Asian American Court Cases
Alien Land Laws of 1913 & 1920
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind
Takao Ozama v. United States
Oyama v. California
Yick Wo v. Hopkins
Hirabayashi v. United States
Korematsu v. United States
The California Alien Land Law of 1913
Prohibited "aliens ineligible for citizenship" (i.e. all Asian
immigrants) which included everyone save for whites and persons of
African descent from owning land or property, but permits three
year leases. It affected the Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Korean
immigrant farmers in California. It passed thirty-five to two in the
Senate and seventy-two to three in the Assembly.
California was not alone in passing restrictive land laws –
Washington, for example, had such a statute as early as 1886. Such
land control laws have been used in 19th century United States, and
can be traced back to English common law.
The Alien Land Law of 1920
This enacted further restrictions. It prohibited the transfer of land to
noncitizens by sale or lease. Aliens not eligible for citizenship could not
hold land in guardianship for their children who were citizens. If it was
determined that land was purchased in one person's name, but with
money from an Asian alien, the land would automatically become state
property. Despite the punitive provision of the Alien Land Laws,
evasions were largely ignored. Between 1912 and 1946, only seventy-six
escheat proceedings were filed in California under the Alien Land Laws.
The Alien Land Law of 1913 and 1920 were found unconstitutional in
1952 by the Supreme Court of California as a violation of the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution in the case of Sei Fujii v. California. In 1956, all Alien Land
Laws were repealed in California by popular vote.
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind,
261 U.S. 204 (1923)
A case in which the United States Supreme Court decided that
Bhagat Singh Thind, who was a high caste Punjabi, settled in
Oregon, could not be a naturalized citizen of the United States,
despite the fact that a proportion of anthropologists had defined a
proportion of people in India as part of the Caucasian race. The
ruling followed a decision in Takao Ozawa v. United States, where the
same court had ruled that a light-skinned native of Japan could not
be counted as "white", because "white" meant "Caucasian". In
Bhagat Singh Thind, the court seemed to contradict itself, ruling
that Thind was not a "white person" as used in "common speech,
to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the
common man." Using the "understanding of the common man"
argument, it was therefore decided that Congress never intended
for Indians to be able to naturalize.
OPINION & BACKGROUND
Associate Justice George Sutherland found that, while Thind, an Asian
Indian, may have had "purity of Aryan blood" due to being "born in Punjab"
and having "high caste" status he was not Caucasian in the "common
understanding", so he could not be included in the "statutory category as
white persons".
Not only were Indians denied the ability to naturalize, their new
classification as Asian, rather than white, allowed the retroactive
stripping of previously naturalized Indians of their American citizenship,
because zealous prosecutors argued that Indian Americans had gained
citizenship illegally, a claim often upheld. Moreover, without citizenship,
Indian land owners fell under the net of the California Alien Land Law
and other racist laws spearheaded by growing hatred against Asian
immigrants.
OPINION & BACKGROUND
Specifically, Attorney General Ulysses S. Webb was very
active in revoking Indian land purchases; in a bid to
strengthen the AEL, he promised to prevent Indians from
buying or leasing land. Under intense pressure, and with
The Barred Zone Act of 1917 preventing fresh
immigration to strengthen the fledgling Indian-American
community, most Indians left the United States, leaving
only half their population, 2,405, by 1940.
AFTERMATH
As a result of a U.S. Supreme Court decision stipulating that no person of East Indian origin could become a
naturalized American, the first person of Indian origin to earn American citizenship, A.K. Mozumdar, had his
citizenship revoked. A decision on his appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that revocation.
Suggestive of the poor coordination within the legal system of the early 20th century is the fact that Thind
applied for and received U.S. citizenship through the state of New York a few years after his original U.S.
citizenship was revoked by the U.S. Supreme Court. Numerous other instances exist of naïve clerks, or clerks
acting in protest, who granted citizenship in defiance of the Supreme Court. Enthusiastic anti-Indian
sentiments seemed fairly absent in New England.
As public support for Indians grew throughout World War II, and as India's independence came closer to
reality, Indians argued for an end to their legislative discrimination. The repeal of Chinese exclusion laws in
1943 and the granting of naturalization privileges to Chinese encouraged Indians to hope for similar gains.
Hurdling over many members of Congress and the American Federation of Labor, which vehemently opposed
removing legislative measures barricading Indian immigration and naturalization, the Indian community
succeeded in gaining support among several prominent congressmen, as well as President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. The support culminated in the signing into law by President Truman on July 2, 1946, of the Luce-
Celler Act. This Act reversed the Thind decision, insofar as allowing naturalization to Indians, and set a token
quota for their immigration at 100 per year.
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Hart-Celler Immigration Act, which phased out the national
origins quota system first instituted in 1921. In 1965–1970, 27,859 Indian immigrants entered the United
States. Immigration from India in 1965–1993 was 558,980.
Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178
(1922)
A case in which the United States Supreme Court found Takao
Ozawa, a Japanese man, ineligible for naturalization. In 1922,
Takao Ozawa filed for United States citizenship under the
Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906 which allowed white
persons and persons of African descent or African nativity to
naturalize. He did not challenge the constitutionality of the
racial restrictions. Instead, he attempted to have the Japanese
classified as “white.”
OPINION OF THE COURT & EFFECTS OF
THE DECISION
Associate Justice G. Sutherland found that only Caucasians were white, and therefore the
Japanese, by not being Caucasian, were not white and instead were members of an
"unassimilable race," lacking provisions in any Naturalization Act.
Within three months, Sutherland carried a similarly disfavorable ruling on another
Supreme Court case concerning another alien from a Sikh immigrant from Punjab region
in India (then British India) seeking U.S. citizenship, United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind.
The upshot of this ruling was that although all whites were considered Caucasian,
Caucasians were not necessarily considered white. („Caucasian,‟ a term used by physical
anthropologists at the time to also refer to people whose ancestry traced to the Asian
subcontinent, was not used in common parlance to refer to white people.)
Both decisions had a deleterious effect on Asian Americans as a class, strengthening and re-
affirming the racist policies of U.S. immigration laws. With successful judicial backing,
policymakers passed more anti-Asian laws across the nation under the heavy lobbying by
the burgeoning Asiatic Exclusion League. This trend continued until the civil rights
movements of the 1960s.
Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948)
A case in which the United States Supreme Court decided that
specific provisions of the 1913 and 1920 California Alien Land
Laws abridged Fred Oyama‟s rights and privileges guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment and by his status as an American
citizen. However, the court did not overturn the California
Alien Land Laws as unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND
World War II tensions contributed significantly to anti-Japanese sentiments and
the internment of Japanese persons. California responded by tightening its Alien
Land Laws even further, and actively began pursuing escheat procedures. Kajiro
Oyama, a Japanese citizen, was one of the individuals targeted.
Kajiro Oyama, a Japanese citizen ineligible for naturalization, purchased six
acres of land in southern California in 1934. He paid $4,000 for the land, and
the seller executed a deed to Fred Oyama, Kajiro‟s six years old son. Six
months later, Kajiro petitioned the Superior Court of San Diego County to be
appointed Fred‟s guardian, stating that Fred owned the six acres. The court
permitted this. The land parcel was expanded by an adjoining two acres in
1937.
In 1942, Fred and his family were displaced along with all other Japanese
persons in the area. In 1944, the State of California filed a petition to declare an
escheat of the eight acres of land on the ground that the purchases made in 1934
and 1937 had been made with intent to violate and evade the Alien Land Law.
STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
The trial court found that Kajiro Oyama, the father, had enjoyed
the beneficial use of the land, and that the 1934 and 1937 land
transfers were subterfuges done with intent to avoid escheat
procedure. The court ruled in favor of the state, stating that
pursuant to the Alien Land Law, the parcels had vested in the state
as of the date of illicit transfers in 1934 and 1937.
The Supreme Court of California upheld the trial court‟s finding
as justified by the evidence. It further ruled that California was
permitted to exclude ineligible aliens from purchasing,
transferring, and owning agricultural land, and that Fred Oyama
was deprived of no constitutional guarantees.
CONCLUSION
After the case was appealed to and upheld by the California
Supreme Court, it went to the United States Supreme Court via a
writ of certiorari.
The Court agreed by a vote of 8 to 1 with the petitioners‟ first
contention – that the Alien Land Law deprived Fred Oyama of the
equal protection of California‟s laws and of his privileges as an
American citizen. Because this decision alone was grounds for
reversal of the California Supreme Court decision, the Court saw
no need to address the second and third contentions - that the law
denied Kajiro Oyama equal protection of the laws, and that the
law contravened the due process clause by sanctioning a taking of
property after expiration of the appropriate limitations period.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
The first case where the United States Supreme Court ruled that a law that was race-neutral on
its face that was administered in a prejudicial manner, an infringement of the Equal Protection
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
FACTS
In the 1880s, Chinese immigrants to California faced many legal and economic hurdles, including
discriminatory provisions in the California constitution. As a result, they were excluded, either by
law or by bias, from many professions. Many turned to the laundry business and in San Francisco
about 89% of the laundry workers were of Chinese descent.
In 1880, the City of San Francisco passed an ordinance that persons could not operate a laundry
in a wooden building without a permit from the Board of Supervisors. At the time, about 95% of
the city's 320 laundries were in wooden buildings. Approximately two-thirds of those laundries
were owned by Chinese persons. Although most of the city's wooden building laundry owners
applied for a permit, none were granted to any Chinese owner, while only one non-Chinese
owner was denied a permit.
Yick Wo (Americanization: Lee Yick), who had lived in California and had operated a laundry in a
wooden building for many years, continued to operate his laundry and was convicted and fined
$10.00 for violating the ordinance. He sued for a writ of habeas corpus when he refused to pay
the fine and was imprisoned in default of the fine.
BEFORE THE COURT
The state argued that the ordinance was strictly one out of concern
for safety, as laundries of the day often needed very hot stoves to boil
water for laundry, and indeed laundry fires were not unknown and
often resulted in the destruction of adjoining buildings as well.
However, the petitioner pointed out that prior to the new ordinance,
the inspection and approval of laundries in wooden building had been
left up to fire wardens.Yick Wo's laundry had never failed an
inspection for fire safety. Moreover, the application of the prior law
focused only on laundries in crowded areas of the city, while the new
law was being enforced on isolated wooden buildings as well. The law
also ignored other wooden buildings where fires were common -
even cooking stoves posed the same risk as those used for laundry.
OPINION OF THE COURT
The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Matthews, noted that it was clear that
the administration of the law was discriminatory even if the ordinance was not. Even though
the Chinese laundry owners were usually not American citizens, the court ruled they were
still entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. He also noted that the
court had previously ruled that it was acceptable to hold administrators of the law liable
when they abused their authority. He denounced the law as a blatant attempt to exclude
Chinese from the laundry trade in San Francisco, and the court struck down the law,
ordering dismissal of all charges against other laundry owners who had been jailed.
Yick Wo had little application shortly after the decision. In fact, it was not long after that the
Court developed the "separate but equal" doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), in practice allowing discriminatory treatment of African Americans.Yick Wo was
never applied at the time to Jim Crow laws which, although also racially neutral, were in
practice discriminatory against blacks. However, by the 1950s, the Warren Court used the
principle established in Yick Wo to strike down several attempts by states and municipalities
in the deep south to limit the political rights of blacks.Yick Wo has been cited in well over
150 Supreme Court cases since it was decided.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943)
This case has been largely overshadowed by Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944), decided the following term.
Facts of the Case
In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt
acted to prevent incidents of subversion and espionage from individuals
of Japanese descent living in the United States. He issued two executive
orders which were quickly enacted into law. One gave the Secretary of
War the power to designate certain parts of the country "military areas"
and exclude certain persons from them. The second established the War
Relocation Authority which had the power to remove, maintain, and
supervise persons who were excluded from the military areas. Gordon
Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, was
convicted of violating a curfew and relocation order.
Question & Conclusion
Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military
authorities discriminate against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in
violation of the Fifth Amendment?
The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be
constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account
the great importance of military installations and weapons production that occurred on
the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their
motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actions served an important
national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and focused solely on
the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued
that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents having ethnic
affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a
different ancestry."
In 1986 and 1987, Hirabayashi's convictions on both charges were overturned by the
U.S. District Court in Seattle and the Federal Appeals Court.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1994)
FACTS OF THE CASE
During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and
congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of
Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense and
potentially vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in San
Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the
U.S. Army, because he refused to be separated from his Italian-American
girlfriend.
QUESTION
Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by
implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of
Japanese descent?
CONCLUSION
The Court sided with the government and held that the need to protect against
espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black argued that compulsory
exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified during circumstances of
"emergency and peril."
The U.S. Government officially apologized for the internment in the 1980s and
paid reparations totaling $1.2 billion dollars, as well as an additional $400 million
in benefits signed into law by George H. W. Bush in 1992. In January of 1998,
President Bill Clinton named Fred Korematsu a recipient of the Presidential Medal
of Freedom.
Other significant legal decisions arose out of Japanese American internment,
relating to the powers of the government to detain citizens in wartime, i.e.
Yasui v. United States (1943)
Ex parte Endo (1944)