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Space Weapons Bad - Georgetown Debate Seminar 2011

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					Georgetown 2011-12
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                     ***SPACE WEAPONS BAD




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                     ***CHINA ASAT DA




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                                                    1NC
Weaponization causes ASAT attacks and nuclear weapons proliferation
Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth S. Blazejewski, in private practice in New York City, focusing primarily on
international corporate and financial transactions and he received his master‘s degree in public affairs
from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University
School of Law , ―Space Weaponization and US-China Relations,‖ Spring 2008, Strategic Studies Journal,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509492&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

I argue that the United States should take a proactive role in developing international rules for the military
use of outer space. The United States can use its significant international influence to shape rules that
preserve its national interests, such as deploying a limited ballistic missile defense (BMD) system but
placing a ban on the testing of ASAT weapons. To maximize US long-term security, however, I would
argue that the United States not deploy space weapons as part of a multilayered BMD shield or
otherwise. Space weapons would not contribute to US security in the way that many proponents suggest.
Ultimately, space weapons deployment is likely to expose US satellites to greater threat by encouraging
foreign states to develop more advanced ASAT technology and expedite nuclear proliferation. Even when
considered in isolation, the decision to forgo space weaponization is a wise one; when considered within
the larger context of arms control negotiations, it clearly presents an opportunity to advance US long-term
security. The United States should concede to negotiate on space weaponization with China in return for
Chinese cooperation in other more critical areas of counterproliferation, such as the Fissile Material Cut-
Off Treaty (FMCT) and the Proliferation Security Space Weaponization and US-China. Finally, the United
States should continue to push for increased transparency in China‘s military and space programs.

ASAT weapons produce excessive amounts of debris
Ness 10 (Peter Van Ness, Visiting Fellow, Contemporary China Centre and Department of International
Relations, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies at Berkeley , ―The Time has come for a
treaty to ban weapons in space, 2010, Asian Perspective Journal Volume 34, No.3, pp.215-225,
http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v34n3-h.pdf)

However, the present arrangement in space is vulnerable to disruption or even destruction if there were
ever to be a serious conflict in space. Debris from destroyed satellites might create a ―collisional
cascading effect‖ that could endanger the entire system. 14 Estimates of current space debris run as high
as 600,000 objects of larger than l centimeter in diameter. As an example of the continuing dangers of
space debris, Russian officials in July 2010 were reported to be warning about the threat to astronauts in
the International Space Station from debris produced by the 2007 Chinese ASAT some three and a half
years earlier

Even miniscule debris can destroy satellites
Wright 9 (David Wright, Co-Director and Senior Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of
Concerned Scientists, February 26, 2009, ― Colliding Satellites: Consequences and Implications,‖
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/SatelliteCollision-2-12-09.pdf)

Because of their very high speeds in orbit, even relatively small pieces of debris can damage or destroy
satellites in a collision. Since atmospheric drag at high altitudes is very small, debris at high altitudes can
stay in orbit for decades or longer, so it accumulates as more is produced. As the amount grows, the risk
of collisions with satellites also grows. If the amount of debris at some altitudes becomes sufficiently
large, it could become difficult to use those regions for satellites

American Reliance on satellites makes space debris dangerous to our economy.
Everett 7 [ Terry Everett (R-AL), second district, is an eight-term member of the US House of
Representa- tives. He became the first chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces in 2004, which oversaw many defense programs including military space operations ;
―Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy‖ in the Strategic Studies Quarterly of Fall
2007 ]


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After I became chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee in 2002, I warned of the potential loss of
our commercial and military satellite constellations to foreign attack. The United States has more
satellites in orbit than any other nation. As the most technologically advanced nation in the world,
we are also the most vulnerable to disruption if our satellites are threatened.
Unfortunately, our adversaries do not need to be educated about our re- liance on satellites. On 11
January 2007 the chinese launched a medium- range ballistic missile into space. It targeted an aging
chinese weather satellite orbiting 500 miles above the planet. The kill vehicle rammed into the target
satellite, sending out into orbit thousands of pieces of debris of varying sizes with speeds up to 1,400
miles per hour, according to Air Force Space command.4 Particles a few centimeters in length are large
enough to cause major damage, which is what makes this debris so sig- nificant and why, given its
potential to stay in orbit for years to come, it poses a long-term hazard to our satellites. The United
States, with its space surveillance network, will bear the long-term responsibility for warning others of
potential collisions, including foreign and commercial operators, and ironically, the chinese.
The likely result is that the space shuttle, the International Space Sta- tion, and many satellites in low
Earth orbit will need to expend precious fuel to maneuver around debris. At some point, our satellite
operators will determine the loss of ―mission life‖ due to this extra maneuvering. This could be a
sizeable impact when we are talking about multibillion-dollar satellites designed for lifetimes of
five to 10 years. In recent testimony before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Gen James cartwright,
com- mander, US Strategic command, commented that ―we are going to have to make significant
adjustments as collision, or, as we call it, conjunction opportunities occur over the next 20-plus years. . . .
That is going to have an effect on business, on commerce. And it is going to have an effect on our
national assets that are in low Earth orbit.‖5

ECONOMIC COLLAPSE GOES NUCLEAR.
Mead 9. [2/4, Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Only
Makes You Stronger: Why the recession bolstered America, The New Republic]

None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great
powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of
life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of
Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold
war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars.
Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and
helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might
start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not , yet,
decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.




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                                                 LINKS
Space weaponization causes Chinese destruction of US satellites
Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth S. Blazejewski, in private practice in New York City, focusing primarily on
international corporate and financial transactions and he received his master‘s degree in public affairs
from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University
School of Law , ―Space Weaponization and US-China Relations,‖ Spring 2008, Strategic Studies Journal,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509492&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

First, as the world‘s most technologically advanced country, the United States owns a highly
disproportionate share of the world‘s space assets and satellites. These satellites play a vital role in US
economic activity and military operations.45 Foreign states have certainly taken note. ―The political,
economic, and military value of space systems makes them attractive targets for state and non-state
actors hostile to the United States and its interests.‖46 Unfortunately, satellites also make relatively easy
targets for foreign antagonists. Satellites move in predictable patterns, cannot remain over friendly
territory, and are easily located by other states.47 While most commercial satellites are in
geosynchronous Earth orbit, beyond the reach of existing Chinese ASAT weapons, China could reach US
satellites in LEO with its current basic ballistic missile technology. In the case of a limited US-China
conflict, perhaps over Taiwan, US military satellites, most of which orbit in LEO, would make for a
tempting target. Strategic elimination of US military satellites could effectively blind US forces. China
might consider such a limited attack especially attractive since it would be unlikely to incite a full-scale
nuclear response.


Space Weaponization makes satellite attacks inevitable
Graham 5 (THormas Graham, Jr., former special representative of the president for arms control,
nonproliferation and disarmament, December 2005, ―Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear
War,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-SpaceWeapons#bio)

These dangers would be particularly worrisome for those components that are placed in geosynchronous
orbits (GEO). Space objects in GEO are sufficiently far from the Earth (about 36,000 kilometers) so that
their speed roughly matches the rotational speed of the Earth and they remain ―stationary‖ above one
location. To be sure, any country that can place a satellite in these farther orbits—and there are several—
could potentially threaten another country‘s satellites there. Yet, it would be easier to do so, and perhaps
more importantly, the threat perception would be greater with weapons based in space than with existing
ground-based technology. The 15 U.S. early warning satellites are almost entirely in GEO. The three
functioning Russian early warning satellites utilize two different orbits. Two of the satellites use a highly
elliptical orbit, which ranges from low-Earth orbit (LEO)—100 to 2,000 kilometers above the Earth where
space objects travel at about 8 kilometers per second—out to GEO. The other satellite is permanently
stationed in GEO




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[File Name]                                                                                                        [Name]

                                  I/L – ASAT ATTACKS = DEBRIS
ASATs create debris that destroys satellites
Krepon and Black 9 (Michael Krepon, , Samuel Black, May 2009, ―Space Security or
Anti-satellite Weapons?‖)

 The desire by some to ―seize the high ground of space‖ by testing and deploying weapons in space has
outlasted the Cold War. But conditions have changed radically since the Soviet Union dissolved. Old
fashioned arms races have been replaced by asymmetric warfare. Washington‘s space budgets will
continue to dwarf those of Beijing and Moscow, but China and Russia do not have to be America‘s equal
to nullify US attempts to dominate space. Even a few ASAT weapons can do great damage to essential
satellites, as was evident when China tested an ASAT weapon in January 2007. This irresponsible test
created a large, lethal debris field that will last for perhaps a century in low earth orbit, placing manned
spaceflight and hundreds of satellites at risk — including those belonging to China.

The testing of ASAT weapons causes space debris and overwhelms any
reduction capability.
Wright 7 [ David Wright is a physicist who codirects the Union of Concerned Scientists' (UCS) Global
Security Program. His expertise is in national missile defense, space weapons, and U.S. nuclear
weapons policy. In 2001, the American Physical Society awarded him with the Joseph A. Burton Forum
Award for his arms control research and work with international scientists. ; October 2007 ; ―Space debris
from antisatellite weapons‖ in the bulletin of atomic scientists ; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-
edition/features/space-debris-antisatellite-weapons ]

There are two main sources of orbital debris: (1) The accidental breakup of objects placed in orbit by routine activity; and
(2) the creation of debris by the testing or use of destructive antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. The
international community is addressing the first issue by developing debris mitigation guidelines. The
United States wrote and released its own guidelines in 1997, which call for measures such as designing
satellites and rocket stages to limit the release of debris when placing satellites in orbit and depleting
propellant from nonoperational satellites or stages to reduce the risk of explosions. By calling for spent
stages and satellites to be removed from orbit, the guidelines also attempt to control the number of large
objects in space that could break up due to collisions. Following Washington's lead, other countries
developed similar national guidelines, and the international Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee (IADC) adopted a consensus set of debris mitigation guidelines in 2002. Earlier this year, the
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space adopted guidelines based on the IADC measures
PDF (PDF). This is progress, and there are indications that international guidelines are helping curb
the growth of debris. However, the guidelines aren't legally binding and lack enforcement mechanisms.
Requiring such actions (in particular venting unused propellants) could likely have prevented the
explosion of the Russian Briz-M rocket stage in early 2007, which may have created as many as 1,000
pieces of debris large enough to be tracked from the ground (5 to 10 centimeters in size or bigger). Debris
of this size can destroy a satellite in a collision. But more importantly, the debris created by the testing
and/or use of kinetic energy ASAT weapons, which destroy satellites by colliding with them at high
speed, could overwhelm these reductions, since such breakups can create enormous amounts of
orbital debris. There is no legal restriction on the testing or use of such weapons, and there are no
international negotiations dealing with such weapons. Somewhat surprisingly, the enormous debris
consequences of testing or using destructive ASAT weapons isn't widely understood since estimates
have only recently been published, which helps account for the lack of attention the issue has received.
(See "The Consequences of Using Kinetic Energy Antisatellite Weapons" and "Space Debris.") These
estimates illustrate that the destruction of a single 10-ton satellite (comparable to a U.S.
reconnaissance satellite) would double the total amount of large debris currently in low Earth orbit
(i.e., at altitudes below 2,000 kilometers). In particular, it could produce 250,000 pieces of debris
larger than 1 centimeter and 5,000 pieces larger than 10 centimeters. Because of their military
value, reconnaissance satellites are seen as potential ASAT targets during a conflict. The amount
of debris from the destruction of one such satellite would negate the debris reduction that would
be achieved in several decades of debris mitigation measures described above.


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                                           TIME IS NOW
The time is now. One ASAT testing matters.
Wright 7 [ David Wright is a physicist who codirects the Union of Concerned Scientists' (UCS) Global
Security Program. His expertise is in national missile defense, space weapons, and U.S. nuclear
weapons policy. In 2001, the American Physical Society awarded him with the Joseph A. Burton Forum
Award for his arms control research and work with international scientists. ; October 2007 ; ―Space debris
from antisatellite weapons‖ in the bulletin of atomic scientists ; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-
edition/features/space-debris-antisatellite-weapons ]

The concern about ASAT weapons was highlighted by a Chinese test of such a system in January
2007. The satellite destroyed in this test--a defunct weather satellite named the Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C)--
was relatively small, with a mass of less than a ton. And yet, the Chinese test appears to have
increased the amount of debris (size greater than 1 centimeter) in low Earth orbit by 15 to 20 percent,
becoming the worst debris-producing event on record. The satellite was orbiting at about 850
kilometers, so the resulting debris is concentrated in a region of space that's heavily used by
satellites and already crowded with debris. In addition, because the atmospheric density at this
altitude is so low, the debris will decay from orbit slowly, and a large fraction will remain in space
for decades.

Time is now. Debris will only get worse.
Wright 7[ David Wright is a physicist who codirects the Union of Concerned Scientists' (UCS) Global
Security Program. His expertise is in national missile defense, space weapons, and U.S. nuclear
weapons policy. In 2001, the American Physical Society awarded him with the Joseph A. Burton Forum
Award for his arms control research and work with international scientists. ; October 2007 ; ―Space debris
from antisatellite weapons‖ in the bulletin of atomic scientists ; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-
edition/features/space-debris-antisatellite-weapons ]


The long-term consequences of additional debris would be even worse. A recent NASA study
showed that prior to the Chinese test parts of space have already reached "supercritical" debris
densities. Supercritical means that the density of objects has become so large that collisions
between objects are frequent enough that they produce additional debris faster than drag
removes debris from the region. Those additional debris particles further increase the collision
probability, leading to a cascade effect as the large objects in orbit are ground into smaller
fragments. In particular, the NASA study showed that in the heavily used altitude band from 900 to 1,000
kilometers, the number of large (greater than 10 centimeters) pieces of debris is expected to more than
triple over the next 200 years--and that's assuming no additional launches of objects into this band. The
study estimates that the amount of large debris in low Earth orbit is expected to increase by nearly 40
percent during that time, still under the assumption of no additional launches. By significantly increasing
the number of objects near 850 kilometers, the debris from the Chinese test will increase the rate at which
these collisions take place, and therefore, speed up debris growth. The destruction of additional
satellites--especially larger ones--near this region could make the debris situation much worse,
both in the near and long term.




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                                    !- CONFLICT IN SPACE
Any conflict in space destroys civilization
Ness 10 (Peter Van Ness, Visiting Fellow, Contemporary China Centre and Department of International
Relations, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies at Berkeley , ―The Time has come for a
treaty to ban weapons in space, 2010, Asian Perspective Journal Volume 34, No.3, pp.215-225,
http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v34n3-h.pdf)

So from a positive perspective, we should propose to affirm a global-commons approach, keeping in mind
that, if an agreement cannot be reached, a conflict in space could destroy the major benefits, both
commercial and military, that we now enjoy, plus the potential benefits of future development. This would
be an immense loss: all the ways that we communicate with each other today, the way that we navigate,
and of course the way that governments spy on each other. Proponents of weaponizing space have not
yet taken into account the full dimensions of this serious risk.




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                                          SATELLITE I/L
Even small debris destroys satellites
Wright 7 [ David Wright is a physicist who codirects the Union of Concerned Scientists' (UCS) Global
Security Program. His expertise is in national missile defense, space weapons, and U.S. nuclear
weapons policy. In 2001, the American Physical Society awarded him with the Joseph A. Burton Forum
Award for his arms control research and work with international scientists. ; October 2007 ; ―Space debris
from antisatellite weapons‖ in the bulletin of atomic scientists ; http://www.thebulletin.org/web-
edition/features/space-debris-antisatellite-weapons ]

To preserve the long-term use of space, it's particularly important to address how to control the
production of orbital debris. Due to their high speed in orbit, even small pieces of orbiting debris can
damage or destroy a satellite. Since debris at high altitude can remain in orbit for decades or
longer, it accumulates as more is produced, expanding the risk of collisions with satellites. If the
amount of debris at some altitudes becomes large enough, it could become difficult to use those regions
for satellites. Currently, there isn't an effective way to remove large amounts of debris from orbit; as a
result, controlling the production of debris is essential for preserving the long-term use of space.

Space Debris threatens the use of satellites
Canada Press 6/23 [ The Canadian Press ; Jun 23, 2011 ; ―Space junk threatens satellites‖ ;
http://thechronicleherald.ca/Canada/1249829.html ]

"In the last couple of years, we have had roughly a dozen warnings that our satellites are in
danger of being hit by objects that could render them inoperable," he told The Canadian Press.
"We‘ve actually had to change the orbit of these satellites five times in order to protect them, so
this is a very real, current threat." Kendall adds that the CSA gets warnings about space debris about
once a month. "These satellites are worth $500 million so we‘re talking about very expensive
propositions here," he noted. Heiner Klinkrad, the head of the European Space Agency‘s space debris
office, says two recent collisions in space are a sign of things to come. In January, 2007, the Chinese
tested their anti-satellite system by blowing up an old weather satellite. That by itself created over
3,000 pieces of large debris. In February 2009, there was an accidental collision between a U.S.
communications satellite and a Russian communications satellite which resulted in 2,000 chunks of space
junk. "Space debris has a future unless we do something about it," Klinkrad warned. "Satellites will not
be able to function at certain altitudes without encountering a certain risk."




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                                    SATELLITE ! – MILITARY
US military depends on satellites
Hansel 10 (Mischa Hansel, visiting scholar at the Space Policy Institute (SPI) of the George Washington
University in Washington DC, March 29, 2010, ―The USA and arms control in space: an IR analysis,‖
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964610000275)

Seeing China and Russia not supporting a high-level commitment to refrain from debris-producing
activities would therefore be consistent with neo-realist predictions. In contrast, what is striking from a
realistic perspective is that such an approach is not supported by the USA. Again, the conclusion is based
on the distribution of relative gains. First, the USA owns and operates more satellites than any other
spacefaring nation. In terms of dedicated military spacecraft there is an even larger gap.59 Based on
these considerations one would logically expect the USA to be in favor of a code of conduct against
indiscriminately harmful activities in space. However, this is not just about numbers. It is also because the
political usability of the USA's military power is so dependent on space-based information infrastructures:
space assets are an indispensable component of the ‗American way of war‘. For instance, the percentage
of guided munitions (via lasers or GPS signals) grew from just 8% in the 1991 Gulf War to 34% in the
1999 Kosovo air campaign and 59% during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan (2001–
2002). By the time Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) took place, that figure had risen to 68%.60 In 1991 the
majority of intra-theatre and inter-theatre communications (85%) were already transmitted by satellites.61
But 500,000 US soldiers in 1991 had seven times less bandwidth at their disposal than 50,000 in
Afghanistan in 2001. By exploiting these space-based systems and services conventional military power
could be used more decisively, selectively, and efficiently than ever before.62 Precision warfare has
superseded attrition. Most notably, the risks to American soldiers have been minimized, at least in
conventional battle.63 Given the political importance of space-based capabilities for US conventional
military power there is thus even more reason for the USA to limit the chances of physical weapons
testing and warfare in space.




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                                     SATELLITE ! – PROLIF
Satellite key to prevent nuclear proliferation
Graham 5 (Thomas Graham, Jr., former special representative of the president for arms control,
nonproliferation and disarmament, December 2005, ―Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear
War,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-SpaceWeapons#bio)

Moreover, a space arms competition could hinder the flow of satellite imagery that can be used to track
activities that might reveal programs to develop weapons of mass destruction in countries of concern. For
example, activities detected through space-based collection systems can be used to trigger requests for
inspections pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (implicitly) or the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (explicitly), should that treaty be brought into force. It is important in this respect
to recall that the suspicions that Israel and South Africa may have conducted an atmospheric nuclear test
in 1979 were driven by readout from a U.S. VELA satellite.

Proliferation causes nuclear war
Utgoff 2 (Victor, Deputy Director for Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for
Defense Analysis,Survival, "Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions", Summer,p. OUP
Journals, accessed: 5/17/11)

The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and
exchanges of missiles again steach other's cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East
escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police
actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human
nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined
by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation
or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily
accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear
weapons and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum
destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed
toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations
wearing nuclear "six-shooters" on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today,
but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole
nations.




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[File Name]                                                                                       [Name]

                                           TURNS GOTR
Space Debris endangers all future spaceflight.
Hsu 10 [ Jeremy Hsu is a senior Writer for LiveScience and SPACE.com at TechMediaNetwork ;
MSNBC ; 12/23/10 ; ―Orbiting junk rivals weapons as major threat to space use : Debris could damage
other crafts, people and Earth-based property; http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40797342/ns/
technology_and_science-space/t/orbiting-junk-rivals-weapons-major-threat-space-use/ ]

What began as a minor trash problem in space has now developed into a full-blown threat. A
recent space security report put the problem of debris on equal footing with weapons as a threat to
the future use of space. Hundreds of thousands of pieces of space junk — including broken
satellites, discarded rocket stages and lost spacewalker tools — now crowd the corridors of Earth
orbit. These objects could do serious damage to working spacecraft if they were to hit them, and
might even pose a risk to people and property on the ground if they fall back to Earth and are
large enough to survive re-entering the atmosphere. The new Space Security 2010 report released by
the Space Security Index, an international research consortium, represented space debris as a primary
issue. Similar recognition of the orbital trash threat also emerged in the U.S. national space policy
unveiled by President Obama in June 2010. Such growing awareness of the space debris problem builds
on stark warnings issued in past years by scientists and military commanders, experts said. It could also
pave the way for U.S. agencies and others to better figure out how to clean up Earth orbit. Consideration
of space debris as a major threat may cause the United States to take a more global view on the threat of
space weapons, said Brian Weeden, a former U.S. Air Force orbital analyst and now technical adviser for
the Secure World Foundation, an organization dedicated to the sustainable use of space. "This is an
important realization, because before that much of the security focus was on threats from hostile actors in
space," Weeden explained. "This is the first [national policy] recognition that threats can come from the
space environment and nonhostile events." All those bits of garbage in space could eventually create
a floating artificial barrier that endangers spaceflight for any nation, experts said.

Space Debris harms the future of satellites, space travel, and the ISS. Space
warfare may make any debris mitigation attempt impossible.
Krepon and Katz-Hyman 5 [Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a
Diplomat Scholar at the University of Virginia, and director of the South Asia and Space Security
programs. Michael Katz-Hyman is another member of the Stimson Center ; ―Space Weapons and
Proliferation‖ was originally published in the Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 2, July 2005. ]


The last Cold War-era ASAT test was in 1985, when a US F-15 fired a direct homing device against an
old Air Force Solwind scientific satellite. The resulting impact created over 250 pieces of space debris
that were visible to US space surveillance systems.13 One piece of space junk from this ASAT test
came within one mile of the International Space Station.14 Seventeen years later, the last piece of
hazardous space junk created by this ASAT test decayed out of low earth orbit.15 As with the earlier
atmospheric nuclear tests, during the 1970s and 1980s few appreciated how debris created by ASAT
tests could cause harm to one's own or friendly satellites.16 Now there is far greater recognition that
space debris is an indiscriminate killer. It remains the biggest threat to satellites, the space
shuttle, and the international space station. NASA has preliminarily reported that if another
catastrophic accident occurs to the space shuttle, there is a 50 percent chance that it would be
the result of space debris.17 Space shuttle windows have needed to be replaced 55 times between
1981 and 1996 due to pits caused by tiny pieces of debris.18 Even in the absence of ASAT tests over the
past two decades, the amount of orbital debris has doubled. In a typical year, 150 metric tons of debris,
including paint flecks, pieces of rocket boosters, and stray nuts and bolts are added into orbit.19 Over
13,000 objects greater than ten centimeters in diameter are now tracked by US Air Force Space
Command.20 With new appreciation for the dangers created by space debris, the international
community has begun working on mitigation strategies. Eleven space agencies, including NASA and
the European Space Agency, have formed the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee and have
published a set of guidelines to mitigate space debris. These worthwhile steps would be overwhelmed
if space warfare occurred and produced debris fields. Because of the potential dangers posed by
debris to US and friendly satellites, the Pentagon now proposes to focus on offensive space warfare

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[File Name]                                                                                       [Name]
capabilities featuring temporary and reversible effects. There are, however, no guarantees that
adversaries would engage in space warfare using similarly polite rules. Dictating the rules of warfare has
not been easy for the United States on the ground, and may be no easier in space.




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                     ***RUSSIAN RELATIONS DA




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[File Name]                                                                                                                [Name]

                                                               1NC
US-Russian Relations on the rise now
Good 6-21, (Allison Good, freelance writer and major in Political Science at Vassar College, 6-21-11,
―U.S. and Russia are strengthening their relationship, Ambassador says‖,
http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2011/06/us_and_russia_are_strengthenin.html)

The Obama administration has experienced a positive reset in U.S.-Russian relations both politically and
economically, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation John Beyrle said during a speech in New Orleans on Tuesday.
"This relationship has been reset over the last two to three years," Beyrle said at an event at the World War II
Museum sponsored by the World Trade Center of New Orleans and other organizations. "We're on the threshold of a new
and better period of relations." Beyrle noted recent U.S.-Russia accomplishments such as the signing of the
START Treaty to reduce nuclear arms in both countries, increasing Russian support for NATO troops in
Afghanistan and increased cooperation and coordination within the United Nations Security Council to curb
Iran's nuclear program. The ambassador also emphasized that relations with Russia are not only politically advantageous for
the United States, but also economically essential. "Good political relations are not enough, and we need more solid foundations of
trade and business. Our prosperity is closely intertwined with Russia, since it's a major market for U.S. goods and services," he said
during the luncheon program, which was called "The Current State of U.S.-Russia Relations." While trade between the United
States and Russia has doubled over the past four years, the scope of economic cooperation between Russia and New Orleans has
also expanded. "Our exports to Russia from New Orleans grew exponentially between 2006 and 2010," said
Mayor Mitch Landrieu. "There's a great partnership between New Orleans and Russia." American companies have
taken the reset to heart, added Beyrle. "U.S. companies are now well-established in Russia and are creating
jobs," he explained, citing the recent activities of Ford, General Motors, and high-tech entities such as Microsoft, Cisco and
Boeing. Democratic development in post-Soviet Russia has also had positive implications for United States tourism. "Russia is now
more open and increasingly connected with the world," the ambassador said. "Russians recently discovered the
American South, and now there are direct flights to and from Houston and Atlanta." Beyrle, however, noted that
there are still significant obstacles overshadowing the U.S.-Russia economic relationship. "Russia is still a tough place to do
business because there are bureaucratic obstacles and corruption is an enormous problem," he continued. "For example, the United
States is constantly fighting protectionist lobbies that want to keep American beef and poultry out of Russia." American initiatives to
improve trade relations with Russia include working to support Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization. According to
Beyrle, this will "allow the United States to benefit from the free movement of goods and services." The United States is also
concerned with the uneven democratic development in post-Soviet Russia and popular calls for more governmental accountability.
"The road ahead for Russia is not completely clear," the ambassador said. "It is our interest as Americans to support their transition
to democracy." Despite these impediments, Beyrle emphasized, the U.S.-Russia relationship remains an important cornerstone of
American foreign policy and trade. "This relationship has been and remains fundamentally important to our national interests as
Americans," he said.


Space weaponization tanks US-Russian relations
Krepon 3 (Michael Katz-Hyman , Research Assistant at the Henry L. Stimson Center, and Michael Krepon , co-founder of
the Henry L.Stimson Center and the author or editor of eleven books and over 350 articles, April ‘03 , ―Assurance or Space
Dominance? The CaseAgainst Weaponizing Space,‖ Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=81

 The likely consequences of a dynamic, but uneven, space warfare competition are not hard to envision . Potential adversaries
are likely to perceive American initiatives to weaponize space as adjuncts to a U.S. military doctrine of
preemption and preventive war. Depending on the scope and nature of U.S. space warfare preparations , they could also
addto Chinese and Russian concerns over the viability of their nuclear deterrents. U.S. initiatives to extend
militarydominance into space are therefore likely to raise tensions and impact negatively on U.S.-China and
U.S.-Russia relations at a time when bilateral relations have some promising, but tenuous, elements. Cooperative relations
with both countries willbe needed to successfully combat proliferation, but Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to tender such
cooperation if theyperceive that U.S. strategic objectives include the negation of their deterrents . Under these circumstances,
proliferation of weapons in space would be accompanied by terrestrial proliferation.



Russia key to solve numerous scenarios of global conflict
National Interest 3,(The national interest a prominent conservative American bi-monthly international
affairs magazine published by the Nixon Center, 2003 (―Advancing American Interests and the US-
Russian Relationship. The Commission on America's National Interests and Russia‖,
http://nationalinterest.org/article/advancing-american-interests-and-the-us-russian-relationship-the-
commission-on-a-2439?page=1)



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[File Name]                                                                                                              [Name]
The proper starting point in thinking about American national interests and Russia—or any other country—is the candid question:
why does Russia matter? How can Russia affect vital American interests and how much should the United States care about
Russia? Where does it rank in the hierarchy of American national interests? As the Report of the Commission on American
National Interests (2000) concluded, Russia ranks among the few countries whose actions powerfully affect American vital interests.
Why? § First, Russia is a very large country linking several strategically important regions . By virtue of its size
and location, Russia is a key player in Europe as well as the Middle East and Central, South and East Asia.
Accordingly, Moscow can substantially contribute to, or detract from, U.S. efforts to deal with such urgent challenges as
North Korea and Iran, as well as important longer term problems like Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, Russia shares the world‘s
longest land border with China, an emerging great power that can have a major impact on both U.S. and Russian interests. The
bottom line is that notwithstanding its significant loss of power after the end of the Cold War, Moscow‘s geopolitical weight
still exceeds that of London or Paris. § Second, as a result of its Soviet legacy, Russia has relationships with and
information about countries that remain comparatively inaccessible to the American government, in the
Middle East, Central Asia and elsewhere. Russian intelligence and/or leverage in these areas could
significantly aid the United States in its efforts to deal with current, emerging and still unforeseen strategic
challenges, including in the war on terrorism . § Third, today and for the foreseeable future Russia‘s nuclear arsenal will
be capable of inflicting vast damage on the United States. Fortunately, the likelihood of such scenarios has declined dramatically
since the Cold War. But today and as far as any eye can see the U.S. will have an enduring vital interest in these weapons not
being used against America or our allies. § Fourth, reliable Russian stewardship and control of the largest arsenal       of
nuclear warheads and stockpile of nuclear materials from which nuclear weapons could be made is
essential in combating the threat of ―loose nukes.‖ The United States has a vital interest in effective Russian programs
to prevent weapons being stolen by criminals, sold to terrorists and used to kill Americans. § Fifth, Russian stockpiles,
technologies and knowledge for creating biological and chemical weapons make cooperation with
Moscow very important to U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons . Working with Russia may
similarly help to prevent states hostile to the United States from obtaining sophisticated conventional weapons systems, such as
missiles and submarines. § Sixth, as the world‘s largest producer and exporter of hydrocarbons (oil and gas), Russia offers America
an opportunity to diversify and increase supplies of non-OPEC, non-Mid-Eastern energy. § Seventh, as a veto-wielding permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia can substantially ease, or complicate, American attempts to work through
the UN and other international institutions to advance other vital and extremely important U.S. interests. In a world in which
many are already concerned about the use of U.S. power, this can have a real impact on America‘s
success at providing global leadership. More broadly, a close U.S.-Russian relationship can limit other
states‘ behavior by effectively eliminating Moscow as a potential source of political support.




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[File Name]                                                                                         [Name]

                                            UNIQUENESS
US-Russia cooperation high now.
Ria-Novosti 5/30 [ Dmitry Kosyrev is a political analyst from the RIA-Novosti news agency. ; RIA
Novosti is Russia's leading news agency in terms of multimedia technologies ; 5/30/11 ; ―US-Russian
Relations Have Been Reset. What Next?‖ ; http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20110530/164310228.html ]

Until their recent meeting in Deauville, Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama had not met face
to face since the APEC summit in Yokohama, Japan last November. This six-month hiatus was only to be
expected, given the particular way that bilateral relations between the two powers have unfolded. It will
undoubtedly be some time before any details on the exact nature of the agreements reached on missile
defense become available. That is, supposing that Deauville saw any agreements reached at all, and that
it was not just a convenient opportunity to continue the talks. Obama, who is renowned for his oratorical
gifts, had this to say after the meeting: "We continued our discussions around the issue of missile defense
and we are committed to working together so that we can find an approach and configuration that is
with the security needs of both countries, that maintains the strategic balance, and deals with
potential threats that we both share." Both countries' media write that the United States and Russia
want two different things from missile defense. Washington wants absolute security from any missile
attack, whereas Moscow wants to know for sure whether Americans have stopped preparing for a nuclear
war against Russia. The two countries simply think differently and are talking about two different things,
and they are unlikely to ever understand each other. Medvedev and Obama, who have been working
tenaciously to cut strategic and offensive weapons over the past two years, clearly have the stamina to
reach an agreement on missile defense as well. Moreover, Russia has said more than once that the
New START Treaty is worthless without an agreement on missile defense. Other achievements of their
meeting at Deauville include the U.S.-Russian joint statement on visa liberalization. Of course, the United
States will not allow visa-free travel for Russians overnight, but maybe potential tourists from provincial
Russia will no longer need to go to Moscow for interviews at the U.S. Embassy. Washington may approve
multiple-entry visas for Russians, something the EU has already done. Russia and the United States
also agreed on Thursday to further cooperate in the fight against terrorism, in particular al Qaeda.
This harkens back to the post-2001 era when the U.S. and Russian intelligence services really
cooperated and people in both countries hoped for a strong friendship forged in a struggle against a
common enemy. Furthermore, the two presidents signed a joint statement on deepening cooperation in
the cross-boundary Bering Strait region, including the expansion of interaction between the national
agencies responsible for the specially protected natural areas in Alaska and Chukotka. And lastly, Obama
said the reset in U.S.-Russian relations paying off. "Over the past two years, I think that we have built
an outstanding relationship and, as a consequence, we've been able to reset relations between the
United States and Russia in a way that is good for the security and the prosperity of both of our
countries," he said at a news conference after his meeting with Medvedev. Unfortunately, there is still
no clear path forward in bilateral relations. As diplomats would say, there is no agenda. And efforts to
formulate a new agenda for U.S.-Russian relations in the past few months have not yielded substantial
results. Coasting is not a problem in such a situation, but there is always the danger of ending up in a
minefield. It is clear that these two new-thinking leaders honestly want friendly relations between their
countries. But, as is often the case, the voters get in the way. Ordinary people may know little about
politics but the two leaders need their support at next year's presidential elections. It usually takes people
years, and possibly even several generations, to stop seeing someone as an enemy, but accelerating the
process could spoil everything in the current explosive global situation. It would have been ideal if there
were one pro-American party and one anti-American party in Russia, but doubts about a U.S.-Russian
partnership do not run along party lines. Obama said we should help maintain a strategic balance
between the two countries (like during the rule of Nixon and Brezhnev), but what about all the other
aspects of our relations? Unlike Russia, the American electorate is being split by many other foreign
policy events, such as Barack Obama's call for a two-state solution that uses the 1967 borders as a
starting point, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu response that these borders are
"indefensible." Even Democrats say Obama should not have raised the issue, although many think it is
not Obama but Netanyahu who is betraying Israel. In an even more unpleasant move for the people, the
United States may decide to hold talks on the future of Afghanistan with the war-weary Taliban. Part of
the U.S. electorate hates the idea, although it could be the only way out of this 10-year war. In light of
this, the current crawling pace of the U.S.-Russian reset could be conducive to progress. You
know, "less haste, more speed."
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[File Name]                                                                                         [Name]

US-Russian Cooperation High – arms control and lifting of controversial
legislation proves
CNN 3/9[CNN White House Producer Jamie Crawford ; March 9th, 2011 ; ―Biden Hails US-Russia
Relations‖ ; http://whitehouse.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/09/biden-hails-u-s-russian-relations/ ]

WASHINGTON (CNN) - Citing progress in the areas of arms control, as well as cooperation over
the situations in Iran and Afghanistan, Vice President Biden told Russian President Dimitry
Medvedev Wednesday that "we've proved the skeptics wrong" when it comes to the "re-set" in
relations between the two countries. In a brief evening appearance at Medvedev's dacha in the
Russian countryside before journalists covering the visit, the two men hailed the ratification of the New
START nuclear arms accord, Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization, as well as the current
wave of unrest currently rolling across the Middle East and North Africa. Biden told Medvedev the
situation will "require a joint effort," by the US and Russia according to members of the American press
pool traveling with the vice president. Making light of his age, Biden joked that the first Russian leader he
had met was Leonid Brezhnev of the former Soviet Union. Brezhnev led the Soviet Union from 1964-
1982. He found strong support from Medvedev for the lifting of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, a
piece of legislation from the Cold War era that denied Most Favored Nation trade status to the
Soviet Union as a means to pressure for the allowance of greater Jewish emigration. The
legislation remains a thorn in the relations between the two countries. Medvedev told Biden to send
his "best regards to my colleague, Barack Obama."

New Russian Ambassador means Russia relations are on the rise
RIA Novosti 5/31[RIA Novosti commentator Dmitry Babich ; RIA Novosti is Russia's leading news
agency in terms of multimedia technologies ; 5/31/2011 ; ―New U.S. Ambassador to Russia to Offer
Creative Solutions‖ ; http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20110531/164340880.html ]

McFaul would have to wrangle with more difficult problems than Jackson-Vanik as the new ambassador.
He would need compromise skills to overcome Georgia's resistance and ensure Russia's accession to the
WTO. The Guardian and The New York Times write that McFaul's priorities in his new job, at least in
the first few months, will be to negotiate Russia's membership in the WTO, maintain U.S. supply
routes to Afghanistan through Russia, and work toward a missile defense deal. Russia has been
knocking on the WTO door since 1993. Although its membership would benefit U.S. economic interests,
Washington is using it as an instrument for pressuring Russia. It prevented Russia's WTO entry under
different pretexts during the George W. Bush presidency, and later Georgia withdrew its approval after
the August 2008 war over South Ossetia. According to the WTO rules, accession is granted to an
applicant country only if all members of the working group approve the appeal. Moscow's arguments are
clear and understandable. There has never been an instance in WTO history when an accession
approval has been withdrawn. Russia's membership would benefit not only Russia, but also the United
States and its European allies, yet Washington is still looking for a way to ensure its membership without
offending Georgia. McFaul has recently proposed a "creative solution" without disclosing its details.
Georgia thinks its border guards must be deployed on the Abkhazian and South Ossetian border with
Russia, while McFaul said "there is a creative solution to that without having to put customs officials in
Abkhazia or South Ossetia on the border with Russia." "The idea is probably to choose an intermediary to
control the border," said a source at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on the condition of anonymity. This
compromise might appease all sides. Moscow would not need to protest the deployment of Georgian
troops on the border of the de facto independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Georgian authorities
would be able to tell their people that the border is not controlled by Russians, but rather by an
international force. "We think there is a way to increase transparency and information flows about what
(goods) might be going across that border," McFaul said at the Washington-based Peterson Institute for
International Economics. As for elements of the U.S. ballistic missile shield in Poland, which the Russian
military say threatens Russia's nuclear potential, so far McFaul has not offered a solution. However, the
situation regarding strategic offensive weapons also seemed unsolvable until the new START Treaty was
signed in the Czech Republic. According to The Washington Post, Joseph Cirincione, an arms-control
expert who worked with McFaul when both men advised then-candidate Obama on foreign policy, said
McFaul "is one of the leading lights guiding nuclear policy with Russia and someone who could
drive the bureaucracy in the direction the president wanted." Maybe McFaul also has a creative
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[File Name]                                                                                     [Name]
solution to the ballistic missile shield issue. Creative solutions are what U.S.-Russian relations have
lacked over the past 10 or 15 years. If the new U.S. ambassador offers them, his mission to
Moscow will be an undeniable success.




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[File Name]                                                                                         [Name]

                                                 LINKS
Space Weapons destroy US relations with Russia and China: lack of MAD
Ness 10 (Peter Van Ness, Visiting Fellow, Contemporary China Centre and Department of International
Relations, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies at Berkeley , ―The Time has come for a
treaty to ban weapons in space, 2010, Asian Perspective Journal Volume 34, No.3, pp.215-225,
http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v34n3-h.pdf)

First and foremost in designing an agreement is the need to ban space-based weapons before any are
deployed. Both China and Russia are adamantly opposed to these weapons, and Chinese analysts make
a strong case that a U.S. space-based, boost-phase missile defense system would indeed threaten the
PRC‘s basic nuclear deterrent.12 Space-based weapons, if they are ever developed, would be hugely
expensive, difficult to deploy, and vulnerable to attack by China‘s and Russia‘s existing ASAT capabilities.

Space weaponization tanks foreign relations: dual use tech and offensive use
Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth S. Blazejewski, in private practice in New York City, focusing primarily on
international corporate and financial transactions and he received his master‘s degree in public affairs
from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University
School of Law , ―Space Weaponization and US-China Relations,‖ Spring 2008, Strategic Studies Journal,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509492&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The issues surrounding the weaponization of outer space present difficult security and diplomatic
challenges to the United States in its relationship with foreign states. Several features of space
weaponization account for these difficulties. First, many space technologies have dual-use capacity,
making it difficult for states to distinguish between defensive and offensive preparations or conventional
and space weapons.1 Second, some defense analysts argue that space weapons are inherently better
suited to offensive than defensive warfare since they are able to launch powerful attacks quickly but are
vulnerable to attack.2 Third, due to insufficient situational awareness in space and poor ―forensic‖ ability,
the causes of satellite failures can be unclear, creating the potential for both anonymous attacks and
groundless accusations of antisatellite (ASAT) attacks.3 Finally, as in many areas of foreign policy, states
often send mixed signals regarding their true intentions in space.




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[File Name]                                                                                      [Name]

                                ! - RUSSIAN RETALIATION
Russia will retaliate to space weaponization – results in war – Russian General‘s
comments prove
Rianovosti News 7 (Rianovosti Russian News, September 27, 2007, ―Russia promises retaliation if
weapons deployed in space,‖ http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070927/81302492.html)

MOSCOW, September 27 (RIA Novosti) - Russia is ready to take appropriate measures if weapons are
deployed in space, the commander of the Russian Space Forces said Thursday. "Should any country
deploy weapons in space, then the laws of armed warfare are such that retaliatory weapons are certain to
appear," Col. Gen. Vladimir Popovkin said. He said Russia and China have drafted an international
declaration on the non-deployment of weapons in space and sent it to the UN. "It is necessary to
establish the rules of the game in space," he said, adding that the deployment of weapons in space could
have unpredictable consequences, since such weapons are "very complex systems." "A sizable war
could break out," the commander said. He said space must not be the sphere of interests of any one
country. "We do not want to fight in space, and we do not want to call the shots there either, but we will
not permit any other country to do so," he said. Popovkin also said that Russia has an integrated missile
attack warning system, covering the country's entire territory.

No space weaponization - Russia will retaliate and opens the door for misclac
New York Times 07 ("Russia issues warning on space-based weapons" Thursday, September 27,
2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/world/europe/27iht-russia.4.7662417.html AMayar)

MOSCOW — The chief of Russia's space forces said Thursday that the nation would have to retaliate if
others deployed weapons in space - a stern warning to the United States.
While Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin did not name any specific country, he was clearly referring to
U.S. plans for space-based weapons, which the Kremlin has vociferously opposed.
"We don't want to wage a war in space, we don't want to gain dominance in space, but we won't allow any
other nation to dominate space," Popovkin said in televised remarks. "If any country deploys weapons in
space then the laws of warfare are such that retaliatory weapons are certain to appear."
President Vladimir Putin has criticized U.S. plans for space-based weapons, saying they could trigger a
new arms race.
When China tested an anti-satellite missile in January, Putin said that the move was a response to U.S.
plans for space-based weapons.
Russia and China have strongly pushed for an international agreement banning space weapons, but their
proposals have been stymied by the United States.
"It's necessary to legalize the game rules in space," Popovkin said. He warned that the complexity of
space weapons could trigger a war.
Satellites may fail on technical reasons, but their owner could think they were incapacitated by an enemy
and could be tempted to retaliate, he said




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[File Name]                                                                                                                [Name]

                                                         ! - PROLIF
US-Russia relations key to prevent proliferation and terrorism in the Middle East
Yale Global ‗05, February 28, ―US-Russia Relations Saved for Now‖,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5348)

 For the United States, a declining agenda with Russia will sooner or later result in overextension of US resources
and global disaster. Short- and middle-term reasons for engaging Russia lie in policy toward North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and China,
and the long-term - in the broader Middle East. Russia, with its imperial history, vast experience, and readiness to
invest in security, is the only US ally capable of collaborating to bring about Mideast stability- a rather
imperial, but necessary mission. Neither Europe nor the southern CIS have the resources to accomplish the task. Despite an EU
presence in Afghanistan and some contribution to Iraq, Europe's political culture an`d growing Muslim populations do not allow for
serious investments in missions like occupation and state-building. Ultimately, Washington and Moscow must work
together [to check back], despite all the difficulties and prejudices. They should strengthen those elements of agenda -
creating the NATO-Russia Council and Russian participation in the G8 - that may still facilitate cooperation and joint action. The US-
Russia foreign policy priority should be stabilization and governance promotion in the broader Middle East. Radical Islamic
terrorism and nuclear proliferation are facets of one single problem: degradation of this region.

US-Russian relations are key to preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation
Kramer, ‘06 [David Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, July 12,
2006, ―The Future Orbit of US Russian Relations‖, Speech: US State Department, July 2]

Our cooperation will include the physical protection of nuclear materials, suppressing illicit trafficking of those
materials, responding and mitigating the consequences of any acts of nuclear terrorism, and cooperating on the
development of the technical means to combat nuclear terrorism , denying safe haven to terrorists, and
strengthening our national legal frameworks to ensure the prosecution of such terrorists and their supporters. This initiative serves
U.S. national security interests. We have invited partner nations to meet in the fall to elaborate on and endorse a statement of
principles for this initiative. It's one we hope to expand.

Middle East war causes extinction
Nassar ‘02 Bahig, Arab Co-ordinating Centre of Non-Governmental Organizations, and Afro-Asian
People‘s Solidary Organization, 11/25, keynote paper for Cordoba Dialogue on Peace and Human Rights
in Europe and the Middle East, http://www.inesglobal.org/BahigNassar.htm )
Wars in the Middle East are of a new type. Formerly, the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union
had prevented them, under the balance of the nuclear terror, from launching war against each other. In the Middle East, the
possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction leads to military clashes and wars [that].
Instead of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, the United States and Israel are using military force to prevent others from
acquiring them, while they insist on maintaining their own weapons to pose deadly threats to other nations. But the production,
proliferation and threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear chemical and biological) are among the major global
problems which could lead, if left unchecked, to the extinction of life on earth. Different from the limited character
of former wars, the current wars in the Middle East manipulate global problems and escalate their
dangers instead of solving them




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[File Name]                                                                                                           [Name]

                                                 ! - IRAN PROLIF
Drop in U.S.-Russian relations leads to Iranian nuclearization
Freedman ‘07 [Robert O. Freedman is Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone professor of political science at
Baltimore Hebrew University and is a visiting professor of political science at Johns Hopkins UniversDaily
Star, December 3, 2007,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=87176]

Yet from the US (and Israeli) perspective, things could get worse. If US-Russian relations deteriorate further, Russia
may decide that having [find] a solid ally in Iran is more important than improving ties the Gulf Arabs - a measure Putin has
sought both to help the Russian economy and to deter theArabs from aiding the Chechen rebels. This could well happen, especially
if oil prices remain in the $90-100 per barrel range and the Chechen rebellion remains under control. Under these circumstances,
Russia will even more strongly oppose further UN sanctions against Iran and will ship it the nuclear fuel it has withheld,
thus providing Tehran with another means of nuclear enrichment. One could also expect deliveries of
ever more sophisticated Russian weapons to Iran to counter a possible US or Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear
installations.


Nuclear Iran threatens apocalyptic nuclear terrorism
Eisenstadt ‘05 [MICHAEL EISENSTADT, (Senior fellow and director of the Military and Security
Studies Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), October 2005,
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub629.pdf]

Instability in Iran. Finally, there are the implications of political instability and domestic unrest in a nuclear Iran.
Should anti-regime violence escalate to the point that it were to threaten the existence of the Islamic Republic (unlikely in
the near-term, but possible in the future, should Iran‘s conservative leadership prove unable to better the population‘s living
standards, and continue to ignore calls for political change), diehard supporters of the old order might lash out at the
perceived external enemies of the regime with all means at their disposal, as the regime teeters on the brink. In
such a scenario, the apocalyptic possibility of nuclear terrorism by the Islamic Republic in its death throes must be
treated seriously.




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[File Name]                                                                                                                    [Name]

                                                                ! HEG
A close U.S.-Russia relationship is vital to America‘s global leadership
Ellsworth 3 [Robert Ellsworth (Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, served three congressional terms,
and former Deputy Secretary of Defense) 2003 September, ―Advancing American Interests and the U.S.-
Russian Relationship‖, The Commission on American‘s National Interests and Russia, The Nixon Center,
< http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/FR.htm>]

Seventh, as a veto-wielding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia can
substantially ease, or complicate, American attempts to work through the UN and other international
institutions to advance other vital and extremely important U.S. interests. In a world in which many are already
concerned about the use of U.S. power, this can have a real impact on America‘s success at providing
global leadership. More broadly, a close U.S.-Russian relationship can limit other states‘ behavior by effectively eliminating
Moscow as a potential source of political support.

U.S. leadership prevents proliferation and global nuclear war
Khalilzad ‘95 [Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to the United Nations. ―Losing the Moment? The
United States and the World After the Cold War.‖ The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring
1995]
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return
to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable
not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous
advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets,
and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major
problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally,
U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the
world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange.
U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
Precluding the rise of a hostile global rival is a good guide for defining what interests the United States should regard as vital and for
which of them it should be ready to use force and put American lives at risk. It is a good prism for identifying threats, setting priorities
for U.S. policy toward various regions and states, and assessing needs for military capabilities and modernization.




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                               TURNS SPACE EXPLORATION
That turns case – US-Russian relations key to space exploration
Jones 4 (Elizabeth Jones , Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Testimony before
the House of International Relations Committee, March 18, 2004, http://www.ransac.org/Official%20
Document s/U.S.%20Government/Department%20of %20State/492004121756PM.html)

Another area of cooperation is in space . Since the loss of the shuttle Columbia, Russian capability to lift
payloads has supported the operations of the International Space Station . As we define future challenges in
space, we believe that continuing our cooperation and combining Russian and American resources,
technology and experience will benefitboth nations and accelerate space exploration .42




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                     ***PROLIFERATION DA




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                                                   LINKS
Leads to space weapons prolif – nuclear prolif proves
Lowery,7 (Scott, Writer for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
―Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued‖, Occasions Online, 2007,
http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%
20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, accessed: 6/1/11

It is clear that the weaponization of space is not inevitable. However, does the concern of foreign
weaponization justify the pursuit of space weapons anyway? The answer is an emphatic no. Although
doing so would seem to increase the asymmetric space advantage the US has, it would actually have a
destabilizing effect and result in a decreased advantage. The idea of space weapons brings to mind
visions of military omnipotence, with the US able to easily strike down any adversary without fear of
retaliation. Such an ability would deter many conflicts. A similar rationale developed in the 1940s with the
creation of the atom bomb. It too seemed to provide infinite power that would cause the rest of the world
to kneel before the US or suffer unimaginable retaliation. This idea worked once, ending World War II.
Once the atom bomb became public, it sparked a massive arms race as other nations developed nuclear
power. The stockpiling of nuclear arms led to the Cold War, an era defined by a world on the brink of
destruction and rapidly shifting political climates. It is not a large leap in logic to conclude that since space
weapons offer advantages of similar magnitude to nuclear weapons, their development will cause a
similar situation. Other nations will not stand idle as the US weaponizes space—they will follow suit. In
the end, space will become a volatile political liability and the medium for a new Cold War–style weapons
spiral.

Space Weaponization causes proliferation
Krepon 4 [Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Diplomat Scholar at the
University of Virginia, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. ; ―Weapons in the
Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option‖ in Arms Control Today, November 2004. Reprinted as
―Avoiding the Weaponization of Space‖ ; www.stimson.org/images/...pdfs/Avoiding_the_Weaopnization
_of_Space.pdf ]

Weaponizing space would poison relations with China and Russia, whose help is essential to stop
and reverse proliferation. ASAT weapon tests and deployments would surely reinforce Russia‘s
hair-trigger nuclear posture, and China would likely feel compelled to alter its relaxed nuclear
posture, which would then have negative repercussions on India and Pakistan. The Bush
Administration‘s plans would also further alienate America‘s friends and allies, which, with the possible
exception of Israel, strongly oppose the weaponization of space. The fabric of international controls over
weapons of mass destruction, which is being severely challenged by Iran‘s and North Korea‘s nuclear
ambitions, could rip apart if the Bush Administration‘s interest in testing space and nuclear weapons is
realized. This highly destabilizing and dangerous scenario can be avoided, as there is no pressing
need to weaponize space and many compelling reasons to avoid doing so. If space becomes
another realm for the flight-testing and deployment of weapons, there will be no sanctuary in
space and no assurance that essential satellites will be available when needed for military
missions and global commerce. Acting on worst-case assumptions often can increase this likelihood.
Crafting a space assurance posture, including a hedging strategy in the event that others cheat,
offers more potential benefits and lower risks than turning the heavens into a shooting gallery.

Space Weaponization causes arms race: China‘s self defense over Taiwan
escalates
Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth S. Blazejewski, in private practice in New York City, focusing primarily on
international corporate and financial transactions and he received his master‘s degree in public affairs
from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University
School of Law , ―Space Weaponization and US-China Relations,‖ Spring 2008, Strategic Studies Journal,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA509492&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

On this account, China‘s primary concern with US space weaponization is its contribution to a US
multilayered missile defense shield. Indeed, China‘s campaign for PAROS negotiation at the CD seems
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to intensify after each new development in United States BMD plans.20 Although China could respond to
a BMD shield with effective countermeasures, future technological developments may permit the BMD
system to vitiate China‘s nuclear deterrent.22 In the case of a conflict over Taiwan, for example, a US
space-based BMD system could prove very valuable to the United States. According to this view, if the
United States decides to advance with such a BMD program, China will respond so as to maintain its
nuclear deterrence. It will modernize its ICBM fleet (a program it has already initiated), develop further
countermeasures to circumvent the BMD shield, and develop the means to launch multiple ASAT attacks.
Ultimately, an arms race could ensue. This, however, would not be China‘s chosen outcome. Its
development of space weapons is merely a counterstrategy to what it views as likely US space
weaponization.23 China would much prefer that the United States negotiate a PAROS agreement not to
build the BMD shield.24 If this were the case, China‘s January ASAT test would appear to be an attempt
to get the United States to the negotiating table. By launching the ASAT, China sought to put the United
States on notice that any attempt to weaponize outer space would lead to this mutually undesirable path.

Space weaponization causes space proliferation
Lewis , Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation,
‘04 , (Jeffrey, ―What if Space Were Weaponized?‖, Center for Defense Information ,
http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf )

It is important to understand that there is another, more likely ―inevitability‖ involved if the United States
pursues these capabilities, that is: other nations almost assuredly would, too. Although Russia and
China have declared a moratorium on ASAT testing, it would be irresponsible for either state not
to acquire their own deterrent to potential U.S. ASAT attacks. Russian and Chinese ASATs may, in turn, be a
reason (or, perhaps, just an excuse) for states such as India to follow suit. Still other countries – and this includes North Korea and
probably Iran – that have the desire, but not yet the skills, would then be able to ―draft‖ in the wake of the big powers through
espionage, declassification and, perhaps, the black market. The point is this: once the United States has gone down
the ASAT road, there likely won‘t be an option of negotiating a ban on ASATs or discouraging the
proliferation of legitimate dual-use technologies such as microsatellites. As we have learned with
nuclear and missile proliferation, once the genie is out of the bottle, it is out for good.

American Space Weaponization leads to global nuclear proliferation
Krepon and Katz-Hyman 5 [Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a
Diplomat Scholar at the University of Virginia, and director of the South Asia and Space Security
programs. Michael Katz-Hyman is another member of the Stimson Center ; ―Space Weapons and
Proliferation‖ was originally published in the Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 2, July 2005. ]

1 Will flight-testing or deploying space weapons prompt arms races? This assertion figures
prominently in the writings of both critics and boosters of space warfare initiatives. Critics Helen Caldicott
and Craig Eisendrath argue that ―placing weapons in space inevitably would provoke an arms race there.
Such a race eventually would consume hundreds of billions of dollars.‖2 Similarly, Mike Moore contends
that, ―If the United States chooses to go the route of space dominance, other countries will look at ways to
make sure it doesn't happen, and we'll be back in another arms race.‖3 Supporters of space warfare
initiatives also base their advocacy, at least in part, on preempting an arms race. Everett Dolman argues
that, ―The time to weaponize and administer space for the good of global commerce is now, when the
United States could do so without fear of an arms race there.‖4 Baker Spring agrees: ―If the US military
squanders its lead in military space capabilities, it will invite the arms race that arms control advocates
say they wish to avoid.‖5 We contend that the arms race argument is weak and beside the point,
since arms racing is not needed to negate the space weapons of a potential adversary. Advanced
space-faring nations like Russia and China could, if they felt it necessary, compete in making low
earth orbit inhospitable to satellites with modest investments and unsophisticated techniques.
Simply put, asymmetric warfare can be waged in space as well as on the ground. Any nation that
possesses medium-range ballistic missiles, space tracking capabilities, and the means to precisely insert
a satellite into orbit also has the ability to destroy a satellite. Satellites are expensive and vulnerable;
they don‘t need to be attacked by large numbers of highly sophisticated weapons in order to be
placed in jeopardy. Rather than engaging in an expensive arms race, states threatened by US
space warfare initiatives are likely to respond in cost-effective ways to negate US efforts to
dominate space. We argue that additional proliferation of nuclear weapons, rather than new arms

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races, is the most likely outcome in the event of renewed interest in space warfare. Proliferation
will be a natural consequence of more nations feeling less secure as a result of space weapons.
Adverse proliferation consequences could be both direct and indirect. China and Russia will likely
feel most directly threatened by US space warfare initiatives. Beijing will likely increase its nuclear
weapon requirements to counter increased threat perceptions without engaging in an arms race,
while Moscow will likely seek to adjust the contraction of its nuclear arsenal, to the extent the
Kremlin believes that its deterrent might be challenged by US initiatives. Indirect, horizontal
proliferation is likely to result from greater strains in major power relations and in US-alliance ties
triggered by US initiatives to dominate space. In the absence of united fronts against proliferation by
major powers and by US friends and allies, international efforts to strengthen nonproliferation and
disarmament norms are likely to fail, and hedging strategies against a more worrisome future are
likely to multiply. The US Air Force‘s Counterspace Operations doctrine, released in August, 2004,
embraces power projection in and through space by means of what the Pentagon calls ―offensive
counter-space‖ capabilities.6 Pentagon research and development programs that could be applied to
these space warfare initiatives include laser programs, space-based missile defense interceptors, and
technology demonstrated on microsatellite programs, such as the recently launched XSS-11.7 The
purpose of developing and fielding such capabilities is to ensure the unhindered exercise of dominant US
ground, air, and naval power projection capabilities. US military dominance in these domains is already
well established. Its implications for the nonproliferation regime— constructed during an era of bi-polar,
Cold War competition—have not been carefully analyzed. The presumed positive or negative impacts
of US military dominance on proliferation would surely be accentuated in the event that
Washington also seeks dominant military capabilities in space. It is unfortunate that the connection
between space warfare initiatives and proliferation has been little noted, since the two are bound together
so closely. Unless the trade-off between flight testing and deploying the space warfare capabilities and proliferation is recognized,
the implementation of the US Air Force‘s new doctrine for offensive counterspace operations will spur
more proliferation and generate increased dangers for national, regional, and international
security. We believe that the extension of US military dominance into space, when accompanied
by a low regard for international compacts designed to prevent proliferation and promote
disarmament, will result in more, not less, proliferation. The US impulse to flight test and deploy
offensive counterspace capabilities comes at a time when the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is
facing serious challenges. We view the advocacy of US space dominance as a useful prism to analyze
why proliferation concerns are growing, and why efforts to strengthen nonproliferation and disarmament
norms have encountered such great difficulty in recent years.




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[File Name]                                                                                                                [Name]

                                                       !- STABILITY
Arms-race is cosly and destabilizing
Van Ness, PhD,Visiting Fellow at Contemporary China Centre and Department of International
Relations and School of International, Political & Strategic Studies, 10 (Peter, ―The Time Has Come for a
Treaty to Ban Weapons in Space‖, http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v34n3-h.pdf)

An arms race in space among the major powers would be immensely dangerous, destabilizing,
and expensive. Russia, which has a long history in space technology dating back to Sputnik in 1957, does not today have the
resources or the political will to sustain such a race. But China does. This is principally an issue between the United States and
China. Some analysts say that it is too late to conclude a treaty to ban weapons in space, but others argue that if a treaty cannot be
negotiated, then perhaps a code of conduct might work. It is in the interests of both the United States and the
People‘s Republic of China—and the world, for that matter—that the weaponization of space be stopped . On June
28, President Obama announced a New National Space Policy with a central goal ―to promote peaceful cooperation and
collaboration in space,‖ and he invited armscontrol proposals to help make that happen.1 We must take advantage of this
opportunity. The objective of this commentary is to identify common ground in the debate about weapons in space, and to suggest
the basis for an agreement between the United States and the People‘s Republic of China about their relations in space. I will try to
show that no country would benefit from an arms race in space; it would not serve any country’s
national interests. Such an arms race would be strategically destabilizing and economically costly
almost beyond belief. Moreover, it would potentially endanger the security, not just of the major participants, but of all
nations. Since the United States and the PRC are the most likely participants in an arms race in space, the commentary will focus
on analyzing their positions with respect to weapons in space. ―What is a space weapon?‖ In the relevant literature, there is much
debate about which particular weapons should be banned. But there is no agreement. Some American analysts argue that space
has already been weaponized, dating back even to the German rocket attacks on Britain during World War II. For them,
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the existing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons are space weapons. On the Chinese
side, there is a preoccupation with U.S. plans for missile defense, nominally “defensive”
weapons, that might compromise China’s basic nuclear deterrent. Of paramount concern for
China are U.S. designs for space-based weapons that could attack Chinese ICBMs in their so-called
boost phase, when they are especially vulnerable to interception by an opponent power . Meanwhile,
both countries continue to plan to fight a war in space if a military conflict between the two
powers ever does break out.




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                                       ! – NUCLEAR WAR
Proliferation causes nuclear war
Utgoff 2 (Victor, Deputy Director for Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for
Defense Analysis,Survival, "Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions", Summer,p. OUP
Journals, accessed: 5/17/11)

The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and
exchanges of missiles again steach other's cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East
escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police
actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human
nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined
by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation
or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily
accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear
weapons and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum
destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed
toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations
wearing nuclear "six-shooters" on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today,
but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole
nations.




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                                     TURNS DETERRANCE
Nuclear Proliferation turns deterrence – irrational actors will gain weapons
Arbatov 4 (Alexei Arbatov, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Director of
the International Security Center at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations; member
of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs, April 13, 2004, ―Horizontal Proliferation: New
Challenges,‖ http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_2911)

The dialectics of nuclear deterrence and proliferation is well in line with Hegel‘s classical laws. Initially,
nuclear deterrence (as a policy of indirect employment of nuclear weapons for political purposes) gave
rise to proliferation, as more and more countries sought to use the fruits of deterrence for serving their
own interests. However, as an increasing number of countries obtained nuclear weapons, deterrence
grew vague, unstable and contradictory. This tendency was explained by the increased versatility and
inherent paradoxical qualities of deterrence. These are the ambiguity with regard to the possibility of the
first use of nuclear weapons, and the dubious rationality of some of the fundamental premises within the
concept of deterrence. The final stage of proliferation – access to nuclear weapons by non-state entities
(terrorist organizations) – will put an end, once and for all, to nuclear deterrence as a doctrine for
protecting one‘s national security. Terrorists need nuclear weapons not for the purpose of deterrence, but
for direct employment, as well as blackmailing states or the entire civilized world. In turn, nuclear
deterrence is futile against terrorists, as terrorists have no territory, industries, population or a regular
army that might be targets for retaliation.




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                     ***CODE OF CONDUCT CP




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[File Name]                                                                                         [Name]

                                                     1NC
TEXT: The United States Federal Government should formally endorse an
international code of conduct against ―harmful interference‖ with space objects.

Code of Conduct Key to Space Security
Krepon 10 (Michael Krepon, co-founder and senior associate at Stimson, and director of the South
Asia and Space Security programs, December 1, 2010, ―A Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-
Faring Nations,‖ http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2675.pdf)

A Code of Conduct is needed because ―rules of the road‖ for outer space are no less important than rules
of the road on the ground, at sea or in the air. Rules of the road make driving safer; without rules, there
would be chaos, and chaos in outer space is not in the interest of military, business and scientific
establishments. Rules become norms, and norms can become treaties. While rules during peacetime and
rules during warfare can be quite different, even warfare has rules. If the analysis presented here is
sound, then protections for satellites should also be respected even in the event of warfare. Rule
breakers can still be expected, but their presence does not 171 negate the need for rules. Indeed, without
rules, there are no rule breakers; having rules helps to isolate and penalize such actors. A Code of
Conduct is needed for outer space because, while some rules already exist, there are many loopholes.
The use of outer space is expanding, and the potential for friction is growing. The absence of a Code of
Conduct and growing concerns over military doctrines for space warfare encourage hedging strategies.
These strategies are reflected in the flight testing of multipurpose technologies by China and the United
States— technologies that could be used for peaceful as well as offensive purposes in outer space—as
well as in the Chinese ―hit-to-kill‖ anti-satellite test in January 2007. Hedging strategies are reinforced by
the absence of regular discussions or negotiations on space security. This equation means more
hedging, less security and a growing interest in devices that can interfere with or otherwise harm space
objects. A Code of Conduct would serve to increase space security and promote the peaceful uses of
outer space—the same general purposes served by a treaty to ban space weapons. Treaty negotiation—
especially one carried out in the Conference on Disarmament, which operates by consensus, and which
has been tied to a very challenging negotiation for a fissile material cut-off treaty—would take a very long
time to complete and could result in a lowest-common-denominator outcome. Even then, the treaty might
take many years to enter into force. A Code of Conduct could be produced much sooner, and could be
pursued in many different forums. A small group of stakeholders could work together to produce a higher-
common denominator result, which might then be considered by a wider group of countries.

China and Russia will agree to a Code of Conduct – neo-realism proves
Hansel 10 (Mischa Hansel, visiting scholar at the Space Policy Institute (SPI) of the George Washington
University in Washington DC, March 29, 2010, ―The USA and arms control in space: an IR analysis,‖
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964610000275)

However, the fact that an international agreement against space debris-producing activities would not
serve all US security interests at the same time does not have to be a disadvantage. What is a paradox,
at first glance, makes perfect sense from the perspective of neo-realism. Note that neo-realism expects
international cooperation to happen only when relative gains are fairly equally distributed. Thus, an
agreement which decisively privileges the USA is for the same reason also unlikely to be realized in the
first place. Fortunately, this is only the case in the field of conventional military power. After all, space
security is considered primarily in terms of strategic military capabilities by non-Western space powers.68
Russia in particular seems to be worried about the integrity of its space-based early warning networks.
China, on the other hand, could hardly be comfortable with an extensive US missile shield, given its
rather small nuclear arsenal. Both states might therefore be willing to subscribe to an international
agreement against the physical destruction of spacecraft for the sake of their status as nuclear powers.
Roles are reversed then in the area of nuclear capabilities. For the US, kinetic energy weapons are an
opportunity rather than a threat. For less capable nuclear powers they are a possible risk to the viability of
their nuclear forces.



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[File Name]                                                                                          [Name]
Using the phrase ―no harmful interference‖ prevents confusion with the definition
of space weapons
Krepon 10 (Michael Krepon, co-founder and senior associate at Stimson, and director of the South
Asia and Space Security programs, December 1, 2010, ―A Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-
Faring Nations,‖ http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2675.pdf)

What key elements might be included in a Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations? The
proposed Code of Conduct devised by the Stimson Center and our partners is built around the key
element of ―no harmful interference‖ with space objects. This formulation, which is borrowed from other
agreements, avoids the traps associated with trying to define what constitutes a space weapon. The ―no
harmful interference‖ injunction applies to dedicated anti-satellite weapons, latent or residual anti-satellite
capabilities, and multipurpose technologies used in a harmful manner. Participating states would still
require common understandings of what constitutes ―harm‖, but this is a far simpler problem than trying to
define space weapons. Our proposed Code of Conduct also includes key elements of providing advance
notice if there is reason to believe that activities in space may inadvertently cause harmful interference,
and consultations when concerned about harmful interference.




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[File Name]                                                                                           [Name]

                        SOLVES FASTEST/ IMMEDIATE ACTION
Immediate Action is required for successful cooperation
Graham 5 (Thomas Graham, Jr., former special representative of the president for arms control,
nonproliferation and disarmament, December 2005, ―Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear
War,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-SpaceWeapons#bio)

The history of the last 50 years teaches us that, if dangerous weapons and technologies are to be
controlled to the safety and security of all, it must be done early, before the programs become
entrenched. That time may well be now with respect to weapons in space. The United States does not
have a secure future in space without broad and sustained international cooperation. The deployment of
weapons in space, whether offensive or defensive, would make this necessary cooperation difficult if not
impossible. There would likely be retaliation, which would seriously degrade the progress that has been
made over the last five or six decades toward multilateral international cooperation in space.

The US should favor code of conduct to solve space debris faster
Hansel 10 (Mischa Hansel, visiting scholar at the Space Policy Institute (SPI) of the George Washington
University in Washington DC, March 29, 2010, ―The USA and arms control in space: an IR analysis,‖
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964610000275)

Why is the simple physical destruction of objects so particularly harmful in space?40 The reason for this
lies in the uniqueness of orbital movement. Objects do not have to provide their own energy source to
circle the Earth. They can travel with extraordinarily high velocities almost indefinitely. This applies to
even the smallest objects, of which there are thousands in different Earth orbits. Because of their speed
even these small particles can inflict serious damage if they collide with a spacecraft. Unfortunately such
instances are becoming more and more likely as for various reasons the population of space debris has
been ever increasing since the beginning of the Space Age. One of the reasons for this has been the
long-term practice of throwing away rocket stages or leaving no longer useful satellites in orbit. The
consequences are unintended collisions between spacecraft. Until the Chinese ASAT test the least
significant source of space debris was the testing of kinetic energy weapons. But, as the Chinese ASAT
test showed, the intentional destruction of objects in space could easily become the most troubling source
of space debris. This would almost certainly be the case if an arms race were underway. There are,
of course, other activities which pose risks to the economic viability of space activities as well. For
instance, the jamming of satellite communication links – whether intentional or unintentional – happens on
a daily basis and is worrying for the operator of commercial satellite services. There are also concerns
about ongoing research in the field of high-energy lasers by a number of states. They could be employed
against individual satellites in order to degrade their sensors and electronics. Finally, micro-satellites are
doubtless as useful as space attack devices as they are for in-orbit inspection, repairing, or refueling
purposes.41 However, with the exception of a HAND none of these space attack methods would be able
to threaten the usability of near Earth space itself as significantly as physical destructions and collisions in
orbit. In other words, because of the indiscriminate and long-term nature of the threat of space debris, it is
easy to make the case for an international regime against space debris-producing activities. It would
supplement already ongoing efforts of civil space agencies to coordinate and improve their debris
mitigation measures.42 Any effort to ban less harmful threats has a lower priority from the perspective of
interdependence theory. Such efforts should therefore be set aside to avoid any complication of the
negotiation process. Given the urgency of the space-debris threat the USA should also favor a rather
informal intergovernmental agreement in order to circumvent time-consuming and risky ratification
procedures.

Code of Conduct Key to Arms Control Negotiations
Hansel 10 (Mischa Hansel, visiting scholar at the Space Policy Institute (SPI) of the George Washington
University in Washington DC, March 29, 2010, ―The USA and arms control in space: an IR analysis,‖
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964610000275)

President Obama, in contrast, was expected to take a more constructive stance toward space arms
control. Already during his presidential campaign he had issued a policy statement in favor of a ―code of

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[File Name]                                                                                         [Name]
conduct for spacefaring nations, including a worldwide ban on weapons to interfere with satellites and a
ban on testing anti-satellite weapons‖.16 He reiterated this position after taking office in January 2009.
Defense officials also indicated a new emphasis on passive instead of active protection of the US space
infrastructure.17 Weapons systems would no longer be considered part of a defensive posture in space –
an understanding which is certainly more favorable to arms control negotiations. However, the Obama
administration's general approach to space security is still waiting to be officially defined. The Space
Posture Review (SPR), initially expected to be finished in early 2010, will be delayed by several months.
The development of a new National Space Policy may take until the middle of 2010 at least. Thus, the
USA is very unlikely to present any arms control initiatives of its own at the moment. Moreover, the US
delegation in Geneva is prioritizing negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).

Code of Conduct restricts behavior – not capabilities – makes it more popular –
helps prevent space debris
Hansel 10 (Mischa Hansel, visiting scholar at the Space Policy Institute (SPI) of the George Washington
University in Washington DC, March 29, 2010, ―The USA and arms control in space: an IR analysis,‖
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964610000275)

Together these events lent a new urgency to ongoing arms control efforts. Despite the deadlock in the CD
there has not been a shortage of ideas.25 Quite the opposite: in 2002 Russia and China presented a
working paper on ―possible elements for a future international legal agreement on the prevention of the
deployments of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects‖.26
Although in clear contradiction of its own ASAT test in 2007, if not by letter then at least in spirit, China,
together with Russia, continued to make the case for a formal initiation of arms control talks in the CD.
For example, the two countries presented a slightly changed draft treaty in 2008.27 As with the preceding
working paper, the draft treaty represented an attempt to define and outlaw certain capabilities, i.e.
‗weapons in space‘. Whereas Russia and China were thus following a traditional approach to arms
control, the European Union (EU), instead of seeking a solution in the form of a treaty, elaborated the
idea of an informal Code of Conduct (CoC).28 Space powers would thereby commit themselves to
minimizing the risk of physical destruction of satellites and collision between space objects. Hence, they
would not refrain from exploring certain technologies but would restrict the usage of whatever capabilities
they had. In other words, the CoC intends to restrict behavior, not capabilities. The primary purpose of
this restriction is to limit any further increase of the population of space debris. It therefore represents a
unique approach to space security which is distinct from the Russian and Chinese treaty proposal. While
far from being mutually exclusive, both approaches provide different starting points for a theoretical
analysis.




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                                       US LEADERSHIP KEY
US Formal Endorsement Key to Success
Black 10 (Samuel Black, Research Associate at the the Henry L. Stimson Center, May 2010, ―Next
Steps on a Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations,‖ ESPI Perspectives Journal Issue
No. 32, http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy&hl=en&site=&source=hp&q=%E2%80%9CNext+Steps
+on+a+Code+of+Conduct+for+Responsible+Space-Faring+Nations%2C%E2%80%9D+&aq=f&aqi=&aql=
&oq=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.&fp=228030924e49558f&biw=1363&bih=721)

The U.S. policymakers developing the new National Space Policy are thus very familiar with the draft EU
Code of Conduct. They are most likely to adopt a combination of the following options: indicate support
for proposals that advance the general principles set forth in the policy, indicate support for a KE ASAT
test ban, or indicate support for a code of conduct. In my view, a combination of the first two would be the
best course of action. The third could unnecessarily alienate those in Europe who have dedicated some
years to producing a draft which, by many accounts, has been positively received in Washington. An
indication of general openness to proposals consistent with U.S. policy would open the door to a formal
endorsement of the EU Code, while an endorsement of a KE ASAT test ban would allow the United
States to champion in parallel an initiative which reinforces the goals of the EU Code.

US key to successful international treaty – influence in world politics
Lowery,7 (Scott, Writer for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
―Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued‖, Occasions Online, 2007,
http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%
20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, accessed: 6/1/11

The weaponization of space will be destabilizing to the global economy and could cause another costly
arms race similar to that during the Cold War. Rather than instigate hostility through the development of
space weapons, the adoption of a space assurance posture would both foster a mutual atmosphere of
trust and reduce the vulnerability of space systems without the need for weaponization. Due to its
influence in world policy, the US is in prime position to set the example and to encourage the world to
allow everyone safe access to the benefits of space. By refusing to weaponize space, the United States
can better protect itself through strategy than with any new weapon.

Peaceful US leadership necessary in an international treaty – China, Russia, and
others will follow
Hitchens 3 (Theresa Hitchens, Center for Defense news director,‖ Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or
Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons,‖ October 2003,
http://www.gwu.edu/~spi/assets/docs/Security_Space_Volume.Final.pdf)

As noted, there is also the question of intent. It is not obvious that any nation has any intention, or even
incentive, to launch a war in space. Instead, most countries, including China and Russia, have been
urging a global ban on weapons in space. Many experts, including a number of Air Force strategists,
persuasively argue a U.S. move to put offensive weapons in space could have the perverse effect of
creating a new threat because other countries would feel compelled to follow suit.




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                                            EU AGREES
EU will sign on – it has already desires a Code of Conduct
Arbatov 10 ( Alexei Arbatov, Academician and professor of the Academy of Defense, Security and
Police by the President of Russia and Head of the Center for International Security Center of the Institute
for International Economy and International Relationships of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladimir
Dvorkin, November 8, 2010, ―Outer Space Weapons, diplomacy, and security,‖
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YFTZSqErClUC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=code+of+
conduct+space+weaponization+treaty+Obama&ots=JHO3Mf6_CI&sig=ES_cYSggUmTC1-
UM9IF4PGeb4NM#v=onepage&q=code%20of%20conduct&f=false)

The viability of a COC was boosted considerably by the Council of the European Union at the end of 2008
in its proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, which promulgated a number of important
principles intended to enhance progress toward averting an arms race in space. Under the document‘s
general principles, the participating states would resolve to abide by a certain set of principles on the use
of outer space, such as freedom of access to outer space while ―fully respecting the security, safety, and
intergrity of space objects in orbit,‖ or the need for countries to ―take all the appropriate measures and
cooperate in good faith to prevent harmful interference in outer space activities.‖




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                  SOLVES GENERAL LAUNDRY LIST IMPACTS
Arms control Key to prevent ASAT development and usage, large scale nuclear
proliferation, and global nuclear war.
Hui 6 [ Zhang Hui is a research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom of the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. ; Issue
2, 2006 ; “Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective‖ in Issue 2 of China
Security: A Journal Of China‘s Strategic Development ;
http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=245&Itemid=8 ]


Due to the threatening nature of space weapons, it is reasonable to assume that China and others would
attempt to block their deployment and use by political and, if necessary, military means.11 Many Chinese
officials and scholars believe that China should take every possible step to maintain the effectiveness of
its nuclear deterrent. This includes negating the threats from missile defense and space weaponization
plans.12 In responding to any U.S. move toward deployment space weapons, the first and best
option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent not just the United States but
any nation from doing so -- as it is advocating presently. However, if this effort fails and if what
China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, it would very likely develop
responses to counter and neutralize such a threat.
Despite the enormous cost of space-based weapon systems, they are vulnerable to a number of low-
cost and relatively low-technology ASAT attacks including the use of ground-launched small
kinetic-kill vehicles, pellet clouds or space mines. It is reasonable to believe that China and
others could resort to these ASAT weapons to counter any U.S. space-based weapons.13 This,
however, would lead to an arms race in space.
To protect against the potential loss of its deterrent capability, China could potentially resort to
enhancing its nuclear forces. Such a move could, in turn, encourage India and then Pakistan to
follow suit. Furthermore, Russia has threatened to respond to any country‘s deployment of space
weapons.14 Moreover, constructing additional weapons would produce a need for more plutonium
and highly enriched uranium to fuel those weapons. This impacts China‘s participation in the fissile
material cut-off treaty (FMCT).15 Eventually, failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament
process, to which the nuclear weapon states committed themselves under the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
would damage the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime itself, which is already at the breaking
point. As Hu Xiaodi, China‘s ambassador for disarmament affairs, asked, ―With lethal weapons flying
overhead in orbit and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people eliminate weapons
of mass destruction or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do harm to global peace, security
and stability, and hence be detrimental to the fundamental interests of all States.‖ 16

Code of Conduct solves ASAT and space weapons testing, US military
capabilities, US deterrence, and space debris

Krepon 4 [ Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Diplomat Scholar at the
University of Virginia, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. ; ―Weapons in the
Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option‖ in Arms Control Today, November 2004. Reprinted as
―Avoiding the Weaponization of Space‖ ;
www.stimson.org/images/...pdfs/Avoiding_the_Weaopnization_of_Space.pdf ]

Instead of weaponizing space, a ―space assurance‖ posture would offer a greater likelihood that essential
US satellites will be available when needed. Adopting a space assurance posture above all requires
the avoidance of dangerous military activities in space, including flight tests that simulate attacks
against satellites and the deployment of ASAT and space weapons. Space assurance has many
other mutually reinforcing components. One basic element is to maintain superior US conventional
military capabilities. Potential adversaries must understand clearly that if they damage, or destroy
US satellites, they will not alter the outcome of battle. Rather, they will only suffer more casualties
by impairing satellites that improve targeting and reduce collateral damage.
A second key element of space assurance is increased situational awareness in space so US
military leaders can quickly identify developments that could cause potential harm to satellites.
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This includes improved monitoring capabilities for objects in space, whether small satellites
operated by foreign nations or space debris. A corollary requirement to improved situational
awareness is improved intelligence capabilities relating to the space programs of potential
adversaries.
The more US officials know or can find out about space-related activities of potential adversaries,
the more they can strengthen deterrence against unwelcome surprises. Another way to strengthen
deterrence would be to adopt a hedging strategy against the initiation by others of space warfare flight
tests and deployments. One key aspect of a hedging strategy is already in place. In extremis, the United
States could use long-range ballistic missiles and lasers designed for other missions to disable or kill
satellites. These residual, or latent, space warfare capabilities, which are growing with the advent of
missile defense interceptors, have long existed. Rather than leading inexorably to the flight-testing and
deployment of weapons specifically designed for space warfare, they have served as an insurance policy
while deterring unwelcome surprises.
Additional hedges can be taken in the form of research and development programs that stop short of
flight- testing. Potential adversaries can be expected to be working on their own space warfare initiatives
behind closed doors, as is now the case with the United States. Ongoing research and development
programs would shorten the timelines of flight-testing new initiatives if potential adversaries do not
emulate US restraint. Not every research and development program is worthy of support, however,
particularly kinetic-kill programs that generate space debris.
An essential element of space assurance is the strengthening of existing norms against the flight-
testing and deployment of space weapons. Many norms for responsible space-faring nations already
exist, including prohibiting the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space under the
aforementioned Outer Space Treaty, helping astronauts in distress, registering space objects, accepting
liability for damage caused by national endeavors in space, and acknowledging that the exploration and
use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all countries and humankind.
The scope of existing norms needs to be expanded if space assurance is to be reinforced. Traditionally,
the forum in which international norms are codified is the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.
This 65-nation body operates by consensus, however, and at best requires many years to reach
agreement on treaty texts, which might then be stalled further in the process of ratification, as is now the
case with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This reason is not sufficient to block or reject negotiations
in the CD relating to the prevention of space weapons, but it does suggest the wisdom of reinforcing
existing norms in quicker ways.
The development of a code of conduct establishing agreed ―rules of the road‖ for responsible
space-faring nations can expedite international efforts to prevent the weaponization of space.
Many codes of conduct already exist in the form of bilateral or multilateral executive agreements. During
the Cold War, the United States entered into executive agreements with the Soviet Union to prevent
dangerous military practices at sea, on the ground, and in the air. The Bush Administration champions
codes of conduct to prevent ballistic missile proliferation and terrorism. A similar approach could reinforce
space assurance.
The US-Soviet Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) accord, signed in 1972, has served as a model for comparable
agreements signed by more than 30 other sea-faring nations. The INCSEA agreement established
important rules, including pledges to avoid collisions at sea, the use of blinding light to illuminate the
bridges of passing ships, and interference in the ―formations‖ of the other party. Washington and Moscow
subsequently signed the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (PDMA) agreement in 1989. The
PDMA agreement covers, among other dangerous military activities, ―interfering with command and
control networks in a manner that could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed
forces of the other Party.‖ It establishes procedures to deal with boundary incursions and permits the
designation of ―special caution areas.‖
Space also deserves ―rules of the road‖ to help prevent incidents and dangerous military
activities. Such a code of conduct would include provisions against simulated attacks; the flight-
testing and deployment of space weapons; dangerous maneuvers in space, except those for
rescue, repair, and other peaceful purposes; and commercial interference, as well as
requirements to mitigate space debris.10
The definitions of space warfare, the scope of agreed constraints, and the ability to monitor them
have plagued every prior initiative in this field. They will also bedevil efforts to craft a code of conduct.
Nonetheless, thiseffort is worth pursuing. The risks associated with pursuing a code of conduct for
responsible space-faring nations are minimal compared to the risks of flight-testing and deploying
space weapons.
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The weaponization of space was avoided during the Cold War, even though both superpowers jockeyed
for military advantage on virtually every other front. Space weaponry can also be avoided now, when the
United States enjoys unparalleled agenda-setting powers. Existing norms against weaponizing space can
be strengthened if Washington exercises restraint, adopts prudent hedges, and joins others in diplomatic
efforts to pursue space assurance. The time is ripe to reinforce existing norms in space that have
greatly benefited space- aided commerce, scientific exploration, and the US armed forces.




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[File Name]                                                                                            [Name]

                                    SOLVES SPACE DEBRIS
Code of Conduct encourages US tech leadership
Hansel 10 (Mischa Hansel, visiting scholar at the Space Policy Institute (SPI) of the George Washington
University in Washington DC, March 29, 2010, ―The USA and arms control in space: an IR analysis,‖
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964610000275)

Finally, there is a third rationale for the USA to encourage a code of conduct or treaty against debris-
producing activities. Development and deployment of more discriminating ASAT technologies – be they
lasers, micro-satellites, microwave weapons, jammers, or even cyber attack tools – would still be allowed
after such an agreement. And in all these technological fields the USA is either further ahead than other
space powers or on par with them.64 What is more, the US military already prefers capabilities which are
able to deliver reversible and temporary effects.65 This is because third parties' space assets are likely to
become a target in future conflicts. For example, the US military could employ the Counter
Communication System (CCS), a sophisticated jamming device, to make sure that commercial
communication satellites are inaccessible in the military theater. As far as the USA disposes of these non-
kinetic ASAT options there seems to be less reason to oppose an international agreement against the
use of kinetic energy against spacecraft.

Code of Conduct is the best way to solve space conflict and debris
Beck 8 (Brian J Beck, attorney and graduate New York University School of Law and University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law, 2008. "The Next, Small, Step for Mankind: Fixing the Inadequacies of the
International Space Law Treaty Regime to Accommodate the Modern Space Flight Industry,‖
http://works.bepress.com/brian_beck/1/)

Mirmina argues that a code of conduct is likely to be the most successful method of limiting orbital
debris.137 A number of European agencies have already signed the 34 European Code of Conduct for
Space Debris Mitigation.138 This code is far more specific and detailed than the UN guidelines on space
debris mitigation, and requires specific design and end-of-life measures for space objects. It remains to
be seen how effective the European Code of Conduct will be, but it certainly looks to be a more effective
way of mitigating space debris than the U.N. approach. Another advantage to a code of conduct is that if
commercial space ventures take part in negotiating such codes, they are more likely to comply with the
codes. The major disadvantage, as Mirmina notes, is that unless adopted in domestic law, there is
nothing requiring private space ventures to comply with a code of conduct.139 A code of conduct could
also lead to an international treaty on space debris mitigation, providing the advantages of the negotiating
process for a code of conduct along with the enforceability of an international treaty.

Code of Conduct is popular in US government—prevents space debris
Logsdon 11 (John M. Logsdon, fellow at the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University in
Washington, DC, January 8, 2011, ―Change and continuity in US space policy,‖
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964610001128)

Perhaps the most significant changes in the new policy are the explicit recognition that ―it is in the shared
interest of all nations to act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust‖
and the pledge that the USA will take a leading role in ―preserving the space environment for the
responsible, peaceful, and safe use of all users‖. In order to give substance to this declaration, by the end
of 2010 US representatives had traveled widely, discussing in bilateral and multilateral settings enhanced
cooperation in orbital debris mitigation and space situational awareness and proposing additional
―transparency and confidence building mechanisms to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful
use of, space.‖ The United States has signaled that it is open to adhering to a voluntary ―code of conduct‖
or ―rules of the road‖ to guide actions in space. In what could be a major departure from the Bush
administration space policy, the new statement adds that ―the USA will consider proposals and concepts
for arms control measures‖. Subsequent statements by US representatives have made it clear that such
measures might even include negotiating a space arms control treaty that would, for example, ban debris-
creating anti-satellite weapons. There is a significant qualification, however; any arms control treaty would
have to be ―equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its

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[File Name]                                                                                           [Name]
allies‖. As public and private space efforts continue to increase, there is the very real possibility that
proliferation of orbital debris, accidental collisions, or unintended radio-frequency interference could limit
access to specific orbits. As the global economy becomes ever more dependent on space-based
services, the possibility of disruptions of the ability to make reliable use of space could have profound
economic consequences. As more countries make space systems an important element of their national
security posture, the possibility of purposeful interference with, or the disabling or destruction of, those
systems is a threat to global stability. Thus steps to limit these possibilities are of paramount importance
in keeping the space environment a global commons available for all to use for peaceful and productive
purposes. Recognizing the need for international norms to govern activities in space could be the most
lasting heritage of the new US national space policy.




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[File Name]                                                                                      [Name]

                         SOLVES SATELLITE DESTRUCTION
International Treaty necessary to prevent satellite destruction
Graham 5 (Thomas Graham, Jr., former special representative of the president for arms control,
nonproliferation and disarmament, December 2005, ―Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear
War,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-SpaceWeapons#bio)

These are crucial efforts that must never be allowed to be disrupted, either by space-based weapons or
with the relatively simplistic ground-based anti-satellite weapon systems that could today be deployed.
The United States has considerable anti-satellite weapons capability. An F-15-based homing vehicle
system was successfully tested in the 1980s, and the anti-ballistic missile system currently being
deployed in Alaska and California has an inherent anti-satellite capability. Right now, no other country is
developing a counterspace system, although the Soviet Union successfully tested a co-orbital anti-
satellite system in the 1970s and 1980s and Russia and China are believed to be capable of doing so.
Notably, 28 countries have ballistic missiles that can reach LEO satellites, and all have the technical
capability to develop a LEO anti-satellite system by modifying these missiles. Active defenses—the
deployment of devices intended to deflect, destroy, or render unworkable offensive systems—cannot by
themselves be expected to provide adequate protection of space assets either now or in the long term.
These technologies, as well as hardening and other passive means of defense, may provide some means
of defending against the current generation of anti-satellite technology. Eventually, however, our would-be
attackers would find ways to counter those defenses. Thus, it would appear that an agreed legal regime,
predicated on mutually beneficial and, of course, verifiable restraint, should at least be considered.




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                                          SOLVES PROLIF
International Agreements are the only way to prevent weapons proliferation
Graham 5 (Thomas Graham, Jr., former special representative of the president for arms control,
nonproliferation and disarmament, December 2005, ―Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear
War,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-SpaceWeapons#bio)

Rather than building space weapons, it may be best to put space off-limits for arms. Domestic law in
major spacefaring countries around the world could prohibit programs for developing space-based
weapons. To reinforce this effort, there could be a worldwide understanding that placing weapons in
space or further developing existing anti-satellite weapons capability is contrary to international law and
thereby a basis for economic and political pressure and punitive sanctions by a united world community.
The best way to accomplish these twin objectives is by the development and negotiation of an
international treaty on space weapons and anti-satellite weapons. Treaties become domestic law when
ratified, and they can establish worldwide norms of behavior .

Code of Conduct key to stability: only way to prevent proliferation and nuclear
use
Graham 5 (THormas Graham, Jr., former special representative of the president for arms control,
nonproliferation and disarmament, December 2005, ―Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear
War,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-SpaceWeapons#bio)

The groundwork for a comprehensive treaty-based regime has been laid, and the importance of this
objective is clear. Much work remains, but the creation of a space regime, under which the international
community decisively enshrines space as a peaceful environment, ultimately is the only thoroughgoing
alternative to a weaponized space free-for-all. The United States and the rest of the world risk being
rendered forever vulnerable to the vagaries and fluctuations of technology development. In this age of a
worldwide struggle against international terrorism, this is the last thing we should want. Preventing the
weaponization of space is of paramount importance to world stability. Any deployment of weapons of a
significant nature in space, particularly highly capable weapons systems such as a space-based missile
defense, could provoke countermeasures. There are many important assets in space, and it is highly
likely that they will only continue to flourish in the current sanctuary environment in place since the days
of Eisenhower. Above all, we should never take the slightest chance of impairing early warning systems
on which the long nuclear peace between the United States and Russia may continue to depend.




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                                    ***NO SPACE WEAPONS NOW
The US has no weapons in space nor plans to deploy any
U.S. State Department. 2006. ("U.S. Remains Committed to Peaceful Uses of Space." Washington File. June 16,
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=June&x=20060616172021sjhtrop8.289737e-
02&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html AMayar)

The United States does not have any weapons in space, a State Department arms control official says,
nor does it have plans to build any.
John Mohanco told members of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva June 13 that the United
States steadfastly is committed to the exploration and use of space "by all nations for peaceful purposes."
Mohanco, who is deputy director of the State Department's Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security
Affairs, defined peaceful purposes as including "appropriate defense activities in pursuit of national
security and other goals."

The US has not weaponized space and can influence others to do the same
Strategy and International Affairs Commission 07
("The militarization and weaponization of space : towards a European space deterrent" 10/22/07
http://www.aaafasso.fr/DOSSIERSAAAF/DOSS.ACCES_LIBRE/PJ_CT/Comm.Aff.Internat/Militarisation_
et_Arsenalisation_Vers.angl.oct07.pdf AMayar)

If the active militarization, offensive or aggressive (which the Americans call "counter space", "space
denial ") of space is avoidable, how can we influence the players so that they reject this? In fact, despite
having accumulated the technological elements necessary, the United States has not, since the
demonstration of 1985, engaged in activities generating debris nor deployed even "simple" weapons.
Some American researchers remain convinced that the operational implementation of numerous futurist
systems would be random and costly. It is not impossible that the excesses of the Rumsfeld doctrine of
the "revolution in military affairs" 8 and the fully technologyoriented policy will be tempered, at least
momentarily. If stopping the arming of space is therefore still a realistic objective, we can argue for a
European approach which is still to be organized around the shared views of France, Germany and Italy –
quite close to the Canadian position. It would mean an increased securing of the outer space environment
for space objects, whether civil or military, by means of rules of conduct similar to those recommended for
the prevention of space debris, and/or political declarations drawing attention to the most significant
efforts from the responsible nations.

Space won't be weaponized - collateral damage, space debris, international
backlash, high costs, lack of transparency, and risk of accidental war through
misidentification
Moltz, 07 (James Clay. Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies at National Security Affairs
"Protecting Safe Access to Space: Lessons from the First 50 Years of Space Security." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (November 2007):
199-205. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964607000860 AMayar)

A major problem in past and current arguments supporting testing and deployment of constellations of weapons
in space has been the threat of possible—and indeed predictable—―collateral‖ damage to other space assets.
China's 2007 test is a case in point since the USA has already had to move a NASA satellite to avoid a deadly collision, but there
are corollaries in the 1962 US and Soviet nuclear ABM tests in space, in the 1968–1982 Soviet ASAT test program, and in the 1985
US ASAT test. The main risks to date have been EMP radiation from nuclear tests and orbital debris from
kinetic weapons. Both of these threats are significant, and there is no currently available means to remediate them
artificially. For this reason, any space-faring country considering the deployment of any significant constellation
of space weapons faces the dangerous consequence of likely damage to its own space assets and those
of others in the testing and deployment stages (as well as in any possible use scenarios). Such concerns clearly
affected US and Soviet government plans regarding nuclear testing in space, as they do current global attitudes regarding
the testing of debris-producing, kinetic-kill weapons against space-based objects.
Unlike other environments of international activity, space competition is affected in unique ways by orbital physics .
Compared to the collective ―good‖ of safe access to orbital space, we can consider space radiation and debris as
collective ―bads.‖9 This does not keep states from periodically attempting to overcome these limitations, as seen in China's 2007
test. But it does create significant operational obstacles to continuing such harmful behavior, as well as
stimulating widespread international pressure to prevent it. These constraints are increasing over time, not
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decreasing, as space becomes more crowded. Thus, critics of space arms control miss the point when they discount the possibility
of unique military restraint in space as a ―fallacy.‖10 Instead, it is a far worse ―fallacy‖ to believe that states can overcome the laws of
orbital physics. Put simply, orbital warfare on any scale cannot occur without ruining critical regions of space
(such as low-Earth orbit) for other purposes. As few as a dozen explosions—capable of releasing some 420,000
fragments of dangerous space debris—could effectively shut down this region for decades. Thus, to expect that
countries will act against their own interests by using space in this way is counterintuitive. To date, we have seen a powerful logic of
―environmental security‖ at work in space. When countries have crossed the line in terms of damage to space,
they have retreated (or been pushed) backwards by the risk of a loss of access.
Another factor that has thus far worked against promoters of space-based defenses and other types of orbital
weapons has been the threat of hostile international reactions. This point is related to the issue raised above, but has
different implications. Specifically, given that space currently has no weapons, supporters of space sanctuary
arguments have the power of precedent on their side in observing that the start of a space arms race by any
country (based on the ample experience of such contests in other fields, from machine guns to nuclear weapons) is
going to be met eventually by adversaries. The result is likely to be reduced (not enhanced) security for all
countries.
During the Cold War, critics of space weapons could very credibly argue that whatever the USA did in
space would eventually be matched by the USSR, if not directly then by other means. Indeed, this important concept
became embodied in the so-called ―Nitze criteria‖ for evaluating the costs of the SDI program. Former senior Reagan administration
official Paul Nitze argued that it only made sense to continue with the highly expensive effort to field space-
based defenses if it could be done more cheaply than the Soviets could deploy countermeasures . The
failure of SDI to come even close to meeting this cost-efficiency metric—according to the administration's own criteria—proved
to be an important nail in its coffin in the late 1980s.
Similarly, supporters of the deployment of space defenses have often been guilty of engaging in the ―fallacy
of the last move.‖ In other words, analysts have frequently assumed that deployment of space weapons will create
conditions of dominance over all other states, cowing them into submission.11 But this was unlikely during the Cold War
and remains unlikely today. China's ASAT test set out a marker that an expected era of US ―space control‖ was
not going to go unchallenged. For this reason, decision makers in any country must factor into any plan to deploy
space weapons the knowledge that their actions will be challenged by other states. This factor makes
notions of ―space dominance‖ spoken about freely before 2007 highly implausible .
As implied above, another factor that has affected the prospects of space's weaponization has been the extremely high
costs involved. The root of this problem lies in the great expense of placing any objects into space , but it is
exacerbated by the fact that orbiting objects are difficult to maintain and modernize, particularly if there are
changes in technical capabilities and/or targeting information. But perhaps the most damaging factor in regard to cost is the
fact that orbital physics require that any militarily significant constellation of interceptors placed in space
must be deployed in considerable numbers, given the ―absentee problem‖—i.e., the fact that a harmful attack could
be undertaken by an adversary at an ―inconvenient‖ time in the orbit of any defensive system.
One recent report, for example, has estimated that for a constellation of space-based weapons for use in ―global strikes‖ against
ground targets within 45 min, the requirement is for nearly 50 individual interceptors to cover even a limited swath of the Earth's land
mass.12 The report concludes that ―acquiring the capability to attack a ground target within 45 minutes would be
many tens of times more costly if done from space than from the ground ‖ [14]. Of course, for an anti-ASAT
system, the requirements are much higher, since an hour could mean the difference between defense
and irrelevance. For this reason, the start of any arms race in space will involve extremely high costs . In
addition, the deployment of such systems puts assets in space on hair-trigger alert, creating serious risks of
misidentification of targets. Such events could lead to the destruction of property, inadvertent loss of
life, or accidental war.
Finally, another factor that transcends the three historical cases has been the role of transparency in promoting
cooperation. In dealing with space nuclear testing and in assessing debris from kinetic-kill weapons tests, national decision
makers have been able to act with confidence that they will know if their adversary attempts to achieve
any ―breakout‖ capability. Unlike in other environments, where the development of new destructive
capabilities can often be hidden, the fact that space weapons need to be launched and tested in an
internationally governed and highly transparent region allows any other country with a reasonable space
surveillance system—such as the type possessed by both the USA and the USSR/Russia since the late 1960s and by at least
also members of the European Space Agency and China today—can be confident that thbey will detect the development of any
major weapons systems. This factor should play a positive role in weakening the credibility of claims that
―secret‖ programs by potential enemies might create a ―catastrophe‖ some day in space.

Space is militarized NOT weaponized, pressure from all over means it won't be
weaponized

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Lieutenant Colonel Christy 06 (Donald P. - United States Air Force 15 MAR 2006 "United States Policy
on Weapons in Space" http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil307.pdf AMayar)

Space is a distinct medium for military activities. Air Force Doctrine states, ―Space is a medium of warfare
like air, land, and sea…that must be protected and controlled...‖ 1 Already, significant military activity
takes place in space. Nations use space assets in performing communication, weather prediction,
navigation and reconnaissance missions to enhance many aspects of military operations including
indirectly guiding weapons to targets. Although space is militarized, it is not yet weaponized. The
question of whether policy should pursue placing actual kinetic or energy based weapons capable of
directly engaging targets, is one that must be based on sound judgment and take into account the
ramifications. Many people think international agreements or treaties prohibit weaponization of space. In
fact, legal agreements limiting weapons in space only address weapons of mass destruction. There is
significant political pressure from governments, international institutions, the scientific community and
nongovernmental organizations opposed to the idea of space weapons. Before analyzing the case for a
policy direction, it is first important to define space weapons and the period under review, examine the
political environment surrounding weapons in space, understand existing legal constraints and review
current United States policy. .




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                                            AT: RUSSIA AND CHINA
Russia has no plans to deploy space weapons
Brahmand News 10 (Brahmand Defense and Aerospace News Apr 10, 2010 "No plans to deploy
weapons in space: Russia" http://www.brahmand.com/news/No-plans-to-deploy-weapons-in-space-
Russia/3596/1/11.html AMayar)

 MOSCOW (BNS): A day after Russia and the United States signed a new START treaty; t he commander of Russia's space
forces said Russia has no plans to deploy weapons of any kind in space.
According to Russian news agency Ria Novosti, some analysts have suggested that Russia could deploy
space weapons as part of measures to counter controversial U.S. plans to build missile shields in Europe.
"We have no such plans," Maj. Gen. Oleg Ostapenko told a news conference in Moscow. Signing of the new
treaty would not affect the activities and plans of the Russian Space Forces, he added.
"The plans and tasks set by the commander-in-chief, the president, have not changed and are being
developed at a determined pace," Ostapenko was quoted as saying.
He added that changes would only be made if "breakthrough technologies emerge that affect the plans and budgets."
United States and the Soviet Union have developed several orbital weapons systems during the Cold War but it was largely halted
after the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1979 SALT II Treaty came into force.
In 2008, Russia and China proposed a draft international treaty to ban the deployment of weapons of any
kind in space and to prohibit the use of force against space objects, the report said.

Russia and China opposed to space weapons
Stimson Center 08 (The Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace
and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach. "The Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan
institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach."
February 14, 2008 http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/russia-and-china-propose-a-treaty-banning-space-weapons-while-the-pentagon-
plans-an-asat-test-/ AMayar)

On February 12, the governments of Russia and China tabled a draft treaty banning space weapons in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This initiative will gain greater support as a result of the Bush administration's plans,
revealed two days later, to demolish a failing intelligence satellite with a sea-based missile. The proposed draft treaty by Russia and
China as well as the stated rationale for the upcoming Pentagon test are not credible.
Keeping space from becoming a shooting gallery is a critically important goal , as is evident by China's test
of a satellite weapon on January 12, 2007. This anti-satellite (ASAT) test created, according to computer models, over 150,000
pieces of deadly debris. The Pentagon's ASAT test will be designed to mitigate debris, while raising international concerns that
the Pentagon is using a failed satellite to hone its space warfare skills. The ostensible reason for the ASAT test - to protect human
beings from the satellite's unused supply of deadly fuel - is unpersuasive. If this man-made object causes human casualties or
fatalities, they will be the first in the history of the space age.
Clearly, a comprehensive ban on space weapons would be an important accomplishment - but it has proven to
be extremely difficult to negotiate. The Outer Space Treaty (1967) only bans orbiting weapons of mass destruction. The proposed
treaty by Russia and China seeks to extend this prohibition to all other weapons in space. But the proposed treaty would not
prohibit the Pentagon's ASAT test, or ones like it by Russia and China.


Russia and China won't weaponize - aim to ban space weapons
Polmor 08 (Norman Polmar is a leading expert on naval and aviation matters. An internationally known
analyst, consultant, and award-winning author, "Russia and China Propose Space Weapons Ban"
http://defensetech.org/2008/02/15/russia-and-china-propose-space-weapons-ban/ AMayar)

Russia and China — enemies for most of the Cold War — have joined together to propose a new treaty
to ban space weapons. The proposal comes a little more than one year after China demonstrated that it
possessed an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability.
Russia (at the time the Soviet Union) and the United States had earlier demonstrated the ability to destroy
satellites in orbit. In January 2007, the Chinese employed an SC-19 ballistic missile to fire directly at and
destroy an outdated Feng-Yun-1C weather satellite at an altitude of 527 miles above the earth. Two
previous ASAT attempts by China may have been intentional ―misses‖ for test purposes. Reportedly, at
the time of those earlier missile launches the U.S. intelligence community believed that China was close
to proving the ability to hit an orbiting satellite, but some officials were taken by surprise when the ASAT
capability was demonstrated, creating a massive field of space debris.


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Now China has joined Russia in proposing a ban on all weapons in space. The proposal was voiced by
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 12 February at an international disarmament conference in
Geneva. ―Without preventing an arms race in space, international security will be wanting,‖ he told the
conference. ―The task of preventing an arms race in space is on the conference‘s agenda. It‘s time … to
start serious practical work in this field,‖ he said.
The existing Outer Space Treaty of 1967 — formally known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies — bans the build-up or stockpile of weapons, including nuclear arms and weapons of mass
destruction in orbit, and their installation on the moon. But the treaty does not address the shooting down
of satellites. (To date 98 countries are states-parties to the treaty, while another 28 have signed the treaty
but have not yet completed ratification.)
In calling for a ban of all types of weapons in space including ASAT systems, Lavrov explained,
―Weapons deployment in space by one state will inevitably result in a chain reaction. And this, in turn, is
fraught with a new spiral in the arms race both in space and on the earth.‖
He also criticized the U.S. government‘s plan to expand the ballistic missile defense system into Europe:
―We cannot but feel concerned over the situation where … there are increasing efforts by the United
States to deploy its global ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] system,‖ Lavrov said. ―The desire to acquire an anti-
missile ‗shield‘ while dismantling the ‗sheath‘, where the nuclear ‗sword‘ is kept is extremely dangerous,‖
he added.

If space becomes weaponized, it should not happen based on inevitability
Hardesty 05 (David C. "Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives"
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 2. (Mar 2005), pp. 45-68.
http://www.stormingmedia.us/41/4111/A411125.html AMayar)

If a decision to space-base weapons should not rest solely on arguments of historical inevitability, it is
possible to argue that weaponization of space will occur at some time in the future. When humans
ultimately explore deep space, they may indeed carry weapons for protection. A powerful weapons
system may ultimately be deployed to protect the earth from asteroids. "Ultimately" is a long time.
However, it is not long-term predictive accuracy that is important but the almost complete irrelevance of
"inevitability" to current efforts. Things that are inevitable can be either good or bad. If something is good
and inevitable, it is logical to pursue acquisition now in order to obtain the benefits as early as possible; if
something is inevitable and bad, it is logical to delay it as long as possible. Thus, our current decisions
with regard to space-basing weapons must be dictated not by its inevitability but by whether it is
good or bad--by whether weaponization and its consequences will improve or degrade the national
security environment. If analysis points to overall degradation, U.S. policy should be to delay the
introduction of space-based weapons: "Even if weaponization of space is ultimately inevitable, like our
own deaths, why should we rush to embrace it." (37)

Powers won't use space weapons even in the absence on a formal ban - empirics
prove it's possible
Klotz 99 (Frank G. Klotz, is a former Lt. General USAF who last served as the commander of Air Force Global Strike
Command, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. "Space, Commerce, and National Security" Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign
Relations, January 1999. http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Space_Commerce_NationalSecurity.pdf AMayar)

While legally banning antisatellite systems or activities associated with their use would not appear to add
much value at the moment, it may be possible for nations to mutually refrain from activities that might be
construed as threatening to the satellites of others. Such undertakings are not without precedent. When it
has been within their general interests, nations have held back from employing certain weapons and
engaging in certain activities during wartime, even in the absence of specific agreements. For the most
part, the major powers avoided the use of chemical weapons during the Second World War. None of the
nuclear states have employed their nuclear arsenals in military conflicts since the attacks on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in August 1945. Given the cost of developing weapons in space and the ramifications of
attacking a satellite and thereby inviting some sort of retaliation (either against one's own space systems
or elsewhere), nations might conclude that the long-term costs are not worth the potential gains. As long
as such mutual restraint is exercised, it may be possible for the space powers to uphold the principle of


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[File Name]                                                                                      [Name]
unfettered access to space without the need to actually employ antisatellite weapons either to deter or
defend against their use by others.
.




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[File Name]                                                                                      [Name]

                               AT: ROBOTIC SPACE PLANE
The robotic space plane is not a weapon
Malik 10 (Tariq - Space.com Managing Editor "Air Force: Robotic X-37B Space Plane Not a Weapon"
http://www.space.com/8280-air-force-robotic-37b-space-plane-weapon.html AMayar)

The hush-hush X-37B robotic space plane launched by the United States Air Force late Thursday is many
things, but it's no space weapon, according to high-ranking official with the project.
Gary Payton, Air Force deputy undersecretary of space programs, scoffed at speculation that the X-37B
space plane is the vanguard for a space weapon fleet and said its main purpose is to test space
technology, not orbital weapons.
"I don't know how this could be called a weaponization of space," Payton told reporters this week before
the launch. "Fundamentally, it's just an updated version of the space shuttle kinds of activities in space.




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[File Name]                                                                                           [Name]

                                               AT: ASATS
Only orbit-based ASATs are space weapons, Chinese, Russian, and US ASATs
don't count
Mueller 02 (Karl P. Political Scientist at the RAND institute - Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A.
in political science, University of Chicago "Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?" 27 March 2002.
http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/mueller.html AMayar)

But which space systems should be considered to be weapons? Many space vehicles, the U.S. Space
Shuttle prominent among them, could potentially be used for anti-satellite or space-to-earth strike
purposes. However, when discussing space weaponization, it is usually best to exclude such systems
from the space weapons category, provided that their use as weapons is not customary, and would be
both limited and secondary to other, non-weapon functions, for it is clear that using such systems for their
intended purposes is not generally considered to constitute space weaponization. In addition, this paper
will count as space weapons systems that perform ASAT or STEW functions from orbit by disabling,
damaging or destroying their targets using means other than kinetic or directed energy weapon attacks,
but not anti-satellite systems that merely interfere with the ability to collect or transmit information without
harming the target satellite.[8]




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[File Name]                                                                                                                [Name]

                   AT: HUMAN NATURE/HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY
Weapons don't always follow humans - empirically proven
Mueller 03 (Karl P. Senior Political Scientist at the RAND institute - Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A. in political
science, University of Chicago "Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate." Astropolitics. Vol. 1, No. 13
(Summer 2003): 4-28. http://www.gwu.edu/staticfile/GW/Global/404.html AMayar)

The simplest inevitability argument is that warfare and armaments are intrinsically uncontrollable because
people are warlike: weapons and warfare abhor a vacuum, and will spread wherever humanity goes. This
assertion is often accompanied by arguments that arms control never works, although it is possible to
argue more narrowly that only space arms control is infeasible. This generalization is not far from the
truth, yet it is far enough away that it should be considered invalid. For example, although the
longstanding success of the 1957 treaty prohibiting military bases in Antarctica, often cited as an example
of an effective sanctuary regime, would be more impressive if the signatory powers actually had strong
incentives to establish bases on that continent, it still flies in the face of the idea that weaponization must
always follow wherever people go (the argument that space weapons in particular will have military utility
too great to resist is a different proposition from the contention that weapons always spread everywhere).
Similarly, some types of weapons have fallen into disrepute over the last century, While they have not yet
disappeared, chemical and biological weapons have been shunned by all but renegade states, and anti-
personnel land mines are following in their wake. Many states that could easily have developed nuclear
weapons have opted not to do so, in some cases in spite of apparently very good military reasons to go
nuclear. Perhaps most strikingly of all, even among space weapons advocates one does not find voices
arguing that the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit is inevitable based on the rule that weapons
always spread. The fact that this has not happened is due to many factors other than the Outer Space
Treaty's prohibition on such weaponization, but if some weapons do not necessarily follow wherever
people go, the idea that a law of human nature requires that others will do so should not be seriously
embraced as a basis for national policy

Historical inevitability wrong, history deters policy formulation from recreating
errors
Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space"
Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. AMayar)

Historical inevitability is a heavily freighted and much contested concept. History can certainly repeat
itself, at least in thematic terms. Consequently, knowledge of history can be a useful reference for policy
formulation. But every historical chapter also contains its unique passages that are read and weighted
differently by historians. Moreover, the "historical record" usually contains many blank pages reflecting
unanswered questions. Even heavily studied episodes, such as the Cuban missile crisis, yield new
insights with the release of additional interviews and archival material. We also know that historical
parallels can be forced and made to conform to policy preferences. Those committed to the study of
history, and thus keenly aware of its intricacies, tend to shy away from arguments that begin with the
words, "History teaches." Policy advocates who employ this line of argument usually majored in other
subjects. Historical determinism can therefore be a flawed and dangerous enterprise. As Bernard Brodie
has noted, "History is at best an imperfect guide to the future, but when imperfectly understood and
interpreted it is a menace to sound judgment."




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                                ***WEAPONS NOT INIVITABLE
Terrestrial weapons are just as successful as space weapons for satellite
destruction – no other countries need to weaponize space
Lowery,7 (Scott, Writer for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
―Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued‖, Occasions Online, 2007,
http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%
20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, accessed: 6/1/11

The final and most solid case for inevitability rests on the fact that space assets are an excellent military
target, and attacking them would be an effective precursor to terrestrial warfare. The argument has some
merit, as it has been shown that space plays a key role in the abilities of the US military. The argument
states that if the US does not develop space weapons, someone else will, placing the US at a
disadvantage. This is reasonable but not conclusive. If an enemy did want to disrupt US space power, it
would not necessarily need to weaponize space. The earth-based portions of space systems, such as
ground control stations and communication dishes, are equally vulnerable and can be destroyed with
existing, far cheaper systems: a few men with bombs can disable a satellite network just as well as a
ballistic missile. In summary, the arguments for inevitability fall short of being substantive, relying on little
more than the ―sky is falling mentality‖ (Belote).


Weaponization not inevitable - human nature, historical analogies, economic
vulnerability, and military necessity arguments are false
Lieutenant Colonel Christy 06 (Donald P. - United States Air Force 15 MAR 2006 "United States Policy
on Weapons in Space" http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil307.pdf AMayar)

Space weapons are not inevitable. The decision to place weapons in space is a choice, not
certainty. Those who argue otherwise point to human nature, historical analogies, economic
vulnerability and military necessity to make their case that space weapons are unavoidable. 28
Each of these arguments has merit but none hold up to scrutiny to make a strong case for the
inevitability of space weapons. The human nature argument states that people are warlike and the
nation states they run will do whatever is in their national interest, which naturally includes taking
weapons wherever they go, including space. 29 The implication is that humans cannot control the
tendency to develop and deploy any weapon that could give them an actual or perceived military
advantage6 over an adversary. It should be noted however, that for the last forty-five years space
has in fact been free from weapons. 30 Humans and nations have resisted the temptation so far.
Other weapons, such as chemical and biological weapons and land mines have also fallen into
disrepute and though not yet eliminated, they are certainly out of favor. 31 Some point to
historical analogies of humans venturing onto the high seas, into the air and under the oceans
and that in each case, we weaponized those mediums. Why then should we expect it to be any
different for space? General Howell M. Estes III, former commander of United States Space
Command put the argument like this, If we examine the evolutionary development of the aircraft,
we see uncanny parallels to the current evolution of spacecraft… The potential of aircraft was not
recognized immediately. Their initial use was confined to observation… Until one day the full
advantage of applying force from the air was realized and the rest is history. So too with the
business of space… (military) space operations, like the land, sea and air operations that evolved
before them will expand (into) the budding new mission already included into the charter of US
Space Command…as they become more and more critical to our national security interests. 32 On
the surface, the logic of historical analogies seems sound but further analysis indicates there is
some significant dissimilarity as well. In the case of Sea Power, militarization followed because
the sea transported people and commerce and served as a means for armies to invade enemy
lands. 33 Unlike the sea, commerce and people do not transit through space, only information
does. While information is vital in today‘s global economy, it is not solely dependent on space as
a medium of transit. The idea of invasion from space is only an issue in Hollywood. As for
militarization under the sea, it is important to note that weapons were the first and, for a long time,
the only use for subsurface vessels. Their purpose, tied to the surface, was denying the use of the
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seas for commerce and transport. The case for Air Power seems more promising as argued by
Gen Estes above, but further examination finds some significant flaws as well. One significant
difference between air and space is that air is territorial and space is not. 34 Though the two
mediums evolved similarly initially, they have not continued to do so. 35 Weaponization of the air
took only ten years from the development of the first aircraft. As stated earlier, it has been forty-
five years now without the weaponization of space. The development of observation aircraft and
bombers necessitated the development of fighters to defend against them; therefore,
weaponization of the air was inevitable for the defense of a nation‘s territory. 36 In contrast,
observation and reconnaissance from space has had a stabilizing effect internationally. The
freedom of the7 United States and Russia to see what the other side was doing became so
important that it was codified in several arms control treaties. This necessity, in part, led both
sides to unilaterally abandoned anti-satellite programs that could threaten the other‘s
reconnaissance satellites, something without precedence in Air Power history. 37 The third
argument for weapons in space is that there is a threat to the ever-growing United States
economic dependence on space. This presumably makes space assets a target for a potential
enemy and requires we defend those assets with space weapons. The questions to consider here
are many. How great is the cost to defend those assets with space weapons verses the cost of the
assets themselves? Most military space systems are many times more expensive than the civilian
satellites they would presumably protect. How likely are civilian space assets to be targeted by an
adversary in any case? Most civilian systems or systems with significant economic value operate
in very high earth orbit (11,000 nm to 24,000 nm) making them more difficult to target than a
military reconnaissance satellite in low earth orbit (350 nm). Finally, why would an enemy want to
threaten such systems? Presumably, the reason would be to hurt the United States economically
or coerce behavior. 38 Since most economic space assets have terrestrial alternatives like fiber
optic communications or terrestrial navigation aids, it would seem space assets would be an
unlikely target given the technical capabilities necessary to damage them decisively. Precision
would be difficult to achieve. In a highly globalized world economy, damaging space
infrastructure would very likely affect more than just the United States economy. Finally,
numerous earthbound targets exist that would cause comparable or greater impact at significantly
less cost and effort to an adversary

Weaponization not inevitable - should have happened and cooperation prevents it
Krepon 05 (Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. "SPACE
ASSURANCE OR SPACE WEAPONS"
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2377.pdf AMayar)

The weaponization of space is not inevitable. If it were, it would have occurred during the Cold War.
Rather than engaging in such a competition now, a far wiser course would be to strengthen efforts to
promote space assurance. Key elements of a space assurance posture include unilateral initiatives that
enhance situational awareness in space and reduce satellite vulnerability; research and development
programmes that deter others from crossing key thresholds and hedge against adverse developments by
potential adversaries; and cooperative measures, international agreements and codes of conduct for
responsible space space-faring nations. Cooperative measures, including information exchanges and
greater transparency regarding space launches and payloads, could lend credence to declaratory
statements of peaceful intent, while also serving to clarify threatening and destabilizing activities in space.
Transparency measures must be sufficient enough to alleviate concerns over worrisome activities,
particularly that military capabilities designed for other purposes are not being tested in ways that are
virtually indistinguishable from preparations for space warfare. If states are sufficiently concerned about
the weaponization of space, they will agree to significant, intrusive and broadranging cooperative and
transparency measures.

Not inevitable - poses risk to space-based assets
Johnson 2003 (Rebecca - Affiliate Professor at Georgetown Public Policy Institute, Assistant
Professor of National Security Affairs at the Command and Staff College at Marine Corps University.
"SECURITY WITHOUT WEAPONS IN SPACE: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS" Disarmament Forum
Making Space for Security 2003 no 1 pp. 53 - 66 http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1990.pdf
AMayar)
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Placing weapons in space is not the inevitable outcome of the use of space for commercial purposes.
Many of the perceived vulnerabilities of space assets can be addressed in other ways. At present, no one
but the United States has the capability, intention and resources to pose a significant risk to space-based
assets. In addition, no State with the technological potential to pose a future threat to US (or other) space
assets (for example, the Russian Federation, China, France/European Union, India) is prioritizing
financial or technical resources to developing weapons capable of threatening space assets, and all of
these are more interested in building or maintaining cooperative (if sometimes uneasy) alliances with the
hyper-Power. If US military developments in space continue their drive towards weaponization, however,
other Governments may feel under pressure to devote political, financial and technological resources to
counter or offset US space-based superiority. Before such expensive and dangerous military responses
become necessary, a number of Governments and NGOs are exploring legal, political and diplomatic
ways to address space security and weapons.

Space weaponization not inevitable, miniscule benefits, financially and politically
costly, risks commercial satellite damage and power loss
Mueller 02 (Karl P. Political Scientist at the RAND institute - Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A.
in political science, University of Chicago "Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?" 27 March 2002.
http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/mueller.html AMayar)


What follow are three plausible scenarios describing ways in which space weaponization might not occur
by mid-century. Each is based on a different set of assumptions, but is not intended to suggest that only
a single outcome could follow from them (nor are these the only paths that could lead to perpetuation of
the space sanctuary). It is worth noting, however, that all three scenarios share some essentially realist
premises in common. In each case, it is assumed that U.S. policymaking is driven by a desire to
maximize national power and security in the face of a competitive international system that includes
powerful and aspiring rivals, and that the United States seeks to perpetuate and exploit its current
position of international hegemony. None of the scenarios assume further decline in the bellicosity of
nations, or that states‘ actions will be shaped by altruism, mutual affection, or the inclination to be honest
or honorable (except for instrumental purposes). In short, none is set in the sort of rosy world of idealistic
international fraternity and easy arms control in which space weaponization advocates often accuse
space sanctuary proponents of naïvely pretending that we live.
In addition, none of these scenarios assumes that the United States will, or suggests that it should, fail to
take a number of important measures to increase its security in space. These include continuing to
conduct basic research to support the future military exploitation of space, equipping satellites with
systems to detect and report attacks against them, building a space tracking system capable of
maintaining surveillance over all satellites in orbit, preparing to carry out space control objectives
thorough means other than traditional ASAT attack,[39] and taking steps to reduce the vulnerability of
both the terrestrial and orbital elements of U.S. space systems through hardening, decentralization,
redundancy, and rapid reconstitution of damaged satellite constellations.
1. Start the Revolution Without Me. The first scenario is based on the possibility that the United States
will not weaponize space simply because space weapons will not appear to offer benefits commensurate
with their costs. As discussed above, orbital space weapons may well provide only marginal
advantages for performing most military missions compared with systems whose deployment would not
constitute space weaponization. This is particularly true for the United States, given the U.S. armed
forces‘ great power projection capabilities. Against these advantages will have to be weighed the costs of
developing, building, and operating what would be very expensive space weapon systems, paying for
which would of course require resources to be diverted from other defense or non-defense investment,
along with the political costs of being the first state to weaponize space. How great the latter would
prove to be is highly uncertain, but it does appear more likely than not that they would be considerably
greater than zero.
Other states, in turn, might have greater incentives to develop space weapons, since they do not possess
power projection abilities comparable to those of the United States, but they would also lack a
comparable resource base with which to pay the investment costs required to develop effective space
weapons on a large scale. Moreover, the absence of U.S. space weapons would reduce their strategic
incentives for ASAT development, and would mean that they would have to pay whatever political costs

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[File Name]                                                                                              [Name]
were associated with being the first state to violate the space sanctuary. In the end, whether the United
States or its rivals turn out to be the more strongly inclined to weaponize space, it is entirely possible that
all of them will conclude that it is not worth the price.
2. Enlightened Self-Interest. The second scenario assumes that space weapons do in fact prove to be
fairly useful and cost-effective. In this case, there is a good chance that U.S. security in particular would
be best served by perpetuation of the space sanctuary for purely nationalist reasons: as the leading
spacefaring state and the country most dependent upon satellites for its military power and economic
wealth, the United States has the most to lose if those satellites become more vulnerable to attack. In
addition, having invested vast resources in developing a preponderance of land, sea, air and
unweaponized space power, a true space weapon revolution that wiped the clean the slate of military
competition might well represent a net power loss for the United States relative to its rivals (as the
steam, ironclad, and Dreadnought revolutions each did in turn for the Royal Navy).[40]
One approach to dealing with this problem would be for the United States to announce a policy of
conditional unilateral restraint in space weaponization: that it will not be the first nation to weaponize
space, although it will continue to develop the relevant technologies in order to be prepared to respond in
kind should other states violate the sanctuary. In this scenario, such an approach would not be motivated
by an idealistic belief that eschewing space weapons would inspire or shame other states to do the same.
Instead, it would be based on a hard-nosed, realist calculation: U.S. space weaponization would not only
encourage other states to follow suit, but would greatly assist them in doing so, since they would be able
to exploit the advantages of backwardness after the United States had paid the costs of trailblazing the
new technologies. With the United States not leading the way, yet threatening to lift its self-restraint in the
absence of reciprocity from its rivals (thus denying them the hope of establishing hegemony in space),
other states might well find insufficient value in initiating space weaponization to justify its costs.

Common inevitability arguments – human nature, historical analogies, and the
growing economic importance of satellites--- are ―straw men‖
Mueller 2 (Karl P. Mueller, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, March 27, 2002, “Is the
Weaponization of Space Inevitable?” http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/mueller.html)

There are four prevalent arguments in favor of the proposition that space weaponization is inevitable. This
section will address three of them: that human nature mandates weaponization, that historical analogies
with the sea and air prophesy it, and that the growing economic importance of satellites predestines it.
Each of these arguments is based on a smattering of evidence and logic, extrapolated into facile
overgeneralizations that are well-suited for television talk-show punditry but which provide a poor basis
for national policymaking. In short, they appear to be straw men—except that each of them is widely
believed by intelligent and well-educated people. The following section will examine a much better
argument for inevitability, based on the potential military utility of space weapons. Human Nature The
simplest inevitability argument is that warfare and armaments are intrinsically uncontrollable because
people are warlike and states ultimately will do whatever they believe to be in their self-interest.[12] In
short, weapons and warfare abhor a vacuum, and will spread wherever humanity goes.[13] In some
cases, adherence to this belief is based upon skepticism about, or even deep visceral revulsion for,
negotiated arms control.[14] The premise that states are selfish rational actors in an anarchic world
actually predicts little about what their specific policies will be in the absence of additional information or
assumptions. In fact, warfare and states‘ preparations for war are often limited by a wide variety of
rational considerations, most of which have little to do with formal arms control negotiations. Deploying
space weapons would involve a variety of potential political costs and benefits, both domestic and
international, and is far from unreasonable to think that states might shy away from such a course even if
it promised to increase their absolute military capabilities, depending on the complete set of incentives
and disincentives facing them. As the space weapons debate itself proves, the norm of space as an
unweaponized sanctuary that has evolved during the past forty-five years is far from politically
insignificant. Of course, the more important a military innovation appears to be to a state‘s security, the
more likely it is to be adopted, even if the price for doing so is fairly high, while it is relatively easy to give
up military opportunities of limited value. For example, the longstanding success of the multilateral 1957
treaty prohibiting military bases in Antarctica, often cited as an example of an effective sanctuary regime,
would be more impressive if the signatory powers had strong incentives to establish bases on that
continent. Yet even so it flies in the face of the idea that weaponization will follow wherever people go; the
argument that space weapons in particular will have military utility too great to resist is a different

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[File Name]                                                                                       [Name]
proposition from the contention that weapons always spread everywhere, and will be later in this essay. A
variety of weapons have fallen into disrepute over the last century, While they have not yet disappeared,
chemical and biological weapons have been shunned by all but renegade states. Anti-personnel land
mines are following in their wake. Many states that could easily have developed nuclear weapons have
opted not to do so, in some cases in spite of apparently very good military reasons to go nuclear.[15]
Perhaps most strikingly of all, even among space weapons advocates one does not find voices arguing
that the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit is inevitable based on the rule that weapons always
spread. The fact that this has not happened is due to many factors other than the Outer Space Treaty‘s
prohibition on such weaponization, but if some weapons do not necessarily follow wherever people go,
the idea that a law of human nature requires that others will do so should not be taken very seriously.


Space weaponization not inevitable - no benefit to the US, hurts weaker states
and risks escalatory conflict
Stimson Center 03 (The Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing
international peace and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach.
"SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE DOMINANCE?" http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-
pdfs/spaceintro.pdf AMayar)

This monograph reaches the following conclusions: First, the weaponization of space is not inevitable.
Second, it would not be in the national security or economic interest of the United States to initiate the
flight-testing or deployment of space weaponry, since the United States has far more to lose than to gain
in the event that space becomes weaponized. Third, far weaker states would also be penalized by the
weaponization of space, as the complications to U.S. warfighting capabilities that would result from space
weaponization would not change the outcome, nor lessen the severity, of combat with the United States.
Fourth, the initiation of space warfare could trigger dangerous escalatory steps. Fifth, compelling reasons
have not yet been advanced for the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, especially when the
enhancement of terrestrial U.S. war-fighting capabilities by other means are more cost-effective and are
more readily available, while posing far fewer downside risks.




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[File Name]                                                                                                        [Name]

                                    SELF-FUFILLING PROPHECY
Weaponization not inevitable: space weaponization is a self-fulfilling prophecy
Lowery,7 (Scott, Writer for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
―Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued‖, Occasions Online, 2007,
http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%
20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, accessed: 6/1/11).

Clearly, space is a great asset. An enemy capable of disabling or destroying portions of the US satellite
net would be able to deal a devastating blow to the functionality of the superpower. Some would argue
that in order to counter this potential threat, steps must be taken to mitigate foreign space power. They
also argue that space must become not merely a tool for the battlefield, but a battlefield itself. Many
ingenious devices and systems have been conceived along these lines. However, this argument is based
on several false assumptions, and the reality is that the weaponization of space will cause exactly what it
tries to prevent. This paper will explore the demerits of the weaponizers‘ arguments, illustrate the dangers
that weaponization presents, and offer an alternative policy regarding military action in space.

Assuming space-weaponization is inevitable creates a self-fulfilling prophecy
Park 06 (Andrew T. lawyer and associate in the Corporate Practice Area and the Equipment Finance Group "Incremental Steps
for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." Houston Journal of
International Law. Vol. 28, No. 3 (2006) http://www.hjil.org/ArticleFiles/28_3_871.pdf AMayar)

The simplest argument for space weaponization (inevitability) may also be the most reckless because of
its self-fulfilling nature. Proponents of the inevitability of space weaponization have proffered multiple
theories as to why the realm of space will eventually become weaponized. According to the logic of these
inevitability proponents, the United States should lead the way rather than be left in the dust as military
technology continues to rapidly develop. However, while the inevitability argument may have some merit,
its true danger lies in its unverifiable nature until weaponization actually occurs. Moreover, it is important
to note that this premise is driven not only by American insecurities, but also by the need for the United
States to control its own future. Since the ideological divide between ―space doves‖ and those who
believe space weaponization is inevitable is not likely to be bridged soon, the international community
must recognize the need for a legal regime for space with teeth—or, put another way, a legal regime that
goes beyond simply establishing a set of norms that have little to no consequences.




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[File Name]                                                                                          [Name]

                               AT: HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
No similarities between space and naval or air power
Lowery,7 (Scott, Writer for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
―Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued‖, Occasions Online, 2007,
http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%
20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, accessed: 6/1/11).

The second argument for inevitability draws on historical analogies of the weaponization of the sea and
air. Though it seems that the progression to space power would mirror the progression to sea power, this
is not the case, as there is a difference of functionality. Navies were developed to defend against pirates
and raiders, but there are no analogous threats to the theater of space that would warrant a buildup of
defensive weapons. The similarities between air and space are more intuitively striking, at least at first
glance. In fact, the two theaters have not evolved along the same lines at all. One reason is timescale:
less than ten years after Kitty Hawk there were airborne weapons in World War I, yet after more than fifty
years since the launch of Sputnik, there has been no great buildup. The other difference is a lack of a
multiplying effect in space. In the case of air power, the development of one system, such as a bomber,
necessitated other developments, such as escort fighters. In contrast, the deployment of a new satellite
constellation does not require a new weapon system. It seems then that drawing conclusions from sea
and air power history fails to provide any support for weaponization.

Historical Analogies Argument fails: space is fundamentally different
Mueller 2 (Karl P. Mueller, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, March 27, 2002, “Is the
Weaponization of Space Inevitable?” http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/mueller.html)

Historical Analogies The second argument that space must surely be weaponized is that the previous
examples of the evolution of sea and air power reveal a striking pattern leading in this direction, which the
exploitation of space is also following. According to an influential recent commander of U.S. Space
Command, for example, If we examine the evolutionary development of the aircraft, we see uncanny
parallels to the current evolution of spacecraft. . . The potential of aircraft was not recognized
immediately. Their initial use was confined to observation . . . Until one day the full advantage of applying
force from the air was realized and the rest is history. So too with the business of space. . . . [Military]
space operations, like the land, sea, and air operations that evolved before them, will expand [into] the
budding new missions already included in the charter of U.S. Space Command of space control and force
application as they become more and more critical to our national security interests.[16] The parallels
between the early days of space flight and, especially, the early development of aerial flight are indeed
striking, at least at first glance. But what do these analogies actually reveal about the future? First, there
have only been three previous environments into which human activity has so expanded—the seas, the
air, and the undersea world—so we should be wary of drawing overly firm conclusions form the histories
of these few cases. However, if all three cases do indeed follow a common pattern, this could not be
easily dismissed. Yet upon closer examination, it is clear that the spread of weapons into these three
realms has been far from identical, raising very serious doubts about the soundness of drawing strong
analogies when predicting the future of military space exploitation.[17] Sea Power. The first of the new
realms into which human enterprise expanded was the surface of the seas and other bodies of water,
initially along the coasts and later onto the high seas. Maritime transport offered many advantages over
land-bound alternatives, especially prior to the invention of the railroad. Armed conflict quickly followed
commerce onto the seas, and navies soon developed to protect merchant vessels from pirates and other
enemies, to prey on enemy shipping, and to attack or defend coastlines and sea lanes. How similar is this
to orbital space? In spite of the intuitive similarities between seafaring and spacefaring, there is one
fundamental difference between them which makes the sea-space analogy very weak: ships primarily
transport goods and people, while spacecraft carry information. With only a few, relatively trivial
exceptions, every satellite ever launched has been designed to collect, relay, or transmit information. This
has a number of significant implications. It means that space piracy, at least in the traditional sense, is not
a problem, so space navies are not required to suppress it. It means, as discussed below, that
―commerce raiding‖ threats to space systems can be ameliorated by building redundant, distributed
systems of satellites; for merchant shipping this is not an option, because the same item cannot be
carried by more than one vessel at the same time (and because there are real limits to how small a
merchant ship can efficiently be). And it means that whatever threats may be posed by enemy space
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[File Name]                                                                                            [Name]
systems, invasion is very low on the list. In short, satellites can be said to have more in common with
lighthouses or semaphore stations than with oceangoing ships, and space commerce resembles
telegraphy or terrestrial radio more than it does maritime trade. This does not mean that nothing we know
about sea power can be applied to space, or that space strategists should not study the works of Julian
Corbett and Alfred Thayer Mahan. And as space travel expands beyond earth orbital space into the
interplanetary reaches, where the transportation of material goods may finally become one of its major
functions, the parallels between sea and space power may become more pronounced. However, it seems
safe to assert that there is little reason to conclude from the evolution of naval forces that the
weaponization of space is inevitable—or that it is not. Air Power. The parallels between military use of the
air and of space are far more compelling, at least at first glance. Both balloons and airplanes were used
for military observation soon after they were first invented, and because aerial observation was so
powerful in the First World War, armed aircraft were soon employed as interceptors and then as escorts.
Airplanes and airships were also used for bombing even before the dawn of air-to-air combat, and by
1918 virtually every modern military air mission had been undertaken or proposed. Serious commercial
exploitation of the air came only later. In space, strategic reconnaissance was the purpose of most early
satellites, and intelligence collection remains the most visible military space application;[18] the value of
being able to destroy enemy surveillance satellites has consistently driven ASAT programs in both the
Unites States and the Soviet Union. Of course, there are important physical differences between air and
space warfare,[19] such as air being territorial while low earth orbital space is not, but these do not
prevent drawing parallels between the evolution of air and space power. However, air and space power
have not evolved along lines as similar as space weapon advocates‘ brief analogies often suggest. One
of the most glaring differences between the two cases is that less than a decade elapsed between the
Wright brothers‘ first flight and the first aerial combat missions, while in the fifth decade after Sputnik
space remains unweaponized. Certainly, the occurrence of a major war in the 1910s had a great deal to
do with the rapid evolution of air power, and space power might look very different today if World War III
had broken out in the 1960s, but with no major wars now on the horizon , this caveat hardly makes the
parallel between the two cases look like a strong basis for space policy in the 21st century. Effectively
defending against observation and bomber aircraft, especially in the era before radar and guided missiles,
required armed interceptor aircraft. Therefore it was inevitable that the militarization of the air would lead
to its weaponization. In contrast, it may be quite possible to meet any reasonable requirement for defense
of the United States against hostile surveillance satellites with ground-based ASAT weapons, and with
other means such as attacks on the ground segments of space systems, information warfare, and
coercion of various types. In fact, both superpowers did develop anti-satellite interceptors, but then
abandoned their ASAT programs,[20] something utterly without precedent in the history of air power that
casts further doubt on the soundness of the analogy. Naturally, it would be foolish to conclude from the
history of the last fifty years that space will definitely not be weaponized during the next fifty, but is it any
less foolish to deduce the opposite from the history of flight between 1903 and 1915? Submarine Power.
It is noteworthy that space weapons advocates rarely mention the third new environment into which
human activity has expanded: the undersea world. In this case, although there are many similarities
between submarine and space operations, the two weaponization histories have little in common.
Warfare was the sole purpose of the first generations of subsurface vessels, joined only much later and
on a far more limited scale by scientific research, while submarines have so far been of little commercial
significance. Again, this tells us little about what the future of space power will look like, but it does
provide one more data point to suggest that we should avoid giving too much weight to such analogies
when making military space policy. In the aggregate, the evolutionary patterns of military and commercial
uses of new environments have varied widely across the range of human experience. Three of the four
realms have been weaponized, presumably irrevocably so, but as the result of three very different
paths.[21] To conclude that this evidence proves that the fourth will also be weaponized would require a
degree of deterministic fatalism that would make the most doctrinaire Marxist or environmental
doomsayer blush.




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[File Name]                                                                                             [Name]

                                      AT: MILITARY UTILITY
Military Utility Argument Incomplete – lacks logical connections
Mueller 2 (Karl P. Mueller, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, March 27, 2002, “Is the
Weaponization of Space Inevitable?” http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/mueller.html)

The core of this inevitability argument is that even (or especially) if the United States chooses not to build
space weapons, other countries will certainly do so, in large part because of the great and still growing
degree to which U.S. military operations depend upon what has traditionally been known as ―space force
enhancement‖: the use of satellites to provide a vast array of services including communications,
reconnaissance, navigation, and missile launch warning, without which American military power would be
crippled. This parallels the argument that the importance of satellites to the U.S. economy will make them
an irresistible target, except that military satellites are far more indispensable, and successful attacks
against a relatively small number of them could have a considerable military impact, for example by
concealing preparations for an invasion or by disrupting U.S. operations at a critical juncture.[34] Rivals of
the United States might also find space-to-earth weapons to be a very attractive way to counter U.S.
advantages in military power projection. These are all reasonable arguments, but to conclude from them
that space weaponization is inevitable, rather than merely possible or even likely, is unwarranted, for
several reasons. There is no question that space systems are a key center of gravity (or perhaps several)
for U.S. military capabilities. An enemy that attacked them might be able to impair U.S. military operations
very seriously, and this ranks high among threats that concern U.S. strategists. It need not follow from this
that the enemies of the United States will do so, or invest in the weapons required to do so, however. The
U.S. armed forces possess many important vulnerabilities that adversaries have often, even consistently,
opted not to attack in past conflicts. To cite but one widely-discussed example, during Operation Allied
Force in 1999, Serbia apparently did not attempt to mount special forces attacks against key NATO
airbases in Italy or to use manportable missiles to shoot down aircraft operating from them during take-off
or landing, although such an action could have profoundly disrupted the Alliance‘s bombing
campaign.[35] Moreover, it is quite possible that if a potential enemy did want to develop the ability to
attack U.S. space systems, it would choose to do so in ways—such as investing in ground-based ASAT
lasers or computer network attack capabilities—that would not involve weaponizing space, and against
which the logical defensive countermeasures would not involve placing U.S. weapons in orbit either. For
military as well as commercial satellites, ―bodyguard‖ weapons in space would offer protection only from
certain sorts of attacks, while the terrestrial links in satellite systems would remain inviting targets. Again it
is the transition to larger networks of smaller satellites that will do the most to reduce vulnerability,
perhaps together with supplementing satellite platforms for some military functions with new types of
terrestrial systems, such as high endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),[36] and improving
terrestrial weapons with which to attack ground-based ASATs and satellite launch and control facilities.
Conversely, if the United States decides that it must have the ability to deny an enemy the use of its
satellites, it is quite possible that the most attractive means for doing this will prove to involve non-space
weapons and, to an even greater extent, tools that are not weapons in the conventional sense at all.




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[File Name]                                                                                           [Name]

                             AT: ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY
Economic Vulnerability argument fails: enemies will choose easier targets
Mueller 2 (Karl P. Mueller, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, March 27, 2002, “Is the
Weaponization of Space Inevitable?” http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/mueller.html)

Economic Vulnerability The third inevitability argument holds that rapidly growing American commercial
investment in and economic dependence on space technology will make attacking U.S. satellites very
attractive to enemy states, and that the United States will need to build space weapons in order to defend
them.[22] American industry, commerce, and civil society more generally do indeed depend heavily and
increasingly on space systems for communications, navigation, weather prediction, and many other
functions.[23] From this reality it seems just a short leap to the conclusion that what is important to us
must be an attractive target for our enemies, and another easy step to the implication that averting this
danger will require the active defense of satellites in orbit. However, it is not clear that attacking U.S.
space assets would actually appear to be worthwhile for an enemy seeking ways to hurt the United
States, or that protecting them would require weapons in space. It is important to consider why an enemy
might want to attack U.S. commercial satellites. The most obvious reason would be simply to hurt the
United States or, more likely, to coerce it to change its behavior in order to avoid further punishment—in
other words, for terrorist purposes, broadly defined. The second would be to damage or disrupt the U.S.
economy in order to gain a power advantage over it, most likely during a war or other protracted conflict,
although at the operational level such economic warfare would look very similar to terrorist or coercive
attacks against economically valuable targets.[24] In the abstract, it is clear why an enemy seeking to
harm or to intimidate the United Sates might want to attack important satellites, potentially causing
considerable disruption of the services it provides, destroying expensive pieces of American
infrastructure, and possibly even causing significant damage to the U.S. economy.[25] Although major
acts of state-sponsored terrorism directed against the United States have been relatively infrequent, such
a coercive strategy is certainly possible.[26] However, an enemy that wanted to achieve such a result
against the United States could do so far more easily by attacking something other than satellites in orbit,
and unlike satellites, most of these targets can be attacked without first developing or acquiring
specialized weapons for one particular target set.[27] This is even more true when considering non-state
terrorist organizations, which are unlikely to be even remotely as capable of attacking satellites as they
are of striking a wide range of terrestrial economic targets. Attacking satellites is difficult, at least
compared to attacking most sorts of terrestrial civilian targets.[28] It certainly can be done, but crippling or
destroying a small object several hundred miles overhead moving at 17,000 miles per hour (to say
nothing of satellites at higher altitudes) is vastly more challenging than doing comparable damage to
targets such as ships, airliners, bridges, dams, pipelines, computer networks, office buildings—the list
could go on almost indefinitely. That such targets are not attacked on a regular basis is due mainly (at
least until recently) to the very small numbers and limited capabilities of serious terrorists, not to any great
degree of protection for these assets. Increased defensive measure since 11 September 2001 have done
little to alter the relative difficulty of attacking space and terrestrial targets. Even if an enemy did want to
disrupt the use of American satellites, attacking their ground communications stations and launch facilities
might be far more effective than striking satellites in orbit, as well as much easier. Suppose then that an
adversary did wish to attack U.S. satellites rather than something else in order to hurt the United
States.[29] Would placing weapons in space be an efficient way to prevent such attacks? The answer
depends on the means of attack. Space-based lasers or kinetic energy weapons would be useful for
defense against direct ascent ASATs or ―space mines‖ that were detected before attacking, but they
would provide no protection against attacks by ground-based lasers or covert mines already positioned
near their targets, against electronic jamming, or against attacks on the infrastructure that supports
satellites.[30] Instead, it is likely that the greatest improvements in the security of valuable U.S. space
assets will be achieved by making the satellites less vulnerable to attack and, especially, making them
less valuable. Hardening important satellites could make attacking them more difficult, while satellite
miniaturization is making it increasingly possible to eliminate existing vulnerabilities altogether by making
satellite systems more distributed and redundant, with more smaller satellites doing the same jobs as
fewer large, expensive ones.[31] As this shift continues, there will be fewer and fewer opportunities for
attacks on a single satellite, or even several, to cause the sort of widespread disruption that has
occasionally occurred in the past due to mechanical failures of critical satellites.[32] In short, it is both
desirable and likely that communications and other satellites will gradually become more like the U.S.


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[File Name]                                                                                         [Name]
interstate highway system: economically vital to the nation, but hardly worth the trouble of attacking
because its resilience and redundancy means that none of its individual components is critical.

No country would attack space assets for economic disruption
Lowery,7 (Scott, Writer for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
―Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued‖, Occasions Online, 2007,
http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%
20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, accessed: 6/1/11

The third argument for inevitability is that the expanding influence space has on the economy will
precipitate an attack on space systems. Pro-weaponizers see the economic dependence on space as a
vulnerability waiting to be exploited. However, the logic behind such an attack is lacking. It is
unreasonable for another nation state to attack US space assets for the sole purpose of economic
disruption. Because the US is a superpower, its economy is interlinked with the rest of the world, so that if
another nation—for instance, China—damaged US space assets, it would most likely feel the economic
effects of the attackitself, namely through the loss of the $200 billion (Trade) of goods it exports to the
United States.




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[File Name]                                                                                      [Name]

                                     AT: HUMAN NATURE
Logic Overwhelms: weaponization is human nature argument is flawed
Lowery,7 (Scott, Writer for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
―Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued‖, Occasions Online, 2007,
http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%
20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, accessed: 6/1/11).

The pro-weaponization adherents‘ arguments of inevitability focus on the notion that the United States
must have an early lead in space weapons or suffer the consequences. They have several reasons for
believing in inevitability; however, each argument contains logical fallacies that preclude it from
representing a rational policy. Karl Mueller of the International Studies Association best sums up the
deficiency of their arguments, which are ―based on a smattering of evidence and logic, extrapolated into
facile overgeneralizations that are well-suited for television talk-show punditry but which provide a poor
basis for national policymaking (Mueller).‖ Their first argument is that inevitability is a consequence of
human nature. This is blatant pessimism as there are 5 many weapons such as chemical missiles and
radiation bombs that provide tactical advantages but have been shied away from. Agreements such as
the Chemical Weapons Convention banned the use of these weapons, because it is difficult to control
their effects and they create hazardous environmental conditions. The signature of 182 states (Status) on
this agreement signifies that logic can override baser instincts towards violence.




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[File Name]                                                                                          [Name]

                                          AT: TERRORISM
Terrorism isn‘t a logical warrant for the inevitability of space weaponization
Lowery,7 (Scott, Writer for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
―Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued‖, Occasions Online, 2007,
http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%
20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, accessed: 6/1/11

Similarly, attacking space assets as a terrorist action is also illogical. There are many surface targets
whose destruction would also cause widespread havoc such as dams, bridges, refineries, computer
systems, and so on. All of them require far less sophistication to destroy than satellites.




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                              ***MISCALCULATION MODULE
Space Militerization increases miscalculation and causes nuclear war
Graham 5 (THormas Graham, Jr., former special representative of the president for arms control,
nonproliferation and disarmament, December 2005, ―Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear
War,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-SpaceWeapons#bio)

Both the United States and Russia rely on space-based systems to provide early warning of a nuclear
attack. If deployed, however, U.S. space-based missile defense interceptors could eliminate the Russian
early warning satellites quickly and without warning. So, just the existence of U.S. space weapons could
make Russia‘s strategic trigger fingers itchy. The potential protection space-based defenses might offer
the United States is swamped therefore by their potential cost: a failure of or false signal from a
component of the Russian early warning system could lead to a disastrous reaction and accidental
nuclear war. There is no conceivable missile defense, space-based or not, that would offer protection in
the event that the Russian nuclear arsenal was launched at the United States. Nor are the Russians or
other countries likely to stand still and watch the United States construct space-based defenses. These
states are likely to respond by developing advanced anti-satellite weapon systems.[1] These weapons, in
turn, would endanger U.S. early warning systems, impair valuable U.S. weapons intelligence efforts, and
increase the jitteriness of U.S. officials.

Space Weaponization increases the risk of nuclear miscalculation and ASAT
attacks
Graham 5 (THormas Graham, Jr., former special representative of the president for arms control,
nonproliferation and disarmament, December 2005, ―Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear
War,‖ http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-SpaceWeapons#bio)

Thus,10 years ago, when the declining Russian early warning system was stronger than today, it read
this single small missile test launch as a U.S. nuclear missile attack on Russia. The alarm went up the
Russian chain of command all the way to the top. The briefcase containing the nuclear missile launch
codes was brought to Yeltsin as he was told of the attack. Fortunately, Yeltsin and the Russian leadership
made the correct decision that day and directed the Russian strategic nuclear forces to stand down.
Obviously, nothing should be done in any way further to diminish the reliability of the space-based
components of U.S. and Russian ballistic missile early warning systems. A decline in confidence in such
early warning systems caused by the deployment of weapons in space would enhance the risk of an
accidental nuclear weapons attack. Yet, as part of its plans for missile defense, the Pentagon is calling for
the development of a test bed for space-based interceptors as well as examining a number of other exotic
space weapons. In an interview published in Arms Control Today, Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, director of the
Missile Defense Agency, touted what he said was ―a very modest and moderate test-bed approach to
launch some experiments.‖ Obering said the Pentagon would only deploy a handful of interceptors: ―We
are talking about onesies, twosies in terms of experimentation.‖[2] Despite Obering‘s claims, however,
establishing a test bed for missile defense in space, as opposed to current preliminary research, would be
a long step toward space weaponization. Once space-based missile defenses are tested, they are likely
to be deployed, and in significant numbers, no matter if the tests are successful. To see the path that a
space test bed is likely to follow, one need only look at the present ground-based program: the Pentagon
claims there is little true difference between a test bed and an operational deployment. Moreover, in
space the deployment could be more dramatic. Although the current ground-based configuration
envisions a few dozen interceptors, continuous space coverage over a few countries of concern would
likely require a very large number of interceptors because a particular interceptor will be above a
particular target for only a few minutes a day. Today‘s missile defenses provide very little real protection
as the United States currently faces no realistic threat of deliberate attack by nuclear-armed long-range
missiles. But space weapons could actually be detrimental to U.S. national security. They would increase
the perceived vulnerability of early warning systems to attack and cause Russia and perhaps other
countries such as China to pursue potentially destabilizing countermeasures, such as advanced anti-
satellite weapons.

Space accidents cause nuclear war

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Lewis , Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation,
‘04 , (Jeffrey, ―What if Space Were Weaponized?‖, Center for Defense Information ,
http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf )

A single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning
satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, the United
States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply
destabilizing. For all the talk about a ―new relationship‖ between the United States and Russia, both
sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and configured to fight a nuclear war . When briefed
about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked ―What do we need all these weapons
for?‖43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies,
including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership, which has been
increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the country‘s declining military
might. In the mid-1990s, Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from the ―first use‖ of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of
exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion




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                      ***COMMERCIAL SATELLITE TRADEOFF
Kills commercial satellite development
Lowery,7 (Scott, Writer for the Program for Writing and Rhetoric at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
―Why the Weaponization of Space Should Not Be Pursued‖, Occasions Online, 2007,
http://www.colorado.edu/ArtsSciences/PWR/occasions/articles/Lowery_Why%20the%20Weaponization%
20of%20Space%20Should%20Not%20Be%20Pursued.pdf, accessed: 6/1/11

Another reason to avoid weaponizing space is that to do so would threaten the burgeoning space
industry. Presently, there are several companies developing launch vehicles to lift payloads to space at
far lower costs than any government agency. Also, there is the space tourism and travel industry to
consider. No longer in an embryonic state, commercial flights will be available as early as 2009
(Overview). In the near future, suborbital flights will become as common as trans-Atlantic flights are today.
They are the first step towards a general private use of space. There is a great deal of potential economic
growth tied up in these ventures, but none of it will mature if people feel that they would be flying through
enemy territory, so to speak, or that their investments are at too great a risk. Since there is no orbital
analogue to airspace, future spaceflights could be endangered by weapons from any country regardless
of their trajectory. It is even possible that weapons could be deployed against civilian space targets
without detection. There would not be any evidence to assign blame to a particular nation, making
spaceflights a tempting target. Even if they were not targeted directly, spaceflights would still be at a
significant risk from the debris resulting from the use of space weapons. Much like chemical weapons,
space weapons create a hazardous environment. Simple physics insists that even a tiny piece of
shrapnel from a destroyed satellite can cause major damage when it is travelling at orbital velocities. In
light of these concerns, the weaponization of space would not benefit the United States and could
potentially cause great damage, both politically and economically.




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