Aminzade Civic Versus Ethnic Nationalism and the Politics of Exclusion

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Aminzade Civic Versus Ethnic Nationalism and the Politics of Exclusion Powered By Docstoc
					Ronald Aminzade


Chapter 1       INTRODUCTION


Civic Versus Ethnic Nationalism and the Politics of Exclusion
   In their effort to understand political communities of belonging, scholars have often
distinguished between civic and ethnic nationalism.i This dichotomy was initially
developed by Hans Kohn on the basis of his study of Eastern and Western European
history. His analysis contrasted an exclusionary ethnic nationalism based on a shared
ancestry and inherited culture, with an inclusive civic nationalism based on the will of a
people and expressed in a voluntary political union of equal rights-bearing citizens. In
Kohn’s analysis, the contrast between an ethnic and civic idea of the nation was “based
on history and particularism” for the Germans “as opposed to reason and equality in
France.”ii The dichotomy was subsequently adopted by other historians and incorporated
into political theory as well as political activism, with nationalist leaders adopting the
notion of civic nationalism as a claims-making device to legitimate their demands for
self-determination.iii A number of scholars of nationalism have revised and criticized the
civic/ethnic dichotomy, arguing that this typology provides a useful theoretical tool when
stripped of its normative and spatial assumptions. Anthony Smith insists on the value of
the civic/ethnic conceptual distinction but rejects the notion that these different
understandings of nationhood are mutually exclusive. He applies the concepts not to
make geopolitical distinctions between types of nation-states or to identify different
trajectories of nation-state formation but to identify different elements of nationalist
thought. Smith acknowledges that these elements coexist to varying degrees in concrete
cases since national identity always involves both cultural and political elements.iv
Bernard Yack also notes that all forms of nationalism rely on symbols, stories, and
cultural memories which emphasize both ethnic origins and politics to varying degrees.v
   My research on the history of Tanzanian nationalism supports the claim that concrete
forms of nationalism have different mixes of civic and ethnic forms and thus are internally
contradictory with respect to inclusiveness/exclusiveness. It explores the operation of
exclusionary politics based on nationality and race in the East African country of Tanzaniavi,



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which some scholars have categorized as an example of inclusive civic nationalism.
Tanzanian nationalism deserves our attention because it demonstrates the operation of
exclusionary processes even in relatively inclusionary nation-states and alerts us to the need to
differentiate among different consequences of and justifications for exclusion. While some
exclusionary policies may lead to massive human rights violations and genocide, others are
protective and defensive in nature, based on appeals to egalitarian redistributive principles,
racial justice, and anti-imperialism, and not productive of violence or bodily harm. This
suggests the need for a context dependent historical approach that explores the motivations,
justifications, and consequences of exclusionary measures rather than assume that all such
policies merit moral condemnation.
   The ideology of African socialism that informed the Tanzanian nationalist project for
decades was simultaneously inclusive, universalistic, and state-centered, as well as
exclusive, particularistic, and culture-centered. It insisted on the equal rights of all
citizens of the nation-state at the same time that it emphasized distinctive African cultural
values, such as communalism and collectivism, as the basis for appropriate civic
behavior. The 1961 citizenship law and the Tanzanian National Ethic, developed by a
Presidential Commission in 1964, delineated the rights and obligations of national
citizenship in a highly inclusive and universalistic manner. However, nationalist leaders
denounced those who did not share the cultural values propagated during the socialist era
as enemies of the nation and targeted them for exclusion as mere “paper citizens” whose
loyalty to the nation was questionable. Socialist era nationalism celebrated cultural
values of equality. However, it also denounced those who accumulated private capital as
blood-sucking exploiters, although the cultural values of the country’s Asian racial
minority embraced what some scholars have labeled a “quasi-Protestant ethic” that
included “a passion for accumulation.”vii
   Public policies regarding land ownership, education, and language reveal the
contradictory combination of inclusionary civic and exclusionary racial ideas and
practices. Cultural values concerning land and its meanings have been central to the
African nationalist imaginary.viii Prominent nationalist leaders like Julius Nyerere, who
advocated an inclusive liberal vision of the nation that treated all citizens equally
regardless of race, supported exclusionary policies based on race when it came to control



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over land. In 1970 his government enacted Land Laws that drew a legal distinction based
on race between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens, restricting control over land in
communal areas to “Natives”, a colonial category that had been used to designate black
Africans. Educational policies of preferential treatment based on race were also
implemented by nationalist leaders advocating the equality of all citizens regardless of
race. The Nyerere government granted preferential treatment to black African students
applying for secondary schools in 1963-64, after they did less well than their Asian
counterparts on entrance exams.ix Though espousing a conception of citizenship based
on civic loyalty rather than culture or biological descent, nationalist leaders justified such
policies both in terms of the need to prevent exploitation, address the consequences of
prior racist colonial policies, and foster cultural pride among a black African population
that had been oppressed by colonial rule.x The contradictory character of Tanzanian
nationalism was also evident in language policies, which gave citizens speaking over one
hundred ethnic languages the ability to communicate with one another in Swahili and
become included in the nation-building project. At the same time, it excluded Gujarati
speaking Asian citizens and unschooled African villagers who spoke only their local
language. In short, Tanzanian nationalists created an inclusive political community based
on the equal rights of all citizens regardless of ethnicity or racial descent, but they
engaged in a variety of exclusionary practices in doing so.
   Historical writings on nation-building have typically emphasized either the inclusive
or exclusive dimensions of the process rather than exploring them simultaneously.
Historical accounts of citizenship in Europe often emphasized the progressive inclusion
of growing numbers of people into the political community of the nation and the
democratic extension of political, civic, and social rights. They characterize national
identities as a force for community building and for the creation of bonds of mutual trust
across class, racial, ethnic, gender, and religious divisions. Nationalist discourses
expressing the desire to create a self-governing political community have offered an
emotionally powerful and historically connected language of patriotism that can foster a
sense of responsibility to promote the common good, active participation in community
life, and the placement of public responsibilities before private interests.xi Historically
nationalism emerged in tandem with struggles for democracy and it has been closely



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connected to popular struggles for political participation and rights, with the boundaries
of the nation defining “the people” claiming the right to self-government.xii During the
era of Africa’s anti-colonial liberation struggles, the positive community- building,
democratic, and inclusive features of nationalism received much attention. However,
post-colonial scholarly work has emphasized exclusion and intolerance as key features of
African nation building. Ethnic, racial, and religious antagonisms were expressed in
bloody civil wars and genocides following the establishment of nation-states across the
continent. Scholars have lamented the “curse of the nation-state” in Africa as “the black
man’s burden” and focused attention on nationalism’s violent and exclusionary
dimensions.xiii
   The process of developing rules governing membership in a national community, i.e.
national citizenship, always involves exclusive as well as inclusive dimensions. The
building of a nation, in other words, requires the creation of “others” who are outside the
boundaries of the political community. As Charles Tilly observed, nations are
necessarily exclusive in that they are communities of individuals who claim to be united
by certain characteristics that differentiate them from others. Nation building, he writes,
is a process based on “the drawing and politicization of us-them boundaries, the
exclusion of visible others [and] the foundation of membership on not being something
else.”xiv Love of one’s country is typically accompanied by fear or hostility toward those
perceived to pose internal or external threats to the nation. That hostility may be
expressed in various practices and policies of exclusion. These range from collective
violence to territorial expulsion to public policies restricting access to land, property
ownership, jobs, education, legal protection, political participation, or social welfare.
   Tanzania provides an important case for studying exclusionary processes in the
construction of the nation given that it is frequently cited as one of the few cases of
inclusive civic nationalism in Africa. “Few countries in the world can match Tanzania’s
record of inclusion,” writes Godfrey Mwakikagile. “And it is not uncommon to hear
people from other countries who have lived in Tanzania say, `There is no racism and
tribalism in Tanzania.”xv While many other African nations have experienced violent
ethnic conflicts that have produced divisive fissures in the nation-state, Tanzania
witnessed a successful nation-building project in an ethnically diverse society.



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Neighboring Kenya has been repeatedly plagued by politicized ethnic violence, including
a 2007 general election in which an estimated 1,000 people were killed and 600,000
displaced. Tanzania has been relatively immune from such ethnic violence. Although
Tanzania had a colonial history of racial formation similar to that of Kenya and Uganda,
unlike its East African neighbors Tanzania did not experience any anti-Asian race riots
from 1965 to 1992. Some Asian-Tanzanians attained high-ranking ministerial positions
within the post-colonial government, which repeatedly issued appeals for racial harmony.
Foreigners from other African countries that had not yet achieved independence from
colonial rule were welcomed as liberation struggle heroes and Western expatriates played
a prominent role in the nation’s public university.
   While this sketch suggests a portrait of harmony, inclusiveness, and civic nationalism,
an in-depth historical analysis offers a much more complex picture. Despite a nationalist
master narrative that denies their presence, exclusionary policies based on race and
nationality have been persistent features of political contention among Tanzanian
nationalist leaders. A close look at the historical record suggests ongoing conflicts over
race and nationality expressed in public policy debates in which Asians and foreigners
have been targeted for exclusion.xvi Those who portray Tanzania as a model of civic
inclusion typically focus on outcomes, such as the inclusive 1961 citizenship legislation,
rather than on the process that produced such outcomes. This process entailed intense
divisions among nationalist leaders over exclusionary policies targeting foreigners and
the Asian racial minority. Once we turn our attention to those historical processes, it
becomes clear that exclusion based on race and nationality has played a central role in
Tanzanian’s nation-building project. My argument is that exclusionary public policies
targeting purported internal and external enemies played as central a role in fostering a
strong national identity among the territory’s culturally diverse population as did
inclusionary measures, such as government efforts to provide schools, clinics, and clean
water for all citizens. In other words, the successful creation of a pan-ethnic nation-state
and of a strong national identity that transcended ethnic loyalties was predicated in large
part on the political construction of internal and external enemies of the nation, defined in
terms of race and nationality.




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Imagined Communities and the Contentious Politics of Citizenship
   Just as the history of the formation of national states in Western Europe has been
written with a focus on victors rather than losers,xvii historians of nation-building and
citizenship in Africa have typically ignored or downplayed the voices of those who
offered unsuccessful alternative visions of the nation. In doing so, they have relied
heavily on the master narratives of nationalist movements, which provide histories that
ignore conflicts among nationalist leaders by silencing the voices of those who imagined
alternative communities of the nation.xviii Ernest Renan emphasized the importance of
forgetting as well as remembering in the creation of national identities, arguing:
“Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the
creation of a nation….”xix This forgetting extends beyond the “deeds of violence”
highlighted by Renan to include historical amnesia concerning conflicts and divisions
among nationalist leaders who imagined different political communities. Silence with
respect to those who advocated different visions of the nation is not at all surprising,
given that a central focus of nationalist mobilizations is the creation of national unity
among populations divided by race, ethnicity, gender, class, religion, generation, and
ideology. Paying attention to those defeated actors does not mean that we sympathize
with their goals or tactics. It does mean that we come to appreciate historical outcomes
as a product of conflict rather than the inevitable unfolding of grand historical laws.
   Anthony Smith defines a nation as “a named human population sharing an historic
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common
economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”xx In Tanzania, these
territorial, cultural, economic, and legal-political components of the nation were all
subject to intense political contestation among nationalist leaders before and after
independence. Leaders debated pan-Africanism and British Commonwealth
membership, the appropriate elements of a national culture, economic development
policies, and the rights that should be accorded to citizens and non-citizens. Throughout
the colonial, state socialist, and neo-liberal eras, Tanzanian nationalist leaders disagreed
about the identification of allies and enemies of the nation, fighting over which foreigners
should be welcomed as allies, or as fellow citizens in the case of Zanzibar, and which
should be rejected and punished as enemies. They also fought over which strategies



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should be used in dealing with foreign governments, who should be allowed access to
national citizenship via naturalization and how difficult the process should be, and what
rights should be granted to foreigners rather than reserved exclusively for citizens.
Appealing to notions of national sovereignty and self-reliance, many nationalist leaders
contended that non-citizens should be denied the right to take jobs in the civil service,
manage state-owned industries, teach at institutions of higher learning, own small
businesses, and reside as refugees on the national territory.
   Although nation-building entails a concerted effort to create unity among the
culturally diverse populations of a given territory, my research analyzes nationalism
through the lens of contentious politics, analyzing political conflicts among nationalist
leaders over the meaning and boundaries of belonging to the nation. These conflicts
involved struggles not only over who merited membership in the imagined community of
the nation and what rights should be granted to non-members, but also over which
political, economic, and cultural rights should be granted by the state to those who were
certified as citizens. Tanzania’s nationalist leaders disagreed about whether restrictions
on civic rights- i.e. freedom of the press and speech- were necessitated by the threat
posed by imperialist enemies of the nation and they disputed the need for restricting
political rights, by implementing a single party system, to preserve national unity. These
disagreements, as well as fights over whether a leadership code restricting the right of
government and party officials to own private property and acquire personal wealth, led
to the treason trial of prominent nationalist leaders in 1968. In addition to disputing what
form of the state was necessary to preserve the nation and ensure non-corrupt leadership,
nationalists also fought over whether members of the Asian racial minority who had
acquired citizenship after independence should be granted the same rights as black
Africans. During the state socialist era, nationalist leaders disputed the obligations of
citizenship, with leaders contending that the failure of Asian-Tanzanian citizens to
actively participate in the mass rallies and public rituals of nation-building was evidence
of their lack of patriotism and grounds for limiting their rights. Conflict was also evident
in socialist efforts to create a national culture, which generated heated debates over which
elements of foreign culture- from business suits to mini-skirts and bell bottom pants-




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should be emulated and borrowed as symbols of a modern nation and which should be
rejected as alien imports that were incompatible with the national culture.
   My approach to the study of citizenship and exclusion is based on three distinct claims.
First, the “us” of a national community is constituted in large part by actions targeting the
“them” of non-members. Such a relational rather than categorical approach to citizenship
suggests the need to move beyond studies of the shifting civic, political, and social rights of
citizens in democratic societies to an analysis of the extension or denial of rights to non-
citizens. In post-colonial settings, foreign states typically continue to exercise considerable
power over their former colonial territories, most of which occupy subordinate positions in
the global economy as exporters of raw materials. Citizenship issues are therefore likely to
include contentious debates over the rights of others- framed in terms of anti-imperialism,
national sovereignty, and development imperatives- rather than focus exclusively on the rights
of citizens. Tanzanian citizenship debates were not only about citizens, but also about
whether foreign investors, expatriates, and refugees should exercise certain rights, such as the
right to own property, the right to hold jobs in nationalized industries, and the right to
residence on the national territory. Second, studies of citizenship need to be attentive to
internal as well as external others, that is, to the creation of internal “us-them” boundaries
involving “second class” citizens, or internal others, who, on the basis of race, ethnicity, class,
religion, gender, or sexuality, are excluded in practice from the rights guaranteed in theory to
all citizens. A central feature of citizenship debates in Tanzania concerned whether members
of the country’s Asian racial minority who had acquired citizenship should have the same
rights as “indigenous” black African citizens. Third, although citizenship involves national
politics and the creation of national political communities of belonging, regional and global
forces decisively shape domestic political debates over citizenship and exclusion. Debates
over Tanzanian citizenship cannot be understood outside of an international context, including
Cold War neo-colonialism and imperialism in southern Africa, international financial
institutions involved in the transition from state socialism to neo-liberal capitalism, the global
wave of democratization of the late 20th century, and civil wars and genocides in neighboring
Burundi and Rwanda.




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The Dynamics of Political Contention: A Dialectical Approach
   Dialectical analysis, or the exploration of contradictions embedded in social life,
provides a powerful tool for exploring the dynamics of political change. Although the
nature and consequences of contradictions vary across time and space, the assumption of
contradictions suggests the simultaneous presence of opposing forces that reproduce and
undermine a political system. My research highlights a contradiction between economic
and political processes, i.e. between capital accumulation in a global economy and
political legitimation in a nation-state, because this contradiction generated intense
political conflicts that decisively shaped the trajectory of nation building in Tanzania.
The term capital accumulation refers to the creation of wealth via the investment of
income, savings, or profits. Since the expansion of government tax revenues depends on
economic growth, which in turn depends on the accumulation of capital, government
officials have a vested interest in promoting capital accumulation, by encouraging
domestic or foreign investments and securing development aid from abroad. Scholarly
works that have explored the accumulation/legitimation contradiction have focused on
European and U.S. welfare states and advanced industrial societies, rather than on post-
colonial states located on the periphery of the global economy that have limited
concentrations of domestic capital largely controlled by a politically vulnerable racial
minority.xxi While providing important insights into changing forms of the state in
advanced capitalist societies and the fiscal crises faced by 20th century Western welfare
states, they have not explored the distinctive character and political manifestations of this
contradiction in the context of post-colonial nation-building projects. In a context of low
incomes, limited savings, and relatively few highly profitable domestic enterprises, post-
colonial governments are likely to look beyond as well as within the boundaries of the
nation-state in their efforts to promote capital formation and to seek foreign aid as well as
investments. This means that questions of political legitimacy are likely to focus on the
rights and privileges of foreigners and their proper role in economic development and
nation-building and to highlight issues of national self-reliance and economic
dependency. In a context of dependent development on the periphery of a global
capitalist system, even efforts to promote domestic capital accumulation, by local cash




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crop farmers, landlords, and traders, are oriented toward gaining access to foreign
markets.
   Social processes, such as capital accumulation and political legitimation, are
contingently rather than inevitably contradictory. The existence and intensity of the
contradiction depends on historical context. Under some conditions, robust capital
accumulation and the economic growth it generates can contribute to political
legitimation rather than undermine it, especially when the fruits of economic growth are
widely diffused throughout the population. However, under historical conditions in
which the process of capital accumulation is heavily dependent on the nation’s external
and internal others, due to limited concentrations of capital and a domestic bourgeoisie
dominated by a racial minority, and the benefits of economic growth are limited to a
privileged minority rather than the poor majority, the contradiction is likely to be intense.
In their attempt to develop the economy from a peripheral and dependent position in a
world capitalist system, post-colonial states need to attract the capital necessary for
economic growth from foreign donors and investors or from wealthy domestic capitalists
with global connections. This poses a serious challenge to political legitimacy, especially
when political leaders have embraced national self-reliance and an end to alien rule to
legitimate their power and have made greater racial and class equality a central political
goal. My research on colonial, state socialist, and neo-liberal Tanzania documents the
changing saliency of this contradiction over time, its role in shaping conflicts among
nationalist leaders over the rights of citizens and non-citizens, and its institutional
expression within the state.
   In exploring the history of Tanzanian nation-building, I conceptualize the post-colonial
state not as a unified entity but as a differentiated terrain of contestation. A central division
within the Tanzanian state pitted party leaders and elected members of parliament against
government bureaucrats. The former were focused on mobilizing support and securing
legitimacy among poor rural farmers, who constituted the vast majority of voters. They were
less concerned with technical rationality and problem-solving expertise than with mobilizing
ideological commitments. Government bureaucrats were focused on maintaining public order
and property rights, which were necessary to ensure business confidence, secure foreign
investments, and grow the economy. Whereas party leaders were often suspicious of wealthy



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foreign investors and of Asian-Tanzanian businessmen with transnational connections, senior
government bureaucrats typically adopted a more inclusive view of the role of foreigners and
Asian-Tanzanians in the nation-building project, because of the potential role these two
groups might play in providing the investments and expertise necessary to develop a modern
economy and generate tax revenues. Different priorities and commitments engendered by
institutional locations and social backgrounds meant that leaders of the government
bureaucracy were more likely to embrace a vision of economic development that remained
open to foreign capital and to domestic economic elites with transnational connections. High
ranking party leaders, however, were more likely to embrace popular ideas of national self-
reliance that highlighted the exploitation of nations in the global South by foreign capitalist
powers. Elected officials often sought political legitimacy among a black African majority by
appealing to racial hatreds toward Asians, which were based on jealousy stemming from
economic disparities and stereotypes about insurmountable cultural differences.
   Racial hostility toward Asians was rooted in a colonial order that treated ethnicity and
race as distinctive legal categories, assigning Africans to tribes and non-Africans to racial
groups. All of Tanzania’s approximately 120 ethnic groups were considered by colonial
rulers to be “indigenous”, with ethnicity marking internal differences among black
Africans and race distinguishing them from “non-indigenous” Asian and European
settlers.xxii Alongside a distinction between “Natives” and “Non-Natives”, used to
allocate general rights and privileges, British colonialism constructed the legal categories
of a tripartite racial order in East Africa, constituting Asians (i.e., people of Indian and
Pakistani origin), Europeans (i.e., all whites), and Africans (i.e., all blacks) as distinct
races, despite tremendous cultural variation within each group. Black Africans were the
primary targets of colonial racist practices, which were rooted in a widely shared belief
among Asians and Europeans that racial differences could be ranked as inferior and
superior and that black Africans belonged at the bottom of the racial hierarchy.xxiii Most
black Africans held various stereotypes about Asians as dishonest, greedy, untrustworthy,
and unpatriotic.xxiv
   Given the relatively small number of Asians living in Tanzania, it seems somewhat
odd that politicians frequently appealed to anti-Asian hatreds in their quest for popular
support and political legitimacy. Although Asians wielded tremendous economic power,



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dominating wholesale and retail trade, they constituted a very small part (approximately
2-3%) of the country’s predominantly rural population around the time of
independence.xxv Since most Asians lived in urban areas, the vast majority of black
Africans had few day-to-day interactions with Asian-Tanzanians, especially after Asian
merchants were driven out of the countryside into urban areas by the growth of the
cooperative movement. Just as anti-Semitism thrived in European countries in which
Jews constituted a relatively small percentage of the population, anti-Asian racism
persisted among Tanzania’s overwhelming rural population, despite the very small
number of Asians living in the countryside. This is not at all surprising if we accept
Herbert Blumer’s claims about racial prejudice as a sense of group position and a product
of the process by which racial groups form images of themselves and others. This
collective process, noted Blumer, operates through the public pronouncements of
prominent elites who create abstract images of racial groups as entities that transcend
experiences with individual group members.xxvi
   The racial hatreds to which nationalist politicians appealed in their effort to secure
political legitimacy and popular support were in large part a product of the way in which
political leaders and public policies helped to construct negative images of this minority
racial group. Whether grievances over high prices, widespread corruption, or continuing
poverty were popularly understood as racial or class in origin depended on a political
process of meaning construction in which the competing interpretations of political
leaders played a central role. Nationalist politicians often reinforced popular stereotypes
of Asians as unpatriotic exploiters who sucked up the nation’s wealth at the expense of
the poor black African masses. In arguing that race was central to the efforts of the
Tanzanian politicians to secure popular legitimacy, my intent is not to reduce class to
race or to displace a misguided class reductionism with racial reductionism. Rather than
debate whether race or class matters, or which matters more, we need to explore the
varied ways in which they are connected in different times and places and recognize race,
as well as class, as key structuring principles of modern societies and global politics with
their own specific effects.xxvii Class inequalities underpinned African hostility toward
Asians, but the targeting of Asians, including those who had lived for generations in East




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Africa, connected racial differences to strong feelings of belonging and territoriality that
have always provided an emotional foundation for xenophobia.
   Appeals to anti-foreign sentiments, and calls for exclusionary policies based on
nationality, also played an important role in leaders’ quest for political legitimacy and
popular support. Although all forms of nationalism entail exclusionary boundaries
distinguishing citizens from foreigners, the forms, targets, and causes of exclusion vary
considerably. In the case of Tanzania, most demands for exclusionary practices targeting
foreigners, such as calls to prevent foreigners from ownership of scarce natural resources,
were defensive in character and did not lead to violence or bodily harm. Others were
generated by anti-foreign sentiments aroused in a defensive response to external attacks
by colonial and fascist enemies. During the socialist era, fear and hatred of foreigners
was aroused by the military incursions of colonial Portuguese armed forces crossing the
border from Mozambique and by military aggression against the national territory by
armed forces of the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.
   In exploring the way in which nationalist politicians have attempted to secure political
legitimacy, my research distinguishes between appeals to race and nationality, even
though many scholars have called this distinction into question. Jonathan Glassman
argues that “there is no firm line between national thought and racial thought, and a racial
paradigm of exclusion and dehumanization is implicit in virtually all nationalist projects,
even the most liberal.”xxviii Other scholars have argued that a “neo-racism” has emerged
in the contemporary era that is rooted in cultural differences rather than biological
heredity and, as a discourse of difference, is indistinguishable from xenophobia.xxix
These arguments have the virtue of pointing to the cultural dimensions of racism and
nationalism, their close relationship as ways of thinking about difference and categorizing
people, and their exclusionary claims-making focused on rights allocated by the nation-
state. They alert us to the ways in which these ambiguous and flexible languages of
belonging and exclusion are often overlapping, reinforcing, and rooted in a similar
psychology. However, an emphasis on the similarity of racial and nationalist discourses
runs the risk of mistakenly equating animosities and exclusions based on race and
nationality. A blurring of the boundaries occurs in some times and places, but the
relationship between the “othering” of racial minorities and of foreigners is variable



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across time and space. The foreign other is often but not always racialized and the racial
other can be a citizen rather than an alien. Nations, unlike races, are envisioned in
nationalist ideology as communities that exercise political sovereignty and self-
determination in a system of nation-states.xxx Leaders of the independence movement in
Tanganyika targeted racial minorities as well as foreigners, portraying those minorities as
foreigners and thus conflating race and nationality. However, post-colonial nationalist
leaders often made a clear distinction between race and nationality. They constructed
foreigners as a threat not because of their race but on account of their neo-colonialist and
imperialist role in the international system of nation-states. In Tanzania, African-Asian
race relations were more focused on relations of economic exploitation and social
inequality rather than on inter-state relations. While the foreign policies of colonialist
and imperialist European states were central to mobilizing anti-foreign sentiments, India
and Pakistan’s foreign policies had relatively little impact on Tanzanian race relations.
Anti-Asian hatred was rooted in animosities generated by racially-based domestic
inequalities of class, status, and power not by the policies of the Indian state in the
international arena.
   Just as racial categories are sometimes informed by cultural differences associated
with being foreign, the categorization of foreigners is often, but not always, informed by
racial understandings and antagonisms. Some exclusionary demands targeting foreigners
appeal to both racial and anti-foreign hostilities while others do not. For example, anti-
Asian racial nationalist politicians advocating indigenization policies during the early
1990s, like Christopher Mtikila, utilized a discourse that categorized Asian-Tanzanians as
foreigners and tapped into both racist and xenophobic sentiments. However, during the
late 1960s, the demand made by Marxist-Leninist students at the University of Dar es
Salaam, some of whom were Asian-Tanzanian, to exclude foreigners from teaching at the
university was motivated by animosity toward the neo-colonialist and imperialist policies
of Western foreign states, not by racial hatred toward white people.


The Nation Building Process: Leadership, Institutions, and Contentious Politics
   In exploring the long-term trajectory of nation building in East Africa, an obvious
question arises concerning why Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya followed different



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historical paths. By the time of independence, racial hatreds targeting Asians were a
pervasive feature of social life in all three countries. Available survey research suggests
that most Africans, including highly educated Africans, accepted stereotypes of Asians as
greedy, crafty, dishonest, and unpatriotic. Yet African racial hatreds toward Asians did
not produce the same patterns of exclusion in the independent nation-states of East
Africa. Kenya had the largest Asian population in East Africa, with 139,037 Asians
enumerated in the 1969 census, 60,994 of whom were Kenyan citizens.xxxi Asian-Kenyan
citizens did not have the same rights as black African citizens, who were granted
preferential treatment with respect to government loans and extension services. Asians
who sought citizenship faced numerous bureaucratic delays and obstacles. By 1967 there
were 14,000 unprocessed applications for citizenship and many Asians had already
waited more than three years for citizenship.xxxii Kenya enacted an exclusionary Trade
Licensing Act in 1967 that prohibited non-citizens from engaging in a variety of
economic activities, including trade in basic commodities.xxxiii The result was an Asian
exodus from Kenya beginning in December 1967. Acquisition of Kenyan citizenship
was no guarantee of human rights. Two Asian citizens were deported from Kenya in
1966 simply on the grounds that they were “disloyal and disaffected toward the
government”.xxxiv In 1974 the Kenyan government decreed that only Africans could
engage in the trade of locally produced consumer goods, barring even those Asians who
had acquired citizenship from these business activities. Many Asians were forced out of
business, had to bribe politicians to remain in business, or had to sell their businesses to
politically connected black Africans.
  The situation for the Asian minority was even worse in neighboring Uganda, where
nationalists launched an eight month boycott of Asian shops that drove many out of
business in 1959.xxxv The Ugandan government of Idi Amin declared war on Asian
economic domination and all Asians, both citizens and non-citizens, were expelled from
the country in 1972.xxxvi Tanzania, in contrast to Kenya and Uganda, followed a different
trajectory, despite widespread African racial animosities toward the privileged Asian
minority. At the time of independence in 1961, many prominent politicians advocated
Africanization policies and opposed full citizenship rights for Asians. However, the
newly independent government rejected rapid Africanization and racially based



                                                                                           15
citizenship and it did not enact exclusionary policies targeted at its Asian racial minority.
Julius Nyerere, the country’s President, vehemently denounced racial discrimination and
an Asian citizen, Amir Jamal, held several high-ranking ministerial positions within the
government, including Minister of Finance.

   Why did Tanzania not experience the extensive racial violence and massive human
rights violations against the Asian racial minority that took place in neighboring
countries? This is a puzzle, given that Tanzania inherited the same colonial tripartite
racial order, demographic patterns of migration that brought Indians to the continent were
similar, and racial nationalism played a prominent role in the Tanzanian independence
movement. My argument is that an adequate solution to this puzzle must take into
account the role of political leadership. Political leaders matter more at some times and
in some places than others. In the case of Tanzania, the charismatic leadership and
powerful moral rhetoric of Julius Nyerere decisively shaped the outcome of conflicts
among nationalist leaders over race, nation, and citizenship at key turning points in
Tanzanian history. An understanding the role of Nyerere’s charismatic leadership is
critical to explaining the gap between strong popular support for exclusionary measures
targeting Asians and foreigners and the more inclusive public policies pursued by the
government. Nyerere vehemently condemned nationalist efforts to prevent Asians from
acquiring citizenship or to limit their rights as citizens and rejected attempts to prevent
non-citizens from participating in the national economy as investors, managers, technical
experts, and tourists. In response to the racist and xenophobic outbursts that followed the
Arusha Declaration of socialism in 1967, he argued that “socialism has nothing to do
with race, nor with country of origin.” The Arusha Declaration, he noted, “talks of
socialism and capitalism, of socialists and capitalists. It does not talk about racial groups
or nationalities.”xxxvii Nyerere was staunchly committed to racial equality and to the quest
for modernity and economic development, which, he contended, could be fostered by
welcoming foreign experts and managers.

   While we should not revive “great person” theories of history by limiting our attention
to individualist accounts of the personal traits of influential leaders, we must recognize
the power of charismatic leaders in fluid and often ambiguously defined situations. In



                                                                                              16
situations where institutional structures concentrate political power into the hands of a
small number of people, dynamic leaders can, at key conjunctures, determine trajectories
of political change. Nyerere’s heightened agency as a leader was due in large part to the
institutional structure of the single party socialist state and the political culture of a
predominantly rural society. State structure, which included a very strong executive
branch and relatively weak parliament and subservient judiciary, facilitated the agency of
the President, who served as the top leader of both the ruling party and the government
bureaucracy and was thus able to play a decisive role in adjudicating conflicts between
party leaders and government officials. Nyerere’s charismatic authority was exercised in
a cultural context in which rural peasants, who constituted a majority of the population,
embraced a personalized politics rooted in an informal “economy of affection”. The latter
granted authority to charismatic leaders who appealed to ‘age-old rules and powers” in
their efforts to “reinvent something genuinely African”.”xxxviii As my analysis in chapter
five documents, Nyerere was masterful in wedding a modernist nationalist project to
traditional African cultural idioms and practices. Nyerere’s charismatic leadership
proved decisive at certain turning points, but the collective political action of his
followers and opponents shaped and constrained his decisions, including his desire to
incorporate racial minorities into his political party, which he reluctantly delayed for
many years, and his decision to temporarily resign from the government in early 1962.

   Scholars of nationalism have often ignored the role of political parties and party
competition in creating national identities, focusing more on the constraints and
opportunities imposed by structural relations of the global economy and international
relations. While acknowledging these constraints, my account treats political parties as
key actors in the creation of policies that governed access to membership in the national
community and laws that defined the rights of citizens and non-citizens. It explores
nationalism through the lens of contentious politics, analyzing divisions within the state,
and within political parties, and their consequences for the trajectory of nation building.
Political parties are institutionally separate from, but intimately connected to, government
bureaucracies. The rigidity or fuzziness of this institutional boundary varies over time
and place. Given that political parties typically have some degree of institutional
autonomy, the relationship between ruling party leaders and government officials


                                                                                             17
involves conflict as well as cooperation. My research focuses on the conflict, since this
has been a central source of policy contradictions and changes in Tanzania. Governments
rely on parties to provide leaders by nominating candidates and engaging in electoral
campaigns, but parties operate according to different institutional constraints than
government bureaucracies. Whereas parties need to mobilize broad popular among
citizens in order to win elections, the constituencies of government bureaucracies extend
beyond the electorate and outside the boundaries of the nation. They include foreign
actors, including donors and international financial institutions, which provide resources
necessary to keep the government operating. As a result, legislators and government
officials often disagreed about nation-building and citizenship, debating alternative
definitions of political community and embracing different views concerning the rights
and obligations of non-citizens.

   Scholarship on social movements has typically highlighted claims-making by
disadvantaged minorities engaged in disruptive public protests that are sustained over
time and loosely coordinated at a national level.xxxix Although the nationalist movement
for independence from colonial rule mobilized territory-wide popular opposition to a
foreign-imposed colonial order with a variety of disruptive protest tactics, ranging from
boycotts and marches to strikes and tax rebellions, this movement was rapidly
transformed into a post-colonial political party that subordinated civil society to
authoritarian rule and suppressed organized dissent. In state socialist Tanzania, political
claims-making took on a different form from colonial era protests, given the context of a
relatively strong state and weak civil society, a participatory political culture, and a ruling
party adept at selectively co-opting opposition claims. Non-institutionalized politics
became episodic rather than sustained, local or regional rather than national in scope, and
more focused on noncompliance with state imposed rules or disengagement from the
state than on disruptive public challenges to state policies. Authoritarian state rule meant
that popular opposition was limited and was either expressed surreptitiously, deployed as
part of a quest for economic survival in an informal economy, or expressed in a form that
affirmed rather than challenged stated government goals.xl When collective political
actions in response to state socialist failures posed a potential threat, they were effectively
co-opted by the state. This was the case, for example, with the Sungu Sungu vigilante


                                                                                            18
police forces created by poor village communities in the Sukuma region during the early
1980s to combat cattle theft, which became incorporated into official village security
forces in 1983. During the neo-liberal era, popular protests were more disruptive, with
violent protests targeting Asian shopkeepers as well as foreign multinational mining
corporations and Asian commercial farmers. However, they remained episodic rather
than sustained in character and closely linked to the institutionalized politics of parties
and elections.xli

   “Contentious politics,” argue Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “is not always a story
of neatly divided antagonists, with representatives of the state or dominant classes posed
on one side and members of the popular classes on the other. Sometimes resistance
depends on the discontented locating and exploiting divisions within the state.”xlii
Popular resistance to government policies in Tanzania frequently took advantage of
divisions within the state, between the ruling party and the government, and in doing so
engaged in a form of contentious politics that O’Brien and Li, in their study of rural
China, characterize as “rightful resistance”. This is a form of contentious politics that
“operates near the boundary of authorized channels, employs the rhetoric and
commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on locating and
exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from the wider
public.”xliii In pursuing their claims, protesters often challenged the Tanzanian
government to do what it had publicly promised in its official ideology and adhere to its
stated principles. Thus, for example, when workers engaged in wildcat strikes in their
government-run factories in 1971, they called on the socialist government to live up to its
stated commitment to worker’s control of the means of production. Similarly, when
NGO leaders confronted the neo-liberal government over its land and mining policies in
2001, they did so using rhetoric that urged the government to adhere to the ideals it had
espoused to legitimate its rule. The Chair of the Journalists Environmental Association
of Tanzania (JET), Balinagwe Mwambungu, in calling on the government to respond to
claims regarding human rights abuses by foreign mining companies, told the President to
consider civil society organizations “not as political enemies, but as key allies in the
nurturing of democracy, the rule of law and transparency in decision-making….” “Some



                                                                                              19
critics,” he stated, “think that we, civil organizations, oppose the government. Actually
we are helping it carry out its function properly.”xliv
   The regime change that took place in Tanzania after three decades of socialist rule was
initiated from above, not below, in response not to popular protests but to the
institutionalized contentious politics of the ruling party and government. Despite the
rebirth of civil society during the neo-liberal era, which witnessed increased freedoms of
speech, assembly, association, and the press and greater space for disruptive public
protests, political parties continued to decisively shape political life. Political protests
were often quasi-institutionalized and closely tied to weak opposition parties and their
main consequence was to influence institutionalized politics, as government and ruling
party officials responded to criticism by altering their programs and agendas to
incorporate the issues and grievances. The state continued to deal effectively with
protests by adopting what Katabaro Miti calls a “consensus political style” entailing
“cooptation of compromising elements, concession- giving in to certain demands of the
opposition and coercion of the uncompromising elements.”xlv Public protests were brief
outbursts of popular anger, not the sustained collective action that characterizes social
movements, and they were followed by the government’s cooptation of grievances rather
than by regime change. Thus, for example, the main consequence of the street protests
that demanded the exclusion of Asian-Tanzanians from certain rights of citizenship in the
early 1990s was that the ruling party adopted an alternative version of indigenization into
its platform and the government then attempted to implement exclusionary policies
targeting foreigners based on this altered definition of the term indigenous. Again, the
central challenge to the government came not from disruptive public protests but from
within the ruling party. Small protests contested the consequences of neo-liberal policies
and raised the issues of racial inequality, foreign domination, and high level corruption.
Given the need for democratically elected officials to be responsive to popular concerns,
these protests had an important impact with respect to public policy making. They forced
a government with a professed commitment to national self-reliance and the creation of a
developmental state to more directly intervene in the economy and to reverse course on a
number of key issues, including mining and natural resource policies.




                                                                                               20
History, Sociology, and the Study of Nationalism
   Most theorizing about nationalism and nation-building has been based on studies of
the European experience and Africa has been absent or marginalized in these academic
discussions. In contrast to the European cases that inform sociological theories of
nationalism, African nationalism was the product of a dependent colonial form of
capitalist economic development based on racist thought and practice as well as of a
modern political ideology of development adopted and spread by Western educated
political elites situated in pre-industrial societies and a modern world system of nation-
states. Given the arbitrarily imposed territorial boundaries of colonial rule, the claims of
African nationalists were often not rooted in the existence of a common culture,
language, or tradition but in a common history of oppression by foreigners of a different
race. The historical study of African nationalism can thus make one more attentive to the
assumptions, problems, and silences of a Eurocentric literature, including assumptions
about ethnicity as the necessary core of nationality, conflations of race and ethnicity, and
silences concerning the central role of colonialism, imperialism, and racism in the
creation of modern nation-states.xlvi
   The Euro-centric focus of much political theorizing is evident in world polity theory.
This theory highlights the spread of global models that are appropriated through cultural
diffusion processes as nation-states adopt norms and scripts that are created and
propagated by international organizations.xlvii The focus is on Western trans-national
actors and scripts, international rather than national issue constructions, and consensus-
based diffusion mechanisms. While highlighting the spread of global norms that are
Western in origin, the theory ignores or marginalizes global scripts, such as anti-
imperialism, that originate in the global South and are primarily spread by non-Western
global actors and institutions. By focusing on global rather than national processes and
on consensus rather than conflict, it ignores the way in which national and local actors
and institutions in the global South reject or modify global norms and the conflict-ridden
nature of this process. In Africa as elsewhere in the world, domestic actors imported
global discourses into national political debates, but such discourses were challenged by
competing discourses of racial redress (e.g. Africanization) and anti-imperialism and
altered by national political dynamics.



                                                                                             21
   Although citizenship, or membership in political communities, spans a range of spaces,
from the local to the global, the nation has become a central locus of political community
around the globe, providing a key source of political belonging and identification in the
modern world. The relatively limited scholarship on citizenship in Africa has highlighted the
tension between local, ethnic, and republican conceptions and practices of belonging to
political communities and alternative national, trans-ethnic, and liberal understandings and
practices.xlviii Studies have explored the results of this tension in terms of various dualisms,
conceptualized as dual publics, dual citizenship, and a bifurcated state.xlix My research
examines another key tension that has informed conflicts over citizenship in Africa but
received less scholarly attention- the contradiction between capital accumulation in a global
economy and political legitimation in the nation-state- which produced conflicts among
nationalist leaders over how to grapple with the durable racial inequality inherited from
colonial rule and assert national sovereignty and self-reliance from a position of economic
dependency in a global capitalist economy.
   In writing a history of the Tanzanian nation-building project, I relied heavily on a
variety of documentary sources, especially accounts from the popular press, archival and
secondary sources, government documents, and informal interviews with political actors.
More than a decade of research in Tanzania enabled me to gain access to key political
actors in contentious debates, who were located in parliament, various Ministries, among
ruling party and opposition party officials, and in non-government organizations. English
and Swahili language newspaper accounts provided a highly valuable source of
information for documenting a wide range of conflicts over racial and nationality policies
in the history of the Tanzanian nation-state.l Newspaper accounts typically treat the
stories they report as separate, focusing on events rather than on the conditions
underlying events or the connection of events to long-term and large-scale social
processes. The effect of this eclipsing of context and contraction of time, writes Todd
Gitlin, can be “the sense of being hurled through a time-tunnel, of hurtling from event to
event without the time to learn from experience” and “a simplified political universe.”li
My research, although it makes extensive systematic use of newspaper accounts from
both the government and opposition press, tries to make two types of connections that are
often missing from journalistic accounts: the connections among seemingly disconnected



                                                                                            22
events and the connection of these events to long-term and large-scale processes of
change.
   The study of nation-building and citizenship can very quickly become unwieldy, given
the wide range of issues, debates, and public policies concerning belonging and identity
that are implicated. In exploring changing patterns of exclusion from the nation and their
consequences, I attempt to connect disparate literatures on race relations, xenophobia,
nationalism, citizenship, foreign affairs, and economic development. Tracing the shifting
boundaries of national identity and the racial and territorial dimensions of these shifts
requires attention to laws and policies governing citizenship, immigration, refugees, trade
and tariffs, regional integration, corruption, property ownership, and foreign investment.
The meaning of disparate events and issues, and their connections to one another, come
into focus once we situate them within the broader historical context of long-term
processes of change, including the colonial creation of a racialized social system and
externally dependent economic order, the socialist construction of a unified nation and
state-controlled economy, and the transition to neo-liberal capitalism and liberal
democratic politics.
   As a work of historical sociology, my analysis attempts to combine the historian’s
close attention to detail, context, agency, and events with the social scientist’s concern for
understanding the trajectories and dynamics of large-scale and long-term processes of
change. The goal is to combine what Philip Abrams calls the historians’ “rhetoric of
close presentation (seeking to persuade in terms of a dense texture of detail)” with the
sociologists’ “rhetoric of perspective (seeking to persuade in terms of the elegant
patterning of connections seen from a distance).”lii This research departs from most
studies of Tanzanian history in that it employs a long-term temporal scope to map out the
trajectory of nation-building across three historical eras. This long-term approach
challenges the disciplinary reflexes of most historians, who typically divide history into
distinctive, often relatively short, time periods and focus their research on the short-term
origins and outcomes of particular events within such periods.liii

   This book is organized chronologically based on a periodization that identifies
colonial, state socialist, and neo-liberal eras. The designation of these three periods is an
analytic convenience that imposes static categories and coherence on a fluid temporality.


                                                                                            23
However, it allows us to acknowledge critical turning points during which the pace of
change accelerated and the overall context shaping nation-building dramatically shifted.
The argument is that colonialism, state socialism, and neo-liberalism constitute the
defining features of these eras and that the transitions between them marked key turning
points, when new forms of economic and political power emerged along with qualitative
changes in race and foreign relations. The dangers of using such boundary markers are
that they can lead one to ignore important continuities between eras and may result in
what Fred Cooper labels “the epochal fallacy” of “assuming a coherence that complex
interactions rarely produce”.liv The boundaries that demarcate these eras are fuzzy, which
makes it difficult and somewhat artificial to specify the exact dates that constitute
temporal boundaries. In the case of the end of the colonial era and the beginning of the
socialist era, official declarations and ceremonies to mark the transition make the task
somewhat easier, but, as I argue in Chapter 2, many of what are often taken to be defining
features of state socialism were established during the post-colonial pre-socialist period
of the early 1960s. The dating of the transition from state socialism to neo-liberal
capitalism is difficult to specify, since the transition was relatively long and gradual,
during the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s, but the signing of the country’s first
structural adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1986
provides a convenient marker. My research acknowledges the problematic nature of
imposing temporal boundaries onto a complex historical trajectory by paying close
attention to the continuity provided by historical legacies that cut across designated eras.
I conceptualize these legacies as dynamic and contested economic, institutional, and
cultural inheritances that created opportunities, constraints, and dilemmas for those
seeking and resisting social change.

   Each of the historical eras that provide temporal markers for my analysis were shaped
by very different forms of the state. My research identifies how state formation has
shaped the boundaries and meaning of the nation and documents the shift from a state-
seeking anti-colonial nationalism to a state-led nationalism promoting measures to ensure
that the obligations of citizenship superseded ethnic, racial, and religious obligations.lv
Although nationalism is not simply an ideological reflection of the process of state
formation, the history of nation building is inextricably tied to that of state formation.


                                                                                              24
The hyphen in the couplet nation-state does not signify historically necessary congruence
but rather two central tenets of nationalist discourse that continue to shape modern
political life and generate political conflict. The first is a belief that every state should
have a nation, which justifies its sovereignty by indicating support of a political
community that represents “the will of the people” and thereby legitimates the state’s
domestic and foreign policies. The second is the notion that every nation should have a
sovereign state, to ensure the security and well-being of its political community and
provide its citizens with political, civic, and social rights.
   My research explores the reciprocal relationship between nation building and state
formation in Tanzania. It documents the various ways in which the nation has relied on
the state to secure commitment to the political community by providing social and
cultural institutions, such as schools and the military, which foster a common identity as
citizens.lvi The coercive powers and administrative capacities of a sovereign state are
necessary to enforce nationalists’ claims to a territorial homeland, to regulate movement
of people and goods across the nation’s borders via visas, passports, and other
regulations, to resist foreign domination, and to repress competing visions of the nation,
through laws, treason trials, and the imprisonment of dissidents. The state in turn
depends on the nation, externally to secure the legitimacy needed to gain international
recognition of its sovereign status by constituting the self justifying self-governance and
internally to foster the loyalty, sense of belonging, and domestic legitimacy necessary to
extract resources, such as taxes and conscripts, which are the state’s lifeblood.
   State and nation building were sometimes contradictory rather than mutually
reinforcing processes. For example, during the socialist era, certain nation-building
policies, such as the placement of government officials in non-home regions where they
lacked local knowledge and the allocation of scarce resources to primary rather secondary
and university education, weakened state capacities. As I document in subsequent
chapters, socialist and neo-liberal forms of the state in Tanzania produced alternative
visions of the national community as well as varied capacities to provide the resources
and unifying values that helped to promote national unity and secure the active consent of
the populace. They also generated differing challenges to and assertions of sovereignty




                                                                                                25
with respect to foreign investments, East African and pan-African integration initiatives,
and cross-border refugee flows.
   Each of the following chapters addresses three central themes that provide unifying
threads for the book. They seek to document: 1) exclusionary features of a nation-
building project that has often been categorized as an example of inclusive civic
nationalism; 2) political contention over public policies concerning the rights of
foreigners, Asians, and citizens; and 3) the contradiction between state efforts to foster
capital accumulation in a global economy and secure political legitimation within the
boundaries of the nation-state. In order to trace the trajectories and dynamics of race and
nationality as distinctive but overlapping sources of policies of exclusion from the nation,
I organized this book by devoting separate chapters on foreigners and Asians for the three
eras- colonialism, state socialism, and neo-liberal capitalism. Each of the three main
sections of this book begins with a chapter that lays out the basic contours of the colonial,
state socialist, and neo-liberal eras by identifying strategies of capital accumulation
adopted by the state, the nature of political institutions and the ideologies and practices
used to legitimate political rule, key divisions within the political elite, and visions of
political community informing debates about national belonging. These overview
chapters provide the context for understanding political contention over race and
nationality that are documented in subsequent chapters. Each of the three sections
includes a chapter focusing on political conflicts over the rights and obligations of
foreigners as well as a chapter on political contestation over the proper role of Asians in
the nation-building project. The final chapter compares the eras of colonialism, state
socialism, and neo-liberalism in an effort to identify the trajectory of exclusionary
policies based on race and nation, factors shaping the intensity and institutional
expression of the accumulation/legitimation contradiction, and the promise and limits of
the nation state with respect to democracy, racial equality, and civic inclusion.




                                                                                              26
i
           Following Charles Tilly, I use the term nationalism to refer to “the collective claim that (1)
nations should correspond to states, (2) states should correspond to nations, and (3) obligations to nations
should supercede other obligations or (4) invocation of claims 1, 2, and 3 on behalf of particular nations
and/or states.” “Epilogue: Where Now?” p. 413.
ii
           Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. For a thoughtful and balanced assessment of Kohn’s
contribution to the scholarship on nationalism, see Craig Calhoun, “Inventing the Opposition of Ethnic and
Civic Nationalism,” Nations Matter, pp. 117-146
iii
           For a review of the pervasiveness of this dichotomy in the literature, see Jocelyne Couture et al.,
eds., “Introduction: Questioning the Ethnic/Civic Dichotomy,” Rethinking Nationalism, pp. 1-61.
iv
           Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, pp. 81-83. Leah Greenfield argues that “…the most
common type is a mixed one. But the compositions of the mixtures vary significantly enough to justify
their classification in these terms and render it a useful analytical tool.” Nationalism: Five Roads to
Modernity, pp. 11-12.
v
           Bernard Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nation,” p. 197.
vi
           Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar in April 1964 to create the United Republic of Tanzania.
vii
           Rharam and Yash Ghai, “Asians in Tanzania: Problems and Prospects,” p. 94.
viii
           For an analysis of the cultural significance of land as the basis of sovereignty and political
authority in East Africa, see Paul Bjerk, Julius Nyerere and the Establishment of Sovereignty in
Tanganyika.
ix
           Ned Bertz, “Educating the Nation: Race and Nationalism in Tanzanian Schools,” p. 168.
x
           For example, colonial administrators of the League of Nations and United Nations mandated
territory of Tanganyika justified the exclusion of non-Natives from purchasing land in paternalistic terms,
as a way to fulfill the requirements of the mandate to protect vulnerable Natives from the challenges of the
modern world. Julius Nyerere invoked a very different justification, the socialist value of equality, to
legitimize the exclusion, warning that the commercialization of land posed not only the threat of foreign
control over land but also that it would lead to exploitation and class inequality. “…even if there were no
rich foreigners in this country,” he wrote, “there would emerge rich and clever Tanganyikans. If we allow
land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would only be a few Africans possessing the land in
Tanganyika and all the others would be tenants...there will be another group of idle people who will not be
doing any work but will simply be waiting to exploit the energies and suck the blood of the poor
workers….” Freedom and Unity, p. 56.
xi
           David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity.
xii
           Nationalism provides what Charles Taylor identifies as the necessary ingredients for democratic
self-governance, including “a relatively high level of cohesion, strong collective identity, and common
allegiance to the political community in order to engage in joint deliberation.” “Democracy, Inclusive and
Exclusive”, p. 184.
xiii
           Basis Davidson describes nation-states as “alien models” that “failed to achieve legitimacy in the
eyes of a majority of African citizens….” The Black Man’s Burden, p. 12.
xiv
           Charles Tilly, “Boundaries, Citizenship, and Exclusion”, p. 181. Charles Taylor makes a similar
argument concerning the exclusionary dimensions of democratic polities. “Democracy, Inclusive and
Exclusive, p. 184.
xv
           Godfrey Mwakikagile, Nyerere and Africa: End of an Era, p. 335.
xvi
           I use the terms “foreigners” to refer to the non-indigenous inhabitants of the territory prior to
independence and to non-citizens of the nation-state after independence. The term “Asians” is used in the
same way that it was popularly used after partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, to refer to
descendents of those who migrated to East Africa from India and Pakistan. Prior to that time, this
population was referred to as Indians and the term Asians was popularized by anti-partition Indians in the
1940s and by colonial administrators. The term Asians, like the other terms used to designate this
population, including South Asians, Indians, and non-Africans, is problematic given the shifting historical
resilience of these categories.
xvii
            Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, pp. 38-39.
xviii
           Benedict Anderson defines the nation is a socially constructed imagined political community in
which people are connected to fellow members whom they do not know and with whom that do not share
face-to-face relations. It is a community imagined as limited (by boundaries that demarcate it from other
nations) and as sovereign. Imagined Communities, pp. 6-7.



                                                                                                           27
xix
           Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” , p. 11.
xx
           Anthony Smith, National Identity, p. 14.
xxi
           See James O’Connor’s analysis of the U.S. welfare state and its fiscal dilemmas in The Fiscal
Crisis of the State as well as Claus Offe’s Contradictions of the Welfare State. Alan Wolfe’s study of
advanced industrial societies suggests that the contradiction characterizes capitalist liberal democracies in
which “liberalism becomes the ideology of and justification for accumulation while democracy upholds the
importance of legitimation, or some kind of popular participation and some equality of results.” The Limits
of Legitimacy, pp. 6-7. My analysis suggests that the contradiction is also present in post-colonial state
socialist societies in which the ideology of development, rather than liberalism, justifies state engagement
in the accumulation process and authoritarian populism rather than liberal democracy necessitates popular
participation and a degree of equality.
xxii
           Although scholars often conflate race and ethnicity, Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann offer
a clear discussion of the distinction. They suggest that racial claims reference genes rather than kinship or
provenance and are typically made by outsiders rather than insiders, and that the moral implications of the
claims and the role of power in the construction process are more significant for race than for ethnicity.
“Conceptual Confusions and Divides: Race, Ethnicity, and the Study of Immigration,” p. 29.
xxiii
           A race, write Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, is “a human group defined by itself or
others as distinct by virtue of perceived common physical characteristics that are held to be inherent. A
race is a group of human beings socially defined on the basis of physical characteristics.” Ethnicity and
Race, p. 24. The creation of racial groups, observes David Theo Goldberg, involves an ordering that
identifies difference and a valuation that provides a criterion of inclusion and exclusion. Racist Culture, p.
87.
xxiv
           Van den Berghe's 1968 study of racial attitudes among 155 university students at Nairobi and
Makerere documented widespread negative stereotypes portraying Asians as clannish, untrustworthy,
arrogant, and exploitative. “Racial Attitudes in East Africa”.
xxv
           By the time of independence, Asians controlled over 50% of the country’s export-import business
and over 80% of wholesale and retail trade. Simon Mbilinyi, “Ethnic Economic Differentiation,” p.152.
xxvi
           Herbert Blumer, “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position.”
xxvii
           Howard Winant, The World is a Ghetto, p. 1.
xxviii
           Jonathan Glassman, “Slower Than a Massacre: The Multiple Sources of Racial Thought in
Colonial Africa”, p. 728.
xxix
           Etienne Balibar, “Is There a Neo-Racism?” in Race,Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, p. 21.
xxx
           For an analysis of the ideology of sovereignty in Tanzania, see Paul Bjerk, Julius Nyerere and the
Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanganyika.
xxxi
           Yash Tandon, “The Asians in East Africa in 1972,” p. A16. In 1962 there were 176,613 Asians
in Kenya, 92,000 in Tanganyika, and 77,400 in Uganda. Robert G. Gregory, South Asians in East Africa,
p. 13.
xxxii
           Theroux, “Hating the Asians,” p. 50.
xxxiii
           By 1969 only 44% of Kenya’s 139,037 Asians had acquired citizenship. Most of the country’s
78,043 Asian citizens had acquired citizenship automatically at independence in 1963 rather than
registering for it. Yash Tandon, “The Asians in East Africa in 1972,” p. A6.
xxxiv
           Theroux, “Hating the Asians,” p. 50.
xxxv
           Yash Tandon, “The Asians in East African in 1972,” p. A6.
xxxvi
           In response to international pressures, Amin retracted the expulsion order for Asian citizens but
this had little consequence, and citizen as well as non-citizen Asians fled the country in fear.
xxxvii
           Julius Nyerere, “Socialism is Not Racialism”, The Nationalist, February 14, 1967. Reprinted in
Knud Erik Svendsen and Margaret Teisen, Self-Reliant Tanzania, pp. 205-208.
xxxviii
           Goran Hyden, African Politics in Comparative Perspective, pp. 81-83. Hyden argues that “like all
prophets or heroes, his relations with others was based on affection rather than cognitive reflections about
the feasibility of the new policies. There was never any room for criticisms of the proposals he made.” My
analysis suggests that this overstates the case. It documents debates over policy among government and
party leaders and Nyerere’s role in mediating conflicts between party and government officials over highly
contentious issues.
xxxix
           See the critique of this focus provided by Doug McAdam et al., “`There Will Be Fighting in the
Streets’: The Distorting Lens of Social Movement Theory.”



                                                                                                           28
xl
          See James Scott, Weapons of the Weak; Aili Tripp, Changing the Rules.
xli
          Tim Kelsall’s study of violent religious conflicts of the early 1990s and a tax revolt of 1998 in the
Arumeru District of northern Tanzania documents the close connection between elite and popular politics
at the local level and the role of divisions within the political elite at both the local and national levels in
shaping local collective political action.” Contentious Politics, Local Governance and the Self: A
Tanzanian Case Study.
xlii
          Kevin J. O’Brien, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, p. 1.
xliii
          Ibid., p. 2.
xliv
          Sydney Kwiyamba, “Land Issue: High on Agenda in Tanzania.” The African, August 11, 2011,
p. 11.
xlv
          Katabaro Miti, Whither Tanzania, p. 34.
xlvi
          Theories of nationalism often assert a strong connection between national identity and ethnicity
and often treat national communities as politicized ethnic groups with a shared language, religion, or
culture. For an analysis that emphasizes a strong connection between nations, nationalism, and ethnicity,
see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations.
xlvii
          John Meyer, John Boli, George Thomas, and Francisco Ramirez. “World Society and the Nation-
State”;
xlviii
          Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa.” C.R.D. Halisi, “From Liberation to
Citizenship: Identity and Innovation in Black South African Political Thought.” Stephen Ndegwa,
“Ctizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Movements in Kenyan Politics.” Mamdani,
Citizen and Subject.
xlix
          Halisi, Kaiser, & Ndegwa, “The Multiple Meanings of Citizenship- Rights Identity, and Social
Justice in Africa.”
l
          There was a rapid proliferation of newspapers and magazines following liberal political reforms
of the early 1990s and by 2008 Tanzania had 63 newspapers and magazines, including 16 daily
newspapers, 4 biweeklies and 10 monthlies. Samuel Stephen Mushi, “Tanzania’s Controlled Social
Pluralism in National Politics,” p. 8.
li
           Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching.
lii
          Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology, p. 194.
liii
           William Roy, “Time, Place, and People in History and Sociology: Boundary Definitions and the
Logic of Inquiry”; Brian Dill and Ronald Aminzade, “Historians and the Study of Protest.”
liv
          Fred Cooper, Colonialism in Question, p. 19.
lv
          These concepts are borrowed from Charles Tilly, who distinguishes between the “demand by self-
identified agents of a currently identified stateless nation that it acquire control of its own state” and the
“demand by those who currently control a state that its subjects comply with a particular definition and
implementation of the nation”. “Epilogue: Now Where?” State/Culture, p. 413.
lvi
          Successful nation-building projects depend not only on the deployment of state coercion and
material resources to help foster a sense of shared territorial belonging. They also depend on what Philip
Gorski identifies as ideological and administrative infrastructures, through which states provide symbols
and identities to mobilize loyalty to the nation and networks and organizations that enable the categorical
identity of national citizen to become embedded in the routines and rituals of everyday life. Philip S.
Gorski, “Calvinism and State-Formation in Early Modern Europe,” pp. 156-157.




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