Psychological Security:
the most effective route to peace
Political leaders speak of "national security" in terms of keeping us safe from
terrorist attacks and other threats. To accomplish this goal, they address
questions of military security, economic security, and now use specialized
terms like resource security, and more recently climate security.
These dimensions of security are clearly important. Nevertheless they do not
deal with the full story of security, since they do not address the key
underlying human factors that make us feel safe or unsafe. They do not for
example begin to address the powerful emotions that drive cycles of violence,
with the result that one atrocity leads to another. They do not yet address the
realities, lodged in people's minds and hearts, of war and terror - and their
effect on us personally and psychologically.
1
Introduction
In dealing with violence, whether international, national or political, we often
talk about „hearts and minds‟. But in reality we don‟t deal seriously with the
problems of hearts and minds. We find it much easier to attend to the physical
and political aspects of security, and much harder – often almost impossible -
to address the psychological issues. Yet it is precisely this type of
psychological insecurity that is most likely to cause the next round of fighting
or fear.
In short, we have not yet adopted a systematic understanding of what makes
people feel unsafe, nor do we recognize and fund the tools needed to provide
and build psychological security.
This paper is a first attempt to fill this gap in understanding. Part 1 will
demonstrate what happens when psychological security is removed, with
examples drawn from around the world – from the insurgency in Falluja in Iraq
as well as the effects on western military of serving in such crisis situations,
and from the after-effects of suicide bombing as well as an analysis of what
drives a suicide bomber.
Part 2 then examines what happens when psychological security is enhanced,
and investigates the most effective methods for building psychological
security, with current examples from Iraq, Burundi, the Balkans, Brazil and the
Middle East. The components of psychological security are then briefly
explored.
The paper shows that just as psychological insecurity perpetuates war, so
psychological security can be the most effective route to peace. It is as
important as political or physical security, and this is thoroughly understood by
Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) operating on the ground. The tools
to bring about psychological security are tested and available, and merit
immediate incorporation into defence and security policy-making. Building
psychological security is also remarkably inexpensive as well as cost-
effective, and therefore a great many localized initiatives can be undertaken
for a fraction of the cost of political or military intervention. These localised
initiatives are well organised and integrated, but they require support, not only
2
from governments but also from the medical profession. The paper concludes
by examining the implications and opportunities inherent in this situation.
Part 1: What happens when psychological security is
removed
The habitual methods for dealing with conflict – attempts to provide physical
and political security – seem unable to deal with the new realities. Although
interstate conflict is becoming less widespread, fifty percent of peace
agreements now break down into further violence. What is agreed at the top
table is either not accepted at ground level, or is torpedoed by unresolved
anger, or destroyed by revenge attacks. The root causes of this breakdown
can be traced to the psychological – to hearts and minds.
Force of arms is not sufficient to establish peaceful order. One military writer
goes so far as to assert that “For certain purposes, like the creation of a liberal
democratic society that will be a model for others, military power is a blunt
instrument, destined by its very nature to give rise to unintended and
unwelcome consequences. Rather than „do it better next time,‟ a better lesson
is „don‟t do it at all‟”.1
Military victory is not enough to prevent future violence. Whether we are
considering Iraq, al-Qaeda, Chechnya or the Middle East, it is clear that
simply trying to hit back and to destroy the „enemy‟, the „terrorists‟ or the
political opponents provides at best only short-term results. Moreover, military
repression of insurgency produces long-lasting (and extremely costly) after-
effects on the psychological health of soldiers.
Psychology has long been used in the waging of war – the science of Psyops
(psychological operations) to disorientate the enemy is well known to military
planners. But the situation is now reversed - whole populations live in daily
fear of terror attacks, in all parts of the world. If terror is such a potent and
widespread weapon, it is essential to now to examine how the insights of
psychology can and are being used to provide more security, rather than less.
1
David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker, “Revisions in Need of Revising: What went wrong in
the Iraq War”, Strategic Studies Institute, Dec 2005, pvii
3
We start by charting what happens to human beings when they lose their
sense of security, whether in the midst of an insurgency, or suppressing an
insurgency, whether through enduring systematic humiliation, or living in fear
of suicide bombings.
1a. How one set of actions can trigger an insurgency – Falluja
Too often terrorism is exacerbated – indeed sometimes even triggered – by
the actions and reactions of governments. In Iraq for example, the town of
Falluja offered no resistance to the invasion in April 2003 and, according to
authoritative local sources at the time, hosted no insurgents. However the
actions taken by the Coalition forces produced a situation whereby 18 months
later they were battling an estimated 25 - 30,000 insurgents prepared to fight
to the death.2
In April 2003, before any conflict had erupted in Falluja, US soldiers opened
fire on a demonstration against their occupation of a primary school, killing
eighteen people. Until then, not a single bullet had been fired at US soldiers in
Falluja or any of the cities north of Baghdad.
There followed a period of attacks on Coalition forces, followed by attempts to
root out insurgency in the population. House raids seem to exhibit a general
pattern, summarized in a February 2004 report by the International Committee
of the Red Cross, based on its investigation of reported incidents:
Arresting authorities entered houses usually after dark, breaking down
doors, waking up residents roughly, yelling orders, forcing family
members into one room under military guard while searching the rest of
the house and further breaking doors, cabinets, and other property. They
arrested suspects, tying their hands in the back with flexicuffs, hooding
them, and taking them away. Sometimes they arrested all adult males in
the house, including elderly, handicapped, or sick people. Treatment
often included pushing people around, insulting, taking aim with rifles,
punching and kicking, and striking with rifles. Individuals were often led
away in whatever they happened to be wearing at the time of arrest -
sometimes pyjamas or underwear... In many cases personal belongings
were seized during the arrest with no receipt given.... In almost all
incidents documented by the ICRC, arresting authorities provided no
information about who they were, where their base was located, nor did
2
See Learning from Fallujah, Elworthy, 2005, unpublished full length case study available from
Oxford Research Group.
4
they explain the cause of arrest. Similarly, they rarely informed the
arrestee or his family where he was being taken or for how long,
resulting in the defacto disappearance of the arrestee for weeks or even
months until contact was finally made. 3
The city simmered until 31st March 2004 when four American contractors were
killed and mutilated in a horrifying manner. The US military then unleashed
unprecedented firepower in urban areas: AC150 warplanes dropped 500-lb
bombs, while helicopter gunships fired into densely populated areas. More
than 700 people were killed. After the huge numbers of casualties, US forces
agreed to withdraw to the outskirts, and the city then became a stronghold for
insurgents - 2,500 people from the tribes joined the resistance, and fighting
continued all summer.
In November 2004 the US forces and Iraqi allies launched Operation Phantom
Fury. The aim was to storm the city and eliminate the insurgents. Falluja‟s
main hospital was seized by US troops in the first days of the siege, in order
to control information about the number of civilian casualties. The other clinic
was hit twice by US missiles, and all its medicine and equipment destroyed.
Two ambulances attempting to help the wounded were shot at and destroyed
by the US troops. Such tactics led to a huge growth in the insurgency; after
November those joining in the Sunni triangle numbered 25–30,000.2 Colonel
Douglas A. Macgregor, describing US military experience in Iraq:
Most of the generals and politicians did not think through the consequences of
compelling American soldiers with no knowledge of Arabic or Arab culture to
implement intrusive measures inside an Islamic society. We arrested people
in front of their families, dragging them away in handcuffs with bags over their
heads, and then provided no information to the families of those we
incarcerated. In the end, our soldiers killed, maimed and incarcerated
thousands of Arabs, 90 percent of whom were not the enemy. But they are
now.4
Labelling insurgent organisations with the single definition of „terrorist‟ leads to
a predominantly military strategy in which those involved are seen and treated
as criminals. A military response may reduce the number of attacks in the
short term, but will fuel future violence by antagonising the more moderate
3
On the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the
Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation, Geneva: International
Committee of the Red Cross, February 2004.
4
Douglas A. Macgregor, "Dramatic failures require drastic changes," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 19
December 2004. Quoted in Carl Conetta, “Vicious Circle: The Dynamics of Occupation and Resistance
in Iraq”, Project on Defense Alternatives, May 2005.
5
voices. It ignores the fact that extreme movements emerge out of social,
political and psychological injustice. Thus, as Mary Kaldor suggests, „To use
military means against an assortment of criminals and insurgents, is simply to
provoke and consolidate support for those groups.‟
The British Army‟s approach to counter-insurgency differs from the US in that
it emphasizes minimum force, the rule of law, the importance of intelligence-
led operations, civil-military co-operation and tactical adaptability and agility.
British doctrine recognizes that countering insurgency is not simply the
application of one military force against another.5 The latest US counter
insurgency doctrine, written by General David Petraeus, is considered to be a
notable advance on that used in Falluja, and his approach since assuming
command in Iraq has certainly produced better results.
1b. The effects on soldiers of military repression of
insurgency – US & UK
The extreme and constant dangers endured by troops during protracted
periods of high risk, and the terrifying effects of unheralded land mines, IEDs,
suicide bombers and sudden attack any time, make combat related post
traumatic stress disorder (CR-PTSD) particularly debilitating. 6
More than 10% of troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan develop CR-PTSD7.
Their lack of visible physical injury frequently delays diagnosis, leading to
divorce, violence, alcoholism, drug dependence, serious crime and suicide. A
shocking and little known fact is that every war of the last forty years has
resulted in more suicides of combatants afterwards, than combatants killed in
action. More US military veterans have been committing suicide than US
soldiers have been dying in Iraq; at least 6,256 US veterans took their lives in
2005 alone, according to figures from CBS News.8
5
See Revising the British Army’s Counter-Insurgency Doctrine, RUSI Journal, Aug 2007, Vol. 152,
No. 4.
6
This is fleetingly acknowledged in British Military Doctrine, see
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwd1/pdfs/docs/british_military_doctrine.pdf
7
Quote in The Independent dated 30 Sept 2007 from Commodore Toby Elliot, chief executive
„Combat Stress‟ charity.
8
„America suffers an epidemic of suicides among traumatised army veterans‟ The Times, November
15, 2007.
6
Combat Stress, a charity that assists UK veterans with mental health issues,
is dealing with a 27 per cent increase in GP referrals of veterans - 1,200 new
cases a year. More than half of those reporting psychotic nightmares,
depression and suicidal thoughts have not been granted a war pension and
are, therefore, not eligible for specialist psychiatric help.9 UK military charities
are unable to cope.
Major Hugh McManners served 18 years in the British Army and was
mentioned in despatches during the Falklands War (1982) while serving with
the elite Special Boat Squadron. While at the Staff College in 1984 he
became ill, and despite completing successful operational tours in Northern
Ireland, UK and Germany, was unable to continue and left the Army in 1989.
Shortly after that, his mysterious illness was diagnosed as PTSD. He then
wrote his definitive book “The Scars of War” about the psychology of modern
professional soldiers and about PTSD, which formed the basis of a six-month
High Court Class action in 2002: „PTSD Veterans versus MoD’. After
recovering from several years of serious ill health, he became a television
producer and presenter, and was Defence Correspondent of The Sunday
Times for five years.
McManners is now campaigning for effective psychological care and
treatment for combat veterans, and researching the extent of CR-PTSD. He
says that most if not all physically wounded service men and women also
suffer from it, which impedes their physical recovery and usually gets worse
once they have been invalided out.
Territorial Army soldiers, National Guard units and Reservists are increasingly
deployed on operations to make up for the under-recruitment and over-
deployment of Regular Army units. At the end of combat tours, back in their
civilian jobs many quickly become very isolated, as a result developing high
percentages of PTSD (up to 50% of each deployed detachment).
Determining the extent of CR-PTSD in soldiers and other members of the
armed forces is difficult because most sufferers leave the Services, and many
will be unaware that the way they feel is due to the condition.
9
„Iraq veterans are denied help for combat trauma‟ Mark Townsend, defence correspondent, Sunday
February 3, 2008 The Observer.
7
1c. Russian approach to insurgency in Chechnya
During the initial campaign of the Second Chechen War in 1999, Russian
military faced Chechen separatists in open combat, and seized the Chechen
capital Grozny after a winter siege that lasted from late 1999 to the following
February. Although Russia established direct rule of Chechnya in May 2000,
Chechen guerrilla resistance throughout the North Caucasus region continued
to inflict heavy Russian casualties and challenge Russian political control over
Chechnya, including terrorist attacks against civilians in Russia.
Although Russia severely disabled the Chechen rebel movement, violence
still occurs throughout the North Caucasus with bombings targeting federal
troops and forces of the regional government. The exact death toll from this
conflict is unknown, unofficial estimates ranging from 25,000 - 50,000 dead or
missing, mostly civilians in Chechnya. No clear figures for Russian losses are
known to the public, and in spite of the large amount of casualties, both
Chechen wars remain largely unpublicized abroad.
Chechnya is another poignant example of how to get it wrong. Russia's
indiscriminate attacks in Chechnya created a huge backlash of bitterness,
humiliation and retaliation by the Chechnyans.The Black Widows who
engaged in suicide attacks in Moscow and elsewhere were one unwholesome
byproduct of Russian military repression in Chechnya. Curiously the Western
media hardly takes the Russians to task for this example of state terrorism
that is exploited by al Qaeda and others to recruit alienated youth to their
cause.
1d. The effects of systematic humiliation
Whether we are considering Iraq, Chechnya or the Middle East, it is clear that
strategies of simply trying to hit back and to destroy political opponents can
increase, rather than decrease, both the level of violence and the yawning
chasm between the two sides. Such strategies will not be successful unless
they address the full range of factors that fuel cycles of violence and influence
the use of terror over time.
8
These factors include the emotional and psychological effects of violence and
humiliation, factors often missing from traditional approaches to counter-
terrorism, and especially the „war on terror‟. Actions such as stripping Arab
men in public, demolishing houses, confiscating land, bulldozing olive groves
and constructing a „security fence‟ result in an acute loss of dignity and sense
of humiliation.
Residents of the Occupied Territories are subjected to daily pre-meditated
and dangerous humiliation, whereby a father will be forced to strip at a
checkpoint in front of his children, or a woman giving birth will be kept waiting
in the hot sun, while her male relatives are powerless to relieve her distress.
Such humiliations are rendered more inflammatory because they are a
ruthless and intentional flaunting of the power of the gun.
Previous findings indicate a direct link between trauma and fundamentalism10.
Many of the families who identify with fundamentalist groups like Hamas will
have experienced their own family trauma or witnessed some deep
humiliation or violence inflicted on someone close to them.
Where daily life is harsh in the extreme people become ready to identify with a
culture of death. When people are being killed every day for no apparent
reason, life for young people becomes so futile that life after death can seem
preferable.
1e. What produces a suicide bomber
It is easy - but inaccurate - to assume that suicide bombers are poor,
uneducated religious fanatics who are emotionally unstable and depressed.
That profile simply does not fit the facts.
Yet one factor is almost always essential: an organisation behind the bomber
– not least to convince the recruit that this is the ultimate sacrifice, and to see
that he or she goes through with the act. Often the decisive part is a written or
videoed testimony in which the recruit declares his or her commitment to what
they are about to do. This is the point when a recruit becomes a „living martyr‟
and it is then virtually impossible to back out.
10
Rifkind and Elworthy, Making Terrorism History, Rider, London 2005.
9
Some weeks after the 7th July 2005 attacks, Londoners saw the video
testimony of Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the suicide bombers involved –
a mentor for disadvantaged children at his local primary school in Leeds, and
ostensibly a pillar of the community. This would go some way, but not far
enough, to explain why seemingly normal young men leading a suburban
existence in northern England – „unremarkable‟ is how they have been
described – launched the 7th July attacks.11
In practice, the emotional process at work in the suicide bombers is one of
splitting, in which they presented ordinariness to the outside world, but at the
same time were leading a double life. This kind of splitting often involves
training and using psychological techniques. Parallels may be seen with the
training of spies in espionage.
All this is reinforced by the intensity of the group process, his identification
and sense of belonging with his group. This cannot be underestimated as
many of the young men who are potential candidates to join up to such a
cause and use these methods are often lonely, isolated and alienated in their
societies.
Of key importance is whether a particular bombing is viewed by the planners
simply as strategic. In the case of the London bombings, those running the
organisation behind the bombings may have concluded that the most effective
way to influence British opinion against the occupation of Iraq would be to
convince Londoners that their lives would not be safe until the troops were
withdrawn.
Some may become convinced that they are the vanguard of a revolutionary
movement opposed to the decadence of Western culture. They may believe
that by striking a dramatic blow at Western values and the Western way of life
they can create a different society.
Alastair Crooke, an intelligence officer and former Security Adviser to the EU
with decades of experience in the Middle East, describes how angry and
alienated young men choose a political philosophy which justifies their actions
11
The following paragraphs were written by Gabrielle Rifkind for Making Terrorism History, Rider,
2006.
10
as part of a grand scheme. They justify to themselves that the violence is part
of a global game of psychological chess.
They become convinced that they are the vanguard of a revolutionary
movement opposed to the decadence of Western culture. They believe that
by creating a fundamental disruption of Western values and way of life they
can create a different society. They suppress their own weaknesses, doubts,
and confusion, and project them on their target.
1f.The effects of suicide bombing on the population at risk
The tragic events of 7th July 2005 in London brought terrorism back to the
forefront of people‟s minds, both in the UK and around the world. The attacks
served as a brutal reminder of the challenges of terrorism and political
violence across the world. It has left deep scars in the community.
Next time you‟re on a train or a bus and there‟s a bomb alert, watch what
happens. Our faces shut down. We withdraw and isolate ourselves. We visibly
separate, become passive, and do what we‟re told in a lonely way. This is just
one example of how western citizens have learned to react over the past
seven years, as airliners crashed into skyscrapers, as bombs exploded in
capital cities. This paralysis is both a by-product of terror and a pre-requisite
for its effectiveness. Terror of whatever kind can continue as long as the
middle ground is mute and inactive.
Over the centuries terror has been used by the powerful and by the powerless
as a calculated act of political violence with a clear strategic agenda. Both
have needed the tacit support of the mass of the population.
What‟s new in this century is that the middle ground itself has a mass of
evidence to show that terror is not effective in bringing peace and prosperity,
moreover it creates a cycle of violence that is extremely difficult to end.
If terrorism is to be contained and its impact on civilian populations reduced,
policies for peace and security will need to move on from the existing bias
towards military intervention. This does not simply mean a more sparing use
of military force: it means the use of a much wider range of strategies
designed to address both the causes and effects of violence. For example, it
11
means avoiding at all costs using more violence, thus inflating the value of the
currency of terror. It means addressing the basic needs and human rights of
the population where terror draws its support. It means including all parties in
a political process that they have helped to design. Such measures will be
explored in Part 2.
Part 2: What happens when psychological security is
enhanced
Given that psychological insecurity can fuel terror and perpetuate war, we
shall now examine the means whereby psychological security can be
restored. In this section we shall be considering whether, and how, the
promotion of psychological security is an effective route to peace.
Attention to psychological processes in peace-building or human security is
frequently neglected, perhaps because it is considered „soft‟. So it is time to
investigate why and how psychological insights are being used to enhance
people‟s feelings of safety, and how generally effective this is.
2a. When media works to build trust – Burundi
When there was acute danger of the Rwandan genocide spreading to
Burundi, Search for Common Ground set up a soap opera on local radio to
counteract the hate radio that had inflamed Hutu against Tutsi and vice versa.
One hundred and fifty episodes - weekly over a period of 4 years - led to an
87% listenership and managed to change the definition of a hero to one who
had saved someone else‟s life, rather than taking it. The cost for such a soap
opera was $75,00012.
Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is an international NGO dedicated to
transforming the way individuals and societies deal with conflict: away from
adversarial approaches, toward cooperative solutions. In Sub-Saharan Africa,
SFCG has been using radio as a peacebuilding tool for years, including
developing and producing radio soap operas for social change. Soap opera
12
See http://www.sfcg.org/Programmes/burundi/programmes_burundi.html
12
provides a platform to deal with important issues through the experiences of
the characters. In the soap opera, the characters confront stereotypes and
challenge commonly held perceptions. As people listen to the dramas, they
see themselves in the story and adapt some of the behavioral changes that
the characters make. SFCG draws many of its storylines from real-life
occurrences, sharing success stories from different communities with the
nation as a whole, and encouraging individuals to take a chance on new
approaches.13
2b. When trauma is addressed – Kirkuk
Kirkuk is the northern oil city on the plain below the mountains of Kurdistan,
and viewed as one of Iraq‟s most dangerous points of friction.
Sami Velioglu is an Iraqi who refused to fight in the 1980s Iran/Iraq war and
since became a British citizen, gaining degrees in microbiology and
economics. Having driven an ambulance full of medical supplies to Iraq in
June 2003 on his own initiative, he discovered that those with acute problems
such as disappeared relatives, rape or wrongful arrest had no recourse, no
means of getting help or redress. Frustration and rage built as people stood in
queues daily in 45 degree heat, but obtained no assistance, with the result
that some took the law into their own hands.
In May 2004 Velioglu returned to his home town of Kirkuk, with the support of
UK charity Peace Direct, to set up a Citizens‟ Liaison Centre where people
could tell a trained interviewer of their problem. These problems were
documented, assistance given where possible, or the case passed to an
appropriate authority for action (if one existed), or collated to give an
indication of the extent of need.
The main aim was to defuse tension in an acutely tense area, and to provide
initial listening support to people in extremely troubled situations. By end
August 2004 approximately 2,500 interviews had taken place, the feedback
pointing to an initial relief for those coming to the Centre and being given a
detailed empathic hearing. This gave them a sense that their problems were
taken seriously, and helped to restore a sense of dignity. This result was in
13
http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/angola/angola_jogo.html
13
line with similar experiences in the Balkans, for example at the Centre for
Peace and Reconciliation in Osijek14.
From 2005 - 2007 19,252 cases had been recorded, and a remarkable 12,082
resolved. Concurrently the levels of violence in and around Kirkuk had fallen
considerably; and while credit for this cannot be ascribed entirely to the
Liason Centre, it undoubtedly contributed. At end January 2008 the work at
the Liason Centre still continued: “In the past three years we have managed
to resolve more than sixty five per cent of the cases we have received at the
centre.”15
The work of the Liaison Centre has so impressed specilialists in post conflict
reconstruction that it is now being used as a model for similar cetres in Africa
and in the Balkans.
2c. Experiments in countering radicalism – Yemen and Saudi
Arabia
In Yemen, after a spate of terror attacks, there were several hundred Al
Qaeda prisoners in jail by the year 2000.
So when Judge Hamoud al-Hitar announced that he and four other Islamic
scholars would challenge these Al Qaeda prisoners to a theological contest,
Western anti-terrorism experts warned that this high-stakes gamble would end
in disaster. But the youthful cleric threw down the gauntlet, in the hope of
bringing peace to his troubled homeland.
"If you can convince us that your ideas are justified by the Koran, then we will
join you in your struggle," Hitar told the militants. "But if we succeed in
convincing you of our ideas, then you must agree to renounce violence.
The prisoners agreed.
Two years later, not only had those prisoners been released, but a relative
peace reigned in Yemen. "Since December 2002, when the first round of the
dialogues ended, there have been no terrorist attacks here, even though
14
See War Prevention Works, Oxford Research Group, 2001.
15
Humanitarian Liaison Centre, Annual Report, 31.01.2008.
14
many people thought that Yemen would become terror's capital," said Hitar,
“364 young men have been released after going through the dialogues and
none of these has left Yemen to fight anywhere else.” 16 These debates
became known as the Koranic duels.
Fifteen of the 19 men who bombed New York on 9/11 were Saudi. The Saudi
government, perhaps taking a leaf out of the Yemeni book, have developed
an innovative method of defusing the extreme radicalism that motivated those
bombers.
They have established in Saudi Arabia a prison camp for detainees and terror
suspects, but it is a camp with a difference: it takes 50 „students‟ at a time,
and demonstrates to them how verses from the Koran have been
misrepresented. It has a strong emphasis on sports so that students burn off
their zeal in physical exercise. It has a visitor centre for families, who learn
that instead of the martyr being honoured, to kill in this indiscriminate fashion
is in Islam a dishonour and shame to the family. Results: 70% do not re-
offend.17
2d. Restorative justice – Brazil
Inspired by ancient indigenous circle practices, the process uses best practice
from 30 years of theory and research into Restorative Justice to create circles
in which the individuals involved in a conflict and members of their respective
communities meet as equals.
The intention of the circle is to repair harm caused, restore a sense of justice
and reintegrate all to peaceful co-existence using guided dialogue that
empowers, heals, connects and facilitates action, both individual and
collective, for mutual benefit. It has been pioneered by Dominic Barter,
consultant and training program director to the UN Development Program and
UNESCO for the Brazilian Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and
Special Secretariat for Human Rights' pilot projects in Restorative Justice in
Brazil.
16
James Brandon, The Christian Science Monitor, 4.2.05.
17
From Our Own Correspondent BBC Radio 4, James Robbins 3.5.08
15
In 2005, the Brazilian Ministry of Justice asked Dominic to initiate pilot
projects in shanty towns, schools shelters, youth courts and prisons to test
this practice in some of the toughest social conditions. Dominic has since
trained thousands of adults and youth to set up non-punitive responses to
conflict and facilitate restorative circles. The results have been impressive,
indicating drop in recidivism from high 70 percentiles to low 40 percentiles in
some areas.
As the authorities have begun to understand that restorative circles are real
world alternatives to both punishment and impunity, the model has been
spreading fast. 18
For example, Brazil‟s southernmost state Rio Grande do Sul has requested
training in both Restorative practices and Nonviolent Communication for the
50 cities with the highest recorded levels of violence. The project brings
together the departments of health, education and security for the first ever
state-wide, coordinated program to promote community safety.
The São Paulo state education department, after evaluating the pilot project
begun in September 2006, has requested the program be extended beyond
the initial 32 schools and 3 youth court systems, beginning immediately.
University students and community leaders will join those who facilitate
Circles, helping to meet increased demand.
Sao Paulo, the world‟s 6th largest city, with over 19 million inhabitants, has
been offering an experimental Restorative Circles track for all youth offenders
living in Heliópolis - the city‟s largest favela (shantytown) - since late 2006.
Now the legal authorities have extended the program to cover all youth crime
in the city, creating an RJ track that connects schools, police and judges in a
restorative system.
Restorative Justice programmes are now widely used in Aotearoa/New
Zealand, North America and Europe. Research from around the world shows
that RJ can substantially reduce re-offending rates in many cases.19
2e. Civilian protection
18
http://www.restorativejustice.org/resources/world/latam/alldocs/index_html/Brazil
19
http://www.restorativejustice.org.uk/Resources/pdf/learning_from_research.pdf
16
In areas of high tension, NGOs such as Peace Brigades International provide
trained units of volunteers to help discourage outbreaks of violence. For
example, in Colombia in 1995, where there had been 38,000 political
assassinations over a 4-year period, PBI sent teams to provide round-the-
clock unarmed protection for prominent human rights activists whose
colleagues had been killed, abducted or tortured. At least 19 human rights
organisations in Colombia have benefited from PBI accompaniment, and the
number of assassinations has dropped dramatically. Indeed PBI‟s presence in
Colombia represents the largest unofficial international observer force in the
world.
It should be noted that this kind of intervention only works when the aggressor
knows that the international community supports the protectors, so it operates
on several different levels of psychological security: reassurance for the
activists, deterrence for the violent, and lessening of tension for the
communities.
Protective accompaniment, as it is called, is a strategy pioneered by PBI for
protecting human rights defenders and communities whose lives and work are
threatened by political violence. Their trained teams of volunteers are backed
up by an international support network; over 26 years PBI has protected the
lives of hundreds of organisations and communities in 9 countries. Groups
they have accompanied include indigenous communities in Mexico and
Guatemala, environmental organisations in Guatemala and Indonesia,
lawyers in Colombia and Nepal, women‟s organisations in Colombia and
Indonesia, trades unions in Guatemala, and relatives of the disappeared in
Mexico, Colombia and Guatemala.
Accompaniment has proven to be very effective protection, even where the
overall human rights situation was deteriorating and where death squads
seemed impervious to external pressure. In 26 years PBI has successfully
protected the lives of thousands of activists while never losing a volunteer. 20
2f. Trauma counseling
20
http://www.peacebrigades.org/1165.html
17
In 1994, during the war in Former Yugoslavia, I was traveling with two
busloads of women from all over the world to take relief supplies to Sarajevo.
On the way we had to go to East Mostar to get permits from the military to
approach the besieged city. East Mostar had been heavily bombed, and the
only access to the city was across a rickety wire bridge put up by the UN to
replace the 14th century bridge blown up by the Serbs. Six thousand people
were living in cellars there and had spent the winter surviving by eating grass;
the only source of water was one tap for the 6,000 people.
As we walked down the main street, people – mostly women, children and
older men - emerged blinking from their underground bunkers. When they
heard we were from other parts of the world, they seized us by the arm and
marched us off – to the graveyards. There they made us sit by the graves of
their lost fathers and sons, and told us of their suffering and agony.
They simply wanted us to listen. And they wanted to tell the full story. They
wanted to know that the rest of the world would hear, and that their suffering
would not have been in vain.
This is true of war victims all over the world – they want to be heard. Had we
had training in trauma counselling, which is now quite widely available, we
could undoubtedly have been more helpful to the people of East Mostar.
The principle of trained listening is the same that led Katarina Kruhonja to set
up her centre in Osijek, yet another traumatized town in the Balkans. There
she has trained counsellors to listen, for as long as it takes, to the pain and
fear and terror that the population went through during the time of ethnic
cleansing.
Listening is a vital tool, its value known to the helping professions worldwide.
It is also increasingly seen as an essential ingredient in tough political
negotiations: George Mitchell, when asked about his role in the N.Ireland
peace process leading up to the Good Friday Agreement, said: “I listen. I
listen for as long as it takes.”
2g. Open a dialogue: understand the point of view of your
‘enemy’
18
Robert MacNamara, U.S. Defence Secretary at the time of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, said it was “essential to empathise with your enemy. By
understanding what Kruschev needed to be able to say to the Russian
people, we were able to make the right decision” (a decision that effectively
avoided a nuclear war between Russia and the US). MacNamara went on: “in
the case of Vietnam we didn‟t know them well enough to empathise.”21
In Iraq there was the opportunity to get to know the key people in and around
Falluja. If time had been taken immediately after the invasion, and even at
later stages, to sit down and understand what local leaders needed in order to
isolate those whose main motivation was to stoke hatred, their support could
have been pivotal. Such relationships take time to build, but in an insurgency
can prove to be the best investment of time, since local people know what‟s
going on. If a mutual goal or set of goals can be established with them, with
suitable end results and advantages for their community built in, such
networks can prove much more effective than force in undermining violent
elements.
In this context, angry people are an opportunity. For example, when residents
were so incensed about the occupation of the school, there was an
opportunity to try to create dialogue. What they say about customer service –
a customer who complains and is then satisfied is much more loyal than
someone who has not complained – applies here. The people who take the
initiative to lead protests of that kind have the community‟s respect and should
be fostered as potential allies.
Going further, the Yemen example and the British experience in Northern
Ireland suggest that daring to open a dialogue with fundamentalists committed
to killing can produce profound results. It can break cycles of violence, and
start the process of re-establishing order.
2h. In inflamed situations, when the intention is to restore
order and calm, employ respect rather than force
21
Film, The Fog of War, directed by Errol Morris, released 19 December 2003
19
Experience in the different regions of Iraq demonstrated that certain types of
behavior on the part of soldiers generate more positive responses, especially
when things are tense - for example keeping weapons pointed at the ground,
wearing berets rather than helmets, taking off sunglasses when talking to
people, offering greetings in Arabic, not playing loud western music. Soldiers
must be taught in advance what cultural taboos are not to be violated, for
example that in Iraq a man‟s honour will be abused (and require retaliation) if
his wife is seen by soldiers in her nightdress.
Some of these issues could be dealt with by different kinds of operational
rules of engagement. But others would require a radically different kind of
approach, based on a root and branch overhaul of the way that soldiers are
selected, trained and socialised. This raises the question of military policy
being influenced by a set of beliefs about human behavior, in this case that
the use of force, threats and generating fear in the end may induce
submission, versus the idea that respect, consultation and inclusion are more
likely to produce co-operation.
The latter requires greater courage, perhaps, than the use of force. Here is an
example of this kind of courage on the part of an American officer, described
by Dan Baum in the New Yorker.
"During the early weeks of the Iraq war, the television set in my office was
tuned all day to CNN, with the sound muted. On the morning of April 3rd
(2003), as the Army and the Marines were closing in on Baghdad, I happened
to look up at what appeared to be a disaster in the making. A small unit of
American soldiers was walking along a street in Najaf when hundreds of Iraqis
poured out of the buildings on either side. Fists waving, throats taut, they
pressed in on the Americans, who glanced at one another in terror. I reached
for the remote and turned up the sound. The Iraqis were shrieking, frantic with
rage. From the way the lens was lurching, the cameraman seemed as
frightened as the soldiers. This is it, I thought. A shot will come from
somewhere, the Americans will open fire, and the world will witness the My
Lai massacre of the Iraq war. At that moment, an American officer stepped
through the crowd holding his rifle high over his head with the barrel pointed
to the ground. Against the backdrop of the seething crowd, it was a striking
gesture-almost Biblical. "Take a knee," the officer said, impassive behind
surfer sunglasses. The soldiers looked at him as if he were crazy. Then, one
after another, swaying in their bulky body armor and gear, they knelt before
the boiling crowd and pointed their guns at the ground. The Iraqis fell silent,
and their anger subsided. The officer ordered his men to withdraw.
”It took two months to track down Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hughes, who by
then had been rotated home. He called from his father's house, in Red Oak,
20
Iowa, en route to study at the Army War College, in Pennsylvania. I wanted to
know who had taught him to tame a crowd by pointing his rifle muzzle down
and having his men kneel. Were those gestures peculiar to Iraq? To Islam?
My questions barely made sense to Hughes. In an unassuming, persistent
Iowa tone, he assured me that nobody had prepared him for an angry crowd
in an Arab country, much less the tribal complexities of Najaf. Army officers
learn in a general way to use a helicopter's rotor wash to drive away a crowd,
he explained. Or they fire warning shots. "Problem with that is, the next thing
you have to do is shoot them in the chest." Hughes had been trying that day
to get in touch with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a delicate task that the
Army considered politically crucial. American gunfire would have made it
impossible. The Iraqis already felt that the Americans were disrespecting their
mosque. The obvious solution, to Hughes, was a gesture of respect." 22
The gathering and dissemination of detailed logistical, cultural, social and
political information, particularly to assist planning in advance of a military
intervention, is clearly essential for a successful counterinsurgency. In this
paper, however, we emphasise „human intelligence‟23 – in other words, not
just the collection and analysis of information, but the personal capacity of
soldiers to deal with insurgents and, often more importantly, the communities
in which they operate, in a humane, respectful and perceptive manner. This
capacity is shown not only to be critical to the success of a counterinsurgency
operation, but also requires as much training as conventional combat.
An increasing amount of data is now available on effective strategies for
preventing and reducing the use of terror to pursue political and territorial
conflicts. The medical profession, psychiatrists and psychologists have much
to contribute to this, since to address this broader range of factors requires a
different repertoire of methods, including the prevention of conflict,
strengthening human security and redirecting the cycles of violence through
which terrorism and repression flourish.
Part 3. What are the components of psychological
security?
22
Dan Baum, “Battle Lessons: What the generals don't know”, Annals of War, The New Yorker, 1
January 2005.
23
Human intelligence is a technical term in the intelligence world where it refers to intelligence from
human sources as opposed to intelligence from intercepts - humint and sigint. What is meant here is
something different.
21
In this section we shall consider briefly what psychological security really
means, and what are its stages and components. What is it that, when
activated, begins to break the cycle of violence and retribution?
This can perhaps best be illustrated by a story. Imprisoned on Robben Island,
Nelson Mandela was finally, after several years of asking, allowed to grow
vegetables. “Almost from the beginning of my sentence on Robben Island, I
asked the authorities for permission to start a garden in the courtyard. For
years, they refused without offering a reason. But eventually they relented,
and we were able to cut out a small garden on a narrow patch of earth against
the far wall.”
The garden was Mandela‟s baby and he was fanatical about it. It gave him a
sense of freedom and creativity, taking him back not only to his Transkei
childhood but also to the garden he tended for the headmaster of his mission
school.
“The soil in the courtyard was dry and rocky. The courtyard had been
constructed over a landfill, and in order to start my garden I had to excavate a
great many rocks to allow the plants room to grow. At the time, some of my
comrades jested that I was a miner at heart, for I spent my days at the quarry
and my free time digging in the courtyard.
The authorities supplied me with seeds…The early harvests were poor, but
they soon improved. The authorities did not regret giving permission, for once
the garden began to flourish, I often provided the warders with some of my
best tomatoes and onions…”24
The garden wasn‟t very big – about a metre wide and 25 metres long – but by
late 1975 he and the other prisoners had raised 2,000 chillies, nearly 1,000
tomatoes, some radishes, onions, sweet melons and two watermelons.
The guards were astonished and responded by granting privileges, and
treating Mandela and other prisoners in a less demeaning way. Mandela knew
that gardening – nourishing plants – also nourishes the inner part of us. It
grounds us and gets us back in touch with the earth, which is safe and stable,
when the rest of life may be chaotic or unsure.
24
Long Walk to Freedom p.
22
“To plant a seed, watch it grow, to tend it and then harvest it offered a simple
but enduring satisfaction. The sense of being the custodian of this small
patch of earth offered a small taste of freedom”.
This story contains many of the secrets of building psychological security,
which can be summarised as follows:
Dialogue plus persistence works to obtain your needs – Mandela
eventually got something he wanted, in the midst of an inhumane
system.
Psychological security depends on building communication.
Communication depends on listening to the point of view of others and
working to understand it.
Developing internal as well as external freedom – freedom within
oneself - is hard work, but essential for dismantling hatred and fear.
This internal freedom in turn made possible an extraordinary act on his
part – a demonstration of deep humanity – that led his guards to
respond in kind.
Respect is an invaluable tool. Mandela‟s gesture of respect took
both sides beyond the adversarial position, just as the US colonel
did by showing respect.
Such acts cost nothing, but require a high level of imagination,
alertness and generosity.
Building bridges of trust is a slow but cumulative process.
Building psychological security does not depend on having
physical security or even political security. Neither of these was
available to Mandela and his fellow prisoners.
Indeed, high security prisoners described their time on Robben Island with
Mandela as „our university‟. Fikile Bam - today a senior judge - and Neville
Alexander - now an academic and activist - said they learned „not to be so
self-centred, to understand other peoples‟ motives….‟.
We are not like Mandela, nor do we have to be. Building psychological
security is mostly common sense. Acting in a way that increases others'
psychological security, and ones own, is actually a real possibility for anyone,
and it can be accomplished in many significant ways without profound
personal or spiritual transformation. The most effective programmes we have
23
recorded consist of a set of practical actions and skills which can be trained
and learned, mainly by helping people to be more effective by reminding them
what they already know.
One such training is that offered by Responding to Conflict25 at Woodbrooke
College in Birmingham, where students from hotspots worldwide are enabled
to address the underlying causes of violence through skills development and
capacity building. They learn about the „technologies of respect‟ described
above, and make extensive use of case studies. Indeed most of the trainers
are themselves practitioners from the field.
Other courses now offered in various universities worldwide26 provide training
to strengthen human security and interrupt the cycles of violence through
which terrorism and repression flourish. Research27 now indicates that civil
society organisations and NGOs in conflict situations in many parts of the
world – some of which have been described in Part 2 – have understood
these skills of building psychological security. Moreover, they are practising
them to great effect.
Part 4. Implications
Terrorism and war may never be eliminated, but how we tackle them will
determine whether we exacerbate the problem. Understanding the
psychological and emotional causes of political violence is often dismissed as,
at best, a nice extra, or at worst, a harmful distraction from our real world
goals.
This paper asserts that, rather than being peripheral, the need for a sense of
human security from the ground up must be the starting point of approaches
to terror, political violence and insurgency. This is the most effective route to
lasting peace, and every one of us has a part to play. And the time is now.
The 1990s witnessed a striking change in the resolution of conflict: for the first
time more wars ended by negotiated settlement (42) than by military victory
(23). This started a trend that accelerated in the new millennium. Between
25
http://www.respond.org/
26
http://www.networkforpeace.org.uk/Peace%20ed.html
27
see www.insightonconflict.org
24
2000 and 2005, 17 conflicts ended in negotiated settlements; just four ended
in military victory.28
Nevertheless, as noted earlier, 50% of agreements break down into violence
again. There are many reasons for this, the main one being that agreements
made „at the top table‟ have often not included representatives of the affected
populations, and are therefore not accepted by them. Often peace
agreements are not well communicated to people in rural areas, where militias
and others with a vested interest in continuing to fight may be embedded.
Once again, the psychological impact of being excluded from negotiation has
been overlooked, and can lead to wrecking.
The effectiveness of non-violence
There is nevertheless already a trend recognising the effectiveness of
dialogue, negotiation, non-violence and re-assurance, rather than the use of
force. Recent research29 compared the outcomes of 285 non-violent and
violent campaigns to resist dictatorship in the 20th century and found that
major non-violent campaigns have achieved success 55% of the time,
compared to 28.4% for violent resistance campaigns.
While non-violent direct action against dictatorship is not usually seen as
prevention, the mounting power of civilian-based action over the past 70 years
is based on psychological insights and is an impressive phenomenon,
including:
the Indian Independence Movement, whereby Gandhi‟s campaign of
non-violent action ousted the British from India
the US Civil Rights Movement
the 1980s Polish Solidarity movement that ended Soviet control of
Poland
the overthrow of Philippines dictator Marcos in 1986
the 1987 non-violent movement ousting the Chilean dictator, Pinochet
collapse of Communist governments in eastern Europe - the „Velvet
Revolution‟
28
Human Security Brief 2006, Human Security Center, University of British Colombia, and the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University.
29
“Why Civil Resistance Works: the strategic logic of non-violent political conflict” Dr Maria Stephan
and Dr Erica Chenoweth (Belfer Centre, Harvard University).
25
demise of Mongolia‟s authoritarian system in 1990 via mass civilian
organisation
South Africa: the 600 civic organisations that helped avoid civil war and
enabled Mandela and De Klerk to end Apartheid 1990-94
Serbia: the student-led movement that non-violently ousted dictator
Milosevic in 2000
the Rose Revolution in Georgia, supported by civic resistance
movement Kmara
the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, supported by civic movement Pora
and many more.
The emerging role of civil society
The whole aim of conflict transformation is to deliver what is in the interest of
those in whose name it is carried out. Policy makers therefore need to take
stock of how primary stakeholders (citizens of the country in question) can
and do play the major part.
This is beginning to be recognised. For example, the „fundamental premise‟ to
the United Nations approach is that “local actors and communities are the
primary agents of sustainable peace” and therefore the UN approach is to
“enable local actors to engage in dialogue and joint conflict transformation
processes”.30
The important role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in the field of
peacebuilding is becoming more evident and is also reflected in the literature.
The World Bank report “Civil Society and Peace-building” clearly states the
significant role of CSOs in peacebuilding, listing their strengths, limitations
and challenges in comparison with those of governments.31
The International Task Force on Preventive Diplomacy, funded by the
German and Swiss Governments, is currently undertaking a systematic and
thoroughgoing analysis that indicates that wherever peacebuilding NGOs are
supported, good results follow.
30
Naivasha Synthesis Report: summary of insights from an experience-sharing and capacity
development workshop for UN conflict prevention and peace-building practitioners to enhance conflict
prevention programming, Naivasha, Kenya, 2 Nov 2007. Prepared by Chris Spies, Dynamic Stability
CC spies.c@gmail.com
31
World Bank Report Civil Society and Peace-Building No 36445-GLB, June 2006.
26
Resourcing psychological security
However, budgets for peacebuilding remain small in relation to development
and human rights budgets, and tiny compared to defence budgets. There are
either non-existent or minimal budget lines for peacebuilding within
governments, EU, UN and foundations. Consequently fundraising for
peacebuilding meets many obstacles.
More recognition needs to be given to the psychological and emotional
causes of political violence, and the cost-effectiveness of building security
from the ground up.
From what we have seen, civil society is proving to be the most inventive
sector in developing psychological security. But shortage of funds available
means that much of this creative energy is being lost, because most NGOs in
conflict areas are not receiving the small amounts of support they need.
What needs to happen?
Government departments dealing with development, defence and
foreign affairs would be well advised to open a forum where NGOs can
air and discuss their ideas, and demonstrate precisely how effective
they are in preventing killing, lowering tension or resolving conflict.
It would then be practical to set up some pilot schemes to test cost-
effectiveness, and introduce simple processes of application, screening
and accountability.
Treasury or finance departments in every country could examine the
models developed by the Swiss35 and German Governments36 for
allocating funds for civilian conflict transformation programmes.
Leaders of the medical profession could assist by underlining the
importance of psychological security in re-establishing peace and post
conflict reconstruction.
35 The Swiss Government has recently introduced peace and human rights policies amounting to a budget of 240 milllion Swiss
francs for the period 2008 – 2012. Forty per cent of this is for good offices, mediation and civilian conflict transformation
programmes, and a further 30% goes into an Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding www.eda.admin.ch
36 The German Federal Government has adopted an initial report on its crisis prevention policy and the implementation of its
Action Plan "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-conflict Peace-building" known as „Zivik‟
http://www.ifa.de/zivik/ezivik_aktuell.htm
27
Until adequate services are provided by the Armed Forces or the NHS,
medical professionals, psychologists and psychiatrists could volunteer
their help with PTSD.
They could also become involved with training the military in
communication skills, in particular the „technologies of respect‟, prior to
their deployment in areas where these skills are most needed.
The media could play a very important part in showcasing civilian as
well as military successes in building security. There are a host of
fascinating stories to be told, featuring the heroes of our age – the
unarmed ones.
Scilla Elworthy Ph.D
8,800 words approx
Dr. Scilla Elworthy founded the Oxford Research Group in 1982 to develop
effective dialogue between nuclear weapons policy-makers worldwide and their
critics. It is for this work that she was awarded the Niwano Peace Prize in 2003
and nominated three times for the Nobel Peace Prize.
In 2003 she founded Peace Direct to fund, promote and learn from peace-builders
in conflict areas; Peace Direct was named ‘Best New Charity’ at the Charity
Awards 2005. Since 2005 she has been an adviser to The Elders initiative, and in
2007 was appointed a member of the World Future Council, and the International
Task Force on Preventive Diplomacy. Her most recent book is ‘Making Terrorism
History’, (Rider 2006) co-authored with Gabrielle Rifkind.
28