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Marine Corps Intelligence History Project
2 August 2003
Objective. To research and document the evolution of Marine Corps intelligence over the past
fifty years and, concurrently, to describe my own involvement and that of others in these
activities.
Tentative Title. Marine Corps Intelligence in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century: As seen
by Participants and Supporters.
Purpose. In an organization that reveres its history, Marine Corps intelligence is a neglected
topic. The best of Marine Corps histories have little or no mention of intelligence. Articles and
student theses usually have a relatively narrow focus. The story of what happened in Marine
Corps intelligence since WWII has not been told. This will be an effort to tell the story from the
perspective of Marines from that 50 year period. This period is a convenient frame of reference
for historical purposes, since it encompasses the Cold War (the dominant event of the period),
begins with the Korean War (which I believe covers the watershed years for Marine Corps
intelligence) and concludes with the “new” wars of the 21st Century. Not least, of course, it
parallels my career in Marine Corps intelligence from enlistment in 1948, followed by nine years
of involvement while in retired status.
Experience and Motivations. I served over 45 years in Marine Corps intelligence extending over
six decades, from the 40’s to the 90’s and in 19 different grades and ranks (eight enlisted, five
commissioned and six civilian). My tours included assignments in combat/tactical intelligence,
counterintelligence, signals intelligence, amphibious reconnaissance, interrogation-translator,
and imagery intelligence. These duties frequently placed me in a position to observe or
participate in major Marine Corps operational and intelligence developments. Since retirement in
1994, I have maintained contact with Marine Corps intelligence leaders and issues and have
taken an active role in three Marine Corps intelligence associations. I have maintained a deep
interest and participation in matters pertaining to intelligence history and literature. I believe it’s
time the story of Marine Corps intelligence is told.
Concept. I will review Marine Corps intelligence evolution from the post-WWII period to the
present in two categories: chronological and topical.
Chronological. I will review each decade from the 50s to the 90s from three distinct perspectives:
the Marine Corps, Marine Corps intelligence, and personal. These perspectives will address the
national security environment and intelligence issues of each decade, and how Marine Corps
intelligence responded to these world events, intelligence issues and challenges. The source and
emphasis for the chronology will come from the words and experiences of individual Marines as
reflected in 50 years of Marine Corps Gazette articles and official Marine Corps histories. I will
review each decade’s Gazette articles first to derive a picture of overall Marine Corps issues, and
then refine the search for articles of specific intelligence content. Other sources will be reviewed
and studied, but the emphasis will be on the words, thoughts, ideas, and concerns of Marines.
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Topical. Following the chronology will be sections or chapters on the following intelligence
subjects (not all-inclusive at this time or in any order of relative importance). I will combine
traditional documentary research with personal interviews and contributions from knowledgeable
individuals. A broad range of personnel will be contacted and requested to contribute. All
disciplines, ranks, and categories will be represented to ensure a comprehensive and credible
presentation. Contributions from participants will be attributed. Biographic data will be included
on key personnel and contributors. Descriptive and relevant anecdotes will be included where
appropriate.
The Ultimate Test: Marine Corps Intelligence in support of Combat Operations.
Two Success Stories: Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) and the
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)
The Intelligence Planning Process
HQMC Staff Organization.
Fleet Marine Force Intelligence Organizations. (SRIG, Intelligence Battalion, etc.)
Intelligence Education and Training.
Intelligence Concepts and Doctrine.
Intelligence Systems.
Marine Corps Reserve Intelligence.
Women in Marine Corps Intelligence.
Intelligence in the Joint World.
Marine Corps Intelligence and the Office of Naval Intelligence
Naval and Marine Attaches
Foreign Language Programs and Issues.
Counterintelligence and Counter-terrorism.
Views of Former Marine Corps Intelligence Chiefs and Other Senior Marine Corps officers.
Key Issues for Discussion (Not all-inclusive). In addition to the Topics identified above, a
number of key issues will be explored in detailed discussions with those who agree to participate
and contribute to this work. The information and conclusions developed as a result of these
discussions will be incorporated into the final product:
The WWII legacy of Marine Corps intelligence.
The role intelligence played in the island campaigns.
.Navy and Marine Corps intelligence coordination over the period.
How these issues influenced the future development of Marine Corps intelligence.
The strengths and weaknesses of Marine Corps intelligence over the past 50 years.
How the image of intelligence changed over this period.
How commanders and “operators” viewed intelligence over the years.
How the roles of SNCOs, WOs, LDOs, and unrestricted officers may have changed over this
period.
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The role played by the Marine Corps Reserve in Marine Corps intelligence evolution.
The impact of the SRIG and Intelligence Battalions on intelligence support to deployed
forces.
The impact, if any, of folding intelligence into the C3/C4 concept.
The influence of Marine Corps intelligence in the wars and crises of the last half of the 20th
century.
Results of the Intelligence Roadmap and Intelligence Plan of the 90’s.
The future of Marine Corps intelligence.
Assistance Required. Although I have originated and intend to complete this project, it will
necessarily be a collaborative effort of many interested and motivated Marines, sister service
intelligence professionals and others. In the months ahead I will contact and request
contributions and assistance from former Marine Corps intelligence chiefs, key personnel in the
various intelligence disciplines, many of my friends from previous assignments, recognized
authorities on Marine Corps intelligence matters, and others who can offer credible, pertinent
information.. I will also request the assistance of officials at the Quantico General Gray Research
Center, the Marine Corps Historical Division, the Marine Corps Association (for Gazette articles
and research), and other military history sources.
John J. Guenther
265 Sea Woods Drive North
St. Augustine, Fl. 32080-6439
Phone: 904 471 5933
E-mail: jjg714@bellsouth.net
Steele Comments:
Two things I would like to see emphasized throughout the book:
1) Although you talk about USMC intel in a joint world, I think the whole issue of whether
USMC knows how to relate to and criticize and leverage national sources and other service
sources needs to be addressed. Apart from my own work for you and General Gray in which we
criticized the top ten national intelligence topics as being too Cold War/hard target in
orientation, and proposed more emphasis on lower tier Third World I&W to enable peaceful
preventive measures, I think a hard look at the disconnect between expeditionary intelligence
needs and actual national ability to satisfy (e.g. MC&G where we either go without maps or--on
those rare occasions when the USMC listens to me--get Russian military combat charts) needs
close attention. The US IC is not trained, equipped, organized nor constitutionally inclined to
support expeditionary intelligence. Either that has to change, or the USMC has to identify the
delta in clear cut terms and work toward devising alternative solutions that include organic
air breather imagery, organic truly tactical SIGINT, and long-term deep HUMINT networks as
well as regional OSINT centers that are operationally oriented. We still don't do provinces and
instream offload/rural airhead intelligence.
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2) Intelligence support to combat operations is one third of the picture. The other two thirds are
intelligence support to policy and intelligence support to acquisition. I think USMC intelligence
does a very poor job of helping the Commandant force key issues at the national level--USMC
is way too bureaucratic "go along, play nice". USMC should be the one voice that carries ethics,
conviction, and ground truth in every statement of every policy general. I realize PP&O and
others don't want to hear the truth, they have already made up their minds from their stupid "keep
as many trigger pullers as possible" mentality, but we have to try. In acquisition, I had my butt
chewed when I was #2 at MCIA and made the case for dumping the M1A1 tank--the tankers
were livid. It did not help that I also said this to Congressional staffers visiting Quantico. The
fact of the matter is that any system over 30 tons is totally unsuited for expeditionary operations,
and if the USMC cannot figure out what I called the basic "strategic generalizations" regarding
bridge loading and port offloading constraints, line of sight distances being under 1000 meters,
need for differing capabilities for jungle, desert, mountain, and urban warfare, then it will
never be more than "Army lite" no matter how gung ho we try to be. USMC should be
emphasizing linguists across all ranks and MOSs, FAOs as a major career track with constant use
of the language and alternatiing rotations into clandestine and open source joint and inter-agency
missions, etc. Indeed, apart from pushing for a 450-ship distributed Navy that can deliver a
platoon with a Cobra anywhere in 24 hours, a company with Harriers anywhere in 48 hours, and
a BLT(-) anywhere in 72 hours, USMC should strive to become the one service that has field
grade and SNCO across all MOS's, but especially intelligence, PAO, combat engineers cross-
trained in disaster relief, JAGs, and civil affairs, where we are as good or better than any cookie-
pushing diplomat in terms on in-country knowledge of the language, culture, history, terrain, and
personalities. USMC should be the DoD foreign service at the human level and USMC should--
as I recommended in 1990--form a very tight and special bond with Airborne, Special Forces,
and TRANSCOM. Gray understood this--50% of the time we *must* be able to arrive via
airhead because the ports are simply not there for us and we are incapable of doing a full
instream offload, beachhead landing, and cross-country movement.