Document Sample
					   The Cruise Missile


    Jeff Kueter and David Kier

     A Presentation before

         Washington, D.C.
                        The George C. Marshall Institute

The George C. Marshall Institute, a nonprofit research group founded in 1984, is dedicated to
fostering and preserving the integrity of science in the policy process. The Institute conducts
technical assessments of scientific developments with a major impact on public policy and com-
municates the results of its analyses to the press, Congress and the public in clear, readily
understandable language. The Institute differs from other think tanks in its exclusive focus on
areas of scientific importance, as well as a Board whose composition reflects a high level of
scientific credibility and technical expertise. Its emphasis is public policy and national security
issues primarily involving the physical sciences, in particular the areas of missile defense and
global climate change.
The Cruise Missile Challenge

     Jeff Kueter and David Kier

       The George Marshall Institute
            Washington, D.C.
Jeff Kueter, President, The George C. Marshall Institute

David Kier, Vice President, Lockheed Martin Corporation
                        The Cruise Missile Challenge *
                                 Jeff Kueter and David Kier

                                          July 9, 2007

Ilan Berman: Good afternoon. My name is Ilan Berman and I am vice president for
policy at the American Foreign Policy Council. I want to thank you all for coming to
what has become a regular series of missile defense roundtables. The American
Foreign Policy Council runs a regular program working on missile defense and ballistic
missile threats and responses. We hold a video conference every year in February.
Our missile defense roundtables are a complement to that. It is a smaller gathering
where we get to hear from experts, not in a conference format, but in a more informal
format where you are free to ask questions about emerging threats to international
security and to U.S. national security and next generation ideas about how to confront
them. So it is really a pleasure for me to invite you to our latest installment today on
the cruise missile challenge.

       This is really an outgrowth of conversations I have had with one of our speakers,
Jeff Kueter of the Marshall Institute, for a long time about the lack of coordination
between our work on protecting the homeland from ballistic missiles, and the numerous
and equally deadly and more challenging technologies that are emerging, such as cruise
missiles. So I was delighted when I heard that the Marshall Institute was publishing a
policy paper on the cruise missile challenge and I am even more delighted to have him
and David Kier of Lockheed Martin here to discuss this issue with you. After the
presentations, we welcome any questions you may have. We ask that you identify
yourself and your organization, and you can direct them at either of the speakers or at
me. Without further ado, let me introduce our speakers. Our first speaker is Jeff
Kueter, who is president of the Marshall Institute. He will talk about the executive
summary of his policy paper on the cruise missile challenge and the ways to confront it.
After Jeff’s presentation, we have the pleasure of hearing from Mr. David Kier, who is
vice president of Lockheed Martin for protection systems and for missile defense and
someone who has worked on the threat posed by cruise missiles for quite a long time.

Jeff Kueter: Ilan, thank you for that that introduction and the opportunity to talk
about the cruise missile challenge and to provide an opportunity for all of you to ask
questions to David Kier, who is the real expert on this issue, and if I can answer any, I
will as well.

        Briefly, the cruise missile challenge stems from the fact that they are a very
attractive weapon system. Essentially they are attractive because they are hard to
  The views expressed by the authors are solely those of the authors and may not represent those of any
institution with which they affiliated.

                                                              The Cruise Missile Challenge

detect, they are adaptable, they are easy to transport, they are cheap, they are accurate
and they are widely available. They are an instrument for achieving an asymmetric
advantage over the United States. Those who are familiar with the Quadrennial
Defense Review know that we are worried about asymmetrical challenges to our
national power. They also provide a means for foreign nations or terrorist groups to
project air power without actually having an air force. But an important thing to
remember is this is not a hypothetical concern. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Iraqis
fired five modified HY-2 cruise missiles at U.S. forces and really complicated that
conflict. You can see a picture of it in Figure 1. It helps to bolster the fact that this is a
real national security challenge that we face, not one that we think might occur in the

                                          Figure 1

         So what is a cruise missile? There are two broad categories of cruise missiles.
One is the anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) and the other is the land-attack cruise missile
(LACM). Anti-ship cruise missiles use radar and other heat-seeking sensors to find and
strike their targets. Land-attack cruise missiles, on the other hand, are a greater worry
because they are equipped with much more precise navigational equipment, including
Global Positioning System capabilities and ground map terrain following systems,
which allow them to fly at much lower altitudes, follow the terrain-following path and
accurately strike land targets ranging from individual buildings to entire cities. The
ability to strike at a distance of twenty-five miles allows them to attack virtually any ship
that can be seen on the horizon. But in contrast, 2,200 miles is more than enough for
a cruise missile to fly from Tehran to Moscow or from Moscow to Paris. Further
compounding the range variability is the fact that these terrain-hugging, air-breathing
vehicles, take circuitous routes to their target, allowing them to slip around and behind
defenses. They employ virtually every form of guidance technology available, which
increases the accuracy of their systems and that accuracy rating has increased markedly
in recent years. The commercial availability of GPS and the Russian GLONASS as well
as the future European Galileo and now even a Chinese plan to deploy a navigation
system, reduce the barriers to entry to accessing more accurate navigational aids. One
estimate is that the widespread availability of these satellite navigation systems will allow
Third World countries to leapfrog fifteen years of development to deploy these fairly
accurate cruise missiles. Integration of these capabilities can also be done cheaply.

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                                                           The Cruise Missile Challenge

Estimates suggest that you can put these capabilities on a cruise missile for $50 to
$150 thousand per missile using capabilities that are drawn from the commercial

       A U.S. Army estimate from the mid-1990s suggested that for an investment of
about $50 million, a country could purchase at least 100 cruise missiles. That estimate
is now more than ten years old and has undoubtedly changed, but with the entrance of
new players into the marketplace, there is without question a robust and cost-
competitive market place for buyers, whole systems as well as the component
technology and manufacturing capability needed to indigenously produce these
systems. The knowledge of what is necessary to modify existing stocks of anti-ship
cruise missiles into the more accurate land-attack cruise missiles is widely available. In
fact you can even download some instructions off the internet. Importantly, the
greatest barriers to LACM proliferation, the detailed mapping databases, the
sophisticated computers and memory required to accurately designate and home in
land targets, has all but disappeared with the recent advent of GPS guidance, GPS-
based maps, GoogleEarth and the latest generation of commercial off-the-shelf
computers and memory technology.

        Cruise missile arsenals are growing quickly. The National Air and Space
Intelligence Center concludes, “The cruise missile threat to U.S. forces will increase
over the next decade.” That is from their most recent assessment published just a few
years ago. That is based on the fact that indigenous manufacturing capability had
expanded rapidly in recent years. Seventy countries possess 75,000 anti-ship cruise
missiles; nineteen countries can manufacture them indigenously and eleven countries
provide them for export, including Iran, China, North Korea and Russia. The
knowledge to refit an anti-ship cruise missile into the more accurate land-attack cruise
missile has expanded rapidly, allowing the proliferation rate for land-attack cruise
missiles to increase quite dramatically.        Twelve countries can produce them
indigenously today and that is up from only three in 1998. The Defense Intelligence
Agency has concluded spending on research and development and production of these
more accurate land-attack cruise missiles is outpacing the anti-ship variety, which
means that those nations that are able to produce LACMS are shifting most of their
resources into the production of those systems and away from the less accurate anti-
ship missiles. The DIA concludes that China will have hundreds of LACMS in their
arsenal by 2030; advanced Russian missiles are now in Iran; France is exporting
variants of its Apache; and Pakistan is developing the Babur.

       In my view, cruise missiles may become the weapon of choice for our peer
competitors as well as for terrorist groups. For peer competitors, cruise missiles offer
air power without having an air force by providing a strategic reach, meaning reach at
a distance at relatively low cost with great likelihood of success. Given the limited
availability and immaturity of defenses against them, it becomes highly attractive for a
peer competitor to invest in cruise missile capability to not only provide national

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                                                             The Cruise Missile Challenge

security functions that otherwise would be provided by aircraft, but also to restrict the
freedom of access for U.S. forces that might be operating in a particular theater. If
cruise missiles continue to serve their traditional naval suppression role, which is why
they were developed first during the Cold War, they are a continuing threat to our
naval operations. For terrorists, cruise missiles can hold cities and overseas bases at
risk. I think they are an effective instrument of terror. Why? Because they can deliver
both conventional warheads as well as weapons of mass destruction.

          Now while their weapons of mass destruction capability fall below the threshold
of most ballistic missiles, the fact that they are more accurate and easier to hide may
make them more attractive to terrorists. They are much more effective delivery devices
for chemical and biological weapons, according to some analyses, because they take a
flat flight path as opposed to the more ballistic trajectory. Additionally the ability to put
even a low-grade conventional warhead on one of these systems and strike anywhere
along the eastern seaboard of the United States provides terrorists with a great terror
weapon against the United States. Whether they actually strike a city like Washington
or New York or they land one on a beach on a sunny holiday afternoon during the
summertime, I think a cruise missile attack would be enough to show the vulnerability
of the United States and strike terror into the hearts and minds of our population.

        They are also an instrument for changing political calculations here and abroad.
By holding allied populations at risk, terrorists or other adversaries can use the threat of
cruise missile attack as a means to blackmail or coerce otherwise friendly nations to
withhold or restrict support to the United States by denying access to bases or airspace,
for example. Strategically placed systems at key choke points such as the Panama Ca-
nal or the Straits of Hormuz could paralyze international commerce and raise appre-
hensions worldwide. And finally, the use or threatened use against the U.S. homeland
or military bases overseas is an all-too-real consideration.

         Let’s talk about the homeland defense problem, specifically the wide area of
homeland defense problem. The acquistion of these systems by terrorists or their
supporting states is inevitable. Indeed, it is already a reality, as was proven by
Hezbollah’s use of anti-ship cruise missiles in the July 2006 war in Lebanon. There
was no return address to go after. A successful terrorist leadership cadre could view
cruise missiles launched from a container ship at an American city as a very successful
strategy. Figure 2 shows you that most standard varieties of anti-ship cruise missiles
can easily fit into a standard cargo container placed on any of hundreds, if not
thousands, of commerical vessels that lie in the waters around the U.S. every day. The
use of commercial vessels to serve as a launch base platform for cruise missiles is widely
discussed in the national security community. Cargo vessels equipped with cruise mis-
sile launchers hidden inside standard shipping containers or from within the cargo hold
itself, are considered possible by the intelligence community.

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                                                            The Cruise Missile Challenge

                       Homeland Defense
                                            • U.S. has 12,000 miles of coastline.
                                            • 75% of the population is <200mi.
                                              of coasts.
                                            • 80% of GNP is generated within
                                              this zone.
                                            • 125,000 shipping vessels
                                              registered worldwide.
                                            • 90,000 of these are at sea at any

                                         Figure 2

        In 2002, then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld warned of the possibility of
terrorists using a rudimentary cruise missile against homeland targets. A 2004 Defense
Science Board study examining the roles of the Defense Department in homeland se-
curity concluded, “ocean vessels, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft are credible de-
livery systems available to adversaries” and urged the DOD to undertake more ad-
vanced defensive efforts to counter those threats. Just last year, the United States Air
Force issued a request for information to address “high priority capability gaps” includ-
ing how to respond to “a rogue maritime platform” that fires a cruise missile off the
coast of Maryland “targeting major metropolitan areas.” In 2003, two former Na-
tional Security Council staffers wrote of such a scenario, noting that Al Qaeda is re-
ported to have fifteen freighters at its disposal for use as possible launch platforms.

       There are a thousand commercial vessels within 200 nautical miles of the U.S.
coast every twenty-four hours. Each ship contains hundreds of containers and tons of
material. Even if the missiles were not hidden, finding a ship carrying a cruise missile is
a daunting task. The scope of the search for such equipment close to the United States
is problematic. My colleague David Kiers has noted that locating a vessel 500 nautical
miles off the coast of the U.S. requires searching three million square miles of ocean.

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                                                           The Cruise Missile Challenge

Even if we relied on our intelligence capabilities to detect when an adversary might
want to engage in this scenario, finding the particular vessel with the particular cargo
container is a daunting challenge.

                               Homeland Exposed

                                         Figure 3

       Figure 3 is a rough approximation of what a cruise missile with a 250-mile at-
tack radius might be able to hit along the coast of the United States. A missile carrying
a nuclear, biological or even conventional warhead would bring devastating physical as
well as psychological damage to the United States population.

        So what do you do about it? In our view, there are four basic approaches to re-
sponding to the cruise missile challenge: Non-proliferation, Pre-emption, Passive De-
fense and Active Defense. All have their limitations; any comprehensive strategy needs
to take advantage of all four. I will run through why we believe that an active defense
needs to become a larger part of U.S. strategy, while listing the one major limitation for
each of the first three. Our principal response strategy against cruise missiles today
and their proliferation is, of course, the non-proliferation regime. But as the earlier
data that I put up demonstrated, the widespread availability of completed systems as
well as component technology in the international marketplace has rendered our ability
to rely on a non-proliferation regime exclusively a moot point. Pre-emption is an op-
tion as well. If we knew which cargo ship was carrying the cruise missiles, we would be

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                                                              The Cruise Missile Challenge

able to deploy our naval forces or aircraft to interdict that vessel, but understanding
where those systems are at a particular point in time is a problematic strategy, particu-
larly if the rate of proliferation continues as we have seen them. Passive defense offers
the opportunity to protect critical assets along the coastline, but we can’t protect every-
thing. If our adversaries begin to use these systems as weapons of terror rather than as
instruments of strategic power projection, then the ability to defend passive targets be-
comes much more difficult. So in our view, only the construction of an active defense
ensures the ability to intercept and destroy cruise missiles after they have been

       So where are these defenses? The United States is principally focused on de-
fending points in space. There are no plans in progress to deploy wide-area cruise
missile defenses, nor are there any plans or budget to do so. The concerns remain fo-
cused on point defenses. Again in the most recent issue of Inside Missile Defense
dated July 4, there is a discussion of a provision in the new defense bill that continues
that focus on fleet defense. It goes so far as to say that the Navy and others haven’t
been focusing enough on fleet defense against advanced cruise missile systems. Prob-
lematic in its own right, but it also indicates that there doesn’t appear to be an appre-
ciation of the asymmetric scenario or the more expanded proliferation of land-attack
cruise missiles. In short, no one in the U.S. defense establishment appears to “have
the ball,” nor is there budget for it. Thank you for your time.

David Kier: Good afternoon. I will talk about fifteen minutes and then we will open
the room for questions. If you think about the missile defense problem – and I am go-
ing to talk about it generically – to attack the cruise missile defense problem in isolation
is unrealistic to me. You have to do an integrated air and missile defense and that is
what I will be talking about, emphasizing the particular problems presented by cruise
missiles. Most of the exemplars are based on the homeland security example, but if
you think about it, the defense of friends and allies is essentially the same problem.
The defense of deployed forces is a little bit of a different problem in which you are in a
combat environment and you have a lot more activities, especially tactical air support,
which you can bring to bear. So it actually makes the problem a little bit easier.

        I will take a systems engineering approach. I am not going to talk about a cruise
missile defense only; it has to be in the context of a total comprehensive system. It has
to be capable of ballistic, cruise and aircraft and it has to be integrated with a larger sys-
tem associated with homeland defense.

       In talking about the cruise missile, I will divide this into four classes. The first
one is the stuff Jeff talked about. Basically it is a subsonic maneuvering cruise missile
without any advanced signature control. It’s what is available today; you can buy it on
the open market, you can buy it in Macao, you can buy it in the Middle East. The sec-
ond class is thing we have to worry about next, the next generation. This is a super-
sonic vehicle with the same type of maneuvering capability. The third class is the ad-

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                                                             The Cruise Missile Challenge

vanced signature control missile, which is maybe years away from many of the bad
guys, but a low observable signature control missile is a bear to counter. The fourth
class is what I call deceptive vehicles. This is, for example, taking a Piper Cub and put-
ting either a suicide driver in it or making it a remote vehicle. These are a different
class and I won’t get into those today.

       When we think about cruise missiles, what do we need to do? We need to de-
stroy these things before they hurt us, so we need an effective kill chain. We have to
be able to detect them, track them, give the decision-maker enough information to
make the decision to launch to engage, which requires that we identify the hostiles
from the good guys, and then we have to engage it to kill it. For a cruise missile more
than any other type of vehicle, perhaps except an aircraft, the idea of consequence
management plays an increasingly important role. In shooting down a ballistic missile,
especially with hit-to-kill technology, the impact is so violent that most of the payload is
destroyed. That is not true in a cruise missile. While a cruise missile is vulnerable with
a lot of fuel as long as you hit it early, it still will end up with a lot more debris and
pieces. So consequence management and expanded battle space become important
and more important with a cruise missile. Again I am going to harp on the theme:
cruise missile defense must be capable of integration with a bigger system and capable
of growing to cover all classes of threats and must have a reasonable cost and assembly
from a schedule point of view.

        I am going to make some assumptions. Cruise missiles are relatively easy to kill
if you can track them. If you know where they are and you watch them in their flight
pattern, you set the target. Hitting them is not very difficult. There are a variety of
systems to do this, Patriot 3 being by far the best. Its success against cruise missiles in
over forty tests is one hundred percent. SLAMRAM (surface-launched advanced me-
dium range air-to-air missile) and AMRAM from an airborne vehicle are quite good
also. The SM-2 on the Navy side is quite good. The new generation of SM-6/SM-7
will be even better. So the issue is not killing them; the issue is detecting them, track-
ing them, finding them. The other issue is how to pick out the bad guys from the good
guys. I maintain that for the Class 1 threats, the stuff that it on the horizon today, we
can do that pretty reliably. Some people say that is the biggest problem, but in a mo-
ment I will show you a chart that shows that it is not quite as bad as it might seem. But
time is the critical dimension; it affects target class 1, 2, 3 and 4. For a cruise missile
traveling at .6 Mach number, which is what their normal speed is, coming from 200
miles, you have eleven minutes. If it is supersonic, you can even go down as low as
four minutes. If it is a ballistic missile on a depressed trajectory, you have two and a
half minutes. That is a tough, tough timeline to carry out all four steps: detect, track,
authorize and engage. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, we met those timelines without
any great difficulty. The concern we would have is that for the HLD mission, the sys-
tems would probably be operated by reserves; it is in the Homeland Defense mission.
Are the reserves trained well enough to do it? I would just point out that the reserves

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                                                                                  The Cruise Missile Challenge

are performing in Iraq today and are doing pretty well. A lot of them need upgrading
and training before they go, but they do pretty well.

        We talked about the debris from a cruise missile. If it is carrying bugs or gas, it
could be terribly ugly. If it is a nuke, think about plutonium as a chemical poison, one
of the most deadly substances on earth. Even if there is no radioactivity problem, it is a
chemical poison par excellence, so we want to engage the missile over water and con-
tain it to keep it away from people and populations. That means, again, early detec-
tion, rapid tracking and rapid engagement. One of the things I am talking about is an
incremental approach. Let’s go after Class 1 first, and then as the technology gets bet-
ter and we expand the system and go for Class 2, Class 3, etc. We can build the sys-
tem and I will show an example where we can start defending the first fifty miles off the
coast, and then go to two hundred, five hundred and thirteen hundred. Why did I pick
those numbers? Those are the classic ranges of some of the threats out there. But we
can do that in stages and have something deployed in fourteen months, if we really
want to.

Operating Envelope Comparison for
Cruise Missiles and Commercial / Executive Aircraft
                                                                         Protection: Asymmetric Missile Defense


                                       Operating Limits
        Altitude 1,000 ft


                                                    Normal Operating


                                                                   Cruise Missiles
                                 .2   .3
                                      .3       .4
                                               .4         .5       .6        .7       .8     .9
                                                               Mach Number

                                                     Figure 4

       So then we come back to the problem of early detection, tracking and ID. In
Figure 4, the x-axis is altitude in tens of thousands of feet and the y-axis is the mach

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                                                            The Cruise Missile Challenge

number, the speed. The red line represents the faring through of every commercial
aircraft and almost every business jet in existence today, if you plot their operating en-
velope. The red line fares through center and the white area is where most aircraft
tend to operate today. They go outside of the white area less than fifteen percent of
their time in flight and that is generally under unusual circumstances. The green box is
where every one of the missiles that Jeff talked about operate. They are coming in low
and fast, some of them 300 feet above the water at .6 mach number. But if we detect
them, we can ID them. There is not much else out there in that arena. The question
is, once we detect them, do we have the time and the rules of engagement to allow us
to engage?

        Everyone is worried about command and control; I am not. The Aegis ships to-
day have a full spectrum air defense mission. They do air defense, they do cruise mis-
sile defense, and the newer ones do ballistic missile defense. If we take that and merge
it with the C2BMC (command and control battle management) system that the Missile
Defense Agency has fully deployed now over thirteen time zones, those two marry up
very nicely and command and control information situational awareness is available.
The issue is the rules of engagement and both those systems support that. So far, ini-
tial indications of the stuff that we have been doing say it’s not that bad, assuming a
reasonable set of rules of engagement. That means that if it’s ballistic, it’s no problem;
we are going to shoot. If it is in the wave of aircraft, it is no problem; we are going to
shoot. If it is a single-burn cruise missile, will we shoot the first time it happens? I am
going to take bets on that that we don’t.

        So it comes back again to detection and tracking. What we need is a wide area
of surveillance. Now the end game, the final part is the radar is associated with weap-
ons systems, so if we can give the right information, the end game is not as bad as peo-
ple think. In Figure 5, the first one is Advanced Over The Horizon Radar (AOTHR). It
is the kind that we used for missile defense and for monitoring the Russian testing for
years during the Cold War Era. The advanced versions of that are very good. The
Australians have one right now that is the best in the world.

        Passive Coherent Location (PCL) sounds like black magic to some folks, but
what it does is use FM radio station signals that permeate the atmosphere and uses dis-
turbances in the FM radio signals to track missiles or aircraft. And it works. The prob-
lem is that most FM radio stations don’t like to broadcast a lot of energy into the
ocean, so while it is very good for close-in stuff, it may not have the range we are talk-
ing about. What we have done is take a look at how to increase that. If you have
driven by the beach in the summer, you have probably seen those big ugly mushroom-
shaped water towers every sixty miles. You can put a small FM directional antenna on
top of them and push that FM signal out into the ocean quite a ways, far enough to de-
tect, identify and track a cruise missile and kill it.

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                                                              The Cruise Missile Challenge

  Wide Area Surveillance –
  Candidate Systems
                                                          Protection: Asymmetric Missile Defense

    AOTHR                          PCL                         HAA
                                   PCL                         HAA
    •   HAA Receivers              •
                                   •   HAA Receivers
                                       HAA Receivers           •   Persistent Low Alt
    •   Broad Area Surveillance    •
                                   •   Passive
                                       Passive                     Coverage
    •   Environment Monitoring         Surveillance
                                   •   Low Alt Proliferated    •   Flexible Deployment
    •   Ship/Plane/Air Neutral     •   Low Alt Proliferated
                                       Ground-Based            •   CM, SRBM, Ship
        Traffic                        Coverage
                                       Coverage                •   Launch Recognition
    •   Launch Recognition         •
                                   •   360° Az SAM
                                       360° Az SAM             •   ADSAM IFC
    •   Point of Origin Tracking       Augmentation
                                       Augmentation            •   Boost Phase Sensors
    •   Maritime Domain            •
                                   •   Event Termination
                                       Event Termination       •   ID, KA Sensors
        Awareness                  •
                                   •   Recovery
        HAA, PCL and OTHR Are Key To A Cost Effective Persistent Wide Area
                           Surveillance Sensor Grid

                                           Figure 5

        The ultimate, in my opinion, is a high altitude sensor looking down. The High
Altitude Airship (HAA) is one of those platforms. No bias here, but it is a Lockheed
program. JLENS, a Raytheon program, has a similar capability, but it doesn’t go as
high and it is tethered. If it doesn’t go as high, you have to be careful in bad weather.
This one goes up to 65,000 feet, stays there for over six months, and hovers within an
area of about two miles from the target area and just looks down and sees everything
that is happening within a five hundred mile circle. The radar horizon, the radio hori-
zon at 65,000 feet is 274 nautical miles, so we take the last twenty-five miles off be-
cause of grazing angle, the real low stuff. Within a five-hundred mile circle they can see
everything that happens with reasonably good radar, and they exist. The Raytheon
Sentinel radar, slightly modified, will do a very good job on this. We can put infrared,
optical and visible sensors up there. We can do maritime domain awareness for ship-
ping control. This reaches right out to the ninety-six hour limit. Every ship that enters
a U.S. harbor has to tell the U.S. Customs and Border Protection within ninety-six
hours of its arrival where it is coming from, what its cargo is, and show the manifest.
This will cover that time for sailing for most ships. So if the ship was doing something
anomalous, we get a much better idea that something unusual is going on, and look
closer at that ship.

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                                                                 The Cruise Missile Challenge

 2007 CM Architecture Capability
                                                            Protection: Asymmetric Missile Defense
                                                       •   1 Lower Tier battalion consisting of
                                                            – 5 organic FC radars
                                                            – 20 launchers
                                                            – 5 Engagement Control Stations
                                                            – 4 Communications Relay Groups
                                                            – 1 Information & Coordination Centra
                                                            – >600 Personnel
                                                            – >150 vehicles
                                                       •   4 Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems

                                Selected MOE Values
                                •   Surveillance Coverage (1 TARS)       282,743 Km2
                                •   Battlespace (5 FU)                   209,420 Km2
                                •   Leakage                              0 % w/30 sec delay
                                •   Offshore Maximum Intercept Range     83 Km
                                •   Offshore Minimum Intercept Range     28 Km
                                •   Earliest Intercept Point             120 seconds
                                •   Total Engagement Space               120 seconds

        In 2007, One Lower Tier Battalion and Four TARS Can Protect
                        The Boston-to-D.C. Corridor
                                            Figure 6

       Figure 6 shows another architecture, one we actually tested in computer model-
ing. The Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) is actually being used right now on
the southwest border of the United States for tracking drug traffic. It used to be across
the Gulf Coast, but the Gulf systems were recently taken down thanks to Katrina and
some other things. But the southwest system is still in operation. Figure 6 shows the
kind of coverage that it gives you. Again, looking down on a cruise missile, even a
rogue state’s cruise missile, gives us a very high probability of detecting and tracking it.
I would like to point out two numbers in the bottom box. If a cruise missile is launched
from 200 km, the system is good enough that we can kill it as early as 80 km off the
coast and as late as 28 km, about eighteen miles, off the coast. That really helps with
the consequence management problem. That is one battalion of Patriot 3 missiles
working with it.

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                                                                      The Cruise Missile Challenge

Architecture Coverage Comparisons
2007 Vs 2013              Protection: Asymmetric Missile Defense

        • 2007                                     • 2013

                                CM Coverage
                                                                                 CM Coverage
                                BM Coverage
                                                                                 BM Coverage

 Note – Coverages based
 upon campaign analysis

                                                 Population Centers

                                              Figure 7

         Figure 7 shows what we think we could do with the system you just saw. The
yellow on the left-hand side is cruise missile defense and the blue is ballistic missile de-
fense. Air defense is a larger area and I didn’t include that. As we upgrade with things
like the High Altitude Airship, we can expand that yellow area and the blue area with
systems that come on line. All the systems represented here are in development today.
It just requires the will to do it.

        In our efforts, we just took a look at the area from Washington, D.C. to Boston.
If you think about it, 80 percent of the U.S. population lives within 200 miles of the
coast, if you include the Great Lakes. We went up and took a look at the St. Lawrence
Seaway and security isn’t all that good, so we included that as being vulnerable. Also if
you take a look at the wealth of the United States, about 75 percent of the wealth rep-
resented is in the 200 miles nearest the coast. And if you take a look at military bases,
by actual count 80 percent of them are within 200 miles of the coast. So it is a target
worth defending. This defense is extensible to the entire coast and the borders of the
United States; we just didn’t have time and resources to look at more than this in detail.

The George C. Marshall Institute                   13
                                                                           The Cruise Missile Challenge

 Increased Threat, Increased Capability
                                                                    Protection: Asymmetric Missile Defense
     Homeland Security       Architecture                   Features           Cost     PES (CM / BM)
      Advisory System

         SEVERE                    2007
                                    2007                 Increase               X+Y+Z       0.99 / 0.91
      Severe Risk of             (Surge 2)
                                  (Surge 2)           Deployed Assets
     Terrorist Attacks

           HIGH                   2007
                                 2007                        Add
                               (Proliferated)                                    X+Y        0.95 / 0.91
       High Risk of             (Surge 1)
                                                       TACAIR & TACISR
     Terrorist Attacks

  Significant Risk of
        GUARDED                   2007
   Terrorist Attacksof
      General Risk             (Cooperative                 24 / 7 / 365          X         0.91 / 0.91
               LOW                  )
     Terrorist Attacksof
            Low Risk
         Terrorist Attacks

                                                 Figure 8

        How good are we, when all is said and done? On Figure 8, we tied this to the
Homeland Security Alert system with the three lowest levels being on the bottom and
the advanced levels above. We believe that with a cooperative system in 2007 operat-
ing twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, we can provide a sys-
tem that is about 95 percent effective against cruise missiles and about 90 percent ef-
fective against ballistic missiles today. That is single-shot probability. Normal shot doc-
trine is that we should shoot two Patriots at a target, and that goes up to 99 percent. If
we have some kind of threat warning and we understand that there is something com-
ing at us, we can begin to deploy tactical air. AWACS and things of that nature are
very, very effective systems. The problem is that the cost, as we found out after 9/11,
of keeping those up 24/7 is prohibitive on both the crews and the aircraft. If you re-
call, we had to borrow some AWACS from NATO to help patrol U.S. skies. But if we
add tactical air and then increase the deployment, if we know a target, we can put up a
pretty formidable defense, one that has a very high probability of protecting you and
me in this city. We obviously think we would be a target; in fact, the building across
the street is one of the biggest targets.

        So with that I will quit and I will be happy to duck your questions. Thanks very

The George C. Marshall Institute                      14
                                                            The Cruise Missile Challenge

Questions and answers.

Question: I am having a strong sense of deja vu. You had a very similar event a year
or two ago. What has changed?

Kueter: For us, one thing that changed is that we produced this little policy paper on
the subject that we released in May of this year, so this is a good opportunity for us to
talk about that. From a broader public policy perspective, unfortunately nothing has
changed and that is the problem. If you are hearing a lot of the same things that you
heard last spring, it is unfortunate that you have to hear it again. I don’t think the pol-
icy process, inside the Congress or at the highest administration levels or within the De-
fense Department, has moved along to begin deployment or even consider deployment
of the kinds of systems that David and I are talking about.

Question: Given the lack of change since last year, can you explain why this threat
which you have described as dire is not being addressed? Is it money? How expensive
would it be to implement this plan? You said you could do it within fourteen months.
What do you need to make that happen and why isn’t anyone paying attention?

Kueter: From my perspective on the broader question, why haven’t we engaged it, I
would point to two things. First, I don’t know that there is enough recognition outside
of the particular community that follows cruise missiles of the proliferation trends that I
outlined or how they might be used and how relatively easily they might be acquired. I
am hopeful that this event and others like it might get that conversation resonating a lot
more loudly inside our security establishment and the halls of Congress, so those deci-
sion makers begin to take that challenge a bit more seriously. I am sure that money
has something to do with it; money has something to do with everything. But I don’t
know that the conversations have gotten detailed enough to begin to say that it is a
money factor that is making a judgment one way or the other.

Question: Is the request for funds for ballistic missile defense sapping funds from
cruise missile defense?

Kueter: I think in some cases they would be complementary. In terms of the C2BMC
systems and some of the other things that they have outlined, you would be able to de-
ploy for ballistic missile defense and use them for cruise missile defense as well.

Kier: I have two comments on the question, but I would like to talk about the policy
issue. My view is that no one has been assigned the mission in a real sense. Without a
champion and an advocate, it is difficult to lobby, even internal to the Executive branch
much less to Congress, for the resources necessary to go forward. So until the rose is
clearly pinned on someone that says, “You have this mission,” it is not going to hap-
pen. Now there are some things moving along in that direction at the Strategic Com-
mand. General Cartwright has a proposal that will fix that, that is wending its way

The George C. Marshall Institute              15
                                                            The Cruise Missile Challenge

through the bureaucratic process. He has an excellent idea how to go about fixing

Question: What would it do?

Kier: Basically it would establish what they call a single integrated authority for all the
requirements associated with cruise missiles. That would take all the war-fighter inputs
and we would come up with a common set of requirements, something like I did here
very quickly, but in some detail. At that point, they would take and assign the mission
to a service or an independent agency to execute the requirements against some kind
of master schedule architecture frame. I don’t know how the Defense Department
would do that, but it would have to be done. On the other issue, the one of cost, I get
that question all the time and I try to be very careful in how I answer it. It would not be
very expensive, in a relative sense. No matter which system I use as a reference, I am
going to anger somebody. But if you think about the money spent to organize an
Olympic event, say the one in Australia or Athens, we could do the defense for some-
thing on that order. We could build a fairly good comprehensive defense in a fairly
short period of time from Washington to Boston for several billion dollars. If we want
to use existing equipment, take equipment out of reserves and spares, we could do it
cheaper than that. For example, there are enough reserve Patriots to do this, but then
we would leave the military short for their tougher missions, so eventually you are go-
ing to have to buy more Patriot battalions. We just never sized the force to do this kind
of job. When you think about it, we have 12,400 miles of coastline, not counting the
land coast, to defend. If we want to defend the Canadian and Mexican borders; that is
a political problem, but if we want to do that, that adds another 4,000 miles. That is
not a trivial area to defend, especially when they can launch from anywhere from forty
miles to 2,000 miles out, at almost any angle. It is a formidable surveillance problem,
but there are solutions to it.

Question: SBI-Net covers a big stretch of the southwest. Could it be integrated into
that kind of cruise missile defense?

Kier: No. SBI-Net basically is looking at a couple miles in. You have to be careful
when dealing with another country. How far do you look into their territory? Do you
just look at the border and try to take what is coming across there? That is not ade-
quate for this mission. You have to look out hundreds of miles. Remember, you only
have eleven minutes from 200 miles. These things will cover that amount of territory
that quickly. And that is from launch, not from detection. It will take probably only
forty seconds or so to detect it, but it is going to take some time, and then to establish
a track will take some more time. And then to make everyone aware what’s going on
and have someone push the button takes more time. If you have more than a thirty-
second delay, you are not going to intercept it over the water, you will intercept it over
land and that brings up the consequence management, especially if it is WMD.

The George C. Marshall Institute              16
                                                             The Cruise Missile Challenge

Question: I am sympathetic to the problem you described that, in a way, when it is
everybody’s problem, it is nobody’s problem. The cruise missile threat touches on
many dimensions of U.S. security interests. It seems to me that a somewhat similar
problem is the question of possible UAVs, where regional or theater commanders
would need to worry about opposing UAVs that, even though they are not armed in
the traditional sense, could provide communications support and other tasks which our
regional military commanders would want to be able to identify and take out. I pre-
sume that a cruise missile defense or something that would be capable of detecting and
going after cruise missiles could expand against UAVs. Do you see any opportunities
for application or hooking on with that particular mission to advance the interests you
are talking about here?

Kier: You missed the beginning of my talk. I said that the only thing that makes sense
is an integrated system: integrated air and missile defense, aircraft, what I call deceptive
vehicles, which are basically UAVs or other similar vehicles, cruise and ballistic missiles.
If you don’t do the whole enchilada or design the system to go after it from Day One,
you are going to end up band-aiding the system and end up with a sub-optimal ap-
proach in some areas.

Question: I take that point; I didn’t hear part of that. Doesn’t that provide an oppor-
tunity in terms of looking for a home for this with those people who are responsible for
dealing with the UAV problem, sort of starting small and building up from there. Isn’t
there an opportunity there?

Kier: I would agree. I would not disagree with any approach that might get us there.

Kueter: I think we ought to take advantage of any particular interest in the subject
that we can.

Question: If you target an area from Washington, D.C. to Boston and we report on
that, then aren’t the bad guys just going pull the ship over to Miami?

Kier: Sure; eventually you have to protect the whole coast. But if you don’t defend
the territory from Washington to New York, they will target it.

Question: You have obviously thought through what you need to make this work on
a large-scale basis, including lessons from Katrina. Would you use the military instead
of the Department of Homeland Security?

Kier: If you go back to what I talked about earlier, the Homeland Defense is a special
case with a worldwide mission with deployed forces and friends and allies. That says it
ought to go to the military, because they have the global mission. Homeland Security
doesn’t. If you accept that as a premise, then the answer is there. If you say that

The George C. Marshall Institute               17
                                                           The Cruise Missile Challenge

Homeland Security is first and foremost, then there is an argument and I don’t know
how to make it. That is more Jeff’s area in policy.

Kueter: I would say that given the familiarity of the Defense Department with the sys-
tems that we are talking about deploying, they would be the natural host for this, par-
ticularly if you integrate it in with the reservist elements along the coastline. If you
compound that with the particular problems that the Department of Homeland Security
has, this may be too big a mission for them to take on at this point.

Question: You mentioned deceptive vehicles. What do you do about identification?
What is the likelihood of shooting down small commercial aircraft?

Kier: There are two questions there; let me first take the one about shooting down a
commercial airline. If you look at that flight envelope, if a commercial airliner is oper-
ating in the proper arena, then they are okay against Class 1, 2 and 3 threats. They
are vulnerable to a deceptive vehicle, which can be made to look like just about any-
thing. There is a series of measures that we have talked to some of the people in gov-
ernment a little bit about. If you want to walk, you have to crawl first; you learn how to
take one sector of the problem and address it. So we looked at things coming off the
ocean. We didn’t look at indigenous things flying out of some airfield in the middle of
the country and hitting a big city. But if we want to consider the more near-term
threat, in my opinion anyhow, we look at what is coming off the ocean. How do we
defend against what comes off the ocean? Look at the nature of the traffic. We
looked at it very carefully, looked at the routes the commercial guys come in. They can
come in to the Air Defense Interdiction Zone that sits off the coast just about any place
that they want, depending on the winds and where they are coming from. If we limited
that a little bit and controlled their access more to gateways, just like we do with the
ninety-six hour registration on a ship, we could do the same thing with aircraft and re-
strict the flight plan where they can come over the ocean. Then take a look at the little
guys, the general aviation aircraft. We actually talked with some of these folks a while
back. General aviation has fought for years and years not to put transponders on their
aircraft. We asked them, could we talk you into a subset of those for people who go a
hundred or two hundred miles off the coast, to Bermuda, the Bahamas or wherever.
We could put transponders on those aircraft coming into the coast. Once they have
the transponder and the identification and we know they are arriving, then you can say,
“Everything here on the screen is planned. Whoops, there is one guy who wasn’t
planned. Let’s look into him or her or it.” That is one form of discrimination. Now
what is a deceptive vehicle? It can be a suicide bomber; it can be anything. And we
are not going to stop them all. As good as we get, it is a man-made system and there
are man-made ways around it.

Question: Mr. Kier, you mentioned the High-Altitude Airship. Where are you now
with that, given that recently the funding was cut?

The George C. Marshall Institute              18
                                                               The Cruise Missile Challenge

Kier: It has been a real roller coaster. The funding was cut with a stop-work order and
a termination notice in February of this year. After a series of meetings with some of
the folks in this building, the termination was rescinded and we went back on to life-
support funding, as I will call it. It is barely enough to keep the core team together.
We are making very slow, incremental progress, but it is progress. A decision will be
made as a result of congressional action this summer as to whether to fund it or not.
The MDA did not put it in their 2008 budget, so it would have to be an add-on. That
is being discussed as to not only where it will be funded and where will its home be and
at what level will it proceed. I personally have a couple actions from the CEO to look
at other alternatives and we are pursuing those.

Question: Is the cruise missile defense similar to that?

Kier: This is a lookdown sensor and the ultimate platform is essential to cruise missile
defense. HAA provides the very best platform at the lowest cost with the most persis-
tence of anything we have been able to find. I keep waiting for someone to get the
cruise missile rose pinned on them, because I want to go and present this platform to
solve a lot of their problems. Not all, but a lot.

Question: You have discussed operation and command. Who should handle the re-
sponsibility for acquisition?

Kier: That is a decision for the Defense Department. No matter what I say in that
arena, it is going to be controversial. Someone has to have the rose pinned on him
and it is up to him to decide.

Question: Right now, no one does have the rose pinned on him. General Obering
does not have it.

Kier: Absolutely he does not. General Obering would accept it, I think, if he had the
funding to go with it, but he would not accept it without the funding, I believe. In my
view, it is the Missile Defense Agency, not the Ballistic Missile Defense Agency.

Kueter: I want to underscore that. I think it is important to take that point away,
given that so many of the component systems that they have outlined integrate in with
the larger ballistic missile defense mission we have undertaken, in particular if you buy
Mr. Kier’s starting assumption that this needs to be an integrated system and operation
capable of cruise missile, ballistic missile and air defense. At some point in time, even
if the rose were put on someone else, you would have to integrate back with all those
ballistic missile defense assets. It just seems like a natural place to put it and it is impor-
tant to recognize that if you do put it there, it needs to come along with the resources
necessary to get the job done.

The George C. Marshall Institute                19
                                                             The Cruise Missile Challenge

Kier: And they’ve also proven that they are technically competent. Hitting a bullet
with a bullet and deploying a system to do so is not trivial. They now have four sys-
tems that do that, and that ain’t bad.

Question: What is Cartwright’s proposal and where does that place the responsibil-

Kier: I haven’t seen the final version, so I don’t know. But the earlier version had it at
the Missile Defense Agency. Where it is in the current version, I don’t know. I know
that it changed, but I don’t know how and where.

Question: It seems to me that in the last six years that the most expensive and fun-
damental changes come after someone catches us with our pants down. You are talk-
ing to the policymakers; is there anybody who is going to jump at something like this
before we are hit hard?

Kueter: I will give another plug to Inside Missile Defense. Their issue from last week
has a front-page story about this new bipartisan missile defense caucus that has stood
up in the House. I am hopeful that that group can continue to grow. As it grows it
will, I think, look more broadly at the missile-related threats that this country faces. I
think it will be a natural for them to take up the cruise missile challenge. They are a
group that I am particularly targeting as a hopeful leader in this effort, in terms of edu-
cating their peers about the importance of this threat.

Kier: I would just take a bit of a retrospective look. Four years ago when I started on
this crusade along with a few others, there wasn’t even cruise missile mentioned in the
lexicon. Today it is being discussed, so we are making progress. Is it as fast as I’d like?
Hell no. Can we do better? Very definitely. But we are getting there and as long as
you can promote the dialogue, the caucus and some of the other things that Riki Elli-
son and the MDAA have done have been very productive in getting public awareness
of the issue. The issue is beginning to build up momentum. Is it enough momentum to
get there fast enough before we are hit? I don’t believe it is a matter of if; it’s a matter
of when. I don’t know.

Ilan Berman: On behalf of the American Foreign Policy Council and the missile de-
fense program, please join me in thanking Mr. Kueter and Mr. Kier for this remarkably
informative hour. I hope you took away from it as much as I did.

                                     * * *

The George C. Marshall Institute               20

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ing the 2006 Season (October 11, 2006)

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         The Marshall Institute – Science for Better Public Policy
       Board of Directors

      Will Happer, Chairman
       Princeton University

Robert Jastrow, Chairman Emeritus

Frederick Seitz, Chairman Emeritus
        Rockefeller University

       William O’Keefe, CEO
        Solutions Consulting

       Jeff Kueter, President

         Gregory Canavan
   Los Alamos National Laboratory

       Thomas L. Clancy, Jr.

           John H. Moore
President Emeritus, Grove City College

        Rodney W. Nichols
    President and CEO Emeritus,
   New York Academy of Sciences

         Robert L. Sproull
     University of Rochester (ret.)

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