CL70: SUMMARIES
17. SOPHISTS, RHETORIC, AND DEMOCRACY
1. Sophists and Rhetoric
Protagoras (G&W pp.173ff.), from Abdera, a Greek polis on the Thracian coast in the
northern Aegean, was one of the earliest sophists. He came to Athens as early as the 440s and
collaborated with Pericles in preparing the constitution for the panhellenic colony of Thurii,
founded in southern Italy on Pericles’ initiative. His myth, as reported by Plato (G&W #8),
offers one of the most cogent justifications of democracy. He seems to have used the word
“sophist” (#1-2; cf. Prodikos #3, p.211: the sophists stand between philosophers and
politicians). His opinion that earlier sophists disguised their profession, claiming to be poets,
religious teachers or even trainers of athletes, is probably not correct but his statement
confirms two important points: (a) the sophists saw themselves as positioned in a long
tradition of educators that reached back to the earliest poets (Homer and Hesiod); (b) in their
own time, the sophists met a lot of resentment. P. was a representative of relativism in belief
and perception (#14ff.), as expressed esp. in the “man-measure-sentence.” His teaching was
concerned not with specialized knowledge but with general goodness (virtue, aretê) and with
political knowledge and skills (euboulia [being able to find and give good advice] and
politikê technê). By teaching these, he aimed at educating men to be good managers of
household (oikos) and polis, and good citizens. For this purpose, training in rhetoric, the art
of speaking and persuasion, was indispensable; hence P., like most of the other sophists, was
intensively interested in language and diction (#29, 31); he wrote a work on dissoi logoi
(#24, the art of speaking on both sides of an issue) and promised to make the weaker logos
(speech, argument) stronger (#27).
Gorgias (G&W pp.190ff.), from Leontini in Sicily, came to Athens early in the
Peloponnesian War as ambassador of his city, seeking to promote an alliance. He was a
relativist too (#18 on “not being”) but he was most famous as a brilliant orator. What
survives of his art are two summaries of “concert orations” (#1-2, defences of Helen and
Palamedes, both mythical figures and “hopeless cases”) and a fragment of his “Funeral
Oration” in honor of the war dead, delivered probably in Olympia (#3). In his dialogue
named after Gorgias, Plato dealt at great length with his theory of rhetoric and the goals he
pursued in teaching it (HO 9 #2); again, we need to be cautious because Plato may have
exaggerated G.’s position. His focus on speech and words is attested in several statements
(#12-13). As the goal of his teaching he seems to have mentioned aretê (#14), which he
defined as “being competent in public affairs, able to help friends and harm enemies, and
avoid suffering harm oneself” (#15). This purpose is enhanced considerable in Plato’s
formulation in Gorgias (HO 8, pp.4-5): G. presents himself there as an expert in the art of
rhetoric, teaching others to be masters in this art (p.5) which “brings freedom to humankind
in general and to each man dominion over others in his country, etc.” Socrates challenges this
purpose by asking whether such use is ethically good or bad and who will intruct the pupils
about how such skills should and should not be applied. G., claiming first that the art itself is
supreme and that it is obvious that it should not be abused, is eventually compelled to admit
that the teacher has to instruct his pupils in this aspect as well—thereby contradicting
himself: elsewhere he had said that aretê is not teachable. It seems thus obvious that G. and
his school tried to teach rhetoric as “art pour l’art” and failed to consider the moral
implications (pp. 6-7). Socrates then induces G. to admit explicitly that most orators use their
skills not for the best of the community but for their own ends (pp.8-9).
Prodicus from the island of Ceos was famous for his investigation of language and for his
exploration of the function of aretê in a social context. His story of the choice of Heracles
(G&W, pp. 211-214) survives as a sample of his teaching.
Antiphon (G&W pp.218ff.), the only Athenian among the sophists, was famous also as
teacher of rhetoric and speech writer who helped many of his oligarchic friends prepare for
their defences; he was himself the leader of the oligarchic coup of 411. A piece of his self-
defence in his trial after the overthrow of the oligarchy in 410 is preserved: a supreme
example of the art of arguing from probability (#1). His extant tetralogies give sample trial
speeches, both of prosecution and defense, including rebuttals; they illustrate the entire range
of argumentative skills developed and employed by the masters of rhetoric at the time.
Why were the sophists so interested in language and rhetoric? And why did they find such an
avid audience of pupils interested in acquiring these skills, despite the price? Since they came
from many different places in the Greek world and brought their already developed interests
and skills to Athens when they got there, we must assume that the market for such teaching
was not restricted to Athens but spread all over the Greek world. The reason must be that law
courts and politics generally required skills in argument and persuasion in all those who
intended to play a leading role in their polis, especially since the spread of democracies or at
least moderate oligarchies made it possible for wealthy non-elite persons to assume such
roles. The economic changes of the 5th cent. generally increased social mobility and changes
in the traditional patterns of the distribution of wealth, and ambitious upstarts could not rely
on the traditional elite education (which already in the archaic period [Homer!] emphasized
persuasive speaking). Hence such persons needed to acquire their skills elsewhere. The
specific “radical” form democracy took in Athens made all this even more important but it
was by no means unique.
In and of itself, the development of rhetorical skills was not essential for political thought.
But this development is inseparable from other forms of sophistic thinking and teaching. In
particular, it caused an enormous advance in the art of shaping a logical argument, in
distinguishing between various types of arguments, and in focusing on more theoretical kinds
of arguments. Like other intellectual endeavors, the discussion and presentation of political
ideas was heavily influenced by such advances.
Finally, Plato, himself taking advantage of these and many other innovations brought about
by sophistic thinking, and Socrates were opposed not to rhetorical skills as such but to their
application without any solid foundation in ethics. As Socrates’ debate with Gorgias shows,
they were convinced that any human skill and action was worthless and outright dangerous if
they were not informed by the ultimate goal of the good man: to contribute to the good of the
community and to serve justice. The rhetorical and political skills most sophists taught, in
their view had the potential of serving, and in fact, as experience showed, did serve primarily
the self-interest of ambitious individuals.
2. Reflections of Sophistic Thinking in Aristophanes’ Clouds
Socrates is an enigmatic figure. He left no written word. All we know about him comes from
remarks in writings of his pupils, esp. Plato and Xenophon. Most probably, what they say
about his life and teaching is correct at least in essence: S. was an Athenian citizen, a stone
mason, who abstained from politics but did his civic duty, fighting as a hoplite in several
battles of the Peloponnesian War and serving as president of the assembly on the day of the
Arginusae trial (when he refused to put an illegal proposal to the vote). He sought true
wisdom and virtue, being convinced that if one knew what the good was one would always
do it. His search for knowledge, based on awareness of his own ignorance, led him to
question others, including intellectual and political authorities, and to challenge their
confidence in their own knowledge. In these discussions, held in public, he probably used
methods that were quite similar to those of the sophists. In addition he was convinced of
being guided by a “divine sign” or voice (daimonion), which outsiders took to mean that he
did not believe in the gods of the city—another similarity with some sophists. In reaction to
such false beliefs, which they thought contributed to S.’s conviction and execution in 399,
Plato and Xenophon drew a portrait of him that radically distinguished him from the sophists.
Still, the similarities were probably just close enough to make it easy for Aristophanes to
portray S. in the Clouds as the ultimate sophist and to pile on him characteristics, interests,
and activities of other thinkers as well (such as cosmology, meteorology, geology, and
zoology). S. was a well-known but eccentric Athenian figure and thus an easy target for
comedy.
That Aristophanes’ portrait in this play was essential in prejudicing the judges against S. in
399, as Plato claims in S.’s Apology, is unlikely, not only because of the great time lapse
between performance and trial. Rather, what must have hurt S., apart from some of his
teachings, must have been his close association with a number of young elite politicians who
later turned out to favor oligarchy (Alcibiades) and were involved in the tyranny of the Thirty
in 404/3 (Critias and Charmides).
In the context of this course, The Clouds is useful because it confirms some of the doctrines
and theories presented by sophists, and illustrates how deeply familiar the Athenians were
with them and how greatly their reactions to such teachings varied. To list just a few of these
aspects, science is ridiculed thoroughly (pp.32ff.); religion is presented as mere superstition,
to be replaced by scientific principles (41, 50 and often); the traditional gods (Zeus) are
replaced by new gods (the Clouds); the sophists are described as corrupters of youth (95); the
law of nature is contrasted with the law of the polis, which is man-made and serves the
interests of special groups (126, 137); the sophistic and socratic logic is contrasted with the
philosophical and moral logic (30) which leads to the great contest between old and new
education (91ff., one of the high points of the play). Most of all, the play caricatures the
sophist’s teaching of rhetoric: for a fee he promises winning law suits (29, 111) and mastery
of the “get-away-without-paying-argument” (41); rhetoric uses verbal fluff (46f., 56f.), utter
mockery of truth (90), lacks morality (106), and tends to subvert the existing moral order. In
all this, close parallels to Frogs are unmistakable, and what Socrates criticizes seriously in
Gorgias, is here parodied outrageously.
Although the sophists do not cut a good figure, we should not overlook that Strepsiades,
portrayed as an average Athenian, looks pretty bad too: he first is ready to sell his soul to the
sophist in order to learn the skills of persuasion so that he can get out of his debt; his purpose
in studying with a sophist thus is entirely selfish. When the exercise backfires, he violently
turns against the Thinkery and burns it down. Aristophanes’ comedy thus is as critical of the
Athenian demos as it is of its primary targets (a conclusion to be drawn as well, e.g., from
Knights).