
HS2 would not have any crowding benefit (as it would not reduce crowding),
so their suggestion that the loss in benefits from time on board trains being
productive would not be recouped through reduced crowding.

Demand forecasts

The demand forecasts for HS2 are much less moderate than DfT present
them as being. As we discovered from an FOI, the 1.4% increase per
annum is not for long distance (over 50 mile) journeys, but 'strategic trips'
which includes shorter journeys. The doubling in background demand for
WCML to 2043, with an average growth rate of 2.0% per annum is also a
misrepresentation, as the 2043 figure is reduced by transferring some of the
journeys attributed to Virgin Trains in the 2007/8 base to London Midland.
A more representative figure is given by looking at the traffic north of Milton
Keynes that gives an increase of 127% and a growth rate of 2.4%. This is
the level of long distance rail demand forecast by DfT in 2007 — without
the recession or the period of RPI +3% fares rises.

The 'background' growth does not include the effects of improvements to
services — including the improvement from the WCML December 2009
timetable — which are on top of the 2.4% growth per annum. The `do
minimum' growth is for exogenous factors and fares only. The demand
forecasts for HS2 and RP2 (etc) include uplifts for service improvements over
the 2007/8 service specification.

You note that DfT still employ crucial PDFH4.1 values in their guidance and
HS2 assessment — and not version 5.0. Readers might not be aware that
DfT continue to use income elasticities on demand of 4.1 that have a
distance term — unlike with version 5. We understand that the work that
Oxera yourselves have recently done confirms that there should not be a
distance term. The removal of this distance term has a major impact on the
demand forecast.

You note that the demand forecasts are the area most thoroughly
subjected to sensitivity tests. I am not sure that you are aware that the
sensitivity test required by DfT's own guidance on income elasticities was
not performed. Again we had this confirmed in an FOI from HS2 Ltd and
are still waiting for a reply from Phil Graham as to whether permission was
given not to follow the guidance. Had it been it would have showed that the
economic case is not robust.

We agree that the doubling in demand does not seem to have a proper
basis. However, we feel that using PDFH to make forecasts over a 35 year
period with income elasticities as high as 2.8 should attract specific
questioning.

An important but unobvious omission in DfT's case is that of the Evergreen
3 improvements to the Chiltern Line. These reduce London — Birmingham
journey times to near Pendolino levels this autumn. This will be bound to
win traffic from WCML, thus reducing demand and capacity requirements
on WCML, and increasing competition for HS2. It is omitted from the 'do
minimum' case, and the assessments of HS2 and RP2.

Pricing

In your discussion of premium fares you did not note that HS2 Ltd's view2 is
that:

          demand for HS2 would be price elastic for the induced demand
           (some 35% of passengers) so that increases in ticket price
           would reduce overall revenues
          there would be limited scope for higher prices for the leisure
           market (70% of passengers)
          The availability of non-premium competition affects the ability to

2
    ‘HS2 Demand Model Analysis’, February 2010, Section A2.4.5, page 155
         generate additional revenue through premium fares

Interestingly, HS2 Ltd are more positive about using premium fares to
price off excess demand, which they recognise here cannot be
accommodated on some of the services running onto the classic
network but fail to in their economic assessment.

It would seem that competition would increase costs (as passengers will
chose cheaper classic services, so that more such services will be run)
and may well reduce revenues as over-supply reduces fares, worsening
the overall economic performance.

Reliability

You note that the impact on reliability of the strategic alternatives is
unclear. While we agree, the reliability of the strategic alternatives to the
London — West Midlands phase was discussed in the 2010
documentation, that concluded:

'Even with higher levels of train frequency, the packages may enhance train
performance at a network level.....These locations [where grade separation of
extra track is built] may more than compensate for other area where there will be an
enhanced train frequency but no infrastructure enhancements' 3


There are grounds for suggesting that the claimed reliability benefits of HS2
are questionable.

DfT claim HS2 will deliver £5.7bn of reliability benefit for the full "Y" network.
However such reliability benefits are predicated on HS2 being largely
isolated from the classic network to avoid importing delays. Such isolation
will not apply either to phase 1 or phase 2 of HS2. Given the very intensive
time tabling planned for HS2 (18 trains/hr), this suggests the claimed benefits
may be doubtful.

Uncertainty

A major uncertainty that DfT have not covered is the deliverability of the "Y"
network service pattern. This requires 18 trains/hr in the peak — without
allowance for trains to Heathrow and directly onto HSI. This is recognised
by HS2 Ltd not to be deliverable with current technology, and HS2 Ltd
have given no evidence to support it becoming deliverable in the future —
despite an FOI request for the basis of their expectation.

This is clearly — if not a show stopper — at minimum a major uncertainty
about the deliverability of benefits (reducing the services to 14/15 trains
per hour would do serious damage to the economics) — or on the costs as
building an additional line or 4-tracking the stem of the "Y" would have
major cost implications.

3
 ‘High Speed 2 Stategic Alternatives Study: Rail Interventions Report’, March 2010, Appendix B,
Section 1.1.1, page 16
DfT have not even considered issues surrounding their proposals being
capable of supporting 18 train per hour in the sensitivity analysis.

It may be that HS2 must be regarded as incapable of supporting services to
Leeds, and that it needs to be appraised on the case for London West
Midlands and Manchester by itself.

If you would like me to clarify any of these points, or others made in our
submission, I would be pleased to in correspondence or in person.



27 June 2011
Further written evidence submitted by HS2 Action Alliance 1 (HSR 153C)

This note summarises new evidence that shows UK passengers are more satisfied with the
journey speeds being achieved than for any other aspect of the railways, and that this reflects
the facts on journey times in the UK, compared to other EU countries.

It also sets out the arithmetic to show how our proposed alternatives to HS2 deliver their
capacity improvements to more than meet the doubling in forecast demand.

Recent European evidence on speed
1. A recent EU study of passengers views on their rail services has just reported. It shows
   that passengers in the UK are more satisfied than most other EU countries. This study of
   people’s views on speed coincides with an analysis of the facts on the journey times that
   was originally done for the 2006 Eddington Transport study, and updated by HS2AA.

2. The EU study shows UK satisfaction scored highest for speed. Not only are UK rail
   passengers 92% satisfied with their journey times (second in Europe) and well above
   Germany, France and Italy, but this perception reflects the facts. The facts show that UK
   has shorter journey times between its capital and top five cities than in Spain, Italy,
   France and Germany, all who have been investing in high speed rail so as to improve their
   journey times, that still do not match ours.

2011 Eurobarometer survey 2

3. The passenger satisfaction survey of those making middle or long distance rail trips shows
   the UK are happier with their journey than almost all their European neighbours.

4. On 17 of the 19 aspects measured, the UK are above the EU average of 25 countries. For
   over half of the 19 the UK was in the top third, and on 6 aspects the UK was in the top 3.

5. The analysis shows for key measures:
        On travelling speed (ie length of journey time) UK scored 2nd, with 92% satisfied
        (compared with the EU average of 78% satisfied). UK was 16% percentage points
        above Italy; 13 percentage points above France; 8 percentage above Germany.
        On frequency of trains UK was 3rd, with 84% satisfied (compared with the EU
        average of 72% satisfied). UK was 11 percentage points above France and Italy; 10
        percentage points above Germany.
        On reliability and punctuality UK came 6th, with 87% satisfied (compared with the EU
        average of 66% satisfied). UK was 35 percentage points above Germany; 32
        percentage points above France; and 24 percentage points above Italy.
        On connections with other rail services UK was top, with 71% satisfied (compared
        with the EU average of 59% satisfied). UK was 14 percentage points better than
        France; 8 percentage points better than Germany; and 1% point above Italy.
6. Overall UK passengers were more satisfied than German passengers on all 19 criteria. The
   UK also scored higher than France in 15 and above Italy in 14 of the criteria measured.
   These are countries that have majored on high speed rail.




1
  This paper was prepared by Hilary Wharf, on behalf of HS2 Action Alliance, which is a not for
profit organisation that is campaigning on an evidence based approach against HS2, and has
73 affiliated groups (see www.hs2actionalliance.org).
2
  . The survey can be found at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/flash_arch_329_315_en.htm#326
7. This survey confirms that UK rail passengers do not rank faster speeds as a priority.
   In fact they are more satisfied with their current journey lengths than for any of the other 19
   factors that were measured.

8. ATOC noted 3 “There is often a widespread perception that the rest of Europe is happier
   with their rail services than are UK passengers. But the European Commission’s opinion
   polling shows that the people surveyed in the UK were more satisfied with their train
   services than in many other countries on the continent”.

9. The results reflect the significant investment that has been put into all aspects of the UK
   railways, that needs to continue in ways that benefit everyone, if such results are to be
   repeated.

10. People’s perceptions on speed also reflect the facts on actual journey length times, as the
    studies below show.

Study of connections between capital and biggest cities

11. The UK is a small and already well connected country to our capital. Unlike Europe it has
    had a fast national railway system (with routes capable of 200km/h, 125mph) for a long
    time.

12. The HS2AA study (at Annex A) showed that the UK has shorter journey times between the
    capital and top five biggest cities than in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, despite their
    concentration on high speed rail. Because our major cities are relatively close to each
    other we do not need faster trains to achieve short journey times:
        Averaging 145 minutes in UK (or 148 mins using the same 5 cities as Eddington)
                 o 151 minutes in Spain
                 o 184 minutes in Italy
                 o 221minutes in France
                 o 244 minutes in Germany

13. This is consistent with what Sir Rod Eddington found in his 2006 study. He then states ‘
    ….with [rail] journeys between London and other UK major cities performing particularly
    well relative to journeys from other European capitals’. HS2AA updated this study

2 Countries facing problems with high speed rail

14. Recent high speed rail developments have been facing difficulties in Europe and around
    the world. Attached (Annex 2) is a summary of recent reports. It shows a tendency to over
    estimate demand, and the financial difficulties of some recent high speed rail developments

3. Summary of how the alternatives meet the forecast demand
15. To avoid confusion over exactly what the different alternatives deliver in terms of capacity
    against forecast demand, we have summarised how the capacity builds up, with all the
    figures put onto the same basis (as how demand is calculated). See Annex 3

16. This demonstrates that both RP2, and more importantly the best alternative more than
    meets the doubling in forecast demand. It should be noted when replacing first class with
    standard class seats this adds capacity for no loss in revenue as all first class demand is
    readily accommodated within the reduced first class capacity. (First class loadings are
    currently around 20%).



3
3. ATOC comments on the report are in Rail at www.rail.co/2011/06/24/uk-rail-passengers-
more-satisfied-with-their-service-than-in-many-other-eu-countries/
Annex 1: ‘HS2AA study of journey time lengths’
The UK actually has an extensive high speed network. With the exception of CTRL, the
principle routes in the UK have a line speed of 125mph for intercity services (ie WCML, East
Coast Main Line and Great Western). 125mph is sufficiently fast to qualify as high speed for a
line uprated to be high speed under the European Directive on high speed rail 4 .

Bearing in mind the compactness of the UK and the closeness of centres of population such a
speed is entirely appropriate, as supported by Eddington’s report and findings 5 .

In fact the UK has the shortest travelling times by rail between the capital and its major cities
(using the most recent data and timetables 6 ). Our times are shorter than for Germany, France,
Italy and Spain.

Germany
                                                7
City                           City pop. 000s         Rank by Population       Time from capital city
                                                             size                 (fastest train)
Hamburg                             1,773                        2                    1hr 36m
Munich                              1,357                        3                    5hr 52m
Cologne                              995                         4                    4hr 19m
Frankfurt                            668                         5                    3hr 34m
Stuttgart                            600                         6                    5hr 00m
Avge time to/from Berlin            3,430                        1                    4hr 04m (244m)



France

City                           City pop. 000s 8       Rank by Population       Time from capital city
                                                             size                 (fastest train)
Marseille                            839                        2                     3hr 03m
Lyon                                 472                        3                     1hr 57m
Toulouse                             438                        4                     5hr 31m
Nice                                 347                        5                     5hr 38m
Strasbourg                           273                        6                     2hr 17m
Avge time to/from Paris             2,203                       1                     3hr 41m (221m)


Italy
                                                9
City                           City pop. 000s         Rank by Population       Time from capital city
                                                             size                 (fastest train)
Milan                               1,307                        2                    2hr 59m
Naples                               964                         3                    1hr 07m



4
 ‘Directive 96/48/EC — Interoperability of the Trans-European High Speed Rail: System Technical
Specification for Interoperability’
5
  Transport Study: Main Report (December 2006), Vol. 2 para 2.18, chart 2.4
6
  Information on fastest times in Europe from timetables on Rail Europe (on a typical midweek July 2010
day)
7
  2008 census (except Cologne and Frankfurt (2007))
8
  2006 census (except Paris (2007))
9
  2008 census (except Rome 2009)
Turin                                   909                           4                  4hr 10m
Italy (continued)
                                                  10
City                             City pop. 000s              Rank by Population   Time from capital city
                                                                    size             (fastest train)
(Palermo) 11                            (660)                         (5)               (11hr 32m)
Genoa                                   612                           6                  4hr 58m
Bologna                                 375                           7                  2hr 05m
Avge time to/from Rome                2,727                           1                  3hr 04m (184m)


Spain
                                                       12
City                              City pop. 000s             Rank by Population   Time from capital city
                                                                    size             (fastest train)
Barcelona                               1,622                         2                  2hr 43m
Valencia                                  815                         3                  3hr 43m
Seville                                   703                         4                  2hr 20m
Zaragoza                                  674                         5                  1hr 18m
Malaga                                    568                         6                  2hr 30m
Avge time to/from Madrid                3,213                         1                  2hr 31m (151m)


UK
                                                        13
               City                City pop. 000s            Rank by Population   Time from capital city
                                                                    size             (fastest train)
Birmingham                              1,017                         2                  1hr 22m
Leeds                                     771                         3                  2hr 04m
Glasgow                                   582                         4                  4hr 09m
Sheffield                                 535                         5                  2hr 08m
Bradford                                  502                         6                  2hr 24m
Avge time to/from London                7,556                         1                  2hr 25m (145m)


Summary of average (fastest) journey times between the capital and five largest cities
Country        Average Journey Time                                       Notes
Germany        4hrs 04m (244m)            Mixture of high speed, upgraded and some conventional lines
France         3hrs 41m (221m)            All high speed TGV except Marseille - Nice link
Italy          3hrs 04m (184m)            All high speed except last section to Genoa
Spain          2hrs 31m (151m)            All high speed except some short sections to Valencia
UK             2hrs 25m (145m)            Intercity network




10
   2009 census (except Barcelona 2008)
11
   Palermo is on the island of Sicily, and has been excluded from the analysis of average times
12
   2009 census (except Barcelona 2008)
13
   2008 census (except Glasgow (2007)
The tables also show how dominant London is as the major city in the UK (seven times the next
largest), compared to other major West European countries (where the capital is about twice as
large).

Sensitivity:

The above analysis uses different cities than those used in the original Eddington analysis. As
a sensitivity the UK cities used were adjusted to match Eddington’s selection.

                                                 14
               City             City pop. 000s        Rank by Population   Time from capital city
                                                             size             (fastest train)
Birmingham                           1,017                     2                1hr 22m
Leeds                                     771                  3                2hr 04m
Glasgow                                   582                  4                4hr 09m
Manchester                                484                                   1hr 58m
Newcastle                                 275                                   2hr 50m
Avge time to/from London             7,556                     1                2hr 28m (148m)


Sir Rod Eddington’s cities (Manchester and Newcastle Dec 2010 timetable)
As can be seen there is little impact on the overall comparison.


Centralisation
One of the reasons that the UK is so centralised is because journey times from major cities to
London are short and have been for over 100 years. It is interesting that it is suggested that
further shortening the journey times will reverse the centralisation that has resulted from it.




14
     2008 census (except Glasgow (2007)
Annex 2          Countries facing problems with their high speed railways
 
It is suggested by some that we should build more high speed rail in the UK to keep up with
other countries. This note summarises some recent development in other countries.

Portugal
The Portuguese government has decided to suspend construction of its 3.3bn€ Lisbon-Madrid
high speed rail link. This was debated in their parliament on June 30th and July 1st, following
their 78bn€ bailout by the International Monetary Fund and European Union. Suspending this
project is not a requirement of the bailout, but the idea is to guard against possible external and
internal risks. Portugal’s debt as a proportion of GDP was 93% at the end of 2010. In the UK
the figure was 52% at the end of last year, and is now believed to have risen to 60%.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/05/portugal-spain-rail-plan-morel
http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/downchart_ukgs.php?year=1900_2011&chart=G0-
total&units=p#copypaste

Spain
From July 1st, Spain will be axing the high speed train running between Toledo, Cuenca and
Albacete. This high speed line, which cost 3.5bn€, was opened last December; however only 9
passengers (on average) used this route per day. The failed route was costing 18,000€ per day
to operate. This is one of several austerity measures intended to drastically shrink public
spending and reduce Spain’s borrowing costs.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/8603392/Spain-cuts-high-speed-
ghost-train.html
http://en.lacerca.com/news/castilla_la_mancha/high_speed_madrid_albacete-73451-1.html

France
France’s plans for TGV expansion are running into financing problems because of the
recession and the county’s high budget deficit. We risk having longer and longer high-speed
lines which are used less and less; so said the president of the SNCF, Guillaume Pépy. He
thinks that France is going too fast in its further construction of high speed lines. TGV fares
have increased by 100% in the last decade compared to about 30% for car travel. Pépy went
on to say: The whole basis of the high-speed rail revolution – that the TGV should be the
"normal" means of travel, not just something affordable by the business elite – is under threat.
The SNCF president also described the state railways as: Decaying... facing a financial
impasse... and heading for the wall. He should know better than most.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/life-on-the-fast-track-thirty-years-of-the-tgv-
2265455.html

Netherlands
Earlier this year Reuters reported: The Dutch high-speed train operator could face eventual
bankruptcy unless steps are taken to boost its viability, after little more than a year of full
services. However passenger numbers have increased, from a low of 15% occupancy on some
trains, following the decision by the operator to reduce its price premium for high speed rail
tickets.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/01/netherlands-rail-idUSLDE71025P20110201
http://www.forexyard.com/en/news/Dutch-high-speed-rail-faces-financial-woes-govt-2011-02-
01T182016Z
Plans for a high speed line from Amsterdam to Germany (HSL-Oost) have been suspended.
The scope of the project has been reduced, and the Dutch have no plans to run high speed
trains on this route in the near future.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-speed_rail_in_the_Netherlands

Taiwan
In 2009 it became necessary for the Taiwanese government to take over the running of the
Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation as it was almost bankrupt, two years after it first started
running its high speed trains. One of the contributing factors to the financial problems was that
passenger numbers were approximately one third of those that had been forecast.
http://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijbm/article/view/6370/6325
China
China has incurred a vast amount of debt during the building of its high speed rail network. The
debt was estimated to have reached 2 trillion yuan (US$304 billion) by the end of 2010. The
Chinese Railways Ministry is required to pay interest of up to 120 billion yuan (US$ 18.26
billion) each year. Apparently the railway system is currently only able to pay interest on the
debt, and is unable to repay any of debt itself.
One comment reported by Reuters may strike a chord: Professor Zhao cited the line from
eastern Henan province's capital Zhengzhou to the Shaanxi city of Xi'an as the perfect example
of a white elephant rail project."It is basically empty," he said. In the first six months after its
launch in February 2010, the railway reported 1.98 million passengers. It was designed for 37
million a year.

 Following some safety concerns, the speed of the trains has been reduced from 380 kph to
300 kph.
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-
cnt.aspx?cid=1502&MainCatID=15&id=20110301000115
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/23/uk-chinas-railway-boom-hurtles-into-the-
idUSLNE75M04520110623
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d859f1e-a1a1-11e0-b9f9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Qe9CBRd8

USA
In February this year, Florida’s governor Rick Scott turned down a $2bn government incentive
to develop a high speed rail link from Tampa to Orlando. He believed passenger numbers to be
overestimated, and that the state would have to pick up the bill for subsidies because the line
would be unable to pay for itself. His decision follows very similar decisions made in Ohio and
Winsconsin.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/us/17rail.html
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/09/us-usa-infrastructure-highspeedrail-
idUSTRE6B860B20101209

United Kingdom
We only have the experience of HS1 to draw on. Some may remember that 18 Javelin
carriages were taken out of service four months after the line was completed in 2009 due to low
passenger usage. In April 2011 a Telegraph reporter noted there were more than 200 empty
seats on a peak time train leaving St Pancras at 6:10pm. Off peak usage was described as
90% empty.
http://www.metro.co.uk/news/824624-140mph-train-service-is-reduced-after-complaints
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/8423638/High-speed-rail-Britains-first-
link-hasnt-worked-as-planned-say-critics.html


Conclusion
What can we learn from this? There is a tendency to overestimate demand for high speed rail
lines. Aalborg University found that nine out of ten rail projects overestimated passenger
demand, the average overestimation being 106%. Serious financial difficulties have been
experienced on some of the more recently constructed high speed lines. A government with a
high level of debt finds it prudent to suspend further investment in a high speed rail project.
http://seekerblog.com/2010/08/31/high-speed-rail-inaccuracy-in-traffic-forecasts/
Annex 3: Summary of Alternatives to HS2: using existing lines to meet
capacity needs

The McNulty report stressed the importance of ‘sweating existing assets’. There is
substantial scope to do this for the West Coast, East Coast and Midland Mainlines.

Given that the benefits of faster speeds are small (see independent Oxera report to
Transport Select Committee, and the 2011 Eurobarometer survey for UK passenger
views), the primary benefit of HS2 is to add to capacity. However, this can be done
more quickly and more affordably by developing the existing lines.

The table below gives the arithmetic for increasing West Coast Mainline intercity
capacity from London for three options:

   •   The (unrealistic) DfT 'do minimum' used as the comparator for HS2
   •   The DfT alternative to HS2, 'Rail Package 2' (RP2), which has many benefits
       but is not 'optimised' and there is no immediate need for much of the
       engineering work suggested
   •   An 'Optimised Alternative'.

The table shows that RP2 more than meets the doubling in demand that is forecast by
HS2 Ltd to happen, but also that the ‘Optimised Alternative’ can achieve this (with
121% extra capacity overall) largely before the need for infrastructure changes.

Resolving commuter over crowding problems

It is worth noting that the grade separation at Ledburn junction (at 2.1 in the table) will,
with new trains, also be able to double the fast commuter train capacity (not shown in
the table) to Milton Keynes and Northampton. This is an overcrowded service that
needs to be dealt with now. It cannot wait for HS2 in 2026.

Providing sufficient peak time capacity

Questions have been raised over the extent that train lengthening etc. can provide
extra capacity at peak times. The ‘Optimised Alternative’ suggests a timetable that
increases the base timetable in the period 16:30 to 18:29 from 19 Intercity and 4 fast
commuter trains (in the 2007/8 base) to 24 Intercity and 8 fast commuter trains. This
shows the doubling of the fast commuter trains (i.e. Milton Keynes) capacity while at
the same time (as the table shows) increasing the number of standard class intercity
peak time seats from 5,736 seats (18x9 car Pendolinos and 1x10 car Voyagers) to
13,700 (18x12 car Pendolinos, 4x11 car Pendolinos and 2x10 car Voyagers), a 139%
increase.

So its not just that overall capacity increases with the ‘Optimised Alternative’, or even
that standard class capacity increases, but peak standard class capacity does too.

Conclusion

Capacity needs can be therefore be met incrementally (hence with less risk given the
uncertain demand) and much more affordably, and given that the benefits of speed are
small, there is no justification for the very high costs of HS2.
      Alternative elements for intercity WCML capacity (ie excl commuter services)
             (On same basis as the background growth in demand ie over 2007/08 base)
                                  Alternatives:              ‘Optimised’ capacity increase     Comment
                                                             over 2007/8 base (cum. figures)
                        ‘do        RP2            ‘Optimis
                                                                                               *Evening peak 16.30 to
                        minim-                    -ed’                                         18.39
                                                             Total         Standard class
                        um’
                                                                        total      Peak*
WCML 2007/8             88,544     88,544         88,544      88,544     59,298      5,736     16hr/2way seats in
base                                                                                           traffic
1. Train investment (with little/no infrastructure investment)
1.1 Dec. 2008              Y           Y             Y        +36%        +38%       +23%      Not in 2007/8 base
timetable change
1.2 Evergreen 3            N           N             Y                                         From autumn 2011,
Chiltern speed                                                                                 scope for extra
improvements                                                                                   capacity
1.3 Extra                  Y           Y             Y        +63%        +79%                 Being implemented;
Pendolinos (by                                                                                 benefits peak & off-
2013)                                                                                          peak capacity
1.4 2013 timetable         N           N             Y        +75%        +92%        na       Increases off-peak
change                                                                                         capacity only
1.5 Reassign 1             N           N             Y        +84%       +127%                 Very low cost:
Pendolino car to                                                                               benefits peak & off
standard class                                                                                 peak capacity
1.6 Full 11-car on         N           Y             Y                              +106%      Benefits peak & off
WCML                                                                                           peak capacity
1.7 12-car WCML            N           N             Y        +121%      +181%      +130%      Benefits peak & off
(not Liverpool)                                                                                peak capacity
Trains total:           133,328     149,725       195,432    195,432    166,908      13,179    Seats in traffic
(% incr. in capacity)   (+51%)      (+69%)        (+121%)    (+121%)    (+181%)     (+130%)    Increase over 2007/8
2. Infrastructure         9 tph      12 tph        11 tph                                      Trains per hour
investment
2.1 Grade-                 N           Y             Y                                         Needed to relieve
separated junction                                                                             peak crowding on
between Leighton                                                                               commuter services
Buzzard/Ched’ton
2.2 Stafford area          N           Y             Y                                         Benefits peak & off
by-pass                                                                                        peak
2.3 Extra 3 Euston         N           Y             N
platforms
2.4 Extra platforms        N           Y             N                                         HS2 has same train
at Manchester                                                                                  frequency to
(with Ardwick                                                                                  Manchester without
grade separation)                                                                              these changes
2.5 4-tracking             N           Y             Y                                         Benefits peak & off
Attleb’rgh/Brinklow                                                                            peak
(incl. freight works
at Nuneaton)
2.6 Northampton            N           Y             Y                                         Benefits peak & off
area speed                                                                                     peak
improvements
2.7 4-tracking             N           Y             N                                         Benefits peak & off
Beechwood Tunnel                                                                               peak
– Stechford
3. Total after all      133,328     222,080       218,538    218,538    186,648      13,700    Seats in traffic
investments:            (+51%)      (+151%)       (+147%)    (+147%)    (+215%)     (+139%)    Increase over 2007/8
(% incr. in capacity)
                        Written evidence from Glasgow City Council (HSR 154)


    Summary of Main Points

    Glasgow City Council strongly supports the construction of a UK High Speed Rail network, which
    is considered essential both for the country’s future economic prosperity and also to reduce
    transport’s contribution to carbon emissions. However, GCC contends that the full economic and
    environmental benefits of HSR will not be realised until a dedicated HSR line is constructed over
    the entire route between London/HS1 and Scotland.

    GCC considers the construction of a new HSR line between London and Birmingham to be the
    optimum means of providing the increased transport capacity urgently required in that corridor.
    However new HSR infrastructure has the potential not only to provide increased transport
    capacity but also to reduce end-to-end rail journey times between Glasgow/Edinburgh and
    London to well below 3 hours. So doing will encourage considerable modal shift from air and
    road to rail, thereby reducing transport’s overall carbon emissions and generating new rail
    patronage to maximise the return on investment in HSR.

    Glasgow City Council is concerned that the construction of dedicated HSR lines only as far north
    as Manchester and Leeds could increase Scotland’s peripherality and concentrate economic
    development and regeneration in the southern half of Britain, to the detriment of Scotland’s
    economy and that of north east England. Consequently, given the significantly greater journey-
    time reductions and consequent modal shift from air that would be achieved by providing a
    dedicated HSR line over the northern half of the London – Scotland route, GCC believes that the
    UK Government should commit to the early provision of a new HSR line over the entire route
    between Edinburgh/Glasgow and London and construct this line simultaneously from both ends.

    Responses to Listed Questions

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?
1.1 The main arguments for HSR are as follows:
1.1.1 Economic Growth – Capacity constraints on much of the existing rail network are proving
    costly to business and restricting economic growth. Most constrained at present is the southern
    end of the West Coast Main Line (WCML) between London and Birmingham with capacity on
    more northerly sections of this line and parts of the East Coast (ECML) and Midland Main Lines
    (MML) also constrained. With HSR the fastest-growing transport mode in Europe, there is a
    danger of regional British cities losing out to regional European cities in terms of economic growth,
    in the absence of HSR connectivity.
1.1.2 Reduced Journey time – This is a more important benefit for longer journeys such as those
    between Scotland and London. Current rail journey times between Glasgow/Edinburgh and
    London are too long for travel to morning business meetings and same-day return trips by rail
    allow little time for activity in the destination city.
1.1.3 Reduced Emissions – Increased capacity and reduced journey times will encourage modal
    shift from air and road to rail. The emission benefits from HSR will obviously be highest where
    trains run with high load factors and utilise electricity generated from renewable fuels. Again, the
    most significant reductions will be for longer journeys (such as London – Glasgow) where city
    centre – city centre journey times by rail will better those by air and be considerably shorter than
    those by road.
1.1.4 Capacity on existing rail lines will be released by the construction of a new HSR line,
    facilitating improved freight and local passenger services on these lines. These services will, in
    turn, encourage more modal shift from road thereby reducing road congestion, benefitting both the
    economy and the environment.
1.2 The main arguments against HSR are as follows:
1.2.1 Affordability – Some claim that public finance in the United Kingdom cannot afford HSR.
    However, by the time that major expenditure is required, the country is likely to be emerging from
    the current economic downturn. Without HSR the economy is likely to be more (not less)
    vulnerable to future economic downturns.
1.2.2 Disruption – The construction of any major engineering project will be disruptive to the
    landscape and communities through which it passes. However, the disruption caused by
    construction along a carefully chosen new alignment is likely to be much less than that caused by
    widening an existing transport corridor, where many residents and businesses located adjacent to
    the existing corridor boundaries would require relocation. The use of an existing corridor would
    also be much more disruptive to existing transport services using the corridor than will be the case
    for a new alignment.
1.2.3 An upgrade of existing rail lines would be preferable. Some argue that the provision of
    additional capacity on the existing rail network would achieve the same objectives (as HSR) but be
    cheaper and less disruptive. However, the actual costs of adding capacity to the existing network
    are more difficult to estimate than those for a new line on a new alignment. Widening existing rail
    corridors to provide additional tracks is likely to require the purchase of many parcels of land and
    will prove extremely disruptive to some owners. While it may be argued that lengthening trains or
    providing higher-capacity rolling stock would be relatively inexpensive and easily implemented, the
    consequent changes required to infrastructure may not be.
1.2.4 Any platform lengthening required to accommodate longer trains will be disruptive, both to rail
    users and to those with property required for the extended platforms. Platform lengthening is
    likely to be particularly problematic adjacent to existing bridges or tunnels and future services may
    require selective door opening or the omission of some station stops. Similarly, there are likely to
    be many locations on existing lines where increasing the gauge clearance to accommodate
    double-deck trains is problematic. However, the chief failing of any proposal to increase capacity
    on the existing rail network is that it would not provide high speed rail services. While this may be
    of little consequence to those travelling between London and Birmingham, the benefits for those
    travelling between London and Scotland are significantly less than for HSR.
1.2.5 Environmental Damage – Any civil engineering construction work has the potential to
    damage the environment but this can be mitigated by sensitive design and ancillary works. The
    most commonly cited environmental arguments against HSR are damage to landscape and noise
    pollution. The insertion of a new rail line into a landscape will certainly change it but not
    necessarily damage it. The route currently identified for HSR between London and Birmingham
    does not cross open moorland but a landscape already bisected by numerous roads, tracks,
    pathways and even rail lines. The new line will obviously be a feature in the future landscape but,
    carefully designed, should not inflict lasting damage. In fact many major structures on ‘classic’ rail
    lines are now listed in recognition of their positive contributions to the landscape.
1.2.6 The noise generated by HSR trains is likely to be intrusive only in areas that are currently
    quiet. For much of its route the HSR line will pass through built-up areas, where there is already
    background noise from traffic, aircraft, industry and farming operations. In these areas, HSR will
    add to the noise but is unlikely to be particularly intrusive. In ‘wilderness’ areas, the introduction of
    noise where there is presently silence will inevitably destroy the tranquillity. However, even in
    these circumstances, the intermittent noise from passing trains is, arguably, less intrusive than the
    constant drone of road traffic, which emanates, night and day, from a motorway.
2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?
2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in
    importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the
    strategic road network?
2.1.1 Improving inter-urban connectivity is the most important transport policy objective for
    economic development, although improving the sustainability of transport is arguably the most
    important objective overall. HSR scores highly on both counts. Inter-urban connectivity is
    improved through the provision of additional capacity and reduced journey times. Being
    electrically-powered, HSR is more sustainable than either road or air transport due to the potential
    to generate electricity from a variety of renewable sources and its non-reliance on depleting
    reserves of increasingly expensive oil.
2.1.2 Additions and improvements to the strategic road network can improve capacity locally but are
    also likely to reinforce the perception that road is the preferred mode of travel, leading to greater
    congestion elsewhere on the network. By way of contrast, investment in HSR will create capacity
    for an alternative travel mode. This will abstract some traffic from the road network, thereby
    reducing road congestion, without simultaneously encouraging additional road traffic. HSR will
    also release capacity on the existing (classic) rail network for additional freight and local
    passenger services, thereby further reducing road traffic and congestion.
2.1.3 Over longer distances, such as those between Scotland’s Central Belt and London, HSR will
    also abstract traffic from air services, since city-centre to city centre travel times will be shorter by
    HSR. Assuming similar load factors for air and HSR services, this transfer will significantly reduce
    carbon emissions. It will also bring economic benefits in terms of the ability to use HSR journey-
    time more productively than is the case with air travel.
2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’
    network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and
    around major cities?
2.2.1 There is no reason to suppose that spending on the construction of new HSR infrastructure
    will reduce capital spending on the existing network. There are already significant ‘high-cost’ rail
    projects under construction, in particular London Cross Rail (approx. £15 billion over around 7
    years) and Thameslink (approx. £5.5 billion over around 8 years) and it does not appear than
    these schemes have affected funding for the general ‘classic’ network. These two schemes will
    be close to completion by the time construction is proposed to start on HSR between London and
    Birmingham in around 2016. Spread over ten years, the £17 billion estimated cost of HSR should
    generate annual expenditure no greater than for Crossrail and certainly below the combined peak
    expenditure of the two London projects.
2.2.2 As regards increasing track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities, HSR may
    constitute the most cost effective means of doing just this. Transfer of long distance inter-urban
    services to the HSR network will provide seats on existing rolling stock for commuters and
    capacity on classic tracks for additional commuter services.
2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation?
2.3.1 There is likely to be little impact on domestic aviation as a result of HSR services between
    London and Birmingham, since most travel between these cities is currently by road or rail and
    reductions in overall rail journey times between London and cities north of Birmingham will be
    insufficient to encourage significant modal shift from air.
2.3.2 Extension of the new HSR line to Manchester and Leeds is likely to reduce journey times
    between London and Scotland sufficiently to encourage some transfer of cross-border domestic
    air travel to rail. It should also eliminate the use of air services for travel between London and
    those cities on the HSR network, except, perhaps for some interlining.
2.3.3 However, to achieve a significant modal shift from air to HSR, it will be necessary to provide a
    new HSR rail line over the entire route between London and Scotland, thereby eliminating the
    current                                                                                        time
    penalty in using rail services for these longer journeys. In 2009, some 20% of journeys between
    Edinburgh/Glasgow and London were made by rail. If the rail journey time were to be reduced to
    2hr 30min (by providing a new HSR line over the entire route), it is anticipated that around 80% of
    journeys would be made by rail – resulting in 4 or 5 million fewer domestic air trips on these
    routes.
2.3.4 One implication of this reduction in domestic air travel between cities served by HSR services
    could be the release of capacity at British airports for additional domestic flights to cities beyond
    the reach of HSR infrastructure (e.g. Aberdeen and Inverness) and for additional international
    flights. These additional flights could bring economic benefits in excess of those already
    calculated to result from the construction of a UK HSR network.
3. Business case
3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal
    shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the
    impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network?
3.1.1 In addition to the work undertaken by HS2, Atkins (on behalf of SRA, later updated for the
    Government in 2008), Network Rail (New Lines, 2009) and Greengauge21 (Fast Forward, 2009)
    have separately researched the business case for HSR. While each of these studies considered a
    slightly different HSR network, all produced a case for a north-south spine route linking the major
    cities between London and Edinburgh/Glasgow, indicating that the overall case is robust.
3.1.2 The methodology adopted by HS2 is based on standard DfT and Treasury models and
    cannot, therefore, be challenged in isolation. Moreover, the use of this methodology allows the
    benefit:cost ratio for HSR to be compared directly with those calculated for other transport
    schemes.
3.1.3 It has been argued recently that, in assuming that time spent on trains is ‘un-productive’, HS2
    has overestimated the benefits of HSR arising from reduced journey times. On the other hand,
    Greengauge21 reported that regarding time spent on HSR trains as productive ‘working-time’
    marginally increases the overall benefit:cost ratio for HSR. The basis for this finding is that the
    productive time gained by passengers transferring from car and air outweighs the working time
    lost by passengers transferring from classic train services of longer duration. It might also be
    argued that HSR will create a better working environment than current rail services, affording
    greater en route productivity for passengers than by all other modes, including classic rail.
3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by
    upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?
3.2.1 The most recent upgrade of the West Coast Main Line added significant capacity to the route
    but this capacity is rapidly being filled as passenger numbers continue to rise and is likely to be
    exhausted by 2020. To create significant additional capacity on the existing tracks, it would be
    necessary to lengthen the trains and/or provide higher-capacity rolling stock (e.g. double-deck
    carriages). As set out in response to Question 1 above, provision of the infrastructure necessary
    to accommodate either of these capacity enhancements is unlikely to be readily achievable over
    the entire length of the existing route. Even if additional capacity were to be created in this way, it
    would be only a matter of time before this too was exhausted. Consequently, Network Rail have
    concluded that the only realistic long-term capacity solution for travel between London and West
    Midlands is to provide an additional line.
3.2.2 Additional to the considerable engineering costs of increasing the capacity of an existing rail
    line are significant costs in terms of disruption to services and reduced capacity during
    construction. These latter costs were further increased in the case of the recently completed
    upgrade of the WCML by delays to the project programme, due to the difficulties of working
    alongside an operating railway. None of these additional costs will arise with the construction of a
    rail line on a new alignment and the capacity created will be considerably greater that that
    achieved by upgrading an existing line.
3.2.3 A new conventional line (restricted to 125 mph) could deliver increased capacity equally as
    well as an HSR line but would not reduce journey-times and would therefore be of more limited
    benefit for longer journeys (e.g. between London and the North of England and Scotland) where
    overall travel times are a major consideration. Without the journey-time savings, there will be less
    modal shift to rail from road and air and consequently reduced environmental benefits in terms of
    pollutant and carbon emissions. However, proposals for a new conventional line are likely to
    generate the same opposition from those on the line of route as proposals for a HSR line. The
    construction of a new conventional line would therefore appear to be a non-starter.
3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for
    example by price?
3.3.1 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would encourage
    passengers to travel by less sustainable modes (i.e. car or air) and, in the case of car travel, would
    increase road congestion. Alternatively, some journeys may not be undertaken at all which, while
    more sustainable, would be detrimental in overall socio-economic terms.
3.3.2 To some extent, demand is already managed by price and, except where travel is free of
    charge at the point of delivery, this will continue to be the case. If it is accepted that rail travel is
    more sustainable and environmentally acceptable than air or road travel, the aim should be to
    provide the capacity that will enable rail services to be available at the lowest possible cost. To do
    otherwise would adversely impact on both the environment and business and the economy in
    general.
3.3.3 It is likely that there will be a continuing role for price in maximising the efficient use of the rail
    network. Differential pricing according to time of travel and speed of journey could assist in
    maximising train load factors on both the classic and high speed networks.
3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any
    new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?
3.4.1 The construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) in this country has a
    reasonably good track record in terms of time and budget (e.g. HS1 and the recent Airdrie-
    Bathgate project). Competitive procurement on a design-and-build basis is probably the best
    means of reducing cost overruns.
4. The strategic route
4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham
    International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria
    should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?
4.1.1 For the benefits of HSR in terms of reduced journey times to be maximised, there should be
    few, if any, intermediate stops on routes between any two city centre stations. Consequently, the
    HSR network should be designed in a similar fashion to the UK’s motorway network with the route
    by-passing all towns and cities en route. In general, intermediate cities would be served not by
    through stations on the main line but by terminal stations reached via spurs off the main line.
    Such a terminal station is currently planned for Curzon Street in Birmingham.
4.1.2 In certain situations, it may be appropriate to provide through stations on the main line, such
    as that currently proposed at Birmingham International. However, only trains commencing or
    terminating their journeys a few miles distant (in this case at Curzon Street) should slow down and
    stop at these stations; other services should continue non-stop at high speed on a parallel bypass
    line, thereby avoiding any increase in their end-to-end journey times.
4.1.3 The proposed station at Old Oak Common (OOC) is supported, in the short term at least, as a
    useful interchange for London Crossrail and services to Heathrow airport. Given its proximity to
    the proposed Euston terminal, the increases in end-to-end journey times for HSR services
    resulting from stops here should be smaller than would be the case for intermediate stops
    elsewhere on the network. Stopping HSR services at OOC for interchange to London suburban
    services could also reduce congestion on connecting services at Euston. In addition, directly
    connecting the West Coast Main Line into London Crossrail at OOC, could reduce the number of
    platforms required at Euston to accommodate classic services (see also comment at 6.4.2 below).
4.1.4 Additional stations should be provided only in cities where passenger demand for travel to a
    single destination served by HSR is sufficient to entirely fill high speed trains. If it becomes
    necessary for trains to collect passengers from several stations to achieve the loading required for
    viable operation, the benefits of high speed travel will be seriously eroded by repeated station
    stops. Where a city cannot generate sufficient patronage to justify a HSR station, feeder services
    should be provided on classic lines to a convenient HSR station for interchange. To minimise the
    potential for feeder journeys to be undertaken by private car, interchange with HSR services
    should take place at city centre stations wherever possible.
4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y
   configuration the right choice?
4.2.1 As stated above, only those cities generating sufficient patronage to fill trains destined for a
    single location should be directly served by the eventual high speed network. Likely candidates
    are London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Newcastle, Bristol, Edinburgh and Glasgow. These
    cities should be considered core cities for the network and could be joined by Sheffield and an
    East Midlands station if patronage there is sufficient.
4.2.2 The proposed Y configuration serves only four of the suggested core cities but the eastern
    branch of the Y could readily be extended northwards to also serve Newcastle, Glasgow and
    Edinburgh, suggesting that it forms a good basis for the eventual HSR network. Two further
    extensions should be considered to complete the network of dedicated HSR lines – one from
    Birmingham International to Bristol and the other from the East Midlands to London.
4.2.3 Given that hybrid HSR/classic trains are proposed to provide initial HSR services to
    destinations north of Birmingham, it is suggested that, network capacity permitting, these trains
    could be used subsequently to provide through-running HSR/classic services westwards to Cardiff
    via Heathrow and Bristol, southwards to Southampton via Heathrow and northwards to Aberdeen
    and Inverness.
4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?
4.3.1 Pragmatically it makes perfect sense to start the HSR network with the London-Birmingham
    section, which is the most capacity-restrained section on the West Coast Main Line. Furthermore,
    the link to London and HS1 is an essential element of any national HSR network so, should the
    London – Birmingham section be rejected, it is unlikely that a truly national network could ever
    materialise.
4.3.2 However, future phases do not necessarily have to be constructed in a consecutive
    northwards order. The most speed restricted sections of the network are typically across the
    English-Scottish border so serious consideration should be given to starting construction of these
    sections at an earlier stage rather as the last legs. In particular, the Government should show
    greater commitment to plan the future network beyond Manchester and Leeds so that the longer
    term benefits of a national network become clearer.
4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as
    part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?
4.4.1 While it is understood that construction of the link to HS1 has been proposed as part of phase
    1 for technical reasons, it is welcomed as essential to enable direct services between Europe and
    UK cities north of London. It is suggested that, as soon as this link is operational (possibly prior to
    the opening of HS2) consideration is given to extending the UK’s existing sleeper services to
    European destinations. Caledonian sleeper services currently arrive in London at around 6.00am
    and, given the procurement of suitable rolling stock could reach Brussels and Paris in time for
    morning meetings. Similarly, evening departures from these cities would reach London prior to
    midnight to utilise the existing WCML train paths to Scotland.
4.4.2 The Heathrow market will to a large extent be catered for through the Old Oak Common
    interchange as part of phase 1 so it is reasonable that further expenditure on this link should come
    later. However, the Heathrow link should be built in a way that enables High Speed Trains for
    Heathrow from the north to continue on the classic network to Southampton and those from
    London to continue to Bristol and Cardiff (see 4.2.3 above).
5. Economic rebalancing and equity
5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-
    south economic divide?
5.1.1 While not all European cities directly connected to the high speed network have benefitted
    economically, those that have co-ordinated their social, economic and planning policies and
    projects to capitalise on HSR have experienced increases in their economic growth. The only
    experience of HSR in the UK to date is HS1 and Greengauge21 reported an upsurge in business
    activity in parts of Kent following its construction.
5.1.2 A study undertaken by Halcrow for the Glasgow-Edinburgh Collaboration Initiative has
    specifically identified the policy approach and action necessary to ensure that the construction of
    HSR lines to Edinburgh and Glasgow will promote economic regeneration throughout Scotland.
    The location of HSR stations in Edinburgh and Glasgow City Centres will, in particular, facilitate
    urban regeneration rather than the development of ‘greenfield’ sites.
5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting
    local and regional regeneration?
5.2.1 The most important role of a High Speed Network is to improve connectivity both between the
    main centres of population in the UK and also with Europe, where HSR is fastest growing mode of
    travel. Currently London and the South East are both better connected to Europe than other UK
    cities and also experiencing the greatest economic growth. By directly linking regional city centres
    to London and Europe, HSR will bring agglomeration benefits to UK plc and will also promote
    regional regeneration.
5.2.2 The network should certainly be shaped to serve those areas of the UK most in need of
    regeneration. In this respect, it is particularly important that the North East of England and
    Scotland are included in the network from the outset and that their regeneration does not stall as a
    result of HSR’s initial connection only to Birmingham and the WCML. Scotland is already at a
    disadvantage due to its geographic peripherality in both the UK and Europe. The UK’s HSR
    network should aim to reduce this peripherality and not increase it.
5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?
5.3.1 It is anticipated that any city-region directly served by the HSR network will benefit from its
    development. While HSR services will be long-distance and used mainly for business and leisure
    (tourist) travel, the capacity released on the classic network will facilitate improvements to local
    passenger, commuter and freight services. Consequently, all socio-economic groups will benefit
    from HSR. The cascading of hybrid HSR/classic rolling stock to lines running on from the
    dedicated HSR network (see 4.2.3 above) will ensure that the benefits of HSR are also felt beyond
    the network itself.
5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local
   authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks
   appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?
5.4.1 Government procurement of a HSR network will be funded by all UK taxpayers and
    businesses. Provided that the network is developed to benefit all regions of the UK, this appears
    an appropriate means of sharing costs and risks. Given that the UK HSR Network is likely to
    ‘replace’ classic rail lines that currently form part of TEN, it would appear sensible to seek support
    from any relevant EU budgets.
6. Impact
6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from
    aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?
6.1.1 Assessment of the overall impact HSR on carbon emissions is complex due to the number of
    variables involved. While emissions resulting from initial construction of the track and rolling stock
    can be calculated with a fair degree of accuracy, those resulting from HSR operation will be highly
    dependent on the mix of fuels used for electricity generation and train loadings. However, under
    almost all scenarios, the emissions due to HSR travel will be lower than those for the equivalent
    journey by air. It therefore follows that most favourable impact on emissions will result where HSR
    encourages a significant transfer of air passengers. This significant transfer is unlikely to
    materialise for domestic passengers until Scotland and London are connected by HSR (see 2.3.3
    above).
6.1.2 The impact of HSR on carbon emissions as regards modal shift from roads is likely to result
    more from the capacity relief that HSR brings to the classic rail network than from the HSR
    services themselves. In particular, the provision of additional freight paths on the classic network
    will enable a transfer of container traffic from road to rail. This will not only directly reduce the
    carbon emissions generated by the transport of that freight; it will also reduce congestion on the
    road network, thereby reducing the emissions per tonne-kilometre for freight that remains on the
    road network. Similarly for passenger traffic, additional commuter and local rail services will
    reduce emissions both directly, in terms of those who shift from road to rail, and also indirectly, in
    terms of a reduction in road congestion.
6.1.3 Overall, GCC would expect carbon emissions to be lower with HSR in place than would be the
    case if an HSR network were not constructed. This will certainly be the case if the primary energy
    source is renewable, when the carbon footprint from HSR operations (after construction) should
    be negligible.
6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the
    business case?
6.2.1 HS2 appear to have taken a very cautious (pessimistic) approach in their assessment of
    overall environmental benefits. With the exception of noise, the effect of which is difficult to
    analyse on a cost:benefit basis (see 1.2.6 above), it is likely that HS2 have underestimated the
    environmental benefits of HSR.
6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network?
6.3.1 The release of capacity on the classic network, in particular on the West Coast Main Line (the
    busiest rail freight corridor in the UK)) should in part be utilised by rail freight services.
   Consequently, HSR’s impact on freight services on the classic network is expected to be entirely
   positive.
6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction,
    particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?
6.4.1 Provided that the HSR network is constructed on a new alignment, there should be no
    disruption to services on the classic network other than at locations where the two networks cross
    each other. Even here, disruption should be minimal. However, there is obviously potential for
    significant disruption at Euston and some during construction of the HS1-HS2 link.
6.4.2 Experience of the St Pancras redevelopment indicates that it is possible to minimise
    disruption to existing services, while redeveloping a station to accommodate HSR, but the scale of
    reconstruction proposed at Euston is greater than at St Pancras, as is the scale of existing rail
    operations. It is suggested that potential disruption to classic services at Euston could be reduced
    by connecting the West Coast Main Line to Crossrail at Willesden/Old Oak Common and diverting
    services running between London and towns south of Birmingham on to the Crossrail network,
    prior to works commencing at Euston.


May 2011
                   Written evidence from London Councils (HSR 155)


London Councils represents all 32 London boroughs, the City of London, the
Metropolitan Police Authority and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority.
We are committed to fighting for fair resources for London and getting the best possible
deal for London’s 33 Councils. We lobby on our members’ behalf, develop policy and do
all we can to help boroughs improve the services they offer. We also run a range of
services ourselves which are designed to make life better for Londoners.

London Councils’ Transport and Environment Committee (TEC) welcomes the
opportunity to respond to the questions posed by the Transport Select Committee’s
inquiry into high speed rail. Due to the nature of our organisation not all of the
questions posed are of equal relevance for London and therefore we have answered
questions 2.2, 3.1, 4.1, 4.4 and 5.4.


2.2       Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR
          on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to
          investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around
          major cities?

2.2.1     One of the strongest elements of the case made in the government’s recent
          consultation document ‘High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future’ is the
          potential financial boost high speed rail could bring to the national economy.
          On the basis that a high speed network would generate significant economic
          benefits (estimated at £71 billion over a 60 year time frame; a cost:benefit
          ration of 1:2.6), we would not wish to see initial investment in it come at the
          price of much needed funding for the existing network. Overcrowding is
          already a problem on many suburban lines in the capital, limiting both the
          city’s economic potential and quality of life for many Londoners.

2.2.2     Network Rail’s draft Route Utilisation Strategy (RUS), published in December
          2010, anticipates that over half of London’s suburban lines will face significant
          capacity issues by 2031, including the East Coast, Great Eastern, West
          Anglia and Midland main lines. 1 The RUS highlights the opportunity high
          speed rail represents to free up capacity on the West Coast Main Line but
          cautions that additional interventions may be necessary to manage large
          numbers of passengers arriving at Old Oak Common and Euston stations and
          to alleviate disruption to the North London line caused by a link to High Speed
          1 (HS1). The RUS outlines the benefits investment in Crossrail 2 (the
          Chelsea-Hackney line) would bring in alleviating many of the additional
          burdens high speed rail would impose on London’s existing transport
          infrastructure, and for this reason TEC advocates funding for Crossrail 2
          being made available in line with the development of high speed rail.

2.2.3     Though this question specifically addresses future investment in rail services
          it is important to consider the wider role of sustainable transport options for

1
    Network Rail (December 2010) ‘Route Utilisation Strategy. Draft for Consultation’
        passengers arriving in London. Bus services, walking and cycling are crucial
        forms of transport, particularly in inner London, and funding for improved
        provision of all three should be incorporated into plans for the development of
        both Old Oak Common and Euston stations.

3.1     How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on
        passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic
        assumptions (e.g. about the value of time) and the impact of lost
        revenue on the ‘classic’ network?

3.1.1. TEC committee welcomes the Department for Transport’s recent update of
       the economic appraisal of the London – West Midlands high speed route.
       TEC member’s had shared concerns expressed by some commentators that
       the original ‘value of time’ assumptions did not adequately take into account
       the use many business passengers make of laptops and wi-fi to continue
       working on train journeys.

3.1.2. Though complex and challenging, it is critical that such appraisals are realistic.
       In the case of HS1, demand forecasts proved to be significantly optimistic and
       have been previously criticised by the Transport Select Committee. It would
       not be desirable to see future high speed rail fares having to be raised to
       balance lower than forecast demand, a situation that would impact on the
       attractiveness of high speed rail to potential passengers and undermine the
       potential capacity and environmental benefits that stand to be gained from the
       project.

4.1     The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old
        Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street.
        Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to
        assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

4.1.1   London Councils’ TEC committee does not have comments to make on the
        specific location of stations on the West Midlands route but is supportive of
        the decision to include an interchange station in West London. Indeed, the
        consultation document’s proposals for Old Oak Common are expected to
        create up to 20,000 new jobs and be accompanied by new housing, office
        and retail space, all of which will bring welcome economic benefits to the local
        community in what is currently a deprived area.

4.1.2   In contrast the use of Euston station as a terminus raises a number of
        concerns, particularly around the impact a high speed line will have on local
        suburban rail services. The consultation document anticipates that an extra
        5,500 passengers could arrive at Euston during the three hour rush hour
        period looking to use the underground to reach their onward destination. The
        Victoria and Northern lines are often already overcrowded at these times, and
        though the figures may represent an only two per cent increase in the number
        of passengers it is obvious that the existing infrastructure would struggle to
        cope.

4.1.3   The current high speed proposals will require the demolition of around 200
        mainly local authority owned homes on the Regent’s Park Estate. It would not
        be appropriate for any local authority to be disadvantaged in terms of the
        number of socially rented homes or social amenities available to local people.
        We urge project partners to ensure that upheaval and disruption to London’s
        communities throughout the construction phase is minimised.
4.4     The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct
        link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

4.4.1   Ensuring that any future extension of Britain’s high speed rail infrastructure is
        integrated into the existing international rail network is crucial. Britain’s first
        purpose-built high speed line, HS1 (linking London to the Channel Tunnel),
        has transformed travel between London and mainland Europe. Already
        Eurostar services account for 80 per cent of journeys made from London by
        both rail and air to Paris and Brussels. A direct link between HS1 and HS2 will
        ensure reduced journey times and greater convenience for passengers
        choosing to travel by rail and will therefore help to maximise the
        environmental benefits of building the whole HS2 line. The government’s
        consultation document states that, for technical reasons, tunnelling for this
        direct link must be completed before the interchange station at Old Oak
        Common is operational. Therefore not including it in phase one would
        represent a very significant missed opportunity.

4.4.2   London Council’s TEC committee is also supportive of the government’s
        proposals not to include a direct link to Heathrow in phase one of the scheme.
        The principle aim of building a high speed rail network should be to support
        the provision of low-carbon travel choices, rather than support any expansion
        in air travel. Including a direct link in phase one will increase journey times
        between Birmingham and London, making high speed rail a less appealing
        option for inter-city travel.

4.4.3    Around half of passengers flying from Heathrow begin their journey in
        London, and already have access to the airport by rail (access that will
        improve with the expected completion of Crossrail in 2018). However
        travellers accessing Heathrow from other areas, in the Midlands, South East,
        Wales and the South West are at present poorly served by rail services. In
        2007, 63 per cent of journeys to Heathrow were made by car. 2 Enhanced
        environmental benefits may be better achieved in the long-term by a full
        examination of how existing rail services across the South of England could
        better connect with all the airports in the South of the country, rather than just
        a possible link between the proposed high speed line and Heathrow.

5.4     How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR
        (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate
        financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the
        Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

5.4.1   London’s local authorities are concerned about potential future funding
        burdens that could be placed upon them if the construction of high speed rail
        goes ahead. The current Crossrail project is being partially funded by
        contributions from section 106 planning agreements and also through the
        imposition of a Mayoral CIL (Community Infrastructure Levy). In the case of
        the former, only commercial developments within the Central Activities Zone
        (CAZ), Isle of Dogs and within the reach of a Crossrail station (which
        therefore stand to benefit from its construction) will be charged. The Mayoral
        CIL, however, is to be levied on all development over 100sqm, both


2
  CAA data cited on p.46: Bow Group (2010) ‘The right
track’, http://www.bowgroup.org/files/bowgroup/The_Right_Track_PDF.pdf
        commercial and residential, within London’s boroughs, meaning that even
        those too far away to feel the benefit of the new line must pay.

5.4.2   The Mayoral levy is likely to be introduced in summer 2012, and will continue
        to be charged until a £300 million target has been reached. The Mayor
        predicts this will be in 2018/19, (already after 2017 when the government’s
        high speed rail consultation anticipates construction beginning). Reaching this
        target could, of course, take longer.

5.4.3   The ability of London’s boroughs to implement their own CIL will be affected
        by the introduction of a Mayoral levy (a situation not found elsewhere in the
        country). With the viability of many potential developments in London severely
        limited by the economic climate, many boroughs have been concerned that
        the implementation of their own local CIL on top of the Mayor’s Crossrail CIL
        would see fewer much-needed developments, particularly of affordable
        housing, come to site. The proposed arrangements, as they stand, will reduce
        London’s local authorities’ ability to invest in the valuable social infrastructure
        needed to enhance their local communities, a situation that could be
        significantly prolonged if a further charge for high speed rail is introduced.



May 2011
                                      Written evidence from Angel Trains (HSR 156)

Angel Trains
Angel Trains owns, leases and maintains trains for Train Operating Companies. We
are the largest Rolling Stock Operating Company (ROSCO) in the UK:

       •      Angel Trains owns nearly 4,500 vehicles
       •      37% of the trains currently leased for operation on the UK rail network are run
              by Angel Trains
       •      99.8% of our fleet are currently on lease to operating companies

We do more than just lease trains to Train Operating Companies. Through our team
of expert engineers based at our offices in London and Derby, Angel Trains provides
expertise in maintenance of leased trains and advice on the purchase of new rolling
stock.

Since 1994 we have invested over £3 billion in the UK economy through the
purchase of rolling stock, and the refurbishment of existing trains. The single biggest
investments made by Angel Trains include over £700 million in new passenger trains
for the South West Trains route into London, and £977 million on new tilting trains for
the Virgin Railways West Coast Mainline route from London to Birmingham,
Manchester and Glasgow.

Our company was established in 1994 as part of the privatisation of British Rail.

Angel Trains does not have a position on the strategic case for High Speed Rail, as
some crucial aspects of the analysis required fall outside its area of expertise.
However, Angel Trains would like to respond specifically to Question 2.2, which
deals with the potential impact of HS2 on the current, conventional rail network.


2.2   Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR
on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to
increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

63% of all current rail journeys are accounted for by passengers commuting to and
from work or education 1 . While the High Speed line will offer long-distance and
business users an alternative, commuters will have no option but to continue to use
the conventional rail network on a daily basis.



                                                            
1
    National Rail Travel Survey, updated 2010: http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/statistics/datatablespublications/railways/

                                                                    
 
It is important that these passengers continue to receive the improved service that
they have come to expect from the UK rail industry, and also benefit from
technological innovation in the future. This can only occur if the conventional
network receives continuous, steady, predictable levels of investment.
Unfortunately, the past few years have been characterised by a ‘boom and bust’
approach to rail investment as political and departmental priorities are adjusted over
time. Angel Trains consider that the political focus on the High Speed 2 project
might lead to a significant recalibration, resulting in reduced investment in the
‘classic’ network. We note that the “Economic Case for HS2” already indicates an
additional £3.1bn of cost savings on the classic line 2 .

We do appreciate that, particularly in times of highly constrained public spending, the
development and subsequent adherence to a rail strategy and its associated
investment programme is a complex undertaking. However, a continuous,
predictable investment programme for the ‘classic’ network would have a significant,
three-fold impact: on efficiency, on physical assets, and on human capital.

Efficiency and value for money is a dominating focus at present for all the
organisations which constitute the rail industry. (As a member of the UK Rail family
Angel Trains have engaged at every opportunity with Sir Roy McNulty’s Value for
Money Review team.) Angel Trains only has the expertise to comment on those
issues which impact on rolling stock, but here the ‘boom and bust’ approach has had
a significant impact. The Rail Industry Association 3 estimates that the lack of
continuity of rolling stock production adds approximately 20% to the cost of rolling
stock in Great Britain. This issue is not restricted to train manufacturers, but also
impacts the entire supply chain supporting rolling stock manufacture, maintenance
and operation over the rolling stock’s asset life.

Passenger vehicles have improved since privatisation, leading to measurable,
positive changes in passenger satisfaction 4 as a result. Over the course of the next
decade technological improvements will allow passengers greater access to Wi-Fi
provision, more real-time, integrated information about their current and onward
journey, and improved seat allocation systems. The Train Operating Companies
who lease our trains will also see benefits from innovation, as our engineers will be
able to monitor the health of vehicles in real-time, rather than waiting for the regular
maintenance checks. This will lead to increases in safety, reliability and availability
of rolling stock.



                                                            
2
  p.12, “Economic Case for HS2: The Y Network and London – West Midlands”
http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/library/documents/economic-case
3
  Costs of Rolling Stock for the GB national network, published by the Railway Industry Association, 2 August
2010
4
  National Passenger Surveys (2005-2010), published by Passenger Focus,
http://www.passengerfocus.org.uk/research/nps/content.asp?dsid=496

                                                                
 
Finally, human capital will also be affected. Angel Trains believe that stability in the
investment environment would also be beneficial in encouraging sustained
investment in people and their skills, leading to greater adoption of apprenticeships,
graduate training programmes, and general staff development throughout the
industry.


May 2011




                                             
 
 
                      Written evidence from Andrew Green (HSR 157) 
 
Wider impact on non HS2 journey times and HS2 user’s actual ‘door to door’ journey times 
 
I would like to request that the Committee fully considers the wider impact of HS2 on the 
wider publics journey times and potential users actual door to door journey times. 
 
The main justification for HS2 and the selection of an extremely high speed option is often 
given as the savings in journey times simplistically quoted as ‘platform to platform’ times.  
This ignores the more complex real world times of peoples actual journeys which don’t start 
and end at a train platform.  The actual impact on journey times using the complete 
transport system and real world speeds (rather than maximum design speeds) that will 
actually be achieved by HS2 needs to be independently assessed. 
 
Secondly, HS2 will lead to less frequent services for all the passengers at intermediate stops 
on the existing rail lines who will not have access to HS2.  It will not be commercially viable 
to run so many services once large numbers of passengers are removed from the line 
resulting in less frequent and slower journey times for many rail users.  This also needs to be 
independently assessed and set against HS2 speed benefits for passengers that can use it. 
 
These appear to be major flaws in HS2 relating to the UKs overall transport policy which 
have not been fully scrutinised and independently assessed. 
 
 
May 2011 
                Written evidence from The Scottish Council for
                     Development and Industry (HSR 158)

    1. The Scottish Council for Development and Industry is pleased to participate in
       the Transport Select Committee’s inquiry into the strategic case for high speed
       rail. SCDI is an independent membership network that strengthens Scotland’s
       competitiveness by influencing Government policies to encourage sustainable
       economic prosperity. SCDI’s membership includes businesses, trade unions,
       local authorities, educational institutions, the voluntary sector and faith groups.

    2. SCDI strongly supports the introduction of a high speed rail network connecting
       Glasgow and Edinburgh to London and welcome the all-party vision to build a
       high speed rail network linking large areas of the UK to the high speed rail
       network in continental Europe. Whilst SCDI welcomes the speed with which
       detailed plans for HS2 are progressing and the assurance that Birmingham will
       not be the end of the line, we remain concerned by the lack of a firm commitment
       to continue the HSR network to Scotland and the lack of any timetable for this.

    3. Inter-city rail travel has seen substantial increases in passenger numbers over
       recent years. As fuel prices increase and consumers are increasingly aware of
       their carbon footprint, this modal shift is likely to continue. Significant
       improvements in passenger satisfaction levels, investment in rolling stock and
       reduction in journey times on major routes have also been instrumental in
       increasing passenger numbers. Parts of the existing inter-city rail infrastructure,
       such as the West Coast Main Line are approaching maximum capacity.

    4. As with any high-speed transportation system, the greatest benefits are seen
       over longer distances. Network Rail’s August 2009 Strategic Business case for
       high speed rail 1 concluded that a strong business case exists for the construction
       of HSR to Scotland – stronger than a route terminating in the West Midlands,
       Greater Manchester or Yorkshire. Greengauge 21’s Fast Forward: A High Speed
       Rail Strategy for Britain 2 calculated the economic and wider benefits of HSR.
       Scotland’s benefit figure of £19.8bn is the highest of any region in the UK outside
       of London [Annex 1].

    5. Including Glasgow and Edinburgh in HS2 from the outset significantly improves
       the business case and provides increased value for money to the taxpayer. Over
       60 years, it pays for itself 1.8 times over. Network Rail’s report showed that new
       HSR lines to Glasgow and Edinburgh are major demand generators, adding
       some 10-11 million trips to the network. However, using the classic network north
       of Preston severely reduces the advantage of new lines and reduces the demand


1
  Strategic Business Case for High Speed Rail, Network Rail,
http://www.networkrailmediacentre.co.uk/Publications/Strategic-business-case-a44.aspx
2
  Fast Forward: A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain, Greengauge 21,
http://www.greengauge21.net/wp-content/uploads/fast-forward1.pdf
   by 62% to just 4.1 million. The benefits of the investment can only be maximised
   over the longer London-Scotland distance.

6. High Speed Rail has the potential to create a more balanced society where
   opportunities are more evenly shared between regions. This is a policy priority
   which SCDI shares with Government. Including Glasgow and Edinburgh in the
   network will deliver significant economic benefits to Scotland; improving
   connectivity with London, the South East and North of England and with Europe.
   However, the failure to bring HS2 to Scotland will comparatively disadvantage
   the Scottish economy, particularly in relation to tourism.

7. Overseas evidence indicates that when a journey can be made in less than three
   hours, railways capture 50% of the market. HSR to Scotland would deliver the
   journey times required at two and three quarter hours between Glasgow and
   Edinburgh and London. Running High Speed trains on existing lines north of
   Manchester and Leeds would not. Indeed, journey times would, at best, be 3
   hours 37 minutes and High Speed trains using classic tracks north of Manchester
   and Leeds could even be slower than at present.

8. Cross-border connectivity is a significant issue for the development of Scotland’s
   economy. SCDI was disappointed that the third runway at the UK’s hub airport,
   Heathrow, is not to go ahead, raising concerns that lower-value domestic slots,
   carrying traffic to and from Scottish cities will be lost in favour of higher-value
   long haul slots into Heathrow. This makes High Speed Rail connections between
   Scotland and London all the more important.

9. SCDI recognise that high speed rail is unlikely to be competitive on routes to the
   north of Scotland’s central belt. However, modal shift on journeys between the
   central belt and London will present opportunities for increased regional air
   services between Aberdeen, Inverness and Heathrow. We would also like to see
   coordinated interconnecting services between the high speed rail line and
   services on the classic rail network to and from the north of Scotland.

10. High Speed Rail will also have a positive impact on carbon emissions. As High
    Speed 1 and European routes have demonstrated, in addition to the economic
    benefits of shorter journey times, improved connectivity would promote modal
    shift towards rail and away from aviation.

11. If rail is to become the mode of choice for most inter-city journeys between the
    population and economic centres of Scotland and the largest cities of the rest of
    the UK, building new lines to Scotland is the only option. It would significantly
    reduce air demand, capacity pressures at South East airports, and carbon
    emissions.

12. SCDI is aware of and concerned by proposals which would slow down high-
    speed rail in England. Any lengthening to journey times will further erode the
    more marginal overall benefits of journey time reductions to Scotland of the
      existing high-speed rail proposals, the potential economic benefits and likely
      environmental benefits of modal shift between air and rail.

   13. SCDI would like to see construction of the new high speed line started at both
       ends as part of a firm commitment to cross-border high speed rail. The Scottish
       Government, working closely with northern English cities, should immediately
       begin to prepare the way through the planning process. In addition, the existing
       East and West Coast Main Lines linking Edinburgh and Glasgow to London have
       the opportunity to undertake incremental and comparatively inexpensive
       improvements which would act as stepping stones on the way to a full high-
       speed rail link. Once High Speed 2 is built, these lines would provide fast inter-
       regional travel where there is large scale demand, and open up more track space
       for low-carbon freight transportation.

   14. With the new lines comes additional capacity for freight transit. The UK and
       Scottish Governments should explore the opportunities for freight, either from
       high speed freight or greater access to existing main lines.

May 2011



Annex 1

Regional economic benefits of High Speed Rail


          Image produced by Greengauge 21 and reproduced with permission
         Written evidence from LaSalle Investment Management (HSR 159)


INTRODUCTION

1. LaSalle Investment Management is one of the world’s leading real estate investment
managers. With nearly 700 employees in 16 countries, LaSalle manages approximately
£26billion of private and public property equity investments.

2. In the UK, LaSalle is the largest owner and manger of high technology science parks
around the country, including the Royal Agricultural Society of England’s 1,047 acre
Stoneleigh Park estate.        As an established innovation park, and a significant
agricultural, equine and rural cluster, Stoneleigh accommodates agricultural,
horticultural, equestrian, animal welfare and rural organisations. The Park currently has
140 tenants and employs over 2,000 people, including the National Farmers Union, the
Agricultural and Horticultural Development Board, the British Equestrian Federation and
the British Horse Society. It has between 3 - 4 million visitors and over 200 events each
year and contributes some £43million to the economy

3. The Royal Agricultural Society for England’s core purposes are the promotion and
improvement of the science, technology and practice of agriculture, forestry, horticulture
and husbandry of livestock and land, and the promotion and application of improved
methods and processes connected to this.

4. At the time LaSalle acquired the site it committed to an investment of £20million by
2012 and £50million by 2020 to build on and cement the Stoneleigh estate’s reputation
as a national hub for innovation and research.



THE BUSINESS CASE FOR HIGH SPEED RAIL

5. It is recognised that the Committee is not intending to examine the precise
specification of the HS2 route nor how the route would affect individual landowners,
businesses or residents since this can be addressed through the Hybrid Bill process.

6. However, the current proposed alignment of HS2 will have a significant adverse
economic impact on LaSalle’s and the Royal Agricultural Society of England’s
investment plans for the future and their on-going management of the overall estate.
The original route for HS2 avoided the estate. The revised route goes directly through it
and will therefore significantly undermine the viability of the business.

7. Many of the businesses can be expected to relocate (not necessarily in the UK) and
the significant advantages of a science park and cluster of related businesses and
activities will be lost. It is unlikely that a site similar to the Stoneleigh estate can be
found elsewhere in the UK.             This will seriously undermine important research
programmes in areas such as agricultural innovation which facilitate knowledge transfer
and the application of best practice to the environment, sustainable food production and
land management.
8. LaSalle has serious reservations whether the economic analysis undertaken by HS2
in determining the revised route for the line has taken into account not just the
significant economic implications for the Stoneleigh estate, but also the wider national
implications of undermining a significant world renown hub for agricultural and rural
innovation and research.

9. If these important wider national implications have not been assessed in HS2’s
business case then it must be seriously questioned whether it is sufficiently robust for
HS2 to be able to justify the current alignment through Stoneleigh Park.

10. The importance of the site is recognised by the government itself which has just
agreed to renew the lease at the Park for the Agricultural and Horticultural Development
Board, while Sport England plans to promote the site as an equine training arena.

CONCLUSION

11. LaSalle recognises that the Select Committee will wish to focus on the “higher level”
justification for and economic merits of high speed rail, and that it wishes to avoid
detailed issues around specific alignments and the impacts on individual businesses
and properties. However, the significant adverse implications of the proposed route
through Stoneleigh Park are of sufficient national importance that LaSalle believes there
is a compelling case for the Select Committee to investigate whether the economic
justification for HS2 has sufficiently taken into account the impact of the proposed route
on those businesses which have a significant wider national role and importance.


May 2011
                                      Written evidence from the Association of Train
                                                      Operating Companies (HSR 160)



The Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) represents train operators in
Great Britain. We welcome the chance to submit this evidence to the Transport
Committee on the case for High Speed Rail.

1. The main arguments for High Speed Rail - ATOC’s View

       1.1. ATOC firmly backs the principle of the provision of a new high speed link to the
            Midlands and beyond to provide greater capacity to allow more people and
            freight to use rail.

       1.2. The development of high speed rail and in particular High Speed 2 (HS2), with
            the Y-shaped network that the Government proposes, sets a clear, long-term
            plan that will help bring significant journey time gains to and from many regions
            of the country, including the North West, Yorkshire, the North East and Scotland.
            It will also release capacity on all three of the existing North – South main line
            corridors (the West Coast, Midland and East Coast Main Lines).

       1.3. Beyond these immediate impacts, a high speed rail network of this kind would
            provide substantial, broader benefits in development and environmental terms.
            In particular, it would:

              1.3.1. improve the economic development of the regions served, increase their
                   competitiveness and reduce their peripherality,

              1.3.2. contribute to the country’s longer-term environmental goals by attracting
                   passengers from air and car, whilst also taking the pressure off runway
                   capacity in London and the South East, and

              1.3.3. through the release of rail capacity, unlock the development of improved
                   commuter and regional services on today’s North-South main lines,
                   particularly the West Coast, whilst permitting improvement in both the
                   capacity and transit times of freight services. The latter would make a
                   significant contribution to the development of the strategic freight network
                   that the rail industry has been developing since 2007.

       1.4. The lead time for development and construction of High Speed One (HS1) was
            20 years and this is why it is right to plan now for new high-speed lines that will
            be required beyond 2020. ATOC, together with Network Rail and the Rail Freight
            Operators’ Association, has been actively working on a network-wide approach to
            investment looking at growth trends over the next Control Period (CP5) and the
            next 25 years and, in Planning Ahead 2010: the Long Term Planning Framework
            set out an initial viewpoint 1 . This document sets out the industry’s view on
            where it should be going in terms of long term improvements in customer
            satisfaction, capacity, carbon emissions and performance. It provides the

                                                            
1
 Planning for CP5; Planning Ahead 2010: The Long Term Planning Framework – see
www.networkrail.co.uk
                planning background both for CP5 and for longer-term investment plans such as
                HS2 whilst also setting out the need to continue to fund upgrades of the capacity
                and capability of existing routes, in line with the strategies the industry is now
                developing, where there is a good business case for doing this and the costs
                involved are demonstrable value for money.


2. The Strategic Route

       2.1. ATOC welcomes the Government’s conclusion that the line should be planned as
            a Y-shaped network serving not only Birmingham but also Manchester, the East
            Midlands, Sheffield and Leeds. The earlier plans for a route to Birmingham alone
            would have limited the benefits that high speed rail could bring; the new plans
            for a Y-shaped network set much clearer goals and will deliver greater
            advantages, in particular by offering high speed services to and from
            Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Sheffield. On these routes, today’s current
            journey times of 2 to 2.5 hours to London can readily be reduced to 1 to 1.5
            hours. The Y-shaped network with connections to Birmingham will also improve
            connectivity between many of the cities in England’s central belt to underpin
            economic regeneration here as well.

       2.2. We also welcome the Government’s commitment to explore further options with
           the Scottish Government for reducing journey times to and from Scotland,
           although we expect that the costs involved here are likely to mean that the
           tradeoff will be between new route construction and selective upgrades of the
           existing routes. Scotland will gain some immediate journey time benefits from
           the first stage project now being consulted on, with Anglo-Scottish expresses
           able to use the new high speed line south of the Trent Valley and further savings
           would be possible once the Y-shaped network reaches the North West.

       2.3. ATOC also supports the Government’s decision to base the London terminal of
            the high speed line at Euston. A comprehensive view is needed here of the
            additional demand this will pose for the already crowded tube network. One
            option that ATOC and Network Rail have looked at is the possible diversion of
            London Midland services at Willesden into the new Crossrail network. This would
            release track and platform capacity at Euston whilst bringing commuters directly
            into the West End rather than having to change onto tube and bus services.
            Such a project would potentially also permit the HS2 platforms to be
            accommodated within a smaller station ‘footprint’ due to the release of suburban
            platforms, facilitating reduced disruption during the station’s rebuilding.

       2.4. ATOC is pleased to see that phase 2 of the programme is now planned to include
            a spur to Heathrow. The examples of France, Germany and Spain show that a
            high speed rail network can abstract air traffic without having stations directly at
            airports, 2 however a direct airport link may make sense in the longer term,
            providing a sound business case is proven. The spur solution will avoid the
            journey time penalty that diverting the HSL via Heathrow would have created

                                                            
2
 The networks in France and Germany, for example, initially focussed on city to city
centre traffic and were only extended to airports (specifically Lyon, Paris Charles de
Gaulle and Frankfurt) later on.  
                and will also unlock the potential for additional extensions of the high speed
                network to the South and South West.

       2.5. The decision to carry out preparatory works for an eventual link to HS1 is
            important as, providing a good business case can be established, it will allow the
            development of journey opportunities into the wider European high speed
            network, not only from the Midlands and the North, but also from Heathrow, the
            West and the South West. The establishment of a link to HS1 will also accord
            closely with the EU’s 2011 Transport White Paper objectives to complete a pan-
            European high-speed rail network 3 , enabling links into existing high speed
            services across the EU (e.g. to Lyon, Bordeaux, Amsterdam, Cologne and
            Frankfurt) .

       2.6. The proposed Crossrail Interchange station at Old Oak Common would provide
            links into Central London and to Heathrow, but ATOC believes the longer-term
            business case for all HS2 and most Great Western trains to call at this station
            needs to be examined carefully. This strategy would undermine the journey time
            benefits of HS2 and journey times on the Great Western from London to
            Reading, Bristol, South Wales and the South West would be increased if stops on
            Great Western trains were introduced. In the longer term, following a Heathrow
            spur, some of the advantages of Old Oak Common as an HS2 interchange station
            for high speed services would naturally disappear and an overall balance
            therefore needs to be struck between interchange benefits, journey time
            disbenefits and the timing of any eventual direct link to Heathrow.

       2.7. The proposed station at Birmingham, Curzon Street is in a good location for the
            city but ATOC believes that planning for it needs to accommodate fast, local links
            into the city centre and to the existing rail services at New Street and Moor
            Street stations. This might be accommodated by light rail.


3. The fit with Government’s Transport Policy Objectives

       3.1. HS2 makes a significant contribution to improving city to city journey times and
           capacity, not only to and from London but also between the Midlands and the
           conurbations in the central belt, both east and west of the Pennines. The main
           motorways in these areas, the M1 and M6, are already at capacity due to the
           high levels of short to medium distance traffic; beyond measures to promote a
           smoother flow of traffic, there are few alternatives to expand the Motorways to
           accommodate further growth. By taking long distance traffic from the
           motorways, HS2 could play a role in reducing congestion on these routes and
           delaying the time when more substantial measures might be needed to improve
           capacity.

       3.2. An important aspect of high speed service planning is to operate trains beyond
            high speed lines over the ‘classic’ network. Around two-thirds of the train-
            mileage operated by TGVs in France is on the classic network, with the trains
            using the high speed lines to reduce journey times on the main corridors. In
            Germany, the equivalent proportion for the ICE network is even higher. High
                                                            
3
  “Roadmap to a single European Transport Area” – EU Commission DG MOVE -
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/2011_white_paper_en.htm 
                speed trains based on advanced rail technology have the advantage of being
                compatible with the conventional rail network, so that they can use existing city
                centre stations or run through to destinations where new construction cannot be
                justified.

       3.3. One of the principal benefits of a new high speed network in Britain would be the
            creation of additional capacity to meet the growing needs of passengers and
            freight customers across the network, both on high speed and ‘classic’ lines. A
            recent report by Greengauge 21 (of which ATOC is a member) on ‘Capturing the
            benefits of HS2 on existing lines’ 4 demonstrates that the building of HS2 would
            also allow the delivery of a wide range of improvements and increased capacity
            on traditional lines to the North West of London, in the West Midlands and
            beyond.

       3.4. The impact of HS2 on freight services running on the classic network will also be
            positive. The release of capacity by the reduction of faster services will be
            exponential, since the speed of freight services will be more closely matched to
            that of the existing and new passenger services. This could, in effect, see the
            replacement of a fast service transferred from the classic network by both a new
            semi-fast regional service and an additional freight service.

       3.5. A wide package of regional benefits could be enabled by the release of capacity
            on the classic network that HS2 allows. The following improvements at regional
            stations exemplify what could be implemented – and which would not be possible
            without HS2:

              3.5.1. Trent Valley (Lichfield, Tamworth, Nuneaton)

                         30-minute services to London and the North West.

              3.5.2. Coventry

                         An improved package of, regular local and fast services to Birmingham.

                         Cross-country services to/from North West, the South doubled from hourly
                         to 30-minutes.

                         Maintain a high frequency (30-minute) fast service to London through use of
                         more economic service options (e.g. shorter trains in off-peak)

                         New north - south service options possible due to the release of capacity at
                         Coventry e.g.:

                             Nuneaton – Coventry - Kenilworth (new station) - Leamington/Stratford.

                             Coventry - Kenilworth (new station), Bicester, High Wycombe (& London).

              3.5.3. Rugby

                         30-minute services to London and the North West. Presently hourly to
                         London, irregular to North West.
                                                            
4
  High Speed Rail – Capturing the benefits of HS2 on existing lines. Greengauge 21
February 2011.
              3.5.4. Northampton

                         Five trains per hour to London (fastest 46 mins) in the peak. Presently three
                         trains per hour (fastest 59 mins).

              3.5.5. Milton Keynes

                         Nine peak fast London services per hour. Presently four trains per hour.

                         Regular (hourly/30 minutes) direct services to West Midlands, Manchester,
                         Liverpool and Scotland. Presently irregular or off-peak.

                         Potentially, new journey opportunities on services to/from new East – West
                         Rail Link (Oxford – Milton Keynes - Bedford).

              3.5.6. Watford

                         Opportunities for regular frequency (30 minute) services to/from the West
                         London Line and south London

       3.6. The case for HS2 is also supported by recent trends in modal shift from domestic
            air routes to rail. ATOC’s latest findings 5 show that the delivery of improved,
            faster, rail services has led to a major transfer from air to rail. Between 2008
            and 2010, the market share for rail on the London – Manchester corridor rose
            from 69% to 79% whilst between London and Glasgow it rose from 12% to 20%.
            These figures indicate that the further improvements that HS2 can bring will
            deliver even greater modal shift and will, as French TGV services have done,
            wipe out demand for domestic air travel on many routes. The major shifts in
            travel patterns that this can promote will deliver additional environmental
            benefits in terms of reduced emissions.

       3.7. High speed rail will deliver a form of transport that has the potential to be
            extremely low in terms of carbon consumption, as a consequence of the
            ‘decarbonisation’ of electricity supply which is being planned by Government to
            meet national carbon reduction targets. Analysis by ATOC for Greengauge 21 6
            has shown that a journey by present high speed rail services generates only
            33% of the CO2 emissions of a comparable car journey and 25% of the
            emissions of an equivalent journey by air and this advantage will widen over
            time. Although energy use increases with speed, the sophisticated design of
            high speed trains together with their high load factors substantially offsets this.

       3.8. An issue that ATOC has long been concerned about is the risk that spending on
            HS2 might draw funding away from the existing ‘classic’ network. In our view, it
            is important not to view these as competing options: the ‘classic’ network is
            complementary to HS2 both in acting as a feeder to the high speed services and
            in enabling the wider benefits across the rail network that HS2 can allow. We
            were very encouraged by the outcome of Spending Review 2010, in which the
                                                            
5
   “Shift from air to rail heralds ‘turning point’ in how people travel between UK’s main
cities” ATOC, 5 April 2011. 
 
6
   Energy consumption and CO2 impacts of High Speed Rail: ATOC analysis for
Greengauge 21, ATOC, April 2009 
      Government recognised this point and safeguarded investment in the ‘classic’
      network whilst also setting aside substantial funding to take HS2 forward. The
      McNulty ‘value for money’ review will be key in setting out the way forward in
      terms of the affordability of future investment but the point remains that a
      balanced approach to rail investment will remain important.

4. Business Case

  4.1. ATOC notes that HS2’s cost estimates are higher than those assumed by the
       Network Rail and Greengauge 21 studies but still generate a positive business
       case, with a benefit/cost ratio of 2:1. However, to ensure efficient delivery,
       ATOC believes that the opportunity should be taken to review these costs and to
       assess the benefits of wider private sector involvement in construction and
       operation. This will both help maintain firm control on costs and create a clear
       commercial link between the revenues earned from the line and the costs
       incurred to achieve them which can help offset the risk of cost increases. The
       UK’s train operators have wide experience of high speed operation, including
       Southeastern and Eurostar on High Speed One and of the demand and growth
       patterns in the regions to be served and we have met HS2 on a number of
       occasions to share this experience.

  4.2. We do not support the position taken by some commentators that a further
       upgrade of the existing West Coast Main Line (WCML) would be a better
       alternative to building HS2. The recent upgrade of the WCML cost about £9bn,
       caused significant disruption to existing services and the limited additional
       capacity it delivered is likely to be consumed at peak time well before 2020.
       There are also significant physical limits on what could be done next: for
       example construction of two new parallel tracks alongside the existing line would
       be impossible in some locations and the curvature of the route would still
       constrain line speeds to similar levels as those of today.

  4.3. There are probably opportunities to improve the business case by challenging
       aspects of its cost and it is to be expected that, as the project progresses, the
       business case will evolve further, not least through the application of the findings
       of the Value for Money review.



May 2011
      Written evidence from Campaign for Better Transport (HSR 161)


1.     Background

1.1    Campaign for Better Transport has been involved in the debates on the merits of the proposals for
       the HS2 route from London to Birmingham and beyond since they were initially developed by the last
       government. Campaign for Better Transport chief executive Stephen Joseph is a member of the HS2
       challenge group and we have also worked with a range of other environmental organisations to
       coordinate responses to the proposals and to arrange meetings with officials and ministers.

1.2    There is a tendency for much of the debate on HS2 to be dominated by those backing the idea of
       high speed rail on the one hand (who can be less concerned with discussion of alternatives in the
       desire to see the scheme through) and those opposed at all costs to the proposals (often because
       they are directly affected but using wider arguments to try to oppose the plans). With other
       organisations, we have focussed on the details of what is being proposed and are backing the Right
       Lines Charter Group’s work to ensure that if high speed rail proposals do go ahead, then they are
       done well.

1.3    Campaign for Better Transport’s focus generally is more on people’s everyday transport and, in the
       context of rail, that services are accessible, affordable and convenient. There is a danger that too
       much focus on the new proposals for high speed rail will deflect attention away from the
       improvements we need on the existing “classic” railway.

1.4    Our initial work on high speed rail was informed by five priorities for any proposals for high speed
       rail. These were that the Government should:

       •   Prioritise investment in existing public and local transport and ensure that high speed rail does
           not abstract funding from these

       •   Use high speed rail to shift existing trips from planes and cars, not generate new ones

       •   Use pricing to encourage people to choose rail – lower train fares and increased taxes on short
           distance flights are needed

       •   Include a moratorium on airport expansion and major road development

       •   Integrate the high speed line with wider planning and regeneration

       •   Avoid or if absolutely necessary mitigate impacts on environmentally sensitive sites and protect
           tranquil areas



2.     Right Lines Charter Group proposals
2.1       Campaign for Better Transport is a member of the Right Lines Charter Group, which is a grouping of
          environmental NGOs seeking to ensure that if high speed rail proposals are to go ahead, they are
          done well. We have worked closely with the Campaign to Protect Rural England in the development
          of the Charter, including organising a recent meeting with Secretary of State Philip Hammond. The
          Charter 1 sets out four priorities for high speed rail:

          •   Principle 1. National Strategy: High Speed Rail proposals need to be set in the context of a
              long-term transport strategy stating clear objectives.

          •   Principle 2. Testing the Options: Major infrastructure proposals, such as High Speed Rail, need
              to be 'future-proofed' by comprehensive testing against different scenarios. This will help identify
              the best solutions for genuinely furthering sustainable development.

          •   Principle 3. Public Participation: Early public involvement in the development of major
              infrastructure proposals, including High Speed Rail, is essential. People need to be involved
              when all options are open for discussion and effective participation can take place.

          •   Principle 4. Minimising Adverse Impacts: High Speed Rail proposals need to be designed from
              the start to avoid significant adverse impacts on the natural environment, cultural heritage and
              local communities (including biodiversity, landscape, tranquillity and access) during construction
              and operation.



3.        National transport strategy and the business case for HS2

3.1       Campaign for Better Transport has called for a clearer national transport strategy for a number of
          years. Decisions about transport investments, particularly when the sums involved are of the scale of
          tends of billions of pounds over a number of decades, must be clearly part of a coherent national
          strategy rather than merely justified on the basis of a benefit cost ratio (BCR).

3.2       Both proponents and critics of HS2 have focused on the published business case and its
          assessment of time savings, demand forecasts and carbon savings. The reality of HS2 is that the
          numbers are inherently unreliable. They are based on business as usual forecasts extrapolating past
          trends, which for a long term business case will inevitably not prove accurate.

3.3       For example, higher oil prices will drive up rail demand beyond the level assumed in the business
          plan, while extra rail capacity, if used for railfreight or local passenger trains, will help reduce carbon
          beyond the HS2 forecasts, especially if allied with supportive planning policies and less rather than
          more roads and runways. The time savings values are also spurious and we have criticised reliance
          on them in transport appraisal more generally.

3.4       The real question for HS2 is how it fits with a wider package of policies in a coherent transport
          strategy. It is difficult to make assumptions about HS2 without clarity on what will happen to roads,
          airports, planning, local public transport, lorry charging, aviation taxes and other Government
          policies. The business case does address this to some extent with a short discussion on scenarios
          based on changes in relative pricing and this should be subject to wider discussion than it has been.



4.        Remaining questions for high speed rail


1
    See http://www.cpre.org.uk/resources/transport/item/download/531 for details of the Charter
4.1       The plans for HS2 still need to do more to demonstrate that the line will result in a real shift to rail
          from driving and flying and, as a result, cut carbon emissions from transport. Transport produces a
          fifth of our domestic emissions and is still the sector where little fundamental progress on carbon has
          been made. The Department for Transport's model for the first phase of the high speed network
          suggests that there will be just a one per cent drop in motorway traffic as a result with most trips on
          the new line being from those who would otherwise have travelled on the old west coast mainline.
          Not surprisingly, the best that this scenario can do is to be "broadly carbon neutral".

4.2       But the scale of the climate change challenge requires us to do much more - particularly with HS2's
          price tag running into the tens of billions. To do this, the government has to do three things. Firstly, it
          must continue to invest in the existing (or "classic") rail network. Secondly, it needs to enable
          investment in local sustainable transport access to stations. And thirdly, it must introduce
          complimentary measures to make rail more attractive than driving or flying.

4.3       Philip Hammond has recognised in public statements that spending on HS2 needs to be additional to
          continued investment in the classic network. The confirmation of electrification to Cardiff is a good
          sign. Spending on rail has been maintained in this CP4 spending period (if at the expense of
          massive rises in most ticket prices). But the real challenge will be after 2015 when the main costs of
          HS2 will come in and when it will compete with other schemes that have been “moved to the right” in
          the next CP5 investment period. To cut carbon, the government must continue with further
          electrification of lines in this period and in growing the railways.

4.4       Continued investment in rail is also essential if the benefits of the “liberated capacity” on the West
          Coast Mainline are to be fully realised. Released capacity could deliver benefits for passengers 2 , for
          instance through new timetabling to enable more services and investment in improved links and lines
          like the proposed East West rail link, and could help deliver increased freight usage. This requires
          continued support for rail freight, for instance by ensuring that the new National Planning Policy
          Framework for spatial planning supports the development of rail freight depots.

4.5       Using the planning system to foster growth and locate new development (such as warehousing and
          housing) to take advantage of these extra services would increase the benefits from HS2, which are
          not currently taken account of in DfT’s business case.

4.6       New stations on the high speed route must be accessible by public transport if they are not to add to
          congestion and carbon. Local transport investment has been significantly scaled back to 2015 but
          new stations need to be linked to existing and improved local transport networks, as well as being
          easily accessible for those coming on foot or by bike. Providing investment for local transport
          improvements will be key and will help avoid overloading already stretched local transport services.
          The new stations for the second phase of HS2 should be located close to existing city centres rather
          than in stand-alone parkway stations.

4.7       Both high speed rail and classic rail must be attractive in terms of pricing relative to flying and
          driving. Since 1997 the cost of motoring has fallen by seven per cent in real terms and the cost of
          flights within the UK fell by a third. Rail fares rose by 17% over the same period, and will now rise
          even faster with the Government's decision for most fares to rise by three per cent above the RPI
          inflation rate.

4.8       The detailed business case published with the HS2 consultation shows that if rail fares continue to
          rise, its benefits will be much less - so much less that they will be outweighed by the costs of the


2
    See Capturing the benefits of HS2 on existing lines, Greengauge, February 2011
          project. Campaign for Better Transport's Fair Fares Now campaign shows the strength of feeling
          from those facing fare rises.



5.        Public participation

5.1       On public participation, we are aware that the Government’s view is that there are limits to the
          changes that can be made now for this phase, given the need to avoid further blight and stay within
          the current timetable for delivery. We remain seriously concerned, however, about the limitations of
          the current approach to public consultation on the route. Campaign for Better Transport will continue
          to raise concerns about the preferred route, but we would also be keen to explore what options are
          available in practice to changes in design and alignment on this section to avoid the valuable and
          sensitive sites and places that are currently likely to be affected.

5.2       On the second phase, we believe that in looking north of Birmingham, it would be worth considering
          ways of planning and public engagement that are different and more inclusive than the way in which
          phase one has been done. There is a tension between being open and inclusive in planning the
          route and the need to avoid casting blight over a wide area but the Government should explore the
          options for early engagement, with reference to good practice in other countries and on other major
          infrastructure projects in this country including HS1.



6.        Access to Heathrow

6.1       Campaign for Better Transport agrees with Lord Mawhinney’s conclusion in his report 3 for the
          Department for Transport that a Heathrow link is not necessary at this stage and that the existing rail
          network is used to link Heathrow with high-speed rail connecting London with other British cities and
          the rest of Europe.

6.2       We also believe that the question of HSR connections to Heathrow is linked to whether there is a full
          link and through trains between HS2 and HS1. This will enlarge the market where rail can substitute
          for air to include journeys between the UK regions and near-Europe destinations.



7.        Conclusion

7.1       HS2 could deliver the step-change in travel that we need to cut carbon and support the future needs
          of the economy, but it must be part of an overall strategy to shift to rail for many journeys. A decision
          to go-ahead with this level of spending needs wider support. Failure to demonstrate how HS2 fits
          into an overall strategy for transport will risk losing green groups as a key element of that wider
          support.

7.2       However, critics of the proposals need to address how the increase in demand for travel for the
          Birmingham-London route will be met. Even if there is little change in the split of modes for travel on
          the Birmingham-London route, demand for rail travel on this route will outstrip the capacity of the
          existing network. If there are policies to restrain demand for car and air travel (and even with policies
          to reduce the need to travel overall), there will still be a need to address the capacity issue and this
          would be likely to lead to an overall rise in the demand for rail travel.

May 2011

3
    High speed rail access to Heathrow: a report by Lord Mawhinney, Department for Transport, July 2010
          Written evidence from the London Borough of Newham (HSR 162) 
                                          
1.       What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 
 
1.1      We believe the compelling argument in favour of a new high speed rail 
         network is not just that it will bring UK cities together with resulting 
         economic benefits but that it can also link the West Midlands, the North and 
         Scotland with European destinations for trade, commerce, leisure and 
         tourism.   
 
1.2      Business growth overwhelmingly relies on transport infrastructure, and if the 
         Government is serious about rebalancing the UK’s economy and generating 
         further growth outside the capital, high speed rail is a pre‐requisite. Huge 
         extensions of the European high speed rail network are being planned and 
         delivered. The UK should be looking at becoming an integral part of this 
         network.  
 
1.3      That is why Newham has welcomed the link between the new high speed 
         two line and the existing high speed one (Channel Tunnel) line currently 
         operated by Eurostar. The country is constructing a railway for the next 100 
         years; given this, it is critical to take the long term approach. The alternative 
         is to build a discrete set of lines which fail to join up and, by extension, fail to 
         capitalise on the growth which would be generated by a link between 
         European cities and the UK regions.  
 
1.4      Those who question the existence of a market to travel between the UK 
         North and Europe are often not including economic projections around 
         growth and business relocation. We remain concerned that regeneration 
         benefits are not fully taken into account in the appraisal of major transport 
         schemes. In many transport schemes (the Thames Gateway Bridge is a local 
         example) regeneration benefits are not fully included in the Benefit to Cost 
         and investment appraisals. 
 
1.5      The regeneration benefits seen at existing Eurostar stations have driven at 
         least £6 billion of gross development value. 1  A report for London and 
         Continental Railways on the total regeneration benefits of High Speed 1 
         estimated these as £17bn. LSE and the University of Hamburg also 
         demonstrated that high‐speed rail lines bring significant economic benefits 
         to the communities they serve, the first thorough statistical research on the 
         subject. Towns connected to a new high‐speed line saw their GDP rise by at 
         least 2.7 per cent compared to neighbours not on the route. 2 
 


1
  Development press releases, Kings Cross Central Limited Partnership, Stratford City development 
limited.  
2
  From Periphery to Core: economic adjustments to high speed rail by Gabriel M Ahlfeldt (LSE) and Arne 
Feddersen (University of Hamburg)
1.6        The benefits of investment in transport are well documented; High Speed 2 
           Ltd’s work demonstrated that the first step of the London to Birmingham 
           high speed line would generate a return of £2 for every £1 spent. 3 
 
The strategic route  
2.1    Having said this, we believe the proposed current HS2 route does not make 
       the most of existing high speed rail assets. Stratford International station, in 
       Newham, is international only in name and we believe it is in danger of 
       becoming a white elephant; despite its strategic location at the heart of the 
       2012 Olympic district springing up in London’s new metropolitan centre. We 
       believe Stratford is an option that has not been fully explored in the 
       consultation.  
 
Sweating existing transport assets  
2.2    Stratford International station has had public investment of over £210m to 
       make it fit for its purpose as an international stopping point, and £238m has 
       been invested in an extension of the Docklands Light Railway due to open 
       this summer and enabling international travellers better access to Docklands 
       in particular. Yet still no international services are stopping at the station.  
 
2.3    We have clear evidence that demonstrates a commercial case for operators 
       to stop at Stratford now on the existing High Speed One line. However, we 
       are also anxious that the station is utilised to its full potential in the new 
       network.  
 
2.4    Stratford could be used as a complementary station to Euston and Old Oak 
       Common – with international trains from Birmingham and the North using 
       Stratford as their London stop and also with Stratford acting as an 
       intermediary stop for some intercity High Speed Two trains. 
 
Preventing duplication of investment 
2.5    There are several advantages to Stratford. The London Borough of Newham 
       supports a station at Old Oak Common in West London in order to enable a 
       connection between the new HS2 and the existing HS1 lines.  However, the 
       original role for the Old Oak Common interchange station did not envisage it 
       as an international station. Since the Old Oak interchange station was first 
       proposed it has now been suggested its scale should be enhanced so that it 
       becomes a superhub and an international station ‐ with the infrastructure 
       alone costing over £200m. This clearly duplicates investment in Stratford. 

2.6        If Old Oak is used as an international station, passengers would have to 
           change at Old Oak and board a second (HS1) train in order to complete their 
           journey to Europe. However, we do also need to be able to provide a single 
           train service joining the North and the Midlands to the European network. 
           We believe Stratford to be the best option for this. 

3
     High Speed Rail Command Paper, p.13 (Mar 2010) 
2.7    Stratford International already has the facilities needed to be an 
       international station. With the recent addition of the eastern egress 
       walkway, the capacity of the station for traveller numbers has been doubled. 
       Using Stratford can therefore relieve the pressure on Euston by dispersing 
       excessive traveller numbers, providing a more sustainable solution. Utilising 
       Stratford as an existing asset would create a more sustainable solution for 
       the future needs of the capital – population growth around Euston has 
       already peaked and the expansion needed to make Euston a station is 
       already very considerable.  
 
2.8    It can also link international business clients with Canary Wharf and the City 
       in a fraction of the time it would take them to travel from St Pancras, Euston 
       or Old Oak Common. It is vital we “sweat the use” of such a transport asset.  
 
Clear demand 
2.9    The stop at Stratford would create extra passengers from a large and distinct 
       catchment area including much of London, Essex and East Anglia to join the 
       trains. Stratford covers one of the widest catchment areas in Greater London 
       and is easier to get to by car, taxi and public transport for most passengers, 
       with the exception of those coming from West London. And as the planned 
       economic development continues in the East, more passenger numbers will 
       be generated. 
 
2.10 Colin Buchanan Associates have demonstrated that stopping at Stratford 
       now on High Speed One (existing Channel Tunnel line) is financially viable, 
       would see 2 million passengers opt to use the station annually and deliver 
       £600m in user benefits in the evaluation period (based on the Department 
       for Transport’s own methodology for valuing journey time savings). 
 
2.11 Some 30 percent of Eurostar passengers would switch to Stratford from St 
       Pancras. An additional 51,000 passengers would be created through Eurostar 
       stopping at Stratford. The revenue contribution from stopping at Stratford 
       International has been conservatively estimated at around £5.5 million by 
       2016 and £7 million by 2026. The latter forecast in particular is likely to be on 
       the low side when Crossrail ‐ with 5 stations in Newham ‐ is operational and 
       additional West Anglia services are expected to be available by 2021. 
 
Following existing economic growth trends in London 
2.12 By 2025 when the line is built, many passengers will have East London as 
       their end destination. Stratford is at the centre of a growing commercial 
       district in East London. This stretches Old Street to the Olympic Park 
       including the Prime Minister’s vision for a ‘Tech City’ in East London, down to 
       London’s only Enterprise Zone in the Royal Docks, and across to the O2, 
       Greenwich peninsula, Canary Wharf and the City. This new growth corridor 
       would be hugely supported by the ability to utilise Stratford as the 
       international high speed rail hub it was intended to be. There is currently no 
       major transport hub east of Liverpool Street to serve this growing business 
       community.  
 
2.13   We are expecting East London to become the economic powerhouse for the 
       capital over the next two decades. Stratford holds a unique strategic position 
       in the economic development of London and the UK as a whole. Within the 
       next decade, it will have become London’s major metropolitan centre 
       outside the City and West End, with the development of a high quality 
       commercial, residential and retail offering, including Westfield Stratford City 
       and the Olympic parklands. Stratford will be a prime visitor attraction; a 
       vibrant area to work and do business; and a fantastic place to live.  
             •    Stratford is home to the Olympic Park, the biggest new urban park 
                  in the country.  
             •    It already has 5 million square feet of consented office space.   
             •    Westfield is opening the biggest urban retail development in 
                  Europe at Stratford.  Westfield's £1.5 billion scheme includes 340 
                  shops opening in September 2011. 
             •    It is the growth hub along with the Royals for the Mayor of 
                  London's Green Enterprise District. 
             •    Stratford already enjoys enviable transport connections into west 
                  London, the City and Canary Wharf. It currently takes around 12 
                  minutes to travel to Canary Wharf, 20 minutes to Oxford Circus, 
                  and 25 minutes to Westminster (all direct services). This 
                  connectivity will be further supported by the opening of the DLR 
                  Stratford Internation extension in the summer of 2011 and  
                  Crossrail in 2017, which will link Stratford to Heathrow in the 
                  West. 
 
2.14   Independent analysis by Oxford Economics shows that the potential for 
       growth in East London is hugely significant and could have a national impact. 
       However, the right infrastructure is absolutely vital to enable us to capitalise 
       on potential for growth and regeneration. If we do not provide the right 
       conditions for the private sector to invest over the next decade, it may not 
       happen.  
 
2.15   This explains the significant business backing we have for the Stratford case, 
       from AEG (owners of the O2), Canary Wharf Group, Westfield Stratford City, 
       and London’s largest international conference centre ExCeL, among others. It 
       also has cross political party support. Lord Heseltine, Chair of the Regional 
       Growth Fund advisory board has said: “The fact that we are still arguing 
       about whether High Speed One trains should stop at Stratford after all of this 
       time is mind blowing, and represents a massive failure of government.” 
        
   
May 2011 
          Written evidence from the London (Heathrow) Airport
                    Consultative Committee (HSR 163)


Inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail

On behalf of the London (Heathrow) Airline Consultative Committee (LACC)
and the Heathrow Airline Operators Committee (AOC) we are grateful for the
opportunity to comment on the Strategic case for High Speed Rail (HSR). Our
comments are focused exclusively on the need to provide a direct link to
Heathrow as the nation’s hub airport and the implications for wider transport
policy in general.

In response to Question 2 as to how HSR fits with the Government’s transport
policy objectives in the context of aviation, our understanding is that these
would be best met by including Heathrow on the mainline HSR route. This
primary alignment would meet the following criteria:

   •   Satisfy the Government’s policy for the integration of transport
       systems;
   •   Facilitate the effective migration from domestic aviation to the rail
       network;
   •   Maximize economic benefits and the competitiveness of industry in the
       distribution network for goods and services;
   •   Reduce carbon emissions through air/rail modal shift; and
   •   Respond to European aspirations for full intermodality and connectivity
       with Europe’s fast growing high speed rail network.

In order to meet these objectives, the view of the airlines at Heathrow is that a
HS2 scheme, in terms of the routing, should provide the following attributes:

   •   A “seamless” transfer for passengers and baggage at a HS2 rail station
       located at or near Heathrow to enable modal shift from air to rail;
   •   Ideally that this station should be en-route on the HS2 mainline as
       opposed to a spur to maximize potential connectivity benefits;
   •   The Heathrow HS2 station should be an intermodal solution which is
       fully integrated into the UK transport network along designs similar to
       equivalent hubs at Frankfurt, Paris and Amsterdam and which attract
       EU funding from the Trans European Network -T initiative (TEN-T).

The existing HS2 scheme and the Secretary of State for Transport‘s
recommendations in December 2010 propose that the airport should be
connected to HS2 via a spur to the north of the airport. This will be
constructed in Phase 2, alongside links to Manchester and Leeds. We believe
that although a spur would deliver benefits to Heathrow it will not maximise all
the benefits that an en-route station would do, as detailed above. This has
implications for both meeting Government objectives and the affordability of
the scheme.
The LACC and AOC will be taking part in the Government’s consultation
process with a view to improving surface access at Heathrow. Our aim will be
to ensure the best possible outcome for both Heathrow and the UK transport
system.

Whilst we fully respect the Government’s desire for economic balancing
across the UK, the airlines are of the strong view that the strategic route for
HSR must be fully integrated with an en-route station at or near Heathrow.
Only this solution will meet the Government’s and the airlines requirements to
enhance the air and rail passenger experience in a fully integrated transport
solution aligned with European norms and developments.

May 2011


 




                    London (Heathrow) Airport Consultative Committee
                          Rm 2044 D’Albiac House, Cromer Road
                                    Heathrow Airport
                             Hounslow, Middlesex TW6 1SD
 Written evidence from Staffordshire County Council (HSR 164)

1.   Staffordshire is one of a number of counties that make up the central
     ‘cross roads’ of Britain and is consequently very much aware of the
     significance of the transport network to the well being of the economy and
     the people of Staffordshire. Part of this awareness includes the need for
     the networks, primarily road and rail, to work effectively and not suffer from
     unreliability and congestion. Consequently the County Council welcomes
     efforts to maintain or improve the network in these respects. Upgrades to
     the West Coast Main Line have and will continue to bring benefits in terms
     of service improvements to various stations/settlements across
     Staffordshire.

2.   Maintaining and improving the economic well being of the County and its
     residents is the top priority of the County Council. Much of the County
     Council’s activities are focussed on this priority, including its own
     transportation policies and proposals. It is against this background that
     the County Council has come to its views with regard to the present High
     Speed Rail proposal.

3.   The primary concern regarding the current High Speed Rail proposal with
     respect to the economy of Staffordshire is the prospect of deterioration in
     rail passenger services available at stations/settlements in the county, in
     particular in north Staffordshire. While HS2 highlight the potential benefits
     of available capacity released as a result of introducing the new line, there
     are no guarantees that viable services of the existing quality will be
     provided.

4.   While Stafford may be served by a High Speed train service using the
     classic network to Liverpool, the likely absence of any other stop/s in
     Staffordshire on the HS2 ‘Y’ network as a very consequence of its ‘need
     for speed’ and limitation on stops, puts Staffordshire at an economic
     disadvantage with the prospect of loosing economic development both
     existing and new.

5.   While specific to Staffordshire, similar concerns are relevant to authorities
     along the route/s most of which will not have stations on the High Speed
     network. Also in the wider context, the importance/value attached to
     station to station time savings as opposed to real full journey times
     (including time taken to get to and from the stations) is considered to have
     been grossly overstated. The wider economic benefits have been
     assessed as modest by HS2, and their advisers, and international
     experience has shown them to be limited in extent around stations and
     often simply local redistribution of development.
6.   The County Council does not deny the need for improvements to the
     national transport network but is of the view that the current High Speed
     Rail Network proposal, intrinsically (by virtue of the essential
     characteristics and requirements of High Speed Rail) fails to maximize the
      possible benefits of such improvements across the country and presents a
      real risk of concentrating future economic development rather than
      dispersing it away from London and the south east.

Specific issues to be addressed by the Committee:

1. What are the main arguments (either for or) against HSR?

7.    The UK does not need very expensive ‘off the shelf’ new High Speed Rail
      infrastructure technology to provide the most worthwhile solution to its
      capacity problems and in the process improve economic prospects across
      the nation. The circumstances of the UK warrant a particular approach
      that recognises the quality and speed of existing services; the potential to
      improve them within the existing network and individual corridors; the need
      for greater flexibility in routing in order to protect the environment; and the
      need to serve many more centres than the few on the proposed High
      Speed network.

8.    The ‘high speed’ characteristics of the proposed infrastructure are
      unnecessary. Compared to other countries the existing speed of rail travel
      between major cities is already faster in the UK. The proposed increased
      speed levels provide only marginal real journey time (trip beginning to trip
      end) improvements for most journeys. Appropriate increases in the speed
      of journeys on the existing network can be achieved by the full use of
      existing technology in particular the use of European Rail Traffic
      Management System (ERTMS) or in cab signalling, and specific targeted
      network improvements.

9.    Various actions have been proposed as ways of increasing capacity on
      the railway network including lengthening trains, converting some first
      class seats to standard class, and providing specific targeted line
      improvements together with programmed improvements such as at Norton
      Bridge and Stafford, which can be implemented at significantly lower cost
      and with the prospect of much quicker benefits.

10.   The case for economic benefit as a result of faster rail connectivity is
      unproven. Research into international experience clearly indicates that it
      is difficult to find well defined empirical and quantified evidence on the
      impacts of HSR. The wider economic effects of HSR could be significant
      but they are not always obvious or predictable and can vary significantly
      between different HSR projects. The possible economic consequence is
      just as likely to be a “drain” of any economic benefit into London as it is to
      be a “gain” for the locations on the route. Furthermore, the increased used
      of e-business solutions means that historical models that might link
      economic prosperity with rail accessibility are likely to be outdated. The
      benefits case for business (which makes incorrect assumptions such as
      the idea that time spent on the train is “lost” working time) is ill-conceived
      and overstated.
11.   Even if a case could be made to link economic growth with rail, the
      presumption of limited stopping restricts the number of localities that could
      potentially benefit from any service improvements and consequently
      places those localities not served, included all of Staffordshire, at a
      potential disadvantage that can be made worse by the possible
      deterioration of services available as business and income is diverted onto
      the new high speed network.

12.   In terms of environmental impact, the proposed infrastructure will have
      significant and inappropriate adverse impacts in terms of accommodation
      within the environment.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

13.   Inter-Urban Connectivity: HSR is partial in the extreme in its improvements
      to inter-urban connectivity and may actually cause a deterioration. This is
      by virtue of the limited number of stations that are proposed and indeed
      are required in order to achieve the speeds sought. The passenger
      numbers required to justify the HSR proposal while potentially providing
      new path opportunities for new services on the classic network, put in
      question whether they could be economically justified or that the
      necessary subsidies would be available. Consequently, there is a real
      prospect of deterioration in inter-urban connectivity for many major urban
      areas and significant settlements.

14.   Carbon Reduction: The proposed HSR is at best carbon neutral and even
      this is based in part on the large increase in passenger numbers and
      speed of travel that are essential parts of the justification for the project.
      The Government is committed to reducing carbon emissions and yet is
      proposing transport infrastructure that, by virtue of these two fundamental
      requirements, is making no contribution to such a reduction. Contrary to
      the fundamental feature of HSR, Government/Department for Transport is
      positively seeking ways of reducing travel and in particular business travel.
      It is monetary value attached to time spent on such travel that is critical to
      the business case for HSR.

3. Business case

15.   There is no doubt that the use of the railways by passengers and freight
      has been increasing over the recent past. Similarly there can be little to
      counter the prospect of this increase continuing for some time to come
      both of its own accord and positively encouraged by the diversion of traffic
      from less sustainable road and air travel. Improvements in transport and
      communications over history have undoubtedly had economic benefits for
      the country albeit with varying impacts on different regions/areas/places
      depending on the localities served or ignored/bypassed.

16.   Some projections of future travel demand have been based on
      relationships with forecast levels of economic growth. This should not be
      the basis for assuming that economic growth is founded on increased
      capacity to travel, rather that travel demand may be generated by
      increased personal wealth. The HS2 business case confirms this by
      anticipating 70% of future passengers/journeys will be for leisure
      purposes.

17.   The basis for high future travel requirements needs to be questioned in the
      context of government aims to cut the need for business travel being
      investigated by Department for Transport.

18.   There is much debate around the basis for forecasting future travel
      demand particularly over the long term which provides the context for the
      assessment of the high speed rail network. There is concern that the
      Government’s proposal and its justification are based on unjustified
      projections of travel requirements including substantial new demand
      expected to be generated by the existence of the high speed service, and
      with over optimistic expectations of modal shift.

19.   Both policy and technology are working to reduce the need to travel. The
      Government/Department for Transport is positively seeking ways of
      reducing travel and in particular business travel as part of its ‘green’
      commitment. Technology forms part of this search with recent advances
      in e-technology including e-conferencing often removing the requirement
      to travel completely. As a consequence of these developments forward
      projection of travel demand should be approached cautiously.

20.   The evidence for linking significant economic development with high
      speed train facilities is inconclusive. A particular set of circumstances
      would appear to be necessary for significant economic development to
      take place (well established or strongly developing service sector with
      extensive local public transport networks) and most of this development
      would appear to be simply diverted from other localities rather than totally
      new.

21.   The material presented in support of the proposal with respect to new job
      creation shows a clear emphasis on it being located in and around London
      in the south east rather than remedying the north-south divide as claimed
      elsewhere.      At the Birmingham end of the current defined route,
      supporters of the proposal show future economic activity focussed
      increasingly on central Birmingham and to a lesser extent near the
      interchange facility, to the detriment of other parts of the conurbation and
      the rest of the region including virtually all of Staffordshire.

22.   Given the regular and consistent over running of major infrastructure
      project costs in this country there is little reason to expect the already high
      costs of the proposed high speed rail network to be anything other than a
      minimum cost. The benefits are at best contrived in terms of the amount
      and valuation of travel time savings and otherwise minimal (wider
      economic impacts) or un-quantified (the statements of support from
      business). The method of financial appraisal effectively pre-empts the
      form of the proposal, maximum speed with limited stops thus
      fundamentally questioning the appropriateness of the evaluation process
      used.

23.   The level of government subsidy included in the HS2 business case
      already amounting to £17bn is likely to exceed this level if project costs
      were to increase and the projected passenger numbers were to prove
      unrealistic overestimates. This was the case with HS1 and is increasingly
      becoming the experience in many parts of the world. Most recently
      reports suggest the Dutch high speed rail is rapidly heading for bankruptcy
      and several states in America are pulling out of the President’s high speed
      rail programme with fears that traffic forecasts are over-inflated.

24.   The costs (or disbenefits) need to include the reductions in the number
      and quality of services from settlements/stations that currently have a
      good intercity service. While the potential released capacity on the
      existing/classic network might provide new paths for new services,
      whether they would be economically viable or receive the necessary level
      of public subsidy is a matter of conjecture.

4. The strategic route

25.   As commented under other headings, the strategic route and stations
      proposed are essentially determined by the project requirements in terms
      of speed and necessary journey time savings. If these ‘essentials’ are
      changed then the ability to serve more stations, either existing or new, with
      improved services is increased with potentially greater economic benefits
      for more settlements and communities. Alongside the north Staffordshire
      conurbation, Stafford and Burton within Staffordshire are recognised as
      potential growth locations that could benefit from inclusion on the
      enhanced network.

26.   The idea of a phased roll-out of network improvements is fully supported
      but on a different scale to that attached to the current proposal, the first
      benefits of which would not be available until 2026 at the earliest.
      Incremental improvements to the existing network such as included in
      Atkins Rail Package 2 would allow benefits to be realised on a phased and
      more prompt implementation.

27.   Linking directly to the High Speed 1 line to the Channel Tunnel would have
      potential benefits for more distant parts of the country including
      Staffordshire.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

28.   There appears to be little evidence that HSR will/can promote economic
      regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide. As
      commented under other headings, international evidence appears to
      suggest the need for very specific circumstances to exist (well established
      or strongly developing service sector with extensive local public transport
      networks) and that most development would appear to be simply diverted
      from other localities rather than totally new.

29.   Furthermore, the evidence presented by HS2 would suggest that the
      greater part of the economic benefits will accrue to London and the south
      east thereby further enhancing the north-south divide.

6. Impact

30.   While appreciating that to date much of the Appraisal of Sustainability has
      been of a strategic nature, it must be realised that this seriously
      underestimates the impact of the proposal. In particular, the visual impact
      on local communities has not been addressed or the impact on the local
      landscapes; the impacts on biodiversity are downplayed by
      underestimating impacts on designated sites and failing to address
      impacts on species and of fragmentation of ecological networks; impacts
      to Grade II Listed structures which, by their nature are also considered to
      be of national significance are currently ignored; vibration and noise from
      works and increased traffic along surrounding roads, as well as within the
      construction corridor may have a considerable impact. There are a
      number of shortcomings in assessments of noise impacts included in the
      Appraisal including: the absence of site surveys or baseline noise surveys
      having been carried out for the noise appraisal; probable need to adapt
      the assessment procedure to take into account the aerodynamic noise
      effects which occur at very high speeds; the need to take account of the
      potential adverse noise impact from the short term high pass by noise
      from individual trains; the possibility of locally lower ambient noise levels
      than those assumed in the Appraisal that mean for the section of the line
      through Staffordshire, being primarily rural and routed away from urban
      areas, the noise impact could be significantly greater than currently
      indicated.

May 2011
                    Written evidence from British Airways (HSR 165) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.    British Airways welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Transport Select 
      Committee’s inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Speed Rail.  The inquiry is timely 
      and seeks to address the key themes in the current debate. 
 
2.    In this memorandum, British Airways has focussed its response on the impact of 
      High Speed Rail (HSR) on UK aviation, and in particular, offers a perspective as a 
      Heathrow‐based carrier.  It has addressed issues of concern to its business and the 
      aviation industry. 
 
3.    British Airways is one of the world’s largest international airlines, carrying 
      approximately 32 million passengers worldwide annually on around 750 daily flights.  
      The airline employs almost 40,000 people, the vast majority of these at its sites 
      throughout the UK. 

4.      The airline’s two main operating bases are London’s Heathrow and Gatwick airports, 
        with a smaller base at London City airport serving New York and European business 
        destinations.  From these, British Airways flies 237 aircraft to 152 destinations in 75 
        countries.  In addition to passengers, the airline also transports cargo – more than 
        750,000 tonnes of cargo are carried around the globe each year. 

5.      In 2010, the airline completed its merger with Iberia of Spain to create the 
        International Airlines Group (IAG).  Our combined business offers flights to 205 
        destinations throughout the world on a fleet of 415 aircraft.  It also commenced a 
        joint business agreement with American Airlines, which further extends the benefits 
        for its customers.  The combined network of British Airways, Iberia and American 
        Airlines serves 433 destinations in 105 countries with more than 5,180 daily 
        departures. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
6.   British Airways believes the optimal High Speed Rail (HSR) scheme for the UK should 
     operate the mainline via Heathrow between Birmingham and London and include a 
     High Speed 2 (HS2) station at the airport. This would allow all trains to stop at the 
     airport,  maximising  connectivity  to  destinations  on  the  network  and  allowing 
     maximum  economic  benefits  and  carbon  reductions  to  be  realised.  This  scheme 
     would have the most compelling business case for airlines and would go furthest to 
     realising the Government aim of air‐rail substitution. 
 
7.   The above model is the one used throughout Europe for integrating new high speed 
     rail  lines  with  existing  hub  airports.  At  Paris  Charles  De  Gaulle,  Frankfurt  and 
     Amsterdam the high speed mainline runs via the airport with the station located at 
     the  terminal  of  the  main  network  airline  ‐  Air  France,  Lufthansa  and  KLM 
     respectively. British Airways believes that this model should be adopted for HS2. 
 
8.   However, the scheme currently proposed would see a spur from  the HSR  mainline 
     connect to the airport from a northerly direction. This would allow some, but not all, 
     HSR trains from the UK regions to access Heathrow directly.  These HSR trains would 
     terminate at the airport, whilst other London‐bound high speed trains would not call 
        at it. Heathrow would also be unable to directly serve passengers travelling to and 
        from Europe on High Speed 1 (HS1).  
 
9.      Whilst  this  scheme  may  provide  adequate  capacity  for  some  UK  air  passenger 
        markets  to  access  Heathrow,  it  is  less  desirable  when  compared  to  a  scheme  that 
        has the high speed rail mainline routeing through the airport.  The scope for air‐rail 
        substitution,  economic  benefits  and  carbon  reductions  will  be  reduced.  The 
        proposed  scheme  could  still  be  beneficial  for  airlines  in  terms  of  increased 
        connectivity and access to UK and near‐Europe markets, however the business case 
        for investment would be much more challenging for airlines. 
 
SECTION 1 : What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? 
 
10.     British Airways supports the strategic case for development of a HSR network in the 
        UK that is directly connected to Heathrow, the UK’s only hub airport. Key arguments 
        for such an integrated transport system include: 
 
     • Improved connectivity across the UK and onward to international destinations; 
     • Economic benefits from increased connectivity and productivity; 
     • Potential  for  air‐rail  substitution  –  dependent  on  infrastructure,  HS2  fares  and 
        codeshares (joint airline‐rail marketing of services); 
     • Reduced carbon emissions; 
 
11.     British  Airways  intends  to  respond  to  the  Government’s  consultation  on 
        development  of  the  proposed  network  to  discuss  the  scheme  detail  and  business 
        case for HSR from an aviation perspective. 
 
SECTION 2 : How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 
 
(2.2) Rail funding 
 
12.     British Airways believes the funding of HSR should not detract from investment on 
        the  ‘classic’  network.  In  particular,  there  are  a  number  of  current  schemes  and 
        proposals  that  could  benefit  Heathrow  Airport,  and  it  is  important  these  are  not 
        sacrificed because of funding constraints. These include electrification of the Great 
        West  Mainline;  a  ‘Western  Connection’  from  Terminal  5  allowing  South  West 
        Mainline  and  Great  West  Mainline  trains  to  connect  directly  to  the  airport;  and 
        increases in track capacity between Heathrow and Paddington.  
 
13.     There are also significant benefits that improved rail access in the London area (e.g. 
        an  “Airtrack”‐type  scheme)  and  better  connectivity  to  South  Wales,  the  South  and 
        South West England would deliver as well.  
 
(2.3) What are the implications for domestic aviation? 
 
14.     British Airways has provided detailed responses on the impact for domestic aviation 
        in previous submissions to consultations by High Speed Two Ltd, the Department for 
        Transport  and  the  Mawhinney  Review.  These  are  available  for  the  Committee  on 
        request. 
 
15.    In summary, we believe HSR will impact on air passengers travelling point‐to‐point 
       between destinations served directly by the new rail network, for example between 
       London  and  Newcastle,  and  Glasgow  and  Birmingham.  Other  regional  point‐point 
       routes  such  as  Southampton  to  Edinburgh  or  Exeter  to  Newcastle  would  be 
       relatively unaffected. 
 
16.    The restriction of the HSR stations to Central London and the major cities of the UK 
       regions  will  deter  passengers  travelling  outside  of  these  centres.  Indeed,  many 
       point‐to‐point air travellers are not travelling between city centres – the catchment 
       area for domestic passengers using Gatwick Airport is Kent, Sussex, East Surrey and 
       South London. The HSR termini in London are not easily accessed from this area, and 
       domestic air links from Gatwick may continue to operate. 
 
17.    It  is  worth  noting  that  an  HS2  station  at  Heathrow  would  provide  a  significantly 
       more  accessible  alternative  for  travellers  from  the  South  West,  South  Wales  and 
       Southern England. 
 
18.    An assumption has been made that HS2 fares will be comparable with regular long‐
       distance  rail  fares.    Even  if  they  are,  air  travel  will  remain  a  strongly  competitive 
       option  for  point‐to‐point  passengers,  as  it  is  today.    For  international  connecting 
       passengers,  the  current  rail  fare  offering  is  uncompetitive  and  this  is  unlikely  to 
       change.  
 
19.    Domestic flights to Heathrow Airport provide invaluable connectivity for the regions 
       of the UK to the global marketplace, and vice versa. If HS2 is to replace all domestic 
       flights  then  the  network  will  need  to  serve  the  needs  of  air  transfer  passengers  as 
       well as point‐to‐point passengers. At Heathrow, an HS2 station at or near the airport 
       is vital.  Additionally, if airlines are to codeshare with the high speed rail operator as 
       has  been  suggested,  they  will  need  assurance  on  the  ability  of  HSR  to  provide  the 
       interline customer experience currently offered. 
 
20.    If  these  two  elements  are  not  in  place  as  part  of  the  HS2  offering,  British  Airways 
       believes  that  domestic  air  links  to  London  will  continue,  as  well  as  cross‐country 
       routes.  
 
21.    HS2  will  need  to  be  competitive  with  both  domestic  flights  and  flights  from  UK 
       regional  airports  to  overseas  hub  airports  as  well.  As  happens  today,  if  a  UK  air 
       passenger cannot fly to Heathrow, they will fly overseas to make their international 
       connection.    HSR  must  offer  a  competitive  transfer  product  if  it  is  to  capture  this 
       market too. 
 
22.    In  Phase  1  of  the  proposed  scheme  (London  –  Birmingham)  there  will  not  be  any 
       direct  air‐rail  substitution  impact  as  there  are  no  flights  between  these  cities. 
       However,  there  will  be  opportunities  for  air  passengers  who  today  fly  from 
       Birmingham  to  transfer  at  overseas  hub  airports  to  use  HS2  to  travel  to  Heathrow 
       instead and then fly directly to their destination. 
 
23.    In Phase 2 (London & Heathrow – Manchester & Leeds) there is the potential for air‐
       rail substitution between the North of England and London, for instance Manchester 
       ‐  Heathrow  flights.  The  potential  for  passengers  who  currently  fly  from  regional 
       airports to transfer at overseas hub airports to switch to Heathrow for connections 
         will  also  be  significantly  increased  as  they  gain  direct  rail  access  to  the  UK’s  hub 
         airport. However, as before, this depends on there being an HS2 station at Heathrow 
         providing a competitive product and codeshare arrangements between airlines and 
         the high speed rail operator. 
 
24.      In the longer term (London & Heathrow – Glasgow & Edinburgh), the scope for air‐
         rail substitution is increased but is again dependent on a Heathrow HS2 station and 
         codeshare arrangements. In particular, for stations located further from London the 
         frequency,  journey  times,  scheduled  timings  and  customer  offering  of  high  speed 
         trains will be critical. To compete effectively for domestic air passengers, HSR would 
         need to offer journey times of around 3 hours and have early and late departures to 
         allow for return day‐trips, an important consideration for the business traveller. 
 
25.      Importantly, if there is a link between HS2 and HS1 that allows for through‐running 
         rail services from the UK to Europe then Heathrow must be part of the high speed 
         mainline instead of located on a spur.  
 
26.      The  proposed  spur  will  only  allow  Heathrow  to  effectively  serve  HS2  passengers 
         travelling  from  north  of  the  airport.  The  spur  will  not  allow  it  to  serve  passengers 
         travelling to the UK on HS1, as they would need to interchange in London to reach 
         the airport, making the journey unattractive. This would not be equivalent to access 
         enjoyed  by  competing  EU  airports  such  as  Paris‐Charles  De  Gaulle,  which  would 
         effectively  gain  access  to  the  UK  domestic  air  market  under  the  current  proposed 
         scheme.  A  spur  alignment  to  Heathrow  would  not  support  equal  access  to  UK  and 
         European air passenger markets for Heathrow and other European hubs. 
 
SECTION 3 : Business case 
 
(3.1)  How  robust  are  the  assumptions  and  methodology  –  for  example,  on  passenger 
forecasts,  modal  shifts,  fare  levels,  scheme  costs,  economic  assumptions  (e.g.  about  the 
value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network? 
 
27.      British Airways provided analysis to the Mawhinney Review included analysis of High 
         Speed  Two  Limited’s  forecasts  for  an  HS2  station  at  Heathrow.  We  believe  the 
         forecasts  underplayed  potential  demand.  British  Airways  estimated  that  c.7,000 
         passengers per day would use a HS2 station at a 2‐runway Heathrow by 2030. 
 
28.      The success of HS2 in securing air‐rail substitution will depend on: 
 
     • Competitive passenger interchange located at or near Heathrow Airport: 
     • Airlines,  in  particular  British  Airways  as  the  UK’s  largest  network  airline,  entering 
         into viable code share arrangements with the high speed rail operator. 
 
29.      One  of  the  key  areas  for  concern  is  the  fare  levels  for  high  speed  rail  services.  As 
         mentioned  previously,  High  Speed  Two  Ltd  has  assumed  that  fares  will  be  at  a 
         comparable  level  with  regular  rail  long‐distance  fares.  Whilst  fares  may  be 
         competitive  with  airline  fares  for  point‐to‐point  trips  they  are  likely  to  be  more 
         expensive  than  airline  fares  for  transfer  passengers  on  UK  domestic  flights.  Far‐
         reaching commercial codeshare agreements to attract transfer passengers from the 
         regions  to  Heathrow  would  be  needed  before  airlines  would  remove  domestic 
         flights  and  then  market  and  price  HSR  as  a  viable  alternative.  Without  these 
         agreements,  British  Airways  is  likely  to  maintain  some  domestic  flights  because  of 
         the important contribution domestic transfer passengers make to its network. 
 
30.      Simply building a rail network to meet forecast demand is no guarantee of achieving 
         modal shift.  
 
(3.3) What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail 
travel, for example by price?  
 
31.      From  a  pure  air‐rail  perspective,  there  should  be  no  requirement  for  additional 
         demand management measures to promote high speed rail. The focus should be on 
         ensuring that the estimated £40bn investment in HSR delivers a competitive product 
         for  all  passengers,  allowing  HSR  to  compete  on  a  level  playing  field  with  aviation. 
         There  should  not  be  any  need  for  additional  subsidy  for  HSR  over  and  above  rail 
         industry norms or increased taxation on UK aviation with the aim of suppressing and 
         then  switching  demand  from  air  to  rail.    The  quality  of  HSR  rail  infrastructure, 
         particularly  integration  between  air  and  rail  at  Heathrow,  should  determine  the 
         demand for high speed rail services. Further market interference in HS2 may begin 
         to look like a solution in search of a problem. 
 
(3.4)  What  lessons  should  the  Government  learn  from  other  major  transport  projects  to 
ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 
 
32.      Terminal 5 and the Heathrow Expansion/Runway 3 projects offer important lessons 
         for  HS2.  It  is  important  that  HS2  enjoys  long‐term  planning  stability  supported  by 
         robust  policy  framework  to  ensure  efficient,  timely  and  successful  delivery. 
         Establishing  strong  cross‐party  support  for  the  project  is  crucial  to  avoid 
         politicisation of the proposed scheme. In the context of taking a hybrid bill through 
         Parliament,  this  will  be  essential  to  maintain  the  required  policy  framework  and 
         planning  stability.  An  objective  and  thorough  evidence  base  to  support  the 
         economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of the scheme is absolutely 
         necessary  to  ensure  investment  is  appropriately  targeted.  Alternative  funding 
         mechanisms such as EU TEN‐T should also be pursued. 
 
SECTION 4 : The strategic route 
 
(4.1) The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, 
Birmingham  International  and  Birmingham  Curzon  Street.  Are  these  the  best  possible 
locations?  What  criteria  should  be  used  to  assess  the  case  for  more  (or  fewer) 
intermediate stations? 
 
33.      The choice of Euston as the London terminus for HS2 drives the requirement for Old 
         Oak  Common  ‐  which  is  needed  for  passenger  dispersal  onto  the  wider  London 
         transport network as Euston cannot handle full capacity HS2 trains. 
 
34.      In Phase 1 of the proposed HS2 scheme Old Oak Common will be the interchange for 
         Heathrow.  Heathrow  Express  and  Crossrail  are  assumed  to  provide  the  onward 
         connection  to  the  airport.  It  is  uncertain  that  Heathrow  Express  will  operate  in  its 
         current  form  when  Phase  1  is  complete  ‐  Network  Rail  has  indicated  a  desire  to 
         move  the  service  onto  slower  train  paths  to  allow  for  increased  capacity  into 
         Paddington  for  intercity  services.  Crossrail  will  be  operational  but  it  will  provide  a 
        slower,  stopping  service  into  Heathrow.  Whilst  these  services  will  provide  good 
        connectivity  for  passengers  in  the  London  area,  they  are  unlikely  to  provide  an 
        attractive  option  for  air  passengers  travelling  from  Birmingham  and  beyond  to 
        Heathrow. 
 
35.     British Airways is concerned that no full or proper assessment has been made of the 
        benefits  of  using  Heathrow  as  a  “parkway”  station  for  the  wider  South  of  England 
        region. High Speed Two Ltd cites the significant benefits of Birmingham International 
        station serving a far greater catchment area and being more accessible to the wider 
        Midlands area than Birmingham Curzon Street terminus in the city centre. However, 
        in the South of England, which has the largest market for high speed rail, both Old 
        Oak Common and Euston stations are located deep in Central London.  
 
36.     Heathrow  is  far  better‐placed  than  any  other  London  station  to  serve  passengers 
        outside  of  London  as  a  “parkway”  station.    The  size  of  its  potential  catchment 
        market should be properly considered to fully assess the benefits of locating an HS2 
        station  at  the  airport.  A  mainline  Heathrow  station  would  also  make  HSR  more 
        accessible to the South of England with increased frequency and better connectivity 
        to the UK and Europe. 
 
37.     We believe that in terms of Heathrow’s catchment area, the more connectivity that 
        HSR  can  provide  and  the  greater  the  level  of  access  that  UK  cities  and  regions  can 
        get to the airport the better. The challenge for HS2 is to balance the number of stops 
        on the network (maximum passenger catchment and range of destinations) with the 
        speed of the service.  
 
38.     There  is  no  benefit  from  linking  airports  via  high  speed  rail  (e.g.  Heathrow  and 
        Birmingham)  to  create  a  so‐called  ‘virtual  hub  airport’.  This  proposition  will  not 
        deliver  competitive  minimum  connection  times  or  the  necessary  customer 
        experience  for  transfer  passengers.  Without  a  competitive  transfer  proposition, 
        passengers  will  choose  to  connect  at  other  competing  aviation  hubs.  Only 
        passengers travelling from home to the airport will benefit from high speed rail. 
 
(4.2) Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y 
configuration the right choice? 
 
39.     From a Heathrow perspective HS2 needs to serve major UK cities that have air links 
        to Heathrow and other overseas hub airports. 
 
40.     This  will  help  to  achieve  the  Government’s  stated  aim  of  air‐rail  substitution.  HS2 
        must  also  make  Heathrow  more  accessible  and  attractive  for  air  passengers 
        throughout the UK.. If there is a sub‐optimal link between HS2 and Heathrow, then 
        air passengers in the UK regions will simply fly to foreign hub airports, as at present  
        – thus bypassing HS2 and contributing to UK carbon leakage. 
 
41.     It  is  important  that  cities  and  regions  not  directly  located  on  the  eventual  HSR 
        network  are  connected  to  Heathrow  too.  This  includes  South  and  South  West 
        England  and  South  Wales,  which  could  be  better  connected  through  integrating 
        ‘classic’  rail  routes  with  the  airport,  as  well  as  cities  in  Europe  that  could  be 
        connected to London and Heathrow through the linkage of HS1 and HS2. 
 
(4.3)  Is  the  Government  correct  to  build  the  network  in  stages,  moving  from  London 
northwards? 
 
42.       It is likely that staged development is the best way of delivering the proposed HSR 
          network.  A  connection  to  Heathrow  in  Phase  1  would  enable  the  benefits  of 
          integration between the airport and HS2 to be realised sooner. Deployment of dual‐
          use rolling stock that can run on both high speed and ‘classic’ rail lines would allow 
          Heathrow to be connected to more UK cities than those directly served by HSR and 
          effectively  enable  connections  to  the  UK’s  hub  airport  at  an  earlier  date  than  HS2 
          itself could deliver. 
 
(4.4)  The  Government  proposes  a  link  to  HS1  as  part  of  Phase  1  but  a  direct  link  to 
Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 
 
43.       No.  British  Airways  believes  both  connections  should  be  undertaken  in  the  same 
          phase.  A link from HS2 to HS1 should not be progressed before Heathrow is directly 
          linked to the HS2 network and is able to connect to HS1 services. Connecting HS1 to 
          HS2  will  enable  through‐running  rail  services  between  the  UK  regions  and 
          continental  Europe.  This  will  give  major  European  airports  direct  access  to  UK  air 
          passengers, without a reciprocal benefit for Heathrow. The airport must be able to 
          compete for air passengers in the UK and in Europe too, which requires equivalent 
          access to both HS2 and HS1 services.  
 
44.       Heathrow  and  UK  airlines  will  be  at  a  disadvantage  if  a  link  to  HS1  was  developed 
          before  Heathrow  was  served  by  HS2  and  if  the  airport  does  not  have  equivalent 
          access  to  air  passengers  in  Europe  via  HS1  that  other  airports  such  as  Paris  and 
          Amsterdam would enjoy. 
 
45.       Early  construction  of  links  to  both  Heathrow  and  HS1  would  deliver  Government 
          objectives  sooner  and  should  be  timed  together  to  ensure  parity  of  access  for  UK 
          and European airports. 
 
 
SECTION 5 : Economic rebalancing and equity 
 
(5.4)  How  should  the  Government  ensure  that  all  major  beneficiaries  of  HSR  (including 
local  authorities  and  business  interests)  make  an  appropriate  financial  contribution  and 
bear  risks  appropriately?  Should  the  Government  seek  support  from  the  EU’s  TEN‐T 
programme? 
 
46.       Funding  for  public  transport  projects  is  predominantly  based  on  “the  beneficiary 
          pays” principle. As far as  Heathrow airport and  its  airline users  are concerned, the 
          commercial  case  for  contributing  to  development  of  HSR  is  extremely  challenging. 
          Over  the  likely  HSR  construction  period,  airlines  will  continue  to  fund  a  significant 
          capital  expenditure  programme  at  Heathrow  designed  to  renew  and  develop  the 
          UK’s  hub  airport.  In  this  context  the  airline  community  will  not  be  able  to  support 
          funding for HSR as their primary focus and responsibility is to the airport itself.  
 
47.       British  Airways  suggests  the  Government  should  seek  support  from  the  EU  TEN‐T 
          programme  as  HSR  has  the  potential  to  provide  integrated  and  transformative 
          transport infrastructure. 
 
 
 
SECTION 6 : Impact 
 
(6.1)  What  will  be  the  overall  impact  of  HSR  on  UK  carbon  emissions?  How  much  modal 
shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 
 
48.      We  do  not  have  research  of  our  own  to  reference,  but  refer  to  BAA’s  second 
         submission to the Mawhinney Review.  This details its analysis of UK carbon impacts 
         of  HSR  development.    From  this  analysis,  it  is  clear  the  potential  to  reduce  carbon 
         increases if: 
 
     • HSR  serves  Heathrow  directly  and  an  excellent  passenger  interchange  facility 
         supports commercial “codeshare” arrangements between airlines and rail operators. 
     • The  HSR  network  is  fully  developed  and  balances  serving  the  maximum  passenger 
         catchment with speed of service. 
     • The UK power grid supplying HSR decarbonises. 
 
49.      BAA’s  analysis  indicates  that  if  HS2  directly  serves  Heathrow  then  between  226  – 
         262kt  per  year  could  be  saved.  These  significant  reductions  require  the  above 
         conditions  to  be  met  and  demonstrate  the  value  of  running  HS2  to  the  airport  as 
         soon as possible. 
 
(6.4)  How  much  disruption  will  there  be  to  services  on  the  ‘classic’  network  during 
construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 
 
50.      British  Airways  believes  that  disruption  to  Heathrow  Express  and  Crossrail  services 
         should be minimised as much as possible during construction of HS2. Proposals for 
         connectivity in Phase 1 from Old Oak Common to the airport rely on both Heathrow 
         Express and Crossrail services. It is important that fast and effective connections to 
         the  airport  are  maintained  throughout  construction  and  this  will  require  co‐
         ordination between Network Rail, franchise operators and HS2 contractors. 
 
51.      In a wider context, it is essential that disruption be kept to a minimum to ensure the 
         smooth and efficient running of London as a world class city.  London is a key driver 
         of  the  UK  economy  and  the  impacts  of  disruption  will  be  keenly  felt  beyond  its 
         border.    Euston  also  provides  the  major  rail  link  to  the  north  west  of  England  and 
         west of Scotland and it is vital that these links can continue uninterrupted as far as 
         possible.   
 
May 2011  
                      Written evidence from Stephen Plowden (HSR 166)

1. This reply concentrates on HS2, but many of the points would apply to any HSR proposal for
Britain. Because of the committee’s and my own time and length constraints, the reply is not as
full or as well referenced as I would like, but I would be happy to supplement it by answering any
questions the committee may have.
2. The committee asks for the main arguments for or against HSR. I doubt if there are any
arguments of any consequence for HSR in Britain, and certainly there are none for HS2. HS2 will
work against some of the most important objectives of transport or other policy. Even apart from
that, the business case fails.
The harm that HS2 will do
Carbon emissions
3. Reducing carbon emissions should be a principal aim of transport policy. The government’s
calculations suggest that HS2 would be carbon neutral. That conclusion is too optimistic. HS2
would lead to an increase in CO2 emissions.
4. The only way HS2 could lead to a more than trivial reduction in CO2emissions would be if
travellers who would otherwise fly on domestic flights to and from Heathrow switched to rail.
But if that were to happen, the airlines would transfer the slots vacated by domestic flights to
international ones, with a consequent increase in emissions. HS2 Ltd’s December 2009 report
High Speed Rail London To The West Midlands And Beyond acknowledges (para 4.2.25) that
such a substitution might occur, and could lead to an increase in emissions, but these are not
possibilities but certainties. It was precisely because the Conservatives, when in Opposition, were
persuaded that HS2 would provide a way of increasing the capacity of Heathrow for international
flights without having to build a third runway that they decided to support it. In a conference last
autumn, BAA’s chief executive, Colin Matthews, said “. . . BAA would like more passengers to
arrive [at Heathrow] by train. High speed rail would attract people who currently arrive by short-
haul flights, freeing slots for more long-haul flights” (page 34 of the November 2010 issue of
Transport Times). As an indication of the effect on emissions, according to Climate Care, the
carbon per passenger emitted in a flight from Heathrow to New York is eleven times that emitted
in a journey from Heathrow to Edinburgh. Emissions per flight would be several times that (the
capacity of a Boeing 747-400 is five or six times that of the Bombardier Q400, one of the most
efficient short-haul aircraft).
5. HS2 will also lead to more international flights from airports other than Heathrow. It is hoped
in Birmingham that the increased accessibility of its airport will enable it to capture some
business that would otherwise have gone to Heathrow. If the current plans to extend HS2
northwards go ahead, they will provide very good access to East Midlands airport and Robin
Hood airport. Easier access will generate more air travel. The hopes that by linking HS2 to HS1
some short haul flights to the near Continent could be replaced by rail are unrealistic. It is very
difficult for rail to compete with air on time and cost over the distances involved, and even if it
could, the market is too small to support an acceptably frequent service.

6. Even if the substitution of international flights for domestic flights could be avoided, HS2 is
not a good way of dealing with carbon emissions from domestic flights, which in any case
amount to a little less than two per cent of those from road transport. Any reductions would be
partly, perhaps largely, offset by emissions from the high-speed trains. In addition, most journeys
on domestic flights are cross country and not susceptible to competition from HS2, even if it were
extended to Scotland. According to HS2 Demand Analysis (HS2 Ltd, February 2010), HS2 would
increase rail’s share of the market for travel between London and Glasgow from 34% to 50%
(para 10.2.8), with almost all the rest held by air, and would reduce the number of domestic air
passengers by only eleven per cent (para 10.6.13). Reducing domestic air travel requires measures
that would impinge on domestic flights generally, not only on those between Scotland and south-
east England. For example, landing charges could be related to the carbon emissions of each
flight; the type of aircraft to be used on domestic air services could be regulated; possibly speed
limits could be imposed.
7. Everyone acknowledges that high-speed trains are less energy efficient, and so produce more
carbon, than their conventional equivalents. It is also acknowledged that HS2 will generate some
extra rail journeys. But another equally important effect, not allowed for in the calculations, is
that HS2 will also lead to a lengthening of some of the journeys that would otherwise be made
by conventional rail. For example, some people who commute to London would decide to live
further out. People who without HS2 might have taken a city break in Eastbourne or Oxford
might decide to go north instead. These longer journeys will produce more carbon. (Transport
investment commonly leads to a lengthening of journeys through redistribution. The fact that this
effect is not allowed for in the HS2 forecasts is a very serious defect which has other important
implications.)
The north-south divide
8. The predominance of London and the south-east vis-à-vis all other regions is a very serious
national problem. It is bad for London as well as for the rest of the country. The coalition has
rightly set itself the objective of rebalancing the economy with respect both to economic sectors
and to geographical regions. That may explain why bridging the north-south divide seems to have
become the centre piece of the government’s case for HS2. In the Daily Telegraph of 25
November 2010, Mr Cameron is reported as saying,
“If we think about governments of all colours, they have all failed – over 50 years – to deal with
the North-South Divide. With high-speed rail we have a real chance of cracking it. . . . The most
powerful regional policy is transport and the most powerful form of transport is high-speed rail.”
9. Regional benefits do not figure in the formal evaluation of HS2 in the report Economic Case
for HS2 (DfT February 2011). When I asked the DfT where in the documents regional benefits
were discussed, I was referred to paragraphs 4.4.9 to 4.4.11 of this report. But these paragraphs
simply contain a general discussion, of rather a cautionary nature, of the circumstances in which a
high-speed rail station could help local development. There is nothing in them which supports Mr
Cameron’s extreme claim.
10. There is no need to dwell on this subject here, since I understand that it will be treated in other
submissions, where it will be shown that HS2 would increase the present regional imbalance.
This is hardly surprising, since it has been recognised for decades that improving connections
between an economically strong region and a weaker one is at least as likely to suck activity out
of the weaker one as to regenerate it. It is not clear that transport investment of any kind should
be a major component of a policy to bridge the north-south divide. Education, the siting of
universities, research centres and government offices, and all the traditional tools of regional
planning may be much more important, But if transport investment does have a part to play, it
should take the form of local improvements, or improving connections within and between the
distressed regions, not their connections with London. To regenerate the north, invest in the north.
The countryside
11. The protection of the countryside should rank very highly indeed as a national aim. The
damage that HS2 will do is not, as Mr Hammond and Mr Cameron seem to think, of concern only
to people living close to the route, nor is their concern only about property values. This is like
saying that the demolition of Durham cathedral would matter only to the citizens of Durham and
then only because of the loss of revenue from tourism. Other people will be telling the committee
of the impact of HS2. Perhaps a slightly less damaging route could be found, but an acceptable
route could not be.
The failure of the business case
12. The case for HS2 is based on a completely inappropriate business-as-usual, trend planning
approach. Even accepting that approach, other submissions will show that the likely growth of
demand for rail travel has been exaggerated, and that if more capacity is needed, there are better
ways of providing it. Even if the demand forecasts were correct, other ways of providing the
desired capacity were not available, and the harmful effects discussed above could be set aside,
HS2 does not give value for money.
13. Table 10 of Economic Case for HS2 estimates the benefit/cost ratio (BCR) of HS2 at 1.6 if the
claimed wider economic impacts are not included and at 2.0 if they are. According to NATA
Refresh: Appraisal for a Sustainable Transport System (DfT, April 2010, paras 39 and 43), 95%
of recent transport investments achieved a BCR of more than 2.0, and these schemes were split
roughly equally between those with BCRs of more and less than 4.0. Schemes with BCRs of 2.0
or less would therefore need very large benefits of a kind not included in the monetary evaluation
to deserve a place in a transport budget. But the environmental and social effects of HS2 are
highly adverse, which raises the question of whether it is right to subsidise HS2 (see para 23
below).
14. According to this table, the capital and operating costs of HS2 come to £24bn but would be
reduced by £13.7bn by revenue from fares. The fare revenues come from the journeys that are
predicted to transfer to HS2 from road and air and from the travel that HS2 is expected to
generate. In cost benefit analysis the welfare gain resulting from a project is given by the increase
in consumer surplus plus the increase in producer surplus. The revenue from new rail travel
clearly contributes to producer surplus and should certainly be included in the appraisal, but two
questions arise:
(i) What allowance should be made for the loss in producer surplus of the firms which, if HS2
were not built, would be supplying goods and services to the people who would constitute the
new rail passengers if it were?
(ii) Should fare revenues be treated as a reduction in costs or as an increase in benefits?
15. The DfT argues that the producer surplus of those suppliers who would lose revenue if people
switched their expenditure to rail does not have to be included, since the loss would be spread
over many firms who, over time, would be able to reduce their costs accordingly. It would be
difficult to apply this argument to domestic air services, whose losses, according to these
forecasts, would not be only marginal. It seems to me that some of the businesses who would
experience proportionately smaller falls in income would also find it difficult to cut their costs
accordingly. Even if they could do so over a 60-year period, as the DfT argues, their earlier losses
should figure in the appraisal. (My correspondence with the DfT on this and other points can be
forwarded to the committee if it would like to see it.) I believe that a significant part of the
producer surplus predicted for rail should be offset by losses to other suppliers.
16. Until last year, changes in indirect taxation were treated as changes in costs, but they are now,
correctly in my view, treated as changes in benefits. I believe that the same considerations apply
both to indirect taxes and to fare revenues, so that both should be treated in the same way.
However, in a recent email to me the DfT gave the following argument for continuing to consider
revenue from fares as a reduction in costs. “This is based on the reasonable assumption that fare
revenue from operating rail services (after covering costs) is contracted to return to the
Department for Transport and can therefore be offset against costs.” This argument might have
some force if the DfT, or a Railway Division within it, were a separate, self-financing
organisation. In fact, however, taxpayers in general are being asked to pay for building HS2, even
though very few of them will benefit from it as travellers, and even though its construction will
also lead to a loss of tax revenue. As some compensation, they deserve to receive the benefit of
the increase in fare revenues that HS2 is predicted to bring. The money could then be spent on
whatever purpose seemed then, in the distant future, to be most worthwhile, rather than being
automatically earmarked for transport. Reclassifying fare revenues reduces the BCR from 1.6 to
1.26 without wider economic impacts or from 2.0 to 1.6 with them.
17. The appraisal period for HS2 is the construction period, which ends in 2025, and the
following sixty years. Costs and benefits are discounted at 3.5% for the first thirty years from
now and at 3% thereafter. The justification for looking so far ahead is that HS2 is expected still to
be in good working order in 2084. However, I would have thought that the period should be
determined by the working life of the facility or the length of time for which travel needs and
behaviour can reasonably be predicted, whichever is shorter. The discount rate raises questions of
our responsibilities to future generations. We have a duty to leave them a world in which they can
live and which would be worth living in, but if, as the Treasury seems to think, they will be richer
than we are, then in my view we have no other responsibility to them. The implication is that non-
reversible environmental effects should not be discounted at all but narrower economic ones
should be discounted very heavily. Such philosophical considerations apart, there are other very
good reasons for reducing the appraisal period and increasing discount rates. Professor Peter
Mackie, one of the architects of the DfT’s New Approach to Appraisal (NATA) methodology,
suggested last year that in present circumstances it would be reasonable to revert to the pre-2003
rules of a forty-year appraisal period and a 6% discount rate (Local Transport Today, 25 June
2010). This would greatly reduce the BCR.
18. HS2 is predicted to reduce traffic on motorways between London and Birmingham by one per
cent, so bringing reductions in congestion worth £1.8bn and savings in noise and accidents
approaching £400m (Economic Case for HS2, para 4.3.14 and Table 4). Traffic on these
motorways over the next 74 years cannot be predicted to within one per cent. If a significant
reduction in congestion did come about, the eased conditions would generate traffic, which would
negate the gain. In addition, it seems that the diversion from cars was calculated by a formula
based only on travel time and cost. Even if, which is not clear, the number of people in the party,
and hence the cost per person, was taken into account, such a formula is inadequate. Anyone now
travelling between city centres by car probably has some wider reason for doing so. For example,
the car is needed for further journeys at the destination end, it is carrying awkward luggage or
equipment, someone in the party has physical difficulties in using trains or getting to or from the
stations.
19. Wider economic impacts are predicted to be worth £4bn, £3bn of which comes from
agglomeration benefits. The figure of £3bn is hard to reconcile with the caveats of the researchers
at Imperial College on whose studies the estimate is based. In any case, everyone agrees that the
benefits will not come automatically but depend on other actions being taken by the local
authorities concerned. The cost of such actions is not included in the calculation of the BCR, but
clearly it should be.
The values placed on business and commuting travel time
20. The values of business time used in the BCR calculations assume that this time cannot be
used productively. It is probably true that time spent getting to and from the station or changing
trains cannot be used, but the train itself provides a very good working environment. If the train is
not crowded, commuters, as well as business travellers, can make good use of this time. Of
course, not all business travellers will choose to work in the train. For example, it is
understandable that a London-based businessman who has spent a long day working away from
his base may want to relax on the way home, but such time should be valued at no more than the
commuting rate.
21. It is argued in para 7.3.5 of Economic Case for HS2 that people transferring from cars to
trains would not only gain a time saving but would also be able to do some work on the train,
which would increase the benefits of HS2 to business passengers. This argument assumes,
however, that it would not be possible to work when travelling on the classic railway. If that
were possible, but some people chose to travel by car rather than taking advantage of this facility,
it would be incorrect to increase the estimate of the benefits they obtain from HS2.
The alternative to business as usual
22. The travel forecasts that underlie both the promoters’ case for HS2 and the DfT’s investment
plans more generally are based on an extrapolation of recent trends. That approach makes sense
only if those trends are desirable, or, whether desirable or not, nothing can be done about them.
23. The worst problems arise in road transport and there is plenty to be done about them. But the
same principle applies to rail as to road: ways of reducing demand should be examined before any
expansion is planned. Advances in technology have opened up huge opportunities to substitute
telecommunications for rail both for business travel and commuting. Reforms to the legal and
fiscal framework governing road transport, especially the most important reform of all, lowering
and enforcing speed limits, which, given the political will, could be done very quickly, would
remove one major justification for subsidising rail, to encourage people to use the less
environmentally damaging mode. The other justification for rail subsidies is social, but that does
not apply to long distance travel. Under BR, Intercity was rightly required to be self-supporting.
Without subsidies HS2 is clearly not viable. The scope for substituting motorway coaches for rail
also needs to be very carefully examined. That would be cheaper than rail provision, since the
infrastructure already exists, and would be socially desirable since fares are much lower.
24. Of course, reforming the rules for the use of the roads would also boost the demand for rail
and hence the case for investment in rail. It is hard to know what the net effect of all the reforms
would be. But if more rail capacity did turn out to be required, that would not necessarily require
building major new lines and it would certainly not justify HSR. The impact on the landscape,
carbon emissions and the fact that HSR would lead to journeys becoming longer are sufficient to
rule it out.
Recommendations
25. The plans for HS2 have caused distress and anxiety to a great many people and have already
involved considerable public expenditure, all in pursuit of a scheme which should not have been
put forward in the first place, or at least should not have got this far. I hope the committee will tell
the government to withdraw the plans immediately. If that is not possible, I hope that at least the
committee will insist that the DfT’s current inadequate and inappropriate consultation is scrapped
and replaced by a proper inquiry, which, among other things, would allow objectors to cross-
examine the promoters’ witnesses.
26. The fact that such a very bad scheme has progressed as far as it has, and would almost
certainly now be implemented if it were not for the determined resistance of well informed people
who feel threatened by it, casts a very disquieting light on the way that major proposals are
formulated and scrutinised in Britain. I hope Parliament will now consider very seriously how
such a thing could have happened and what must be done to stop similar things happening again.
27. Crossrail is an example of a scheme which should not have survived but has because no one,
or no well organised people, feels threatened by it. It contravenes the coalition government’s
objective of rebalancing the economy with respect both to economic sectors and geographical
regions even more flagrantly than HS2 – its whole raison d’être is to increase employment and
productivity in London’s financial districts. Its BCR is far below what is usually required.
Although work is in progress, there is plenty of scope to modify the scheme. I hope the
committee will look at this urgently.
28. All the government’s plans for transport, whether road, rail or air, rest on the same business-
as-usual, predict-and-provide approach. The defects of this approach have been pointed out for
forty years or more. The urgent need to combat global warming makes them even more serious.
This approach should be replaced by one which addresses all the current problems and tackles
them by reforming the user rules – the legal and fiscal framework within which transport
decisions are made. With some local exceptions, no expansion of the infrastructure should be
contemplated until the necessary reforms have been implemented. I hope the committee will
launch an inquiry into this alternative approach. If that happens, then some good will have come
from the sorry saga of HS2.

May 2011
       Further written evidence from the Department of Transport (HSR 167A)


DfT responses to questions from the Transport Select Committee

In response to your letter of 18 July to Sir Brian Briscoe of HS2 Ltd, the Department has
agreed with HS2 Ltd to provide answers to your questions 5, 6 and 16. This letter
provides the Department’s responses.

In addition, I attach a paper with responses to a number of the questions raised by Oxera
in its recent review of the Economic Case for HS2. These questions relate to wider issues
for which DfT has responsibility; the remainder of Oxera’s questions, which deal more
directly with the details of the economic case, will be answered separately by HS2 Ltd.

It should be noted that the public consultation period on HS2 only recently closed. The
answers below reflect the Government’s current view, and the evidence which
underpinned the consultation documents, but the Committee should recognise that no
final decisions will be taken by Ministers until the analysis of consultation responses
(which is still at an early stage) has been completed and any new evidence considered.

5. We have received submissions (e.g. from 51M) that substantial extra capacity
could be provided quickly and at relatively low cost by lengthening WCML trains to
12 car sets, and (especially relevant for commuters from Milton Keynes and
Northampton) by operating additional trains enabled by a new grade separated
flyover junction e.g. at Ledburn. Do you have any comments on this?

The Government has not at this stage carried out a full analysis of the 51M Group’s
proposals, but at the strategic level, its current view is that no package of upgrades to
existing lines could offer the same level or range of benefits as a new high speed line.

The capacity increase offered by the 51M proposal, although slightly higher than that
offered by Atkins’ Rail Package 2, is still comparatively low – only around 30% on long-
distance services, for example, than the capacity available following completion of the
committed Pendolino lengthening programme. Furthermore, to accommodate the 12-car
sets needed to deliver even this capacity increase, significant investment in platform
lengthening, plus track and/or signalling remodelling in some locations, would be
required, which the 51M Group has neither scoped nor costed.

Similarly, their proposal provides no information on the costs of procuring and operating
longer Pendolino trains or of modifying depots to accommodate them. It also does not
include any assessment of the costs of procuring the 125mph-capable suburban rolling
stock needed to deliver the proposed increase in the Northampton service.

As a result, they have not carried out any cost-benefit analysis of the case for incurring
expenditure of this kind to deliver a relatively modest increase in capacity over committed
plans and few of the journey time, connectivity or wider economic benefits provided
through new high speed rail lines. However, Network Rail’s recently published West
Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Study, whose development included a process of wide
industry involvement as well as a public consultation, concluded that the most effective
way to create additional long term capacity on this corridor would not be through train
lengthening or infrastructure enhancements, but through the construction of a new line.

There are also a number of deliverability concerns in respect of 51M Group’s proposed
service pattern. For example, Network Rail’s Route Utilisation Strategy states that the
performance impacts of using even one ‘firebreak’ path out of Euston to accommodate an
additional Northampton service would need careful consideration before implementing
such a change. The 51M Group’s proposal adds two such Northampton services and an
additional long-distance service, but assumes no impact on performance.

Their proposal also states that it retains greater spare capacity in the peak than the Rail
Package 2 proposal developed by Atkins and that this would contribute to improved
reliability. In fact, the peak hour service specification that they have published shows the
same 16 fast line services per hour. Furthermore, it assumes that this can be delivered
not only without the additional platform capacity at Euston proposed by Atkins, but also
with increased train lengths, which would further reduce operational flexibility.

The additional service proposed by the 51M Group on the Coventry-Birmingham section
of the route is also unlikely to be deliverable, given that it has not proved possible to meet
current aspirations to route an extra Cross Country service along this corridor.

6. What assessment have you made of the costs and benefits of running
Pendolinos at up to 140mph by further upgrading the existing line?

Atkins considered 140mph operations in a long list of potential interventions (see
Appendix A of Atkins’ March 2010 Rail Interventions Report 1 ). It was not taken forward
into the short list of interventions because of the likely adverse impact on overall route
capacity (due to worsening the speed differentials between intercity and other services)
and the high cost and disruption of resignalling (to provide in-cab signalling). Also, the
journey time savings of 140 mph max speed compared with 125 mph max speed would
be very small - of the order of 3 seconds per mile - and there are few sections of the
WCML where 140mph would be possible because of issues such as track curvature,
junction constraints and aerodynamic effects in tunnels.

16. What analysis have you made of business relocations between London,
Birmingham and other major cities likely to arise from HS2?

The Government has made no specific analysis of that kind. However we believe that
high speed rail would offer significant opportunities to support long-term and sustainable
economic growth that would be spread across the country. In particular, we estimate
economic benefits from the Y network totaling £44 billion for the UK, of which more than
50% relates to journeys beginning outside London and the South East. The cities of the
North and the Midlands would benefit from improved inter-connectivity, allowing them to
act as a coherent economic whole, and from improved connections with London, allowing
them to benefit more directly from, and complement, the economic strength and diversity
of the capital.


1
 Accessible at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/
alternativestudy/
European and wider international experience demonstrates that the introduction of high
speed rail can help boost the performance of regional economies.

   •   HS1 – the town of Ashford has seen valuable new investment and development
       since the arrival of high speed services. Analysis carried out by Volterra and Colin
       Buchanan has estimated that the value of the regeneration benefits of HS1 could
       be as high as £10 billion.
   •   Lyon, France – high speed rail has helped service sector firms to thrive by
       providing enhanced access to the Paris market. The Part-Dieu area where the
       Lyon station is situated has become one of the largest commercial developments
       in France.
   •   Ciudad Real, Spain – high speed rail has enabled the town to develop into an
       important regional business centre and its university to expand its student
       population.
   •   The Government is considering a significant amount of evidence, submitted as part
       of the consultation, on the potential positive economic impacts of high speed rail in
       the North and the Midlands. We understand that much of this analysis has also
       been submitted as evidence to the Committee by relevant local and regional
       organisations.

To maximise the economic potential that high speed rail brings to an area it is also vital
that it is developed in an integrated way with other economic and transport planning
initiatives. If a decision is made to go ahead with plans for a national high speed network,
the Government would work with the regions concerned to secure the maximum possible
benefits from HS2.


Responses from the Department for Transport to questions raised in Oxera’s 
review of the HS2 economic case 
 
Q1 To what extent would demand management on the conventional network delay the need 
for extra rail capacity?  

Whilst there may be a case for employing demand management as a tactical response to
managing demand on the railways, it is unlikely to significantly alter the case over the
medium-to-long term for the provision of additional capacity. It is also important to
recognise that fares are already substantially higher on peak services than in the off-
peak, which makes a significant contribution to managing peak demand, and that the
effects of more sophisticated demand management techniques are likely to be complex.
The best way of illustrating this is to look at each of the potential measures in turn:

Ticket pricing: The most obvious tool to manage demand on the railway is to increase
fares. The fares increase required to achieve a significant demand reduction would
however be unacceptable, and would not provide a sensible or sustainable solution to
managing demand. The Government does believe that there is a strong case for reducing
the costs of the railways, but the associated savings should be returned equitably to both
the taxpayer and the fare-payer.
“Peak spreading”: Significant price differentials are already in place between the peak and
off-peak periods. There may be some additional scope to make more effective use of
capacity through more sophisticated peak pricing measures, but research carried out for
the Department by Aecom has indicated that, in practice, any such gains are likely to be
limited. To achieve any more significant change in this area would require wider social
changes: the “9-5” working day is unlikely to disappear overnight. Furthermore, given the
high all day crowding levels forecast over coming decades, measures of this kind would
clearly not provide a long-term solution to predicted capacity constraints.

Crowding in the shoulder peak: The Government recognises that the current approach to
ticket pricing on the railways can lead to some artificial peaks and troughs in demand, and
the Secretary of State has indicated his intention to address this issue. However, this
would require changes to long-established systems for regulating ticket prices, and would
need to be handled carefully given the implications for the income of train operators. It
would also have at best a limited effect in reducing long-term crowding levels, given the
level of demand growth forecast. Considering that over-crowding on certain services is
likely to be dampening demand currently, it could in practice have the opposite effect of
encouraging further demand.

Compulsory seat reservation: Existing demand management techniques already
incentivise travel on reserved seats and specific services through low prices for advance
purchase tickets. More widespread introduction of compulsory seat reservation, however,
could have profound implications for the value that many attach to travelling by train.
Constraining passengers’ freedom to travel at the time that their often uncertain daily
schedule dictates, could discourage rail travel or make it prohibitively expensive if
associated with a premium ticket to retain existing flexibility. For these reasons, the
Secretary of State has ruled out ending the ‘turn up and go’ railway.
 
Question 2: What is the latest estimate of WEIs for the conventional strategic alternatives to 
HS2? 
 
In the March 2010 report (Strategic Outline Case page 52), Atkins state that wider
economic impacts are estimated as:

   •   agglomeration £190 - 299m
   •   imperfect competition £ 238 - 412m
   •   labour markets - negligible

They also state that the wider benefits are consistent across all four rail packages.

This work was not updated in the refresh by Atkins in February 2011.
 
Question 3: Is further work progressing to estimate the impact on the reliability of conventional 
services for both the high speed rail options and for the strategic alternatives? 
 
No work is currently underway on this issue. As the Oxera report notes, however, Rail
Package 2 could potentially have a negative impact on West Coast Main Line reliability.
This is because the current WCML public timetable includes additional journey time for
recovery from delays and incidents to underpin train service reliability, which is strongly
valued by passengers. In contrast, in the modelling of Rail Package 2, this additional
journey time element was removed from the timetable to improve journey times for
services on the WCML.

Given concerns about the potential impact on reliability of this approach, especially when
the more intensive WCML service pattern in RP2 was taken into account, a variation on
RP2, called Rail Package 2a, was also modelled in which no journey time savings from
this source were assumed. The Government considers this variation to be a more feasible
option than the ‘standard’ Rail Package 2, given its potential reliability impacts, but when
these additional journey time savings are removed, the benefit cost ratio of upgrading
existing lines drops significantly.

We do not consider that HS2 would have the same impacts on reliability on the classic
network. The illustrative service pattern developed by HS2 Ltd for the use of released
capacity on the WCML does not increase the number of services from the current level,
and reductions in crowding should minimise any performance issues relating to dwell
times at stations. See also HS2 Ltd’s answer to the Transport Committee’s question 8,
which looks specifically at the West Coast Main Line north of Lichfield.  
 
Q4: Is it appropriate to focus on the benefits of the Y network given that its case has been 
assessed in less detail?  

Yes. The Government’s proposed strategy for high speed rail is to construct a Y-shaped
high speed rail network so this focus is entirely appropriate. The appraisal of the Y that
we have conducted to date has been undertaken on the basis of conservative
assumptions in those areas where, at this stage, there is less certainty and available
detail. We have also run sensitivity testing to provide further information about the case.

We have published the clear basis on which the appraisal of the Y has been undertaken,
and are committed to producing further appraisal in due course on the basis of the more
detailed technical work which is currently underway. However, given the deliberately
cautious approach adopted in the current appraisal, we do not anticipate that this more
detailed work will materially alter the strength of the case for the Y.

It is also important to bear in mind that the case for the Y rests not only on the strength of
its economic case (the benefit:cost ratio) but also on the strength of its strategic case.
Whilst the availability of detailed engineering and other appraisal is useful in developing
the economic case, the wider strategic case has been appraised in considerable detail
even at this stage. The strategic case relates to the fit with wider Government policies and
objectives – such as shifting to a low-carbon economy, improving inter-urban and
international connectivity and supporting growth in the major urban economies of the
Midlands and the North.

Q6: Has the prospect of benefits from further extensions to the Y network been considered and 
analysed?  
Yes. Chapter 6 of HS2 Ltd’s report, High Speed Rail: London to the West Midlands and
Beyond 2 , reviewed the case for a number of strategic options for a national high speed
rail network including indicative costs and benefits.
Working from a recognition that the phasing of any high speed rail network is crucial to its
affordability and deliverability, this work indicated that the strongest case for the initial
phases of a network existed along the lines currently proposed.

If a decision were taken to proceed with high speed rail proposals, the Government would
be prepared in future to consider evidence from HS2 Ltd, the Scottish Government and
any other organisations, to extend the network to serve further regions across Britain. For
this reason, the Y network is being specifically designed to enable extensions further
north in the future.

 
Question 7: To what extent do you consider that travel time should be considered productive?  
How realistic is the sensitivity test in Chapter 7 of the Economic Case? 
 
As noted in the Economic Case for HS2 (Feb 2011) we recognise that some travel time
may be used productively and, as a consequence, acknowledge that the standard
assumptions underpinning the values of time attributable to journeys made during the
course of work are open to debate.

The degree of productive use of travel time, however, should not be over-estimated. The
Oxera Review of the Government’s case for a High Speed Rail programme (Jun 2011)
quotes studies that suggest around 10-20% of rail travel time may be productive. 3 More
recent evidence prepared by the University of the West of England found that around half
(54%) of business travellers may spend some of their time working, but only a third (34%)
work for a majority of their journey. 4 In fact, more business travellers spent most of their
travel time reading for leisure, gazing out of the window or “people-watching” than spent it
working. The report also found that there was negligible change between 2004 and 2010
in the proportion of business travellers who spent the majority of travel time working
despite technological improvements. Therefore while rail passengers may report a similar
level of productivity when working as can be achieved in the office, it may be that in most
cases only a relatively small proportion of travel time is used productively.

In any case, as with all assumptions of this kind, the approach to valuing travel time
savings is a necessary simplification to enable a broad assessment of benefits and not a
complete representation of all the effects of altering journey times. And whilst the
inclusion of some additional factors may reduce the benefits, such as accounting for time
spent working productively on trains, other factors may increase it, for example
considering the impact on productivity of crowding reduction or modal shift. As another
example, reductions in journey time might enable some business travellers to schedule
addi