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					                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF F L O R I D A



ARTHUR F R E D E R I C K GOODE, 111,   :

            App e 1lant ,
vs .                                       Case Jo. 51,&80

STATE OF FLORIDA,

            Appellee.




                 APPEAL FROM THE C I R C U I T COURT
                     IN AND FOR LEE COUNTY                          .   _._-------
                         S T A T E OF FLORIDA




                     B R I E F OF T H E APPELLANT




                                           J A C K 0 . JOHNSON
                                           PUBLIC DEFENDER

                                           F7. C . McLAIN
                                           A S S I S T A N T P U B L I C DEFENDER

                                           H a l l of Justice Annex
                                           495 North Carpenter S t r e e t
                                           B a r t o w , F l o r i d a 33830

                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
                    TOPICAL INDEX TO BRIEF


                                                           PAGE N O .


PRELIMINARY STATEMENT                                          1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE                                          2


STATEMENT OF THE FACTS                                         3-16

POINTS ON APPEAL                                               17-19

ARGUMENT

POINT I.      WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S APPOINT-
              I N G COUNSEL TO PARTIALLY REPRESENT
              APPELLANT, WHILE ALLOWING APPELLANT
              TO PARTIALLY REPMSENT HIMSELF,
              DENIED APPELLANT H I S RIGHT TO EFFEC-
              TIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND H I S
              RIGHT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF, WHEN
              APPELUNT REQUESTED TO REPRESENT
              HIMSELF WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF
              COUNSEL?                                        20-26

POINT 11.     WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I N
              PERMITTING APPELLANT TO HOLD A PRESS
              CONFERENCE DURING H I S TRIAL OR I N
              REFUSING TO GRANT A MISTRIAL AFTER
              THE PRESS CONFERENCE AND ITS PUBLICITY
              DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS?                   27-30

POINT 111.    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED I T S DIS-
              CRETION I N REFUSING TO SEQUESTER THE
              JURY, SINCE THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
              PUBLICITY PERVADED THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY
              CREATING A H I G H PROBABILITY OF THE JURY
              BEING EXPOSED TO INADMISSIBLE AND PRE-
              J U D I C IAL INFORMATI ON ?                     31

POINT I V .   WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I N
              REFUSING TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF
              APPELLANT'S CASE, THEREBY DEWYING
              H I M DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
              TRIAL?                                           32-

                              i
                       TOPICAL INDEX TO BRIEF


                                                              P A E NO.


POINT V .       WETHER APPELLANT, WHO PARTIALLY                47-50
                REPRESENTED HIMSELF WITH ASSISTANCE
                FROM APPOINTED COUNSEL, WAIVED A
                CHANGE OF VENUE AND A FAIR AND
                IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY MERELY REQUESTING
                HIS TRIAL TO REMAIN I N LEE COUNTY?
POINT V I .     WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED I T S           51-55
                DISCRETION I N F I N D I N G APPELLANT SANE
                AND COMPETENT TO ASSIST COUNSEL I N
                THE PREPARATION OF H I S DEFENSE?
POINT V I I .   WHETJBR THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I N              56-59
                PERMITTING THE PROSECUTOR TO MISSTATE
                THE LAW TO THE JURY DURING THE
                SENTENCING PORTION OF THE TRIAL?
POINT VIII.     WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I N              60-62
                F I N D I N G AND WEIGHING THE AGGRAVATING
                CIRCUMSTANCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION
                FOR A CAPITAL FELONY, SINCE THE
                STATE PRODUCED ONLY HEARSAY EVIDENCE
                TO I T S PROOF AND COULD NOT PRODUCE
                A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE VIRGINIA
                JTJDGMENT?
POINT I X .     WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I N             63-46
                NOT F I N D I N G AND WEIGHING THE MITIGATING
                CIRCUMSTANCES, (1) THAT APPELLANT
                COMMITTED THE CAPITAL FELONY WHILE
                UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF EXTREME MENTAL
                OR EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE, AND ( 2 ) THAT
                APPELLANT'S CAPACITY TO APPRECIATE
                THE CRIMINALITY OF H I S CONDUCT OR CONFORM
                HIS CONDUCT TO THE LAW WAS SUBSTANTIALLY
                                 N
                IWAIMD; I VIEW OF THE PSYCHIATRIC
                TESTIMONY THAT SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED?


 CONCLUSI O N                                                   67


 CERTIFICATE O F SERVICE                                        67



                                 ii
                        TABLE OF CITATIONS



CASES CITED:                                                         PAGE NO.

Alvord v. S t a t e
322 S o . 2 d 533 (Fla. 1975)                                         57,58
Ashley v. S t a t e
72 Fla. 1 3 7 , 72 So. 647 (1916)                                     48,49
Boykin v. Alabama
395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969)                    47
Brock v. S t a t e
69 S o . 2 d 344 ( Fla. 1954)                                         51
Brooks v . S t a t e
336 So . 2 d 647 ( F l a . 1st DCA 1976)                              21,23
Brown v. S t a t e
245 So.2d 6 8 F l a . 1971), modified on other grounds,
 408 U . S . 938, 33 L.Ed.2d 759, 92 S . Ct. 2870 ( 1 9 7 2)          51
Carnley v . Cochran
396 U . S . 506, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, 82 S . C t . 884 (1962)                47
Deeb v . S t a t e
 18 F l a . 88 , 158 So. 880 (1935)                                   51
Drope v. Missouri
420 U.S. 162, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 95 S . C t .           896 (1975)       51

Elledge v. State
346 S o.2d 998 (Fla. 1977)                                            59

Estes v . Texas
318 U.S. 532, 14 L.Ed.2d 543, 85 S.Ct. 1628 (1965)                    32

F a r e t t a v. California
422 U.S. 306, 4 5 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975)                   20,21,23,24

Fowler v . S t a t e
255 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1 9 7 1 )                                         51

Gavin v. S t a t e
 59 so . 2 d 544 (Fla.3d DCA 1 9 7 2 ) , c e r t .   den., 265-370
 ( F l a . 1972)                                                      35

                                   iii
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                               TABLE OF CITATIONS



CASES CITED:                                                             PAGE NO.



Sheppard v . Maxwell                                                     27,29,30
384 U.S. 3 3 3 , 1 6 L . E d . 2 d 6 0 0 , 86 S . C t . 1 5 0 7 (1966)   32,48

Singer v. S t a t e
109 So.2d 7 ( F l a . 1959)                                              35

Singer v. U n i t e d S t a t e s
380 U.S. 24 , 13 L . E d . 2 d 630, 85 S . C t . 783 ( 1 9 6 5 )         32 ,35 ,48

S t a t e ex r e l . Deeb v. F a b i s i n s k i
1 1 F l a . 4 5 4 , 152 So. 207 ( 1 9 m , - &.,
 1                                               reh.          -Fla.
                                                                         51
 -,       1 5 6 So. 2 6 1 (1933)
S t a t e v . Burgin
539   s .W.Zd    652 (Mo.App. 1 9 7 6 )                                  20

S t a t e v. Cappetta
216 S o. 2d 749 ( F l a . 1 9 6 9 ) , cert. den. , 394 U.S. 1008,
 22 L.Ed.2d 787, 89 S . C t . 1 1 ( m  60   1                            20

State v. Dixon                                                           57-60
2 8 3 S o . 2 d 1 (Fla. 1973)                                            66

Thompson v. S t a t e
1 9 4 S o . 2 d 6 4 9 ( F l a . 2 d DCA 1 9 6 7 )                        20

United S t a t e s v. Hill
526 F . 2 d 1019 (10 t h C i r . 1975)                                   20

U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Swinton
400 F.Supp. 805 (S.D. N.Y. 1 9 7 5 )                                     20

Ward v. S t a t e
328 S o . 2 d 260 (Fla.1st DCA 1976)                                     48 ,49

-- So.2d 846 ( F l a . 2 d DCA 1976)
Williams v. State
                                                                         21
3'37
Burch v. S t a t e
343 S o . 2 d 83 1 ( F l a . 1 9 7 7 )                                   66

Jones v, S t a t e
332 S o . 2 d 615 ( F l a . 1 9 7 6 )                                    66

Miller v. S t a t e
332 S o . 2 d 65 (Fla. 1 9 7 6 )                                         66

                                             V
t




                                      OTHER AUTHORITIES:



                                                           PAGE NO.


    FLORIDA STATUTES :

    5775.084 (1975)                                         60

    §921.41                                                 60
    §921.141(1)                                             60

    § 9 2 1 . 1 4 1 ( 5 ) (b)                               60

    $ 9 2 1 . 1 4 1 ( 6 ) (b) ( f )                         63

                                                            20,24,26,34,
    United States Constitution, Amendment VI                35)47)4a,49
    United States Constitution, Amendment XIV               20,24,26 ,34,
                                                            35,47

    F l o r i d a Constitution, Article I, $9               20,34

    F l o r i d a Constitution, Article I, $16              24,26,34,35 ,
                                                            47 ,48,49

    F1a.R.Crim.P. Rule 3.210                                51
    F1a.R.Crim.P. Rule 3.370(a)                             31




                                             vi
                     I N THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA



ARTHUR FREDERICK GOODE, 111,                     :

               Appellant,
vs .                                                            Case No. 5 1 , 4 8 0
STATE OF FLORIDA,

               Appellee.




                           BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT



                             PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

               The A p p e l l a n t , ARTHUR FREDERICK GOODE, 111, was t h e
d e f e n d a n t below and w i l l h e r e a f t e r b e r e f e r r e d t o as " A p p e l l a n t   .ID


The A p p e l l e e , t h e S t a t e o f F l o r i d a , w a s t h e p l a i n t i f f below

and w i l l h e r e a f t e r b e r e f e r r e d t o as " S t a t e . "   References t o
t h e Record on Appeal will b e d e s i g n a t e d by "R"                 f o l l o w e d by t h e

a p p r o p r i a t e page number.




                                                -1-
                     Also on January 1 4 t h , Appellant p e r s o n a l l y r e q u e s t e d
0 '   t h e c o u r t t o a l l o w him t o r e p r e s e n t himself and t o d i s c h a r g e h i s
      attorney.        Judge S h e a r e r p e r m i t t e d A p p e l l a n t t o d i s c h a r g e
      Wilbur Smith and t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n h i s own d e f e n s e . (R954-960)
      However, t h e judge appointed t h e P u b l i c D e f e n d e r ' s O f f i c e t o as-

      s i s t Appellant a f t e r t h e f o l l o w i n g c o l l o q u y :

                             THE COURT: T h a t ' s t h e l a w y e r ' s problem.
                     H i s o b l i g a t i o n i s t o a d v i s e M r . Coode of what
                     t h e y a r e and what: he should do. I t ' s Mr.
                     Goode's o p t i o n t o a c c e p t t h a t a d v i c e o r re-
                     ject it.
                               MR. SMITH:         I am merely o f f e r i n g a
                     s u g g e s t i o n t o t h e Court t h a t no lawyer i s
                     going t o be a b l e t o work under t h o s e con-
                     d i t i o n s and you a r e going t o have -- what-
                     e v e r lawyer you a p p o i n t w i l l be f i l i n g a
                     motion t o withdraw s h o r t l y and you a r e
                     going t o wind up back t o t h e same t h i n g .
                     T h a t ' s my s u g g e s t i o n .

                             THE COURT: I ' m s u r e t h e r e a r e compe-
                     t e n t counsel who a r e c a p a b l e of f u l f i l l i n g
                     their obligations.
                             r
                         M , Goode, d e f i n e f o r m e f i r s t degree
                     murder.
                             THE DEFENDANT:             Pardon me?

                          THE COURT:   Define f o r m e f i r s t degree
                     murder. What a r e t h e elements i n F l o r i d a ?

                          THE DEFENDANT: F i r s t degree murder i s
                     when you p l a n t o k i l l t h e p e r s o n .

                          THE COURT: What i s t h e v o i r d i r e exami-
                     nation of jurors?

                             THE DEFENDANT:            The what?          Pardon me?
                     (R956)




                                                      -5
                        THE DEFENDANT: About a11 t h i s pub-
              l i c i t y and s o f o r t h t h a t h e ' s t a l k i n g
              a b o u t , I admit I ' m r e s p o n s i b l e f o r most
              a l l of i t . T h e r f o r e , I d o n ' t see i t ' s
              n e c e s s a r y f o r you t o g r a n t a motion f o r
              change of venue, because ( R 1 3 ) , I 'm r e -
              sponsible f o r i t , and I w r o t e a l e t t e r
              t o M r . D'Alessandro--

                                  y
                   THE COURT: M questlion i s t h i s :
              do you want t h e change o f venue?
                     THE DEFENDANT:           No, sir.

                       THE COURT: Has your lawyer e x p l a i n -
              ed t o you what t h e change of venue means,
              t h a t you c o u l d have t h e c a s e t r i e d i n
              a n o t h e r a r e a anywhere i n t h e s t a t e ? W      e
              can go t o P e n s a c o l a , J a c k s o n v i l l e , Miami,
              as f a r a s I t h i n k i t would be n e c e s s a r y
              t o g e t away from t h e impact t h e media may
              have had on c h i s p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e d u r e .
                     THE DEFENDANT:                e
                                              Let m say--

                       THE COURT: 1 am a s k i n g you has he
              e x p l a i n e d t h a t t o you?
                     THE DEFENDANT:           Yes.

                        THE COURT: Okay. Notwithstanding
              t h e r i g h t t h a t you may have t o do t h a t - -
              and I s a y may have because i t i s my de-
              c i s i o n - - d o you want t o b e t r i e d h e r e ?
                     THE DEFENDANT:           Yes, I do.

                     THE COURT: In o t h e r words, you do
              n o t want venue moved?

                     THE DEFENDANT:           No.     (R14)

Another c o l l o q u y o c c u r r e d a f t e r t h e f i r s t renewal of t h e mo-
tion (R43-44),

                    THE COURT: I d i s a g r e e .          Arthur,
              what: do you t h i n k about i t ?

                     THE DEFENDANT:           I d o n ' t believe so.




                                             -8-
                            THE COURT:          Don't b e l i e v e what?

                         THE DEFENDANT:                I t h i n k i t should be
                    right here,
                          THE COURT: A f t e r s e e i n g t h e s e folks
                    and l i s t e n i n g t o - -

                            THE DEFENDANT: I can sive you a b e t -
                    t e r i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e morning on t h a t .
                             THE COURT: Okay. I w i l l reserve t h a t
                    u n t i l t h e morning. (R44)
                    The n e x t morning, a f t e r t h e above d i a l o g u e , Appellant

    s a i d he w a s happy w i t h t h e j u r y . (R50)              However, new p u b l i c i t y

    o f t h e c a s e had o c c u r r e d , and defense counsel renewed h i s motion

    f o r Change of Venue. (R50-56)                    The c o u r t denied the motion sum-
    m a r i l y w i t h o u t a response from A p p e l l a n t . (R56)              Appellant's
    counsel a l s o moved t o s e q u e s t e r t h e j u r y , b u t t h e c o u r t u l t i m a t e l y


e   denied t h e motion a f t e r j u r y s e l e c t i o n . (R39)
                    A p p e l l a n t p e r s o n a l l y r e q u e s t e d permission t o h o l d a      '
    p r e s s conference d u r i n g t r i a l .         Judge S h e a r e r , over S t a t e and             \


    defense counsel o b j e c t i o n s , r u l e d A p p e l l a n t could h o l d t h e con-

    ference. (R44-48)              The second day o f t r i a l , Appellant: h e l d t h e

    conference.         (R118)
                    Twenty-five p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s were c a l l e d d u r i n g t h e

    .jury s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s i n t h i s c a s e . (R518-841)            The c o u r t ex-
    cused one ( R 7 7 4 ) , t h e S t a t e excused one p e r e m p t o r i l y and Appel-

    l a n t ' s a t t o r n e y ' s excused t e n p e r e m p t o r i l y . ( R 4 0 - 4 1 )   Appellant

    did not personally p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e voir d i r e .                   Since Appe l-

    l a n t ' s a t t o r n e y s exhausted a l l t h e allotted peremptory c h a l l e n g e s ,




                                                      -9-
*                   The s e n t e n c i n g t r i a l w a s conducted t h e f o l l o w i n g

    day.     O i t s own motion, t h e t r i a l c o u r t c a l l e d t h r e e psychia-
              n
    t r i s t s t o t e s t i f y - - T i n Myo Than, Robert Wald and Mordecai
    Haber. ( R 1 1 0 7 - 1 1 7 1 )    These t h r e e p r e v i o u s l y found Appellant

    competent t o s t a n d t r i a l , and Judge S h e a r e r had asked them t o

    reexamine Appellant t o determine h i s mental s t a t u s a t t h e
    time of t h e o f f e n s e . ( R 8 8 1 - 9 2 0 )     A l l three agreed t h a t A p p e l -

    l a n t w a s sane a t t h e time of t h e o f f e n s e . (R113,114,1132-1136,
    1155-1156)
                    Each p s y c h i a t r i s t responded t o t h e j u d g e ' s q u e s t i o n s

    concerning A p p e l l a n t ' s mental s t a t u s as a m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r .

    I n Tin Myo Than's o p i n i o n , Appellant w a s under t h e i n f l u e n c e of
    an extreme mental o r emotional d i s t u r b a n c e a t the time of t h e

    o f f e n s e . (R116-118)        Additionally, Appellant's capacity t o

    a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s a c t o r conform h i s behavior t o

    t h e requirements of t h e law was s u b s t a n t i a l l y impaired. (R118-
    119)     Robert Wald and Mordecai Haber d i s a g r e e d w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n

    on both i s s u e s . ( R 1 1 3 7 - 1 1 3 9 , 1157-1158)

                    Ronald Yeager, a V i r g i n i a policeman, t e s t i f i e d f o r t h e
    S t a t e concerning A p p e l l a n t ' s murder c o n v i c t i o n i n V i r g i n i a .      The

    c o u r t p e r m i t t e d Yeager t o t e s t i f y t o t h e f a c t s o f t h e V i r g i n i a
    murder       (R1172-1179,1183-1154),                over defense o b j e c t i o n s t h a t a
    c e r t i f i e d judgment b e r e q u i r e d . (R1088-1093)           After the State

    r e s t e d , t h e c o u r t p e r m i t t e d t h e S t a t e t o reopen and r e c a l l
    Yeager t o e l i c i t testimony about t h e s t r a n g u l a t i o n murder i n

    V i r g i n i a . (R1183-1184) Again, d e f e n s e counsel o b j e c t e d . ( R 1 1 8 3 )




                                                        -11-
    P

                    Appellant a l s o testified during the sentencing
0       trial. He detailed the commission of the crime and his feelings
        about it. (R1187-1203)
                    The court allowed the State, Appellant: and Appellant's
        counsel to present arguments to the jury. (Rl223-1247) During
        his argument, the prosecutor made the following statements of
        the law:
                       Mitigating circumstances, and this is
                    probably on of the only times there is
                    any burden on the defendant in a criminal
                    trial because mirigating circumstances
                    can be presented--they don't have to be
                    proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt.
                    There is a different standard. 1 believe
                    it is--I may be incorrect, but I believe
                    it is the preponderance of the evidence.
                    I may be wrong, b u t it is l e s s than the
                    State. (R1226)
                       What: I'm saying is, when you get down
                    to your ultimate decision, if you are con-
                    vinced that the aggravating circumstances
                    outweigh the mitigating and a majority of
                    you were s o convinced, seven o r more, then
                    you must recommend death. (R1227)
                    Appellant's counsel objected to two instructions on
        aggravating circumstances made at the close of the sentencinp
        trial.    The first was on involuntary sexual battery under cir-
        cumstance (d) of the standard intructions. ( R 1 2 0 5 , 1 0 7 3 , 1 9 7 6 )
        The second was the instruction on circumstance (b) (R1073,1217);
        the instruction ultimately read,
                        (b) That at the time of [conviction f o r
                    the] crime for which he is to be sentenced,
                    the defendant had been previously convicted
                    of. . . . (111073,1249)
                    After deliberating about thirty minutes, the jury
        recommended Appellant be sentenced to death. (R1258,1261,1262)




                                             -12-
        1   few days l a t e r , on 14arch 2 2 , 1 9 7 7 , C i r c u i t Judge John
0
    \


        S h e a r e r , J r . , sentenced A p p e l l a n t t o d e a t h . ( R 1 2 7 3 - 1 2 7 9 )
                                  THE COURT: F l o r i d a S t a t u t e 9 2 1 . 1 4 1
                        r e q u i r e s t h a t s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s of f a c t
                        i n s u p p o r t o f s e n t e n c e of d e a t h b e reduced
                        t o w r i t i n g . I t i s t h e d e c i s i o n and .judg-
                        ment of t h i s Court t h a t Arthur F r e d e r i c k
                        Goode, XI1 b e sentenced t o d e a t h f o r t h e
                        r e a s o n s I w i l l e l a b o r a t e on.
                                  I a m of t h e o p i n i o n and have been
                        t h a t f i n d i n g s o f t h e Court i n s u p p o r t
                        o f such a s e n t e n c e should b e s t a t e d i n
                        t h e r e c o r d a t t h e t i m e of s e n t e n c i n g i n
                        t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e Defendant and h i s
                        c o u n s e l , and a s such t h i s Court does
                        hereby o r d e r t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r t o t r a n -
                        s c r i b e t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e Court t h a t I
                        have began t o r e n d e r h e r e and w i l l con-
                        t i n u e t o do s o and d e l i v e r them t o t h e
                        Court f o r i n c l u s i o n i n t h e o r d e r of sen-
                        t e n c i n g t h e Defendant t o d e a t h i n t h i s
                        cause.

                                  The s c a t u t e s e t s f o r t h c e r t a i n i s -
                        s u e s which t h e Court must c o n s i d e r i n
                        r e a c h i n g t h e judgment. One, do any ag-
                        g r a v a t i n g circumstances e x i s t and do they
                        exist: beyond and t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of every
                        r e a s o n a b l e doubt; s e c o n d l y , whether m i t i -
                        g a t i n g circumstances e x i s t and most i m -
                        p o r t a n t l y do t h e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances
                        outweigh t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

                                 It i s n o t t h i s Court's opinion t h a t
                        because t h o s e have been s e t f o r t h i n t h e
                        s t a t u t e t h a t they a r e t h e o n l y m a t t e r s t h e
                        Court can l o o k a t i n s e n t e n c i n g . However,
                        t h e y a r e t h e primary guidelines t h e Court
                        must u s e i n r e a c h i n g a d e c i s i o n as t o
                        whether t o impose t h e s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h o r
                        l i f e imprisonment.

                                  The Court f i n d s t h e f o l l o w i n g aggra-
                        v a t i n g circumstances t o e x i s t beyond and t o
                        t h e e x c l u s i o n o f every r e a s o n a b l e doubt:
                        t h e Defendant was p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t e d o f
                        another c a p i t a l felony involving t h e use




                                                         -13-
o r t h r e a t e n e d u s e of v i o l e n c e t o a p e r s o n ;
i n f a c t , i n v o l v i n g t h e d e a t h of t h a t p e r -
son. That ? a c t o r i s s e t f o r t h i n Sub-
paren B of Paragraph 5 of t h e s t a t u t e t h a t
I have h e r e t o f o r e mentioned .

         The Court a l s o f i n d s Subparagraph D
t h a t t h e c a p i t a l f e l o n y of which t h e Defen-
d a n t was c o n v i c t e d , t o w i t : F i r s t degree
murder, was committed w h i l e t h e Defendant
was engaged i n kidnapping and was commit-
t e d s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e s e x u a l b a t t e r y , and
t h a t does n o t mean t h a t I conclude o n l y
one i n c i d e n t of s e x u a l b a t t e r y t a k i n g p l a c e ,
b u t s h o r t l y a f t e r an i n c i d e n t o r i n c i d e n t s
o f s e x u a l b a t t e r y , which w a s a p a r t o f a
scheme t o commit a s e x u a l b a t t e r y a n d / o r
b a t t e r i e s , and t o u l t i m a t e l y murder t h e
victim.

          I a l s o f i n d under Subparagraph H t h a t
t h e c a p i t a l f e l o n y was e s p e c i a l l y h e i n o u s ,
a t r o c i o u s and c r u e l . The Court f i n d s no
o t h e r a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances t o have
been proved beyond and t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of
e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e doubt.

          The Court f i n d s t h e f o l l o w i n g m i t i g a -
t i n g circumstances t o e x i s t , a g a i n c i t i n g
the s t a t u t e : B , t h a t t h e c a p i t a l felony
w a s committed by t h e Defendanr--I'm s o r r y ,
n o t B , b u t D--forgive me a g a i n , m i t i g a t i n g
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , A , which i s Subparen 6 ,
Subparen A o f t h e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances
s e t f o r t h i n t h e s t a t u t e which I have a l -
ready c i t e d ; one, t h a t t h e Defendant had
no s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r y o f p r i o r c r i m i n a l
a c r i v i t y p r i o r t o t h e d a t e of t h e murder
o f t h e v i c t i m i n t h i s c a s e ; G I t h e age o f
t h e Defendant a t t h e time of t h e crime was
age 2 2 . The f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s i n t h e r e c o r d ;
which support: t h e f i n d i n g t h a t t h o s e m i t i -
g a t i n g circumstances e x i s t i s e s t a b l i s h e d
by t h e Defendant's t e s t i m o n y . A l l I r e c a l l
was t h a t h e s a i d h e was age 22 a t t r i a l and
t h u s it- i s easy t o conclude t h e d a t e a t
t h e time of t h e o f f e n s e and, q u i t e f r a n k l y ,
t h e r e was simply no evidence o f mitigating
circumstances under A , t h a t i s , p r i o r
criminal a c t i v i t y occurring p r i o r t o the




                                  -14-
    murder i n t h i s c a s e . O f c o u r s e , a f t e r
0   t h a t murder w e have t h e V i r g i n i a murder.
              The Court f i n d s t h e e x i s t e n c e of no
    o t h e r m i t i g a t i n g circumstances from t h e
    r e c o r d , and t h e Court makes t h e follow-
    i n g f i n d i n g of f a c t s supported by t h e
    r e c o r d and a l l u d e s t o them i n s u p p o r t of
    t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e a g g r a v a t i n g f a c t o r s
    which e x i s t beyond and t o t h e e x c l u s i o n
    o f e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e doubt; I n r e g a r d t o
    Subparagraph B one need t o only review
    t h e testimony of O f f i c e r Yeager from the
    S t a t e o f V i r g i n i a t o s u p p o r t t h a t con-
    c l u s i o n beyond and t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f
    e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e doubt. That testimony
    was e l i c i t e d a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g p o r t i o n
    of the t r i a l .
             Under Subparen D i n r e g a r d t o t h e
    q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e c a p i t a l f e l o n y
    was committed w h i l e the Defendant w a s en-
    gaged i n c e r t a i n o t h e r crimes, one need
    o n l y t o review t h e Defendant's testimony
    given a t t r i a l and t h e taped s t a t e m e n t
    which was p r e s e n t e d i n t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e
    when c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e testimony of t h e
    w i t n e s s e s S t i n t z i , 6 o n z a l e z , Walker and
    Reppa, and I t h i n k i m p o r t a n t l y D r . S c h u l t z ,
    t h e p a t h o l o g i s t , t o c l e a r l y f i n d support:
    f o r t h e f i n d i n g of a g g r a v a t i n g circum-
    s t a n c e ; D , that i s , t h a t t h e r e was beyond
    a q u e s t i o n t h e h o l d i n g of che minor c h i l d
    a g a i n s t h i s w i l l a s d e f i n e d by law and
    a g a i n s t h i s w i l l a s a m a t t e r of f a c t and
    committed s h o r t l y a f t e r s e v e r a l a c t s o r
    i n c i d e n t s of s e x u a l b a t t e r y s o c l o s e l y con-
    n e c t e d i n t i m e t h a t I cannot conclude a s a
    m a t t e r o f l a w t h a t they were n o t committed
    w i t h i n t h e meaning o f t h e s t a t u t e w h i l e
    t h e Defendant was--that t h e murder was n o t
    committed w h i l e t h e Defendant was n o t i n
    f a c t engaged i n them.

            I n o t h e r words, I j u s t c a n ' t c u t o f f
    t h e i n c i d e n t l e a d i n g up t o t h e murder
    under t h e s p e c i f i c words "engaged i n " .         I
    have t o l o o k a t tlhe t o t a l p i c t u r e , and have
    done s o and concluded t h a t b o t h t h e kidnap-




                                      -15-
p i n g and t h e a c t s of s e x u a l b a t t e r y , t h a t
t h e murder was committed w h i l e he w a s
engaged i n t h e kidnapping and, a s I have
i n d i c a t e d , s h o r t l y a f t e r several sexual
b a t t e r i e s , which I even found as a m a t t e r
of f a c t was a p a r t of t h e scheme t o murder
a f t e r the sexual b a t t e r i e s .

          Under Subparagraph H , t h a t t h e murder
was e s p e c i a l l y h e i n o u s , a t r o c i o u s and c r u e l ,
a g a i n t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s testimony a t t r i a l and
a l s o t h e taped c o n f e s s i o n e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t
t h e murder was e s p e c i a l l y h e i n o u s , a t r o c i o u s
and c r u e l . Furthermore, t h e testimony o f
D r . Schultz, the parhologist, indicates
s e v e r e trauma, s e v e r e trauma t o t h e head and
abdomen i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e trauma of t h e
s t r a n g u l a t i o n which u l t i m a t e l y caused d e a t h .

          I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e head trauma and t h e
abdominal trauma, and I a m s p e c i f i c a l l y re-
f e r r i n g t o t h e trauma found i n the b r a i n
which, I b e l i e v e was on t h e r i g h t s i d e ,
E x h i b i t s 6-A1, 6-P, 6-R, 5-A, 5 - A 1 , 5 - C ,
5 - E , 5-1, 5-V and 5-Id when c o n s i d e r e d i n
connection w i t h t h e testimony of t h e patho-
l o g i s t c l e a r l y and e m p a t h e t i c a l l y i n d i c a t e
t h a t the murder and e v e n t s surrounding t h e
murder were e s p e c i a l l y h e i n o u s , a t r o c i o u s
and c r u e l .
          Thus, t h e Court: i n weighing t h e aggra-
v a t i n g circumstances and t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r -
cumstances f i n d s t h a t t h e m i t i g a t i n g circum-
s t a n c e s found t o e x i s t do n o t outweigh t h e
a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances found t o e x i s t ,
and t h u s i t i s t h e d e c i s i o n and judgment of
t h e Court t h a t t h e Defendant be sentenced t o
t h e p e n a l t y of d e a t h .
(R1273-1279,SR1346-1352)




                                  -16-
    POINTS ON APPEAL

          POINT I.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S APPOINT-
ING COUNSEL TO PARTIALLY REPRESENT
APPELLANT, WHILE ALLOWING APPELLANT
TO PARTIALLY REPRESENT HIMSELF,
DENIED APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO EFFEC-
TIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND HIS
RIGHT TO REPRESENT EIIMSELF, IJHEN
APPELLANT REQUESTED TO REPRESENT
HIMSELF WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL?

(Predicated upon Assignments o f
Error No. 9 and 18)

         POINT 11.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
PERMITTING APPELLANT TO HOLD A PRESS
CONFERENCE DURING HIS TRIAL OR IN RE-
FUSING TO GRANT A MISTRIAL AFTER THE
PRESS CONFERENCE AND ITS PUBLICITY
DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS?
(Predicated upon Assignments of Error
No. 15 and 16)

         POINT 111.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION IN REFUSING TO SEQUESTER THE
JURY, SINCE THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PUB-
LICITY PERVADED THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY
CREATING A HIGH PROBABILITY OF THE JURY
BEING EXPOSED TO INADMISSIBLE AND PRE-
JUDICIAL INFON4ATPON?
(Predicated upon Assignment of Error
No. 17)

         POINT IV.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RE-
FUSING TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF APPEL-
LANT'S CASE, THEREBY DENYING HIM DUE
PROCESS AND A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL?



                -17-
( P r e d i c a t e d upon Assignment of
Error No. 5 )

           POINT V.
WHETHER APPELLANT, WHO PARTIALLY
REPRESENTED HIllSELF WITH ASSISTANCE
FROM APPOINTED COLNSEL, WAIVED A
CHANGE OF VENUE AND A FAIR AND IM-
PARTIAL TRIAL BY MERELY REQUESTING
HIS TRIAL TO REMAIN IN LEE COUNTY?
(Predicated upon Assignment of
Error No. 5)

           POINT VI.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING APPELLANT SANE
AND COMPETENT TO ASSIST COUNSEL IN
THE PREPARATION OF HIS DEFENSE?
(Predicated upon Assignment of
Error No. 4 )

           POINT VII.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PER-
YITTI N G THE PROSECUTOR TO MISSTATE
THE LAW TO THE JURY DURING THE SEN-
TENCING PORTION OF THE TRIAL?
(Predicated upon Supplemenral Assign-
ment of Error No. 1)

          POINT VIII.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT EXRED IN
FINDING AND WEIGHING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUIGTANCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION
FOR A CAPITAL FELONY, SINCE THE
STATE PRODUCED ONLY HEARSAY EVIDENCE




                   -18-
TO ITS PROOF AND COULD NOT PRODUCE
A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE VIRGINIA
JUDGMENT?
(Predicated upon Assignments of E r r o r
N o . 19 and 21 and Supplemental Assign-
m e n t of Error No. 2)

         POINT IX.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING AND WEIGHING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES, (1) THAT APPELLANT
COMMITTED THE CAPITAL FELONY WHILE
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF EXTREME MEN-
TAL OR EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE, AND (2)
THAT APPELLANT'S CAPACITY TO APPRE-
CIATE THE CRIMINALITY OF HIS CONDUCT
OR CONFOEW HIS CONDUCT TO THE LAW WAS
SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED: IN VIEW OF
THE PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY TNAT SUCH
CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED?
(Predicated upon Supplemental Assign-
ment of Error No. 3)




                -19-
                                             ARGUMENT
0 '
                                               POINT I .

                              THE TRIAL COURT'S APPOINTING
                              COUNSEL TO PARTIALLY REPRESENT
                              APPELLANT, WHILE ALLOWING AP-
                              PELLANT TO PARTIALLY REPRESENT
                              HIMSELF, DENIED APPELLANT H I S
                              RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
                              OF COUNSEL AND H I S RIGHT TO RE-
                              PRESENT HIMSELF WITHOUT THE
                              ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.


                      The U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d F l o r i d a C o n s t i t u t i o n s g u a r a n t e e

      e v e r y c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t t h e r i g h t t o a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel o r the
      r i g h t t o r e p r e s e n t himself.        Amend. V I , X I V , U.S. C o n s t . ;             Art. I
      $16 F l a . C o n s t . ;    Faretta v . C a l i f o r n i a , 422 U . S . 8 0 6 , 45 L.Ed.2d
      5 6 2 , 95 S . C t . 2525 (1975);              S t a t e v. C a p p e t t a , 216 So.2d 749
      ( F l a . 1 9 6 9 , c e r t . d e n . , 394 U . S .    1 0 0 8 , 22 L . E d . 2d 7 8 7 , 89 S . C t *
      1610 (1969).           However, a m i x t u r e of p a r t i a l l y a p p e a r i n g pro

      and p a r t i a l l y b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l i s n o t a c o n s t i t u -
                                                                                                          I/
                                                                                                          I




      tional right           a n d f e w t r i a l c o u r t s p e r m i t such a p r a c t i c e .
      I n t h i s case, t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s f o r c i n g such a h y b r i d form of r e -
      p r e s e n t a t i o n o n A p p e l l a n t , when he r e q u e s t e d t o r e p r e s e n t himself



      1/
      -        S e e , P o w e l l v . S t a t e , 206 So.2d 47 (Fla.4th DCA 1 9 6 8 ) ;
      Thompson v . S t a t e , 1 9 4 So.2d 649 ( F l a . 2d DCA 1967) ; U . S . v
      H i l l , 526 F , 2 d 1019 ( 1 0 t h Cir. 1 9 7 5 ) ; U.S. v . Swinto-F.
      Supp. 805 (S.D. N . Y . 1 9 7 5 ) ; P e o p l e v . H a r r i s , 63 C a l . App.
      3d 9 7 8 , 135 Cal 6 6 8 ( 2 d DCA 1 9 7 7 ) ; S t a t e v . B u r g i n , 539 S.W.
      2d 652 (Mo.App. 1976).




                                                        -20-
    4

c
        without a lawyer, denied Appellant: both his right to represent
        himself and his right to effective assistance of counsel. (R.22-
        30,954-957)

                    Initially, the trial court erred in failing to pro-
        perly inquire into Appellant's waiver of counsel before allowing
        him to partially represent himself.          Faretta v. California,
        422 U.S.   806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ( 1 9 7 5 ) requires
        a trial judge to fully inform the accused of the perils of self-
        representation and clearly establish, on the record, that the
        accused decides to appear pro - knowingly, intelligently and
                                      se
        with full awareness of the consequences. Florida courts have
        recognized and followed the Faretta standard. Williams v. State,
        337 So.2d 846 (Fla.2d DCA 1 9 7 6 ) ;     Brooks v. State, 3 3 6 So.2d 647
        (Fla.lst DCA 1976)
                         When an accused manages his own
                   defense, he relinquishes, as a
                   purely factual matter, many of the
                   traditional benefits associated with
                   the right to counsel. For this reason,
                   in order to represent himself, the ac-
                   cused must "knowingly and intelligently"
                   f o r g o those relinquished benefits.
                   [citations omitted]
                        Although a defendant need not him-
                   self have the skill and experience of a
                   lawyer in order competently and intel-
                   ligenrly to choose self-representation,
                   he s h o u l d b e made aware of the dangers
                   and disadvantages of self-representation,
                   so that the record will establish that
                   ''he knows what: he is doing and his choice
                   is made with eves oDen." Faretta v.
                   California, 425 U.S: 806, B 3 5 , - 4 5 L.Ed.2d
                   5 6 2 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ( 1 9 7 5 ) .




                                           -21-
-.                  When Appellant: r e q u e s t e d t o r e p r e s e n t h i m s e l f ,

     t h e f o l l o w i n g colloquy t r a n s p i r e d :

                            THE COURT:         Very well.

                            Mr. Goode, on your r e q u e s t t o t e r -
                    minate your a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p
                    w i t h M r . Smith, i s t h a t s t i l l your d e s i r e
                    and i n t e n t , t o t e r m i n a t e M r . Smith?

                         THE DEFENDANT:               To d i s c h a r g e him from
                    being my counsel?

                            THE COURT:         Yes.
                            THE DEFENDANT:            Yes, s i r .

                         TIIE COURT:           You do n o t want him t o ke
                    your lawyer?
                             THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. I want t o r e -
                    p r e s e n t myself a s my own a t t o r n e y .

                             THE COURT: I won't let you r e p r e s e n t
P.
                    y o u r s e l f w i t h o u t the a s s i s t a n c e of counsel
                    u n l e s s you can s a t i s f y m e you have s u f f i -
                    c i e n t l e g a l t r a i n i n g t o do s o , s o I w i l l
                    have t o a p p o i n t an a t t o r n e y f o r you.
                     (R954-955)


                            M r . Goode, d e f i n e f o r me f i r s t de-
                     gree murder.
                            THE DEFENDANT:            Pardon m e ?

                            THE COURT: Define f o r m e f i r s t de-
                    g r e e murder. What a r e t h e elements i n
                    Florida?

                           THE DEFENDANT: F i r s t degree murder
                     i s when you p l a n t o k i l l t h e person.

                         THE COURT: What i s t h e v o i r d i r e
                     examination o f j u r o r s ?

                             THE DEFENDANT:           The what?       Pardon m e ?




                                                      -22-
                                                 -
                                                 ..
                                                  .           .   .
                 THE COURT: What is the voir dire
            examination of j urar s ?
                   TIIE DEFENDANT:    I don ' t understand.
                 THE COURT: Very well. Tell me, Mr.
            Goode, what is the purpose of opening and
            closing argument in a jury trial?
                 THE DEFENDANT: To get the Court t o
            understand everything
                 THE COURT: Who has the order of bur-
            den of proof in a criminal trial?
                   TIIE DEFENDANT :   I don ' t: understand .
                 THE COURT: What is rhe method of
            presentation of testimony in a criminal trial?
                   THE DEFENDANT: I don't understand.
                 THE COURT: Then you need a lawyer t o ex-
            plain these things to you.
                   THE DEFENDANT: But the point is, I do
            not want to have a lawyer, to have that take
            place, as far as representing me at the trial,
            especially a lawyer like Mr. Smith, who has not
            been truthful with me whatsoever at all.
            (R9 5 6-9 57)
            The trial court's questions concerned only Appellant's
l e g a l skills, which were irrelevant to the issue of self-repre-

sentation. S e e , Faretta v. California, 422 U,S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d
562, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975);       Brooks v. State, 336 S o . 2 d 647 (Fla.
1st DCA 1976).      No inquiry was made into Appellant's awareness
of possible adverse consequences of self representation.          This
failure invalidates any waiver of counsel or decision to appear
pro s e .   Id.   The record does not establish that Appellant knew
the pitfalls of self representation.




                                      -23-
              If this Court decides the trial court's ruling
    that Appellant could represent himself was correct, Appellant
    submits, in the alternative, that he was not permitted to
    represent himself. Partial self-representation coupled with
                                                                        -
                                                                        21
    partial assistance of counsel is not what Appellant requested.
    He asserted his right to represent himself without a lawyer.
    (R256,257,954-957) The trial court's forcing legal counsel upon
    h i m denied him his constitutional right to self-representarion.
    Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct.
    2525 (1975).
              The hybrid form of representation not o n l y denied
    Appellant his right t o represent himself, but also denied him
    his right to effective assistance of counsel. Amend. VI, XIV,

0   U.S. Const.; Art. I 516 Fla. Const. Since Appellant and his
    appointed counsel had different trial strategies, an enforced
                                                     3
                                                     -1
    co-counsel relationship hampered both of them.        (R16,17,22-
    23,43,46,256-258)
              This conflict appeared at several crucial points
    during the trial. Appellant disagreed with his counsel over
    a change of venue (see point IV and V), over his participation in


    2/   Cf., People v. Windham, 129 Ca1.R. 828 (4th DCA 1976).
    This c a s e discusses distinctions between assistance of counsel
    and a co-counsel relationship when a defendant represents him-
    self. Although the decision's holding was vacated at 137 Cal.
    R. 8 (1977), the case is enlightening on this subject.




                                   -24-
*
        +
    ,   t h e case (R22-23),             and over h i s i g n o r i n g c o u n s e l ' s a d v i s e .
        (R256-258)           The disagreement l e a d t o c o u n s e l ' s moving t o

        withdraw f r o m t h e c a s e , b u t t h e t r i a l judge denied t h e motion.
        (R2 5 6- 2 5 8 )

                                    MR. SEIPSON: S i n c e t h e o u t s e t of t h i s
                           c a s e I have r e q u e s t e d a number o f o c c a s i o n s
                           t h a t t h e c o u r t n o t a l l o w Arthur Coode t o
                           participate i n the t r i a l i n the nature i n
                           which he i s doing and t h e c o u r t has r u l e d
                           a g a i n s t m e each t i m e . I t h i n k , though, t h e
                           c a s e has g o t t e n t o such a p o i n t t h a t i t i s
                           almost becoming t h a t of a c i r c u s atmosphere
                           on t h e p a r t o f Nr. Goode. Because of t h a t
                           I would a s k f o r a m i s t r i a l .      I think the
                           c o u r t was wrong i n p e r m i t t i n g t h e p r e s s con-
                           f e r e n c e . I t h i n k t h e c o u r t w a s wrong i n
                           p e r m i t t i n g Mr. Goode t o c r o s s examine t h e
                           w i t n e s s e s inasmuch a s he i s n o t t r a i n e d i n
                           law.

                                                                                         4.
                                    W have been a p p o i n t e d t o r e p r e s e n t F r
                                     e
                                          e
                           Goode. W a r e doing no good f o r M. Goode       r
                           by h i s a c t i o n s , and I would ask t h a t t h e
                                                y
                           c o u r t g r a n t m motion.
                                 THE COURT:          What i s good, J o e ?          What
                           i s good?
                                    MR. SIMPSON: W a r e n o t a b l e t o pro-
                                                            e
                           p e r l y r e p r e s e n t him.
                                    THE COURT: What i s proper r e p r e s e n t a -
                           t i o n ? What does t h a t mean? Does t h a t mean
                           l o o k s ? Does t h a t mean what you t h i n k i s
                           right?


        3/   See n o t e 2 , s u p r a . The f o l l o w i n g appears i n Peo l e v
        Windham, 1 2 9 Ca1.R. 828 ( 4 t h DCA 1 9 7 6 ) , at: pages 8&;4.
                                 T h e o r e r i c a l l y , i t would be p o s s i b l e f o r
                           defendant t o be r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel and
                           a l s o t o a c t a s h i s own c o u n s e l . Defendant
                           and h i s counsel would then be " . j o i n t l y and
                           s e v e r a l l y " r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e management
                           o f t h e d e f e n s e . T h i s arrangement, which i s




                                                           -25-
                         MR. SIMPSON: See t h a t he g e t s a f a i r
                t r i a l , b u t w i t h h i s own a c t i o n s , he can-
                n o t be a s s u r e d of a f a i r t r i a l .

                    THE DEFENDANT:                   I want t o represent:
                myself.

                           THE COURT: Arthur i s competent. Your
                 f u n c t i o n i s t o a d v i s e him. I f he l i s t e n s to
                 that a d v i c e and i g n o r e s i t then i t ' s h i s
                 damned t r i a l , h e can do what he wants.
                 (R2 5 6 - 2 5 7 )
                 Such d i s c o r d rendered i m p o s s i b l e a c o o p e r a t i v e co-
counsel r e l a t i o n s h i p .      P u l l i n g i n t w o d i r e c t i o n s , i t rendered

impossible e f f e c t i v e u s e of a t r i a l l a w y e r ' s s k i l l .             T h i s en-
f o r c e d r e l a t i o n s h i p worked t o deny Appellant h i s r i g h t t o s e l f -
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and t h e r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l ,

Amend. V I , X I V , U . S . C o n s t . ;         A r t . I 016 F l a . Const., and t h i s
                                                   _I




Court should r e v e r s e .




                what we mean by co-counsel s t a t u s , could
                c o n t i n u e , however, o n l y s o long as both
                defendant and h i s a t t o r n e y agreed p e r -
                f e c t l y on a l l q u e s t i o n s of t r i a l s t a t e g y
                and t a c t i c s , i n c l u d i n g who should conduct
                which p o r t i o n s of t h e d e f e n s e . Such total
                agreement must be r a r e and d i f f i c u l t t o
                p r e d i c t i n advance. A s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r ,
                moreover, t h i s arrangement would be cumber-
                some and tend t o c o n f u s i o n .




                                                   -26-
                                       POINT 11.

                        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
                        APPELLANT TO HOLD A PRESS CONFER-
                        ENCE DURING H I S T R I A L A ” ) I N REFUSING
                        TO GRANT A PIISTRIAL AFTER THE PRESS
                        CONFERENCE AND I T S PUBLICITY DENIED
                        APPELLANT DUE PROCESS.


                A p p e l l a n t ’ s p e r s o n a l p r e s s conference ( R l l & ) , d u r i n g
an a l r e a d y h e a v i l y p u b l i c i z e d t r i a l ( s e e p o i n t IV,i n f r a ) , w a s

i c i n g on t h e cake f o r t h e l o c a l news media.                 Although t h e con-

f e r e n c e was n o t h e l d i n open c o u r t o r r e c o r d e d , newspaper and
t e l e v i s i o n r e p o r t s could have e a s i l y reached t h e unsequestered

j u r y . (See p o i n t 111) (R1287-1288)                 S i n c e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of
prejudicing the j u r y w a s high, the t r i a l court f a i l e d i n i t s

inherent r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o ensure a f a i r t r i a l .            Sheppard v .

Maxwell, 384 U . S . 3 3 3 , 16 L.Ed.2d 6 0 0 , 86 S . C t . 1507 ( 1 9 6 6 ) .
                The United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , i n reviewing a

h i g h l y p u b l i c i z e d c a s e which t h e t r i a l judge f a i l e d t o ade-

q u a t e l y r e g u l a t e , had t h e f o l l o w i n g comments:

                      The c o u r t ’ s fundamental e r r o r i s com-
                pounded by t h e h o l d i n g t h a t i t lacked
                power t o c o n t r o l t h e p u b l i c i t y about t h e
                t r i a l . From t h e v e r y i n c e p t i o n of t h e
                proceedings t h e judge announced t h a t
                n e i t h e r he n o r anyone e l s e could r e s t r i c t
                p r e j u d i c i a l news a c c o u n t s . And he r e i t -
                e r a t e d t h i s v i e w on numerous o c c a s s i o n s .
                S i n c e he viewed t h e news media as h i s
                t a r g e t , the judge never considered o t h e r
                means t h a t a r e o f t e n u t i l i z e d t o reduce
                t h e appearance o f p r e j u d i c i a l m a t e r i a l and
                t o protect: t h e j u r y from o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e .




                                                  -2 7-
                                                                                                        __   . .
W conclude t h a t t h e s e procedures would
  e
have been s u f f i c i e n t t o g u a r a n t e e Shep-
pard a f a i r t r i a l and s o do n o t c o n s i d e r
what s a n c t i o n s might b e a v a i l a b l e a g a i n s t
a r e c a l c i t r a n t p r e s s n o r t h e charges of
b i a s now made a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e t r i a l
j udge.

      The c a r n i v a l atmosphere a t t r i a l could
e a s i l y have been avoided s i n c e t h e c o u r t -
room and courthouse premises a r e s u b j e c t t o
t h e c o n t r o l of t h e c o u r t . A s we s t r e s s e d
i n E s t e s , t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e p r e s s a t
j u d i c i a l proceedings must be l i m i t e d when
i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e accused might
o t h e r w i s e be p r e j u d i c e d o r disadvantaged.
Bearing i n mind t h e massive p r e t r i a l pub-
l i c i t y , t h e judge should have adopted
s t r i c t e r rules governing t h e u s e of t h e
courtroom by newsmen, a s Sheppard's counsel
r e q u e s t e d . The number o f r e p o r t e r s i n t h e
courtroom i t s e l f could have been l i m i t e d
a t t h e f i r s t s i g n t h a t t h e i r p r e s e n c e would
d i s r u p t t h e t r i a l . They c e r t a i n l y should
n o t have been p l a c e d i n s i d e t h e b a r .
Furthermore, t h e judge should have more
c l o s e l y r e g u l a t e d t h e conduct o f newsmen i n
t h e courtroom. F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e j u d g e
b e l a t e d l y asked them n o t t o handle and
photograph t r i a l e x h i b i t s l y i n g on t h e
counsel t a b l e during r e c e s s e s .
I d . a t 357, 358.
_I




 . . .The c o u r t s must t a k e such steps by r u l e
and r e g u l a t i o n t h a t w i l l p r o t e c t t h e i r
p r o c e s s e s from p r e j u d i c i a l o u t s i d e i n t e r -
f e r e n c e s . N e i t h e r - p r o s e c u t o r s , counsel f o r
d e f e n s e , t h e accused, w i t n e s s e s , c o u r t s t a i f
nor enforcement o f f i c e r s comine under t h e     u    .   -

j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t should b e p e r m i t t e d
t o f r u s t r a t e i t s f u n c t i o n . Co l l a b o r a t i o n
between counsel and t h e p r e s s as t o informa-
t i o n a f f e c t i n g t h e f a i r n e s s of a c r i m i n a l
t r i a l i s n o t only subject t o r e g u l a t i o n , but
i s h i g h l y c e n s u r a b l e and worthy o f d i s c i g l i -
nary measures.
 (Emphasis added) - a t 363    Id.




                                -28-
        #
                      T h i s c a s e i s analogous t o Sheppard v . Maxwell,
0   -
        supra.     The t r i a l j u d g e , i n t h i s c a s e also b e l i e v e d he lacked

        t h e power t o c o n t r o l t r i a l p u b l i c i t y . (R44-48)
                           MR. SIPlPSON: Fred has a couple m a t t e r s
                      he wants t o b r i n g up t o t h e c o u r t .
                              THE DEFENDANT:             Concerning what?
                              MR. SIMPSON:            You know.
                               THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I would l i k e you
                      t o o r d e r me sometime tomorrow t o t a l k t o
                      t h e s e r e p o r t e r s and d i s c u s s c e r t a i n t h i n g s .

                               THE COURT: I d o n ' t know. I o r i g i n a l l y
                      thought of p u t t i n g some c o n d i t i o n s on i t a s
                      t o t h e i r questions. I don't believe I w i l l
                      do t h a t . I f you want t o do t h a t I have no
                      o b j e c t i o n t o a b r i e f conference w i t h t h e
                      reporters.
                               MR. D'ALESSANDRO: If i t p l e a s e t h e
                      c o u r t , t h e S t a t e w i l l i n t e r p o s e an o b j e c t i o n
                      on t h e r e c o r d .
                           THE COURT:      I mean, s u b j e c t t o you all
                      convincing m e o t h e r w i s e , e i t h e r one of you.
                                MR. D'ALESSANDRO: To t h e Defendant
                      t a l k i n g t o t h e r e p o r t e r s ? I t h i n k once w e
                      are within the t r i a l matters within the
                      courtroom and a j u r y t h a t a t t h i s s t a g e
                      appears w i l l n o t b e s e q u e s t e r e d , t h a t I
                      o b j e c t t o t h e Defendant being allowed t o
                      t a l k t o t h e r e p o r t e r s . Obviously t h e c a s e
                      has had p u b l i c i t y i n t h e p a s t . I d o n ' t know
                      what he w i l l say and t h a t i s something t h a t
                      concerns me t h a t t h e j u r y may see o r h e a r ,
                      and I t h i n k t h a t ' s something w i t h i n t h e
                      i n h e r e n t d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t t o n o t allow,
                      I d o n ' t t h i n k he should be a b l e t o d i s c u s s
                      it.
                          THE COURT:               I know t h a t you vehemently
                      object.
                                MR. SIMPSON: I c o n t i n u e t o o b j e c t ,
                      a l t h o u g h M r . Goode s t a t e d he u n d e r s t a n d s .




                                                        -29-
                      THE COURT:              What's t h e b a s i s o f your
                 objection?

                           MR. SIMPSON: I f e e l t h a t ir's v e r y
                 d e t r i m e n t a l and p r e j u d i c i a l t o h i s c a s e t o
                 talk t o reporters.
                          THE DEFENDANT: I know I have freedom
                 of speech, and s i n c e I have been r u l e d com-
                 p e t e n t and s a n e --
                        THE COURT: I a g r e e . I w i l l schedule a
                t i m e f o r you tomorrow. Anything e l s e you
                want t o t a l k t o m e a b o u t a t t h i s time?
                 (R44-46)
                 The t r i a l c o u r t was f u l l y aware of t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r

p r e j u d i c i a l p u b l i c i t y from t h e p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e .   Just prior t o

t h e press c o n f e r e n c e , t h e p r o s e c u t o r a d v i s e d t h e c o u r t of an

a r t i c l e i n t h a t morning's newspaper c a r r y i n g a p u r p o r t e d con-

f e s s i o n A p p e l l a n t gave r e p o r t e r s t h e p r e v i o u s day. ( R 4 9 - 5 3 )

Both appointed defense counsel and t h e s t a t e a t t o r n e y o b j e c t e d
                                      41
                                      -
t o Appellant's p r e s s conference.    A newspaper a r t i c l e
t h e f o l l o w i n g day r e p o r t e d t h e p r e s s conference and d e s c r i b e d
t h e t r i a l as a " c i r c u s " .       (R1287-1288)
                A t t h e v e r y l e a s t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t should have g r a n t e d

a m i s t r i a l o r s e q u e s t e r e d t h e j u r y (R56), a f t e r t h e p r e s s con-
ference.         A p p e l l a n t submits t h e c o u r t f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e i t s

i n h e r e n t a u t h o r i t y t o c o n t r o l t h e t r i a l and i t s l i t i g a n t s , and

t h i s Court should reverse.                   Sheppard v . Maxwell, 3 8 4 U . S . 3 3 3 ,

1 6 L.Ed.2d 6 0 0 , 8 6 S . C t . 1507 ( 1 9 6 6 ) .


-/
4        A p p e l l a n t submits t h e S t a t e i s estopped t o argue that: t h e
t r i a l c o u r t w a s c o r r e c t i n p e r m i t t i n g a press c o n f e r e n c e , s i n c e
it also asserted error a t trial.




                                                    -30-
                                       POINT 111.

                        THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED I T S DIS-
                        CRETION I N REFUSING TO SEQUESTER
                        THE JURY, S I N C E THE PRETRIAL AND
                        TRIAL PUBLICITY PERVADED THE EN-
                        T I R E COMMUNITY CREATING A H I G H
                        PROBABILITY OF THE JURY BEING
                        EXPOSED TO INADMISSIBLE AND PRE-
                        J U D I C I A L INFORMATION.

                A p p e l l a n t r e q u e s t e d s e q u e s t r a t i o n o f t h e j u r y on
a t l e a s t t w o o c c a s i o n s (R30-39,56);            b o t h were d e n i e d . (R39,56)

The f i r s t o c c u r r e d b e f o r e s e l e c t i o n of t h e j u r y which t h e c o u r t

denied upon empaneling a j u r y .                  (R39)      A second o c c u r r e d a f t e r
t h e p r o s e c u t o r a d v i s e d t h e c o u r t of a c u r r e n t newspaper a r t i c l e

c a r r y i n g a c o n f e s s i o n and t h e c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o p e r m i t Appel-

l a n t ' s press conference. (R56)
                F l o r i d a Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 . 3 7 0 ( a ) l e a v e s

t h e d e c i s i o n t o s e q u e s t e r a j u r y t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l

court.
                (a) R e g u l a t i o n o f J u r y . A f t e r t h e j u r o r s
                have been sworn they s h a l l h e a r t h e c a s e
                a s a body and, w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of
                t h e t r i a l j u d g e , may be s e q u e s t e r d .
                Fla .R . C r i m .P . 3 . 3 7 0 .
However, t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n t h i s c a s e abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n
i n denying A p p e l l a n t ' s r e q u e s t f o r s e q u e s t r a t i o n .     The proba-

b l e p r e j u d i c i a l impact: on t h e j u r y of t h e comprehensive news
coverage was a p p a r e n t .          (For b r e v i t y Appellant incorporates

t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n P o i n t s IV A & B concerning p r e t r i a l and

r r i a l publicity.)          A p p e l l a n t urges t h i s Court t o reverse.




                                                  -31-
                                POINT IV.
a                    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RE-
                     FUSING TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF
                     APPELLANT'S CASE, THEREBY DENY-
                     ING H I M DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR
                     AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL,


                                    A.
                The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In
                Denying A Change Of Venue, Since Appel-
                lant's Admissions Of Guilt Featured In
                The News Media Peremptorily Pre,judiced
                His Case.

                On several occassions, the United States Supreme
    Court has reversed criminal convictions because community
    publicity s o affected the judicial process as to be inherently
    prejudicial t o a fair trial. Pervasive news media coverage of
             5/I                             -/
                                             6                  7
                                                                -/
    a trial,    televising pretrial hearings    and confessions
    have all been held due process violations without regard to a
    specific showing of prejudice.        - Rideau
                                          See,              v. Louisiana, 373
    U.S. 7 2 3 , 1 0 L.Ed.2d 6 6 3 , 83 S.Ct. 1 4 1 7 (1963).      When media
    publicity t r i e s a case, rendering court proceedings a "hollow
    formality" Id. at 726, due process has been violated.
                This Court has also shown its concern for "newspaper
    trials."    - Singer v . State,
                See,                       109 So.2d 7 ( F l a . 1 9 5 9 ) ;   Oliver


    -/
    5     Sheppard v. ?~laxwe11, 8 4 U.S, 3 3 3 , 1 6 L.Ed.2d 600, 86
                               3
          S.Ct. 1507 (1966) *

    -/
    6     Estes v. Texas, 3 8 1 U.S. 5 3 2 , 14 L.Ed.2d 5 4 3 , 8 5 S.Ct.
          1 6 2 8 (1965).
    -/
    7     Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 10 L.Ed.2d 663, 83
          S.Ct. 1417 ( 1 9 6 3 ) .
                                              B.

                The T r i a l Court Abused I t s D i s r e t i o n
                In Denying A Change O f Venue, Since
                News Media P u b l i c i t y P r e j u d i c e d The
                J u r y That Heard A p p e l l a n t ' s Case,
                Thereby Denying A p p e l l a n t A F a i r T r i a l .


                A p p e l l a n t submits t h a t t h e l o c a l p u b l i c i t y of h i s

c a s e presumptively p r e j u d i c e d any t r i a l h e l d i n Lee County.

However, an examination o f t h e c h a r a c t e r o f the p u b l i c i t y ,
and i t s e f f e c t on t h e j u r y , shows a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e .          -
                                                                                        See,

Murphy v. F l o r i d a , 4 2 1 U.S. 7 9 4 , 44 L.Ed.2d 589, 95 S . C t .

2031 (1975).            The t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of a change of venue

a f t e r j u r y s e l e c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d an abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n re-

q u i r i n g t h i s Court t o r e v e r s e .           See, S i n g e r v. S t a t e , 109
So.2d 7 ( F l a . 1 9 5 9 ) .
                 The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l

t r i a l does n o t r e q u i r e a j u r y of persons totally i g n o r a n t of

t h e case, b u t i t does r e q u i r e a j u r y o f persons capable of
l a y i n g a s i d e any p r e c o n c e p t i o n s .     Amend. V I , X I V , U . S .   Const.,
A r t . I 516, F l a . Const.              I r v i n v . Dowd, 366 U.S. 7 1 7 , 6 L.Ed.

2d 751, 81 S.Ct. 1 6 3 9 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ;               Murphy v . F l o r i d a , 4 2 1 U . S .        794,

44 L.Ed.2d 5 8 9 , 9 5 S . C t . 2031 (1975);                      S i n g e r v . S t a t e , 109

So.2d 7 (Fla.1959);                 P i t t s v. S t a t e , 307 S o . 2 d 4 7 3 ( F l a . l s t DCA

1 9 7 5 ) ) c e r t . d i s . , 423 U.S. 918 (1975);                  Cavin v . S t a t e , 259

So.2d 544 ( F l a . 3 d DCA 1 9 7 2 ) , c e r t . d e n . , 265 So.2d 3 7 0 ( F l a .

1972).       Looking t o the comprehensiveness and p e r v a s i v e n e s s of




                                                     -35-
     I*




0   t h e media coverage, r h e d i f f i c u l t y a j u r o r would have i n
    l a y i n g a s i d e o u t o f c o u r t i n f o r m a t i o n i s a p p a r e n t . (R973-1028,
    1287,1319-1338)            The v o i r d i r e confirmed t h e d i f f i c u l t y ,
    showing t h e j u r y was n o t i m p a r t i a l . ( R 5 2 5 - 8 4 0 )

                   Newspaper and t e l e v i s i o n r e p o r t s encompassed every
    f a c e t of t h i s case over a s e v e r a l month p e r i o d from i n v e s t i g a -
    t i o n through t r i a l . (R973-978,1387,1319-1339)                          They included
    n o t o n l y A p p e l l a n t ' s admission of g u i l t and r e q u e s t t o be ex-
    e c u t e d (See p o i n t IV-A, supra) (R932,1002,1003,1287-1288,1319-
    1 3 2 0 ) , b u t a l s o numerous i t e m s which were n o t a d m i t t e d i n t o
    evidence a t t r i a l .
                   S e v e r a l a r t i c l e s and t e l e v i s i o n b r o a d c a s t s r e f e r r e d
    t o A p p e l l a n t ' s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n f o r Murder i n V i r g i n i a . (R981,
    983,987,991,994,995,1007,1020,1021,1321,1326,1333,133~) A l -
    though t h e j u r y heard t h i s f a c t d u r i n g t h e s e n t e n c i n g s t a g e ,
    no evidence of i t was p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g t h e g u i l t determining

    stage.
                   A mere look a t some h e a d l i n e s tells t h e a r t i c l e s '
    stories.
                   Murder Suspect Goode I s I n d i c t e d F o r Slay-
                   i n g O f Youth I n V i r g i n i a (R987)


                   Murders Link Maryland, V i r g i n i a With Cape
                   Coral (R989)


                   Grand J u r y I n d i c t s Goode I n Baltimore
                   (R991)




                                                     -36-
..   "Convicted K i l l e r .     I'   (R994)      A l l t h e p u b l i c i t y even brought

     t h e t r i a l judge i n t o t h e h e a d l i n e s , "Judge ' t i r e d ' of coverage
     i n Goode c a s e . " (R1000)            The a r t i c l e ' s f i r s t paragraph r e a d ,

                     Claiming h e ' s t i r e d of s e e i n g accused
                     s l a y e r Arthur Goode 111 on t h e t e l e v i -
                     s i o n s c r e e n , C i r c u i t Judge John S h e a r e r
                     o f F o r t Myers Monday postponed a h e a r -
                     i n g f o r t h e defendant u n t i l h e ' s s u r e
                     newsmen a r e n ' t i n t h e c o u r t h o u s e .
                     (R1000)
                     The e f f e c t t h e p u b l i c i t y had upon t h e v e n i r e i s b e s t

     demonstrated i n t h e p r o s p e c t i v e , j u r o r s ' answers d u r i n g v o i r

     dire.      Although r e s p o n s e s of j u r o r s who a c t u a l l y heard A p p e l -

     l a n t ' s c a s e a r e more c r u c i a l , t h e answers of persons f r o m t h e
     v e n i r e who were n o t s e l e c t e d e n l i g h t e n t h e q u e s t i o n o f p r e -
     judice.
                     Twenty-three of t h e t w e n t y - f i v e p r o s p e c t i v e , j u r o r s

     c a l l e d had heard news r e p o r t s of t h i s case. (R518-841)                     The

     c o u r t excused one p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ( R 7 7 4 ) ,   t h e S t a t e ex-

     cused one p e r e m p t o r i l y and Appellant's appointed counsel
     excused t e n peremptorily, e x h a u s t i n g a l l a v a i l a b l e c h a l l e n g e s .

     (R40-41,810)
                     Responses f r o m members of the v e n i r e who d i d n o t s i t

     on t h e j u r y i n c l u d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g :
                          MR. SIMPSON: D o you r e c a l l having
                     followed t h i s c a s e i n t h e news?

                              MRS. WARNER: I r e a d about i t . I
                     d o n ' t know i f I followed i t , r e a l l y .       I
                     r e a d i t , j u s t l i k e you r e a d a l l t h e news.




                                                       -38-
1   c
             MR. SIMPSON: Okay. W s t h i s j u s t a
                                                 a
        minor a r t i c l e o r a s e r i o u s a r t i c l e t o your
        way o f t h i n k i n g ?
                MRS. WARNER: I t w a s n ' t minor, i t
        w a s n ' t q u i t e major, b u t I d i d n ' t d w e l l on
        i t , A l s o t h e paper --
               MR. SIMPSON:           I d i d n ' t hear t h a t .
                 MRS. WARNER: I s a i d t h a t the news-
        p a p e r , you can p r i n t a n y t h i n g i n i t . Some
        of t h e t h i n g s that: I r e a d i n t h e paper I
        d o n ' t t h i n k - a r e p o s s i b l e . It d o e s n ' t
        n e c e s s a r i l y make i t a f a c t .
                  MR. SIMPSON: Okay. Has t h e thought
                                             y
        e n t e r e d your mind t h a t m c l i e n t must be
        g u i l t y o f something o r e l s e he w o u l d n ' t be
        s i t t i n g r i g h t h e r e today?

                MRS. WARNER: I d o n ' t b e l i e v e s o . He's
        h e r e because he i s h e r e . Somebody must have
        thought something happened t o him. H e must
        have been i n t h e wrong p l a c e at: t h e wrong
        t i m e or the r i g h t place a t the r i g h t t i m e ,
        o r something i s t h e r e a s o n h e ' s h e r e .
         (R628- 629)


                                      r
              MR. SIMPSON: M . Mudge, based on what
        you r e a d , w h a t you l i s t e n e d t o , have you
        formed any o p i n i o n s concerning t h i s c a s e ?
                 MR. MUDGE: I d o n ' t t h i n k you can h e l p
        b u t form some o p i n i o n s , b u t I r e a l i z e o p i n i o n s
                                                               e
        a r e n ' t what we a r e b a s i n g t h i s on. W g o t t o
        base i t on what w e h e a r i n t h e courtroom.

             MR. SIMPSON:             What i s t h e o p i n i o n you
        have, s i r ?
                  MR. MUDGE: The a r t i c l e s t h a t I read was
        more based o p i n i o n on l a w enforcement than
        a n y t h i n g e l s e , r a t h e r than whether he i s
        g u i l t y o r i n n o c e n t o r a n y t h i n g l i k e t h a t . The
        a r t i c l e s t h a t come t o mind--and I maybe missed
        a week o r so--but they seemed t o be b e f o r e
        t h e r e was any s u s p e c t s . (R629-630)




                                        -39-
0   '*
                   MR. SIMPSON: M . Waxman, d i d you
                                          r
         f o l l o w t h i s c a s e i n t h e newspaper o r
         on t h e TV?

                MR. WAXMAN:           J u s t t o glance a t i t .
              MR. SXMPSON: Based upon what you
         glanced a t , d i d you form any o p i n i o n one
         way o r t h e o t h e r concerning t h i s c a s e ?
              MR. WAXMAN: The only o p i n i o n I
         formed i s t h a t t h e paper was s l a n t i n g
         towards g u i l t .  (R631)


                 MR. SIT'IPSON: Based upon what you
         may have r e a d i n t h e p a s t , d i d you form
         any o p i n i o n one way o r t h e o t h e r about
         t h e c a s e as t o what you thought should
         happen o r what may have happened, t h i s
         s o r t of thing?
                  MRS. ALLEN: I thought what a t e r -
         r i b l e crime, you know. I was shocked
         t h a t something l i k e t h i s could happen,
         and I c o u l d n ' t understand i t . (R631)


              MRS. ANDERSON: I h e a r d about i t
         when i t was i n t h e papers b e f o r e , b u t
         I haven't read anything t h i s t i m e .
              MR. D'ALESSANDRO: Have you formed
         any o p i n i o n s about i t ?
                 M R S . ANDERSON: Well, I have a f e e l -
         i n g t h a t - - t o be p e r f e c t l y h o n e s t I t h i n k
         maybe I do have an o p i n i o n .

                MR. D'ALESSANDRO: W e l l , L e t m e ask
         you a couple o t h e r q u e s t i o n s and t h e n I
         will come back t o t h a t i n a minute. D o
         you u n d e r s t a n d t h a t i f you a r e s e l e c t e d
         t o s i t on t h i s j u r y t h a t whatever d e c i s i o n
         you r e a c h you do so based upon t h e evidence
         and testimony you hear i n t h i s courtroom?




                                         -40-
           MRS. ANDERSON:          Yes, s i r .
0           MR. D'ALESSANDRO: There is n o t h i n g
    wrong w i t h having an o p i n i o n . T h a t ' s
    p a r t of l i f e , b u t m q u e s t i o n t o you i s
                                    y
    i s your o p i n i o n , whatever i t i s , of such
    a n a t u r e t h a t r e g a r d l e s s o f what: you may
    h e a r o r s e e o r whatnot t h a t i t would n o t
    change t h a t o p i n i o n ?

         MRS. ANDERSON: Well, I t h i n k I can
    look a t t h e evidence and be f a i r about i t .
             MR. D'ALESSANDRO: Well, I under-
    s t a n d t h a t , b u t t h a t ' s n o t an answer t o my
    question.
           MRS. ANDERSON:          I ' m sorry.

           MR. D'ALESSANDRO:           No, I ' m not t r y -
    i n g t o p u t you on a s p o t .

           MRS. ANDERSON:          I ' m nervous.
           NR. D'ALESSANDRO: I understand t h a t ,
    b u t i t i s a question which w e need t o know
    an answer t o . The o p i n i o n which you h o l d ,
    i s i t of such a n a t u r e thatl you could n o t
    change i t ?
            MRS. ANDERSON: No, I d o n ' t t h i n k s o ,
    because i t ' s been q u i t e a w h i l e ago and I
    s o r t of f o r g o t t e n r e a d i n g about i t . I j u s t
    remember a t t h e t i m e I w a s shocked.
            MR. D'ALESSANDRO: You u n d e r s t a n d t h a t
    t h i s Defendant i n t h i s courtroom i s p r e -
    sumed i n n o c e n t and t h a t presumption remains
    w i t h him u n l e s s o r u n t i l t h e S t a t e proves
    h i s g u i l t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt?

             MRS. ANDERSON: I'm being p e r f e c t l y
    h o n e s t when I t e l l you how I f e e l .
             MR. D'ALLESSANDRO: Yes, ma'am, I
    a p p r e c i a t e t h a t . T h a t ' s what I asked you
    f o r . I ' m n o t t r y i n g t o p u t you on t h e s p o t
    a t all. Can you g i v e t o t h e Defendant t h a t
    presumption of innocence which t h e law a f -
    f o r d s t o him?




                                 -41-
                 I n o t h e r words, as he sits h e r e r i g h t now
                 t o you does he have t h a t presumption of
                 innocence ?

                         MRS. ANDERSON:               I don't think so.
                  (R7 7 2- 7 74)

                 Focusing on j u s t t h e j u r y a c t u a l l y s e l e c t e d , t h e

p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t : of t h e p u b l i c i t y i s a p p a r e n t .   One j u r o r
and A p p e l l a n t ' s counsel had t h e f o l l o w i n g exchange:
                        MR. SIMPSON: Okay. Do you recall
                 having followed t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e i n
                 t h e newspaper?
                     MR. OWEN: Yes, s i r . I t p r e t t y much
                 dominated t h e h e a d l i n e s f o r s e v e r a l weeks.
                      MR. SIMPSON: Okay. S o , you have f o l -
                 lowed t h i s c a s e ; i s t h a t c o r r e c t ?
                          MR. OWEN:          Yes, sir.           (R618)


                       MR. SIMPSON: M r . Owen, a s a r e s u l t
                 of what you may have seen on t h e TV o r
                 what you r e a d i n t h e p a p e r , d i d you f o r m
                 any t y p e o f o p i n i o n ?

                         MR. OWEN: From what I had from t h e
                 media, y e s . I t tended t o i n d i c a t e Mr.
                 Goode w a s , you know, g u i l t y of t h e crime,
                 b u t t h e n I a l s o know t h a t what you r e a d i n
                 t h e newspaper i s n o t t o o good a s o u r c e o f
                 information.

                           MR. SIMPSON: Okay. Based upon what
                 you r e a d i n t h e newspaper you formed t h i s
                 o p i n i o n ; i s that: c o r r e c t ?
                          MR. OWEN: A t t h e t i m e , y e s , i t i n d i -
                 c a t e d t h a t h e was a p e r s o n g u i l t y of t h e
                 crime.

                         MR. SIMPSON: And have you s i n c e
                 changed you o p i n i o n o r do you s t i l l have
                 t h a t opinion?




                                                    -42-
         MR. OWEN: Well, he i s h e r e i n c o u r t
n o w , and s o i t would i n d i c a t e , you know,
t h a t t h i s m i g h t be t h e case, b u t I h a v e n ' t
h e a r d t h e f a c t s from t h e people t h a t have
them, and s o I r e a l l y d o n ' t know.
          MR. SIMPSON: Okay. Do you have an
o p i n i o n one way o r t h e o t h e r a t t h i s time?
       MR. OWEN:        N o t r e a l l y , no.

     MR. SIMPSON: A r e you l e a n i n g one way
or the other a t t h i s t i m e ?
       MR. OWEN:        N o , I don't believe so.
        MR. SIMPSON:           What was che o p i n i o n
t h a t you formed?

       MR. OWEN:        Well, - -
        MR. D'ALESSANDRO: I o b j e c t , Your Honor.
I d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e prospec-
t i v e juror h o l d s i s r e l e v a n t , o t h e r t h a n i f ,
i n f a c t , h e has an o p i n i o n and if i t i s f i r m
and a b i d i n g o r whether i t can be s e t a s i d e .

                          n
     MR. SIMPSON: O t h e c o n t r a r y , Your
Honor, t h e gentleman says he has an o p i n i o n
and I ' d l i k e t o know what h i s o p i n i o n i s .
     THE COURT:           I w i l l allow t h e i n q u i r y .
Overruled.
       MR. SIMPSON:            Thank you.

         MR. OWEN: My o p i n i o n was t h a t what came
through t h e news w a s t h a t h e had been a r r e s t -
e d and b r o u g h t back t o t h e county and would
s t a n d t r i a l and, you know, had been a r r e s t e d
for t h e crime. So, t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e w a s enough
evidence t o a r r e s t him and t h e r e must b e , you
know, r e a s o n a b l e assumption of g u i l t .
          MR. SIMPSON: Does t h e f a c t t h a t he i s
s i t t i n g here today i n f l u e n c e t h a t o p i n i o n t h a t
you have?

       MR. OWEN:         NO.
                           MR. SIMPSON: Does i t s t r e n g t h e n i t
                   o r t a k e away from i t ?
                             MR. OWEN: No.          I mean, i t w a s an
                   o p i n i o n t h a t h e w a s probably g u i l t y , b u t
                   n o t t h a t he i s .

                             MR. SIMPSON: That he i s probably
                   g u i l t y b u t not: t h a t he i s ?
                            MR. OWEN: Well, t h e r e ' s g o t t o be
                   p r o b a b l e g u i l t o r cause t o have him i n
                   court?
                   (R623- 6 2 6)
                   Another j u r o r gave t h e f o l l o w i n g r e s p o n s e s t o t h e
    effect:   Of   pretrial publicity,
                            MR. SIMPSON: Okay. Mr. Edwards,
                   a f t e r having l i s t e n e d o r watched what
                   you may have watched on t h e TV concerning
                   t h i s c a s e and what you may have r e a d a f t e r
                   you came back from your t r i p s , d i d you
                   f o r m any o p i n i o n concerning t h i s c a s e one
                   way o r t h e o t h e r ?

                          MR. EDWARDS: Not r e a l l y . You know,
                   a l o t of t h i n g s you h e a r and you r e a d i n
                   t h e paper and i t ' s n o t s o , and s o you d o n ' t
                   know t h e t h i n g u n t i l you g e t t h e understand-
                   i n g of i t , and s o I d i d n ' t form anything
                   whatsoever.

                             MR. SIMPSON: Has t h e thought ever
                   e n t e r e d your mind t h a t Mr. Goode must be
                   g u i l t y of something o r e l s e he w o u l d n ' t be
                   s i t t i n g h e r e today?
                            MR. EDWARDS: Well, t h a t d i d e n t e r m        y
                   mind something had t o be wrong f o r him t o b e
                   h e r e , b u t he c o u l d b e i n n o c e n t . There a r e
                   a l o t t h a t do b e i n n o c e n t . (R626-627)
                   Even though t h e j u r o r s s e l e c t e d s a i d they could be

    i m p a r t i a l i n s p i t e of exposure t o t h e c a s e , t h a t does n o t p r e -
                                                                                  -91
    elude t h i s Court from reviewing t h e j u r o r s p a r t i a l i t y .




I
                                                 -44-
    Murphy v. Florida, 4 2 1 U.S. 7 9 4 , 44 L.Ed.2d 5 8 9 , 95 S.Ct.
    2031 (1975):    Irvin v. Dowd. 366 U.S. 7 1 7 . 6 L.Ed.2d 751.
    81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961).
                , . N o doubt each juror w a s sincere when
                he said that he would be fair and impar-
                tial to petitioner, b u t the psychological
                impact requiring such a declaration before
                one's f e l l o w s is often its father, Where
                so many, so many times, admitted prejudice,
                such a statement of impartiality can be
                given little weight. As one of the jurors
                put it, 'You can't forget: what you hear
                and see.'
                Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 7 1 7 , 7 2 8 , 6 L.Ed.
                2d 751, 7 5 9 , 81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961)
                Given the publicity, Appellant submits to this Court
    that it was impossible for the jurors to be impartial. The
    subtle effect on the jurors cannot be measured by their state-
    ments of impartiality. Determining the impact: of the media
0   necessarily requires probability and degrees, and the degree
    of publicity in this case certainly makes .jury prejudice more
    probable than not. - Murphy v. Florida, 421 U . S , 7 9 4 , 44
                       See,
    L.Ed.2d 589, 95 S.Ct. 2031 (1975).
                   The length t o which the trial court must
                go in order to select jurors who appear to
                be impartial is another factor relevant in
                evaluating those jurors' assurances of im-
                partiality. In a community where most


    -/
    9    A   New Mexico Court had the following t o say about a
    juror's statement of impartiality:
                   To expect a juror to confess prejudice
                is n o t always a reliable practice. A j u r o r
                can be completely honest in denying pre-
                judice. In the words of Alexander Pope,
                'All looks yellow to the jaundiced eye. '
                State v. Shawon, 423 P . 2 d 3 9 , 4 2 (N.M. 1967).




                                       -45
  %'



           veniremen w i l l admit t o a d i s q u a l i f y i n g
           p r e j u d i c e , t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e o t h e r s '
           p r o t e s t a t i o n s may be drawn i n t o q u e s t i o n ;
           f o r i t i s then more p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e y
           a r e p a r t of a community deeply h o s t i l e t o
           t h e accused, and more l i k e l y t h a t t h e y
           may u n w i t t i n g l y have been i n f l u e n c e d by
           i t . . . . -. a t 8 0 2 , 803.
                           Id
            The t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h e j u r y f a i r and
i m p a r t i a l and i n denying a change of venue.                  Appellant requests
t h i s Court t o reverse.




                                             -46-
                                               POINT V .


                          APPELLANT, FMO PARTIALLY REPRE-
                          SENTED HIMSELF WITH ASSISTANCE
                          FROM APPOINTED COUNSEL, D I D NOT
                          WAIVE A CHANGE OF VENUE AND A
                          F A I R AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY
                          MERELY REQUESTING HIS TRIAL TO
                          REMAIN I N LEE COUNTY.


                 The t r i a l c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d changing t h e venue i n t h i s

c a s e on t h r e e s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n s . ( R 9 6 7 - 1 0 2 8 , 6 - 2 0 , 4 3 - 4 4 , 5 6 )

A p p e l l a n t , o b j e c t e d t o h i s c o u n s e l ' s motion and r e q u e s t e d t o
                                             lo/
                                             _.

be t r i e d i n Lee County.                          H i s actions created a contradiction,

demanding t h e r i g h t t o a j u r y t r i a l v e r s u s t h e r i g h t t o be
t r i e d i n t h e county of t h e crime.                     Amend. V I , U . S . C o n s t . ;            Art.

I $ 1 6 , F l a . Const-




10/ A p p e l l a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n t o t h e change of venue i n t h i s c a s e
=st       be analyzed a s a waiver of a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l .
                                                             s"-
(See arguments on p o i n t I V - A & B , s u r a . ) To waive such a c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l r i g h t , Amend, V I , X I V , U .      C o n s t . ; A r t . I 516, F l a .
Const. a defendant must do s o f r e e l y , Knowingly and v o l u n t m y *
m o y k i n v . Alabama, 3 9 5 U . S . 238, 23 L.Ed.2d 2 7 4 , 89 S . C t .
1 7 0 9 (1969) A p p e l l a n t ' s i n i t i a l o b j e c t i o n and t h e c o u r t ' s i n -
q u i r y might be f a c i a l l y s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e a w a i v e r . (R13-
14)       But t h e second and t h i r d renewal of t h e motion engendered
l i t t l e ( R 4 4 , 5 0 ) , o r no i n q u i r y o r r e a c t i o n . ( R 5 6 ) With a p r e -
sumption a g a i n s t waiver of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t , t h e s i l e n t
r e c o r d , a f t e r t h e r h i r d renewal of t h e motion f o r change of venue,
cannot b e deemed a renewed o b j e c t i o n and waiver of a r i g h t t o a
f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l . S e e , Carnley v. Cochran, 396 U . S . 5 0 6 ,
8 L.Ed.2d 7 0 , 82 S . C t . 884 T f 9 6 2 ) ; Johnson v . Z e r b s t , 304 U . S .
4 5 8 , 8 2 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S . C t . 1019 (1938) ; Saunders v . Wainwright:,
2 5 4 So.2d 1 9 7 ( F l a . 1 9 7 1 ) ; P e r e z v . S t a t e , 1 6 7 S o . 2 d 313 ( F 1a . 2 d
DCA 1 9 6 4 ) . T h i s Court need n o t even c o n s i d e r A p p e l l a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s
i n reviewing t h e f i n a l d e n i a l of t h e change o f venue.




                                                     -47-
          7'                   I n our system of j u s t i c e , a demand for a j u r y t r i a l
0   I *
               n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e s a t r i a l by an i m p a r t i a l j u r y .     Fairness

               and i m p a r t i a l i t y a r e concomitants t h a t a r e i n d i s p e n s a b l e .           Ap-
               p e l l a n t had t h e r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y t r i a l , n o t

               t h e r i g h t t o an u n f a i r and partial j u r y t r i a l .             Amend. V I ,
               U.S.    Const.;        A r t . I 516, F l a , Const.;             cf,,Singer            v. U . S . ,
               380 U . S , 2 4 , 1 3 L.Ed.2d 6 3 0 , 85 S . C t . 783 ( 1 9 6 5 ) .                   I n v i e w of

               t h e p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y and i t s t a i n t upon t h e minds of t h e j u r o r s

               (See P o i n t N A & B ) , A p p e l l a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n t o a change o f venue
               i n t e r p r e t s i n t o a r e q u e s t f o r a partial j u r y .

                               A i n h e r e n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of a t r i a l judge i s t o en-
                                n

               s u r e a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l .      Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U . S .

               3 3 3 , 1 6 L.Ed.2d 600, 8 6 S . C r . 1507 ( 1 9 6 6 ) .                When A p p e l l a n t ' s

               o b j e c t i o n s o r r e q u e s t s hampered t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of t h a t r e s p o n s i -

               b i l i t y , t h e t r i a l judge should deny t h e r e q u e s t .                 H e has t h e
               d u t y , n o t only f o r t h e defendant b u t a l s o f o r t h e maintenance
               of our j u s t i c e s y s t e m , t o a s s u r e no o n e , i n c l u d i n g the accused,
               makes a mockery of a t r i a l .                -.
                                                               Id
                               The r i g h t t o be t r i e d i n t h e county of t h e crime must
               g i v e way when an i m p a r t i a l t r i a l i s n o t p o s s i b l e ,            - Ashley
                                                                                                      See,

               v . S t a t e , 72 F l a . 1 3 7 , 7 2 So. 647 (1916);                 O ' B e r r y v. S t a t e , 47
               Fla. 7 5 , 3 6 S o . 440 ( 1 9 0 4 ) ;          Ward v . S t a t e , 328 So.2d 260 (Fla.

               1st DCA 1 9 7 6 ) .       A p p e l l a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s t o a change o f venue were

               i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s demand f o r a j u r y t r i a l .        Those o b i e c t i o n s

               should be denied s i n c e p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y had p r e j u d i c e d t h e

               jury.       ( S e e , Point: I V A & B ) .




                                                                 -48-
                     This c a s e i s analogous t o s i t u a t i o n s where t h e s t a t e
0                                                                                          Id
                                                                                           -.
     moves f o r a change o f venue over defense o b j e c t i o n s .
     Those i n s t a n c e s a l s o i n v o l v e two competing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . r i g h t s

     - - t h e r i g h t t o be t r i e d i n t h e county of t h e o f f e n s e and t h e
     r i g h t t o an i m p a r t i a l t r i a l .   The cases a l s o support t h e t h e o r y

     t h a t a defendant i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o a p a r t i a l t r i a l , whether

     t h e p a r t i a l i t y be f o r o r a g a i n s t him.     Id.
                                                                   I__




                     I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a s t a t e ' s motion f o r

     change o f venue w i l l be g r a n t e d o n l y a f t e r an a c t u a l t e s t shows
     i t p r a c t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o impanel an i m p a r t i a l i u r y .   See,
     Askley v. S t a t e , 72 F l a . 1 3 7 , 72 So.647,Ns(l916);                    O'Berry v .
     S t a t e , 47 Fla. 75, 36 So. 440 (1904);                    Ward v. S t a t e , 328 So.2d

     260 (Fla.1s.t DCA 1976).
                        Where an a p p l i c a t i o n i n a c r i m i n a l pro-
                   s e c u t i o n f o r a change o f venue from t h e               f


                   county where t h e crime was committed i s
                   made by t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y , and t h e
                   accused o b j e c t s t h e r e t o , t h e m a t t e r should
                   be t e s t e d i n some way so a s t o make i t t o
                   c l e a r l y appear t h a t i t i s p r a c t i c a l l y impos-
                   s i b l e t o o b t a i n an i m y a r t i a l j u r y t o try
                   t h e accused i n t h a t county. Ashley v. State, a t
                   647, 648.
     This s t r i c t s t a n d a r d i s r e q u i r e d o u t of d e f e r e n c e t o t h e a c -

     cused's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o be t r i e d i n t h e county o f t h e

     crime.       However, i f an i m p a r t i a l j u r y i s p r a c t i c a l l y impos-

     s i b l e t o impanel, t h e venue can be changed over t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s
     objections.          -.
                          Id      This i n d i c a t e s t h a t a r i g h t t o an i m p a r t i a l

     t r i a l o v e r r i d e s t h e r i g h t t o be t r i e d i n t h e county of t h e crime.
     Those t w o r i g h t s , a l t h o u g h embodied i n t h e same paragraph i n our

     c o n s t i t u t i o n s , Amend. V I , U.S. Const.;           A r t . I 816, F l a . C o n s t . ,
i.   a r e n o t e q u a l i n importance.
     ..
                  T h i s s t a n d a r d can be a p p l i e d i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e .
0   Although i t i s t h e s t r i c t e s t s t a n d a r d t h i s Court could a d o p t ,
    t h e p r e j u d i c e a c t u a l l y shown i n the voir d i r e more than meets

    t h e burden. (See, p o i n t I V - B ) .




                                                  -50-
                                          POINT VI

                        THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DIS-
                        CRETION IN FINDING APPELLANT
                        SANE AND COMPETENT TO ASSIST
                        COUNSEL IN THE PREPARATION OF
                        HIS DEFENSE.

                 It i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t t h e s t a t e cannot t r y an

i n s a n e person f o r a c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e .    See, Drope v . N i s s o u r i ,
                                                              I_




420 U . S . 162, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 95 S.Ct. 896 (1975);                             Deeb v .

S t a t e , 118 F l a . 88, 1 5 8 S o . 880 (1935);              S t a t e ex r e 1 Deeb
                          1
v. F a b i s i n s k i , 1 1 F l a . 454, 1 5 2 S o . 207 (1933), r e h . d e n . ,
-Fla.                  156 So. 2 6 1 (1933).           F l o r i d a l a w recognizes

t h a t anyone who i s i n s a n e cannot a s s i s t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of

a d e f e n s e , and cannot be t r i e d .          F1a.R.Crim.P. 3 . 2 1 0 , Brock v .
S t a t e , 69 So.2d 344 ( F l a . 1 9 5 4 ) ;       S t a t e ex re1 Deeb v . F a b i s i n s k i ,
 1
1 1 F l a . 454, 152 So. 207 (1933), r e h . d e n . ,                                 ,
                                                                              F l a , - 156

So. 261 (1933).             A p p e l l a n t i s aware t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s

the discretion i n finding o r not finding insanity a t the t i m e

of t r i a l .     Fowler v. S t a t e , 255 So.2d 513 (Fla.1971);                       Brown
v. S t a t e , 245 So.2d 68 ( F l a . 1 9 7 1 ) , modified on o t h e r grounds,

408 U . S .      938, 33 L.Ed.2d 759, 92 S . C t . 2870 (1972) ;                    Brock v .
S t a t e , 69 So.2d 344 (Fla.1954).                 A p p e l l a n t is a l s o aware h e

has t h e burden of proving h i s insanity by a preponderance of

t h e evidence.          Brock v . S t a t e , 69 So.2d 344 ( F l a . 1 9 5 4 ) .         Never-
t h e l e s s , A p p e l l a n t submits h e m e t t h a t burden through h i s own

o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r’ .
                                   , Cf     P a t e v. Robinson, 383 U . S .        375, 385,




                                                -51-
.. 386, 1 5 L.Ed.2d 815, 8 2 2 , 86              S . C t . 836 (19661, and t h e t e s t i -
mony of D r . George Barnard. (R856-878)
                 Four p s y c h i a t r i s t s examined A p p e l l a n t t o determine
h i s s a n i t y and a b i l i t y t o s t a n d t r i a l , (R856-921,1361-1369)
A l l a g r e e d t h a t A p p e l l a n t s u f f e r e d from a mental d i s o r d e r ,
b u t o n l y Dr. George Barnard concluded A p p e l l a n t was unable t o
                  ll/ I




stand t r i a l .
                 Barnard i n s i g h t f u l l y diagnosed A p p e l l a n t as a border-
 l i n e s c h i z o p h r e n i c (RS62) , w i t h p e d o p h i l i a . (R866)      While Appel-
 l a n t appeared r a t i o n a l and o r i e n t e d t o p e r s o n , t i m e , p l a c e and
 c i r c u m s t a n c e s , he s u f f e r e d from i l l u s i o n s o f g r a n d i o s i t y and
power m a n i f e s t i n g itself i n a misperceprion o f r o l e s . (11869-874)
                      A.   H e does, however, demonstrate
                 a thought d i s o r d e r i n my o p i n i o n .
                         Q.      And how does he demonstrate
                 that?
                           A.        I'll show you. The d i s t u r b a n c e
                 i n t h i n k i n g i s m o s t v i v i d l y demonstrated
                 a s he e x p r e s s e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g about h i s
                 r o l e , h i s own r o l e a s w e l l as t h e r o l e o f
                 t h e defense a t t o r n e y , S t a t e Attorney and
                 Judge d u r i n g t h e p r o c e s s of t h e t r i a l . He
                 p e r c e i v e s t h e S t a t e Attorney a s b e i n g an
                 a l l y who w i l l h e l p him i n t h e t r i a l t o
                 a c h i e v e h i s m i s s i o n . H e does n o t b e l i e v e
                 h i s a t t o r n e y can defend him because h e i s
                 making it i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h e defense a t -
                 t o r n e y t o do s o by h i s a c t i o n s , t h u s b e g i n s
                 some o f t h e s t r e s s e s of t h e i l l u s i o n s of
                 g r a n d i o s i t y and power.


-
11/       A p p e l l a n t i n c o r p o r a t e s B a r n a r d ' s testimony f r o m page 856
through 880 i n t h i s b r i e f . A l s o , w r i t t e n r e p o r t s of p s y c h i a -
t r i s t s Haber (R 1361-1363), Tin Myo Than (R1364-1365), and
Wald (R1366-1369), a r e found i n t h e Supplemental Record.




                                                  -52-
     Q.   From a p s y c h i a t r i c s t a n d p o i n t
what does g r a n d i o s i t y indicatle?

         A.        It means t h a t h e i s f a l s e l y r e -
p r e s e n t i n g r e a l i t y or p e r c e i v i n g r e a l i t y .
(R870)


          In summary, M r . Goode t o m e shows
s i g n s of s c h i z o p h r e n i a of t h e l a t e n t
type with disturbance i n h i s thoughts,
i n h i s t h i n k i n g , i n h i s a f f e c t and h i s
b e h a v i o r . I n a d d i t i o n , I t h i n k t h a t he
meets t h e c r i t e r i a as I u n d e r s t a n d them
r e l a t e d t o t h e i s s u e of competency t o
s t a n d t r i a l i n t h a t - and I t h i n k h e r e i s
t h e m i s l e a d i n g p a r t - h e can g i v e f a c t u a l
i n f o r m a t i o n and h e does s o v e r y r e a d i l y ,
and I t h i n k that: t h i s i s d e c e i v i n g t o
people i n t h a t he appears t o make s e n s e
about what he i s s a y i n g , but--and I t h i n k
t h i s i s a m a t t e r t o b e argued by you and
t h e S t a t e and f o r t h e Judge t o d e c i d e ,
b u t i s i t r a t i o n a l , and I t h i n k t h a t i s
t h e key i s s u e .
         Q.       I s what y o u ' r e s a y i n g , a r e h i s
decisions n o t t o cooperate o r h i s decisions
t o r e p r e s e n t himself o r t o f i r e m e , a l l of
t h e s e t h i n g s t h a t you have j u s t r e l a t e d ,
a r e you s a y i n g t h o s e a r e n o t - - t h e y appear
t o b e , b u t they a r e n o t r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s ?
        A.       In my o p i n i o n , t h a t ' s i t .
        Q.   Now, i s he making t h e s e d e c i s i o n s
j u s t because he chooses t o behave t h a t way,
o r i s i t a r e s u l t of some t y p e o f mental
disorder?
          A.      I think i t ' s a r e s u l t of the
mental d i s o r d e r , and I t h i n k t h a t i n a way
h e i s - - h e does n o t r e a l i z e t h e s e r i o u s n e s s
of h i s a c t i o n s , t h a t he i s doing a l o t of
i t l i k e a c h i l d p l a y i n g games, b u t he i s
p l a y i n g s e r i o u s and deadly games. H i s
p a r e n t s s a i d they know i n t h e p a s t he had




                                   -5 3
               always been concerned about h i s h e a l t h and
               perhaps e x c e s s i v e l y s o . To m e he s a y s , 'You
               g i v e m e a gun now and I would n o t commit
               s u i c i d e , ' and y e t t h e a c t i o n s t h a t he i s
               doing i s a form o f s u i c i d e by g i v i n g i n f o r -
               mation f r e e l y t o people about evidence which
               could go a g a i n s t him. I n t h e Courtroom to-
               day he showed, I t h i n k , poor judgment i n
               t h a t he w a s passing o u t l e t t e r s and informa-
               t i o n t o r e p o r t e r s a v a i l a b l e and--.
                         0.      Okay, Doctor, I u n d e r s t a n d , and
               I t h i n k everyone understands t h a t i t ' s
               n o t i n h i s b e s t i n t e r e s t and most people
               would understand t h a t , b u t i s he doing
               t h e s e t h i n g s because o f - - j u s t because he
               i s an o r n e r y guy o r because he has a men-
               t a l disorder?

                         A.   He does t h i s , i n m o p i n i o n , be-
                                                     y
                c a u s e he has a mental d i s o r d e r .

                     Q.   And how long has he had a mental
                disorder?
                        A.      Perhaps from t h e day he was born.

                          Q.    D o you have any o t h e r testimony
                t h a t could e n l i g h t e n t h i s Court as t o t h e
                r e a s o n s you have reached your o p i n i o n t h a t
                he i s n o t competent t o a s s i s t counsel?
                    A.    Not u n l e s s I respond t o some
                specific questions.
                        Q.       Can M r . Goode a t t h i s p o i n t a s s i s t
                counsel i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of h i s defense a t
                h i s t r i a l , i n your o p i n i o n ?

                        A.      In my o p i n i o n , no.
                (R874-87 6 )
                A p p e l l a n t ' s behavior throughout h i s c a s e s u p p o r t s t h e
t y p e of r o l e d i s t o r t i o n i n h i s t h i n k i n g Barnard diagnosed. (R870-

974)     T h i s Court has c e r t a i n l y gleaned t h e instances of A p p e l l a n t ' s

unusual b e h a v i o r from t h e r e c o r d and t h e p r e v i o u s arguments

in this brief.           A p p e l l a t e counsel w i l l n o t b e l a b o r them a g a i n ,

b u t w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e them by r e f e r e n c e h e r e .




                                                -54-
           The trial court abused its discretion in rejecting
Barnard's diagnosis and opinion, which Appellant amply supported
with his behavior before and during his trial.        Appellant submits
the trial court erred in f i n d i n g h i m competent to stand trial, and
requests this Court to reverse.




                                  -55   -
                                        POINT V I I .


                         THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I N PERMIT-
                         T I N G THE PROSECUTOR TO MISSTATE
                         THE LAW TO THE JURY D U R I N G THE
                         SENTENCING PORTION OF THE TRIAL.


                During h i s argument t o t h e j u r y i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g

p o r t i o n of t h e t r i a l , t h e p r o s e c u t o r m i s s t a t e d t h e law con-
c e r n i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n of r h e d e a t h p e n a l t y .   (R1226,1227)       The

f i r s t misstatement p u r p o r t e d t o p l a c e a burden of proof on t h e
A p p e l l a n t i n proving m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . (R1226)

                      M i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and t h i s i s
                probably one of t h e o n l y t i m e s t h e r e i s
                any burden on t h e defendant i n a c r i m i n a l
                t r i a l because m i t i g a t i n g circumstances
                can b e p r e s e n t e d - - t h e y d o n ' t have t o be
                proven t o you beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt.
                There i s a d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d . I b e l i e v e
                i t i s - - 1 may be i n c o r r e c t , b u t I b e l i e v e
                i t i s t h e preponderance of t h e e v i d e n c e .
                I may be wrong, b u t i t i s less t h a n t h e
                S t a t e . (R1226)
                T h i s Court i n S t a t e v . Dixon, 283 S o . 2 d 1 ( F l a . 1 9 7 3 )

e x p l a i n e d t h e procedures involved i n imposing a d e a t h s e n t e n c e

under S e c t i o n 921.141 F l o r i d a S t a t u t e s .          I n r e g a r d t o aggrava-
t i n g circumstances t h i s Court s a i d ,

                      The a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances of F l a .
                S t a t . 5 9 2 1 . 1 4 1 ( 6 ) , F . S , A . , a c t u a l l y de-
                f i n e t h o s e crimes--when r e a d i n con,junction
                w i t h F l a . S t a t . $ 5 782.04(1) and 794.01(1) ,
                F.S.A.--to which t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i s ap-
                p l i c a b l e i n t h e absence of m i t i g a t i n g c i r -
                cumstances. A s such, they must be proved
                beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt b e f o r e b e i n g
                c o n s i d e r e d by judge o r j u r y .
                I d . a t 9.
                I




                                                   -56 -
h.
      However, as t o m i t i g a t i n g circumstance, t h i s Court s a i d -
                                                                              all
      evidence w a s t o b e c o n s i d e r e d .

                          When one o r more of t h e a g g r a v a t i n g
                    circumstances i s found, d e a t h i s presumed
                    t o be t h e p r o p e r s e n t e n c e u n l e s s i t o r
                    t h e y a r e o v e r r i d e n by one o r more of t h e
                    m i t i g a t i n g circumstances provided i n F l a .
                    S t a t . §921,141(7), F.S.A.             A l l evidence of
                    m i t i g a t i n g circumstances may be c o n s i d e r e d
                    by t h e judge o r j u r y . -.      Id

      The c l e a r meaning i s t h a t a l l evidence i n m i t i g a t i o n i s con-

      s i d e r e d w i t h no s p e c i f i c burden of proof r e q u i r e d .

                    The t r i a l c o u r t and A p p e l l a n t ' s appointed counsel
      compounded t h e harm o f t h e misstatement when they accepted it:
      as correct.        A p p e l l a n t ' s counsel commented d u r i n g h i s argu-

      ment as follows:

                          A s Mr. D'Alessandro e x p l a i n e d t o you,
--.                 w e o n l y have t o show t h e s e by a p r e -
                    ponderance of t h e evidence. I b e l i e v e w e
                    have shown t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a c t , m i t i g a t i n g
                    c i r c u m s t a n c e , by t h e preponderance of t h e
                    evidence,             (R1240)
      Judge S h e a r e r must have a l s o b e l i e v e d t h a t A p p e l l a n t had t o

      p r o v e m i t i g a t i n g circumstance by t h e preponderance of t h e
      evidence, s i n c e he f a i l e d t o weigh A p p e l l a n t ' s mental c o n d i t i o n
      when imposing s e n t e n c e . (R1273-1279,                 see point I X , i n f r a . )

                     I n h i s second m i s s t a t e m e n t , t h e p r o s e c u t o r s a i d t h e
      j u r y must r e t u r n an a d v i s o r y s e n t e n c e of death i f i t f i n d s t h e

      a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances outweigh t h e m i t i g a t i n g .

                          What I ' m s a y i n g i s , when you g e t down
                    t o your u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n , i f you a r e
                    convinced t h a t t h e a g g r a v a t i n g circum-
                    s t a n c e s outweigh t h e m i t i g a t i n g and a
                    m a j o r i t y o f you were s o convinced, seven
                    o r more, t h e n you must recommend d e a t h .
                     (R12 27)




                                                     - 57-
                                                     -   -   - -
    \ \
          Section 921.141 Florida Statutes (1975) does not make such a
0         requirement. The statute merely says,
                       ( 2 ) ADVISORY SENTENCE BY THE J U R Y - -
                    After hearing all the evidence, the jury
                    shall deliberate and render an advisory
                    sentence to the court, based upon the
                    following matters:
                        (a) Whether sufficient aggravating
                     circumstances exist as enumerated in sub-
                     section (6);
                        (b) Whether sufficient mitigating cir-
                     cumstances exist as enumerated in subsec-
                     tion ( 7 ) , which outweigh the aggravating
                     circumstances found to exist; and
                         (c) Based on these considerations,
                    whether the defendant should be sentenced
                    to life [imprisonment] or death
                    5 9 2 1 . 1 4 1 ( 2 ) Fla.Stat. (1975)
                    The decisions of this Court recognize that trial
          juries and judges must exercise reasoned judgment when deciding
          whether or not to impose a death sentence. Alvord v. State,
          322 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1975);       State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 ( F l a .
          1973).   The law was not meant to be coldly applied soley on the
          b a s i s of weight of the circumstances.

                        There is no way that the L e g i s l a t u r e
                     could program a judicial computer with
                     all of the possible aggravating factors
                     and a11 of the possible mitigating fac-
                     tors in each case. See State v. Dixon,
                     supra. The law does not: require that
                     capital punishment b e imposed in every
                     conviction in which a particular state
                     of facts occur. The statute properly
                     allows some discretion, but requires
                     that this discretion be reasonable and
                     controlled. No defendant can be sen-
                     tenced to capital punishment unless the
                     aggravating factors outweigh the mitiga-
                    t i n g f a c t o r s . However, t h i s does n o t
                    mean t h a t i n every i n s t a n c e under a s e t
                    s t a t e of f a c t s t h e defendant must s u f f e r
                    c a p i t a l punishment.

                          The s t a t u t e contemplates t h a t t h e t r i a l
                    j u r y , t h e t r i a l j u d g e and t h i s Court w i l l
                    e x e r c i s e reasoned judgment as t o w h a t f a c -
                    t u a l s i t u a t i o n s r e q u i r e t h e i m p o s i t i o n of
                    d e a t h and which f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s can be
                    s a t i s f i e d by l i f e imprisonment i n l i g h t of
                    t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e circumstances p r e s e n t
                    i n t h e evidence. C e r t a i n f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s
                    may w a r r a n t t h e i n f l i c t i o n of c a p i t a l pun-
                    ishment, b u t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , would n o t p r e -
                    vent e i t h e r t h e t r i a l j u r y , t h e t r i a l judge,
                    o r t h i s Court from e x e r c i s i n g reasoned j u d g -
                    ment i n r e d u c i n g t h e s e n t e n c e t o l i f e i m -
                    prisonment. Such an e x e r c i s e of mercy on
                    b e h a l f of t h e defendant i n one case does n o t
                    p r e v e n t t h e i m p o s i t i o n of d e a t h by c a p i t a l
                    punishment i n t h e o t h e r c a s e . Alvord v .
                    S t a t e , 322 So.2d 533, 540 ( F l a . 1 9 7 5 ) .

                    These e r r o r s concern fundamental p o i n t s i n t h i s

a   s t a t e ’ s d e a t h p e n a l t y law.   Even though t h e e r r o r s were n o t

    c a l l e d t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e t r i a l j u d g e , t h i s Court, e x e r c i -
    s i n g i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o independently review a death sen-
    t e n c e , S t a t e v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973), should remand

    t h i s cause f o r a new s e n t e n c i n g t r i a l .




                                                    59-
                                      POINT VIII.


                       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
                       AND W E I G H I N G THE AGGRAVATING CIR-
                       CUMSTANCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION
                       FOR A CAPITAL FELONY, SINCE THE
                       STATE PRODUCED ONLY HEARSAY E V I -
                       DENCE TO I T S PROOF AND COULD NOT
                       PRODUCE A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE
                       V I R G I N I A JUDGYENT .


               Although S e c t i o n 9 2 4 . 1 4 1 ( 1 ) F l o r i d a S t a t u t e s r e l a x e s
t h e r u l e s of evidence i n a s e n t e n c i n g trial, t h e a g g r a v a t i n g

circumstances must s t i l l be proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt.
S t a t e v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1973).                         For a t r i a l c o u r t
t o f i n d t h e a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance of a p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n f o r

a c a p i t a l f e l o n y , t h e c o n v i c t i o n must be proven beyond a r e a -
sonable doubt.           $921.141(5) ( b ) ;           E l l e d g e v . S t a t e , 346 So.2d 998

(Fla.1977);         Provence v . S t a t e , 337 So.2d 783 (Fla.1976).
The S t a t e f a i l e d i n its burden i n t h i s c a s e , and t h e t r i a l

c o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g and weighing t h e V i r g i n i a murder a s an
a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance. (R1274,1347)

               A V i r g i n i a policeman, Ronald Yeager, t e s t i f i e d about
t h e murder case i n h i s s t a t e .          H e i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e c a s e and
a r r e s t e d A p p e l l a n t f o r t h e crime.     He also testified a t that
t r i a l , and s a i d i t r e s u l t e d i n A p p e l l a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n . (R1172-

1178)     Appellant's counsel o b j e c t e d t o Yeager's testimony,
r e q u e s t i n g , as a minimum, a c e r t i f i e d copy of t h e V i r g i n i a
judgment.       (R1092-1093)          The t r i a l c o u r t o v e r r u l e d t h e o b j e c t i o n .
(R1093,1175)
                     Yeager's h e a r s a y testimony of t h e V i r g i n i a convic-
0   t i o n was i n s u f f i c i e n t proof of an a c t u a l c o n v i c t i o n .             -.
                                                                                                  Id

    Counsel's s u g g e s t i o n o f a c e r t i f i e d judgment a s t h e minimum

    proof required was correct.
                     A d i r e c t analogy i s found i n proving a p r i o r
    c o n v i c t i o n under F l o r i d a ' s h a b i t u a l o f f e n d e r s t a t u t e .    1775.084
    F l a . S t a t , (1975).         T h i s Court h e l d i n Shargaa v . S t a t e , 102
    So.2d 809 ( F l a . 1 9 5 8 ) , c e r t . d e n . , 358 U . S . 873, 3 L.Ed.2d 1 0 4 ,
    79 S . C t . 114 ( 1 9 5 8 ) t h a t i n second o f f e n d e r p r o c e e d i n g s , t h e
    o f f i c i a l r e c o r d s of t h e c o n v i c t i n g c o u r t should be f i l e d i n

    evidence.          It i s n e c e s s a r y t o prove an a c t u a l a d j u d i c a t i o n of

    guilt.

                     ...  It i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e p r o s e -
                    c u t i o n i n a second o f f e n d e r proceeding t o
                    prove t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n by competent
                    e v i d e n c e . This i n c l u d e s a proper showing
                    t h a t t h e accused w a s p r e v i o u s l y adjudged
                    g u i l t y of a f e l o n y by a c o u r t of compe-
                    tent jurisdiction.                 In proceedings of t h i s
                    n a t u r e t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n ,
                    however, i s a f a c t t o be proved as any o t h e r
                    f a c t . The n a t u r e of t h e proof h a s v a r i e d
                    in different jurisdictions.                     I n some i n -
                    s t a n c e s t h e docket e n t r i e s i n t h e C l e r k ' s
                    o f f i c e have been c o n s i d e r e d a d e q u a t e . W     e
                    have t h e view t h a t t h e o f f i c i a l r e c o r d s of
                    t h e c o u r t i n which t h e accused w a s c o n v i c t e d
                    should be produced and f i l e d i n evidence i n
                    t h e second o f f e n d e r proceeding. -. a t 8 1 2 .
                                                                          Id

    Where a man's l i f e i s i n v o l v e d , a s i n t h i s c a s e , such a minimal
    proof requirement should a l s o a p p l y .




                                                       - 61-
    1 b
                         S i n c e t h e a g g r a v a t i n g Circumstance of a p r i o r c a p i t a l
0         f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n w a s n o t proven through competent evidence
          beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n weighing

          t h a t circumstance.         The i m p o s i t i o n of a d e a t h s e n t e n c e w a s i m -
          p r o p e r , and A p p e l l a n t urges t h i s Court t o r e v e r s e .




                                                        - 62-
                                     POINT I X .


                       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I N NOT
                       F I N D I N G AND WEIGHING THE I I I T I -
                       GATING CIRCUMSTANCES, (1) THAT
                       . -~~~~




                       APPELLANT       COMMITTED THE CAPITAL
                       FELONY WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE
                       OF EXTRElE MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL
                       DISTURBANCE, AND ( 2 ) THAT APPEL-
                       LANT'S CAPACITY TO APPRECIATE THE
                       CRIMINALITY OF H I S CONDUCT OR CON-
                       FORM H I S CONDUCT TO THE LAW WAS
                       SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED ; I N VIEW
                       OF THE PSYCHIATRIC TESTII'IONY THAT
                       SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED.


               Three p s y c h i a t r i s t s t e s t i f i e d a t Appellant's s e n t e n c
i n g t r i a l . (R1107-1171)         A t t h e j u d g e s r e q u e s t , each o f them
had examined Appellant t o determine h i s s a n i t y a t t h e time of
the offense.         A l l t h r e e had p r e v i o u s l y t e s t i f i e d at- a h e a r i n g

t o d e c i d e A p p e l l a n t ' s competency t o s t a n d t r i a l .      (See point

VI)    T h e c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y asked each of them h i s o p i n i o n as
t o t h e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances found i n S e c t i o n 9 2 1 . 1 4 1 ( 6 )

( b ) ( f ) F l o r i d a S t a t u t e s . (R111G-1117,1136-1137,1157)

               ( b ) The c a p i t a l f e l o n y was committed while
               t h e defendant w a s under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f
               extreme mental o r emotional d i s t u r b a n c e .
                       ,
                       ,
                       .
                       L               7v              *
               ( f ) The c a p a c i t y of t h e defendant t o ap-
               p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct
               o r t o conform h i s conduct t o t h e r e q u i r e -
               ments o f t h e l a w was s u b s t a n i t a l l y impaired.
               4921.141(6) (b) ( f ) F l a . S t a t . (1975).
               Two of t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t s concluded t h a t n e i t h e r of

t h e above m i t i g a t i n g circumstances a p p l i e d t o A p p e l l a n t ' s c a s e .




                                               - 63-
    , \   Although m e n t a l l y d i s t u r b e d , Appellant ' s d i s t u r b a n c e , i n
          t h e i r opinion, d i d n o t reach t h a t p o i n t .             (R1136-1139,1157-
          1158)      However, p s y c h i a t r i s t Tin Mya Than concluded t h a t
          b o t h circumstances d e f i n i t e l y a p p l i e d t o A p p e l l a n t ' s s i t u a -

          t i o n and c o n d i t i o n . (R1115-1123)             The p s y c h i a t r i s t e x p l a i n e d
          A p p e l l a n t ' s mental c o n d i t i o n a s f o l l o w s :

                                  A.      He has a d i s o r d e r of p e r s o n a l i t y
                          where h i s way of t h i n k i n g and h i s m o t i v a t i o n s
                          a r e only f o r h i s own b e n e f i t t o t h e e x c l u s i o n
                          of c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of o t h e r p e o p l e . And most
                          o f h i s b e h a v i o r , h i s t h i n k i n g and f e e l i n g
                          a r e more i n an immature way, o r s h a l l w e
                          c a l l it: ' c h i l d l i k e ' t h a n mature o r a d u l t l i k e .
                                  P e d o p h i l i a i s a c o n d i t i o n where an a d u l t
                          person has abnormal s e x u a l t e n d e n c i e s and
                          behavior a g a i n s t c h i l d r e n . (R1115)
                                  *                7;
                                                    '               s';


                                  Q.      And what would your o p i n i o n b e , sir?
                                    A.     That h e i s - - o r h e was under t h e i n -
                          f l u e n c e of extreme mental and emotional d i s -
                          t u r b a n c e a t t h e t i m e t h e f e l o n y was committed.

                                Q.   And e x p l a i n again--you and I a r e
                          talking; it i s t o the jury--again explain
                          t o them, p l e a s e , why you make t h a t c o n c l u s i o n ?

                                    A.        When I say an extreme mental and
                          emotion d i s t u r b a n c e , as I have d e s c r i b e d t o
                          you e a r l i e r about h i s n a r c i s s i s t i c o r person-
                          a l i t y d i s f u r b a n c e where t h i s person d o e s n ' t
                          have t h e c a p a c i t y o r r e g a r d f o r o t h e r p e o p l e ' s
                          n e e d s , b u t o n l y h i g h l y s e l f - c e n t e r e d and
                          e x p e c t i n g a l l o t h e r s t o f u l f u l l h i s immediate
                          g r a t i f i c a t i o n s , which means his immediate
                          needs o n l y and has no c a p a c i t y t o postpone his
                          needs t o g r a t i f y h i s n e e d s .
                                    And s e c o n d l y , t h i s person h a s a c l e a r l y
                          overcompensated c o n d i t i o n of h i s i n a d e q u a t e




*
                                                           - 64-
               and v e r y poor s e l f - e s t e e m . H e i s overcom-
               p e n s a t i n g h i s poor s e l f - e s t e e m and poor
               f e e l i n g s u s i n g s e l f - d e n i a l r e a c t i o n forma-
               t i o n which i s a c t i n g d i r e c t l y o p p o s i t e o f
               what he t h i n k s he i s c a p a b l e o f and g r a n d i o s e
               p r e o c c u p a t i o n , which i s h e i s always t h i n k -
               i n g o r preoccupied w i t h g r a n d o i s e i d e a s
               about himself w i t h s e l f - i m p o r t a n c e , how i m -
               p o r t a n t he i s , how h e i s s e l f - i m p o r t a n r
               r a t h e r t h a n about anybody e l s e and about h i s
               s k i l l , preoccupied w i t h t h e s k i l l , w i t h em-
               p l o y i n g people t o g r a t i f y h i s immediate n e e d s .
               ( R 1 1 1 7 - 1118)


                        A.         Yes, s i r , I b e l i e v e t h e c a p a c i t y of
               t h i s Defendant t o a p p r e c i a t e , I would say t o
               f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e c r i m i n a l i t y o f h i s con-
               duct--when I u s e t h e word ' a p p r e c i a t e ' I ' m
               using i t t o f u l l y understand t h e e x t e n t , t h e
               c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct o r t o conform h i s
               conduct t o t h e requirements o f t h e l a w w a s
               d e f i n i t e l y impaired.

                       Q.      Explain t o t h e j u r y why.
                         A.        A s I have s t a t e d e a r l i e r , because of
               t h a t person's self-centeredness, thinking only
               about himself and n o t h i n g e l s e , and n o t r e a l l y
               c o n s i d e r i n g about any o t h e r p e o p l e ' s f e e l i n g s
               o r n e e d s . And a l s o because o f h i s d e s i r e t o
               f u l f i l l h i s own immediate needs o n l y a t a
               p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , n o t r e a l l y c o n s i d e r e i n g about
               any o t h e r needs t h a t he miEht have l a t e r .
                         This person i s n o t a b l e t o a p p r e c i a t e o r
               conform h i s conduct by t h i n k i n g a l i t t l e f u r t h e r
               ahead of what h e i s doing a t a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e .
               (R1119)
               I n s p i t e of t h i s t e s t i m o n y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t
f i n d o r weigh      t h e two m i t i g a t i n g circumstances i n v o l v e d .
(R1273-1279,1346-1352)               The c o u r t d i d f i n d m i t i g a t i n g circum-

s t a n c e s of age and no s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r y of p r i o r c r i m i n a l




                                                - 65
        ,*
h   .        a c t i v i t y (R1276,1349), but made no r e f e r e n c e t o circumstances
         provided f o r i n Section 921.141(6) (b) ( f ) F l o r i d a S t a t u t e s .
         This w a s e r r o r as a l l t h i s evidence i n m i t i g a t i o n should have
         been considered.                S t a t e v . Dixon, 2 8 3 So.2d 1 ( F l a . 1 9 7 3 ) ;       see
                                                                                                        -

         -
         also,        Burch v . S t a t e , 34.3 So.2d 831 ( F l a . 1 9 7 7 ) ;          Miller v . S t a t e ,

             332 So.2d 65 (Fla.1976);                 Jones v , S t a t e , 332 So.2d 615 ( F l a .
             1976)     Appellant submits t h e t r i a l court: may have improperly
             required evidence i n m i t i g a t i o n t o b e proven by a perponderance
             o f t h e evidence b e f o r e c o n s i d e r i n g i t i n s e n t e n c i n g .   (See p o i n t
         VII).         This Court should r e v e r s e ,




                                                            -.66
                                       CONCLUSI0M



                WHEREFORE , Appellant r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h i s
 Honorable Court t o r e v e r s e t h e judgment and s e n t e n c e below

 based on the f o r e g o i n g arguments.           I n any e v e n t , t h e s e n t e n c e

 of death should be vacated.

                                             Respectfully s u m i t t e d ,



                                             A s s i s t a n t P u b l i c Defender

                                             495 North Carpenter S t r e e t
                                             Hall o f J u s t i c e Annex
                                             Bartow, Florida          33830




                             CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE



                I HEREBY CERTIFY t h a t a t r u e copy o f t h e f o r e g o i n g
was d u l y f u r n i s h e d t o t h e Attorney G e n e r a l ' s O f f i c e , The Capitol,
T a l l a h a s s e e , F l o r i d a , 3 2 3 0 4 , by m a i l t h i s 26th day o f September,

1976.




                                             - 67-

				
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