GAS INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING
Overview
The restructuring of gas industries is occurring on a global basis. Multiple countries are considering,
developing and/or implementing restructuring, a process that involves movement from a market that
involves one (or very few) integrated gas companies that are natural monopolies to a competitive
market. This transition has occurred in many other industries, such as telecommunications, banking
and airlines. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), which is the sole source of gas in Korea, has been a part
of the transformations in Spain and the United States. The benefits of competitive markets are clear
- decreased prices resulting from competition. Two examples are illustrative:
It is estimated that price decreases have saved United States gas consumers over US$174 billion
since restructuring began 15 years ago.
Industrial and electric generation gas customers in the United States experienced a 50% decrease in
their gas bills between 1985 and 1999.
However, from experience in other countries, it is clear that there are five elements that are
absolutely critical in attaining a competitive market that will result in lower prices:
1. Enabling legislation that redesigns the market.
The presence of an enabling statute mandates the development of the restructuring process and
clearly sets forth the structure of the new market. The statute functions as a blueprint that guides
the subsequent steps and often sets the timeline within which the market reforms must occur. A gas
restructuring "Framework" was published by the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy (MOCIE)
late in 1999. However, enabling legislation has yet to be presented for passage by the Assembly.
Recommendation
The legislation drafted from the Framework should be developed in consultation with all the parties
who will be affected by this statute.
2. Functional Unbundling.
The separation or dis-aggregation of integrated, monopoly companies is another critical ingredient.
The business is divided into the business functions of production, transmission and distribution.
This process is critical to ensure that production, a function that is not a natural monopoly, is
separated from the businesses that are natural monopolies - the transmission and distribution
functions. In order to achieve a "level playing field" for participants, the pipeline company's supply
business is unbundled from the transmission (transportation) function. This change coupled with
"third party access" (see below) ensures that the transmission and distribution supply functions do
not limit market entry by virtue of their association with the existing pipelines.
Currently in Korea, the importation and "sale-for-resale" or wholesale marketing of LNG, as well as
the related LNG Terminal and high pressure pipeline transportation, are all provided by an integrated,
monopoly - Korean Gas Corporation (KOGAS). In the restructured gas sector, functional unbundling
would result in the wholesale marketing function being separated from the physical pipeline
ownership and operations. The Framework for Korea generally envisions this type of unbundling.
However, an important "bundle" that would be maintained under the Framework is that of the
transmission pipeline and the LNG importation terminals - KOGAS would own both types of facilities.
It is critical that multiple sources of supply be encouraged to expand the supply options available to
end-users.
Recommendation
If South Korea's LNG terminals remain under KOGAS control, it is essential that rules be established
to ensure non-discriminatory access and the prohibition of cross-subsidies between the pipeline
and LNG terminal.
3. Deregulated commodity prices.
The deregulation of the commodity prices is what creates actual competition. Various suppliers of
gas (LNG importers, marketers and distribution companies) compete with each other for the end
users' business. The basis of their competition with each other is the commodity price. Korea
moved much of the way toward this prerequisite when it began "flowing through" the actual cost of
imported gas in 1999.
Recommendation
The enabling legislation should insure that the consumers' price for LNG promptly reflects market
levels. In this regard it would be important for the commodity price to be shown on the customers'
bills.
4. Third party access.
In the newly restructured market, the suppliers and their customers must have a way to move the
gas from the point of production (importation) to the delivery point. The third parties - producers,
marketers or end users - enter into arrangements for the pipeline to "transport" the LNG from the
terminal to the point of sale. The fee for this transportation is the tariff. In order to create a "level
playing field" for competition, the access of third parties must be equal and nondiscriminatory.
While these principals are embodied in Korea's plans, vigilance is required as enabling legislation
and detailed implementing regulations are adopted.
The Framework provides for the participation of "marketers" in the restructured gas sector. A
marketer buys and sells LNG at the wholesale and retail level but owns few - if any - physical
assets. The marketer is the critical player in a competitive market and provides the following
benefits:
Represents an alternate supplier for customers, encouraging competition.
Enables consumers to customize their energy product.
Maximizes efficient use of the infrastructure.
Forces distribution companies and pipelines to compete.
Accumulates supply and demand (aggregation), facilitating economies of scale.
Offers financial products to manage risks inherent in a competitive market.
The legislation does not need to require their creation, but only provide the opportunity for
participation. Given the opportunity, marketers will enter the sector on their own and will provide
various products and services that will enhance competition in both wholesale and retail electricity
markets.
Recommendation
The enabling legislation should actively encourage the entry of multiple marketers. Rules must be
established to prevent actions by the pipeline and terminals in favor of one third party over another,
particularly if KOGAS is to have an affiliated marketer.
5. Independent regulator.
Since natural monopolies are the appropriate subjects of regulation, an independent "regulator" is
required to protect the interests of the end users from the activities of the natural monopolies that
remain after the restructuring is completed - the transmission and distribution pipelines. The
pipeline functions will typically be regulated because the cost of constructing such facilities is very
substantial and it is most unlikely that more than one pipeline will be built to service a specific area.
The regulator serves the purpose of establishing a system that allows the government to formalize
and institutionalize its commitment to the private sector while protecting the interests of customers.
Its key role is to balance the interests of all participants in the industry. It protects the end user from
market power, assures the pipelines of recovery of costs plus a reasonable return, and ensures that
the marketer has access to pipeline facilities and the end users.
There are other roles that the regulator assumes in the restructured market. Most importantly, the
regulator protects the competitive market structure by insuring that different players in the industry
are all treated fairly. This means that there is a level playing field with regard to access to, and the
price of, the pipeline and terminals services, and no one party has a competitive advantage with
respect to information or facility access. The regulator is also the key arbitrator between the industry
participants.
To meet these responsibilities, it is critical in the development and administration of regulations that
the regulator is an independent agency, free from undue political pressures. Likewise, the regulator
must be independent from the regulated companies and from populist consumer pressures.
However, no regulatory entity can be entirely independent: the government must have oversight of
the agency as to implementation of policy and appropriate expenditures. The "policy" that the
regulator implements (such as the achievement of competitive markets) will be under the control of
the appropriate ministry.
In order to attract private investment, a stable, predictable legal and regulatory framework is
required. Gas pipelines and terminal facilities are highly capital intensive, long-lived, geographically
immobile and generally incapable of being used for purposes other than that for which they were
designed. Creating such networks using private capital - even in the most mature and well-
functioning market economies - is a difficult financial undertaking. Success requires a highly
reliable legal and regulatory commitment to reasonably assure investors of the sanctity of their
invested capital. The importance of well-grounded, efficient and predictable regulation cannot be
overstated. Given the magnitude and duration of decisions by both the users of and investors in gas
pipelines and terminal facilities, the legal and regulatory infrastructure vitally affects the efficiency of
those decisions and outcomes.
Recommendation
The regulator that will govern the gas sector should be independently established outside of MOCIE.
Transparent processes should also be established by the regulator to insure that all participants
have access to information, input into data analysis and participation in decision-making that
affects them.
6. Privatization
While not an absolute requisite to organizing a competitive gas sector, the sale of pipelines and
related facilities owned or controlled by government entities is normally a companion to restructuring
programs. Under the current framework, government ownership of KOGAS, which has a monopoly
on the wholesale aspects of the gas industry, is the mechanism through which the public's interest
in this critical sector has been protected. With an independent regulator serving this function,
privatization is greatly facilitated. Through privatization, public resources are freed so they can be
redirected to national needs such as education and health. This action also contributes to the
independence of the regulator by insuring that the agency is not governing a part of the same
government "family". Finally, it promotes operational efficiency and "customer focus" of pipeline as
it strives to succeed financially without the benefit of government credit or market protection.
KOGAS is one of the companies to be sold under a 1997 law. Only limited progress toward this end
has been made to-date and ownership restrictions could diminish the interest of experienced
foreign companies.
Recommendation
Private ownership of KOGAS should be affected as promptly as possible.
All potential investors, domestic and foreign, should be given equal right to own, control and
operate all the privatized elements of KOGAS.