2010
MUNENP - SC
Modelo de Las Naciones Unidas de las Escuela Nacional
Preparatoria
[THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PEOPLE
IN ARMED CONFLICTS]
[Security Council]
The MUNENP welcomes all the delegates taking part in the Security Council. We hope
your participation will enrich both your personal and professional life so that your
participation will be a life time experience.
The main objective of the Security Council is to help keep peace and security all around
the world. Several events threaten peace relentlessly around the world. Thus, the
importance of the Security Council is vital in the present world.
The United Nations Charter enables the Security Council to act in case of conflicts so as to
maintain peace and settle disputes peacefully. Whereas the General Assembly can only
recommend, the Security Council is allowed to take binding decisions.
The League of the Nations failed in two aspects. First, it was not universal, and second it
did not include the United States of America. Consequently, all the powerful countries
were included in the Security Council: United States, France, United Kingdom, People´s
Republic of China and Russia. The first step in the process of the election to the Security
Council is unofficial nomination by representative regional groups. The General Assembly
ultimately chooses the members by vote. In article 23 of the Charter, it is stated that the
General Assembly shall elect ten members of the United Nations to serve on the Security
Council –apart from the five permanent members- due regard being specially paid, in the
first instance, taking account also of an equitable geographical distribution.
A military body was created under Council’s command in order to apply sanctions. A
requirement of unanimity was seen as a safeguard that the power conceded to the Council
was not abused. However, due to the enmity among the US and the USSR during the Cold
War-era, many issues could not be solved by unanimity by the Security Council.
Therefore, the General Assembly took residual powers for solving issues of threaten to
peace in case there is a lack of unanimity in the Security Council.
The Charter mentions in article 30 that ―The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of
procedure, including the method of selecting its President‖. The rules of procedure provide
for the monthly rotation of the Presidency in alphabetical order among the members
regardless of their status as permanent or non-permanent members. The provision that
the President should represent the Council was intended to give the President the
requisite authority to nominate committees and to conclude agreements on behalf of the
Council; in practice it has provided a basis for the President to appeal to the parties in
situations of tension or conflict, to exercise restraint, to submit draft resolutions or
decisions, or to make oral statements of consensus or summaries.
Motions or draft resolutions can be submitted not only by members of the Council but also
by member of the United Nations who has been invited by the Council to participate in its
deliberations or who are involved in a dispute or a matter which might lead to a dispute.
However, draft resolutions by non-members of the Council can be put to the vote only at
the request of a member of the Council.
A draft resolution on a matter of substance usually goes through a number of stages. The
drafter may first sound out interested parties in connection with the proposed draft. The
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draft, in written form, may then be informally circulated among members of the Council and
other interested persons. After extensive and informal consultations, the draft resolution is
finally issued as a formal and numbered document of the Security Council for
consideration in a formal meeting. At that stage, formal amendments may be presented
and the amendments and draft resolution voted up in accordance with the rules of
procedure, or the draft resolution adopted unanimously without a vote.
Each Council member has one vote. Decisions on procedural matters are made by an
affirmative vote of at least nine of the 15 members. Decisions on substantive matters
require nine votes, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. This is
the rule of "great Power unanimity", often referred to as the "veto" power.
Topic: A) The Protection of Civilian People in Armed Conflicts
General Information.
History
In 1862, Henri Dunant published his book, Memoir of Solferino, on the horrors of war. His
wartime experiences inspired Dunant to propose (1) a permanent relief agency for
humanitarian aid in times of war, and (2) a government treaty recognizing the neutrality of
the agency and allowing it to provide aid in a war zone. The former proposal led to the
establishment of the Red Cross. The latter led to the First Geneva Convention. For both of
these accomplishments, Henri Dunant became co-recipient of the first Nobel Peace Prize
in 1901.
The ten articles of this first treaty were initially adopted in 1864 by twelve nations. Clara
Barton was instrumental in campaigning for the ratification of the First Geneva Convention
by the United States, which eventually ratified it in 1882.
The second treaty was first adopted in 1906 and specifically addressed members of the
Armed Forces at sea. The third treaty was first adopted in 1929 to deal with the protection
of prisoners of war. The fourth treaty was inspired by the war criminals of the Nuremberg
Trials and first adopted in 1949. It reaffirmed the prior three treaties and added many new
terms, including the protection of civilians during wartime.
Despite the length of these documents, they were found over time to be incomplete. In
1977, two protocols were adopted that extended the terms of the 1949 treaty with
additional protections. In 2005, a third brief protocol was added establishing an additional
protective sign for medical services, the Red Crystal, as an alternative to the ubiquitous
Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems, for those countries that find them objectionable.
The Conventions and their agreements
The Geneva Conventions comprise rules that apply in times of armed conflict and seek to
protect people who are not or are no longer taking part in hostilities, for example:
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wounded or sick fighters
prisoners of war
civilians
medical and religious personnel
Conventions
In diplomacy, the term convention does not have its common meaning as an assembly of
people. Rather, it is used in diplomacy to mean an international agreement, or treaty. The
first three Geneva Conventions were revised and expanded in 1949, and the fourth was
added at that time.
First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1864
Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1906
Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1929
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, 1949
The whole set is referred to as the "Geneva Conventions of 1949" or simply the "Geneva
Convention".
The Geneva Conventions consist of four treaties and three additional protocols that set the
standards in international law for humanitarian treatment of the victims of war. The singular
term Geneva Convention refers to the agreements of 1949, negotiated in the aftermath of
World War II, updating the terms of the first three treaties and adding a fourth treaty. The
language is extensive, with articles defining the basic rights of those captured during a
military conflict, establishing protections for the wounded and addressing protections for
civilians in and around a war zone. The treaties of 1949 have been ratified, in whole or
with reservations, by 194 countries.
“Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their
honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and
customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially
against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular
against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault. Without prejudice to
the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be
treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are,
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without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in
regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.”
Article 27, Fourth Geneva Convention
Application
The Geneva Conventions apply at times of war and armed conflict to governments who
have ratified its terms. The details of applicability are spelled out in Common Articles 2 and
3. The reader should recognize the controversial nature of the topic of applicability. When
the Geneva Conventions apply, governments must surrender a certain degree of their
national sovereignty to comply with international law. These laws may not be entirely
harmonious with their national constitution or their cultural values. Despite the advantages
offered by the Conventions to individuals, political pressures may cause the governments
to be reluctant in accepting its responsibilities.
Common Article 2
This article states that the Geneva Conventions apply to all cases of international conflict,
where at least one of the warring nations has ratified the Conventions. Primarily:
The Conventions apply to all cases of declared war between signatory nations.
This is the original sense of applicability, which predates the 1949 version.
The Conventions apply to all cases of armed conflict between two or more
signatory nations, even in the absence of a declaration of war. This language was
added in 1949 to accommodate situations that have all the characteristics of war
without the existence of a formal declaration of war, such as a police action.
The Conventions apply to a signatory nation even if the opposing nation is not
bound by it. By 1949, the treaty was becoming viewed less as a reciprocal contract
and more as an agreement on fundamental human rights. Ratifying the treaty binds
the nation to uphold these rights regardless of the behavior of the opposing nation.
Article 1 of Protocol I further clarifies that armed conflict against colonial domination and
foreign occupation also qualifies as an international conflict.
When the criteria of international conflict have been met, the full protections of the
Conventions are considered to apply.
Common Article 3
This article states that the certain minimum rules of war also apply to armed conflicts that
are not of an international character, but that are contained within the boundaries of a
single country. The applicability of this article rests on the interpretation of the term armed
conflict. For example it would apply to conflicts between the Government and rebel forces,
or between two rebel forces, or to other conflicts that have all the characteristics of war but
that are carried out within the confines of a single country. A handful of individuals
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attacking a police station would not be considered an armed conflict subject to this article,
but only subject to the laws of the country in question.
The provisions of the entire Geneva Convention are not applicable in this situation, but
only a limited list of provisions contained within the language of Article 3 and additionally
within the language of Protocol II. The rationale for the limitation is that many articles
would otherwise conflict with the rights of a Sovereign State. In summary:
Persons taking no active part in hostilities should be treated humanely (including
military persons who have ceased to be active as a result of sickness, injury, or
detention).
The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
Protecting powers
The term protecting power has a specific meaning under these Conventions. A protecting
power is a state that is not taking part in the armed conflict, but that has agreed to look
after the interests of a state that is a party to the conflict. The protecting power is a
mediator enabling the flow of communication between the parties to the conflict. The
protecting power also monitors implementation of these Conventions, such as by visiting
the zone of conflict and prisoners of war. The protecting power must act as an advocate
for prisoners, the wounded, and civilians.
Grave Breaches
Not all violations of the treaty are treated equally. The most serious crimes are termed
grave breaches, and provide a legal definition of a war crime. Grave breaches of the Third
and Fourth Geneva Conventions include the following acts if committed against a person
protected by the convention:
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health
compelling one to serve in the forces of a hostile power
willfully depriving one of the right to a fair trial.
Also considered grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention are the following:
taking of hostages
extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly
unlawful deportation, transfer, or confinement.
Nations who are party to these treaties must enact and enforce legislation penalizing any
of these crimes. Nations are also obligated to search for persons alleged to commit these
crimes, or ordered them to be committed, and to bring them to trial regardless of their
nationality and regardless of the place where the crimes took place.
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The principle of universal jurisdiction also applies to the enforcement of grave breaches.
The Geneva Conventions Today
Although warfare has changed dramatically since the Geneva Conventions of 1949, they
are still considered the cornerstone of contemporary International Humanitarian Law. They
protect combatants who find themselves hors de combat, and they protect civilians caught
up in the zone of war. These treaties came into play for all recent international armed
conflicts, including the War in Afghanistan (2001–present), the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and
the 2008 War in Georgia.
Modern warfare continues to evolve, and a growing proportion of recent armed conflicts
are of a non-international character (for instance, the Sri Lankan Civil War, the Sudanese
Civil War, and the Colombian Armed Conflict). Common Article 3 deals with these
situations, supplemented by Protocol II (1977). These set out minimum legal standards
that must be followed for internal conflicts. International tribunals, particularly the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, have helped to clarify
international law in this area. In the 1999 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic judgment, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ruled that grave breaches apply
not only to international conflicts, but also to internal armed conflict. Further, those
provisions are considered customary international law, allowing war crimes prosecution
even over groups that have not formally accepted the terms of the Geneva Conventions.
Colombia
Between 2003 and 2006 the Colombian government implemented a demobilization
process for 37 armed groups that made up the brutal, mafia-like, paramilitary coalition
known as the AUC (the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or United Self-Defense Forces
of Colombia). The government claimed success, as more than 30,000 persons went
through demobilization ceremonies, pledged to cease criminal activity, and entered
reintegration programs offering them training, work, and stipends. Since then, the
government has repeatedly said that the paramilitaries no longer exist. But almost
immediately after the demobilization process had ended, new groups cropped up all over
the country, taking the reins of the criminal operations that the AUC leadership previously
ran.
Today, these successor groups are quietly having a dramatic effect on the human rights
and humanitarian situation in Colombia. Of particular concern, as documented extensively
in this report, the successor groups are engaging in widespread and serious abuses
against civilians, including massacres, killings, rapes, threats, and extortion. They have
repeatedly targeted human rights defenders, trade unionists, displaced persons including
Afro-Colombians who seek to recover their land, victims of the AUC who are seeking
justice, and community members who do not follow their orders. The rise of the groups has
coincided with a significant increase in the rates of internal displacement around the
country from 2004 to 2007. And in some regions, like the city of Medellín, where the
homicide rate has nearly doubled in the past year, the groups’ operations have resulted in
a large increase in violence. To many civilians, the AUC’s demobilization has done little to
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change the conditions of fear and violence in which they live. The threat posed by the
successor groups is both serious and steadily growing. Colombia’s National Police
estimates that they have more than 4,000 members. Non-governmental estimates run as
high as 10,200. According to conservative police figures, the groups are quickly increasing
their areas of operation and as of July 2009 had a presence in at least 173 municipalities
in 24 of Colombia’s 32 departments. They are actively recruiting new members from
among teenagers, demobilized individuals, and young men and women. In several cases,
they have been known to recruit members from distant regions of the country, displaying a
high level of organization at a national level. Increasingly, the successor groups have
merged or have absorbed one another, so that fewer groups are operating in a more
coordinated manner, covering a larger territory.
Paramilitaries’ Heirs 4
The police speak of eight major groups: the Urabeños, the Rastrojos, ERPAC, the Paisas,
theMachos, New Generation, the group from the Magdalena Medio, and Renacer. Human
Rights Watch also received credible reports of the existence of other groups, such as the
Black Eagles in Nariño, which the police did not include in their list at the time. A serious
cause for concern is the fact that many eyewitnesses with whom we spoke reported that
members of the security forces were tolerating successor groups’ activities in various
regions.
The Colombian government and some analysts label the successor groups as ―emerging
criminal gangs at the service of drug trafficking‖ (bandas criminales emergentes or
BACRIM), insisting that the successor groups are something new and very different from
the paramilitaries. Other experts and many residents view them as a continuation of the
AUC, or a new generation of paramilitaries. Regardless of how the successor groups are
categorized, the fact is that today they are frequently targeting civilians, committing horrific
crimes including massacres, killings, rapes, and forced displacement. And the state has an
obligation to protect the civilian population, to prevent abuses, and to hold perpetrators
accountable. Unfortunately, the government has yet to take strong and effective measures
to fulfill these obligations. It has failed to invest adequate resources in the police units
charged with combating the groups, or in the group of prosecutors charged with
investigating them. It has done far too little to investigate regular reports of toleration of the
successor groups by state agents or public security forces. And it has yet to take adequate
measures to protect civilians from this new threat. Instead, the government has dragged its
feet on funding for the Early Warning System of the Ombudsman’s Office, which plays a
key role in protecting the civilian population and state agencies have at times denied
assistance to civilians who reported being displaced by successor groups.
Myanmar
Increasing displacement as fighting resumes in the east
Displacement as a result of armed conflict and human rights violations continues in
Myanmar. Between August 2008 and July 2009, an estimated 75,000 people from ethnic
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minority communities in eastern Myanmar were forced to flee their homes. In several
areas it is impossible to estimate the number of internally displaced people (IDPs). In
October 2009, it was estimated there were at least 470,000 IDPs in rural areas of eastern
Myanmar. Here, conflict between the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar Armed Forces) and ethnic
insurgent groups has intensified since June 2009, as a result of government plans to
transform armed opposition groups which have agreed ceasefires into Tatmadaw-
commanded Border Guard Forces in the run-up to planned 2010 elections.
During 2009, displacement was most prevalent in the Shan and Kayin/Karen States,
where the IDP populations were reportedly 135,000 and 125,000 respectively. In several
parts of Myanmar, coercive measures such as forced labour and land confiscation, often
part of state-sponsored development initiatives, have also caused displacement.
IDPs living in conflict-affected areas of Myanmar are vulnerable and in need of security,
food, shelter, health and education. With the exceptions of the Ayerarwady/Irrawaddy
delta, devastated by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, humanitarian access remains tightly
controlled. International awareness of the nature and extent of conflict-induced
displacement remains limited.
Background
Since independence from Britain in 1948, the country has been subject to armed conflicts.
The collapse of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989 allowed the army to focus on
combating a series of interlinked ethnic insurgencies in northern and eastern areas (RSC,
February 2007, p.3). Between 1989 and 1995, ceasefires were agreed between the
government and most armed ethnic groups. The number of people displaced by these
armed conflicts who have not achieved a durable solution is in the millions. Many have
been living in displacement for decades (RSC, February 2007, pp.3-6). The most acutely
vulnerable IDPs are those in areas still affected by significant levels of armed conflict
(RSC, February 2007, p.4).
In 2009, fighting resumed in some ceasefire areas as the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed
Forces) sought to incorporate into Border Guard Forces those armed opposition groups
who had negotiated ceasefire agreements (―ceasefire groups‖). This would place them
under the command of the Tatmadaw (TBBC, 31 October 2009, p.3; TNI, September
2009). The government plan is for Border Guard Forces to consist of units of 326 soldiers,
detached from their ethnic leadership, 35 of whom, including those in command, are
Tatmadaw personnel (TNI, September 2009, p.6).
The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the official title by which the
government is known, promulgated a new constitution in 2008 calling for a bicameral
national parliament and state and local legislatures (Lwin, 8 December 2009). However,
observers say the constitution does not allow for any significant steps towards real
democratization (Rogers and Cox, 9 December 2009; TBBC, 31 October 2009, p. 6). A 19
November 2009 UN General Assembly resolution called on the Myanmar government to
review the constitution to ensure compliance with international human rights law, noted the
exclusion of the democratic opposition and ethnic groups from the democratization
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program and called on the SPDC to ensure ―a free, fair, transparent and inclusive electoral
process‖ (UNGA, 19 November 2009).
Although it is estimated that at least half a million people are currently internally displaced
in eastern Myanmar, international awareness of the scale of the conflict-induced
displacement crisis continues to be limited. Concessions on humanitarian access were
made after the May 2008 Cyclone Nargis struck the Ayerarwady/Irrawaddy delta.
However, ongoing restrictions elsewhere in Myanmar continue to frustrate efforts to reach
conflict-affected IDPs (FMR, December 2008, p.14).
Causes of displacement
The scale of internal displacement in Myanmar remains difficult to assess. It is impossible
to measure in areas under government control (TBBC, 31 October 2008, p.20). The
human rights impacts on civilians, especially IDPs, of armed conflict, government policies
and counter-insurgency measures have been documented in areas of eastern Myanmar.
The SPDC is widely acknowledged to be the major perpetrator of human rights violations
(Refugees International in May 2007). Other abuses are perpetrated by ethnic insurgent
groups, though to a lesser extent. They present themselves as defenders of minority
populations against state aggression but have been unable to defend civilians when their
guerrilla actions provoke government retaliation. Insurgent groups such as the Karen
National Union (KNU) have an interest in controlling, or at least maintaining, civilian
populations in their traditional territories in order to claim legitimacy and obtain food,
intelligence, soldiers and porters. They thus bear some responsibility for the plight of
civilians in areas where they operate.
Since the 1960s, the Tatmadaw has responded with brutal counter-insurgency strategies
which have included forced relocation of civilians (ANU, 15 June 2007; TBBC, 31 October
2009). Villagers are typically given little notice before receiving relocation orders. Villages
may be burned down and mined in order to prevent return. There are many reports of
soldiers shooting and killing people found in homes after deadlines have passed. Villagers
have reported being threatened with death if they refused to follow relocation orders and
warned that anyone who remained behind would be assumed to support armed opposition
groups and thus be regarded as legitimate military targets (AI, 5 June 2008, p.26; TBBC,
31 October 2009). In order to avoid going to relocation sites, some villagers flee into the
jungle, sometimes to pre-arranged places of refuge, carrying infants, cooking utensils,
blankets, plastic sheeting, and a few days’ supply of rice. Once offensives are over, and
troops return to camp, some try to return to fields and villages (FMR, April 2008, p.11).
Most forms of displacement and associated human rights abuse result from the
Tatmadaw’s ―four cuts‖ counter-insurgency strategy. This seeks to cut off insurgents’
access to food, money, intelligence and fighting personnel (ANU, 15 June 2007; NCGUB,
November 2009, p.880). It aims to transform all areas under the control of opposition
armed groups (described as ―black‖ areas) into contested (―brown‖) and finally into SPDC-
controlled (―white‖) territories. In pursuit of this goal and to impose control over civilians,
communities are continuously moved from ―black‖ areas to designated relocation sites in
―white‖ areas (NCGUB, November 2009, p.880; TBBC, 31 October 2009, p.30).
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Additional displacement in Myanmar in 2009 ensued from new fighting in some ceasefire
areas which followed the SPDC’s demand in June 2009 that all ceasefire groups should
turn themselves into Border Guard Forces. During the year, the Tatmadaw began
attacking some ceasefire groups which opposed the SPDC’s plans. Some ceasefire
groups split, with one faction agreeing to become a Border Guard Force and another
taking up arms again. Northern Karen areas and Southern Shan State were particularly
concerned. There, civilians were specifically targeted by the SPDC in order to weaken
armed opposition groups (Le Monde diplomatique, November 2009; TBBC, 31 October
2009, p.30).
Internal displacement also continues to occur as a result of forced labor, extortion and land
confiscation. Faced with multiple constraints on their livelihoods, people earn so little that
they often have no choice but to leave their homes (UN Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Myanmar, 7 March 2008, p.17 and 11 March 2009). State-
sponsored development initiatives, often organized on military lines and without
consultation of the local population, have also caused displacement. Ethnic communities
generally bear a disproportionate share of the impact and are denied a fair share of any
benefits (TBBC, 31 October 2009, pp.32-34; SGM, September 2009, p.1).
Sri Lanka
Since the decisive military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri
Lanka has made little progress in reconstructing its battered democratic institutions or
establishing conditions for a stable peace. Eight months later, the post-war policies of
President Mahinda Rajapaksa have deepened rather than resolved the grievances that
generated and sustained LTTE militancy.
While the LTTE’s defeat and the end of its control over Tamil political life are historic and
welcome changes, the victory over Tamil militancy will remain fragile unless Sinhalese-
dominated political parties make strong moves towards a more inclusive and democratic
state. The emergence of retired General Sarath Fonseka to challenge Rajapaksa in the 26
January presidential election has opened new space to challenge repressive government
policies. But neither has offered credible proposals for political reforms that would address
the marginalization of Tamils and other minorities.
Whoever wins, donor governments and international institutions should use their
development assistance to support reforms designed to protect the democratic rights of all
of Sri Lanka’s citizens and ethnic communities.
The government’s internment of more than a quarter million Tamils displaced from the
Northern Province – some for more than six months – was further humiliation for a
population brutalized by months of ferocious fighting. The return by the end of 2009 of
most of the displaced to their home districts, and the increased freedom of movement for
the nearly 100,000 still in military-run camps, are important steps forward. However, the
resettlement process has failed to meet international standards for safe and dignified
returns. There has been little or no consultation with the displaced and no independent
monitoring; many returns have been to areas not cleared of mines and unexploded
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ordnance; inadequate financial resources have been provided for those returning home
and the military continues to control people’s movements. These and other concerns also
apply to the estimated 80,000 Muslims forcibly expelled from the north by the LTTE in
1990, some of whom have begun to return to their homes.
The UN and donor governments should insist more strongly that all resettlement is done
according to established guiding principles. Donors should end assistance to any camps
where full freedom of movement is not allowed and condition additional aid on an effective
monitoring role for UN agencies and NGO partners. India, Japan, Western donors, the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank should tie additional development
assistance to an inclusive and consultative planning process for the reconstruction of the
north. Access by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the more than
12,000 Tamils held in irregular detention centers on suspicion of ties to the LTTE is also
essential. The government’s approach to the development and reconstruction of the north
and east is contributing to minority fears and alienation. Government plans remain unclear,
with local communities and political leaders not consulted and even donors not informed of
overall reconstruction plans. Strong military influence over policies, tight military control
over the population and restrictions on local and international NGOs increases the risk of
land conflicts, with the strong possibility of demographic changes that would dilute the
Tamil character of the north. No real space has been given to Tamil and Muslim political or
community leaders in the north and very little in the east. The Rajapaksa government has
initiated no political reforms to address Tamil and other minorities’ concerns. The
government-sponsored All Party Representative Committee (APRC) designed to craft
constitutional reforms has in effect ended with no sign of an alternative process. Tamil and
Muslim parties remain weak and divided, although recent encouraging initiatives to
develop a common platform and build trust among Tamil-speaking parties deserve
support. Inside and outside Sri Lanka, many Tamils remain angry at the lack of accounting
or justice for the thousands of civilians killed in the final months of the war. Most of the
million-strong diaspora is still committed to a separate state and many would be willing to
support renewed violence.
The brutal nature of the conflict, especially in its closing months, has undermined Sri
Lanka’s democratic institutions and governance. All ethnic communities are suffering from
the collapse of the rule of law. Disappearances and political killings associated with the
government’s counterinsurgency campaign have been greatly reduced since the end of
the war. Impunity for abuses by state officials continues, however, and fear and self-
censorship among civil society activists and political dissidents remain widespread.
Afghanistan
The intensification and spread of the armed conflict in Afghanistan continued to take a
heavy toll on civilians throughout 2009. At least 5,978 civilians were killed and injured in
2009, the highest number of civilian casualties recorded since the fall of the Taliban
regime in 2001. Afghans in the southern part of the country, where the conflict is the most
intense, were the most severely affected. Nearly half of all civilian casualties, namely 45%,
occurred in the southern region. High casualty figures have also been reported in the
southeastern (15%), eastern (10%), central (12%) and western (8%) regions. Previously
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stable areas, such as the northeast, have also witnessed increasing insecurity, such as in
Kunduz Province.
In addition to a growing number of civilian casualties, conflict-affected populations have
also experienced loss of livelihood, displacement, and destruction of property and personal
assets. UNAMA Human Rights (HR) recorded a total of 2,412 civilian deaths between 01
January and 31 December 2009. This figure represents an increase of 14% on the 2118
civilian deaths recorded in 2008. Of the 2,412 deaths reported in 2009, 1,630 (67%) were
attributed to anti-Government elements (AGEs) and 596 (25%) to pro-Government forces
(PGF). The remaining 186 deaths (8%) could not be attributed to any of the conflicting
parties given as some civilians died as a result of cross-fire or were killed by unexploded
ordinance.
AGEs remain responsible for the largest proportion of civilian deaths. Civilian deaths
reportedly caused by the armed opposition increased by 41% between 2008 and 2009,
from 1,160 to 1,630. Deaths resulting from insurgent-related activities in 2009 were a ratio
of approximately three to one as compared to casualties caused by PGF. 1,054 civilians
were victims of suicide and other improvised explosive device (IED) attacks by AGEs and
225 were victims of targeted assassinations and executions. These make up the majority
of casualties caused by AGE activities and is 53% of the total number of civilian deaths in
2009. Together, these tactics accounted for 78% of the noncombatant deaths attributed to
the actions of the armed opposition. The remainder of casualties caused by AGE actions
resulted primarily from rocket attacks and ground engagements in which civilian
bystanders were directly affected. Suicide and IED attacks caused more civilian casualties
than any other tactic, killing 1,054 civilians, or 44% of the total civilian casualties in 2009.
Although such attacks have primarily targeted government or international military forces,
they are often carried out in areas frequented by civilians.
Civilians are also deliberately targeted with assassinations, abductions, and executions if
they are perceived to be supportive of, or associated with, the Government or the
international community. A broad range of civilians — including community elders, former
military personnel, doctors, teachers and construction workers — have been targeted.
Other actors, such as the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also
been targeted, often receiving threats, and in some cases becoming victims of violence.
Through these actions, the armed opposition has demonstrated a significant disregard for
the suffering inflicted on civilians. Intermingling with the civilian population and the frequent
use of residential homes as bases puts civilians at risk of attack by the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) and international military (IM) forces.
Pro-Government forces - Afghan National Security Forces and International Military
(IM) forces - were responsible for 596 recorded deaths; this is 25% of the total civilian
casualties recorded in 2009. This is a reduction of 28% from the total number of deaths
attributed to pro-Government forces in 2008. This decrease reflects measures taken by
international military forces to conduct operations in a manner that reduces the risk posed
to civilians.
Notwithstanding some positive trends, actions by PGF continued to take an adverse toll on
civilians. UNAMA HR recorded 359 civilians killed due to aerial attacks, which constitutes
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61% of the number of civilian deaths attributed to pro-Government forces. This is 15% of
the total number of civilians killed in the armed conflict during 2009. IM forces and ANSF
also conducted a number of ground operations that caused civilian casualties, including a
large number of search and seizure operations. These often involved excessive use of
force, destruction to property and cultural insensitivity, particularly towards women.
UNAMA HR remains concerned at the location of military bases, especially those that are
situated within, or close to, areas where civilians are concentrated. The location and
proximity of such bases to civilians runs the risk of increasing the dangers faced by
civilians, as such military installations are often targeted by the armed opposition. Civilians
have been killed and injured as a result of their proximity to military bases, homes and
property have been damaged or destroyed; this can lead to loss of livelihood and income.
The location of military facilities in or near residential neighborhoods has also had the
effect of generating fear and mistrust within communities and antipathy towards IM forces
given their experience of being caught in the crossfire or being the victims of AGE attacks
on Government or pro-Government military installations International military forces did
take strategic and specific steps to minimize civilian casualties in 2009. The change in
ISAF command, clearer command structures, and a new tactical directive have all
contributed to the efforts by ISAF to reduce the impact of the armed conflict on civilians.
However, a Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell, that was established in 2008 in ISAF (with a
similar tracking mechanism in USFOR-A) has not proved very effective in addressing
UNAMA concerns in a timely manner. Measures need to be taken to improve the Tracking
Cell so that it can be more responsive and helpful in relation to civilian casualty incidents.
2009 was the worst year in recent times for civilians affected by the armed conflict.
UNAMA HR recorded the highest number of civilian casualties since the fall of the Taliban
regime in 2001. The conflict has intensified and spread into areas that previously were
considered relatively secure. This has resulted in increasing numbers of civilian dead and
injured and with corresponding devastation and destruction of property and civilian
infrastructure, often leading to loss of income and livelihoods.
The use of asymmetric tactics by the armed opposition is a significant factor in the growing
number of civilians who are killed and injured. The use of air strikes and the placement of
military facilities in civilian areas greatly increase the risk of civilians being killed and
injured. The United Nations calls upon all parties to the conflict to respect and uphold their
obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law in
order to minimize the impact of the conflict upon civilians.
Delegates the resolution you have to reach is to make sure countries such as Colombia,
Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, among others, honor all the treaties and
conventions signed to protect civilians in armed conflicts.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
This report documents how the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) have
neglected their obligation to provide justice and reparation to survivors of war crimes of
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sexual violence which took place in the context of the 1992-1995 war. In doing so, the
authorities have violated the human rights of these survivors.
The government of BiH has failed to ensure justice and reparation for thousands of women
who were raped during the 1992-1995 war. A continuing failure to comprehensively
investigate and prosecute crimes of sexual violence before international and national
courts means that those responsible still manage to evade justice and impunity prevails.
Without meaningful justice and full and effective reparation, victims continue to suffer the
effects of these horrific crimes. Antiquated discriminatory laws and procedures result in
survivors not being treated with dignity or given protection and support. In most cases they
face stigmatization rather than the recognition and vital assistance they need to help them
rebuild their lives.
Despite the fact that the war in BiH finished more than 13 years ago many perpetrators of
war crimes of sexual violence continue to enjoy impunity and often live in the same
communities as their victims. Many survivors of those crimes suffer post-traumatic stress
disorder and other psychological and physical problems. Psychological support is often not
available and access to health services is limited, especially for women living in remote
areas of the country. Many survivors are unemployed, often for reasons related to the
physical and psychological injuries they have suffered. They often live in poverty and
cannot afford medicines. Rape continues to be a taboo subject in BiH and survivors of this
crime are stigmatized by society.
After the war the focus of national attempts to apply the law, motivated by local demands
and international support, was on bringing perpetrators to justice. This process has had its
own successes (in the form of several prosecutions and convictions) and shortcomings
(which are analyzed in-depth in this report). Respect for the survivors' right to reparation
for the crimes committed against them is not only required in international law, but is also
important in assisting the victims to deal with the past and to move on with their lives. Yet
neither the state nor the international community has made reparation to the victims a
priority. The persistence of stigmatization and ostracism from society also needs to be
addressed as part of their right to reparation. Amnesty International has found that the
victims' perception of the justice process (and their well-being in general) is influenced not
only by what happens in the justice system but also by how the authorities and society
responds to their needs. Support for victims through reparation for past injustices cannot
be separated from the right of access to justice - the two are linked.
In 1993, Amnesty International documented the occurrence of rape and other war crimes
of sexual violence on a massive scale during the war in BiH. Since then the organization
has been calling on the BiH authorities and on the international community to ensure that
those responsible for war crimes, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, are
promptly brought to justice and prosecuted in accordance with international fair trial
standards.
In December 2008 Amnesty International delegates visited BiH to conduct field research
on the legacy of war crimes of sexual violence. In the course of this research they
interviewed survivors of war crimes of sexual violence, more than 20 persons representing
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associations of survivors and, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that support
survivors. They also talked to the BiH authorities and representatives of the international
community. In March 2009 further interviews with survivors of war crimes of sexual
violence were conducted and a consultation meeting with BiH NGOs was organized.
During their visit in March 2009 representatives of Amnesty International also conducted
additional meetings with NGOs, government officials and representatives of the
international community.
While men as well as women were subjected to rape and sexual violence during the
conflict, Amnesty International has focused its research about the legacy of such war
crimes on women survivors, due among other reasons to the lack of availability of
sufficient documentation of sexual violence perpetrated against men. Amnesty
International’s research and number of studies indicate the unwillingness of male survivors
to talk about their war time experience, mostly caused by stigmatization related to the
abuses perpetrated on them. The organization believes, however, that research focusing
on men survivors of war crimes of sexual violence would be of significant value.
Nigeria
The government’s human rights record remained poor, and government officials at all
levels continued to commit serious abuses. The most significant human rights problems
included the abridgement of citizens’ right to change their government; extrajudicial killings
by security forces; the use of lethal and excessive force by security forces; vigilante
killings; impunity for abuses by security forces; torture, rape, and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and criminal suspects; harsh and life-
threatening prison and detention center conditions; arbitrary arrest and prolonged pretrial
detention; executive influence on the judiciary and judicial corruption; infringement on
privacy rights; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion and movement;
domestic violence and discrimination against women; female genital mutilation (FGM);
child abuse and child sexual exploitation; societal violence; ethnic, regional, and religious
discrimination; trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution and forced labor; and
child labor.
The government of President Umaru Yar’Adua – now in its second year – has done little to
address deeply-entrenched human rights problems. Despite record oil revenues in 2008,
government corruption and mismanagement robbed Nigerians of their right to health and
education. State security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings, torture, and
extortion. Intercommunal and political violence, often fomented by powerful politicians,
claimed hundreds of lives.
Although many of these problems were inherited from the previous administration, the
Yar’Adua administration has undermined fledgling anticorruption efforts, taken inadequate
steps to address violence and poverty in the Niger Delta, and failed to investigate or hold
to account government officials and security forces responsible for serious human rights
abuses. The National Assembly held public hearings into allegations of corruption but
failed to pass progressive legislation including the Freedom of Information Bill.
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Nevertheless, free speech in Nigeria remains robust and the judiciary continues to
exercise a degree of independence. Nigeria’s election tribunals annulled several of the
state gubernatorial elections, but in February 2008 upheld the election of President
Yar’Adua.
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